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# DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939

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**1919-1939**

**First Series Volume X**

**German Affairs and Plebiscite Problems**  
**1920**





## PREFACE

THIS volume, which falls into two parts, continues the publication of British diplomatic correspondence for 1920. The first part follows up Volume IX, documenting British policy in relation to German affairs generally from July 6 to December 31, and containing, for the whole year subsequent to the entry into force on January 10 of the Treaty of Versailles, correspondence and memoranda concerning the important questions of German reparation and of Allied military control to secure Germany's disarmament. The second part relates to the problems of those plebiscite areas in or near the German borderlands, namely, Schleswig, Teschen, Marienwerder and Allenstein, whose fate was settled by vote or otherwise during the spring and summer of 1920. Documents concerning Upper Silesia, where a plebiscite was not taken until March 1921, will be printed in the first chapter of Volume XI.

The main objectives of British policy in regard to Germany were disclosed at the relevant international conferences whose proceedings are recorded in Volumes VII and VIII. They are also clearly stated in significant documents in this volume. His Majesty's Government attached 'great importance to the resumption of German economic life and production not only on political grounds but as being essential to the ability of Germany to meet the just claims of the Allies upon her' (No. 124); and they shared the policy which the Allies had been endeavouring to carry out since the Conference of San Remo in April, namely, that of 'trying as far as possible to obtain German co-operation in the execution of the Treaty by means of direct exchange of views between the Allied Governments and the German Government' (No. 364). The first such direct exchange of views, at which problems of disarmament and reparation were the principal subjects on the agenda, took place at the Conference held at Spa in July, and many of the documents in Part I of this volume are concerned with preparations for this Conference and with the problems consequent upon its decisions. One of these was the agreement to defer 'this difficult question' of reparation (Volume VIII, No. 77, p. 641) to a further meeting with German delegates to be held at Geneva. The British Government were therefore surprised when the French wished to postpone this Conference and to modify the procedure agreed upon, for they feared that the French Government thereby intended to abandon 'the policy of discussing with German delegates in a neutral country the problem of the fixation and liquidation of the total German liability' (No. 378). They emphasized that 'the German Government were able to return from Spa without serious impairment of their position in Parliament and in the country, largely because they were able to point to the following conference at Geneva as a hopeful step on the road towards solution of the problems with which Germany is confronted. To withdraw that hope will be to

intensify that state of unrest and discontent in Germany which, both from the political and the economic point of view, is a constant menace to the interests of the Allied Governments' (*ibid.*).

At the same time, while His Majesty's Government were anxious to do everything possible to facilitate the maintenance in power in Germany of a moderate Government which they believed would genuinely co-operate in the execution of the Peace Treaty, they were also unwilling to do anything which would unduly embarrass the Government of M. Millerand in France. In the background of British relations with France and Germany, as is particularly evident in Chapter III, there was suspended what M. Poincaré called 'the Sword of Damocles' of a French occupation of the Ruhr. In the background, too, to the whole volume is the Russo-Polish war. This gave a new urgency to the Bolshevik menace and a new importance to the question of the relations between Germany and Soviet Russia; it also emboldened a henchman of General Ludendorff to make overtures for an alliance between Germany and the Allies against Soviet Russia. Upon such schemes of the German militarists, however, the British Government quickly threw cold water: 'Your Lordship no doubt realises from study of the current telegram sections and print and from the British Press that no section of opinion in this country would at the present moment give any support whatever to schemes such as these outlined to you by Captain Rechberg' (No. 207). Yet, despite its generally conciliatory tone towards the German Government, British policy did not avail to prevent an increase in anti-Allied propaganda, propagated by organizations such as the Heimatdienst (No. 224), and 'a general revival of national feeling' (No. 332), which manifested itself in 'a tendency towards increasing resistance on the part of the Germans with regard to the demands of the Allies for fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Peace' (No. 254). Indeed, the year ends on a note of renewed tension, since the stiffness of the letter of December 11 in which General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control at Berlin, reiterated his demand for the suppression of the Einwohnerwehr or Citizen Guard, and of the further demands the Commission proposed to make in this connexion, was such as to create 'a serious crisis in political relations' of the Allies with Germany (No. 348). These demands 'will not be complied with', telegraphed Lord Kilmarnock (No. 341), 'except under threat of severe action and perhaps not then. Question we have to ask ourselves is whether we are prepared to make such threats and eventually to put them into effect. If we merely make them and then do not carry them through effect will be worse for our prestige than any reasonable postponement of surrender of arms.'

So far as Schleswig and the eastern plebiscite areas, which are the subject of Part II of this volume, are concerned, British policy can be briefly summarized as one of encouraging the speediest possible settlements compatible with equity and good order: the danger of fresh unrest owing to the prolongation of uncertainty in disputed territories would thus be minimized, and the Allied Powers would be enabled to liquidate their commitments and to end the expense involved in the maintenance of troops in the plebiscite areas and

of personnel to man the Plebiscite Commissions. Accordingly Danish attempts to reopen the frontier question in Schleswig were firmly opposed (No. 444), and Lord Derby's action in pressing for the holding of the plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder by July 15 at latest was approved (Nos. 552, 566). In Teschen, on the other hand, after attempts at solution by means of a plebiscite and by arbitration had failed 'the Supreme Council was', in Lord Curzon's words (No. 522), 'implored to cut the gordian knot and "impose" a final decision.' Thus when the United States Government was apparently unwilling to agree unreservedly to the proposals of the Allies at Spa (Nos. 520, 521), the British Foreign Secretary telegraphed (No. 522) that he would 'really despair if the Americans, by again reverting to their former tactics of delays and hesitation, once more succeed in frustrating a settlement, as they have done on former occasion'. He urged Lord Derby to 'use all your powers of persuasion to obtain their definite assent to immediate settlement'. In the event, the text of the Teschen agreement was approved by the United States Government. Meanwhile, it had been possible before the end of August to transfer sovereignty and to withdraw Allied troops and Plebiscite Commissions from all the areas with which this volume is concerned.

Part I comprises five chapters. Chapters I and IV illustrate British policy in relation to the disarmament of Germany before and after the Conference at Spa. They show to what extent British views on this question were influenced by the disorders in Germany in the spring (see Volume IX, Chaps. II-V) and they exhibit the variety of problems relating to it which faced both the Inter-Allied Military Commissions of Control and the Conference of Ambassadors, upon which the British representatives were, first, Lord Derby and then, at the end of the year, his successor as H.M. Ambassador at Paris, Lord Hardinge. They include reports on the progress of German disarmament by the Allied Military Committee at Versailles, whose president was Marshal Foch, by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control at Berlin, and by the British representative on the Effectives Sub-Commission of that Commission, Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan. There are many documents relating to the *Einwohnerwehr*, who were a source of preoccupation throughout the year, and some relating to other semi-military formations such as the *Orgesch* and the *Stahlhelm*. The size and character of the new German army were also matters for consideration, and in this connexion attention may be drawn to the final paragraph of the *Précis* of the Third Report of the Effectives Sub-Commission (No. 93). This declared the conviction of the Sub-Commission that 'the German Government is seeking, under one disguise or another, to preserve the old army system, its cadres, its regiments, its non-commissioned officers and its recruiting registers'.

Chapters II and V similarly document British policy upon German reparation before and after Spa. They include assessments of Germany's financial and economic situation by Lord D'Abernon, the newly appointed British Ambassador at Berlin, and they show how other questions as well as that of the Geneva Conference provided fresh causes of Anglo-French friction. In the end the Geneva Conference was postponed until a date in the New Year.



Meanwhile a preliminary meeting of reparation experts assembled at Brussels in December, but it did not complete its deliberations until January 1921 and they have not therefore been recorded in this volume.

Chapter III contains papers relating to a variety of German problems between July 6 and December 31 other than those of disarmament and reparation. Apart from correspondence concerned with Germany's relations with Soviet Russia it includes further documents relating to war criminals and to separate Allied representation in Munich, subjects already treated in Volume IX. Among the despatches describing the growth of German nationalism is one (No. 219) which contains a first reference to the organization of the National Socialist Party. This was reported by the British Consul at Munich, Mr. Smallbones, to be 'making itself rather conspicuous at Munich by frequent meetings and lectures and still more by the posters announcing these. They are extremely violent in tenour and usually anti-semitic . . . Herr Anton Drexler and Adolf Hitler figure as the organizers of these activities. They appear little known but they must have funds at their disposal as one display of posters on a low computation costs M. 10,000.' The chapter ends with documents concerning the objectionable tone of certain speeches made by the Chancellor and other German Ministers in Occupied Territory towards the end of the year and the consequent Allied protest.

Part II contains three chapters. The first, Chapter VI, relates to the plebiscite in Schleswig, 'the first plebiscite in history to be held under an international commission'; and a series of telegrams and despatches from the British President of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission, Sir Charles Marling, and Mr. Brudenell-Bruce, Assistant Commissioner and Secretary-General of the Commission, illustrates the problems with which the Commission was faced. Although voting took place in March the Commission had, in accordance with Article 110 of the Treaty of Versailles, to continue to administer the whole of the territories submitted to the plebiscite until the definite delimitation of the new Danish-German boundary. The Schleswig Treaty embodying the arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty was not signed until July 5, and the documents contained in this chapter cover the period from January 10 to July 10.

Chapter VII begins with the arrival in Teschen on February 3 of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission, on which the British representative was Mr. E. C. Wilton, and ends with correspondence and memoranda relating to the Teschen declaration of July 28. The very similar problems of the East Prussian plebiscite areas of Marienwerder and Allenstein have been treated together in the last chapter of the volume, Chapter VIII. In Allenstein the Plebiscite Commission was presided over by the British member, Mr. E. C. Rennie, and in Marienwerder the British representative was Mr. H. C. Beaumont. The plebiscites in both areas were held on July 11, but formal notification of the plebiscite results and the completion of the evacuation of the areas by the Allied troops and Commissions did not take place until August 15. The period covered by the documents in this chapter extends from January 21 to September 29.

In this, as in the preceding volumes, relevant documents have been included from the personal archives of Lord Curzon, filed in the Foreign Office archives under reference Confidential/General/363/15-24. The opportunity has also been taken to check from the archives of H.M. Embassy at Warsaw, which are now available, the readings of a few passages in telegrams where the text, as received in the Foreign Office, was uncertain. The numerous telegrams from Paris in which the British representative on the Conference of Ambassadors regularly reported the proceedings of the Conference were from May 1920, as has been indicated in the preface to Volume IX, habitually cut up on receipt, the sections relating to different subjects being severally entered as file copies upon the appropriate files. Complete copies of these telegrams were, however, normally preserved under reference Confidential/General/199/1-3, and since these, unlike the sections separately filed, record the dates and times of the meetings of the Conference, it has, from May onwards, generally been considered preferable to print from this source.

I have edited this volume in accordance with the standing conditions, which continue to be fulfilled, of access to all papers in the Foreign Office archives and of freedom in their selection and arrangement.

I have to thank the Librarian of the Foreign Office, Mr. C. C. Parrott, C.M.G., the Deputy Librarian, Mr. C. H. Fone, M.B.E., and their staff for kindly rendering me their indispensable assistance. For their help in connexion with this volume I am also most grateful to the Assistant Editor (Miss M. E. Lambert, M.A.), Mrs. W. Reynolds, B.A., and to Miss I. Bains, M.A., as well as to Miss J. Bradley, B.A., who prepared the Chapter Summaries.

J. P. T. BURY



# CONTENTS

## PART I. GERMANY

	PAGES
CHAPTER I. Allied Military Control of Germany after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. January 10–July 5, 1920 . . . . .	1–177
CHAPTER II. Reparation by Germany after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. January 10–July 5, 1920 . . . . .	178–269
CHAPTER III. Correspondence and Memoranda relating to German Problems other than Allied Military Control and Reparation. July 6–December 31, 1920 . . . . .	270–357
CHAPTER IV. Allied Military Control of Germany. July 6–December 31, 1920 . . . . .	358–494
CHAPTER V. Reparation by Germany. July 6–December 31, 1920 . . . . .	495–562

## PART II. PLEBISCITES

CHAPTER VI. The Plebiscite in Schleswig. January 10–July 10, 1920 . . . . .	563–653
CHAPTER VII. The Plebiscite Question in Teschen. February 4–August 10, 1920 . . . . .	654–719
CHAPTER VIII. The Plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder. January 21–September 29, 1920 . . . . .	720–828





# CHAPTER SUMMARIES

## PART I. GERMANY

### CHAPTER I

#### Allied Military Control of Germany after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles January 10-July 5, 1920

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
1 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 14	Jan. 23	Reports informal conversation with Herr Noske on reduction of numbers in Reichswehr and surrender to Allies of German nationals accused of war crimes.	1
2 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 107	Jan. 26	Reports discussion and proposals of Conference of Ambassadors on surrender of German warships and ultimate disposal of their equipment and munitions. Transmits paraphrases of Admiralty telegrams on these questions, together with draft resolution submitted to the Conference by Lord Derby and copy of telegram of instructions from Conference to President of Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control.	2
3 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 410	Feb. 2	Refers to No. 2 and transmits copy of letter containing the Admiralty's observations thereon. Admiralty and Lord Curzon concur in proposals put forward by Lord Derby, except proposal that equipment from German ships should be despatched to French port for storage by French, which would be dangerous departure from Article 192 of Treaty of Versailles.	7
4 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 129	Feb. 3	Summarizes report made to Conference of Ambassadors by Gen. Niessel, President of the Inter-Allied Commission for securing the evacuation of the Baltic States, upon the work of his Commission and upon a conversation with German Chancellor relating to strength of German army.	8
5 SIR R. GRAHAM The Hague No. 147	Feb. 6	Refers to Vol. V, No. 322, and reports further information concerning alleged entry of German war material into Netherlands. Transmits reports on this subject by H.M. Military Attaché and by a member of the Disposal Board.	9
6 COL. VON TSCHISCHWITZ Berlin No. 328/2-20	Feb. 7	Transmits to Air Commodore Masterman memo. of Feb. 6 referring to German Govt.'s wish to retain small number of military Air Force units for the maintenance of internal order.	13

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
7	AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin No. E.A.M./547/39	Feb. 9	Asks Col. von Tschischwitz to explain why Control Commission officers have been refused admission to certain German establishments, in spite of Article 205 of Treaty of Versailles.	16
8	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 162	Feb. 10	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion of reports and instructions submitted and drawn up by Aerial Clauses Commission, relating to sale of German aviation material, suppression of German Aerial Police Force, and Austrian request to retain aeroplanes for police purposes; also Conference's approval of three decisions submitted by Allied Military Committee of Versailles, on matters arising out of Articles 169, 168, and 202 of Treaty of Versailles, relating to German war material and war-material factories.	17
9	AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin No. E.A.M./575/39	Feb. 11	Complains to Col. von Tschischwitz of infractions of Articles 198 and 201 of Peace Treaty by 'Aerial Transport Companies'. Henceforward all commercial types of aircraft must be available for inspection.	19
10	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 183	Feb. 18	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' approval, on Feb. 17, of Gen. Nollet's proposal to extend time-limit for progressive reduction of German Army.	20
11	SIR M. HANKEY London	Feb. 18	Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Lloyd George to German Chargé d'Affaires, informing him of time extension granted by Supreme Council for reduction of German Army.	20
12	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 203	Feb. 21	Transmits Conference of Ambassadors' decisions upon allocation of surrendered warships. Drafting Committee to be consulted on validity of Allied claim to examine receiving apparatus of German wireless stations under Article 197 of Treaty.	21
13	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 575	Feb. 24	Transmits memo. by Gen. Sackville-West covering copy of telegram from Marshal Foch to Gen. Nollet, giving his interpretation of Article 169 of Treaty, concerning surrender of German war material for destruction by Allies.	23
14	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 214	Feb. 25	Refers to No. 2, and transmits Conference of Ambassadors' decision to proceed with destruction of all German surplus naval equipment except that belonging to light cruisers and destroyers.	24
15	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 79	Feb. 28	Transmits notes of conversation between Lt.-Col. Maude and Herr Lissner, on smuggling of German war material through Netherlands to Japan.	25
16	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 224	Feb. 29	Reports discussion by Conference of Ambassadors on meaning of 'ships in reserve' and 'warships' under Article 181 of Treaty. Clause has been referred to legal advisers for interpretation.	26

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
17	HERR MERTENS Berlin No. F.M. 3.190/20.320	Feb. 29	Transmits to Air Commodore Masterman reply of German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to No. 7, on Allied inspection of German aircraft establishments.	27
18	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 93	Mar. 4	Reports positive information that German war material is being shipped to Japan.	28
19	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 246	Mar. 4	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion on German delivery of surrendered warships, decisions on Allied disposal of aeronautical material, and refusal to permit German sale of military equipment to Czechoslovakia.	28
20	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 253	Mar. 6	Reports discussion by Conference of Ambassadors on disposal of aeronautical material and reconciliation of military safeguards of Treaty with facilities for civilian air-traffic in Germany.	30
21	GERMAN AIR SERVICE PEACE COMMISSION Berlin No. 1036/3/20 Ref. G.	Mar. 8	Replies to Air Commodore Masterman's complaint that German aeroplanes were absent during inspection of military aerodromes by Aeronautical Control Commission officials.	30
22	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 102	Mar. 10	Reports assault on Mar. 9 on members of Naval Control Commission in Bremen, and action taken by Admiral Charlton.	32
23	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 80	Mar. 10	Refers to No. 18: transmits instructions to take up question of export of war material from Germany with Control Commission.	32
24	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 104	Mar. 10	Refers to No. 22, and reports further assaults on French officers of Military Control Commission, Naval Control Commission officers, and French soldiers.	32
25	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 277	Mar. 11	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' endorsement of Control Commission's right to inspect German fortifications, and rejection of German application to maintain military air service for police purposes.	33
26	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 178	Mar. 11	Instructions to bring entry of arms and war material from Germany into Netherlands to notice of President of Control Commission.	34
27	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 181	Mar. 11	Refers to No. 11, and communicates British General Staff view that question of reduction of German Army after Apr. 10 should be referred back to Control Commission.	34
28	AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin No. N.S./100/1.017/39	Mar. 11	Complains to Col. von Tschischwitz of limited information supplied to Aeronautical Control Commission despite provisions of Article 210 of Peace Treaty.	35



NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
29 BRIG.-GEN. J. H. MORGAN Berlin	Mar. 12	Summary of report to War Office on Armed Forces of Germany and work of Sub-Commission. The old Army no longer exists, but framework and organizations still in evidence under new names, suggesting preconceived plan to defeat application of Treaty. Reviews position of Sicherheitspolizei, Zeitfreiwillige and Einwohnerwehr, New Army, Cavalry Brigade Staffs, and Military Schools.	36
30 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 779	Mar. 13	Reports special meeting of Ambassadors' Conference to consider assaults on members of Allied Control Commissions referred to in Nos. 22 and 24, and transmits copies of Air Commodore Masterman's report of incidents and Marshal Foch's draft note to German Govt. demanding reparation and guarantees, demands which he was ready to back by military force.	42
31 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 335	Mar. 15	Refers to No. 30. Supreme Council has decided against action and Lord Derby is instructed, if question raised again, not to commit himself without definite instructions.	46
32 FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Mar. 15	M. Millerand urges immediate Allied representations to German Govt., in line with Marshal Foch's draft note enclosed in No. 30.	46
33 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 307	Mar. 16	Refers to Vol. IX, No. 130, and records M. Millerand's appeal to Conference of Ambassadors to take immediate action to forestall German intention to occupy Ruhr Valley. Conference accepted legal advisers' interpretation of 'ships in reserve', referred to in No. 16.	47
34 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 796	Mar. 16	Asks whether question of smuggling of German war material to Netherlands should be taken up at Ambassadors' Conference and reports French Govt.'s intelligence of similar smuggling into Denmark.	48
35 To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 199	Mar. 17	Transmits copy of letter from Naval Attaché in Madrid, asserting German war material stored in Netherlands is destined for Spain: instructions to take matter up with Control Commission.	49
36 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 322	Mar. 18	Refers to No. 34: transmits recommendation of Ambassadors' Conference that Allied Govts. should take up with Netherlands Govt. matter of smuggling of war material into Netherlands.	50
37 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 886	Mar. 20	Transmits copy of memo. from Marshal Foch to President of Conference of Ambassadors reporting that Treaty articles relating to disarmament and reduction of German Army have remained dead letter.	50

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
38	AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin No. E.A.M./1.185/19A	Mar. 22	Refers to No. 17, and transmits to Herr Mertens decision of Ambassadors' Conference, on Mar. 4, that members of Control Commissions have right to 'visit any factory or establishment whatsoever': demands that relevant instructions be issued.	53
39	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 351	Mar. 23	Refers to Vol. IX, No. 196, and reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of Marshal Foch's list of assaults on Allied officers in Germany; the matter dropped owing to views of H.M.G.	54
40	COL. VON TSCHISCHWITZ Berlin No. 109/3/20 Ref. G.	Mar. 24	Refers to No. 28, and informs Air Commadore Masterman that instructions to give Control Commission officers more detailed particulars than those required by 'preliminary demand' of 17.9.19 would only be issued if further demands received.	55
41	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1020	Mar. 25	Refers to Nos. 34 and 36: instructions to propose joint Allied warning to Scandinavian and Swiss Govts., as well as to Netherland, regarding war material smuggled from Germany.	56
42	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 383	Mar. 29	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' approval of Drafting Committee's Note to German Govt. concerning inspection of wireless station receiving rooms, and of same Committee's report on interpretation of Article 181 of Treaty referring to 'war vessels'; also of Aeronautical Control Commission's request regarding supervision of waste material sales.	56
43	GERMAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Berlin No. F.M. 4566	Apr. 9	Transmits to Inter-Allied Aeronautical Control Commission memo. urging need to defer demobilization of 8 flying units mentioned in No. 6.	57
44	MR. SMALLBONES Munich Tel. No. 13	Apr. 10	Reports and comments on Bavarian Govt.'s refusal to comply with Central Govt. order to disband Einwohnerwehr, on ground that it would lead to renewed Bolshevik rule.	59
45	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 227	Apr. 12	Reports probable resistance by Bavaria and other S. German states to disbandment of Einwohnerwehr.	60
46	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 308	Apr. 12	Reports conversation between Sir E. Crowe and Herr Sthamer concerning Allied demand for Einwohnerwehr disbandment. Sir E. Crowe said this was a matter for Military Control Commission, and spoke strongly about unpunished assaults on Allied officers.	60
47	PRÉCIS OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN MR. CHURCHILL AND M. A. LEFÈVRE Paris	Apr. 13	Discussion on destruction of war material and factories, and German delay in surrendering guns under Treaty. Inter-Allied Sub-Commission to be increased in size to accelerate work of destruction.	61

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
48 MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 23	Apr. 14	Refers to No. 44, and asserts all parties in Bavaria, except some radicals, will resist Central Govt.'s disbanding Einwohnerwehr while reiterating loyalty to German unity: Einwohnerwehr could be useful factor for internal order, and disbandment might have dangerous consequences.	63
49 LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 413	Apr. 19	Transmits reliable information regarding importation of war material into Finland from Germany.	65
50 LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 417	Apr. 20	Refers to No. 49, and reports suspicion that cargo of ammunition from Germany is destined for aggressively pro-German Protective Corps.	66
51 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 486	Apr. 21	Reports Ambassadors' Conference's consideration of Air Commodore Masterman's statement complaining of German authorities' attitude towards Control Commissions. German request for leave to create 3 Cavalry Brigade Staffs and to change army recruiting arrangements refused. Refers to No. 41, and reports decision to instruct Allied representatives to send identical notes of protest to neutral countries importing German war material.	66
52 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1307	Apr. 21	Reports German aeroplanes and war material lying in Netherlands. Instructions to raise question of disposal with Ambassadors' Conference.	67
53 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1231	Apr. 21	Transmits summary of Air Commodore Masterman's statement referred to in No. 51, enumerating complaints of German Govt.'s obstructive attitude towards Aeronautical Control Commission and evasion of terms of Treaty of Versailles.	68
54 TO EARL CURZON San Remo Tel. No. 35	Apr. 22	Refers to Army Council's views on disarmament and reduction of German Army.	70
55 LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 428	Apr. 23	Refers to No. 50, and confirms that Finnish war material imports from Germany destined mainly for Protective Guard. Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has undertaken to enquire further whether this involves breach of Peace Treaty.	70
56 AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin	Apr. 23	Refuses Herr Mertens' request in No. 43 for temporarily maintaining 8 flight formations, and demands immediate demobilization.	71
57 AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin No. E.A.M./1606/39	Apr. 23	Transmits to Col. von Tschischwitz Allied demand for immediate surrender of all aeronautical material in possession of aerial police units, and withdrawal of units from aerodromes where now situated.	71
58 AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin No. E.A.M./173	Apr. 24	Requests definite acceptance or rejection by German Govt. of Allied demand for immediate 'transport and provisional destruction' of aeronautical material, reserving to Germany right to claim expenses she is not bound to pay under Treaty.	72

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
59	To H.M. REPRESENTATIVES The Hague Berne Copenhagen Christiania Stockholm Tel. No. 80	Apr. 27	Transmits instructions referred to in No. 51 to address notes identical with those of French and Italian colleagues to Govts. concerned protesting against import of German war materials.	73
60	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 256	Apr. 27	Suggests diplomatic representations to Finnish Govt. to stop import of arms from Germany.	73
61	To LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 137	Apr. 30	Refers to No. 55, and states that question of warning to Finland has been referred to Ambassadors' Conference. Instructions to address identical note to Finnish Govt. as soon as French and Italian colleagues instructed to do so.	74
62	To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 365	Apr. 30	Refers to Allied warning to Norway authorized in No. 59: instructions to bring export of military and aeronautical material from Germany, reported by H.M. Consul at Bergen, to attention of appropriate Control Commissions.	74
63	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 530	May 1	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion and acceptance of resolution that sales of civil aircraft to Germany be restricted to prevent conversion for military purposes.	75
64	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 536	May 4	Reports Ambassadors' Conference's approval of reports by naval advisers on interpretation of 'ships in reserve', supervising conversion of German warships under construction into merchant ships, and destruction of German war material allegedly held by Danish Govt.	75
65	SIR R. GRAHAM The Hague No. 436	May 4	Reports and endorses view of Netherland Govt. that French reports of war material entering the country much exaggerated. M. de Karnebeek pointed out that Treaty of Versailles had not been officially communicated to his Govt.	76
66	COL. VON TSCHISCHWITZ Berlin No. 1056/5.20	May 7	Repudiates Air Commodore Masterman's charges that German Govt. wilfully obstructing work of Aeronautical Commission, and blames Allies for poor organization and dilatory instructions regarding surrender and disposal of air equipment.	79
67	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 556	May 8	Reports decisions of Ambassadors' Conference: (i) that German Govt. be debited with value of war material exported to neutral countries; (ii) that hangars not destroyed be distributed among Allies; (iii) that Lithuanian Govt.'s request to buy German war material be rejected; (iv) that Netherland Govt. be invited to hand over aeronautical material referred	82

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		to in No. 52, and equipment taken from German troops in Nov. 1918; (v) that representations be made to Finnish Govt. against war material imports.	
68 SIR M. FINDLAY Christiania No. 201	May 8	Refers to No. 59, and reports despatch of identical note to Norwegian Govt. and receipt of verbal assurance that Govt. Departments had been instructed to warn public against importing war material.	83
69 COL. VON TSCHISCHWITZ Berlin No. 1071/4/20	May 8	Refers to No. 56 and reports demobilization of all German flying units, and handing over of aircraft at all air-stations except Stolp.	84
70 COL. VON TSCHISCHWITZ Berlin No. 1141/4.20	May 10	Refers to No. 58 and avers German unwillingness to carry out final destruction of aeronautical material until Allied undertaking given concerning sale of scrap.	85
71 AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin No. E.A.M./2013/39	May 12	Refers to No. 66, and maintains previous attitude: refuses to enter into argument on organization of Commission of Control.	86
72 BRIG.-GEN. J. H. MORGAN London	May 12	Report to War Office on Armed Forces of Germany and Work of Effectives Sub-Commission of Control. Elaborates problems raised in No. 29, and reiterates belief that German Govt. plans to evade Treaty provisions regarding German Army.	86
73 TO MR. BARCLAY Stockholm Tel. No. 71	May 18	Asks for investigation of report that German arms and munitions are being conveyed to Sweden.	105
74 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 610	May 22	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration on May 21 of German protest against resolution in No. 8 about ownership of destroyed war material, and question of sale of war material destroyed by German Govt. before Treaty came into force.	105
75 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 613	May 22	Refers to No. 74, and reports Conference of Ambassadors' rejection of German protest, and decision to postpone settlement of question of war material destroyed by German Govt. pending written opinion of legal adviser.	106
76 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 630	May 26	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decisions on disposal of German industrial machinery, and sale to Allies of war material which might be useful in peace time.	106
77 MR. BARCLAY Stockholm Tel. No. 163	May 28	Refers to No. 73, and reports progress of investigations.	108
78 TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 451	May 28	Asks for report on information alleging German firm's offer of aeroplanes to Dutch firm.	108

XX

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
79 SIR R. GRAHAM The Hague No. 486	May 28	Refers to No. 65, and reports interview with Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs who gave results of Netherland Govt.'s investigation into import of arms from Germany.	109
80 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 311	May 29	Transmits confidential information from German Govt. regarding two accumulations of arms hidden in Germany pending sale abroad.	110
81 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1648	May 29	Transmits memo. by M. Fromageot, legal adviser to French M.F.A., on date from which German obligations under Peace Treaty should take effect.	110
82 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Berlin No. F.M./6335/57492	May 29	Refers to No. 57. Surrender to Reichstreuhandgesellschaft of aircraft material in possession of aerial police units has begun, but Govt. cannot agree to immediate withdrawal of personnel.	112
83 SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 1708	June 1	Refers to German request to maintain army of 200,000 and transmits draft report by Allied Military Committee of Versailles on this question and on reorganization of German police force. Asks whether these matters should be brought before Ambassadors' Conference.	112
84 FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	June 1	Transmits to Mr. Lloyd George memoranda concerning Germany's violation of financial, economic (see No. 152), and military clauses of Treaty.	117
85 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 376	June 2	Transmits German press statement that Germany's ratification of Treaty and repeal of former Constitution make special legislation for abolition of universal military service unnecessary.	126
86 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 636	June 3	Gives H.M.G.'s views on conclusions in memo. enclosed in No. 81, regarding date from which Germany's obligations under Treaty commence.	127
87 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 674	June 5	Reports deliberations of Conference of Ambassadors on report on German Army enclosed in No. 83, and reparations resolution referred to in No. 8.	128
88 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 389	June 5	Transmits copy of German letter offering to Spanish Consulate-General at Hamburg war material for export to S. America, together with list of articles for sale.	129
89 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 670	June 6	Refers to No. 86, and points out embarrassing divergences between H.M.G.'s interpretation of Article 169 of Peace Treaty, and that of M. Fromageot, in No. 81, adopted by Conference of Ambassadors. Requests that F.O. legal adviser be sent to deal with question.	131
90 FRENCH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London	June 7	Note referring to No. 83, and asking for views of H.M.G. on German request therein, and on draft report of Allied Military Committee, which French Govt. strongly endorses.	132

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
91 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 693	June 10	Requests early reply to questions raised in Nos. 83 and 87.	133
92 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 669	June 10	Amplifies views stated in No. 86, and denies inconsistency in interpretation of Article 169 of Peace Treaty, alleged in No. 89.	133
93 BRIG.-GEN. J. H. MORGAN	June 10	Précis of third report on Armed Forces of Germany and work of Effectives Sub-Commission of Inter-Allied Control Commission. Confirms conclusions elaborated in No. 72, and again alleges German intention to evade military clauses of Treaty.	134
94 SIR E. HOWARD Madrid Tel. No. 243	June 11	Refers to attempt by a German national to sell rifles, allegedly belonging to German Govt., to H.M. Consul-General in Barcelona.	138
95 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 695	June 11	Refers to No. 14, and requests instructions on H.M.G.'s attitude towards French and Italian Naval Advisers' Note, considered by Ambassadors' Conference on June 11.	138
96 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 340	June 12	Refers to No. 80, and reports conversation with Finnish Minister regarding possible sham purchase of German rifles by his Govt. to aid German Govt. to expose vendors, also possible purchase with Allied consent.	139
97 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 341	June 12	Refers to No. 96 and reports further conversation with Finnish Minister.	140
98 To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 195	June 13	Refers to No. 96, and states that H.M.G. cannot participate in scheme.	140
99 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 697	June 13	Refers to No. 87, and reports discussion and recommendations of Military Committee of Versailles on increasing size of German police force.	141
100 To SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 1996	June 15	Transmits instructions to inform Conference of Ambassadors of private offer of German war material in Netherlands to a Cardiff firm.	142
101 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 702	June 16	Refers to Nos. 83 and 91. Agrees that question of strength of German Army be dealt with by Conference of Ambassadors, and transmits opinions of Army Council on Sicherheitspolizei.	142
102 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 751	June 23	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decisions on labour for destruction of German aeronautical material, and on Germany's responsibility for destruction of zeppelins to to be surrendered.	143
103 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1995	June 24	Transmits memo. from Air Ministry representative in Paris to Air Commodore Masterman, on Allied requirements with regard to civil aviation in Germany.	143

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
104 AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin E.A.M./2895/2	June 24	Requests Herr Mertens to co-operate in strict execution of Air Clauses of Peace Treaty, and refuses German Govt.'s request for retention of 28 aeroplanes and 6 seaplanes for aerial police purposes.	145
105 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 373	June 25	Reports that German Minister of Defence has threatened to resign, on ground that Communist rising inevitable if Allied notes on reduction of Reichswehr not re-considered at Spa Conference.	145
106 TO MR. MANNERS Lima Tel. No. 29	June 25	Instructions to inform Peruvian Govt. that proposed purchase of arms from German firm involves breach of Peace Treaty.	146
107 BRIG.-GEN. J. H. MORGAN	June 25	Reports on visit to Königsberg Effectives Committee, to investigate problem of men discharged from Reichswehr, but absorbed into German economic detachments and Sicherheitspolizei. Also discusses Reichswehr enlistment, and general situation in E. Prussia.	146
108 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 378	June 26	Refers to No. 105, and reiterates Dr. Gessler's fear of uprising and trouble if immediate Reichswehr reduction to 100,000 men is insisted upon.	153
109 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 374	June 26	Refers to No. 105, and expected agitation against reduction of Reichswehr.	153
110 REPORT ON EXECUTION OF MILITARY ARTICLES OF PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY	June ?	Transmits appreciation of situation by Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, and statement of disarmament and demobilization progress up to June 1920. Enumerates essential points connected with disarmament, which should be insisted upon at Spa Conference.	154
111 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2054	June 30	Refers to No. 99, and transmits copy of despatch from Sir H. Stuart on duty of Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission to control the German police force in Occupied Territory, and inadequate strength thereof.	172
112 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 785	July 1	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decision to communicate all lists of war material to be destroyed or retained by Allies, and all Conference decisions on this subject, to Reparation Commission, and to accept July 11 as date from which Allied Govts. owned material.	174
113 MR. KIDSTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 532	July 5	Refers to Nos. 96 and 97, and gives further information on German firm's offer to sell arms to Finnish Govt. Reports latter's concern at constant rumours of illicit gun-running.	175
114 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2287	July 5	Refers to No. 51, and rejects Lord Derby's suggestion for further note warning neutral countries against purchasing German war material.	176



## CHAPTER II

### Reparation by Germany after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles January 10—July 5, 1920

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		<i>Introductory Note</i>	178
115 U.S. AMBASSADOR Paris No. 235	Jan. 19	Transmits copy of note to President of Peace Conference declining to accept Supreme Council's decision on amount of German reparation for Scapa Flow sinking; this indemnity should not jeopardize claims recognized by Peace Treaty.	179
116 SIR H. STUART Coblentz No. 67	Jan. 31	Transmits despatch commenting on Minute 94 of Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (annexed) concerning German application for two months' coal supply from the Saar, and holding German Govt. responsible for any trouble in Occupied Territory resulting from non-delivery of coal.	180
117 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 123	Feb. 2	Reports consideration by Conference of Ambassadors of German failure to deliver specified monthly amounts of coal to France.	183
118 SIR H. STUART Coblentz No. 99	Feb. 14	Transmits first Fortnightly Report on Coal Situation in Occupied German Territories, by British Dept. of Rhineland High Commission. Report concludes coal situation is critical, but no reason why reduced Allied demands under Peace Treaty should not be met.	184
119 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 46	Feb. 17	Reports conversation with M.F.A., who acknowledged German responsibility for repairing damage wrought in France and Belgium.	196
120 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris	Feb. 19	Letter from Lord Curzon stating that, at Supreme Council, in connexion with coal deliveries to France, M. Millerand favoured Foch Plan for occupation of Ruhr to bring pressure on Germans, but British and Italian representatives insisted whole question be referred to Reparation Commission.	196
121 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 520	Feb. 21	Reports nomination of M. Poincaré as French delegate to Reparation Commission.	197
122 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin	Feb. 22	Letter to Comptroller-General of Dept. of Overseas Trade enclosing memo. by Dr. Watts on resumption of commercial relations between England and Germany, and its dependence on lower rate of exchange and increased coal, and Minute by Mr. Robbins.	199

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
123 MR. LINDSAY Washington No. 279	Feb. 24	Reports great influence on American opinion of Mr. Keynes's <i>Economic Consequences of the Peace</i> , and suggests H.M.G. should endeavour to show that they do not desire harsh financial exactions from Germany under economic clauses of Treaty.	202
124 MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Treasury	Feb. 26	Letter informing Sir J. Bradbury that Cabinet endorses General Staff's views on desirability of maintaining present German Govt. and of restoring German economic life and production, through any arrangements which Reparation Commission decides to make.	204
125 SIR H. STUART Coblentz No. 170	Mar. 15	Reports discontinuance, in accordance with arrangements made by Reparation Commission, of control and supervision of dyestuff facilities in Occupied Territory; and transmits telegram and letter from Reparation Commission relating thereto.	204
126 To FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Mar. 19	Informs him that British delegate on Reparation Commission is being instructed to urge Commission to extend four-month period for reparation proposals by Germany under Peace Treaty.	206
127 SIR J. BRADBURY Paris No. 16	Mar. 20	Report for Treasury on consideration by Reparation Commission, on Mar. 19, of machinery for executing Financial Clauses of Peace Treaty and decision that each delegate seek urgent instructions from his Govt. on the question.	207
128 ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London	Mar. 26	Note requesting British support for Italian Govt.'s view that functions of Council of League of Nations and Reparation Commission should be kept entirely separate.	209
129 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 441	Apr. 12	Message for Sir J. Bradbury from Mr. Blackett: H.M.G. recognizes Reparation Commission as agent for administration of Financial Clauses of Peace Treaty.	211
130 To EARL CURZON San Remo Tel. No. 2	Apr. 16	British delegate reports Reparation Commission's decision to limit for time being demands upon Germany under Article 260 of Peace Treaty, and considers it inadvisable for H.M.G. to propose demand for delivery of interests in Turkish undertakings.	211
131 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 247	Apr. 20	Reports serious food shortage at Essen, and asks whether hint should be given German Govt. to make official approach to Reparation Commission, to allow export of coal to Netherlands in return for provisions.	212
132 To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 136	Apr. 22	Negative reply to No. 131.	212

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
133	BRITISH DELEGATION TO REPARATION COMMISSION Paris B.R. 1098	Apr. 24	Report to Treasury of Reparation Commission's consideration, on Apr. 23, of Polish Delegation's application for recognition of Poland's right to restitution and reparation. Asks for H.M.G.'s interpretation of Allied letter of Jan. 17 in its bearing upon Polish claims.	212
134	SIR H. STUART Coblenz	Apr. 26	Letter to Mr. Waterlow reporting critical food shortage at Essen, and French opposition on Reparation Commission to proposed Netherland loan for German miners' food. Discusses question of coal supply.	214
135	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1306	Apr. 28	Discusses M. Poincaré's position on Reparation Commission, and possibility of his resignation should French desire for considerable time extension in assessing war damage and fixing total reparation not be met.	216
136	BELGIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London No. 2048	May 3	Note requesting H.M.G.'s views on resolutions regarding German reparation payments passed at San Remo on Apr. 25, and suggesting need for agreement between Allies before meeting at Spa.	217
137	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	May 4	Records conversation with Portuguese Minister in London, in which latter expressed his Govt.'s desire to state its views on German reparation at projected Spa discussions, and explains Portugal's special position.	218
138	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1371	May 4	Refers to regular and controversial articles in Paris press by M. Poincaré, and gives extracts from <i>Revue des Deux Mondes</i> article of May 1.	219
139	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 253	May 5	Reports M.F.A.'s opinion that disastrous state of German finances must lead to Allied disappointment with their proposals at Spa. Also transmits Minister's views on disarmament.	221
140	SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 324	May 6	Reports U.S. Govt.'s opposition to further credit advances to European countries, but tentative project afoot whereby certain American concerns would supply Germany on credit for a year or more, with cotton, copper, &c., against undertaking to resume vigorous industrial production.	222
141	EARL CURZON Foreign Office	May 10	Record of conversation with Italian Chargé d'Affaires, who communicated note (annexed) transmitting Signor Nitti's views on preliminary Allied consultations before Spa Conference.	223
142	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 278	May 13	Reports German press scepticism on Spa meeting, and urges that German Govt. be given opportunity to state their financial case there.	225

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
143	MR. KERR Lympne	May 16	Letter to Lord Curzon returning copy of proposed despatch regarding M. Poincaré's press articles and reporting that unsigned copy has been given to M. Millerand by Mr. Lloyd George.	226
144	TO PORTUGUESE MINISTER London	May 17	Refers to conversation recorded in No. 137, and points out that Portuguese claim would not be directly affected by discussions, but H.M. Treasury would bring to notice of appropriate British representative any note on subject addressed to Supreme Council Secretariat.	227
145	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 594	May 18	Reports M. Poincaré's resignation from Reparation Commission.	228
146	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 600	May 19	Reports on suitability of M. Dubois as new French delegate to Reparation Commission, and suggests British delegate should propose him as president.	228
147	TO ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London	May 19	Refers to No. 128, and transmits H.M.G.'s view that Brussels Conference, under League of Nations auspices, should have co-operation of Reparation Commission.	229
148	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	May 21	Records conversation with French Chargé d'Affaires on effect of Lord Curzon's note to M. Millerand referred to in No. 143, and on possibility of M. Poincaré's attempting to overthrow Millerand Govt. on reparation issue.	229
149	ITALIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London No. 1068	May 23	Note regarding Italian claim to participate in common decision concerning distribution of German indemnity.	230
150	GERMAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London No. A 672	May 27	Note stating that German Govt. cannot make further deliveries of animals in response to Allied demands under Treaty.	231
151	GERMAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London	May 27	Reports German progress in reconstruction of devastated areas in Belgium and France, and assessment of damages there.	232
152	FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Undated	Memo. reporting on Germany's execution of financial and economic clauses of Peace Treaty, and asserting delay, passive resistance, and outright violation.	234
153	SIR J. BRADBURY Paris	June 2	Letter to Mr. A. Chamberlain reporting informal discussion on Reparation Commission's role in expediting determination of German liability, and in completing arrangements for percentage distribution amongst Allies.	245
154	TO SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 240	June 4	Message for Signor Nitti from Prime Minister regarding percentage distribution of German indemnity, and expressing hope that Signor Nitti will be at Spa.	247

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
155	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 226	June 5	Reports Italian press campaign against low percentage of indemnity considered likely to be awarded to Italy.	248
156	TO SIR J. BRADBURY Paris	June 5	Reports receipt of memo. on Portuguese Govt.'s claims for German reparation, showing misapprehension of scope of Treaty. Requests Sir J. Bradbury to advise and assist Portuguese delegate.	248
157	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 229	June 6	Reports Signor Nitti's views on reparation and Italy's moral right to equitable treatment.	249
158	SIR J. BRADBURY Paris	June 9	Letter to Mr. Chamberlain reporting talk with Herr Bergmann and Dr. Melchior. Although opinion of German financial experts on attitude and proposals of Govt. is divided, they are likely to do best to secure serious German offer at Spa.	250
159	SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 183	June 22	Transmits urgent request from Serb-Croat-Slovene Govt. for invitation to participate in Spa discussions and preliminary conversations on question of enemy indemnities.	251
160	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2111	June 22	Transmits copy of No. 150, and reviews position under Treaty with regard to delivery of animals.	252
161	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	June 24	Asks for authoritative statement on French 55% share in German war indemnity, in view of press campaign on question of whether this is to be regarded as a percentage or proportion.	253
162	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2153	June 24	Instructions to notify Ambassadors' Conference of H.M.G.'s intention to publish Liberated Territories Contribution Agreements and amending agreement of Dec. 8, 1919. Publication of Anglo-French-Serb-Croat-Slovene Agreement of Jan. 13 on division of German payments is postponed.	254
163	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	June 26	Refers to No. 161, and wholly discounts French claim to absolute percentage of total indemnity. Instructions to correct false contention.	255
164	GERMAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London	June 28	Note averring that Reparation Commission has exceeded its powers in ordering delivery of additional Upper Silesian coal to Poland, and contending that, if order enforced, reduction of delivery of Ruhr coal to Entente must follow.	255
165	TO SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 130	June 29	Rejects Serb-Croat-Slovene Govt.'s request, in No. 159, for invitation to Spa Conference.	257
166	BRITISH DELEGATE TO REPARATION COMMISSION Paris No. B.R. 1324	June 30	Transmits preliminary unofficial statement from Herr Bergmann listing value of reparation deliveries already made to Allies, and observes that figures still inflated, although more moderate than German press evaluations.	257

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
167	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 389	July 1	Summarizes press statement by German delegation to Spa, expressing views on Conference.	262
168	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 450	July 1	Reports information that Germany will assert at Spa that, if Upper Silesia not retained, she cannot meet financial obligations under Treaty.	263
169	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 394	July 2	Reports conversation with M.F.A. on problems of Spa Conference.	263
170	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 397	July 2	Reports excellent impression received at interview with Chancellor, who stressed German willingness to meet Treaty obligations, subject only to economic restoration and capacity to pay.	264
171	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. Unnumbered to Brussels No. 399 to F.O.	July 4	Reports departure of German delegates for Spa, and urges desirability of Lord Curzon's having private interview with Chancellor and M.F.A. before main discussions. Fears breakdown at Spa might endanger present Ministry.	265
172	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. Unnumbered to Brussels No. 400 to F.O.	July 4	Transmits impressions of three German memos. on German financial position.	265
173	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. Unnumbered to Spa No. 402 to F.O.	July 5	Suggests threefold classification of German economic desires at Spa.	266
174	MR. WATERLOW Foreign Office	July 5	Summary of position regarding indemnities based on information available at F.O. Consideration of consequences should Spa Conference fail. Suggests international loan to Germany.	267

### CHAPTER III

#### Correspondence and Memoranda relating to German Problems other than Allied Military Control and Reparation July 6–December 31, 1920

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
175	SIR E. CROWE Spa	July 9	Letter to Mr. Nicolson giving Attorney-General's opinion on case against Cdr. Rücker and Engineer Gallus.	270
176	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2223	July 10	Reports French satisfaction with inclusion of penalty clause on possible Ruhr occupation in Spa declaration, and discusses article in <i>Le Temps</i> on subject.	270
177	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. Unnumbered to Spa No. 418 to F.O.	July 14	Reports conversation with Dr. Stresemann and Capt. Rechberg. They stress danger to disarmed Germany of Bolshevik advance, and propose co-operation between Germany and Allies.	272

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
178	SIR H. STUART Coblenz No. 388	July 19	Reports reaction in Occupied Territory and Ruhr to news from Spa of Ruhr Basin penalty clause.	273
179	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 428	July 22	Reports Soviet emissary's statement that Bolsheviks do not intend invading Germany.	274
180	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 431	July 22	Points out importance of considering whole question of Germany's attitude to Bolshevism and to Russian advance into Poland.	275
181	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. Unnumbered	July 23	Reports alleged White Russian plans for fresh Baltic manoeuvre, possibly with German assistance.	276
182	TO MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 40	July 23	Refers to Vol. IX, No. 555, concerning separate diplomatic representation of foreign powers in Munich.	277
183	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 439	July 24	Refers to Nos. 177 and 180, and transmits proposals of Capt. Rechberg and Gen. Ludendorff for suspension of Peace Treaty, and joint resistance to Bolshevik advance by Great Britain, France, and Germany.	277
184	SIR H. STUART Coblenz Tel. No. 133	July 26	Reports arrest at Wiesbaden of Dr. Dorten by Frankfort police.	278
185	MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 49	July 26	Reports appointment of M. Dard as French Minister at Munich, and Bavarian reaction.	279
186	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 621	July 27	Transmits main passages of Dr. Simons's Reichstag speech on July 26 on German foreign policy, particularly in regard to Russo-Polish War.	282
187	SIR H. STUART Coblenz Tel. No. 136	July 31	Refers to No. 184, and reports discussion by Rhineland High Commission of French demands for removal of Wiesbaden officials and Frankfort police officers allegedly implicated in Dr. Dorten's arrest.	283
188	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 456	Aug. 3	Reports M.F.A.'s views on Poland and resentment at Germany's omission from proposed conference on Russian problems.	284
189	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 462	Aug. 3	Reports further statement by M.F.A. on need for Germany to participate in London Conference on Eastern questions.	285
190	TO SIR H. STUART Coblenz Tel. No. 91	Aug. 4	Refers to No. 187, and approves of Sir H. Stuart's action in Dorten case.	286
191	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 465	Aug. 6	Reports M.F.A.'s determination to maintain German neutrality despite reports that H.M.G. favoured war with Soviet Russia, and belief that French Govt. might use flag incident as pretext for war.	286
192	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 475	Aug. 7	Refers to No. 183, and reports on fresh proposal by Capt. Rechberg for alliance between Germany and Allies against Bolsheviks.	287

XXX

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
193	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 40	Aug. 9	Reports suspected understanding between Germany and Bolshevik Govt.	288
194	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 476	Aug. 10	Refers to No. 192, and reports conversation with Herr Meissner, Secretary to President Ebert, about combating Bolshevism.	289
195	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2715	Aug. 11	Instructions to make strong representations to French Govt. against pressing demands mentioned in No. 187, now that German Govt. has released Dr. Dorten.	289
196	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2722	Aug. 11	Transmits copy of note from Polish Chargé d'Affaires, concerning consequences of German neutrality with regard to Soviet advance on Poland, and Lord Curzon's comments thereon.	290
197	COL. TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 294	Aug. 12	Reports Soviet representative's reference to possibility of impending Soviet-German treaty.	292
198	MR. KIDSTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 570	Aug. 13	Reports German representations to Finland against joining Entente on grounds of impending Soviet-German arrangement which would nullify Treaty of Versailles.	293
199	MR. ROBERTSON Coblentz No. 437	Aug. 21	Transmits copy of despatch reporting conversation between Lt.-Col. Ryan and Oberbürgermeister of Cologne on German political situation. Endorses Herr Adenauer's views.	293
200	MR. ROBERTSON Coblentz No. 438	Aug. 21	Reports and comments on tense relations between French Occupation Authorities and local German officials in Rhineland. Suggests Ruhr occupation would hasten Russo-German alliance.	295
201	GERMAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London B. No. 4203	Aug. 21	Note explaining impossibility of acceding to H.M.G.'s request for German Govt. undertaking that Messrs. Rücker and Gallus would return to British custody if required after release for Leipzig trial; but offering to obtain their promise to do so.	296
202	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 517	Aug. 27	Reports anti-Allied demonstrations and outrages in Breslau and Fürstenwalde and disorders in Stuttgart.	297
203	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 520	Aug. 27	Refers to No. 202, and reports German insult to R.A.F. officers, and strong antagonism towards any assistance for Poland.	298
204	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 780	Aug. 27	Reports and endorses press articles on growth of German National Party and general political trend towards Right.	299
205	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 527	Aug. 31	Reports denial by Dr. Simons of alleged projected entente with Russia and Hungary, and of secret treaty between Germany and Soviet Govt.	300



	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
206	To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 825	Sept. 1	Instructions regarding communication to German Govt. of Anglo-Italian resolution at Lucerne on execution of Spa Agreements. Suggests consultations with Military Control Commission and Reparation Commission on German progress in fulfilling Spa obligations.	301
207	To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 836	Sept. 6	Refers to Lord Kilmarnock's previous communications on German policy towards Soviet Russia, especially Nos. 183 and 192, and points out that no section of British opinion would support Capt. Rechberg's schemes.	302
208	MR. RAMSAY Stockholm Tel. No. 250	Sept. 7	Requests instructions should Swedish M.F.A. again raise question of Germany's willingness to join League of Nations if majority favourable.	302
209	To GERMAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London	Sept. 9	Note referring to No. 201, and enumerating conditions under which H.M.G. will release Messrs. Rücker and Gallus.	303
210	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 541	Sept. 10	Refers to No. 206, and reports that Italian Ambassador still awaits instructions. Enquires whether French Ambassador should be informed.	303
211	To MR. RAMSAY Stockholm Tel. No. 124	Sept. 14	Refers to No. 208, and instructs Mr. Ramsay to inform M.F.A. of necessity for Germany to give guarantees of good faith in fulfilling Treaty obligations before admission to League of Nations.	304
212	To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 310	Sept. 18	Refers to No. 210, and gives instructions to convey friendly warning to German Govt. in sense of Lucerne resolution.	304
213	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 551	Sept. 20	Reports friendly warning to M.F.A. as instructed in No. 212, and latter's comments on execution of Spa agreements. Italian Ambassador still awaits instructions.	305
214	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 671	Sept. 21	Transmits observations of Belgian President of the Council on possible French occupation of Ruhr Basin.	305
215	To MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 447	Sept. 24	Refers to No. 213, and sends instructions to urge Italian Govt. to fulfil terms of Lucerne resolution through their Ambassador in Berlin.	307
216	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 555	Sept. 25	Refers to No. 213, and reports Italian Ambassador's receipt of instructions, and subsequent interview with M.F.A.	307
217	To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 317	Sept. 25	Authorizes public announcement regarding credits and other property of German nationals established in U.K. since resumption of commerce.	308
218	To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 910	Sept. 27	Refers to No. 291, and transmits German Embassy assurances with regard to situation in East Prussia.	308

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
219 MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 68	Sept. 28	Reports Bamberg meeting of Bayerische Volkspartei, its adoption of programme, and secession of Christian Socialist Party. Mentions formation of new and violent German National Socialistic Workmen's Party partly organized by Herr Hitler.	309
220 To LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 914	Sept. 29	Records conversation between Sir E. Crowe and Counsellor of German Embassy regarding possible appointment of British and Italian Ministers to Munich and Dresden.	312
221 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 969	Oct. 2	Reports conversation with M.F.A. on Upper Silesia, Geneva Conference, Bavaria, and disarmament. Records Italian Ambassador's opinion on Independent Socialist Party split, and gives news of separatist movement in Wurtemberg.	313
222 SIR M. FINDLAY Christiania Tel. No. 225	Oct. 6	Reports conversations with Prof. Nansen and M.F.A. on admission of Germany to League of Nations.	315
223 MR. SEEDS Berlin No. 1018	Oct. 13	Reports German Govt.'s reasons for proposed establishment of German Reich Legation at Munich, and suggests H.M.G. consider appointment of British representative there.	316
224 MR. ROBERTSON Coblenz No. 509	Oct. 13	Reports on propagandist activities of Heimatdienst in Occupied Territory.	317
225 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 766	Oct. 23	Transmits despatch from Military Attaché reporting conversation with Sous-Chef of Belgian General Staff on role of Belgian army in event of French advance into Ruhr Basin.	320
226 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1077	Oct. 24	Reports on representations to Dr. Simons concerning delay in commencing Leipzig trials.	322
227 GERMAN AMBASSADOR London No. A 1860	Oct. 25	Note requesting deferment of payment to H.M.G. of monthly debit balances struck by Clearing Offices, in view of serious commercial and political consequences of cash payment for Germany.	322
228 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1250	Oct. 27	Reports French Govt.'s request that H.M.G. suspend action on dossier on alleged war criminals sent to Leipzig Court, pending consultation on common action on Nov. 5.	323
229 MR. BARCLAY Stockholm No. 814	Oct. 29	Reports imminent breakdown in negotiations concerning delivery of German locomotives to Soviet Russia, and Swedish Govt.'s refusal to be involved in this deal.	324
230 FOREIGN OFFICE	Nov. 2	Memo. on the admission to the League of Nations of Germany and other States not mentioned in the annex to the Covenant section relating to Germany. Suggests consultation with France, Belgium, Italy and Dominions.	325

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
231	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1196	Nov. 4	Refers to No. 228. Law Officers intend discussing common policy at meeting of M. Jules Cambon's Committee on Nov. 5, but see no reason to have Leipzig Court suspend action on seven British cases.	327
232	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1141	Nov. 6	Reports further on difficulties in way of Soviet-German locomotive contracts.	328
233	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1144	Nov. 6	Gives general account of German political situation, with particular reference to financial problem, and prospects of disorder during coming winter.	329
234	REPORT OF MEETING OF INTER-ALLIED COMMITTEE ON WAR CRIMES Paris	Nov. 10	Extract from <i>procès-verbal</i> dealing with German request for information regarding cases other than 45 selected for Leipzig trials, and proposed Allied reply.	330
235	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1059	Nov. 18	Asks for observations on Report concerning alleged secret agreement between German and Soviet Govts.	332
236	GERMAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London No. A 2133	Nov. 19	Note reiterating German Govt.'s request, despite British and French refusal, to carry forward debit balances regularly to next monthly accounts.	333
237	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 345 Overseas	Nov. 24	Asks for particulars of any recent Soviet-German trading transactions.	336
238	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 593 Overseas	Nov. 25	Replies to No. 237: only one specific instance known of Soviet-German trading transaction.	337
239	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 597	Nov. 26	Transmits French request for simultaneous Allied representations to German Govt. against recent public speeches in Rhineland of German Ministers and requests instructions.	337
240	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 350	Nov. 27	Refers to proposed French and Belgian protests against German Ministers' speeches in Rhineland, and requests summary of Aix speech and Lord D'Abernon's opinion on steps to be taken.	338
241	COL. RYAN Coblenz Tel. No. 178	Nov. 27	Reports serious view taken by Rhineland High Commission of German Ministers' speeches and of propaganda against Peace Treaty. Urges common Allied representations in Berlin.	338
242	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 600	Nov. 27	Refers to No. 239, and gives American Commissioner's views on German Ministerial speeches in Rhineland.	339
243	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 603	Nov. 28	Refers to No. 240, and summarizes German Ministers' Aachen speeches. Advises individual representations by Allies to German Govt.	340

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
244	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 357	Dec. 1	Refers to No. 243, and transmits instructions for joint representation, with France and Belgium, on lines suggested in No. 241.	341
245	LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 1966	Dec. 2	Reports consideration by Conference of Ambassadors of German notes protesting that Rhineland High Commission was exceeding its administrative functions.	341
246	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 612	Dec. 6	Reports handing over of joint Allied note regarding Rhineland speeches. Refers to instructions on this subject sent to American Commissioner.	342
247	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 614	Dec. 6	Refers to No. 246, and reports private representation by American Commissioner to German M.F.A.	343
248	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1253	Dec. 6	Refers to No. 235, and reports that Gen. Malcolm and Major Breen believe alleged Russo-German agreement most improbable.	343
249	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1267	Dec. 11	Comments favourably on German Govt.'s reply, of Dec. 8, to joint Allied note respecting German Ministerial speeches in Occupied Territory.	344
250	TO GERMAN AMBASSADOR London	Dec. 13	Refers to No. 236, and rejects German Govt.'s request to postpone settlement of monthly debit balances, but offers to reduce balances by giving priority to larger debts due to German nationals.	345
251	ATTORNEY-GENERAL London	Dec. 13	Submits statement of present position of Leipzig High Court proceedings against German War Criminals.	346
252	CAPT. R. S. PEARSON British Forces on Rhine	Dec. 16	Reports to War Office on intensive German propaganda campaign with object of modifying Versailles Treaty.	349
253	MR. SEEDS Munich Tel. No. 41	Dec. 20	Refers to American loan offer to Bavarian Govt., and suggests British financial interests compete.	350
254	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 1314	Dec. 20	Refers to No. 335, and suggests increasing German resistance to Allied demands under Peace Treaty be combated by system of stipulated alleviation for obligations fulfilled, rather than punishment for clauses evaded.	350
255	TO M. FLEURIAU London	Dec. 23	Requests clarification of proposed French instructions to Inter-allied Rhineland High Commission for insuring against provocative German Ministerial speeches in Occupied Territory.	353
256	MR. ROBERTSON Coblentz No. 593	Dec. 29	Transmits statement regarding Rhineland High Commission's suspension or exclusion of certain newspapers, on grounds of malicious propaganda.	353
257	MR. ROBERTSON Coblentz No. 594	Dec. 29	Reports warning by High Commission to German Commissioner against future speeches in Rhineland by German Ministers, and asks for H.M.G.'s approval.	357

CHAPTER IV  
Allied Military Control of Germany  
July 6–December 31, 1920

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
258	MR. BARCLAY Stockholm No. 541	July 10	Reports protest to Swedish Govt. respecting importation of German aeroplanes into Sweden.	358
259	MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 43	July 10	Reports attitude of Bavarian Govt. towards disarmament conditions signed by German representatives at Spa, especially disbandment of Einwohnerwehr.	359
260	MR. LESLIE Reval Tel. No. 11	July 16	Informs Mr. Porter in Libau that ships with rifles and cartridges bought by Bolsheviks in Germany will sail from Hamburg or Lübeck for Reval.	360
261	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 838	July 21	Reports on interview with M. Millerand and Gen. Weygand concerning joint Anglo-French mission to Poland, and German request to arm E. Prussian population and possibility of German war material sales to Poles.	360
262	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 814	July 22	Refers to No. 261: H.M.G. favour permitting Reichswehr troops to advance to German frontier for defence, but consider Allies should reject German Govt.'s request to arm E. Prussian population.	361
263	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 872	July 26	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decision to instruct Sir R. Tower to hand over air material at Danzig to Aeronautical Control Commission for destruction.	362
264	MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 50	July 26	Reports steps taken to investigate information that 40 trucks of small arms crossed Austrian frontier recently, possibly to be hidden pending disarmament of Einwohnerwehr.	362
265	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 590	July 27	Reports Gen. Bingham's opinion that German Govt. is doing utmost to carry out disarmament despite bribery in German offices and secret arms exports to Russia and Poland.	363
266	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 257	July 31	Instructions to explain circumstances in which additional Spa disarmament protocol was drafted, when it is presented to German Govt. for signature.	363
267	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 467	Aug. 5	Reports that Irish revolutionaries are trying to buy machine guns in Berlin.	364
268	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 926	Aug. 5	Reports meeting summoned by M. Cambon of representatives of various embassies, and consideration of German Govt.'s request to send Reichswehr troops into Allenstein, which was referred to respective Govts.	364

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	
269	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 936	Aug. 6	Summarizes German note of Aug. 5 reporting spontaneous formation of local defence militia in East Prussia, with German Govt. organization where necessary. German Govt. may feel obliged to send troops into Allenstein if no Allied reply to their request received soon.	365
270	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 263	Aug. 7	Instructions to inform Control Commission of arms consignments from Stettin and Hamburg to Ireland.	366
271	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	Aug. 7	Reports conversation with German Chargé d'Affaires, regarding German note requesting Allied approval of Govt.'s action towards voluntary defence force formations in E. Prussia, and for sending regular troops into Allenstein.	366
272	FRENCH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London	Aug. 9	Transmits French Govt.'s request to H.M.G. to support formal demand to German Govt. at Conference of Ambassadors to revoke military measures sanctioned in E. Prussia. French Govt. continues to oppose withdrawal of Allied troops from Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscite zones.	368
273	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 2580	Aug. 10	Refers to No. 114; transmits copy of amended note warning neutral governments against importing German war material, and reports arrangements for its presentation.	369
274	TO FRENCH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London	Aug. 12	Refers to No. 272: H.M.G. are opposed to German formation of new armed forces in E. Prussia, but do not favour definite demand for disbandment of militia. Gives H.M.G.'s views on German request to send German troops into plebiscite zones.	370
275	SIR R. GRAHAM The Hague No. 640	Aug. 12	Refers to No. 79, and transmits memo. by Lt.-Col. Temperley on continued leakage of war material from Germany into Netherlands. Reports Allied note will be addressed to neutral governments protesting against arms traffic with Germany.	371
276	GEN. NOLLET Berlin No. 964	Aug. 12	Demands of Lt.-Gen. von Cramon revision of order issued by Gen. von Seeckt, asserting that Military Control Commission officers must be accompanied on visits of inspection by German liaison officers.	372
277	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 692	Aug. 13	Transmits details of new 'Escherich' organization, and reports Herr Escherich's recent account of his aims.	373
278	MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 59	Aug. 13	Reports difficulties of disarmament in face of spread of Herr Escherich's 'Orgesch'. Transmits views of Herr von Kahr and Dr. Schlittenbauer on friction between Bavarian Govt. and Central Govt. over disarmament and Berlin control of imports and exports.	375

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
279	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 728	Aug. 20	Reports M.F.A. alleges proof of shipment of German war material to Soviet Army, while Poland practically unable to get arms.	377
280	AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin	Aug. 21	Reports to Marshal Foch on German progress in executing aeronautical terms of Peace Treaty.	378
281	MR. KIDSTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 578	Aug. 23	Cites instance quoted by M.F.A. to prove German attempt to involve Finnish Govt. in illicit arms traffic.	379
282	HERR GÖPPERT Berlin Ref. F. 9. 786	Aug. 31	Reports to Gen. Nollet on progress in handing over and destruction of aircraft equipment. Protests against high valuation placed on exported material by Allies under Spa Protocol, and asks for facts on which assessment is based.	380
283	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1071	Sept. 6	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decision to reject German Govt.'s request for additional troops to guard Russian troops taking refuge in E. Prussia, and for organizing a special militia there. Russian troops are to be disarmed. Polish Govt. are to be asked to enable them to cross Corridor from E. Prussia to Germany.	381
284	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 414	Sept. 7	Refers to No. 279 and reports British Control Commission representative's suggestion that Polish Govt. should protest officially to German Govt. and to Conference of Ambassadors respecting weapons captured from Soviet troops.	382
285	MR. KNATCHBULL- HUGESSEN The Hague Tel. No. 158	Sept. 10	Reports offer of 257 German aeroplane engines, which should have been surrendered to Aeronautical Commission, for sale to Netherland firm.	383
286	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1082	Sept. 10	Reports consideration by Conference of Ambassadors of question of German war material wrongfully removed into Netherlands after Armistice, and of report of Aeronautical Committee on German reparation for illegal destruction of zeppelins.	383
287	GERMAN AMBASSADOR London A 1504	Sept. 14	Denies that Polish Press Bureau reports of capture of German rifles from Bolshevik troops are proof of illicit trade between Germany and Soviet Republic.	384
288	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1102	Sept. 16	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion, on Sept. 16, on Germany's reluctance to deliver material required for armament of light cruisers and destroyers for French and Italian fleets. Considers lack of provision in Treaty for imposing non-execution penalties, and records decision to address further Allied note to German Govt.	385

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
289 AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin E.A.M./4877/39	Sept. 16	Asserts to Major Wagenfuhr that aeronautical material is still hidden in Germany and there is liaison by aircraft between Germany and Soviet Russia. Calls on German Govt. to compel surrender and destruction of material forthwith.	386
290 MR. SARGENT Paris	Sept. 18	Letter to Mr. Phipps, referring to letter mentioned in No. 273, note 2, and endorsing suggestion for future procedure in presenting Allied notes to neutral governments.	388
291 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 848	Sept. 20	Refers to Major Mockett's report of Bolshevik soldiers escaping from E. Prussia and armed Germans passing through Lithuania to join Bolsheviks, and suggests strong protests in Berlin.	388
292 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 3141	Sept. 20	Refers to No. 286: instructions to ask Conference of Ambassadors to allow British reparation claim to be met in form other than additional zeppelins.	389
293 TO MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 54	Sept. 20	Asserts Orgesch is in same category as Einwohnerwehr, and must be disbanded under Article 177 of Peace Treaty.	389
294 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 3201	Sept. 25	Instructions to represent, at Conference of Ambassadors, H.M.G.'s belief that Allied Govts. have no treaty rights justifying occupation of Duisburg, Mannheim and Karlsruhe.	390
295 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1154	Oct. 2	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of further German note on E. Prussian militia, and of escape into Lithuania of interned Bolshevik soldiers. Refers to No. 292, and reports Conference's decision that German Govt. pay in specie, where desired, to value of destroyed zeppelins. Refers to No. 286, and records Conference's decision that German Govt. be pressed for reply to Allied note on war material lying in Netherlands.	391
296 MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 70	Oct. 2	Refers to No. 293, and alleges Bavarian Govt. has no intention of disarming or disbanding Einwohnerwehr, particularly as generally felt that French occupation of Ruhr inevitable.	393
297 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1163	Oct. 5	Refers to No. 288, and reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of German note accepting surrender of equipment for five light cruisers for French and Italian navies, and Ambassadors' refusal to agree that value be charged to Germany's credit on Reparation Account.	395
298 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1175	Oct. 8	Refers to No. 283, and reports Conference of Ambassadors' approval of Control Commission's recommendation to reject German application to maintain special militia in E. Prussia. Disbandment to be completed by Oct. 15.	395



	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
299	AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin E.A.M./5.994/2	Oct. 8	Refers to No. 282, and proposes to German M.F.A. method for arriving at final sum to be paid in respect of aeronautical material exported from Germany in contravention of Article 202 of Peace Treaty.	396
300	REICHSTREUHAND- GESELLSCHAFT MEMO. Berlin A.K.g.Tgb. No. IV (a/37.251)	Oct. 8	Instructs all branch offices to ensure that no Entente officers enter premises unaccompanied by German liaison officers.	397
301	MR. SEEDS Berlin No. 1020	Oct. 13	Transmits copy of Munich despatch communicating Bavarian P.M.'s protest against Naval Control Commission's demand for destruction of diesel motors.	398
302	MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 74	Oct. 13	Refers to No. 293, and reports statement by Bavarian P.M. that Einwohnerwehr will be disarmed as soon as Bolshevist danger past, and will then no longer violate Article 177 of Treaty.	399
303	GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER Berlin No. E11042/106931	Oct. 14	Refers to No. 104, and asserts to Air Commodore Masterman that German Govt. is within its rights in organizing squadrons for training aerial police.	400
304	TO MR. SEEDS Berlin No. 962	Oct. 15	Refers to No. 296: instructions to warn German Govt. of responsibility for Bavarian Einwohnerwehr.	401
305	MR. SEEDS Berlin Tel. No. 567	Oct. 19	Refers to No. 302, and reports that French Control Commission is about to raise Bavarian disarmament question urgently at Paris.	401
306	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1066	Oct. 21	Refers to Nos. 304 and 305, and reports German Govt.'s attitude to Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, and alleged impossibility of taking action while Bavarian public opinion unanimously supports organization.	402
307	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 3215	Oct. 23	Transmits note of Oct. 14, from Marshal Foch to President of Conference of Ambassadors, reporting on Germany's execution of Spa protocol and Boulogne agreement, up to Oct. 1.	403
308	GERMAN AMBASSADOR London	Oct. 26	<i>Aide mémoire</i> protesting against extension of time-limit in Article 201 during which Germany may not manufacture aircraft, and seeking more liberal interpretation of Article 202, under which aircraft and installations must be surrendered or destroyed.	407
309	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1085	Oct. 27	Reports German press outcry against Naval Control Commission's alleged intention to destroy all diesel motors, and transmits Admiral Charlton's denial and projected semi-official communication on subject.	409

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>310</b> MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 83	Oct. 29	Refers to co-operation between Einwohnerwehr and Heimatwehr asserted in No. 278, and reports alleged instance of Einwohnerwehr's sending arms into Tyrol.	411
<b>311</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1267	Oct. 30	Refers to No. 295 and reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion and decision on compensation for destruction of zeppelins; also its decision to demand German Govt.'s apology for insults to Allied officers, and, referring to No. 297, its consideration and decision on question of equipment for light cruisers and destroyers destined for French and Italian fleets.	411
<b>312</b> GENERAL STAFF War Office	Nov. 5	Detailed memo. on Germany's progress in executing military articles of Peace Treaty. Concludes only real violations are failure to disband and disarm Orgesch and Einwohnerwehr, failure to disarm civil population, and export of war material.	413
<b>313</b> LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1143	Nov. 6	Records progress achieved in German disarmament, based on reports on navy by Admiral Charlton, army by Gen. Bingham, and air force by Air Commodore Masterman.	427
<b>314</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1307	Nov. 8	Records indecisive discussion by Conference of Ambassadors on divergent views of Conference and Reparations Commission regarding sale of German war material. Reports decision to drop supplementary disarmament protocol of Spa, and to approve certain proposals of Military Control Commission, and also text of note on compensation for destruction of zeppelins referred to in No. 311. Records approval of joint note to German Govt. on commercial use of submarine diesel engines.	429
<b>315</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1324	Nov. 12	Reports rejection by Conference of Ambassadors, of two German protests against surrender of railway material and hangars under Article 202 of Treaty. Refers to Nos. 294 and 316, and reports consideration of draft reply to German protest regarding Allied detachments in Duisburg, Mannheim and Karlsruhe.	431
<b>316</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 3388	Nov. 12	Transmits copy of draft reply to German protest of June 10 on Allied occupation of towns on right bank of Rhine, referred to in No. 315.	432
<b>317</b> LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 11	Nov. 13	Reports conversation with Gen. Bingham on control of armaments after completion of work of Disarmament Commission, and asserts need for definite policy, preferably in agreement with the French.	433

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
318	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1167	Nov. 15	Transmits memo. by Capt. Warburton on dissolution of Orgesch, and intelligence summary by Lt.-Col. Longhurst reporting on Reichswehr, police, Einwohnerwehr, foreign enlistment, and Orgesch, for the week Nov. 6 to 12.	435
319	RHINE ARMY MILITARY NOTES	Nov. 15	Notes on new military Stahlhelm organization in Hanover and Bremen, and its association with Orgesch.	442
320	SIR R. GRAHAM The Hague No. 838	Nov. 16	Reports German individual efforts to dispose of large store of war material deposited in Netherlands, and assurance of M.F.A. that Netherlands Govt. will refuse authorization for its sale.	443
321	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1239	Nov. 17	Refers to Nos. 315 and 316, and approves draft reply to German protest against Allied detachments on right bank of Rhine, enclosed in latter.	444
322	MR. SMALLBONES Munich No. 89	Nov. 17	Analyses composition of Landtag, and reports political debate centring on Bamberg programme of Bayerische Volkspartei, and question of Einwohnerwehr.	444
323	TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 1249	Nov. 22	Refers to Nos. 297 and 311, and suggests Allied acceptance of German proposal that French and Italians use equipment of light-cruisers and destroyers concerned, debiting its value against their reparation accounts.	446
324	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1068	Nov. 22	Refers to No. 317, and points out that question of machinery for giving effect to Article 213 of Treaty is matter for League of Nations Council.	447
325	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 487	Nov. 23	Records his views on chief military questions under discussion: disarmament, disbandment of Einwohnerwehr, and occupation of Ruhr.	448
326	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 592	Nov. 24	Reports Cuxhaven attack by German troops on British and French officers checking arms at Grimmerhorn Naval Barracks.	450
327	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 602	Nov. 28	Refers to No. 326, and reports Admiral Charlton's demand for apology from German Govt., dismissal and punishment of Commandant, and full enquiry.	450
328	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1260	Dec. 7	Transmits political and social report by Maj.-Gen. Malcolm on recent visit to Bavaria, with special reference to Einwohnerwehr.	451
329	LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 3653	Dec. 8	Reports and concurs in Gen. Desticker's views on disarmament of Bavarian Einwohnerwehr.	453
330	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1269	Dec. 11	Refers to No. 325, and discusses Dr. Simons's note to Gen. Nolle on Einwohnerwehr, disagreeing with latter's opinion thereon.	454

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
331	AIR COMMODORE MASTERMAN Berlin	Dec. 11	Memo. to the Allied Military Committee of Versailles on control of civil aircraft production in Germany.	455
332	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 1294	Dec. 14	Reports opinion of British representatives on Control Commissions that German attitude stiffening, and discusses reasons for it.	457
333	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 628	Dec. 15	Reports German apology and promise of compensation for Cuxhaven incident.	458
334	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 629	Dec. 16	Reports Gen. Nollet's uncompromising reply to German Govt. on Einwohnerwehr question, and suggests re-examination of whole matter in light of No. 330.	458
335	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 1303	Dec. 16	Refers to Nos. 330 and 332: comments on Gen. Nollet's reply to German Govt. on question of Einwohnerwehr, and discusses Communist danger.	459
336	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 172	Dec. 17	Refers to No. 334, and endorses Lord Kilmarnock's view of Gen. Nollet's reply.	461
337	GERMAN AMBASSADOR London	Dec. 17	<i>Aide mémoire</i> requesting H.M.G. to support German application to Conference of Ambassadors for delay in disarming Küstrin and Königsberg.	461
338	LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 1407	Dec. 22	Reports decision of Conference of Ambassadors to meet German request that Allies renounce right to seize as merchant tonnage war vessels being converted into merchant ships.	462
339	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 632	Dec. 23	Reports conversation with M.F.A., who asserted German Govt. had not stiffened attitude towards Treaty execution, but question of disarming Bavarian Einwohnerwehr was difficult one, to be tackled slowly.	463
340	MR. GOSLING Frankfort No. 18	Dec. 23	Reports details concerning order alleged to have been placed by German Reichswehr Minister for military equipment destined for Russia.	463
341	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 633	Dec. 26	Reports and discusses demands recommended by Military Control Commission in reply to new German note on Einwohnerwehr question.	465
342	LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 1420	Dec. 27	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of Gen. Nollet's report on sale of German war material outside Germany. Refers to No. 314, and reports discussion of Spa extension of time-limit laid down in Article 201 of Peace Treaty, and rejection of German request to maintain aerial police. Records acceptance of rulings under Article 202, and on armament of coastal fortifications. Reports discussion on activities of German arsenals, and	465

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
			agreement to instruct Allied Military Committee of Versailles to draft report on German execution of military clauses of Peace Treaty and Spa Protocol.	
343	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 637	Dec. 28	Reports conversation with M.F.A. concerning instructions sent to German representatives in Allied capitals, and tension over difficulties with Control Commission.	468
344	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 638	Dec. 28	Refers to No. 343, and reports that M.F.A. spoke in similar vein to French Ambassador on Dec. 26, concerning Control Commission's note on Sicherheitspolizei.	470
345	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 1359	Dec. 29	Suggests extended occupation of Cologne and Coblenz bridgeheads as alternative to Ruhr occupation, should it be necessary to impose penalty for non-execution of Peace Treaty.	470
346	TO LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 4169	Dec. 30	Instructions to report on attitude of Japanese representative when Conference of Ambassadors considers German request for extended time to surrender guns in Küstrin and Königsberg fortresses.	471
347	LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 3865	Dec. 30	Refers to No. 342, and transmits memo. prepared for Herr von Kahr on Bavarian Einwohnerwehr. Repudiates contention that Einwohnerwehr not connected with regular military organization.	472
348	TO SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome Tel. No. 550 and SIR C. ELIOT Tokyo Tel. No. 396	Dec. 31	Instructions to urge Italian and Japanese Govts. to support proposal that Conference of Ambassadors should instruct Control Commission not to make political communications to German Govt. without Conference's approval.	476
349	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 640	Dec. 31	Refers to Nos. 343 and 344, and summarizes personal letter from M.F.A. denying stiffer German attitude towards execution of Peace Treaty and Spa Protocol.	476
350	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	Dec. 31	Memo. on conversation with M. de Fleuriat concerning German Govt.'s attitude towards disarmament and in their dealings with Allied Govts.	477
351	TO LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 4190	Dec. 31	Refers to No. 342, and states that H.M.G. will await report on execution of military clauses before deciding on attitude towards German Govt. Refers to No. 348, and instructs Lord Hardinge to draw attention of French Govt. to need for asserting Conference of Ambassadors' authority over Control Commission on political matters.	478
352	LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 3897	Dec. 31	Refers to No. 342, and transmits detailed reports on progress of German execution of military, air, and naval clauses of Peace Treaty and Spa Protocol.	479

# CHAPTER V

## Reparation by Germany July 6–December 31, 1920

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
353	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	July 24	Reports conversation with M. Marsal concerning proposal that H.M.G. consent to loan instead of French Treasury having to find difference between internal and external price of German coal. Urges concessions to assist M. Millerand's Govt.	495
354	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	July 26	Note recording Portuguese Minister's expression of his Govt.'s gratitude for H.M.G.'s support on reparation claims at Brussels and Spa.	496
355	LORD D'ABERNON Warsaw	July 30	Transmits report on German financial situation in view of forthcoming Geneva discussions, with detailed notes on taxation, currency, and expenditure appended.	496
356	TO BELGIAN AMBASSADOR London	Aug. 10	Suggests Sept. 20 for opening of Geneva Conference, and that Allied delegations include subordinate rather than principal members of Reparation Commission.	503
357	MR. ROBERTSON Coblenz No. 432	Aug. 18	Transmits Capt. Georgi's report on coal situation in Occupied Territory for fortnight ending Aug. 15, with particular reference to likely effects of Spa Agreement.	504
358	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1057	Sept. 2	Transmits French Govt.'s view that Geneva Conference cannot conveniently meet on Sept. 20, as Brussels Conference opens on Sept. 24.	508
359	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 976	Sept. 3	Refers to No. 358: instructions to inform French Govt. that Belgian, German and Italian Govts. have agreed on Sept. 24 for Geneva Conference, and to urge French Govt. to accept this date.	509
360	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1068	Sept 6	Reports M. Paléologue's unofficial intimation that French Govt. would not agree to date for Geneva Conference. They had received U.S.A. protest against Geneva meeting, and Belgian Govt. had made important reservations.	510
361	SIR J. BRADBURY Paris	Sept. 8	Discusses Belgian and French Prime Ministers' joint representation for postponement of Geneva Conference, and examination of German indemnity question by Reparation Commission.	510
362	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1078	Sept. 10	Refers to Nos. 358 to 360 and 366. Transmits note from M.F.A. asserting Geneva and Brussels Conferences cannot be simultaneous as French Govt. insist on same representatives at both, and suggesting that Geneva Conference be dropped or postponed and Reparation Commission meet a German delegation in Paris.	513

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
363 MR. PARR Brussels No. 650	Sept. 10	Reports press interview by M. Delacroix concerning his negotiations with M. Millerand, particularly with reference to reparation.	514
364 To SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 732	Sept. 11	Refers to No. 362, and asserts French attitude towards Geneva meeting is negation of Allied policy since San Remo. Requests explanation for U.S.A. attitude reported in No. 362.	515
365 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 995	Sept. 11	Refers to No. 362: H.M.G. will probably protest to French Govt. against proposal that German delegate be summoned to Paris by Reparation Commission. French Govt. policy appears to contradict that adopted by Spa Conference on July 16.	516
366 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2899	Sept. 11	Refers to M.F.A.'s repudiation of H.M.G.'s assertion in No. 359 that Reparation Commission promised German Govt. discussion of coal advances at Geneva before Oct. 1, and transmits memo. by Sir J. Bradbury commenting thereon.	516
367 SIR J. BRADBURY Paris	Sept. 11	Reports to Chancellor of Exchequer on probable postponement of Geneva Conference, referring to attitude of French Belgian, and U.S.A. Govts., and desirability of preliminary enquiry by Reparation Commission.	518
368 SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 628	Sept. 12	Refers to Nos. 362, 364, and 365, and reports Secretary of State's sympathy with H.M.G.'s desire for German co-operation and exchange of views in Treaty execution. If President agrees, American Representatives at Paris will be instructed accordingly.	520
369 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1089	Sept. 13	Refers to No. 365, and reports M. Millerand's press statement, after conversation with Signor Giolitti concerning Geneva Conference and role of Reparation Commission.	521
370 To SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 743	Sept. 14	Refers to No. 368, and enquires whether instructions were sent to American Representative on Reparation Commission to oppose French Govt.'s policy on postponement of Geneva Conference.	522
371 To MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 430	Sept. 14	Refers to Nos. 362 and 369: instructions to seek reassurance on Italian Govt.'s attitude towards Geneva Conference.	522
372 To MR. PARR Brussels Tel. No. 153	Sept. 14	Refers to No. 362: instructions to express H.M.G.'s astonishment at Belgian Govt.'s change of front, and refusal to abandon policy accepted at Spa.	523
373 MR. WATERLOW Foreign Office	Sept. 14	Memo. refers to Nos. 362 and 368, and records decision at Lord Curzon's meeting, attended by Sir L. Worthington-Evans, to make vigorous protest to French Govt. after receipt of Belgian explanation and of particulars of U.S. Govt.'s action foreshadowed in No. 367.	523

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
374	MR. PARR Brussels Tel. No. 107	Sept. 15	Refers to No. 372, and reports P.M.'s explanation of Belgian change of attitude towards Geneva Conference.	524
375	SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 638	Sept. 15	Refers to No. 370, and reports U.S. Govt.'s agreement with aims of H.M.G. concerning reparation and Geneva Conference.	525
376	SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 639	Sept. 15	Refers to No. 375, and reports that American representative will probably be appointed to attend Geneva Conference and support British policy there.	526
377	MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 426	Sept. 17	Refers to Nos. 362 and 371, and reports M.F.A.'s official statement that Signor Giolitti advocates postponement, not suppression, of Geneva Conference.	527
378	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1022	Sept. 18	Refers to Nos. 362 and 375, and refutes French Govt.'s contentions in favour of abandoning Geneva Conference. Instructions to rebut French arguments and to urge that Geneva meeting be held immediately after Brussels Conference.	527
379	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1107	Sept. 19	Refers to No. 378, and suggests approach to French Govt. be delayed three days until after Presidential election.	529
380	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1030	Sept. 20	Agrees to suggestion in No. 379.	530
381	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 550	Sept. 20	Reports M.F.A.'s concern at French press attitude towards Geneva Conference, and his proposal that Allied experts be invited to Berlin to discuss financial question in preparation for Conference.	530
382	EARL OF DERBY Paris	Sept. 20	Reports hopeful conversation with M. Millerand regarding Geneva Conference and face-saving proposal put forward by Lord Derby.	531
383	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 108	Sept. 21	Refers to No. 214, and reports M. Delacroix's belief that insistence on immediate Geneva Conference would lead to French occupation of Ruhr, with some Belgian support. Transmits his proposal that Reparation Commission meet in Geneva together with Ministers.	531
384	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 318	Sept. 25	Refers to No. 217, and reports H.M.G.'s consideration of question of waiving Treaty right to seize enemy bank balances.	532
385	MR. SEEDS Berlin No. 1012	Oct. 11	Refers to No. 384, and asks leave to issue reassuring statement on possible seizure of bank balances, which is causing apprehension in German official, financial and commercial circles.	533
386	TO MR. SEEDS Berlin Tel. No. 327	Oct. 15	Instructions to inform German Govt. that H.M.G. intend to waive right to seize property of German nationals in U.K. in case of voluntary German default.	533



	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
387	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 3394	Oct. 16	Transmits copy of No. 386, and instructions to inform Conference of Ambassadors of H.M.G.'S action.	534
388	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 570	Oct. 22	Reports conversation with M.F.A. who is content to await London-Paris negotiations concerning Geneva Conference, provided Brussels Conference only preparatory to Geneva and not a substitute.	534
389	EARL OF DERBY Paris	Oct. 23	Reports interview with M. Leygues, who anxiously awaits H.M.G.'s reply to French note of Oct. 20 on reparation.	535
390	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1140	Oct. 26	Informs Lord Derby that French note of Oct. 20 on reparation is unsatisfactory. Suggests revised form in which French proposal for Reparation Commission meeting at Brussels and Ministers' Conference at Geneva would be acceptable.	535
391	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1247	Oct. 27	Reports indignation at H.M.G.'s having informed German Govt. of its intentions respecting treatment of German property in U.K. without previous Allied consultation.	536
392	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 28	Comments on French attitude towards reparation question: no attempt will be made to take assessment of damages from Reparation Commission; H.M.G. will agree to Conference postponement and will if necessary adopt Delacroix proposal.	537
393	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 3261	Oct. 28	Enlarges on No. 391, and reports bitter outcry in press. H.M.G.'s informing French Govt. in advance would have done much to forestall criticism.	537
394	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1258	Oct. 29	Refers to No. 391, and asks what explanations to give at Conference of Ambassadors, should French Govt. raise question of H.M.G.'s waiving confiscation rights over German property in U.K.	539
395	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1260	Oct. 29	Reports M. Berthelot's private opinion on Brussels and Geneva Conferences, and suggests M. Berthelot be sent to discuss matter with Lord Curzon and P.M.	540
396	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1262	Oct. 29	Refers to No. 390, and puts forward four suggested proposals to French Govt. on Conferences of Brussels and Geneva, which would give Reparation Commission appearance of authority, while reserving reality to Governments.	540
397	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 3557	Oct. 29	Reports on, and transmits copy of, M. de Fleuriau's representations on behalf of French Govt. against H.M.G.'s release of German private property in U.K., together with own reply, and complaint against attitude of French press.	541

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
398	TO M. DE FLEURIAU London	Oct. 29	Explains British policy of waiving rights of confiscation over German private property in U.K.: H.M.G.'s decision was result, not of German pressure, but of representations by British commercial and financial interests.	548
399	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1266	Oct. 30	Refers to No. 391, and reports French press assertions that no Allied Govt. should act under Treaty without previous agreement with others.	549
400	MR. BLACKETT Treasury	Nov. 3 or 4	Memo. refers to No. 390, and records alternative suggestions for Lord Derby to communicate to French Govt., decided upon by Lord Curzon, Lord Derby, Chancellor of Exchequer, Sir L. Worthington-Evans, and Mr. Blackett.	549
401	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1131	Nov. 4	Refers to critical German financial position, and insists that question at Brussels should be not what Germany should pay but what she can pay.	551
402	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1303	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 400, and reports French Govt.'s acceptance of H.M.G.'s proposals with two modifications.	552
403	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1304	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 402, and transmits text of French note of Nov. 6 accepting H.M.G.'s proposals.	553
404	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	Nov. 8	Records German Ambassador's concern at statement that Germans would be admitted to Geneva Conference only in consultative capacity, and his own explanation of procedure likely to be followed.	554
405	MR. PRENTICE Berlin British/130	Nov. 8	Report for British Embassy, Berlin, on work of Reparation Commission's 'Bureau de Liquidation du Matériel de Guerre'.	555
406	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1213	Nov. 9	Refers to discrepancies in French standpoint between No. 402 and No. 403, and rejects latter, while willing to accept the modifications made in No. 402.	556
407	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1319	Nov. 10	Refers to No. 406: enumerates textual changes which French Govt. will concede, and asks whether H.M.G. accepts them.	557
408	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Nov. 11	Refers to No. 407, and reports receipt of note in this vein from M. Leygues, with request for early reply and permission to publish.	558
409	LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 3587	Dec. 2	Reports conversation with M.F.A. on French Govt.'s attitude towards reparation payments, particularly in view of reconstruction of devastated regions.	558
410	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels	Dec. 5	Records conversation with M. Delacroix, who reported M. Poincaré's recently expressed views on occupation of Frankfort, reparation question, and occupation of Ruhr basin.	559
411	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 622	Dec. 9	Reports on attitude which German Govt. will adopt at Brussels Conference, as endorsed by M.F.A.	561

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
412	TO LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 4094	Dec. 21	Instructions to ascertain French Govt.'s attitude towards Allied exercise of Treaty rights, whereby Germany is compelled to build merchant ships in German yards for account of Allied Govts. for five years.	562

## PART II. PLEBISCITES

### CHAPTER VI

#### The Plebiscite in Schleswig January 10–July 10, 1920

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
413	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 18	Jan. 10	Colonel Trew reports arrangements for evacuation of German troops and Allied occupation of whole plebiscite zone.	563
414	SIR C. MARLING Copenhagen Tel. Unnumbered	Jan. 13	Refers to press report of arrangement between Supreme Council and Germany prolonging evacuation period, and requests precise information.	564
415	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Jan. 14	Refers to No. 413, and gives approximate date for Northern Zone plebiscite.	564
416	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg Tel. No. 1	Jan. 27	Reports arrival of International Commission.	565
417	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg Tel. Unnumbered	Feb. 11	Reports to Conference of Ambassadors preliminary count in Northern Zone plebiscite.	565
418	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 1	Feb. 12	Reports International Commission's settlement of three important outstanding questions: Agreement with Germany covering exchange of coal, &c., for cattle and dairy produce; provision of corn for towns; Danish occupation of 1st Zone. Reports Commission's preparations at Flensburg for plebiscite, and completion of German evacuation.	565
419	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 214	Feb. 25	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decision that Schleswig Commission should administer whole plebiscite area until delimitation of new Dano-German boundary.	572
420	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 2	Mar. 1	Gives further details of 1st Zone plebiscite on Feb. 10; reports flag incident at Flensburg and replacement as Polizeimeister of Capt. Bruun, French protégé, by M. Hallgren.	573

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
421	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 256	Mar. 6	Sir. J. Bradbury informs Chancellor of Exchequer of Reparation Commission's decision to suspend German delivery of Schleswig ships pending plebiscite.	576
422	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 3	Mar. 7	Refers to No. 420 and reports good results from change in police command and other precautionary measures taken in view of approaching plebiscite.	577
423	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen No. 68	Mar. 13	Transmits copy of despatch from Naval Attaché concerning strategical aspects of Schleswig frontier.	580
424	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg Tel. No. 5	Mar. 15	Reports trend of voting shows little support for Denmark.	581
425	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen No. 76	Mar. 19	Considers attitude of Danish parties and press towards 2nd Zone plebiscite results.	581
426	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 5	Mar. 20	Reports on conduct of 2nd Zone plebiscite: surprisingly decisive German victory facilitates fixing of Dano-German frontier.	583
427	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 6	Mar. 23	Refers to No. 422, and reports justifiable fears of Danish minority in 2nd Zone, now that German victory achieved. Suggests autonomous state comprising middle and southern Schleswig and Holstein as only permanent solution.	585
428	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 8	Apr. 2	Reports Commission's discussion after 2nd Zone plebiscite, of Clausen Line as 1st Zone boundary, with minor modifications mainly in favour of Denmark.	590
429	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 9	Apr. 2	Comments on results of recent plebiscites.	595
430	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg No. 15	Apr. 17	Refers to No. 428, and reports difficulties over frontier question and delay by M. Claudel in producing a minority report. Reports visit to Copenhagen and analyses Danish political crisis.	598
431	MR. BRUDENELL- BRUCE Flensburg Tel. No. 2 [sic]	Apr. 28	Requests Sir C. Marling's approval for insistence that German judges make way for Danes in 1st Zone, and reports that Commission will introduce Danish currency by ordinance.	602
432	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 540	May 5	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of Sir C. Marling's report on plebiscite and Commissioners' divergence of opinion on fixing frontier.	603
433	NOTES OF MEETING OF CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS Paris C.A. 39	May 8	Notes of meeting at which M. Laroche put forward views held by M. Claudel and Norwegian delegate to International Commission—in opposition to those of Sir C. Marling—on delimitation of Schleswig frontier and interpretation of Article 110 of Treaty. Records discussion and majority	604

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		adoption of Sir C. Marling's line, and Conference's request to Sir C. Marling and M. Laroche to prepare proposals concerning minorities, &c.	
434 MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 499	May 8	Reports departure for Paris of unofficial Flensburg delegation advocating internationalization of 2nd Zone, and of quasi-official delegate, Prof. W. Kruse, to act as intermediary between delegation and Danish Minister.	613
435 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 542	May 10	Refers to No. 432: endorses Sir C. Marling's interpretation of Treaty in respect of frontier line, and instructs Lord Derby to urge Conference of Ambassadors to constitute Frontier Delimitation Commission without delay.	614
436 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 573	May 11	Reports his opposition to Danish Minister's request that Conference of Ambassadors should reconsider decision on frontier.	614
437 LORD HARDINGE Foreign Office	May 12	Record of conversation with Danish Minister concerning F.O. reception of unofficial Danish delegation, on its way to Paris to press for inclusion of Flensburg in 1st Zone and internationalization of 2nd Zone.	615
438 SIR C. MARLING Paris	May 12	Letter to Mr. E. Phipps, referring to No. 427. Discusses pros and cons of an autonomous Schleswig-Holstein.	616
439 MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 519	May 13	Refers to No. 434, and reports M.F.A.'s views on protection of Danish minority in 2nd Zone.	617
440 EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1458	May 13	Reports discussion with Prof. Kruse on protection of Danish minority in 2nd Zone, and latter's wish to see Earl Curzon in London.	617
441 MR. BRUDENELL-BRUCE Copenhagen	May 13	Reports on negotiations leading up to Danish occupation of 1st Zone, and proposed ordinances to introduce Kroner currency.	618
442 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	May 14	Refers to No. 439, and reports proposal to introduce into Treaty of Versailles clause permitting 2nd Zone Danes option of nationality.	621
443 EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 583	May 14	Records refusal of Conference of Ambassadors to reconsider case of new Schleswig frontier, and refers to No. 440. Reports consideration of arrangements for winding up Commission and transferring territory to Germany and Denmark.	622
444 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 562	May 15	Refers to No. 436, and approves refusal to reopen frontier question.	623
445 TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen No. 217	May 17	Records interview with Prof. Kruse, and H.M.G.'s refusal to ignore plebiscite result and propose internationalization of 2nd Zone.	623

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>446</b> To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 579	May 18	Instructs Lord Derby to urge speedy notification of frontier line, so as to speed up withdrawal of British troops and dissolution of International Commission.	625
<b>447</b> To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 580	May 18	Refers to No. 446, and authorizes suggestion that Danish and German Govts. be informed that formal notification of new frontier will be made about June 3. British troops will leave on same day.	625
<b>448</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 597	May 18	Reports French draft note to German and Danish Govts. on withdrawal of Allied troops and acceptance of Convention. Regrets ultimatum and suggests invitation to sign draft convention without fixed time-limit.	625
<b>449</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 595	May 18	Reports on visit from Danish deputation from Flensburg, urging international belt to secure protection of minorities in plebiscite areas.	626
<b>450</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 596	May 18	Refers to No. 449, and reports deputation's contention that French Govt. would agree to international belt but H.M.G. objected.	627
<b>451</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 598	May 19	Refers to No. 443, and reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of draft Convention, together with amendments suggested by Danish Govt. and French proposal for arbitral commission to decide subsequent disputes. Refers to Nos. 446 to 448, and reports discussion and approval of draft note to accompany Convention.	627
<b>452</b> MR. BRUDENELL-BRUCE Flensburg	May 20	Refers to No. 441: and reports introduction of Kroner currency, and resultant protests backed by Dr. Mezger, whom German Govt. has since agreed to recall.	629
<b>453</b> To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 593	May 21	Refers to No. 451: instructions to support Danish claim for freedom from German war taxes for those in plebiscite zone who opt for Danish nationality and have to leave Germany for Denmark.	633
<b>454</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 613	May 22	Refers to No. 451, and reports Conference of Ambassadors' further consideration of draft Convention and withdrawal of Allied troops from 2nd Zone.	633
<b>455</b> To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 603	May 26	Refers to No. 450: instructions to seek explanation from M. Cambon, and register protest if necessary.	634
<b>456</b> EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 630	May 26	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration and approval of draft Convention and covering letter to Danish and German Govts. requesting reply within ten days.	635
<b>457</b> SIR C. MARLING Flensburg	May 26	Reports negotiations leading to agreement that Danish Govt. should take over military and administrative occupation of North Schleswig from May 5.	636

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
458	MR. MALKIN Foreign Office	May 31	Records conversation with Prof. Kruse on internationalization of whole or part of 2nd Zone, and own advice that such action impossible under Treaty.	638
459	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 574	June 2	Reports widespread Danish press reproduction of <i>Le Temps</i> article in favour of internationalization of 2nd Zone, despite assurance of Danish Minister in Paris that French Govt. is opposed to scheme.	640
460	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 579	June 4	Reports Danish Govt.'s decision to sign Schleswig Convention without alteration, and King of Denmark's intention of visiting Schleswig.	640
461	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen No. 201	June 8	Reports Danish press reaction to Conference of Ambassadors' decision on new Danish frontier, and refers to article in <i>Le Temps</i> favouring internationalization.	641
462	MR. BRUDENELL-BRUCE Flensburg	June 9	Reports on peaceful introduction of Kroner currency, and gradual turning over of administration in 1st Zone to Danish officials. Records Dr. Köster's comments on draft treaty between Germany and Denmark, and reports arrangements for withdrawal of Allied troops.	643
463	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 695	June 11	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of German request for time extension before submitting observations on Schleswig Convention. Records decision formally to notify German and Danish delegations in Paris of new frontier line on June 15; and Danish Minister's fears for minority in 2nd Zone.	647
464	SIR C. MARLING Flensburg Tel. No. 19	June 13	Refers to No. 463, and discounts as a political move Danish representation against German Govt.'s alleged intention of prosecuting minority leaders in 2nd Zone.	648
465	TO SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 698	June 15	Refers to No. 463, and endorses Sir C. Marling's view as expressed in No. 464.	649
466	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 742	June 19	Reports consideration by Conference of Ambassadors of German observations on draft Schleswig Convention and Danish request for immediate transfer of sovereignty.	649
467	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 358	June 23	Transmits message from H.M. the King thanking Danish King and nation for reception accorded Admiral Sheppard and Schleswig force on visit to Copenhagen.	651
468	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 765	June 26	Refers to No. 466, and requests information about signature by Dominions and India of Schleswig Treaty on July 2.	651
469	SIR C. MARLING Copenhagen Tel. No. 610	June 27	Reports passage by Danish Parliament of bill to incorporate N. Schleswig in Denmark.	652

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
470	To Earl of DERBY Paris Tel. No. 750	June 29	Instructs Lord Derby to see that provision is made for Dominions' representatives to sign Schleswig Treaty at a later date.	652
471	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 793	July 5	Reports signature of Schleswig Treaty on July 5.	653
472	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 629	July 10	Reports Danish rejoicing over union with N. Schleswig.	653

## CHAPTER VII

### The Plebiscite Question in Teschen February 4–August 10, 1920

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
473	MR. WILTON Teschen No. 1	Feb. 4	Reports assumption of office at Teschen by International Commission.	654
474	MR. WILTON Teschen Tel. Unnumbered	Mar. 17	Reports Commission's efforts to restore order after serious strikes by Polish and Czechoslovak miners.	654
475	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 200	Mar. 21	Reports excitement in Poland at events in Teschen, refutations in Diet of Czech allegations against Poles, and accusations of Commission's partiality towards Czechs.	655
476	POLISH MINISTER London	Mar. 24	Asserts necessity for dissolution of Czech gendarmerie, and replacement by Inter-Allied forces, if order is to be restored in Teschen. Signifies willingness for Polish gendarmerie to be also dissolved.	656
477	SIR G. CLERK Prague No. 68	Apr. 1	Transmits memo. by Dr. Benes denouncing Polish terrorism in Teschen and urging an increase of Inter-Allied garrison and representations to Polish Govt.	658
478	MR. WILTON Teschen No. 22	Apr. 17	Reports on events leading to recent political disturbances in Teschen mining districts, after Commission's division of plebiscite area into two prefectures, and in particular on obstructive attitude of Polish delegate.	661
479	SIR G. CLERK Prague No. 88	Apr. 26	Transmits Mr. Wilton's view that plebiscite result unlikely to be peaceably accepted, and wish of Dr. Benes that Commission should impose arranged compromise on two Governments.	665
480	MR. WILTON Teschen No. 27	Apr. 29	Reports conversation with Dr. Benes on probable result of Teschen plebiscite, and latter's recommendation of solution by negotiation rather than plebiscite, to avoid armed conflict with Poland.	666
481	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 536	May 4	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' authorization for postponing Teschen plebiscite for two months.	669



	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
482	MR. WILTON Teschen No. 32	May 15	Reports renewed disturbances in mining districts. Refers to No. 480 and asserts Czech belief that Polish secret organization, 'P.O.W.', is deliberately stimulating agitation.	670
483	MR. WILTON Teschen Tel. No. 10	May 20	Summarizes International Commission's telegram to Conference of Ambassadors reporting Polish obstruction and requesting sanction to take plebiscite separately in four specified districts.	674
484	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 354	May 22	Reports conversation with M. Patek, who stated Polish demands preliminary to participation in plebiscite proceedings but agreed to consider any proposal by Dr. Benes for settlement by negotiation.	675
485	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 352	May 25	Refers to Nos. 479 and 484, and urges direct settlement of Teschen question without recourse to plebiscite.	676
486	MR. WILTON Teschen Tel. No. 15	May 29	Summarizes telegram from International Commission to Conference of Ambassadors requesting retention of extra Italian battalion, and also commander and French or Italian officers for Polish gendarmerie, in view of Polish miners' strike. Suggests Polish proposal that Col. Macready be sent to Teschen be refused.	677
487	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 642	May 29	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' approval of Commission's proposal for holding plebiscite separately in districts referred to in No. 483. Requests instructions on H.M.G.'s attitude towards Dr. Benes's proposal that Conference impose frontier if direct agreement impossible between Czech and Polish Govts.	678
488	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 369	May 29	Reports conversations with Counts Goluchowski and Larisch on Teschen problem. French and British Legations in Warsaw doing everything possible to exercise restraining influence on Poles.	679
489	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	May 31	Records conversation with Dr. Benes, who suggested arbitration in Teschen by King of Belgians. Suggests discussion between Lord Derby and French delegates on possible Conference of Ambassadors' proposal to Polish and Czech delegations for adoption of Benes line, or, failing that, arbitration.	681
490	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 638	June 3	Authorizes private conversation with French M.F.A., who favours arbitration by King of Belgians.	683
491	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	June 5	Memo. repudiating Mr. P. Kerr's suggestion that proposed arbitration in Teschen case by King of Belgians constitutes threat to League of Nations Covenant.	683

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
492	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 671	June 6	Records Conference of Ambassadors' decision, on June 5, that arbitration be formally proposed to Polish and Czech Govts., and King of Belgians be approached unofficially.	685
493	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 376	June 6	Reports M.F.A.'s favourable reception of French Minister's proposal for arbitration by King of Belgians, especially if confined to limited area.	686
494	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 650	June 7	Suggests discussion with Dr. Benes and consideration whether Czech and Polish Govts. should not be offered definite acceptance of a partition line as alternative to arbitration.	686
495	MR. WILTON Teschen Tel. No. 19	June 7	Refers to No. 493, and enquires whether British Commissioner should not be withdrawn if arbitration proposal accepted.	687
496	MR. WILTON Teschen No. 41	June 7	Refers to Nos. 478 and 482, and reports further acute tension and strikes in Teschen, and little success for Commission's efforts at conciliation.	687
497	SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 103	June 8	Asks whether he is to associate himself with French and Italian Ministers in formal arbitration proposal to Czech Govt.	693
498	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 659	June 8	Refers to Nos. 492 and 493: H.M. Ministers at Prague and Warsaw will not be instructed to join in formal arbitration proposals until King of Belgians has been approached and U.S. Ambassador receives instructions. Dislikes Polish suggestion of limited arbitration.	693
499	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 685	June 9	Refers to No. 494; reports that Polish Govt. most unlikely to accept Benes line, and will probably only reluctantly agree to arbitration.	694
500	TO SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 95, and SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 259	June 9	Refers to No. 498, and authorizes association with French Minister in presentation of arbitration proposal, if this accords with French Govt.'s instructions.	694
501	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 681	June 11	Commission cannot be withdrawn until arbitration award has been accepted and sovereignty transferred.	694
502	SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 109	June 12	Refers to No. 500, and reports presentation of arbitration proposal to Czech Govt.	695
503	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 696	June 12	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' approval of appointment of special Military Court for certain Teschen civil cases.	695
504	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 704	June 14	Refers to No. 502, and regrets misunderstanding of procedure formulated by Conference of Ambassadors for communicating arbitration proposal to Polish and Czech Govts.	696

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
505	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 1857	June 15	Transmits notes by Mr. E. H. Carr on visit to Teschen: situation much less disquieting than in Upper Silesia and plebiscite result likely to be very favourable to Czechs.	696
506	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. Unnumbered	June 16	Refers to No. 504, and reports having informed Polish Govt. of H.M.G.'s association with arbitration proposal.	699
507	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 751	June 23	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decision to draft formal arbitration proposals to Czech and Polish Govts., now that King of Belgians disposed to arbitrate.	700
508	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 763	June 25	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration and acceptance of draft note referred to in No. 507.	700
509	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 785	July 1	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion of Czech Parliament's rejection of arbitration proposal, and decision to inform Commission and two Governments that plebiscite must take place.	701
510	TO EARL CURZON Spa Tel. No. 8	July 3	Lord Hardinge refers to No. 509, and suggests Conference of Ambassadors should have imposed frontier line or arbitration on two Govts., as plebiscite will probably have fatal results.	702
511	EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2184	July 8	Refers to Nos. 508 and 510, and requests explicit instructions regarding H.M.G.'s attitude, while suggesting plebiscite is best available solution.	702
512	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 814	July 15	Reports acceptance by Conference of Ambassadors of Lord Derby's proposals arising from Spa decision to suspend plebiscite and impose frontier.	704
513	SIR E. CROWE Spa Tel. Unnumbered	July 17	Transmits telegram from Mr. Nicolson reporting difficulty in persuading French and Italians to interpret Spa resolution in sense of Benes line.	704
514	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	July 17	Transmits Mr. Nicolson's report of continuing difficulties regarding acceptance of Benes line, especially with regard to town of Teschen.	705
515	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 800	July 17	Refers to No. 513, and authorizes adoption of compromise line if necessary, though original line preferred.	706
516	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 801	July 18	Refers to No. 514 and gives details of Benes line settlement, with suggestion that Dr. Benes be consulted on doubtful points.	706
517	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 831	July 19	Reports hearing by Conference of Ambassadors of Dr. Benes's plea for line accepted by joint Polish-Czechoslovak Commission in April 1919.	707
518	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 833	July 20	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' hearing of M. Paderewski's presentation of Polish claims in Teschen.	707

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
519	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 837	July 21	Reports discussion and adoption by Conference of Ambassadors of frontiers drawn up by Sir E. Crowe and Dr. Benes at Spa, and safeguards for coal supplies, Polish railway facilities, and mining property.	708
520	SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 544	July 22	Reports U.S. Govt.'s attitude towards proposals of Allies at Spa.	709
521	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 850	July 23	Reports and comments on instructions to U.S. Ambassador, which convey disapproval of Conference's procedure in imposing frontier line, and propose examination by a mixed commission.	709
522	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 818	July 23	Refers to No. 521, and rejects U.S. arguments against imposed line. Instructions to try and secure U.S. Govt.'s assent to immediate settlement.	710
523	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 855	July 23	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion of U.S. Govt.'s views referred to in No. 521, and decision to write to U.S. Ambassador explaining that Czech and Polish representatives at Spa had desired imposed solution.	711
524	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 878	July 27	Reports U.S. Ambassador's observations at meeting of Conference of Ambassadors.	712
525	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 601	July 28	Refers to No. 522: news that all Teschen coal districts have been awarded to Czechs is spreading and will greatly increase Polish demoralization.	713
526	SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 563	July 28	Refers to Nos. 521 to 523: instructions to U.S. Ambassador in Paris on Teschen issue probably emanated from Mr. H. Gibson, Ambassador to Poland, and have been repudiated by State Department.	713
527	SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 564	July 28	Refers to No. 522, and reports U.S. Govt.'s assurance that Ambassador in Paris has been sent further instructions: U.S. Govt. accepts imposed frontier provided details of line are fixed by a commission.	714
528	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 881	July 28	Reports signing of Teschen Declaration by Czechoslovakia and Four Powers. U.S. Ambassador and Polish representative will sign shortly.	715
529	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 513	Aug. 6	Reports reception by Sir P. Loraine of deputation of Polish miners from Teschen protesting against incorporation in Czechoslovakia.	715
530	MR. WILTON Teschen No. 58	Aug. 10	Reports reaction of inhabitants to Conference of Ambassadors' decision on division of Duchy of Teschen, and Spisz and Orawa.	716

# CHAPTER VIII

## The Plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder January 21–September 29, 1920

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
531	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 78	Jan. 21	Reports arrangements for supplying Allied troops for plebiscite areas.	720
532	MR. RENNIE Alenstein No. 1	Feb. 18	Reports on Allied Plebiscite Commission's arrival in Alenstein and taking over of administration.	721
533	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 6	Feb. 25	Reports Polish obstruction of communications between Marienwerder plebiscite area and neighbouring Polish territory and Danzig.	723
534	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 152	Mar. 5	Refers to No. 533, and reports (1) on conversation with M.F.A. concerning difficulties placed by Poles in way of railway communication with Marienwerder and Alenstein plebiscite areas; (2) on Railway Conference at Warsaw.	725
535	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 8	Mar. 10	Refers to No. 533, and forecasts (1) armed conflict between Poland and Germany if obstructive Polish policy continues; (2) difficulties in determining frontier: reports disarmament of Sicherheitspolizei and Einwohnerwehr.	726
536	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	Mar. 11	Informs Sir H. Rumbold that Conference of Ambassadors supports Marienwerder Commission's protests to Polish Govt. against frontier violation: instructions to join in Allied representations.	729
537	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 317	Mar. 11	Instructions to raise question of Polish obstruction of German traffic and trade through Danzig corridor at Ambassadors' Conference, and to suggest joint protest in Warsaw.	729
538	MR. RENNIE Alenstein No. 9	Mar. 11	Refers to No. 532, and reports Commission's smooth handling of administration, and action taken in recent Polish flag incident. Refers to projected disarmament of Sicherheitspolizei and Bürgerwehr.	730
539	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 181	Mar. 19	Refers to No. 537, and reports impression that once Germans hand over railway wagons under supplementary Paris Protocol of Jan. 9 full transport facilities between E. Prussia and Germany will be restored.	733
540	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 203	Mar. 22	Refers to No. 535, and reports conversations concerning terms of last paragraph of Polish note renewing demand for dissolution of Sicherheitspolizei in Alenstein and requesting additional Allied troops to uphold Commission's authority.	734

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
541	TO MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 4	Mar. 24	Instructions to refuse H.M.G.'s assent to any proposal by Commission repealing customs dues on imports and waiving pending dues and fines.	735
542	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 12	Mar. 25	Reports reactionary sympathies of German large landowners, and their strong support for Sicherheitspolizei. Violent Polish propaganda and obstruction of traffic to and from plebiscite area persist.	736
543	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1045	Mar. 27	States H.M.G.'s inability to supply British detachment to increase Allied forces in Marienwerder plebiscite area: instructions to inform Ambassadors' Conference if question raised.	738
544	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 383	Mar. 29	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decision to inform Allenstein Commission that German Govt. have no right to hold elections in plebiscite area.	738
545	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 222	Mar. 30	Refers to No. 540, and urges disarmament of Sicherheitspolizei in Allenstein plebiscite area, especially as totally disarmed in Marienwerder and partially in Upper Silesia plebiscite zones.	738
546	MR. RENNIE Alenstein Tel. No. 3	Apr. 1	Reports to Lord Derby, for Conference of Ambassadors, on near completion of draft plebiscite <i>règlement</i> , and gives Polish comments thereon.	739
547	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 231	Apr. 8	Refers to No. 540, and reports M.F.A.'s explanation of last paragraph of note of Mar. 15 and reiteration of protest against maintenance of Sicherheitspolizei and inadequate number of Allied troops in Allenstein plebiscite area.	740
548	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 17	Apr. 9	Reports plebiscite arrangements and Polish and German reactions to them.	740
549	MR. RENNIE Alenstein No. 14	Apr. 13	Reports completion of plebiscite <i>règlement</i> and its acceptance by Polish Committee despite Consul-General's disapproval. Refers to No. 553 below, and reports arrangements for disarming Sicherheitspolizei and progress in disarming Einwohnerwehr. Refers to distribution of Allied troops.	742
550	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 13	Apr. 14	Reports Polish Committee's protest against immediate publication of voting regulations.	745
551	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 19	Apr. 14	Refers to No. 537, and reports two specific instances of Polish interruption of supplies. Suggests alternative solutions of Danzig question.	745
552	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 472	Apr. 15	Refers to No. 546, and reports discussion and decision by Conference of Ambassadors on dates for holding Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscites.	747

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
553	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 15	Apr. 15	Refers to No. 545, and reports Commission's decision to disarm Sicherheits-polizei.	748
554	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 20	Apr. 15	Refers to No. 548, and reports and discusses publication of Plebiscite Regulations.	749
555	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 14	Apr. 16	Reports Commission's projected protest to Ambassadors' Conference against Polish Govt.'s closure of frontier for ten days from Apr. 17.	750
556	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 15	Apr. 17	Suggests July 4 as date for plebiscite: regards Polish desire for postponement as unreasonable.	751
557	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 16	Apr. 17	Refers to No. 541, and reports abandonment of proposal to suspend customs duties on imported goods.	751
558	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 6	Apr. 17	Transmits to Lord Derby, for Ambassadors' Conference, Commission's protest against Polish decree stopping railway traffic through Polish corridor.	751
559	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 256	Apr. 18	Refers to No. 550, and suggests Poles should not be left with grievance on grounds of over-rapid conclusion of plebiscite arrangements.	752
560	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 257	Apr. 18	Refers to No. 555: Polish Govt. has not suspended all railway traffic and telegraphic communications with Danzig and plebiscite areas. Object of measure is as stated.	752
561	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 19	Apr. 19	Refers to No. 560, and asserts Polish railway concession inadequate.	753
562	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 259	Apr. 19	Refers to No. 560, and reports categorical denial by Polish General Staff of alleged troop concentration at Deutsch-Eylau.	753
563	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. Unnumbered	Apr. 19	Requests information about Ambassadors' Conference's reply to Polish Govt.'s representations on disturbances in two towns where Poles had arranged propaganda meetings.	753
564	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 16	Apr. 20	Refers to No. 563, and reports obstructive attitude of Polish Consul-General, and proceedings of Polish agitators.	754
565	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 9	Apr. 21	Refers to No. 560, and informs Conference of Ambassadors of Commission's withdrawal of protest, now that railway communication with Danzig and Berlin has been restored.	754
566	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 479	Apr. 22	Refers to No. 552: approves action and considers plebiscites should be held by July 15.	755
567	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 17	Apr. 22	Refers to No. 549, and reports developments since publication of plebiscite <i>règlements</i> , and Polish protests asserting lack of protection.	755

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
568	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 18	Apr. 22	Refers to No. 567: reports small number of effective troops at Commission's disposal and his request to G.O.C. Danzig for return of British company at Deutsch-Eylau.	757
569	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 21	Apr. 23	Reports existing troops adequate, despite French Representative's request for more.	758
570	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 288	Apr. 24	Refers to Nos. 549 and 553, and reports Sir P. Loraine's friendly interview with Vice-M.F.A. concerning date of Allenstein plebiscite, difficulties of Commission, Poland's position between Russia and Germany, and destructive tactics of Polish Consul-General.	759
571	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 11	Apr. 27	Refers to No. 563, and informs Ambassadors' Conference that Commission will meet Poles' demands by dissolution of Sicherheitspolizei, reinforcement of Municipal Police, and formation of mixed frontier and plebiscite guards.	761
572	TO EARL OF DERRY Paris No. 1388	Apr. 28	Instructions to draw Conference of Ambassadors' attention to German Govt.'s equivocal attitude towards holding the plebiscites.	762
573	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 20	Apr. 29	Refers to No. 568, and requests that G.O.C. Danzig, who has refused to release company concerned, be instructed to do so.	763
574	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder	Apr. 29	Explains to Sir E. Crowe statements made in No. 542: believes French wish for strong state on Germany's eastern flank would lead to trouble, and that Poland rather than Germany is likely to indulge in aggression.	763
575	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 24	Apr. 30	Reports dissolution of Sicherheitspolizei and Grenzpolizei in Marienwerder plebiscite area, and arrangements for new police force.	764
576	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. Unnumbered	May 3	Suggests to Sir H. Rumbold that Polish Govt. be requested to instruct local Poles to cease abstaining from participation in plebiscite control committees.	765
577	POLISH MINISTER London No. 2072	May 5	Expresses Polish objections to holding of Marienwerder plebiscite before July 15. Specifies measures necessary to ensure genuinely free vote.	766
578	TO MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 13	May 10	Refers to No. 571: Lord Derby has been told no more British troops are available for Allenstein plebiscite area.	767
579	EARL OF DERRY Paris Tel. No. 583	May 14	Refers to Nos. 552 and 571, and reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion and decision on date for Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscites.	767
580	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 25	May 15	Refers to and discounts Polish complaints, and asserts that Commission has provided all possible safeguards for them; reports generally on situation in plebiscite area.	768



	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
581	MR. CARR Danzig	May 19	Informs Mr. Sargent in Paris of impressions of recent tour of Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscite areas. Criticizes Commission in latter territory.	771
582	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. Unnumbered	May 20	Refers to No. 576: reports Polish Govt.'s refusal to intervene in Allenstein, where specified demands must be met before Polish inhabitants could participate in control committees.	773
583	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 610	May 22	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion of (1) police reinforcements for Allenstein requested in No. 571; (2) extra troops for Marienwerder plebiscite area; (3) Polish requests for plebiscite postponement; (4) German notes opposing postponement (refers to No. 572).	774
584	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 630	May 26	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decision, in light of Plebiscite Commission's change of view, to drop question of reinforcing troops in Marienwerder plebiscite area.	775
585	MR. RENNIE Alenstein No. 32	June 10	Reports general satisfaction with choice of July 11 for plebiscite, and resumption of Polish co-operation. Details action taken against offenders breaking up Polish meetings, and acknowledges arrival of troop reinforcements.	776
586	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 1972	June 11	Transmits memo. from German Chargé d'Affaires, London, on statements by President of Marienwerder Commission; instructions to lay matter before Conference of Ambassadors.	778
587	GERMAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES London No. 823/20	June 11	Informs H.M.G. of German proposals to Polish Govt. for enabling Germans entitled to vote in plebiscite areas to cross Polish Corridor, and requests H.M.G. to obtain guarantees from Polish Govt.	780
588	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 43	June 14	Discusses Polish reluctance and German anxiety to facilitate participation of 'out-voters' in plebiscite.	781
589	MR. RENNIE Alenstein Tel. No. 17	June 15	Reports apparent Polish intention to prevent entry of German voters into plebiscite area.	782
590	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 44	June 15	Comments on report of Allied Railway Mission to Poland and on Poland's disregard of Article 89 of Peace Treaty, under which freedom of transit promised between E. Prussia and rest of Germany.	783
591	MR. RENNIE Alenstein Tel. No. 27	June 16	Reports (1) German request for completion of negotiations for train service for plebiscite voters by June 23; (2) German complaint of restrictions on goods traffic.	784
592	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. Unnumbered	June 17	Telegram to Mr. Rennie referring to Nos. 589 and 591. Is urging direct negotiations between Polish Govt. and German railway authorities for conveyance of voters. General question of traffic between E. Prussia and rest of Germany should be kept separate.	785

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
593	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 417	June 17	Refers to No. 592: summarizes Polish note and memo. concerning German Govt.'s request for facilities for out-voters and disputing German statistics.	785
594	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 411	June 21	Reports interview with Vice-M.F.A. regarding (1) Polish Diet's resolution alleging German intimidation and declaring Poland could not recognize plebiscites held in present conditions; (2) numbers of out-voters and postponement of plebiscite.	786
595	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 751	June 23	Refers to No. 589: reports Conference of Ambassadors' consideration of question of transporting German voters to two plebiscite areas, and own proposals on subject.	787
596	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 439	June 25	Refers to Nos. 592 and 593, and questions decision of Conference of Ambassadors to warn Polish Govt. against interference with German outvoters. Suggests Polish anxiety natural and legitimate.	788
597	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 33	June 25	Transmits memo. dealing with Commission's efforts to meet Polish demands, and refers to Polish allegations concerning electoral lists.	789
598	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 778	June 30	Reports discussion by Conference of Ambassadors of question of supervising passage of trains carrying Marienwerder voters across Polish frontier.	792
599	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2243	July 1	Refers to No. 590, and endorses proposal by Gen. Mance that Conference of Ambassadors should intimate to Polish Govt. desirability of presence of Allied technical experts at negotiations between Poland and Germany under Article 98 of Peace Treaty. Adds that Polish reluctance to execute Article 89 is understandable in abnormal circumstances.	792
600	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 31	July 2	Reports to Sir H. Rumbold refusal of passage across Polish territory to first two trainloads of voters, and Plebiscite Commission's protest against Polish authorities' interpretation of Article 2 of Warsaw Protocol of June 18.	793
601	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 35	July 2	Reports Commission's measures to prevent disturbances and attempts to deal with German and Polish complaints regarding organization of approaching plebiscite.	794
602	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 49	July 3	Reports on examination (completed on June 30) of claims with reference to registration of voters.	796
603	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 3	July 4	Refers to No. 600: informs Mr. Rennie of strong protest to Vice-M.F.A. and of latter's explanations and charge of German falsifications in emigrant voters' lists.	797

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
604	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 4	July 4	Refers to No. 603: informs Mr. Rennie that Polish Govt. allege Germans plan violent demonstration once votes have been counted.	798
605	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 24	July 5	Reports to Lord Derby German Govt.'s protest at Spa against separate voting-urns for non-resident voters. Instruction was issued despite Mr. Rennie's protest that it was contrary to spirit of plebiscite <i>règlement</i> .	798
606	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 36	July 5	Thinks serious trouble more likely after rather than before July 11, and continued presence of occupation troops indispensable.	799
607	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 34	July 6	Requests Sir H. Rumbold to inform Polish Govt. that, despite its orders and protests of Commission, local authorities continue to interfere with out-voters.	800
608	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 40	July 6	Refers to No. 604, and reports lack of evidence for projected German demonstration.	800
609	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 486	July 7	Reports Diet's decision, on July 6, to appeal to Allied Parliaments to urge their Govts. to postpone plebiscites.	801
610	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 803	July 7	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' decisions concerning (1) Polish stoppage of out-voters on grounds of inadequate papers; (2) separate urns for out-voters; (3) right to vote of persons already having voted in Schleswig.	801
611	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 30	July 9	Reports arrest of 37 armed Polish soldiers, forming part of force at disposal of propaganda committees.	802
612	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 31	July 10	Refers to No. 611, and reports 76 further arrests of Poles entering plebiscite area under suspicious circumstances.	802
613	MR. RENNIE Allenstein Tel. No. 45	July 12	Reports provisional results of previous day's vote.	802
614	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 32	July 13	Reports provisional results of vote on July 11.	803
615	MR. RENNIE Allenstein No. 17	July 15	Reports and comments to President of Conference of Ambassadors on taking of plebiscite and its results. German victory decisive, but Polish complaints will be received until July 30.	803
616	LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin No. 591	July 18	Transmits translation of extract from Herr von Gayl's speech to pressmen on necessity for removal of Polish Corridor and recovery of Vistula territory for Germany.	805

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
617	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder No. 52	July 19	Gives details of plebiscite results, and difficulties experienced by Commission in recommending Vistula frontier line. Transmits delimitation proposals accepted by British, Italian and Japanese Commissioners pending French counter-proposal.	806
618	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	July 23	Requests immediate instructions regarding date by which H.M.G. consider all troops should have left plebiscite areas, in view of divergence of opinion amongst Ambassadors.	810
619	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. Unnumbered	July 23	Refers to No. 618: British evacuation should be completed by July 31, and H.M.G. hope for Conference of Ambassadors' agreement by July 26.	811
620	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 857	July 24	Refers to No. 262, and records M. Millerand's rejection (and reasons therefor) of German proposals for volunteer frontier guard, entry of German troops into plebiscite areas, and Allied military co-operation against Bolsheviks. Ambassadors' Conference will probably award whole of Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscite areas to Germany.	811
621	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 347	July 28	Requests Lord D'Abernon's opinion whether Polish situation will deteriorate as result of early withdrawal of British troops from plebiscite areas.	812
622	MR. RENNIE Alenstein Tel. No. 52	July 31	Reports Polish troops crossing frontiers and renewal of German request that Reichswehr troops might enter territory to reinforce guards on southern frontier.	813
623	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 854	July 31	War Office urges withdrawal of British troops from E. Prussian plebiscite areas by Aug. 10. If French Govt. agrees, Ambassadors' Conference should arrange Commission's withdrawal by same date.	814
624	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 902	Aug. 2	Reports message from M. Millerand urging delay in troops' withdrawal from plebiscite areas, and Lord D'Abernon's reluctant concurrence.	814
625	MR. RENNIE Alenstein Tel. No. 44	Aug. 2	Enquires what is to be done with interned Polish troops, and their arms and equipment, when Allied forces leave.	815
626	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris No. 2646	Aug. 4	Instructions to inform French Govt. and Italian Ambassador of substance of conversation between Sir E. Crowe and Herr Sthamer on German protest against Polish sovereignty over right bank of Vistula.	815
627	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 36	Aug. 5	Reports French Commissioner's attempts to extend life of Commission and secure reinforcement of occupying troops. Submits own view that withdrawal desirable.	816

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
628	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 875	Aug. 5	Refers to No. 624, and informs Lord Derby of H.M.G.'s view that (1) German troops should enter Allenstein immediately; (2) British troops should be withdrawn at once; (3) interned Polish troops should go into German custody subject to guarantees.	817
629	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 933	Aug. 6	Refers to No. 268, and reports M. Cambon's submission to meeting of Allied Embassy representatives of proposed frontier modification for Allenstein, and his own objections to reversing decision of Conference of Ambassadors. Refers to Nos. 620 and 628, and reports further message from M. Millerand opposing withdrawal of Allied troops from Allenstein.	817
630	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 948	Aug. 9	Refers to No. 628, and reports French hope that H.M.G. will retain troops in plebiscite areas until Poland able to protect own frontiers.	818
631	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 901	Aug. 11	Refers to No. 630. Instructions (a) to inform French Govt. (1) that completion of British evacuation from plebiscite areas will not be deferred beyond Aug. 15; (2) that H.M.G. cannot agree to modify Conference of Ambassadors' decision of July 26 concerning frontier; and (b) to urge Conference to warn parties concerned that Aug. 15 is date for formal notification of plebiscite results.	819
632	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 969	Aug. 12	Refers to No. 631, and reports official notification of Marienwerder frontier line, on Aug. 12, at request of Italian Embassy.	820
633	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 975	Aug. 13	Reports French acquiescence in surrender of Polish interned troops to German authorities. Authorizes Allenstein Commission to take steps accordingly.	820
634	MR. RENNIE Alenstein No. 20	Aug. 14	Refers to No. 615, and transmits to Conference of Ambassadors a further report on Allenstein plebiscite vote and Commission's recommendations thereon.	820
635	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 43	Aug. 15	Refers to No. 632, and reports German refusal to sign necessary protocol.	827
636	MR. BEAUMONT Marienwerder Tel. No. 45	Aug. 16	Refers to No. 635, and reports Italian troops' peaceful transfer of east bank of Vistula to Polish authorities, without German signature of formal protocol.	827
637	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1082	Sept. 10	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' rejection of German objections to new Marienwerder frontier line.	827
638	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1140	Sept. 29	Reports Conference of Ambassadors' discussion and decision on districts allotted to Poland after the plebiscite, but handed back to German authorities on Aug. 16.	828

PART I  
GERMANY

CHAPTER I

Allied Military Control of Germany after the entry  
into force of the Treaty of Versailles

January 10–July 5, 1920

No. 1

*Lord Kilmaarnock*<sup>1</sup> (*Berlin*) to *Earl Curzon* (*Received January 24, 4 p.m.*)

*No. 14 Telegraphic* [173327/7067/39]

*Confidential*

BERLIN, *January 23, 1920, 8.30 p.m.*

I met Herr Noske<sup>2</sup> to-day informally at lunch with General Malcolm<sup>3</sup> and afterwards had a long and frank conversation with him which I made it clear was of an entirely unofficial character. . . .<sup>4</sup> He told me that there were two questions of highest importance which concerned his sphere of activity.

1. The reduction of numbers in Reichstag [*sic*].<sup>5</sup>

2. The delivery of those accused of crime against usages of war.<sup>6</sup>

With regard to No. 1 he expressed hope that Allied Governments would not insist too drastically on immediate fulfilment of stipulation of Treaty. Difficult times were ahead and various industrial troubles threatened in mining districts of Ruhr and Westphalia.

A movement was on foot to demand reduction of working day to six hours and agitators were endeavouring to bring about a strike from February 1st. He was arresting any persons who incited to strikes and suspending many communist publications but if number of troops at his command were reduced in strict accordance with Treaty he would on April 1st only have 5,000 men at his disposal in a district which contained a turbulent population of 600,000 to take tin [? the] workmen alone. Scale would only give him two battalions for Berlin where he had had to use 30,000 men during serious troubles last year. He pointed out that according to Treaty Germany was bound to reduce her armed forces to 200,000 men within three months but she was also under an obligation to reduce to 100,000 by April 1st 1920. Owing to delay in ratification intermediate period now over-lapped the last

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> German Minister of Defence.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of the British Military Mission in Berlin.

<sup>4</sup> The text is here uncertain.

<sup>5</sup> This word was amended in the Foreign Office to 'Reichswehr', i.e. the German army.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Volume IX, Chap. VII.

mentioned date and a brusque reduction to lower figure was called for immediately. He had prepared plans for carrying this out and was ready to do so but if it was insisted on he did not see how he could maintain order at this critical time with such inadequate means. He must disclaim any responsibility for consequences which in his opinion would be disastrous.

2. Herr Noske stated emphatically and repeatedly that question of delivery of war criminals was a vital one for him. He admitted he had been a member of Cabinet which had approved signature of Treaty but he had never had any illusions as to fact that if this provision were insisted on it would entail his disappearance as a Minister, and with him would disappear only force capable of maintaining slightest semblance of order. Chaos would result leading to civil war and dangers of Bolshevism. What he asked was that accused should be brought before a Court on German soil at which Allied officers might act as accusers and exercise supervision of procedure. If this were done the German people could be trusted to see justice was carried out in cases where evidence of real crimes was clear.

I told Herr Noske that I would inform Your Lordship of what he had said but that I could naturally express no opinion on it. I report his remarks as having considerable importance coming as they do from Minister who has almost alone created such means as exist to-day for maintenance of order. It may of course be that there is a certain amount of bluff in what he said but he was extremely definite in statements he made that if some consideration were not shewn by Allies in these two points chaos must be result.

## No. 2

*The Earl of Derby*<sup>1</sup> (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received January 28)

*No. 107 Telegraphic: by bag [173962/32842/39]*

*Very urgent*

PARIS, January 26, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors with Monsieur [Jules] Cambon presiding, considered this afternoon the questions raised by the telegrams from the President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control,<sup>2</sup> which are repeated in Admiralty telegrams Nos. 623 and 643, paraphrases of which are attached (enclosure 1). The subject falls under two heads:—

(a) The state in which the German warships should be surrendered in accordance with Article 185 of German Treaty and Protocol<sup>3</sup> and Art. 23 of the Armistice of 11th November 1918.<sup>4</sup>

(b) The ultimate disposal of the equipment and munitions landed from the surrendered ships, *vide* Art. 192 of the German Treaty.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Ambassador at Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Admiral Charlton.

<sup>3</sup> The Protocol of January 10, 1920, 'signed on behalf of Germany recording Obligations, under the Armistice Conventions and Supplementary Agreements, which have not been executed or completely fulfilled'. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxiii, pp. 1051-4.

<sup>4</sup> For the text of the Article see *ibid.*, vol. cxi, p. 618.

2. The meeting lasted over three hours, the discussion being mainly between the French representative and myself, with occasional support to the former by our Italian colleague. The Japanese Ambassador supported the British view which has been maintained during previous discussions on this subject at several meetings of the Supreme Council during the past two months (*vide* Sir Eyre Crowe's telegrams Nos. 1709, 1725, 1728 and 1756).<sup>5</sup> The United States Ambassador expressed no opinions but implied unofficially that he was in general agreement with the British views as to the interpretation of Articles 185 and 192 of the terms of the German treaty.

3. The French reiterated and elaborated the argument they have continued to express as regards the surrender of the equipment with the ships, whilst I maintained there were two clear issues, *vide* 1 (a) and (b). Eventually general agreement was reached with regard to 1 (b ? a) namely that all the ships surrendered under the German treaty and Protocol were to be disarmed prior to leaving Germany.

4. I then put forward the proposal shown in Enclosure 2. This was on the point of being generally agreed to when the French—who had only been pressing for the delivery of the equipment of certain light cruisers and destroyers which are to be embodied in their fleet—suddenly altered their tactics and demanded:

- (a) that the equipment of the five light cruisers to be surrendered under the protocol should be delivered in an Allied port with the ships.
- (b) that all the equipment from the other surrendered ships should be held in bond in Germany. In the event of it transpiring that the Germans have broken Article 192 of the German treaty, the above equipment should serve as compensation and should be used for equipping [*sic*] the remaining German warships which are to be embodied in the French or Italian fleet.

5. Monsieur Cambon used every argument he could summon in urging me to modify my views as set forth in Enclosure 2. I replied that whereas the Protocol had been drawn up by the representatives of the five Principal Powers, the German Treaty had been drawn up and signed by a large number of Powers so that although we might claim compensation in regard to the equipment belonging to the Protocol ships, I did not consider that we could take similar action in regard to the treaty ships.

6. Monsieur Cambon again presented his case very forcibly emphasising that France was badly in need of the equipment; that surely the British Government did not intend France to be embarrassed with some dismantled ships and that his nation was feeling very strongly on this subject. Monsieur Cambon went on to say that he fully sympathised with the British interpretation of the peace terms, but there had been a long period between the drafting of the Naval terms of the peace treaty and the coming into force of the treaty,

<sup>5</sup> These telegrams of December 18, 20, 21, and 29 respectively from Sir E. Crowe, then head of the British Peace Delegation in Paris, are not printed. Cf. Volume II, pp. 564–5, 574–6, 621–4.



during which time views had changed. Whereas Great Britain had formerly wished to sink all the enemy ships she had since realised the position regarding the French fleet, with the result that the British had modified their views to the extent of advocating the allocation of a certain number of ex-enemy ships to France for incorporating in her fleet.

7. Finally, both Monsieur Cambon and his Italian colleague urged me to ask my Government to reconsider the question in the light of the French and Italian requirements. Meanwhile they agreed that the President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be instructed in accordance with the directions given in the attached copy of a telegram (Enclosure 3), which was sent by bag to-night to the Admiralty by my Naval Adviser.

8. I would emphasise that we have gained a great point in the French and Italian[s] agreeing to 1 (a) and I urge that we should now do all we can, short of altering our interpretation of the treaty, to assist these two Allies in obtaining the equipment for the ships they are finally to embody in their fleets, instead of destroying it. With regard to this point there are already four Austrian light cruisers and eight Austrian destroyers which have their equipment on board and which are designated for embodiment in the French and Italian fleets. Logically speaking, these Austrian vessels should be incorporated in the Italian fleet, which would leave one German light cruiser and two destroyers to be allotted to the Italian Navy and six German light cruisers and ten destroyers to be allotted to the French Navy.

9. I propose that we should endeavour to meet the French and Italians, especially the former, as follows:

- (a) The complete equipment for six German light cruisers and twelve destroyers to be despatched to a French port at the same time as the warships proceed to such port. The Germans to arrange for the transport of the material in a ship other than a warship. This is in accordance with Article 192 of the Treaty which states that the Germans are to surrender the equipment to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at places to be designated by those Powers.

On arrival at the French port, the equipment to be disembarked and stored by the French who will have charge of such equipment on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers.

- (b) The President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control to report any damage or loss of equipment from the surrendered ships, such damage or loss being in contravention of Article 192 of the German treaty.
- (c) If the Council of Ambassadors receive a report of damage or loss of equipment, they will decide what compensation is to be effected by Germany, in regard to releasing to the French and Italians some or all of the equipment referred to in 9 (a).
- (d) All the munitions and equipment belonging to the surrendered ships and disembarked in Germany or France, which is not affected by 9 (a) and (c)—to be destroyed in accordance with Article 192 of the German treaty.

10. I trust I may be authorised to make the proposals set forth in paragraph 9, observing that the Admiralty, who have in no way altered their views in regard to the interpretation of the Peace Treaty, have concurred in the principle embodied in Enclosure 2; at the same time they consider it undesirable to take any further action with the President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control as the latter is acting in an Inter-Allied capacity and under order of Council of Ambassadors and therefore the interpretation of the treaty must come from the latter body.

11. While putting forward these proposals I feel bound to state my view that it would save a considerable amount of double-handling and useless disturbance of equipment if the five light cruisers to be surrendered under the protocol, which so far as is known have not as yet been dismantled, were to be surrendered intact. This would be possible if the Commission of Control would furnish a report at once of the Germans having contravened Article 192 so that the Conference of Ambassadors could then decide that the equipment of these ships was to be surrendered in compensation. This would only leave the equipment for one light cruiser and twelve destroyers to be delivered at a French port, *vide* paragraph 8 above.

12. It is requested that the above may be treated as an urgent matter and that I may be informed of His Majesty's Government's views by telegram in time for the next meeting of Ambassadors on Thursday 29th instant.

#### ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 2

*Paraphrase of Telegrams Received from P.N.I.A.C.C. through Admiralty, London*

##### I. Received Paris 21st January

*Admiralty No. 623*

The President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control telegraphs that the German Naval authorities were instructed on 17th January that warships are to be surrendered with all equipment on board except for ammunition and explosives. They were informed that directions would be given later in regard to the manner in which these latter should be delivered. This action was taken in anticipation of the approval of the Supreme Council in view of the agreement at which it was understood the Allied Naval Advisers in Paris had arrived.

The German authorities have expressed their dissent from this reading of the articles of the Treaty and Protocol concerned, and it is highly desirable that the Naval Commission should be informed forthwith if the Supreme Council is not prepared to endorse the instructions which the former has given.

Steps should be taken to bring the matter before the Supreme Council at the earliest possible date in order to obtain the final instructions of that body.

##### II. Received in Paris 25th January

*Admiralty No. 643*

The President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control, telegraphing in further reference to the question of the surrender or otherwise of the

material belonging to the German warships, states that the point on which it is desired to obtain Supreme Council's decision is one of interpretation which that body only can give. It is quite understood that the terms of the Treaty and the Protocol must be adhered to.

The opinion of the British and Japanese members of the Commission of Control is that the material should not be surrendered under the terms of the Treaty and protocol; the Italian and French members on the other hand read the articles concerned as intending the surrender of all equipment complete.

The definite ruling of the Supreme Council is therefore required and it is most necessary that they should at their next meeting state clearly and definitely what interpretation is to be placed on the terms of the Treaty and Protocol referred to, more especially as the Naval Advisers in Paris hold divergent views on the subject as well as the members of the Naval Commission.

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 2

##### *Draft Resolution*

To reply to P.N.I.A.C.C.

All warships surrendered under the Treaty and Protocol are to be disarmed in accordance with Article XXIII of the terms of the Armistice of 11th November 1918, and with the exception of the equipment landed from the following light cruisers, all the equipment landed from the surrendered ships is to be destroyed in accordance with article 192 of the Treaty.

Königsberg  
Pillau  
Graudenz  
Regensburg  
Strassburg.

2. The equipment landed from the five light cruisers named in paragraph 1 is to be carefully stored and retained until further orders.

3. The Commission of Control is to report as soon as possible if the Germans have broken the terms of the Treaty in so far as concerns the destruction or loss of equipment either on board the ships to be surrendered to the Allies or amongst that which has already been landed.

4. In the event of it being found that the Germans have broken the terms of the Treaty, *vide* paragraph 3 above, the Commission of Control is in due course to forward details to the Council of Ambassadors and at the same time it is to submit proposals in regard to the material which it is considered should be demanded as compensation—such material to be of use for the five ships in paragraph 1.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 2

*Copy of telegram sent to the Admiralty*

Council of Ambassadors discussed question at great length this afternoon and directed me to cause following instructions to be conveyed to P.N.I.A.C.C. on their behalf. Request Admiralty will communicate to P.N.I.A.C.C. accordingly.

Begins:—

All warships surrendered under the Treaty and Protocol are to be disarmed in accordance with Article XXIII of the terms of the Armistice of the 11th November 1918.

The Commission of Control are to take such steps as they considerable [*sic*] desirable to prevent loss by theft or otherwise of the equipment which has been landed from all the surrendered ships.

No. 3

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 410 [174599/32842/39]

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 2, 1920

My Lord,

In reply to your telegram No. 107 of the 26th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> relative to the surrender of ships and naval equipment by the German Government in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace and of the Protocol, I transmit to Your Lordship, herewith, a copy of a letter from the Admiralty containing their observations on the proposals submitted in paragraph 9 of your above-mentioned telegram.

2. I agree with the views held by the Admiralty on this matter.

I am, &c.,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 3

*Admiralty to the Foreign Office (Received January 30)*

M. 0322 Confidential

ADMIRALTY, January 29, 1920

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. 173962/W/39, dated 29th January,<sup>3</sup> relative to the surrender of ships and naval equipment by the German Government, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they regret they cannot agree to proposal (a) in Lord Derby's Despatch [*sic*], so far as it concerns the transport of the equipment to a French port.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

2. Article 192 of the Treaty of Peace stipulates that the war material under consideration will be destroyed or rendered useless, and the Admiralty view has been consistent throughout that the terms of the Treaty must be upheld.

Any departure therefrom would establish a dangerous precedent and give the Germans a righteous grievance of which they would take full advantage.

3. The whole trouble arises from the fact that the French and Italians discovered too late that under the terms of the Treaty and Protocol they would only get dismantled ships. They tried, therefore, to read their own meaning into Article 192, an interpretation that cannot be accepted.

4. Their Lordships are perfectly ready to agree to anything which can be accepted as a fair interpretation of the Treaty, but they do not consider that the French and Italians can obtain any of the material to which they lay claim, except as compensation for violation of the Treaty, and until such violation has been proved and compensation settled, no reasonable argument for removing to France material destined to be destroyed or rendered useless can be advanced.

5. The Admiralty concur in the proposals contained in paragraph 9 (b), (c), (d) as modified by their refusal to accept paragraph 9 (a).

I am, &c.,

ALEX FLINT,

for Secretary

#### No. 4

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 4)*

*No. 129 Telegraphic: by bag [175890/7067/39]*

PARIS, February 3, 1920

Following for the Cabinet.

. . .<sup>1</sup> 3. The Council then heard General Niessel, President of the Inter-allied Commission for securing the evacuation of the Baltic States<sup>2</sup> who presented a report. (I have at present only received one copy but will forward copies to the Foreign Office as soon as they are available).<sup>3</sup>

After paying a tribute to the loyal co-operation of his colleagues on the Commission, General Niessel said that he did not propose to describe in detail the work carried out by them but only to draw attention to a few salient points. The Germans in every case had yielded only to fear, partly inspired by the threat of military operations by the Letts and Lithuanians against them, and partly by possible consequences from the side of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. They had shown the utmost bad faith over the question of the delivery to the Letts and Lithuanians of war material taken by them, to which they had in principle agreed. They had

<sup>1</sup> The preceding paragraphs reported discussion of other matters by the Conference of Ambassadors on the morning of February 3.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume III, Chap. I.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

placed every possible obstacle in the way, but in spite of this practically all war material had now been given up. Of the rolling stock less than half of the locomotives and only two-thirds of the trucks had yet been delivered, but it was hoped that delivery would be completed by the middle of February. A small Allied Commission had been left on the frontier to superintend the delivery of the outstanding railway material. On the other hand no adequate satisfaction had yet been obtained for numerous acts of violence and insults offered to Allied officers. It was important that the Commission should not be formally dissolved until these two points, namely completion of delivery of material and satisfaction for outrages had been cleared up. Besides these there was the third point which urgently required dealing with, namely the return to the Letts and Lithuanians of horses, cattle etc. which had been taken from them, and the demand of the money indemnity<sup>4</sup> as compensation for damage done on their territory.

General Niessel then said he would like to give a short account of the conversation that he had had in Berlin with Dr. Bauer,<sup>5</sup> though it was not strictly within the provisions of the Commission. Dr. Bauer had said that with the hundred thousand men permitted by the Treaty it was not possible to keep order in Germany itself or to protect Germany against Bolshevik attacks from without. General Niessel had promised to transmit Dr. Bauer's remarks to the Supreme Council. Personally, however, after what he had seen of the insurrection of January 13th in Berlin<sup>6</sup> he felt no doubt of the capacity of the Germans to maintain internal order. As to Bolshevism from without, the German Government were doing all in their power to encourage its attacks in order to give them an excuse for maintaining a military force to resist it. . . .<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Volume III, No. 209.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Volume III, No. 214, n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Volume IX, No. 14, § 3.

<sup>7</sup> The succeeding paragraphs concerned General Niessel's views on the general situation in the Baltic and recorded discussion on other matters.

## No. 5

*Sir R. Graham<sup>1</sup> (The Hague) to Earl Curzon (Received February 14)*

*No. 147 [178759/9019/39]*

*Confidential*

THE HAGUE, February 6, 1920

My Lord,

In my despatch No. 376 Confidential of the 17th of December last,<sup>2</sup> I had the honour to call Your Lordship's attention to reports of arms and other warlike material entering this country from Germany, and to the somewhat unsatisfactory nature of the explanations offered by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject. I did not fail to request the Military Attaché to this Legation to keep a close watch on the matter, and he has done so, reporting to me from time to time, but he has not been disposed to attach great importance to it.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at The Hague.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume V, No. 322.

Recently, the French Minister, who has been receiving constant reports, and even visits of officers from the French Military Control at Aix-la-Chappelle [*sic*] on this question, has expressed to me his serious uneasiness with regard to it. According to Monsieur Benoist, a continuous stream of warlike material, including even two guns of large calibre, has been passing from Germany into Holland, and he believes that some at least of the rifles and machine guns are destined for Ireland and India. He has supplied me with all the information given to him by the French Control at Aix-la-Chappelle, and I have passed it on to the Military Attaché, who has submitted a report, copy of which I enclose.<sup>3</sup> Colonel Oppenheim is assured that any war material entering Holland is under the close control of the Dutch authorities, but the matter will continue to receive strict attention.

I am under the personal impression that my French colleague is deliberately magnifying the affair in order to use it as a lever in negotiations with the Dutch Government on other questions, such as that of the extradition of the German ex-Emperor, and for such a purpose it might certainly be useful.

I have, &c.,

R. GRAHAM

P.S. February 10th.

Since writing the above, I have received the annexed further report<sup>4</sup> from Colonel Oppenheim giving a statement by the Dutch General Staff. With regard to the last paragraph of this statement, the Minister of Justice happened to be dining at the Legation last night, and I took the opportunity of impressing upon him the gravity of the question, about which he seemed to have very little information. Action in the same sense has been, and is being, taken with the Minister for Foreign Affairs both by my French colleague and myself.

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure 1 below.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 3 below.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 5

*Lieut.-Colonel Oppenheim to Sir R. Graham*

THE HAGUE, February 5, 1920

*Notes on a conversation with an officer of the Dutch General Staff on the subject of war-material now being sent into Holland by various German firms: 4th Feb. 1920*

It is an established fact that consignments of war-material of various kinds have been arriving fairly frequently during the last few weeks in Holland from Germany. In almost every case where arms or ammunition were concerned, this material has arrived in parts (i.e. component parts of rifles, or machine-guns, shell-cases, fuses etc.).

Such consignments have usually been addressed to reputable Dutch firms in Amsterdam or Rotterdam, and the latter have taken them into store for account of the German exporters.

The Dutch Government cannot prevent such importations into Holland for they are not parties to the Armistice.

At present it would be difficult for anyone dealing in war-material in Holland to elude the import or export regulations. War-material may not be exported from the Netherlands. All consignments, such as the above, are reported on arrival at the Dutch frontier direct to the General Staff, who, from fear of potential Communist movements or of international complications, keep an eye upon them.

There are undoubtedly large quantities of surplus war-material in the hands of German armament firms and it is probably some of this which is now being sent into Holland, possibly with the object of escaping confiscation at the hands of Allied Commissions in Germany and for eventual sale as war-material in or beyond Holland at some later period when it is hoped that international relations will have become less strained, and export regulations less stringent.

I attach certain notes<sup>5</sup> with regard to this subject made by Captain S. L. Manning, who is at present in Holland acting as representative of the British Disposal Board.

L. C. F. OPPENHEIM

*Lieut.-Colonel, Military Attaché*

<sup>5</sup> Enclosure 2 below.

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 5

*Note by Captain S. L. Manning, R.A.F. (Disposal Board)*

In view of the fact that Germany is very short of non-ferrous metals, and taking into consideration that the work on this material has cost considerably more than the metal itself (as example a recent quotation from the British Disposal Board for a Vickers gun was £188, while the metal composing it would not cost more than £2), the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that it is intended to sell it as war-material, this being the only means the Germans have of covering the manufacturing costs. Otherwise they would melt the metal down themselves and use it for commercial purposes, as in its present form it is useless for any purpose other than that for which it was manufactured.

The above only applies to non-ferrous metals, but it is obvious that this material in its present form would be useless without the ferrous gun-parts.

The honest course for the Germans appears to be to surrender this material to the Allied Commission, but if in their endeavours to smuggle it out of Holland it should be seized by the Dutch Authorities, the Germans would then be no worse off than if they had previously surrendered it to the Allies.

It appears possible that it may be intended that this war-material is to remain in store in Holland for some considerable period, when it will be an easier matter to dispose of it than at the present time when such arrivals in Holland attract attention.



ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 5

*Lieut.-Colonel Oppenheim to Sir R. Graham*

*War-material reported to be entering Holland from Germany*

From: M. A. Hague

No. 816

February 9, 1920

*Statement of the General Staff: 9th Feb. 1920*

1. Germany is full of surplus war-material and German armament firms, which are still in process of conversion to peace footing, wish to clear their premises, and at the same time to escape confiscation at the hands of Allied Commissions.

At the present rate of exchange (one mark = about two cents) such material can be bought for next to nothing in Dutch currency, and it is thought that these consignments are a form of speculation. The holders will sell for any favourable bid from any country if and whenever an opportunity arises.

2. The Netherland Authorities have it in their power to prevent importations just as they control exports. They have been considering the advisability of forbidding such importations of war-material, but for the moment they incline to the view that the disadvantages of such a course might outweigh its advantages. If such importations were to be forbidden, smuggling would be encouraged along the extensive Dutch-German frontier from Groningen to the Rhine, additional police and customs' control would be entailed, and the ultimate result might be that the authorities would never be certain of what had arrived in Holland,—whereas at present, all such importations are reported from the frontier, are kept under observation and control, and can be seized by the government at any time.

3. Neither the General Staff, nor the War Department are responsible for controlling imports and exports, and are merely kept informed of the arrival of any consignments which might prove of interest to them. The police and customs services enforce regulations controlling imports and exports, and are responsible to the 'Commissaris van der Koningen'<sup>6</sup> of the particular province in question, who is in turn responsible to the Minister for Home Affairs.

Next to the latter, the Minister of Justice is the most concerned, for he is charged with the maintenance of internal security.

4. The impression conveyed to me was that, in the opinion of the General Staff, these reports are exaggerated. Some of the consignments detailed in the report from Aix-la-Chapelle had been signalled by the police on the frontier, but others had not.

All war-material imported which had been of any significance whatever had been provisionally confiscated ('in beslag genomen') by the Ministry of Justice, who had placed them [*sic*] under seal and had withdrawn them from the disposal of the consignees.

<sup>6</sup> Royal Commissioner.

The export regulations are believed to be effectively carried out in every way.

5. The General Staff bears in mind that consignments of war-material may reach the Communists in Holland,—but the Chief of the Staff appears to think that he has done all that he can do at present to arouse the attention of the Ministries [*sic*] of Home Affairs and of Justice, who are directly responsible in a sense in which the General Staff is not. Such importations are unsatisfactory from his own point of view, and he would be glad if one of the Allied Ministers could speak to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or to the Home Minister on the subject. The words used to me were ‘that he would be glad if the Minister for Home Affairs could be scared, because the latter had rather poo[h]-pooled the warnings on the subject.’

## No. 6

*Colonel von Tschischwitz to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 338/2-20 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*<sup>2</sup>

BERLIN, February 7, 1920

To the President, I.A.A.C.C., Berlin.

I have the honour to hand you the accompanying memorandum.

The memorandum contains the special points referring to the Air Service, which are to be found in the general memorandum concerning the German Army, a copy of which is forwarded herewith.<sup>3</sup> This document has to-day been handed to the President, I.A.M.C.C.<sup>4</sup>

The demobilisation of the Air Service will be carried out as planned in accordance with the stipulations of the Peace Treaty with the exception of the eight aerial centres and one frontier defence echelon which are proposed in the memorandum.

TSCHISCHWITZ,

*Colonel and President of the Air Service Peace Commission*

<sup>1</sup> Colonel von Tschischwitz was President of the German Air Service Peace Commission (Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission, known for short as Luftfriko). Air Commodore Masterman of the Royal Air Force was President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control for Germany and held the rank of Acting Brigadier-General.

<sup>2</sup> This and subsequent documents under this file-reference are drawn from the Final Report of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, which was printed for confidential circulation and of which a copy was received in the Foreign Office in May 1922.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Report.

<sup>4</sup> Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 6

BERLIN, February 6, 1920

*Memorandum on the necessity for a small number of Military Air Service Units*

The main object of the German Army is the maintenance of order in the interior of the country. The events since the revolution have shown that under then existing conditions of home politics military aviators were an indispensable auxiliary to the army for carrying out this object. The smaller the army is in the future and the weaker the distribution of troops over Germany, the more indispensable military aviators will become to the army.

The duties which aviators will have to carry out in the interior of the country and which they alone can deal with are the following: . . .<sup>5</sup>

The total strength of the flight formations applied for, including the reserve aeroplanes which are in the depots, will amount to:

- 164 Officers.
- 8 Surgeons.
- 1865 Non-commissioned officers and men.
- 172 Service aeroplanes.
- 166 Reserve aeroplanes (not assembled).
- 156 Machine guns.
- 86 Spare engines.

Also in the depots:

- 300 Reserve aeroplanes (not assembled and without machine guns).
- 125 Reserve engines.

The total number of aeroplanes (638) applied for, appears at first sight to be high in proportion to the small number of flight formations; it is to be explained by the adequate reserve which experience has shown should be set aside for the large number of breakdowns. As a matter of fact only 172 aeroplanes would be on duty, the remainder would be in the depots un-assembled.

In the event of the foregoing application being approved, permission is at the same time requested for a few of these military aeroplanes to pass over the 50 kilometres zone when serious disturbances occur, to reach the disturbed areas in question.

<sup>5</sup> The arguments which follow in the next seven paragraphs were largely repeated in Annex 1 to the German note of April 20, 1920, concerning the retention of an army of 200,000 men, which is printed in *Protocols and Correspondence between the Supreme Council and the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Government and the German Peace Delegation between January 10, 1920, and July 17, 1920, respecting the Execution of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919*, Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 110. These seven paragraphs have therefore been omitted.

*Summary shewing the strength of the flight formations requested*

Enclosure to: No. 338/2-20 of 7th February 1920

Order	Unit	Personnel			Aeroplanes			Engines		Machine guns	Carbines	Remarks
		Officers	Surgeons	Other ranks	In service	In reserve	Spares	In reserve	Spares			
1.	Air Stations .	16	1	200	(*) 20	(*) 20	—	10	—	15	216	(*) Including 4 single seaters.
2.	Frontier Defence Flight .	24	—	165	(*) 12	(**) 6	—	6	—	(...) 36	189	(..) [?***] Including 2 single seaters.
3.	Reserve Depot and Administrative staff	12	—	100	—	—	(....) 300	—	125	—	112	(...) Including 24 permanently fitted M G's. (....) Including 50 single seaters.

*Total strength*

1.	8 Air stations .	128	8	1600	160	160	—	80	—	120	1728	
2.	1 Frontier Defence Flight .	24	—	165	12	6	—	6	—	36	189	
3.	1 Reserve Depot and staff .	12	—	100	—	—	300	—	125	—	112	
	<b>TOTAL . .</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1865</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>(*) 156</b>	<b>(*) 2029</b>	(*) In addition 1/25th in reserve.

*II. Résumé. Location of the 8 Air Stations*

Home defence district	Air station
I	Königsberg (East Prussia)
II	Stolp (Pomerania)
III	Döberitz (Berlin)
IV	Brieg (Silesia)
V	Grossenhain (Saxony)
VI	Böblingen (Stuttgart)
VII	Paderborn (Westphalia)
	Schleissheim (Munich)

No. 7

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Colonel von Tschischwitz*

*No. EAM/547/39 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, February 9, 1920

To the President, Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission, Berlin.

*Hindrances to work of the Commission*

On several occasions recently officers belonging to the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control have been refused admittance to German establishments on account of not being accompanied by a German officer.

I wish to call your attention to this matter, which appears to me to be in contradiction of Article 205 of the Peace Treaty, and give for your information the following cases.

(1) Messrs Siemens and Co. at Siemensstadt near Berlin on the 6th of February 1920. A Director refused the Commission's Delegation to enter the works on account of the absence of an accompanying German officer, and stated that he was acting in accordance with the orders of the German Government.

(2) Factory at Merkur, visited on the 7th of February 1920, where similar circumstances arose.

(3) Aerodrome at Johannisthal, visited on the 7th of February, 1920, the doorkeeper refusing to admit the delegation into the aerodrome on account of there being no German officer accompanying the party. I understand that the absence of a German accompanying officer was due to the action taken by these officers in defiance to the German Government's wishes but I do not understand why the Government issued instructions to the German establishments that the visiting parties from my Commission were not to be admitted unless accompanied by a German officer.

Not only has this action delayed the work of the Commission but it has also caused a very bad impression on the officers who were thus subjected to what amounts to indignity.

I request that I may be furnished with an explanation from the German Government on this matter, and would add for your information that I am also reporting this subject to Marshal Foch.

E. A. MASTERMAN,

*Air Commodore R.A.F., President, I.A.A.C.C.*

*Sir G. Grahame<sup>1</sup> (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 11)*

*No. 162 Telegraphic: by bag [177852/7067/39]*

PARIS, February 10, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning chiefly to give a hearing to the Austrian Ministers of Finance and Food who have come to Paris to lay the pressing needs of Austria before the Conference and the Reparation Commission. In the absence of Lord Derby I attended the meeting on receipt of a written invitation from M. Millerand.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese Ambassador was also absent and was represented by his Chargé d'Affaires. . . .<sup>3</sup>

The Conference then proceeded to the agenda of the day.

1. Marshal Foch commented on a report of the Aerial Clauses Commission<sup>4</sup> regarding the sale of aviation material by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces in Germany. He began by pointing out that the Aerial Clauses Commission was one at present not under his control and he proposed that all reports emanating from it should be submitted in the first place to the Allied Military Committee of Versailles (of which he is President). A resolution to this effect was passed.

Marshal Foch then called on Capitaine Roper, Secretary of the Aerial Clauses Commission, to comment on the report now submitted by his Commission. He stated that the resolution of the Supreme Council of November 7th<sup>5</sup> quoted in this report was in apparent contradiction with previous decisions of Marshal Foch, and the French Aviation authorities wished to study the matter further. The question was adjourned for consideration at a later meeting.

At this point the United States Ambassador made a protest to the effect that insufficient notice of this and other items had been given by the Secretariat-General and requested that notice should be given of the discussion of any motion and the documents submitted, at least thirty-six hours beforehand. M. Jules Cambon agreed that this procedure should be observed for the future when possible.

2. Capitaine Roper commented on the draft instructions drawn up by the Aerial Clauses Commission for transmission to General Masterman, President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany, regarding the suppression of the Aerial Police Force which had been instituted by the German Government and was alleged to comprise some two hundred machines (according to a confidential report submitted by General Groves, British representative on the Aerial Clauses Commission). These draft instructions were in substance that, as Article 202 of the Treaty of Versailles bound Germany to surrender to the Allied and Associated

<sup>1</sup> Counsellor in H.M. Embassy at Paris holding the personal rank of Minister.

<sup>2</sup> French President of the Council and President of the Conference of Ambassadors.

<sup>3</sup> The following two paragraphs referred to matters not on the agenda and unrelated to military control. <sup>4</sup> Of the Peace Conference. <sup>5</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 16, minute 2.

Governments all military or naval aviation material, the military aeroplanes and material reported to be employed by the German Aerial Police must be immediately stored and withheld from use in order that it may be examined by the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control and definitely surrendered should it be found to fall under the provisions of Article 202.

Marshal Foch stated that, although these draft instructions had not been submitted to the Allied Military Committee at Versailles, he now approved them. Considering that these instructions had been drawn up with the full consent of General Groves, British representative of the Aerial Clauses Commission, I agreed and the draft instructions were approved by the Conference.<sup>6</sup>

3. Capitaine Roper commented on the report of the Aerial Clauses Commission rejecting the request of the Austrian Delegation that the Austrian Government might maintain twenty aeroplanes for the purposes of aerial police. The report pointed out that the machines in question would be of a military type and that a concession to this request would form a most unfortunate precedent which would certainly be invoked by the German Government with a view to retaining the Aerial Police Force already organised by them. It was decided without discussion to adopt the report and reject the Austrian Government's request.

4. General Weygand<sup>7</sup> explained the decisions submitted by the Allied Military Commission at Versailles in regard to points raised by General Nollet, President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany.

(a) Article 169 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that German war material must be surrendered to the Allies for destruction, but does not indicate who is to remain in possession of the material remaining after destruction. The Commission was of opinion that the words 'livrer' in the French, and 'surrender' in the English text must be taken in the absolute sense and that the product of the process of destruction should remain in the hands of the Allies who would be free to dispose of it as they consider desirable. It was however, undesirable that the Commission of Control should embark upon commercial operations for the disposal of the same, and it was recommended that the Reparation Commission should undertake the sale and should credit the proceeds to Germany's reparation account.

(b) Article 168 of the Treaty of Versailles prescribes that within three months of the entry into force of the Treaty, all establishments for the manufacture of war material in Germany shall be suppressed. The Allied Military Commission had, after careful consideration, adopted in the main the ruling proposed by General Bingham,<sup>8</sup> the substance of which was as follows: 'Sup[p]ression' is to mean that all measures must be taken to ensure that these factories could not be reconverted for the production of war material

<sup>6</sup> On February 18, 1920, Air Commodore Masterman addressed note EAM/634/39 (not here printed) to Colonel von Tschischwitz in conformity with these instructions.

<sup>7</sup> Chief of General Staff to Marshal Foch on the Allied Military Committee of Versailles.

<sup>8</sup> Major-General the Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham, Chief of the British section of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany.

without complete renewal of the plant: Government factories transferred to the Ministry of Labour and actually exploited for clearly pacific purposes, should continue to operate; in return for this concession the German Government should undertake that all factories specially erected for the production of war material should be destroyed if the Commission of Control so required and lastly the German Government should not sell or dispose of any plant in such factories without the authority of the Commission.

(c) General Masterman, President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany had enquired whether aviation material which was unusable or to be rendered unusable, should remain in the hands of the German Government, or should be sold by the Commission for the benefit of the Allied Governments. The Allied Military Commission at Versailles was of opinion that Article 202 of the Treaty of Versailles made it clear that all such material should be surrendered to the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control and that the latter should classify the same as (i) usable material to be used by the Allied countries; (ii) unusable material or material the use of which by the Allies would be inopportune. Material of the latter class could be sold under the supervision of the Reparation Commission.

After a brief discussion the three decisions above, as submitted by the Inter-Allied Military Commission at Versailles, were approved by the Conference. . . .<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The remainder of this telegram related to another matter.

## No. 9

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Colonel von Tschischwitz*

*No. EAM/575/39 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, February 11, 1920

To the President, Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission, Berlin.

### *Infractions*

The activities of certain Companies, calling themselves 'Aerial Transport Companies', have been brought to the notice of the inspecting officers of the I.A.A.C.C. in the course of their visits.

Although these companies do not object to an inventory being taken of the material contained in the hangars occupied by them, they claim the right of disposal, and besides this, they make flights almost daily. Moreover these Companies undertake repairs of war material. Therefore, under these headings they are violating Articles 198 and 201 of the Peace Treaty.

It is the duty of the Aeronautical Commission to inspect and classify all aircraft which may be submitted as commercial types. It is therefore necessary that all aircraft to be submitted for reclassification should be available



for inspection from now onwards, in order that no time may be lost in the course of the visits of inspection.

E. A. MASTERMAN,  
*Air Commodore R.A.F.*

**No. 10**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 19)*

*No. 183 Telegraphic: by bag [179621/7067/39]*

PARIS, February 18, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

A meeting of the Council of Ambassadors was held yesterday afternoon under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon.

. . .<sup>1</sup> 4. The Conference considered the proposals of General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany (already endorsed by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles) for the progressive reduction of the German Army to 200,000 men by April 10th, 1920, and to 100,000 by July 10th, 1920.<sup>2</sup> This involved a small extension of the time-limits stipulated by Articles 160 and 163 of the Treaty but it was made clear that no corresponding delay would be allowed in the surrender of arms, munitions and material stipulated in article 169 of the Treaty. After a brief discussion the Conference approved the proposals. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted preceding and ensuing sections reported discussion of other matters.

<sup>2</sup> See enclosure in No. 11 below.

**No. 11**

*Letter from Sir M. Hankey<sup>1</sup> to Lord Hardinge<sup>2</sup> (Received February 19)*

*[179657/179657/39]*

LONDON, February 18, 1920

Dear Lord Hardinge,

I herewith enclose copy of a letter<sup>3</sup> which was signed by Mr. Lloyd George and dispatched to Marshal Foch this afternoon in regard to the fulfilment of Article 160 of the Treaty of Versailles. I also enclose copy of a letter to Herr von Sthamer [*sic*]<sup>4</sup> which is mentioned in the letter to Marshal Foch. Would you please see that Lord Derby is notified accordingly.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,

for M. P. A. HANKEY,

A. J. SYLVESTER

<sup>1</sup> Secretary of the Cabinet.

<sup>2</sup> Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This letter informed Marshal Foch that the recommendations of the Versailles Allied Military Committee had been adopted by the Supreme Council; cf. Volume VII, No. 13, minute 4.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure below. Herr Sthamer was the German Chargé d'Affaires at London.

<sup>5</sup> Copies of the two enclosures were sent to Lord Derby on February 19, 1920.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 11

*Mr. Lloyd George to Herr Sthamer*

10 DOWNING STREET, LONDON, *February 18, 1920*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you, for the information of the German Government, that the attention of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers has been drawn by the President of the Commission of Control at Berlin to the difficulty with which the German Government will be confronted, if the Allied Powers insist on the strict fulfilment of Article 160 of the Treaty of Versailles, under which, by a date, which must not be later than March 31st, 1920, the total effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots.

As this article was drafted on the assumption that the Treaty of Versailles would have been ratified at a much earlier date, the Supreme Council have decided to permit that the German Forces should be reduced to 200,000 men by the 10th April, 1920, that is to say, three months from the coming into force of the Treaty, as provided for in Article 163, and to 100,000 men by the 10th July, 1920.

I have the honour to request that you will communicate this decision to the German Government.

I have, &c.,

D. LLOYD GEORGE,

*President*

No. 12

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 23)*

*No. 203 Telegraphic: by bag [180290/7067/39]*

PARIS, *February 21, 1920*

Following for Cabinet.

. . .<sup>1</sup> 3. (A). In view of the Resolutions of the Supreme Council of December 9th, 1919, to the effect that no further distribution of ex-enemy vessels should be made,<sup>2</sup> the requests of the Polish, Brazilian, Belgian, Cuban and Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegations for further ships was [*sic*] rejected. It was also decided that the torpedo-boats to be assigned to Poland should be German vessels and not Austrian, in view of the practical difficulty and expense of towing Austrian torpedo-boats from the Adriatic to Danzig.

<sup>1</sup> The preceding paragraphs reported discussion of other matters by the Conference of Ambassadors on the morning of February 21.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume II, No. 39, minute 1.

(B). It was decided to confirm the allocation of the submarine salvage ship 'Cyclops' to Great Britain and the salvage vessel 'Hercules' to Italy; also that the large tubular dock from [?] submarines should go to Great Britain and a smaller dock of the same kind to France on the understanding that in both cases these vessels should be used primarily for commercial purposes. The French naval representative however made it clear that should it be found impossible to use these smaller vessels for commercial purposes, the French Government reserved to themselves the right to use them for naval purposes. The difficult and somewhat strained discussion leading up to this decision forms the subject of a separate telegram<sup>3</sup> from Head of Naval Section to Admiralty.

(C). It was decided without discussion to adopt the unanimous report of the naval representatives of the four Allied Powers that the German battle-ship 'Rheinland' assigned to Great Britain by a decision of the Council of Ambassadors on January 29th [26th] last and now found to be totally unseaworthy, should be broken up by a Danish or Scandinavian firm and that the proceeds should go to Great Britain.

(D). The German naval authorities for some time past have been maintaining that the surrender of the light cruisers under the Protocol of January 10th is still subject to further discussion on the ground that Mr. Loucheur<sup>4</sup> had assured Baron von Lersner,<sup>5</sup> that the number of light cruisers to be delivered by Germany might be reduced from five to four. It was decided that the German Government should be informed that Mr. Loucheur's alleged statement was unauthorised, and that the German Government have absolutely no justification for delaying the delivery of the cruisers, as provided for in the Protocol of January 10th.

(E). It was decided to refer to the naval experts a recommendation by the United States' admiral in the Mediterranean that the two Austrian torpedo-boats Nos. 12 and 52 recently driven ashore in a gale should, because of their bad condition, be sunk forthwith.

(F). The Conference was called upon to consider what instructions should be sent to the Allied Naval Commission of Control in Berlin in view of the refusal of the German Government, based on Article 197 of the Treaty, to allow members of the Commission to examine the receiving apparatus of the German wireless stations. The lengthy discussion which followed forms the subject of a separate telegram.<sup>6</sup> It was decided on the one hand to consult the Drafting Committee whether such examination was justified by Articles 197 and 209 of the Treaty and on the other hand to obtain a definite opinion from the wireless experts on the Commission of Control whether the control stipulated in Article 197 was in fact impossible without examination of the receiving apparatus. . . .<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>4</sup> French Minister of Industrial Production in the recent Clemenceau Government.

<sup>5</sup> Successor to Herr von Haniel as President of the German Peace Delegation after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles until his resignation on February 4, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

<sup>7</sup> The two following paragraphs reported discussion of other matters.

No. 13

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 26)*

No. 575 [181168/40276/39]

PARIS, February 24, 1920

The Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

*Name and Date*

*Subject*

General Sackville West (33/A/2/19)      Destruction of German war material.  
21st Feby. 1920.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 13

*General Sackville West to the Earl of Derby*

33/A/2/19

PARIS, February 21, 1920

I forward herewith for the information of His Excellency the Ambassador a copy of a telegram<sup>1</sup> regarding the destruction of war material in Germany addressed by Marshal Foch to General Nollet, communicated to-day to the Allied Military Committee.

I asked for further information as to paragraph 3, which states that the destruction of war material subsequent to the signature of the Treaty, i.e. 28th June, 1919, constitutes a violation of the Treaty. In reply Marshal Foch explained that he had based his attitude on the Resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council on 22nd August, 1919, establishing the right of ownership of the Allied and Associated Powers over all surplus German war material.<sup>2</sup> In these circumstances Marshal Foch's telegram does not involve any fresh interpretation of the Treaty, but merely maintains a decision already approved by the Allied Governments.

His Excellency may perhaps think it desirable to communicate the text of Marshal Foch's telegram to His Majesty's Government. A copy of Marshal Foch's telegram under reference, together with the above explanation, has been sent to the War Office.

C. SACKVILLE WEST,

*Major-General,*

*British Representative,*

*Allied Military Committee of Versailles*

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure 2 below.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume I, No. 40, minute 4.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 13

*Translation of Cypher telegram from Marshal Foch to General Nollet (Berlin)*  
*Copy*

PARIS, February 17, 1920

(Reply to letter No. 469<sup>3</sup> dated 11th February, 1920)

(1) According to the terms of Article 169 of the Treaty of Peace signed by Germany on 28th June, 1919, all German arms, munitions and war material in excess of the authorised quantities have to be delivered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be destroyed or rendered useless within two months from the entry into force of the Treaty.

(2) It follows that the disposal of the material in any other way by the German Government is contrary to the above text and can, therefore, not be accepted but should be regarded as a violation of the Treaty.

(3) It is, therefore, necessary to regard as a violation of the Treaty, as from 28th June, 1919, any cases of the destruction of material since that date, and, in future, to base our attitude on the text of the Treaty.

(4) Further, the German Government should submit a statement of material which it claims to have destroyed and should be called upon to establish proof of such destruction.

(5) Finally it is in accordance with these instructions that you should dispose of the question of material which has been destroyed, and arrange for the destruction of material still in existence.

MARSHAL FOCH

<sup>3</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 14

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 27)*

*No. 214 Telegraphic: by bag [181377/7067/39]*

PARIS, February 25, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> (8) At their meeting of the 26th January, the Conference had decided that all warships surrendered under the Treaty and Protocol were to be disarmed, and the equipment landed and placed under the supervision of the Naval Commission of Control.<sup>2</sup> No orders, however, have yet been given to the Commission of Control, to proceed with the destruction of this equipment in accordance with Article 192 of the Treaty of Versailles. The Conference today decided in accordance with the recommendation of the Naval experts to instruct the Commission of Control to proceed forthwith with the destruction in Germany of all surplus naval equipment specified in Article

<sup>1</sup> The omitted paragraphs recorded discussion of other matters.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 2.

192 with the exception of that belonging to light cruisers and destroyers provided for in the Protocol of January 10th. Complete equipment necessary for these light cruisers and destroyers is to remain in store under the supervision of the Commission of Control, and it was agreed that should it subsequently be found that the German Government have infringed the terms of the Treaty or protocol so far as the surrender of the ships or their equipment is concerned, the Conference of Ambassadors should decide whether compensation might not be obtained by the Allied Powers taking possession of some or all of this equipment for their own use instead of destroying it under the terms of the Treaty. It will be recollected from my telegram No. 107 of January 26th<sup>3</sup> that the French and Italian Governments are most anxious to obtain possession of this equipment, and this arrangement is in the nature of a concession made to them with the view of helping them to obtain it. In agreeing that these instructions should be sent to the Naval Commission of Control, I laid stress upon the fact that the equipment was to be destroyed in Germany, i.e., not removed to an Allied port. No objection was raised to this at the time but it is probable that the French will want to reopen the question. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>3</sup> No. 2.

## No. 15

*Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received March 4)*

*No. 79 [182899/9019/39]*

BERLIN, February 28, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 135 (178759/W39) of the 23rd instant<sup>1</sup> transmitting a copy of your despatch to Paris No. 640 of February 20th,<sup>2</sup> relative to the entry of warlike material from Germany into the Netherlands, I have the honour to transmit herewith notes of a conversation recently held by Lieut.-Col. Maude of the British Military Mission here with a Russian man of business from which it would appear that the war material in question has been sold by a German firm to the Japanese with view to its being smuggled through Holland.

The American Commissioner tells me he believes that similar smuggling is going on with Mexico as a destination.

I have, &c.,

KILBARNOCK

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch transmitted to Lord Derby a copy of No. 5 above and requested him to 'ascertain whether the French Government considers that a warning should be addressed to the German Government to the effect that export from Germany of arms and ammunition is contrary to the Treaty of Versailles'.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 15

BRITISH MILITARY MISSION, BERLIN, *February 25, 1920*

To: The Chief of the British Military Mission.

*Notes on a Conversation with Herr Lissner on February 20th 1920*

Lissner is a Russian of about 40 years of age. He was formerly Director of several firms in Petrograd and a successful business man. He escaped from Moscow about two years ago and has been living in Berlin ever since. He has been referred to in previous reports in connection with the disposal of German War Material. He probably knows more than any other man in Germany what countries have bought German and Russian munitions, but previous attempts to get him to talk were without results. On this occasion, under the influence of a good dinner, he was slightly more communicative. He made the following admissions:—

That the Konsortium of which he is in charge, which is the Schilde, had disposed of German War Material to the Japanese, that it had gone into Holland (Amsterdam) and had been smuggled out of Holland. He would not impart the name of the channels in Holland but he laid stress on the fact that it had been smuggled and that the Dutch Authorities did not know of the transaction.

No. 16

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 1)*

*No. 224 Telegraphic: by bag [182085/7067/39]*

PARIS, *February 29, 1920*

Following for the Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors considered the following questions this morning under the Presidency of M. Jules Cambon.

...<sup>1</sup> 2. The Naval Commission of Control asked for a ruling on two points:

- (a) As to the interpretation of the words 'ships in reserve' occurring in article 181 of the Treaty of Versailles. The German authorities claim that these ships in reserve should be allowed to have their guns and ammunition on board. According to the usual meaning of the words 'in reserve' it would seem that their claim is justified. On the other hand, from Article 192 it appears to be clear that no ammunition or guns can be allocated to these ships in reserve. I consulted my Legal Adviser on this question, and he maintains the latter view. I accordingly invited the Conference to approve this interpretation, but the Italian Ambassador demurring, it was finally agreed to refer the question back to the Legal Advisers.

<sup>1</sup> The omitted section(s) related to other matters.

- (b) As to whether Germany may retain gunboats and small auxiliary craft on the ground that the Treaty contains no provision for their surrender. My legal adviser considers that any ships which flew the German Naval flag are to be considered as warships within the meaning of the last paragraph of Article 181. This question has also been referred to the legal advisers. Unfortunately these are scattered between London and Paris and will be unable to confer together. . . .<sup>1</sup>

## No. 17

*Herr Mertens<sup>1</sup> to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*

*No. F.M. 3. 190/20.320 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

AUSWÄRTIGES AMT, BERLIN, *February 29, 1920*

The Peace Department of the Foreign Office has the honour to make the following reply to your communication of the 9th of the month EAM/T/547/39<sup>2</sup> addressed to the President of the Air Peace Commission concerning the accompaniment of members of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control when visiting German establishments.

With regard to the instructions of Luftfriko that the members of the Inter-Allied Commission are to be accompanied by German officers when visiting German firms and aerodromes for inspection purposes, there is no intention whatsoever to interfere with the Commission of Control. The freedom of movement within Germany secured by Article 205 of the Peace Treaty for the Commissions are [*sic*] to be in every way assured and furthered, and no obstructions are to be put in the way of their visits to places in question. This arrangement does not ex[c]lude the accompaniment of Sub-Commissions by German officers in the carrying out of the visits. On the contrary, this conducting by German officers helps to secure for the Commissions and their members the facilities laid down by Article 206. It is in accordance with the interests of both sides for the quickest possible completion of the work that wherever visits are made, individuals should be at the disposal of those carrying out the inspections, in the same way as those who are delegated by the German Government, in accordance with Article 206 for the Chief Commissions, to receive the communications of the Commissions of Control. Previous experience has borne out that German conducting officers, as intermediaries in dealings between firms and the Commissions are of great assistance, and the detailed officers will also in future do everything which can help forward the fulfilment of the work of the Commissions. Likewise it is the wish of the German Government that members of the Commissions shall be treated in a proper way.

The instances cited in the above mentioned communications of entry into German places having been refused, occurred at a time when the German conducting officers had temporarily refused to accompany officers of the

<sup>1</sup> Director of the Peace Section of the German Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> No. 7.



Entente States for certain reasons.<sup>3</sup> This refusal has subsequently been settled and so far as is known by this department, no further hindrance[s] to inspections by Commissions have occurred.

Moreover, it is observed that the Commissions of inspection for aircraft, as far back as September of last year asked for officers for the purpose in question, and when, in the middle of January of this year, difficulties arose owing to the great number of officers who were being employed, I went personally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and insisted upon a full attendance of all such officers.

The Peace Department of the Foreign Office is of opinion that in view of the foregoing, it would help and facilitate the work of the Commission of Control for things to remain as they are, so far as concerns the matter of conducting officers.

MERTENS

<sup>3</sup> Note printed in filed copy: 'This I.A.A.C.C. Note refers to the Allied demand for surrender of war criminals.' See Volume IX, Chap. VII.

### No. 18

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received March 5, 11.45 a.m.)*

*No. 93 Telegraphic [183237/183237/18]*

*Secret*

BERLIN, March 4, 1920, 6 p.m.

Officer attached to General Malcolm's Mission has just returned from Hamburg where he obtained absolutely sure information that war material is being loaded on steamship 'Delagoa Maru' for Japan.

### No. 19

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 6)*

*No. 246 Telegraphic: by bag [183386/7067/39]*

PARIS, March 4, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:

. . .<sup>1</sup> 3. I communicated to the Conference a telegram received from the President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control reporting that the Germans are supplying 10,000 out of the 20,000 tons of coal necessary to enable the surrendered German war ships to proceed to Allied ports, and that they hope to commence delivery of the ships in the middle of March. President of the Commission is satisfied that in the circumstances they could not have done so earlier (see my telegram No. 105 of January 26th<sup>2</sup> paragraph 11). . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted section(s) related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

5. Attention was called to the fact that the British and United States armies of occupation on the Rhine had disposed of certain aeronautical material instead of handing it over to the Aeronautical Commission of Control. In order to regularize the position, it was decided on the recommendation of the Inter-Allied Military Commission that all aeronautical material collected by the armies up to the 7th November 1919 shall be considered as material abandoned by the enemy. The armies may therefore dispose as they think fit of such material in their possession but from the 7th November 1919 onwards the decision of the Supreme Council of that date respecting the disposal of aeronautical material is to be applied.<sup>3</sup>

6. The Interallied Military Committee submitted an application from the Czecho-Slovak Government to be allowed to take possession of 400,000,000 cartridges and other military material which they have bought from the German Government. The French Government were as usual inclined to accede to the request notwithstanding the fact that it is contrary to Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty of Versailles and advanced a new argument to the effect that if the German Government were allowed to sell war material to the smaller Allied Governments it should have the effect of reducing the smuggling of such material from Germany into Holland which is assuming dangerous proportions. My other Colleagues and I insisted on adhering strictly to the terms of the Treaty according to which this material ought to be destroyed, and it was finally agreed that permission should be refused to the Czecho-Slovak Government on these grounds.

I understand, however, that the question of smuggling war material into Holland on which I have already consulted the French Government in accordance with your Despatch No. 620 of the 20th February<sup>4</sup> will shortly be brought by Marshal Foch before the Conference. . . .<sup>1</sup>

12. The German Government have raised the question as to the competence of the Interallied Commissions appointed under the Treaty of Versailles, should the United States Government definitely decide not to ratify the Treaty. This question had been referred to the Drafting Committee, but the latter hesitate to express an opinion in the absence of Mr. Malkin.<sup>5</sup> Their report has therefore been adjourned. The matter is not particularly urgent.

13. Similarly the Drafting Committee have expressed themselves unable to pronounce, in the absence of Mr. Malkin, an opinion with regard to the interpretation of the words 'ships in reserve' as used in Article 181 (see my telegram No. 224, paragraph 2 (a)).<sup>6</sup> This question therefore has also been adjourned. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 16, minute 2 and n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> '620' is evidently an error for '640'. See No. 15, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Assistant Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office. For this question cf. Volume IX, Nos. 251 and 255.

<sup>6</sup> No. 16.

## No. 20

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 8)*

*No. 253 Telegraphic: by bag [183578/7067/39]*

PARIS, March 6, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Presidency of M. Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions:—

1. The Aeronautical Commission of Control had asked for instructions:—

(a) with regard to the disposal of the proceeds resulting from the destruction of aeronautical material;

(b) with regard to the sale of hangars.

The Inter-Allied Committee at Versailles had proposed to the Conference that the Commission of Control should be informed:—

(a) that all sales should be carried out in conformity with the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of February 10th, that is to say through the intermediary of the Reparation Commission;

(b) that in cases where the Commission decided that it was preferable to sell hangars instead of pulling them down, care should be taken that before being sold they are rendered definitely useless for military purposes.

In the meanwhile, however, the German delegation had addressed a Note to the Conference<sup>1</sup> pointing out that under Part XI of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany is expected to afford all facilities for civilian aerial traffic across her territories and requesting that in order to enable Germany to carry out these provisions of the Treaty, the Aeronautical Commission of Control should be instructed to leave her the necessary hangars and material.

After a somewhat confused discussion, it was decided to refer this question to the Committee on aerial clauses for a report as to the procedure to be adopted with a view to reconciling the civilian interests dealt with in Part XI of the Treaty with the military safeguards laid down in Article 202. . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 57.

<sup>2</sup> The following paragraphs related to other matters.

## No. 21

*German Air Service Peace Commission (Berlin) to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*

*No. 1036/3/20 Ref. G [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

LUFTFAHRT FRIEDENSKOMMISSION, BERLIN, March 8, 1920

To: the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control.

1. In the recent conversation at the Military Academy on the 2nd inst. complaint was made by the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, that during official visits to, and inspection of military aerodromes

by the I.A.A.C.C., aeroplanes were absent from the aerodromes in question, and that thereby the execution of control of the number of aircraft was rendered more difficult. We would earnestly impress upon you that there was no intention whatsoever [*sic*] to render the control more difficult by the carrying out of such flights.

In order to remove all misunderstanding instructions have been issued to the Military Flying Formations (Königsberg, Stolp, Döberitz, Brieg, Grossenhain, Paderborn, Schleissheim, Böblingen, Insterburg) as follows:

(a) During the visits by the I.A.A.C.C. all flying is to cease, also the absence of any machines on service flights is to be at once reported to the officer in charge of the Commission.

(b) To refrain from sending away any aeroplanes as soon as visits of the I.A.A.C.C. have been notified to the O.C. of the flying formation.

Flights of the above mentioned air service formations took place in accordance with the programme drawn up for the army of 200,000 men up to 1st [10th] July 1920, which was sanctioned by the Supreme Council and also for carrying out those duties which are laid down in detail in the memorandum headed 'Concerning the necessity for a small number of flight detachments'<sup>1</sup> which was enclosed in letter No. 416.2.20 of 12-2-20.<sup>2</sup>

According to Article 202 aeroplanes can only be transferred to other places with the permission of the Allied and Associated Powers. In pursuance of this, when the Peace Treaty came into force, only those aeronautical movements which were for the purpose of demobilisation, i.e. for assembling material in the handing-over depots, were allowed. A copy of the order to this effect is enclosed for information.<sup>3</sup>

In the opinion of the Reichswehrministerium the flights referred to in para. 2 do not constitute a transfer of aeroplanes to other stations, as in point of fact the aeroplanes, after having completed their duties, have to return to the aerodrome of their formation.

If however the I.A.A.C.C. cannot agree with this interpretation, the Reichswehrministerium declares itself prepared to cease these flights at military stations until such time as a definite decision has been arrived at about the memorandum of 12-2-20. In special urgent cases where the use of military aeroplanes is essential, shown in memorandum of 12th February, the exceptional use of military aeroplanes will immediately be notified on each occasion to the I.A.A.C.C.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No memorandum with this title can be traced in Foreign Office archives. It is not clear whether the reference is in fact to the enclosure in No. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Signature lacking from filed copy.

## No. 22

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received March 10, 7.30 p.m.)*

*No. 102 Telegraphic [184300/184039/18]*

BERLIN, March 10, 1920, 11.35 a.m.

My telegram No. 100.<sup>1</sup>

Three officers in uniform and two civilian members of Naval Control Commission were assaulted in streets of Bremen by crowd yesterday. No details have yet been received but Admiral Charlton has requested German Naval Peace Commission to draw attention of Government to necessity of taking strong measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram of March 8 reported an incident at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin where three French officers were assaulted for not rising to their feet when 'Deutschland über Alles' was played. Prince Joachim of Prussia and another German officer were arrested. Cf. Volume VIII, No. 2, minute 4.

## No. 23

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 80 Telegraphic [183237/183237/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 10, 1920, 5 p.m.

Your telegram No. 93 (of March 4th.<sup>1</sup> Exportation of war material from Germany).

You should immediately bring this matter to the attention of the Commission of Control and suggest that they should at once take up the matter in the manner they consider best.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 18.

<sup>2</sup> In his telegram No. 105 of March 12 (not printed) Lord Kilmarnock reported that he had done so.

## No. 24

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received March 12, 2.25 p.m.)*

*No. 104 Telegraphic [184924/184039/18]*

BERLIN, March 10, 1920, 8.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 102.<sup>1</sup>

Further reports show that two incidents took place same day at Bremen in one of which two French officers of Military Control Commission were attacked, in the other officers of Naval Control. Both were rather serious as apparently aggressors belong to Reichswehr. Yesterday yet another incident occurred not far from Berlin. Eight French soldiers went shooting without

<sup>1</sup> No. 22.

leave on land belonging to peasants. They were armed with only three shot guns but were attacked by Ein-Wohnerwehr [*sic*] with rifles. One French soldier was shot dead.

All these incidents are being dealt with by President of Control Commission concerned.

German Government has issued exhortation to people to refrain from molesting members of Foreign Commissions.

## No. 25

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 12)*

*No. 277 Telegraphic: by bag [184684/7067/39]*

PARIS, March 11, 1920

Following for the Cabinet:

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon.

. . .<sup>1</sup> 3. The Conference approved the unanimous proposal of the Military Commission of Versailles to the effect that the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control had the right to visit the German fortifications, referred to in Articles 180 and 196 of the Treaty of Versailles, which Germany is allowed to keep in their 'existing state'. The German authorities have disputed this right, but the Conference agreed with the Military Committee that the Commission of Control must necessarily inspect these fortifications if they are to decide what their 'existing state' is. This is all the more necessary if the League of Nations is to carry out the investigations provided for in Article 213 of the Treaty.

4. On the unanimous recommendation of the Military Committee of Versailles, the Conference decided to refuse the application of the German Government for permission to maintain a military air service for police purposes in contravention of Article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles. It will be remembered that a similar request by Austria was also recently rejected. . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The first paragraph related to the failure of the German Government to prosecute German officers who had insulted members of General Niessel's Mission in the Baltic Provinces (cf. No. 4 and Volume III, No. 214, n. 3), the second to the Russian detachment still at Danzig.

<sup>2</sup> On February 10, cf. No. 8. The last eight sections reported discussion on other matters.

No. 26

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilminster (Berlin)*

*No. 178 [183556/9019/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 11, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 135 of February 23rd<sup>1</sup> in regard to reports as to the entry of arms and other war-like material into the Netherlands from Germany, I have to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram<sup>2</sup> which has been received from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Paris relative to this subject.

2. I should be glad if, in accordance with the observation of the French Government that the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control is charged with the duty of protesting against breaches of the treaty of this nature, you would take an early opportunity of bringing the matter to the notice of the President of the Commission.

3. Copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State),

ERIC PHIPPS<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This was a copy of Foreign Office despatch No. 640 to Paris. See No. 15, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In it Sir G. Grahame reported that the French Government were prepared to join in the action proposed by the British Government (see No. 15, n. 2) and had sent instructions to their Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin to concert with Lord Kilminster in any representations that might be made.

<sup>3</sup> Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office.

No. 27

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilminster (Berlin)*

*No. 181 [182895/4232/18]*

*Confidential*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 11, 1920*

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 75 of the 28th ultimo<sup>1</sup> reporting endeavours which have been made by certain elements in Germany to make known to Your Lordship their views on the Bolshevik question.

2. As you are aware, the whole question of the future reduction of the German army is being dealt with by the Interallied Military Commission of Control. The German Government have already been informed<sup>2</sup> that the German army must be reduced to 200,000 men by April 10th 1920 and to 100,000 men by July 10th 1920. For Your Lordship's confidential information, however, I would add that the British General Staff are of opinion that,

<sup>1</sup> Volume IX, No. 67.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. enclosure in No. 11.

in view of the need of the continuance in Germany of an adequate force to preserve order, the question of a reduction of the German army after April 10th 1920 should be referred back to the Commission of Control.<sup>3</sup> A suggestion on these lines is about to be laid before the Conference of Ambassadors.

3. Your Lordship should continue to report any information of this nature which may come to your knowledge, but you should of course avoid committing yourself or H.M.G. to any opinion in the matter.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>3</sup> In their letter of February 26, communicating their views to the Foreign Office, the War Office stated their belief that the proposal to reduce the German armed forces to 100,000 by July 10, 1920, was premature.

## No. 28

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Colonel von Tschischwitz*

*Nr. S/100/1.017/39 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, March 11, 1920

To the President, Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission, Reichswehrministerium,  
Berlin

### *Information required from German Government*

It has been brought to my notice that use is being made of my letter of 17th September 1919,<sup>1</sup> requesting *preliminary* information from the German Government, in a sense for which it was never intended.

I find that this letter has been printed (in English and German) and issued to the German accompanying officers, and that they regard this as an order from you limiting the information which may be demanded.

I have to point out to you that my letter of the 17th September 1919 was merely a demand for *preliminary* information required by me in order to, if possible, organise the work of the Commission before its arrival in Germany, that the German Government took up the view that this information could not be furnished before ratification of Peace, and that actually after ratification, long delays took place before the information—which even now is manifestly incomplete in many details—was supplied to me.

In no sense whatever was my request intended to limit to the slightest degree the information to which the Commission is entitled under Article 210 of the Peace Treaty and I require you to bring this fact to the notice of the accompanying officers at once, if this has not already been done.

I attribute a certain amount of the delay and difficulty which has already taken place in the inspections to this apparent misunderstanding.

E. A. MASTERMAN,

*Air Commodore, R.A.F., President, I.A.A.C.C.*

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



*Summary of Report on the Armed Forces of Germany and the work of the Effectives Sub-Commission of Control, dated the 12th March 1920, by Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan, British Representative on the Effectives Sub-Commission of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, Berlin.*<sup>1</sup>

[192961/179657/39]

1. *The disappearance of the Old Army*

The units and formations of the Old Army no longer exist. Certain 'Free Corps' have been identified, which are composed of men of the Old Army, but these do not figure on the Army Estimates for the current year and it is doubtful whether they draw Army Pay. There are also the remnants of the Baltic Troops. Both the 'Free Corps' and the Baltic Troops are a danger to public order.

2. *Demobilization*

Although the units and formations of the Old Army have ceased to exist it is not certain that the Cadres and organization have disappeared. Old organizations are to be recognised under new names, such as Demobilization Centres &c. and it is of importance to ascertain whether these organizations are completely 'demilitarized', as is claimed by the Germans, and solely engaged in 'liquidating' the Old Army. There is no evidence that these organizations are at present engaged in any recruiting activities, but they could undoubtedly be used for the sudden restoration of the old conscript system.

3. *'Demobilization'*<sup>2</sup>

Outwardly there has been a great change; whole departments of the old War Ministry have been transferred to other Ministries and some 3,500 officers on the strength of Demobilization Offices are said to represent a 'demilitarized' personnel. This 'demilitarization' may be more ostentations [*sic*] than real and the fact that officers and men in these auxiliary formations which are contrary to the Peace Treaty, such as the Sicherheitspolizei and the Einwoh[n]erwehren, are all presented under a civilian grading as 'functionaries' strengthens the suspicion that here is merely a change of nomenclature and uniform. The liability in Law to compulsory service still exists and a large proportion of the demobilized officers and men still belong to the Reserve over whom the Military jurisdiction is still intact. It is clear that there exists a preconceived plan for defeating the application of the main principles of the Treaty.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This copy was forwarded to the Foreign Office by the War Office on April 19. A copy of the complete report (not printed) was received in the Foreign Office on May 11.

<sup>2</sup> It is clear from the text of the full report that this word should be 'Demilitarization'.

<sup>3</sup> In the full report General Morgan added 'and, on the basis of the argument from design, one may conjecture the existence of an extremely able and astute mind behind it'.

#### 4. *Difficulties of the Government*

As against the foregoing conclusion it is only fair to add that another interpretation is possible. The German Government appears still to entertain the hope that the Allies may consent to an increase in the maximum of effectives prescribed by the Treaty. One must also make allowance for the comprehensible inertia of the officers and men in the Demobilization Offices; the anxiety of the Government to avoid reinforcing the ranks of discontent by making too sudden a reduction; the fear of Bolshevism; and also for the fact that the system of compulsory service was dovetailed into the whole fabric of German administration and that a too precipitate and ill-considered liquidation of that system might cause an administrative collapse. These considerations have been borne in mind by the Effectives Sub-Commission in making their recommendations. In particular they have been led to give favourable consideration to the request of the Germans to be allowed to increase by 75% the personnel of the Police Force by the application of the Eight Hours Day to their conditions of service. Other instances are given in which latitude has been allowed or is recommended in order to avoid a too rude disturbance of the existing social order.

#### 5. *The work of the Control*

The eight District Committees, who are working under the Effectives Sub-Commission were slow in getting to work owing to the delay of the German Government in issuing the necessary instructions. Other difficulties also arose, and in some places the attitude of the local authorities was obstructive and unfriendly. These difficulties overcome, the 'Black List' question made all work impossible,<sup>4</sup> but since the compromise was effected the work of local control has been proceeding fairly smoothly. The German Military Authorities have been correct in their demeanour and it is irresponsible persons who have caused certain regrettable incidents. Nevertheless they have been sparing in their supply of information which in some districts has lacked accuracy. Valuable work has been done in the Berlin District where a very thorough inspection of the Demobilization Centres has been made.

The active control of the Sub-Commission over the effectives and organization of the New Army cannot come into operation till the 10th April, but its control over these clauses of the Treaty, such as the demobilization of [the] Old Army and the prohibition of auxiliary formations, for which no time limit is prescribed, is already proceeding.

#### 6. *Sicherheitspolizei*

The danger of the Sicherheitspolizei lies in the fact that in virtue of armament, training, organization and recruitment, they constitute a potential reserve and provide the German Army with a cadre of Non-Commissioned

<sup>4</sup> i.e. the list of German nationals accused of war crimes which was remitted to the German Chancellor on February 7, 1920; cf. Volume IX, Chap. VII, *passim*.

Officers. They are the more objectionable as the Treaty, while limiting the numbers of the German Police, has imposed no conditions as to their terms of enlistment. In Berlin alone this force numbers some three 'Brigades' or 'Gruppen', of 9,000 men in all and is equivalent in all respects to an infantry Division.<sup>5</sup> The course of training is precisely the same as that for the old Prussian Army and in spite of being under the Ministry of the Interior, the Military character of the force is unmistakable. On the 23rd January the Commission called upon the German Government to render account of the steps taken to give effect to the demands of the Supreme Council in their Note of the 12th December<sup>6</sup> for the suppression of the force, but no reply has been received. Similarly no reply has been made to the Commission's questionnaire of November last.

7. Correspondence with the German Government on the withdrawal by the 10th April of the troops in the Neutral Zone has unmasked their intentions and confirmed all information as to the armament of these forces. Having failed to obtain consent to retain troops in the Neutral Zone and to move in reinforcements in case of disturbance, the German Government has made the proposal to maintain a special force of Sicherheitspolizei, 14,000 strong, armed with machine guns and howitzers. To avoid the intervention of German troops the Commission decided to concede a special police force of 10,000 men for five years, but informed the German Government that the Commission could not sanction the maintenance of such an 'unmistakably military force' as the Sicherheitspolizei, and drew their attention to Articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty, insisting that the character of the Police must be 'local and municipal'. The Commission were aware that behind the screen of civilian control, the new Sicherheitspolizei are controlled by Brigade and Divisional Staffs. The question of armament was more difficult to decide, the more so as the Table of Armaments for Germany has omitted to make any provision for the police in its maximum of 96,000 rifles, and the rifle has always been the arm of the 'Landgendarmarie'. For the moment the question of armament is reserved. It is obvious that the Neutral Zone presents a peculiar case.

8. On the 12th March the German Government presented a Memorandum (Appendix 'C')<sup>7</sup> dated the 15th February, which gives for the first time something like a complete statement of the case for the Sicherheitspolizei. It shows that the German Government has never intended to suppress this institution, but it puts forward arguments which deserve, and must receive, full consideration. In the view of the Sub-Commission on Effectives, numbers are less important than organization and armament and no objection will be taken in principle to the increase of effectives by 75% provided

<sup>5</sup> The full report added 'armed with the weapons used in trench warfare, including Flammenwerfer and Trench mortars, and with an Artillery park and a squadron of aeroplanes'. For further information on the Sicherheitspolizei cf. Volume IX, No. 31.

<sup>6</sup> No note of this date has been traced. Presumably the reference is to the note of December 1 (see Volume II, No. 33, minute 2 and appendix D).

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

the introduction of the Eight Hour Day into the Police forces is really carried out. The armament proposed is indistinguishable from that of an Infantry Division and the organization gives all the mobility of a field force. Attempts have been made to shorten the 12 year term of enlistment in the Army by passing men from the Sicherheitspolizei to the Reichswehr and in other ways. The strength of the Sicherheitspolizei is 60,000 or more.

#### 9. *Zeitfreiwillige and Einwohnerwehren*

These formations<sup>8</sup> were the subject of a Note to the German Government from the Supreme Council in December last, followed by a letter dated the 23rd January from the Commission, and preceded by a questionnaire. No answer has been received except as regards the *Zeitfreiwillige*, which, it was stated, were to be suppressed after the 31st March. Everything points to the disappearance of the *Zeitfreiwillige*, but it seems that the men are being absorbed into the *Einwohnerwehren* and there is no doubt that the German Government intend to retain the latter institution. At present the *Einwohnerwehren* are restricted to their function of special constables, but may now acquire the complexion of the *Zeitfreiwillige*, which was admittedly that of a Reichswehr reserve. It is considered that, as in the case of the Sicherheitspolizei, the elaborate civil control is a mere screen for military control and in view of their organization and the impossibility of checking or controlling them unless totally suppressed, the Commission has decided to call for their complete and immediate suppression and a letter has been addressed to the German Government fixing the 10th April as the 'Extreme limit' for this.<sup>9</sup> Their numbers are impossible to estimate with any precision but they can safely be put at many hundreds of thousands.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. also Volume IX, No. 31.

<sup>9</sup> Copies of this letter of March 12 addressed by General Nollet to Herr Mertens were forwarded to the Foreign Office by the War Office on May 8. The main part reads as follows:—

'En ce qui concerne les *Einwohnerwehren*, la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle tient à préciser dès à présent, les points suivants:—

'Les *Einwohnerwehren*, malgré le caractère d'organisation[s] [*sic*] purement civiles, avec lequel elles cherchent à se présenter, ne peuvent être admises. Quel que soit, en effet, leur rôle prévu pour le maintien de l'ordre intérieur, il n'en est pas moins évident que leur armement [*sic*], leur encadrement et le contrôle sans cesse tenu à jour de leurs effectifs, favoriseraient d'une manière incontestable une mobilisation [*sic*] interdite par le Traité de Paix. De plus de nombreux renseignements indiquent que les *Einwohnerwehren* se livrent souvent à des exercices [*sic*] militaires.

'Ainsi que l'exposait ma lettre du 8 mars, No. 555, relative à la zone neutre, les *Einwohnerwehren* n'existent qu'en opposition avec les clauses des Articles 163, 166, 175 et 178 du Traité de Paix.

'Ni ces clauses, ni les décision[s] du Conseil Suprême en date du 1er décembre, 1919, n'ont été observées jusqu'à présent, les *Einwohnerwehren* ont été maintenues et se sont même développées.

'En conséquence, la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle a l'honneur de faire connaître, au nom des Puissances Alliées que la date du 10 avril, 1920, date à laquelle la réduction de l'Armée Allemande à 200,000 hommes doit être terminée — est fixée comme limite extrême pour l'exécution de la décision du 1er décembre, 1919.

'Veuillez agréer, &c.

NOLLET'

## 10. *The New Army*

Control over the effectives and organization of the New Army cannot commence until the 10th April. The German Government has, however, supplied a certain amount of information regarding the transitional Army and the District Committees have supplemented or corrected this. This and information from other sources has enabled the Commission to form certain conclusions as to the intentions of the Reichswehr Ministry.

In August last, the German Government initiated a scheme for the reduction of the Reichswehr to a provisional establishment of 250,000. Particulars of this were given in the annexe to the War Office Summary of Intelligence of the 7th October 1919.<sup>10</sup> In a reply of the 17th February to a questionnaire, the German Government gave the effectives of the different arms of the transitional Army as 11,458 officers, 61,265 Non-Commissioned Officers and 204,397 men—a total of 277,060 [*sic*]. This figure which does not include Officers on the Active List still in the old Ministries of War and the Army Corps Headquarters corresponds roughly to the Army Estimates. If these Estimates have been adhered to, the total effectives at the moment should be 287,000. Reports by the District Committee[s] go to show that, excluding the 'Freikorps' and 'Gren[z]schutz', 29 'Brigades' can be identified as still existing.

The Peace Army (Reichsheer) is already in process of formation in seven Divisions of Infantry and three Divisions of Cavalry.

## 11. *The annual contingent of the New Army and the terms of enlistment*

The stipulation of the Treaty as to the term of enlistment (12 years) in the New Army and the proportion (5%) allowed for an annual contingent to replace discharges will probably preclude any wholesale evasion of its purpose. Too much importance, therefore, is not to be attached to the attempts recently made by the German Government to temper the rigidity of the 12 year system. One of these attempts took the form of a direct appeal to the Commission to sanction the application to the annual contingent of an experimental period of training of six months, at the end of which the German Government should be at liberty to discharge 25% of them independently of the 5% margin of discharges allowed under the Treaty. The Commission have rejected this proposal which it did not consider a genuine one, but an ingenious attempt to establish a short service term which would have provided an initial reserve of 31,250 at the end of the first year of the new Army.

The same object, but on a much more modest scale, appears to be contemplated by a provision in the conditions of service published in the 'Heeresverordnungsblatt' of the 30th January, according to which recruits enlisting in the Reichswehr will be entitled to deduct from their 12 year term of enlistment any time spent in the old Army. The effect of this arrangement on the creation of a reserve would be inconsiderable as it would not operate at all until 1926 and none of the men leaving the Colours would then be less

<sup>10</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

than 29 years of age. The arrangement is technically a violation of the Treaty, but it does not appear to be one which is worth challenging and its adoption should serve to give some stability to the New Army.

## 12. *Armament*

Armaments are not within the province of the Effectives Sub-Commission except incidentally, but its [*sic*] bearing on the subject of reserve formations is close and obvious, and if the object of the German Government in formulating the proposal referred to in the preceding paragraph was to create an Army Reserve, a search for evidence as to the accumulation of corresponding stocks of arms is relevant. Such evidence seems to be supplied by a proposal recently made by the German Government to the Commission as to the armament of the 14 places scheduled by them as 'systems of fortified works' which they claim to retain under Articles 167 and 180 of the Treaty. It is a claim to retain (a) 250,000 rifles in addition to the 96,000 allowed under the Treaty, (b) 1,150 over and above the 288 field guns and howitzers allotted to the batteries of the New Army and (c) some 2,000 heavy guns for which the Treaty in the Table of Armaments for the New Army makes no provision at all. The inference is that these rifles and guns are useless except on the supposition that the proposal contemplates a mobile defence system involving the maintenance of a Field Army and the existence of a number of artillery formations in excess of that prescribed by the Treaty. With the exception of some minor features, the proposal has been rejected by the Commission.

## 13. *Cavalry Brigade Staffs*

On the 20th February the German Government submitted a Memorandum<sup>10</sup> pointing out that the Treaty while allowing for 3 Divisions of Cavalry, each with 6 regiments and a Divisional Staff, made no provision for the intermediary echelon of Brigade Headquarters for each Cavalry Brigade. This proposal has been forwarded to the Inter-Allied Council for their consideration.

## 14. *Military Schools*

Under Article 176 of the Treaty all Military Schools in Germany, with the exception of 'one school per arm' for the recruitment of officers have to be suppressed within two months of the ratification of the Treaty. The Germans propose to establish the following schools:—

- |                             |   |   |   |                   |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|-------------------|
| 1. Jüterborg [ <i>sic</i> ] | . | . | . | Artillery School. |
| 2. Munich                   | . | . | . | Infantry School.  |
| 3. Hannover                 | . | . | . | Cavalry School.   |
| 4. Munich                   | . | . | . | Engineers School. |

A proposal to create a Signalling School was not sanctioned.

The German Government also announced their intention to 'Transform' at least some Non-Commissioned Officers' Schools, preparatory schools for

Non-Commissioned Officers, and Cadet Schools, into civilian educational establishments. This was approved subject to certain conditions which make it impossible that they should be used for military instruction.

In reply to a questionnaire the German Government reported 42 schools already closed and with the exception of a few of these on which reports from the District Committees have not yet arrived, the German return was found to be correct.

There has been some conflict of opinion at the meetings of the Council of the Commission of Control as to whether the clause of the Treaty which allows the German Army one school per arm for the 'recruitment' of Officers could be interpreted as permitting refresher courses and specialist courses for officers already commissioned. The British view was that this interpretation might be reasonably allowed, but the French demurred, standing on a literal interpretation of the Treaty. The British view was not pressed and the French view was eventually adopted.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Here followed a postscript dated March 24 and a list of appendices to the full report. These are not printed.

### No. 30

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 15)*

*No. 779 [185342/184039/18]*

*Very urgent*

PARIS, March 13, 1920

My Lord,

A special meeting of the Ambassadors' Conference, M. Millerand presiding, was called for to-day at Marshal Foch's request to consider what action, if any, should be taken with regard to the recent numerous unsults [*sic*] and assaults by German soldiers and civilians on members of Allied Commissions.

Marshal Foch was called upon to state what action he proposed should be taken. I enclose copy of his proposals<sup>1</sup> and of the draft note to the German Government which he likewise submitted.<sup>2</sup>

I was then asked to express my opinion and I stated that while I was in entire accord with the action proposed, which I thought moderate and the minimum that could be asked, I was not willing to allow the draft note to go until we had fully considered what would be the consequences if the German Government refused to carry out the reparations and to give the guarantee which we demanded. My colleagues agreed with me, and Marshal Foch

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Marshal Foch's note 403/1 of March 12 to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors listed a number of recent incidents, including those reported in Nos. 22 and 24 above. He requested that an energetic protest should be addressed to the German Government and that due reparation should be demanded, 'comme aussi les garanties positives et immédiates sans lesquelles le fonctionnement des Commissions de Contrôle, et, par conséquent, l'exécution du Traité deviendraient très prochainement impossibles. Le Gouvernement allemand en porterait toute la responsabilité.'

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 2 below.

was thereupon asked the following definite question by M. Millerand. 'What action could Marshal Foch take to enforce the demands, it being well understood that any military action should be carefully circumscribed?' Marshal Foch stated very definitely that in case of a refusal, no action except the action of force could be taken and that it would be quite impossible for him to state that such action could be circumscribed. In answer however to a further question he assured the Conference that he would be fully prepared to take such military action as would compel the German Government to agree to our demands.

A long conversation thereupon ensued and two proposals in particular were put forward. Marshal Foch proposed an addition to his draft note, which addition is indicated in the attached copy of the note,<sup>2</sup> and the Italian Ambassador suggested the despatch of a different note altogether couched in general terms which while demanding reparation would not specify the form it would take. This last proposal was unacceptable to all and I objected to Marshal Foch's addition to his own note. Finally I insisted that no decision should be arrived at until after we had had time to consult our respective Governments.

The necessity for immediate action was much pressed and I agreed that it was most desirable. A meeting therefore of the Conference has been called for next Tuesday<sup>3</sup> morning when I said I trusted that you would enable me to announce the decision of His Majesty's Government on the subject. Although it is very desirable that there should be no undue delay, I may note that by postponing the despatch of the proposed Allied note for a few days the Allies will not give the appearance of ignoring the incidents which have occurred, since General Nollet, Admiral Charlton, and General Masterman, the Presidents of the three Commissions of Control, have each on their own responsibility and without prejudice to any action that their respective Governments may take, made representations to the German Government asking for apologies. I enclose copies of the reports received from General Masterman<sup>4</sup> and Admiral Charlton<sup>5</sup> on the subject.

Personally I feel that we cannot allow these insults and attacks to go unpunished and I further consider that Marshal Foch's proposals are the minimum that we should ask. At the same time having clearly in view the fact that our proposals may be refused by the German Government and that then military force would have to be used I felt that I was not in a position to accede to the note being sent without your permission.

I hope you will be good enough to telegraph to me in time for me to have your answer before our meeting on Tuesday, making it clear, if you consent to the draft note being sent, whether you wish it to be sent with or without Marshal Foch's subsequent addition.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

<sup>3</sup> March 16.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 1 below. A section entitled 'Difficultés d'exécution' is omitted.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This paraphrase of a telegram of March 11 from Admiral Charlton gave details of the Bremen incident reported in Nos. 22 and 24.



*Compte-Rendu No. 5 des Opérations de la Commission Interalliée de Contrôle Aéronautique*

*1. Incidents divers*

La semaine qui vient de s'écouler a été fertile en incidents divers qui ont entravé considérablement les travaux de la Commission.

Des officiers allemands d'accompagnement s'appuyant soi-disant sur des ordres donnés par leur[s] chefs ont opposé aux membres des délégations des refus catégoriques à donner certaines [*sic*] renseignements demandés et à faire visiter des locaux dans lesquels pouvaint [*sic*] se trouver du matériel aéronautique.

En outre plusieurs rapports ont été adressés pendant la semaine relatant des faits graves qui se sont produits sur des points différents.

1. En Prusse orientale, insultes aux officiers qui ont visité les aérodromes.
2. Au cours d'une visite au centre d'aviation maritime de List, insultes adressées à un officier.

3. Insultes proférées par des soldats en présence d'officiers allemands à des officiers de la Commission au camp de Döb[e]ritz.

4. Des soldats du camp de Döb[e]ritz ont insulté des officiers et frappé l'un d'eux. Ils ont de plus jeté des pierres sur des voitures automobiles dont l'une porte l'empreinte d'un violent coup de sabre. Des rapports spéciaux seront adressées [*sic*] à ce sujet.

5. Aussitôt après les premiers incidents, le Général Président de la Commission Interalliée de Contrôle Aéronautique s'est rendue [*sic*] le premier Mars auprès du Ministre Noske Président du Reichswarministerium [*sic*] pour demander des explications.

A la suite de l'entrevue une conférence a eu lieu le 2 Mars avec les représentants [*sic*] qualifiés de la Luft Frieden Kommission.

Ces représentants ont donné l'assurance que des mesures seraient prises immédiatement pour faire cesser l'état de choses signalé.

Cependant étant donné les distances qui séparent Berlin des différents centres d'opérations on peut concevoir que les ordres donnés n'ont pas encore produit leur effet, et que de nouveaux incidents ont pu arriver les jours qui ont suivi la conférence.

*2. Question des Zeppelins détruits*

Une conférence [a] eu lieu le 3 Mars entre le Président de la C.I.A.C.<sup>5</sup> et le représentant du ministre des affaires étrangères au sujet des réparations à accorder par le Gouvernement allemand en raison de la destruction de sept Zeppelins.

Le représentant du Ministre des affaires étrangères a répondu qu'il ne pouvait engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement allemand pour les cinq dirigeables détruits avant la signature du Traité de Paix.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. Commission Interalliée de Contrôle Aéronautique.

Le Président de la C.I.A.C. n'a pas cru devoir poursuivre les pourparlers et attend une réponse ferme du Gouvernement allemand.

Le Président de la C.I.A.C. a l'intention de se rendre à Paris le 12 mars pour rendre compte de la situation générale et des travaux de la Commission.

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 30

##### *Draft Note to the German Government submitted by Marshal Foch*

Du 2 au 9 Mars, à Prenzlau, à Berlin, à Brême, à Friesack, à Wernitz, des Officiers ou soldats alliés des Commissions de Contrôle en Allemagne ont été l'objet d'agressions caractérisées et d'injures de la part de militaires ou de civils allemands.

Ces agressions répétées en différents endroits du Territoire allemand peuvent résulter d'un plan concerté. Elles témoignent en tous cas de la part du Gouvernement allemand, d'une faiblesse ou d'une connivance [*sic*] inadmissibles [*sic*].

Elles créent aux Nationaux alliés en Allemagne une situation inacceptable et rendent difficile et même périlleux le fonctionnement des Commissions de Contrôle, compromettant ainsi l'exécution même du Traité.

Les Gouvernements alliés adressent en conséquence de ces faits au Gouvernement allemand une protestation énergique et exigent de sa part l'application sans délai des mesures suivantes:

##### 1°) *Réparations*

a) Des excuses exprimant les regrets des autorités allemande[s] seront présentées publiquement aux Officiers alliés, en présence des détachements de troupes de la garnison, par les Commandants d'Armes de Berlin, Prenzlau, Brême, Friesack.

Ces cérémonies auront lieu avant (8 jours).

Le texte des excuses présentées sera publié dans les journaux de Berlin et dans 3 journaux des villes où se trouvent des détachements des Commissions de Contrôle, savoir: Königsberg, Breslau, Kiehl [*sic*], Hanovre, Munster, Cologne, Francfort, Stuttgart, Munich et Dresde.

b) Des sanctions seront prises contre les auteurs des agressions. Les coupables devront être traduits devant les tribunaux compétents et les jugements, qui devront être rendus avant (15 jours), seront publiés par la presse dans les mêmes conditions que ci-dessus.

Des officiers délégués par les Commissions de Contrôle seront autorisés à assister aux audiences.

c) Les réparations pécuniaires à accorder aux victimes des agressions seront fixées par les chargés d'affaires représentant à Berlin les Gouvernements alliés.

##### 2°) *Garanties*

En outre, le Gouvernement allemand s'engagera à garantir matériellement et moralement les Officiers ou soldats alliés faisant partie des

Commissions de Contrôle contre toutes agressions ou insultes de la part des militaires ou des civils allemands en particulier par une déclaration qu'il rendra publique.

*Subsequent Addition proposed by Marshal Foch*

Si ces réparations et garanties ne sont pas données dans les délais fixés ci-dessus, les Gouvernements alliés devront considérer que le Gouvernement allemand s'opposerait par la violence à l'exécution du Traité.

**No. 31**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 335 Telegraphic [185789/184039/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 15, 1920, 8 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 779.<sup>1</sup>

Matter was brought up this morning at meeting of Supreme Council,<sup>2</sup> who were agreed that it would be useless to take any action at present juncture.<sup>3</sup> French Representative undertook to communicate this decision to Ambassadors' Conference.

If question is raised again at short notice you should decline to commit yourself without definite instructions.

<sup>1</sup> No. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Volume VII, No. 61, minute 3.

<sup>3</sup> Owing to the Kapp Putsch in Berlin; cf. Volume IX, Chap. II.

**No. 32**

*Note communicated by the French Ambassador<sup>1</sup> (Received March 15)*

*[185789/184039/18]*

*Très urgent*

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES, *15 mars, 1920*

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Paris a dû faire connaître à son Gouvernement les propositions présentées le 13 de ce mois à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs par Monsieur le Maréchal Foch en vue d'exiger du Gouvernement allemand des sanctions et réparations pour les agressions dont ont été victimes divers membres des missions alliées de contrôle en Allemagne.

Ces propositions comportent en substance:

1° — Des excuses publiques par les Commandants de Place aux chefs des Commissions de Contrôle, faites devant des détachements de troupes de la garnison.

<sup>1</sup> M. Paul Cambon. An unsigned typescript note on the file recorded that this note had been handed to the Secretary of State by M. Cambon on the morning of March 15 and also that M. Cambon had undertaken that the decision of the Supreme Council to take no action should be conveyed to the Ambassadors' Conference.

2° — La publication dans des journaux de Berlin et des principales villes allemandes.

3° — Des indemnités pour les dommages causés.

4° — Pour l'avenir, la garantie donnée par le Gouvernement allemand d'assurer le libre fonctionnement des Commissions. A défaut de cette garantie, les Alliés constateraient que le Gouvernement allemand s'oppose par la violence à l'exécution du Traité.

La Conférence des Ambassadeurs doit se réunir dans l'après-midi de Mardi pour prendre connaissance de la réponse des Gouvernements alliés.

Monsieur Millerand estime que la note à transmettre au Gouvernement allemand au sujet de ces agressions devrait être remise le Mardi même aux Représentants à Paris du Gouvernement du Chancelier Bauer. Ce serait pour les Alliés le procédé le plus sûr pour faire connaître à l'Allemagne leur volonté de poursuivre vis-à-vis de tout Gouvernement et quels que soient les événements l'exécution du Traité de Paix.

### No. 33

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 18)*

*No. 307 Telegraphic: by bag [186081/7067/39]*

PARIS, March 16, 1920

Following for Cabinet:

The Conference of Ambassadors including the Belgian Ambassador met this afternoon under the Presidency of M. Millerand to consider the following questions:—

1. The question of the measures to be taken in view of the outrages recently committed on members of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. This question is dealt with in my telegram No. 304.<sup>1</sup> In the ensuing discussion the general question was raised of the attitude of the Allied Governments in the face of the apparent violations of the Treaty by Germany. M. Millerand in particular called attention to the intention expressed by the new German Government to occupy the Ruhr Valley in contravention of Article 43 of the Treaty, and urged the importance of the Allied Governments taking immediate action to forestall a German advance into this neutral zone. This question also is dealt with in my telegram No. 304. . . .<sup>2</sup>

3. The legal advisers having reassembled in Paris have at length been able to consider the question of the interpretation of the clauses of the German Peace Treaty dealing with ships in reserve—a question which forms the subject of my telegram No. 273.<sup>3</sup> They have now submitted a unanimous report to the Conference to the effect that although according to the strict

<sup>1</sup> Volume IX, No. 130.

<sup>2</sup> The following paragraph related to another matter.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This telegram of March 11 emphasized the urgent need of a decision on this question.

text of the Treaty, 'ships in reserve' must be interpreted as meaning ships deprived of their guns and munitions, it is evident that in drafting these clauses the naval experts intended that these 'ships in reserve' should retain their guns but should be without ammunition, crews or stores. They recommend, therefore, that the Allied Powers should notify the German Government that, notwithstanding the strict sense of the clauses of the Treaty, they are prepared to allow these ships in reserve to retain such guns as the Inter-Allied Naval Commission shall decide, with a view to allowing these vessels to replace when occasion arises the warships in commission which are allowed to Germany by the Treaty. The Conference accepted in principle this report from the legal advisers and decided to apply it in practice in the following manner:

The German Government are to be allowed to retain the following number of surface warships in reserve with their guns on board, but with no crews, munitions or stores:

- 2 battleships
- 2 light cruisers
- 4 destroyers
- 4 torpedo-boats.

The Inter-Allied Naval Commission of Control will decide which ships shall be used for the above purpose and the number of guns which each ship in reserve shall retain.

#### No. 34

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 18)*

*No. 796 [186158/40276/39]*

PARIS, March 16, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 257 of the 7th instant<sup>1</sup> respecting the smuggling of war material from Germany to Holland, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Note which Marshal Foch has addressed to the Conference of Ambassadors on the subject.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the fact that this question is already the subject of direct discussions between the various Governments immediately concerned, I shall be glad to learn whether Your Lordship would wish it to be taken up by the Conference of Ambassadors as well. If the Conference is to deal with it, it is desirable that I should be informed of the present state of the discussion with the German and Netherlands Governments.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Of March 4, not printed. This note forwarded details of German war material which had found its way into Holland by various railway lines. Marshal Foch suggested that the Conference of Ambassadors should make representations to the Netherland Government in order that an end should be put to this illicit traffic.

The French Government have also communicated to the Ambassadors' Conference a Memorandum, copy of which is enclosed,<sup>3</sup> calling attention to a similar smuggling of war material into Denmark.

These two aspects of the same question ought obviously to be dealt with concurrently and through the same channel.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

<sup>3</sup> Of March 8, not printed. It reported that guns and cartridges destined for the Chinese Government were to be sent from Germany via Holland and Denmark and that Marshal Foch had suggested that the President of the Schleswig Plebiscite Commission should be asked to keep a watch on sea and rail transport from Germany.

### No. 35

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmaunock (Berlin)*

*No. 199 [184970/183237/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 17, 1920*

My Lord,

I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter which has been received from the Director of Naval Intelligence in regard to certain naval material which is stated to be destined for shipment to Spain<sup>1</sup> and I request that Your Lordship will take an early opportunity of drawing the attention of the Commission of Control to the matter.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State),

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure below. It was forwarded to the Foreign Office on March 12.

### ENCLOSURE IN No. 35

*Naval Attaché (Madrid) to the Director of Naval Intelligence*

MADRID, *February 9, 1920*

From an extremely reliable source I have reports that the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin has recently communicated to the Secretary of the Navy, Madrid, the information that the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin had placed in warehouses in Holland new Naval artillery material and that arrangements had been completed for immediate shipment to Spain.

Further that Spanish Naval Officers are negotiating for a large amount of material for Spanish battleships.

Some of the articles mentioned were Zeiss telemeters for the battleship 'España' some for the 'Alfonso XIII' and 'Jaime I', sight adjusters, spotters and anti-aircraft telemeters.

It is suggested that other nations are also purchasing material of this description, particulars are not known and are not likely to be until the goods arrive in Holland, to which country they are consigned.

G. MAUDE  
for Captain R.N.,  
Naval Attaché

No. 36

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 20)*

*No. 322 Telegraphic: by bag [186773/7067/39]*

PARIS, March 18, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Millerand, the Belgian Ambassador being also present. The following subjects were considered:

. . .<sup>1</sup> 2. The Conference considered Marshal Foch's Note enclosed in my Despatch No. 796<sup>2</sup> calling attention to the smuggling of War Material from Germany into Holland. I pointed out that His Majesty's Governme[n]t were already dealing with this matter direct with the Governments concerned, and that without definite instructions I could not agree to its being discussed simultaneously by the Conference of Ambassadors. In these circumstances it was decided that the question should be referred to the Allied Governments with the recommendation that it would be advisable for them to take up the matter with the Dutch Government, and that it should be pointed out to the latter that this traffic is an infringement of the Treaty, and that in permitting it the Dutch Government would be conniving with Germany in violating the Treaty. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted section(s) related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 34, n. 2.

No. 37

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 22)*

*No. 886 [186831/4232/18]*

PARIS, March 20, 1920

The Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

<i>Name and Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>
Marshal Foch, 19th March 1920.	Treaty of Peace with Germany.

*Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors*

PARIS, le 19 mars 1920

Par sa Résolution en date du 10 Janvier, le Conseil Suprême a chargé le Comité Militaire Allié de Versailles 'd'agir comme conseil auprès des Gouvernements Alliés et Associés dans les questions militaires se rapportant à l'exécution du Traité avec l'Allemagne'.<sup>1</sup>

Le 10 Mars, fixé par l'article 169 de ce Traité comme le terme de la livraison aux Puissances Alliées de tout le matériel de guerre allemand, en excédent des quantités autorisées, marque une date importante dans l'exécution des clauses militaires. Aussi la Conférence des Ambassadeurs a-t-elle demandé au Comité Militaire Allié de Versailles de lui faire connaître les conditions dans lesquelles le Gouvernement Allemand s'est conformé, jusqu'à cette date du 10 Mars, aux obligations qui lui étaient imposées.

Considérant dans son ensemble l'exécution du Traité, et sans s'arrêter aux clauses militaires d'importance secondaire dont l'énumération est faite dans le dossier ci-joint,<sup>2</sup> on se bornera à faire ressortir ci-dessous les résultats obtenus pour les clauses essentielles de ce Traité:

le désarmement de l'Allemagne,  
la réduction des effectifs de l'armée allemande.

À la date du 10 Mars, les Allemands n'ont livré aux Commissions de Contrôle aucune partie de leurs matériels de guerre.

Ils ont d'abord déclaré que la 'livraison' n'avait aucune importance, que la destruction seule intéressait les Puissances Alliées, et qu'ils faisaient eux-mêmes cette destruction, en dehors de tout contrôle. Sur les protestations répétées des Commissions de Contrôle, ils ne se sont décidés que peu de jours avant le 10 Mars, à remettre des listes indiquant les matériels qu'ils auraient détruits et ceux restant à détruire. Mais ces listes, en raison de l'époque tardive de leur remise, n'avai[en]t pu être vérifiées, et les Commissions de Contrôle n'étaient entrées en possession d'aucun matériel.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 54, minute 2.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This dossier, as received in the Foreign Office, contained (1) a statement concerning those articles of the Treaty of Versailles (in particular Nos. 167, 196, and 169) the execution of which was required to be completed by March 10, 1920; (2) a statement concerning the violation of articles to which no time limit was attached; (3) a statement concerning the violation of Article 170 relating to the export of war material from Germany; (4) reports relating to the fulfilment of the clauses concerning the control of aviation; and (5) a memorandum by the Naval Advisers to the four Principal Allied Powers concerning Germany's violation of the naval clauses of the Treaty. To No. (2) was attached a secret report on a Congress of Einwohnerwehr leaders held at the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin on January 20 and 21. A representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Councillor von Keller, had taken part and was reported to have said that confidential agents were at work both in London and in America to try to secure the continued existence of the Einwohnerwehr. The conference had discussed among other questions those of arms and of the information to be given to the Entente.



En résumé, à la date du 10 Mars, le Traité a été violé dans une de ses parties essentielles. L'Allemagne n'a pas été désarmée dans le délai de 2 mois qui lui avait été fixé.

En ce qui concerne la réduction des effectifs de l'Armée Allemande, d'après l'article 163, la réduction de cette armée à l'effectif de 200.000 hommes ne doit, il est vrai, être achevée que le 10 Avril. Une violation caractérisée ne peut donc encore être relevée à ce sujet. Mais il est évident que, pour arriver au 10 Avril au chiffre fixé le Gouvernement allemand aurait dû, depuis la mise en vigueur du Traité, réduire progressivement ses forces militaires.

Or il n'en est rien, à la date du 10 Mars, aucune diminution de ces effectifs n'avait été réalisée.

Bien plus, les Allemands donnaient à leurs forces dites de Police un accroissement et une organisation militaire formellement interdites [*sic*] par l'article 176, — et en contradiction flagrante avec l'article 178, qui 'interdit toute mesure de mobilisation ou tendant à une mobilisation', ils ont créé, sous le nom de Einwohnerwehr et de Zeitfreiwillige de véritables réserves.

Déjà, par sa Résolution du 1er Décembre,<sup>3</sup> le Conseil Suprême avait averti le Gouvernement Allemand que ces formations étaient en opposition formelle avec le Traité et qu'elles devaient disparaître dès sa mise en vigueur.

Non seulement ces formations n'ont pas disparu, mais elle[s] se sont constamment développées jusqu'au 10 Mars.

Aux rappels réitérés de la Commission de Contrôle, le Gouvernement Allemand n'a fait aucune réponse. Une instruction secrète, tombée en notre possession, démontrait d'ailleurs que le but de ces organisations, qui devaient être dissimulées aux Commissions de Contrôle, était de reformer l'unité militaire Allemande.

Ainsi, non seulement le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas pris de dispositions convenables pour se conformer en temps utile aux clauses du Traité, mais, en prenant des mesures interdites par ces clauses, malgré les protestations du Conseil Suprême et de la Commission de Contrôle, il les a manifestement violées.

Comme on le voit, les dispositions du Traité, qu'elles concernent le désarmement de l'Allemagne ou la réduction de ses effectifs, sont jusqu'ici restées lettre morte.

Les avertissements ou injonctions adressés soit par le Conseil Suprême, soit par la Commission de Contrôle sont demeurés sans effets. L'opposition des Représentants du Gouvernement Allemand au fonctionnement du Contrôle a été sans cesse grandissante depuis la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix jusqu'au 10 Mars, pour aboutir, dans la semaine du 2 au 9 Mars, aux agressions violentes signalées par la lettre du 12 Mars N° 403/1, adressée au Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.<sup>4</sup>

Le 13 Mars éclatait le coup d'État militaire qui obligeait les Commissions de Contrôle à suspendre toutes leurs opérations.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 33, minute 2 and Appendix D.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 30, n. 1.

En ce qui concerne les clauses aériennes, l'exportation et la destruction de matériels aéronautiques, qui ont fait l'objet de plusieurs observations adressées en 1919 par le Conseil Suprême au Gouvernement Allemand, ont continué et depuis le 10 Janvier 1920 des forces aériennes ont été employées sous des prétextes divers, du matériel aéronautique a été fabriqué et des exportations dans divers pays neutres ont été signalées.

*En présence de ces faits, le Comité Militaire Allié de Versailles doit prendre acte de ce que le Gouvernement Allemand, par faiblesse ou par connivence, a violé le Traité dans ses clauses essentielles, et en rend compte à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.*<sup>5</sup>

FOCH

<sup>5</sup> For the circumstances giving rise to this note and for the discussion upon it at the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors on March 20, see Volume IX, Nos. 147, 170, and 174.

### No. 38

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Herr Mertens*

*No. EAM/1.185/19A [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, March 22, 1920

Herrn Mertens, Director of the Peace Section, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the German Empire, Berlin.

#### *German Accompanying Officers and visits to Factories and Establishments*

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your communication Nr. F.M. 3.190/20.320 dated 29th February 1920<sup>1</sup> on the subject of German accompanying officers and visits to factories and establishments, and note your remarks.

Notwithstanding the wishes expressed by you on behalf of the German Government that the freedom of movement within Germany secured by Article 205 of the Peace Treaty is to be in every way assured and furthered, and that no obstructions are to be put in the way of the Officers' visits to the places in question, I must again state that such obstructions and hindrances have undoubtedly occurred.

On my reporting the matter to Marschal [*sic*] Foch at the same time as I communicated the difficulties to you, the matter was taken up in Paris and referred to the Council of Ambassadors.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following decision of the Council of Ambassadors taken on the 4th March 1920:

'Visits to Factories. . . The text of Articles 202, 205, 206, of the Treaty give[s] to the Commissions of Control the right to visit any factory or establishment whatsoever'.

In order to effectively carry out the duties of the Commission of Control, it is found to be essential that unexpected visits should be paid to factories and establishments. In carrying out this work it will not be possible in every case for the officers to be accompanied by a German accompanying officer,

<sup>1</sup> No. 17.

nor will it be possible to give notice of the intended visit to the factory or establishment concerned.

Making use of the right conferred upon members of the Commission of Control by the Treaty of Peace, and strengthened by the decision of the Council of Ambassadors on the particular point referred to above, I have therefore now to demand that instructions be issued to all factories and establishments concerned that they are bound to admit properly qualified members of the Commission of Control to their premises, whether accompanied by a German accompanying officer or not. I am willing nevertheless to make the following proposal in the interests of the better working of the plan, namely, that in all cases of the *first* visit to a factory or establishment, the visiting party of the Commission of Control shall be accompanied by a German accompanying officer.

I have had to complain of several cases in which the German accompanying officers have, in my opinion, greatly exceeded their proper duties during the course of visits by intervening between the members of the Commission and the representatives of the factory or establishment, in endeavouring to prevent information being given which the members of the Commission were legally entitled to obtain.

I have to request that effect may be given to the wishes expressed above as soon as possible, in order that no further hindrances to the work of the Commission may continue to arise in future.

E. A. MASTERMAN,

*Air Commodore, R.A.F., President*

### No. 39

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 24)*

*No. 351 Telegraphic: by bag [187727/4232/18]*

PARIS, March 23, 1920

Your telegram No. 374 of the 22nd instant.<sup>1</sup> Proposed Notes to German Government.

The Conference of Ambassadors considered today Marshal Foch's list of assaults on Allied officers in Germany and of cases of non-execution by Germany of the terms of the Treaty. I read verbatim the text of your above mentioned telegram. The Italian and Japanese Ambassadors had received no instructions, though the former said that his general instructions would have permitted him to agree to the sending of the proposed Notes if His Majesty's Government had also been prepared to agree. The Belgian Ambassador also said that his Government approved the sending in of a list of infringements of the Treaty.

M. Millerand said that the views of His Majesty's Government amounted to indefinite postponement of the presentation of these lists to Germany and prevented any joint action for the present. The matter then dropped.

<sup>1</sup> Volume IX, No. 196.

*Colonel von Tschischwitz to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*

*No. 1069/3 20 Ref. G. [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, March 24, 1920

To the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, Berlin.

With reference to your Nr. S/100/1.017/39 of 11.3.20,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to communicate to you the following standpoint:

I have hitherto considered that your 'preliminary demands' of 17.9.19<sup>2</sup> included all the particulars which you required for the practical execution of the Peace Treaty.

The demands, and more especially the appendices attached to the same required such detailed particulars that I was of the opinion that with these particulars the work of your Sub-Commission could be successfully carried out.

If these particulars are not sufficiently detailed, this is on account of the special circumstances which I clearly pointed out in my letter Nr. 102. 1.20 of 16.1.20.<sup>2</sup> The difficulty of establishing the total aeronautical material in Germany and of giving all the particulars which you require is immense, and it is only the untiring efforts of all departments which has [*sic*] led to the production of the required lists, which you yourself state are only lacking in details. I have not assumed that your 'Preliminary demands' would limit the particulars which the German Government according to the Treaty is bound to give.

If however you consider that you will be obliged to make further demands, which are of importance for the general work of your Sub-Commissions, I beg you to acquaint me with them and I will then, when I have recognised their justification, immediately transmit them to the accompanying officers under my orders.

It requires no further explanation to make it clear that these officers, who are mostly very young, must have precise instructions for carrying out their duties.

I have therefore given the order, that these officers shall only give or allow to be given such particulars as correspond with your demands of 17.9.19, and see no reason for changing this order until I receive from you any further demands. Independently of the previous demands necessary for the general work of execution, I have to request that special demands, such as for instance for the details of the organisation of the 'Reichsamt für Luft und Kraft-fahrwesen' and for the strength and organisation of the aerial police units, may be forwarded as previously to my Department.

Should your Sub-Commission in certain cases consider it necessary to obtain special particulars which are not included in your demands of the

<sup>1</sup> No. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

17.9.19, I beg you to arrange that the said Sub-Commissions should communicate such requirements to their corresponding German Sub-Commissions and not to the accompanying officers.

(Signed)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking from filed copy.

## No. 41

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1020 [186158/40276/39]*

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 25, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 796 of March 16th<sup>1</sup> in regard to the smuggling of war material from Germany to Holland, I have to inform you that no action has so far been taken by His Majesty's Government in this matter other than to instruct His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin to draw the attention of the Military Mission of Control to the question.<sup>2</sup>

2. In view, however, of the contents of the memoranda enclosed with your despatch, I am of opinion that it would be useful if a joint formal warning were addressed by the Allied Governments not only to the Dutch Government, but also to the Scandinavian countries and to Switzerland in the sense of Section 2 of your telegram No. 322 of the 18th March.<sup>3</sup>

3. I should be glad if Your Lordship would make a proposal to this effect at the Conference of Ambassadors.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> No. 34.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 26. On March 31 Air Commodore Masterman made representations to the President of the German Aeronautical Peace Commission on the subject of exports of aeronautical war material to neutral countries, especially Holland and Switzerland.

<sup>3</sup> No. 36.

## No. 42

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 31)*

*No. 383 Telegraphic: by bag [189120/7067/39]*

PARIS, March 29, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions:

...<sup>1</sup> (4) The Conference approved a note<sup>2</sup> by the Drafting Committee in-

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> A translation of the note as despatched is printed as No. 86 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

forming the German Government of the decision taken by the Conference on March 15th (my telegram No. 297 paragraph 5)<sup>3</sup> with regard to the right of the Naval Commission of Control to visit the receiving rooms of the wireless stations specified in Article 197 of the Treaty of Versailles. Admiral le Vavas seur pointed out that the period during which this inspection could take place under the Treaty expired on 10th April, and urged that in view of the delay which had occurred in settling this question this period should be prolonged. I objected to this proposal which was not pressed.

(5) The Conference approved a report by the Drafting Committee, interpreting Article 181, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Versailles to mean that all gun boats or auxiliary craft, having the character of war vessels, must either be placed in reserve or be adapted to commercial purposes. The German authorities had maintained that they had the right to keep such gun boats etc.

(6) The Conference approved the request of the Chairman of the Aeronautical Commission of Control that a British officer should be attached to the Commission in order to supervise the sale of the waste material resulting from the destruction of German air-craft, etc. It was agreed that a French representative, with similar functions, should be equally attached to the Commission, and the Japanese and Italian Ambassadors reserved the right of their Governments to send officers for the same purpose. It was decided that the salary of these officers should be paid in the same manner as other members of the Commission. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

## No. 43

### *Peace Department of the German Foreign Office to the I.A.A.C.C.*

*F.M. 4566 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, April 9, 1920

The Peace Department of the Foreign Office has the honour to forward herewith, in reply to the Note of 31 March of this year EAM 1192/40,<sup>1</sup> a Memorandum from the Reichswehrminister, concerning postponement of the demobilisation of eight flying units in Germany, with a request for decision.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This note demanded that the necessary measures should at once be taken to implement the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 11 referred to in the enclosure to the present document. Cf. No. 27.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 43

*Herr Gessler<sup>2</sup> to the I.A.A.C.C.*

*No. 200/4/20 W I VIII FI*

BERLIN, April 8, 1920

Herewith is acknowledged receipt of your communication E.A.M. 1180/39<sup>3</sup> and 1192/40 of the 31-3-1920, containing the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of 11-3-1920.

In accordance with the decision come to, orders have been issued for the cessation of flying in military formations, and for the return to their home stations of aeroplanes which had been temporarily detailed for duty in the Ruhr district. Upon the return of these aeroplanes to their home stations, orders will be issued for the demobilisation of the flying units in question.

The decision of the Council of Ambassadors: 'It is impossible to concur with any change of Article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany may not maintain aerial forces either on land or on sea' was arrived at in Paris on the 11th March, at a moment when, as it appeared, completely tranquil and politically stable conditions prevailed in Germany. Meanwhile, however, Germany has suffered the most severe internal troubles,<sup>4</sup> and has been forced to carry on a difficult and bloody conflict for the maintenance and restoration of authority. During this crisis the presence of military aeroplanes, both in regard to military measures and for political purposes, has been of exceptional, if not even decisive significance in securing the victory of the Government. The military units have, so far as the small number of machines and the limited establishment made it possible, fulfilled thorough[h]ly the tasks allotted to them in the Memorandum of 12-2-1920.<sup>5</sup>

By the employment of a military postal service from Berlin there was assured a constant communication of orders and information to the leading commands throughout Germany. By the despatch of aeroplanes alone was it possible to acquaint the population with the decision and whereabouts of the old Government, as also with their intentions and counter measures. By aerial means alone was it possible to distribute propaganda and leaflets in Berlin, considering the printers' strike prevailing there. Unbelievable and most contradictory reports concerning the position in and around Berlin and other towns (Leipzig) could be quickly and irrefutably explained by the employment of military flying machines. An exceptionally large number of civil and military Government officials were able to be brought with promptness and punctuality to threatened localities by means of military aeroplanes, and these were enabled to be present at decisive conferences. It was only by means of a military aeroplane that it was possible to arrest an individual who was proceeding from Pilau to Swinemünde, and whose arrest was effected upon his landing in Swinemünde.

<sup>2</sup> Herr Gessler had succeeded Herr Noske as Minister of Defence on March 25.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume IX, Chaps. II and III.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 21, n. 1.

The Reichswehrministerium is prepared to give any further details concerning the activity and employment of aeroplanes since 13-3-20.

It is impossible to foresee, even approximately, the consequences, so far as concerns the satisfactory carrying out of military commands and Government measures, when the remaining eight military aerial units have been disbanded.

Germany has so far not asked for any change in Article 198, as is stated in the decision of the Council of Ambassadors. *Germany again proposes, even now, a temporary suspension of the demobilisation of the eight flying units requested in the Memorandum of the 12-2-1920 until the restoration of satisfactory political and social conditions in the country.* Germany renounces the request in the Memorandum of 12-2-20 for an additional flying unit for frontier defence. The Inter-Allied Commission of Control can at any time satisfy itself of the actually small strength of these flying units and machines, and also that these very limited establishments in military aeroplanes cannot be regarded as *air forces* in the sense of Article 198.

The Reichswehrministerium thinks that it can give, at a verbal discussion between the I.A.A.C.C. and the representatives of the Ministry at the earliest possible moment, irrefutable proof of the necessity of a temporary maintenance of military aeroplanes in the interests of the State, and also give irrefutable proof of the uselessness of these flying formations for military purposes.

GESSLER,

*The Reichswehrminister*

#### No. 44

*Mr. Smallbones<sup>1</sup> (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received April 11, 10.55 a.m.)*

*No. 13 Telegraphic [191126/4232/18]*

MUNICH, April 10, 1920, 4 p.m.

Following sent to Foreign Office and Embassy [at Berlin]. Bavarian Government with backing of all non-Socialist parties informed Central Government yesterday that they refused to carry out order of disbandment of Einwohnerwehr on ground that it would lead to another Bolshevik rule here.<sup>2</sup> This fear appears justified and is confirmed by reports which reach me of renewed activity amongst Independent Socialists.

Compliance by Central Government with order of disbandment has widened breach between North and South. South . . .<sup>3</sup> to demand is likely.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Consul at Munich.

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Office telegram to Berlin No. 129 of April 16 instructed Lord Kilmarnock to bring this matter to the attention of the Military Commission of Control. In April, 1919, the Bavarian Spartacists had set up a Soviet government in Munich.

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain.



No. 45

*Lord Kilmaonock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received April 13, 9.25 a.m.)*

*No. 227 Telegraphic [191515/4232/18]*

*Confidential*

BERLIN, April 12, 1920, 10 p.m.

Resistance to disbandment of Einwohnerwehr is likely to be encountered from Governments of Bavaria and other south German States. I am told by source in touch with political parties that Bavarian Deputies to National Assembly which met again to-day declare that nothing will induce them to consent to this measure. They say its adoption would mean handing over the country to Red Terror and that they would sooner die than expose their wives and children to be murdered. They assert that they will offer armed resistance either to Berlin Government or Allies if an attempt is made to enforce it. Whilst there may be some exaggeration in this, I think it right [to] report it as it bears directly on the execution of the Treaty of Peace.

No. 46

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmaonock (Berlin)*

*No. 308 [191854/4232/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 12, 1920

My Lord,

The German Chargé d'Affaires referred in conversation to-day with Sir Eyre Crowe<sup>1</sup> to the allied demand for the disbandment of the 'Einwohnerwehr'. He described this body as quite incapable of ever possessing any military character, whilst it certainly helped effectively at times in the discharge of ordinary police duties.

2. Sir E. Crowe said he was not in a position to discuss the merits or demerits of this organisation; but the allies had appointed under the treaty a Commission of Control, who were properly charged with the duty of dealing with questions of this kind. He presumed that the demand for disbanding the Einwohnerwehr had come from that Commission. If so, any observations or suggestions which the German Government desired to put forward, should clearly in the first instance be addressed to the Commission.

3. Herr Sthamer merely replied that the attitude of the Military Commission of Control under General Nollet was not very sympathetic.

4. Sir E. Crowe thought it important not to let the German Government believe that they could play us off against the French by getting us to take up a question which clearly ought to be treated by the Allies conjointly. He, therefore, said that the authority of General Nollet must be accepted and respected. He added that Herr Sthamer ought not really to feel much surprise if the Military Commission was not brimming over with sympathy, in

<sup>1</sup> Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

view of the large number of cases in which allied officers in the discharge of their duties had been flouted, ill-treated and assaulted by German officers and civilians, without the guilty parties being brought to book. He reminded him of the series of outrages committed against the officers of General Niessel's Mission in the Baltic provinces, against allied officers in the plebiscite areas, and even in Berlin. So far he had not heard of anyone having been punished.

5. There was the recent case of Mr. Voigt, the correspondent of the 'Manchester Guardian'.<sup>2</sup> Sir E. Crowe advised Herr Sthamer to read the account of his experience given in to-day's issue of that paper; Herr Sthamer knew England well enough to realise the impression which such incidents created among the public.

6. Herr Sthamer said that an apology had been at once offered, and orders given for the officer at fault to be tried. Sir E. Crowe said that he hoped he would be punished and dismissed, and not acquitted and fêted as a hero.

7. Sir E. Crowe brought back the conversation to the starting-point by observing that so long as there was so much painful evidence of the recrudescence of the worst spirit of military brutality, H.M.G. could hardly be expected to welcome suggestions for mitigating the effect of those clauses of the treaty which were specially designed to reduce the military organisation of Germany to the necessities of keeping order. At the same time he felt sure that the allied Governments would give every proper consideration to any observations or proposals which the German Government might wish to put forward through the proper channel.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Volume IX, No. 658, n. 2.

#### No. 47

*Précis of a conference held at the Ministère de la Guerre between Mr. Churchill (Secretary of State for War) and M. André Lefèvre (French Minister of War)*  
*April 13, 1920<sup>1</sup>*

[194459/40276/39]

There were present:—

Marshal FOCH,

General WEYGAND,

General BUAT,

General BINGHAM (President of the Inter-Allied Sub-Commission [for Armaments and Material] in Berlin),

General SACKVILLE-WEST,

General MAURIN, and

General REMOND (of the Direction de l'Artillerie).

<sup>1</sup> This copy was received in the Foreign Office on April 27. The document was circulated to the Cabinet.

The Conference was opened by M. Lefèvre putting certain questions to General Bingham as to the manner in which the destructions of German war material were being carried out. He made some suggestions which General Bingham said would be examined by the sub-Commission on his return to Berlin.

Marshal Foch pointed out that only 500,000 rifles had been surrendered by the Germans. A certain number of rifles had been recovered by the French in the recent advance in the neutral zone. It could be assumed from this that a great many of the rifles were distributed amongst the inhabitants.

General Weygand pointed out that the Germans had only handed in the list of guns to be destroyed on the 8th March, the latest date upon which, according to the Peace Treaty, these guns were to be handed over for destruction being the 10th March. This was clearly a violation of the Peace Treaty, since the 12,000 guns in question could not possibly be destroyed between the 8th and 10th. Further, had the German revolution been successful all these guns would have fallen into the hands of the revolutionaries.

Marshal Foch emphasized this point of view, stating that if the Treaty had been executed there would have been no arms in the Ruhr during the recent troubles in this area.

The question of guns in fortresses was also raised, but was not further discussed, the question having already been dealt with by the Council of Ambassadors.

Mr. Churchill said that it was important to destroy at the same time as the weapons the factories and machines that manufactured these weapons. This was agreed to, and it was reasserted that those factories that can only manufacture warlike material should be definitely closed down, and the machinery which can only be used for making weapons of war should be destroyed. Certain machines which can be used for the manufacture of material used in commerce as well as war material would be dealt with separately by the Commission. It was clearly understood that machines which had a *bona fide* peace value would not be destroyed.

The question of wood for rifle-stocks was also dealt with, but the question was finally reserved, the general opinion being that such wood could be rendered useless for warlike purposes by the planks being sawn in half.

Mr. Churchill, in summing up the result of the Conference, stated:—

1. The personnel of the Commission is to be increased so that both the material and the weapons can be destroyed simultaneously.
2. The number of rifles surrendered by the Germans is absurd. It cannot be hoped to recover all those rifles, but every endeavour should be made to recover a number corresponding with the numbers the German Army put in the field.
3. The questions of the methods of destruction raised by M. Lefèvre, which are technical, should be further studied.
4. It had been alleged that there were a great number of German guns hidden. Every endeavour should be made to discover the location of such guns, but the Commission should not be charged with this duty.

General Weygand asked whether the Germans should be notified of the increased number of the Commission.

General Bingham said that he would notify the Germans of this increase, he having an absolute right to increase the numbers of the Commission; the Americans had already been replaced by British and French officers. Fourteen French and ten British officers were now going to be appointed in addition. He would inform the Germans that this increase in the numbers of the Commission was being made with a view to accelerating the work of the Commission.

No. 48

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received April 19)*

*No. 23 [192729/4232/18]*

MUNICH, April 14, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 13 of the 10th instant,<sup>1</sup> repeated as No. 14 to Lord Kilmarnock, on the subject of the disbanding of the 'Einwohnerwehr,' or citizen guard, in Bavaria.

Your Lordship is no doubt aware that the conference at Stuttgart<sup>2</sup> decided to request the imperial government at Berlin to enter again into negotiations with the Allied Powers with a view to obtaining permission to maintain the Einwohnerwehr. I understand that the central government has complied with this request. The conference at Stuttgart made a point of declaring its loyalty to German unity. This declaration is significant as showing the existence of strong opposite tendencies. I learn on fairly good authority that Mr. Hamm, Minister of Commerce, who was sent by the Bavarian government to Berlin to protest against compliance with the order to disband the Einwohnerwehr, had instructions to make it clear that insistence on the part of the central government might lead to an open breach.

The question of the Einwohnerwehr appears to me to be of very great importance both politically and economically. I have therefore made it my business to ascertain the views of leading men of various political views.

Compliance with the demand to disband the Einwohnerwehr will be resisted by all political parties in Bavaria with the exception of a section of the radicals. These are divided into Independent Socialists, Communists, Bolsheviks and Spartacists. About one half of the Independent Socialists lean towards the Majority Socialists. They believe in parliamentary government. The other half and the Communists though desiring to abolish parliaments wish to use them as long as they exist as a convenient forum from which to propagate their views. The Bolsheviks and Spartacists will have nothing to do with the parliamentary system. The anti-parliamentary parties desire the rule of the proletariat maintained by a 'red guard' and therefore hope for the

<sup>1</sup> No. 44.

<sup>2</sup> Representatives of Baden, Bavaria, and Württemberg had been meeting at Stuttgart.

disbandment of the Einwohnerwehr. All other parties wish to see it maintained, though they view the question from slightly different angles. It is common ground that the disarming of the Einwohnerwehr would inevitably lead to mob rule. It is known that when the German army dispersed the most unruly elements retained rifles and machine-guns. After the Bolshevik rule in Munich last year an attempt was made to disarm them which however proved a failure. The Prime Minister has informed me that some 40,000 rifles are missing in Munich alone which, it is presumed, are hidden away under beds, in cupboards and on lofts. A special constabulary armed with revolvers and batons would, he maintained, be powerless against these rifles. The number of arms served out to the Einwohnerwehr, on the other hand, is known and complete disarmament in their case is therefore theoretically possible. The conservative parties look upon the Einwohnerwehr as a useful supplement to the Reichswehr. The socialists are hostile to the Reichswehr and hope to counterbalance it, in the first place, and supplant it, eventually, by the Einwohnerwehr. Mr. Timm, the leader of the Majority Socialists, said to me last night in confidence that he welcomed the reduction of the Reichswehr to 100,000 men. He and Mr. Hoffman, the late Prime Minister, on a previous occasion explained to me that they looked upon a professional army in Germany as a prætorian guard, for ever ready to upset the existing order for their own ends. It appears to be proved that efforts to persuade steady and reliable working men to join the Reichswehr have been fruitless. It has attracted from the ranks of labour only the undesirable and habitually unemployed. Mr. Timm desires to see the Einwohnerwehr shorn of all militaristic character, such as route marches and combined exercises which might foster a martial spirit and inspire ideas of an organisation for an ulterior object. It was his intention to launch a campaign to persuade more of his followers to join the Einwohnerwehr.

All parties are prepared, I gather, to formally comply with the demand to disband the Einwohnerwehr if a compromise can be suggested by which the orderly elements are permitted to retain their arms as a protection against the rule of the proletariat. Neither the present Government nor any other parliamentary combination that might be formed would be prepared to enforce disarmament. It is generally held, and I believe it to be a fact, that no parliamentary government in Bavaria could carry out an order to disarm even if it were willing to issue it. Nor is it thought possible that the central government has the moral force or the military strength to carry out such an order here.

The alternatives apprehended are economic pressure applied by the allied governments or military occupation. In the former event the economic revival of Germany which can be faintly discerned in the rising value of the mark would receive a heavy blow while eventual compliance would lead to the rule of the proletariat. It is therefore suggested by some that, in that case, a short cut taken in desperation to bolshevism is not an unlikely contingency.

As regards the second alternative conceived, it is curious to note that the demand to disband the Einwohnerwehr is attributed to the French Government, possible [*sic*] owing to the fact that the communication embodying that

demand appears to have been presented by a French representative. The feeling of animosity against the central government, when it was reported that it was prepared to comply with the demand, has now turned to renewed bitterness against the French. It appears to be firmly believed that the French government desires the disruption of the German Empire and that the method to be employed to achieve this object is military intervention. This might, it is thought, take place immediately in order to enforce the disbandment of the Einwohnerwehr or, after a period of Bolshevik rule, in order to restore a parliamentary form of government. Similarly the occupation of Frankfort<sup>3</sup> is thought to be a stepping stone towards the realisation of the Republic of the Rhine. The 'Munich-Prague-Warsaw' line is glibly being spoken of which is to encircle Prussia with French allies. It is again hinted that France would be prepared to allow the Austrian Republic to join Southern Germany as a reward for separation from the North.

I venture to state it as my opinion that the demand to disarm the Einwohnerwehr would lead to serious consequences in Bavaria. Though not a competent judge, I also venture to state that, in my opinion, from what I have seen of the Einwohnerwehr, it does not appear to constitute a military danger. I am further persuaded that it was not created in the spirit of Scharnhorst. It would become still more innocuous, while not losing its essential function of maintaining order, if it were reorganised on the lines suggested by Mr. Timm.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

<sup>3</sup> See Volume IX, Chap. IV.

## No. 49

*Lord Acton<sup>1</sup> (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received April 20, 12.10 p.m.)*

*No. 413 Telegraphic [192995/192995/56]*

*Secret*

HELSINGFORS, April 19, 1920, 9 p.m.

Military Attaché is informed by thoroughly reliable English business man here that contrary to Chapter 2, Article 170, Peace Treaty with Germany, approximately 10,000,000 Finnish marks' worth of arms and ammunition have been imported by private firms into Finland from Germany under licenses granted by Finnish Government between September 1st, 1919 and February 29th, 1920.

List of consignees and other particulars<sup>2</sup> will be sent by bag.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Helsingfors.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

No. 50

*Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received April 22, 10 p.m.)*

*No. 417 Telegraphic [193542/192995/56]*

HELSINGFORS, April 20, 1920, 8 p.m.

My telegram 413.<sup>1</sup>

A few days ago Mr. Tanner one of Finnish delegates designate to Soviet Peace Conference<sup>2</sup> was brutally maltreated by members of Protective Guard at a meeting of his constituents.

To-night I learn that German vessel 'Baltic' has just reached Helsingfors from Lübeck with a heavy cargo of ammunition consigned to Finnish Government but presumption is strongly in favour of suspicion that true destination is Protective Corps whose pro-German activities are becoming daily more aggressive. Consigning agents in Germany are Karl-Prior.

I am making immediate enquiry as to origin and destination of ammunition in question which aggregates 292 tons.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Negotiations between Soviet Russia and Finland were taking place at Rajajoki.

<sup>3</sup> In his telegram No. 422 of April 22 Lord Acton reported that the steamship 'Burgomeister' which had just come from Germany was unloading 100,000 rifles at Helsingfors under Protective Corps guard.

No. 51

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received April 23)*

*No. 486 Telegraphic: by bag [193505/7067/39]*

PARIS, April 21, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions.

1. At my request General Masterman, Chairman of the Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany, made a statement to the Conference regarding the work of the Commission and the unsatisfactory attitude adopted by the German authorities with regard to it. It was decided that a summary of this statement should be telegraphed by the Secretariat General to San Remo<sup>1</sup> for communication to the Supreme Council. I am forwarding copy of this summary in a separate despatch. I am also sending copy to Sir M. Hankey.

General Masterman complained that the German Government were inclined to make applications direct to the Conference of Ambassadors over the heads of the Commission of Control. As this method of short-circuiting the Commissions is obviously most undesirable the Conference of Ambassadors decided that the German Peace Delegation in Paris should be informed<sup>2</sup> that in future all communications from the German Government respecting the

<sup>1</sup> No. 53 below. An Allied Conference was held at San Remo, April 18-26. See Volume VIII, Chap. I.

<sup>2</sup> An English translation of the note from the Conference of Ambassadors to the German Peace Delegation is printed as No. 111 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

military, naval or air clauses of the Treaty should be addressed to the Conference of Ambassadors through the intermediary of the Commission of Control concerned. There will of course be nothing to prevent the German Delegation sending copy of the communication simultaneously direct to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris. . . .<sup>3</sup>

6. The Military Commission of Versailles submitted a unanimous report recommending that the following two applications made by the German Government should be refused:

- (a) Permission to create three Cavalry Brigade Staffs in each of the three Cavalry Divisions provided for in the Treaty.
- (b) Permission to subject the annual body of recruits for the army to six months' trial and to increase the annual number of recruits by 25% so as to make good those eliminated during the six months' trial.

In view of the fact that this represented the unanimous decision of the Military Commission and as, moreover, I understand that this decision is in accordance with the wishes of the War Office, I did not think it necessary to insist on referring the matter to San Remo, and the recommendation of the Military Commission was accordingly approved. . . .<sup>3</sup>

9. In accordance with your despatch No. 1020<sup>4</sup> I proposed that the Allied Governments should address a joint warning to the Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavian Governments in the matter of the export of military, naval and air material from Germany into these neutral countries. The Italian Ambassador, though agreeing in principle, strongly resisted the proposal of a joint note and urged that each Government should act on its own. I insisted that in order to produce any real effect on the neutral Governments, it was essential that a joint note should be presented, and it was finally agreed to recommend the Allied Governments to instruct their representatives in the various neutral countries concerned to draw up and present identical notes on the lines indicated in your despatch. The United States Government are not included in this resolution but the United States Ambassador said he would refer the matter to his Government and that they would probably agree to instruct their representatives in the neutral countries concerned to cooperate with their colleagues in this matter. . . .<sup>3</sup>

Copy of this telegram is being sent to Lord Curzon at San Remo.

<sup>3</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>4</sup> No. 41.

## No. 52

*Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup> to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1307 [192159/179449/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 21, 1920*

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at The Hague containing a report as to certain German

<sup>1</sup> Lord Hardinge was in charge of the Foreign Office during Lord Curzon's absence at San Remo.



aeroplanes and war material lying in Holland,<sup>2</sup> and of two letters from the Minister of Munitions on the same subject.<sup>3</sup>

2. I should be glad if Your Lordship would take an early opportunity of raising this matter at the Conference of Ambassadors. You should at the same time say that, as there appears to be no special provision in the Treaty of Versailles relative to such material lying in neutral countries, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the German Government should be required to authorize the Netherlands Government to hand over the material in question to the Allies forthwith in order that the necessary measures for the disposal thereof may be taken by the Commissions of Control.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch (No. 163 of February 12) enclosed a report from the British Military Attaché at The Hague which stated that there were approximately 40 German aeroplanes of various types interned at Soesterberg, all apparently in excellent condition: 'The Netherland authorities have applied on several occasions to the German Government for instructions with reference to disposal of these machines, but have received no reply whatever to date. . . .'

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

### No. 53

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received April 23)*

*No. 1231 [193541/7067/39]*

PARIS, April 21, 1920

The Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

<i>Name and Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>
Summary of statement by General Masterman to Council of Ambassadors April 21st.	Aeronautical Commissions of Control in Germany.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 53

21 avril 1920

Monsieur Millerand, San Remo

*De la part de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs pour le Conseil Suprême*

Le Général Masterman, qui préside la Commission de Contrôle Aéronautique en Allemagne, a fait ce matin devant la Conférence des Ambassadeurs un exposé du travail accompli par la Commission depuis la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, en insistant sur les difficultés qu'elle a rencontrées dans sa tâche.

Cet exposé met en lumière les faits suivants:

1°) Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a donné que tardivement, et alors que le travail de la Commission était commencé, les informations préliminaires qu'il avait été invité, en temps utile, à faire parvenir.

2°) Le Gouvernement Allemand a commencé par ne pas mettre à la disposition de la Commission un nombre suffisant d'officiers pour accompagner les Sous-Commissions dans leurs tournées d'inspection; des ordres avaient été donnés, d'autre part, pour que l'entrée des usines fût refusée aux officiers alliés non accompagnés d'officiers allemands. Par la suite, des officiers allemands en nombre suffisant ont été adjoints à la Commission, mais ils se sont efforcés d'entraver son travail par tous les moyens dont ils disposent.

3°) Après les incidents auxquels a donné lieu la question de la livraison des coupables, l'attitude de ces officiers est devenue de plus en plus arrogante et hostile jusqu'à la contre-révolution. Celle-ci a interrompu le travail de la Commission pendant plus de trois semaines. Quoique plusieurs des officiers allemands qui lui étaient adjoints eussent des sympathies pour les fauteurs du coup d'État, il ne semble pas qu'aucune démarche ait été, depuis, entreprise par le Gouvernement Allemand pour les remplacer.

4°) Le Gouvernement actuel paraît avoir le désir d'exécuter le Traité de Paix, mais il est sans pouvoir pour imposer ses volontés aux nombreux subordonnés, pour la plupart anciens officiers, dont, en fait, dépend l'exécution. Un des procédés d'obstruction les plus usités consiste à renvoyer constamment la Commission d'un Service à l'autre, en retardant sans cesse les décisions demandées par elle.

5°) Malgré le refus opposé le 11 Mars par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs à la demande de l'Allemagne tendant à être autorisée à conserver des forces militaires aériennes et navales, de nouvelles propositions ont été faites depuis la contre-révolution, afin de retarder la démobilisation des 8 groupes d'aviation existant encore sous prétexte que la Conférence des Ambassadeurs pourrait revenir sur sa décision première en raison de la situation troublée où se trouve l'Allemagne. Les autorités allemandes entendent, de même, conserver une police aérienne.

6°) Trois dépôts secrets de matériel aéronautique ont été découverts aux environs de Berlin. Le Général Masterman pense que si la Commission disposait pour son service de Renseignements de ressources pécuniaires plus grandes, elle en découvrirait d'autres.<sup>1</sup>

7°) En dépit des instructions données, des avions ont continué à effectuer des vols; d'autre part, des exportations de matériel aéronautique se poursuivent et le Gouvernement Allemand refuse d'accepter aucune responsabilité pour les 5 Zeppelins qui ont été détruits immédiatement avant la signature de la Paix et pour les 2 Zeppelins détruits après sa signature.

<sup>1</sup> In a report dated May 3, 1920, the I.A.A.C.C. stated that the value of hidden material traced with the help of German informers represented about 5 million marks and that 42,000 marks had been expended in rewards. It added: 'The German Government have accorded every facility for the tracing and seizure of hidden material.'

'Except in one instance, there is reason to suppose that the seized material mentioned in Appendix II [not printed in I.A.A.C.C.'s reports] was destined for eventual export.'

8°) Le Gouvernement Allemand prétend que rien ne l'oblige à rendre impropres à tout usage militaire le matériel aéronautique dont les Alliés n'exigent pas la livraison.

9°) Les Allemands espèrent pouvoir, sous le couvert d'une aviation civile, parvenir à conserver quelques forces militaires d'aviation.

10°) Le Général Masterman conclut que si l'on peut espérer surmonter à la longue les difficultés rencontrées, l'impression générale qui se dégage après trois mois est: 'Pour assurer une exécution rapide et complète des clauses du Traité de Paix, il serait essentiel d'exercer une nouvelle pression sur le Gouvernement allemand, afin qu'il mette un terme à la politique d'obstruction poursuivie à l'égard du travail des Commissions de Contrôle et qu'il devienne plus soucieux qu'il ne l'est à présent d'exécuter fidèlement le Traité.'

La Conférence des Ambassadeurs a estimé que l'exposé du Président de la Commission de Contrôle Aéronautique en Allemagne méritait d'être pris en sérieuse considération et a décidé, sur la proposition de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, d'en adresser d'urgence un résumé au Conseil Suprême, puisque la question allemande figure à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence de San Remo.

#### No. 54

*Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon (San Remo)*

*No. 35 Telegraphic [193153/179657/39]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 22, 1920, 6 p.m.

According to this morning's 'Times' the general question of the disarmament of Germany and reduction of the German armed forces is in process of discussion by the Supreme Council.

You are doubtless aware of the Army Council's views on this subject from advance copy of War Office letter<sup>1</sup> to Foreign Office which Colonel Gribbon took with him to San Remo, and which has now been approved by the Army Council.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this letter of April 20 the War Office maintained the view already expressed in a letter of February 26 that the reduction of the German armed forces to 100,000 by July 10, 1920, would be premature and consequently undesirable and dangerous. In a subsequent letter of May 8, however, the War Office informed the Foreign Office that the Army Council had 'reconsidered the measures necessary to secure the disarmament of Germany while allowing her to maintain the necessary forces for the preservation of order' and that they now agreed with the conclusions reached at San Remo.

#### No. 55

*Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received April 24, 9.15 p.m.)*

*No. 428 Telegraphic [193944/192995/56]*

HELSINGFORS, April 23, 1920, 7.50 p.m.

My telegram No. 417.<sup>1</sup>

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted to me to-day that arms and ammunition discharged at this port from Germany are destined for most part

<sup>1</sup> No. 50.

to use of Protective Guard, a fragment only being earmarked for Ministry of War. I asked him whether supply of arms and ammunition by Germany to neutral countries was in accordance with provisions of Treaty of Versailles. His Excellency replied that he understood that an exception had been made in Treaty in favour of supply of those arms which could not be manufactured in certain countries, but promised that he would make further enquiry.

## No. 56

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Herr Mertens*

*Unnumbered [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, April 23, 1920

To Director of The Peace Commission (Friedensabteilung)  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt) Berlin.

*Request for delay in demobilisation of eight flight formations*

In reply to your F. M. 4566 of the 9th April,<sup>1</sup> enclosing a Memorandum from the Reichswehrminister (No. 200/4/20 W. I. VIII Fl. of 8th April 1920),<sup>2</sup> I have to inform you, on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, that the request for a postponement of the demobilisation of the eight flight formations referred to is refused.

I have to request, therefore, that you will call upon the necessary authorities concerned to effect the immediate demobilisation of these units, and that this may be completely effected before the 8th May 1920, and further, that a report may be rendered to me on that date stating that the demobilisation has been duly carried out.

E. A. MASTERMAN,  
*Air Commodore R.A.F.*

<sup>1</sup> No. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure in No. 43.

## No. 57

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Colonel von Tschischwitz*

*EAM/1606/39 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, April 23, 1920

To The President, Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission, Reichswehrministerium, Berlin.

*Aerial Police Units*

In order to carry out the disposal, destruction and delivery of aeronautical material, I have to demand on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers the immediate handing over of all the aeronautical material now in possession of

the aerial police units, and the immediate withdrawal of the aerial police personnel from the aerodromes where they are now situated.

If the instructions contained in my letter EAM No. 634/39 of 18th February 1920<sup>1</sup> have not yet been fully carried out, the material still remaining at aerodromes other than the eight centres mentioned therein, may be left where it is at present, in order that no further delay in dealing with this material may occur. I have to request that the above may be communicated to the Minister of Interior Affairs in order that the necessary action may be taken.

E. A. MASTERMAN,

*Air Commodore, R.A.F.*

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This letter required the immediate immobilization of the aeronautical material belonging to the aerial police units at Grossenhain, Böblingen, Paderborn, Schleissheim, Königsberg, Stolp, Döberitz, and Brieg.

### No. 58

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to the German Government*

*EAM/173 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, April 24, 1920

*Demand presented to the representative of the German Government at 10.30 a.m. on Saturday 24th April 1920*

On behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments, I hereby present the following demand to the German Government:

‘The transport and provisional destruction of aeronautical material in accordance with the orders which have already been given to the Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission [?] are] to commence forthwith, and the local authorities concerned to be given the necessary instructions to execute this work [sic] to the satisfaction of the inspecting officers of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control without any further delay whatever.’

‘The German Government may reserve to itself the right to claim before the “Réparations Commission” any expenses in connection with this work which it considers it is not bound under the Treaty to pay, but this is in no way to hinder the execution of the work, nor on the other hand will the commencement of the work under these conditions in any way prejudice any claim which the German Government may at a later date put forward.’

‘The German Government is hereby requested to hand me through its representative before midday Tuesday (27th April 1920) a definite reply stating either its willingness to comply unconditionally with the above demand or on the other hand a definite refusal to do so. No further “conditional” replies or proposals for discussion can be entertained.’

E. A. MASTERMAN,

*Air Commodore R.A.F., President.*

No. 59

*Earl Curzon to His Majesty's Representatives at The Hague, Berne, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm*

*No. 80<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [193914/40276/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 27, 1920, 6 p.m.*

Reports have recently reached Allied Governments to effect that Military Naval and Air material is being exported from Germany to Netherlands, Scandinavian countries<sup>2</sup> and Switzerland in contravention of terms of treaty of Versailles.

As soon as your French and Italian colleagues receive similar instructions you should therefore address an identic note to Government to which you are accredited to effect that export of such material by Germany is a breach of Treaty of Versailles and that, in permitting it, they will be conniving with Germany in violating the treaty.

<sup>1</sup> No. 80 to The Hague, No. 41 to Berne, No. 290 to Copenhagen, No. 59 to Christiania, No. 53 to Stockholm and on April 30 No. 136 to Helsingfors repeated there on May 6 as No. 143. Repeated to Paris as despatch No. 1433 on May 1.

<sup>2</sup> On this same day Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, noted that a Mr. Meisterlin of Christiania had come to see him that afternoon and had told him that to his certain knowledge large numbers of German aeroplanes were going to Sweden and some also to Norway and Denmark. 'I understood him to say', Mr. Harmsworth recorded, 'that they are smuggled to the coast in pieces, assembled, and flown to the respective Scandinavian countries by German pilots.'

'In the case of Sweden some of the German pilots are remaining for service in that country.'

'Mr. Meisterlin is not certain whether any of the planes have been bought on account of any of the respective Governments. In any case, they are intended to be used mainly for commercial purposes.'

No. 60

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received April 27, 11.30 p.m.)*

*No. 256 Telegraphic [194486/40276/39]*

BERLIN, *April 27, 1920, 8.9 p.m.*

General Bingham has received information through War Office based on reports from Lord Acton that considerable quantities of arms are being shipped from Lübeck to Finland with knowledge of Finnish Government. As Military Control Commission have no effective means of stopping this traffic he asks whether diplomatic representations cannot be made to Finland with a view to restraining them from connivance in evasion of stipulation of Treaty of Peace.

No. 61

*Earl Curzon to Lord Acton (Helsingfors)*

*No. 137 Telegraphic [194486/40276/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 30, 1920, 12 noon*

Your telegram No. 428 (of April 23rd:<sup>1</sup> export of arms and ammunition from Germany).

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has been instructed<sup>2</sup> to raise at Conference of Ambassadors question of addressing similar warning to Finnish Government. As soon as your French and Italian colleagues receive instructions you should address identic note to Finnish Government on lines of instructions contained in my immediately preceding telegram.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 55.

<sup>2</sup> In Lord Curzon's despatch No. 1434 of May 1 (not printed).

<sup>3</sup> See No. 59, n. 1. The Conference of Ambassadors decided on May 8 that instructions to act accordingly should be sent to allied diplomatic representatives at Helsingfors; Mr. Kidston, who was appointed to succeed Lord Acton on April 30, was so informed in Foreign Office telegram No. 148 of May 12 (not printed).

No. 62

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 365 [194652/40276/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 30, 1920*

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Bergen<sup>1</sup> in regard to the export of certain military and aeronautical material from Germany.

2. I request that Your Lordship will draw the attention of the Military and Aeronautical Commissions of Control to these matters.

3. As you are aware a joint Allied warning has recently been addressed to the Norwegian Government<sup>2</sup> to the effect that transactions of this nature are in contravention of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and that, in continuing to permit them, the Norwegian Government will be conniving at a breach of the Treaty.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The first, of March 27, related to the activities of Mr. P. Scholtz, a German Director of the Bergens Bliktrykkeri, in connexion with sales of German aeroplanes in Norway, and gave details of some of these sales. The second, of March 30, enclosed a translation of a report in the *Bergens Aftenblad* that German shells had been sold to a zinc smelting works at Glomfjord.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 59.

No. 63

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 4)*

*No. 530 Telegraphic: by bag [195667/7067/39]*

PARIS, May 1, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met to-day under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions.

. . .<sup>1</sup> 5. I asked the Conference for a ruling as regards the sale by Allied countries to Germany of civilian aircraft which in reality can be easily transformed into military aircraft. I pointed out that it would be futile to insist upon the German Government surrendering all their military aircraft, if at the same time, the Allies supply them with other aircraft which can easily be adapted to the same purpose, and I urged that the Conference should recommend the Allies' Governments to enter into some agreement between themselves whereby they would undertake to restrict their sales of aircraft to Germany so as not to stultify the execution of paragraph 1 of Article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles. The Italian Ambassador strongly resisted the proposal that a definite recommendation should be made to the Allied Governments, on the ground that it would be beyond the competence of the Conference and an extension of the terms of the Treaty. A resolution was eventually decided upon which met the Italian Ambassador's objections. A copy of this resolution will be forwarded to you in a separate despatch.<sup>2</sup> . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted paragraphs reported discussion on other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Paris No. 1389 of May 6, not printed. The resolution read as follows:

'It was decided: that the Conference of Ambassadors, considering that the execution of the Treaty of Versailles requires the destruction of military aircraft belonging to ex-enemy Powers, has the honour to bring to the attention of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers a point which in practice is such as to render null and void Article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles. It is essential that the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers do not place at the disposal of ex-enemy powers by the devious method of the sale of so-called civil aircraft, any means of reconstituting the strength of their military air forces. Consequently it is of the very highest importance for the Allied and Associated Powers to come to an agreement to this effect. In the view of the British Ambassador, who has requested that his opinion be specially mentioned, a Convention to this end is indispensable.'

In his covering despatch Lord Derby explained that he had initiated the discussion on this subject at the Conference of Ambassadors on the advice of his aeronautical adviser.

No. 64

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 6)*

*No. 536 Telegraphic: by bag [196172/7067/39]*

PARIS, May 4, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:

. . .<sup>1</sup> 15. The Conference approved three unanimous reports by the Naval advisers, as follows:—

<sup>1</sup> The first fourteen paragraphs recorded discussion on other matters.



(a) The German Government having protested against the decision of the Conference of the 19th instant<sup>2</sup> regarding the interpretation of the words 'in reserve' in Article 181 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Conference decided to reply that they could not alter that decision.

(b) In accordance with a proposal made by the President of the Naval Commission of Control it was decided that that Commission should have complete supervision over the procees [*sic*] of converting into merchant-ships, the German warships which are in building, so as to ensure that they cannot be reconverted for military use at some subsequent date. Consideration is also being given to the possibility of any such reconverted warships being taken over by the Allies, should they so desire, in part payment of the mercantile tonnage which Germany is to provide in accordance with clause 5, annexe 3, of the Reparations Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

(c) The Danish Government are to be approached with the view of verifying the statement of the German Government with regard to certain German war material which is lying in Denmark in the charge of the Danish Government. In the event of the German statement being correct the Danish Government is requested to allow the destruction of this material under the superintendence of representatives of the Naval Commission of Control. It is to be explained to the Danish Government that the German Government have agreed to the destruction taking place in this manner.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably the decision of March 16 is intended: cf. No. 33, § 3.

## No. 65

*Sir R. Graham (The Hague) to Earl Curzon (Received May 8)*

*No. 436 [196778/40276/39]*

*Confidential*

THE HAGUE, May 4, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 422 of the 29th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> I took the opportunity this afternoon, in a conversation with the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs, of referring to the Identic Note addressed by the Allied Representatives to the Dutch Government on the subject of the passage of arms from Germany to this country. I expressed the earnest hope that the Netherland Government would do their utmost to put an end to any traffic of the kind.

Monsieur de Karnebeek replied that the Identic Note was under the serious consideration of the Netherland Government, but that, although they did not wish to adopt a formal or unaccommodating attitude in the matter, there were one or two points to which the attention of the Allied Governments ought to be called.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This acknowledged the receipt of No. 59 and enclosed the text of the note presented to the Netherland Foreign Minister on April 29..

In the first place, the Netherland Government were not a party to the Peace Treaty of June, 1919, nor had this Treaty ever been officially notified or communicated to them by the Allied Governments. His Excellency had purchased copies of the German edition of the Treaty with its English and French translations but, otherwise, neither he nor his Government had any cognizance of it. Yet the Netherland Government were not only being requested to apply the provisions of the Treaty, but even to interpret them. If they were expected to decide as to Germany violating the Treaty, were they also to do so in the case of possible Allied violations? How were the Netherland Government to know whether material imported from Germany into this country in the ordinary course of business came under the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 170 of the Treaty? They could not address enquiries on the subject to the German Government. For instance, a number of disused ambulances had been imported from Germany by a Dutch merchant. They had been broken up, and the shafts and wheels and other parts of them had been utilised for peasants' carts. The Dutch merchant had bought them cheap, and had no doubt made a considerable profit over the transaction. By what right or under what regulation could the Dutch Government have prohibited it? Again, a certain amount of scrap war material, mere metal, entirely useless for any purpose but to be melted down, had been purchased cheaply by Dutch traders in Germany and had been imported. His Excellency proceeded to say that the reports of large importations of war material from Germany into Holland, which had emanated from the French Control Service at Aix-la-Chapelle, were not only grossly exaggerated but distorted and even malicious. Ordinary merchandise packed in old ammunition boxes had been reported as 'ammunition'. He believed that such exaggerations might be attributed, partly to the desire of the Control Service at Aix-la-Chapelle to justify its existence, and partly to an intrigue against this country in which Mr. van Groenendael (See my despatch No. 336 of November 25th last),<sup>2</sup> who had recently been to Aix-la-Chapelle, was concerned. His Excellency understood that more similar reports, detrimental to Holland, were being concocted from the same sources. The idea, which had been mooted, that the Dutch Government would allow this country to become a dépôt for German war material, was simply grotesque.

I said that this was all very well, but that, even admitting that the accounts might be exaggerated, a certain amount of war material had undoubtedly come into Holland. Under the attitude adopted by His Excellency, the German Government might have endeavoured to evade the provisions of the Peace Treaty altogether and to send all their aeroplanes, guns and other war material into Holland; the Allied Governments could not be expected to sit quietly and contemplate such an evasion, nor could they be expected to

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. It had been alleged that Mr. van Groenendael, a Roman Catholic member of the Dutch Second Chamber, who sat for Sittard in the province of Limburg, had intrigued in Belgium in favour of holding a plebiscite in Dutch Limburg and that he had invoked 'the support of the British authorities', who, 'so far from supporting him', had 'warned the Netherlands Government of his anti-Dutch intrigues'.

tolerate the action of the Dutch Government in facilitating it. Monsieur de Karnebeek replied that such a contingency was impossible, as under Dutch law no war material could be imported into the country without the permission of the Government, and this permission had not been given.

I enquired whether it was not the case that in three localities, which I named to him, there were not considerable dépôts of German guns—some of them in various stages of decay, but others in good condition, and of machines for fabricating war material.

Monsieur de Karnebeek shewed me a voluminous and detailed report which had been drawn up by the Dutch authorities concerned with regard to these and other alleged dépôts, and promised me a copy of it as soon as it had been translated. He said that in almost every case the allegations made had been controverted, but he admitted to at least one dépôt where there were not only old German guns, mere scrap iron, but some new guns all unmounted in an unfinished condition. These had simply been purchased as metal and were to be melted down at once. There were, further, some moulds for casting heavy guns, but which could also be and would be utilised for other purposes. All such purchases had been made by private Dutch traders in the ordinary course of business. The Netherland Government could not be expected to determine whether such importations were or were not in contravention of the provisions of a Treaty to which Holland was not a party. I again expressed the earnest hope that all such traffic should cease, and I understand from my French colleague that none has taken place since the middle of March.

I am under the impression that, while the existence of this traffic has been sufficiently established to justify a protest, the reports from the French Control Service at Aix-la-Chapelle should be received with caution, as they are exaggerated and in many instances unreliable. This view is strongly held by Colonel Oppenheim and, I may add in strict confidence, is shared by the able French Military Attaché here. My French colleague, on the other hand, attaches great importance to them, and I had some difficulty in persuading him to eliminate from the text of our identic note references to specific cases, which might well have proved insufficiently established, and to couch our protest in general terms.

In connection with Monsieur de Karnebeek's remark reported in the third paragraph of this despatch, I have the honour to suggest, for Your Lordship's consideration, whether, if neutral Governments are expected to recognise and respect the Provisions of the Treaty of June 28th, 1919, and of the other Treaties with the enemy Powers when they are signed and ratified, it might not be advisable for the Allied Governments to communicate officially the Texts of such Treaties to the neutral Governments concerned.<sup>3</sup>

I have, &c.,

R. GRAHAM

<sup>3</sup> In his despatch No. 1577 of May 12 (not printed) to Lord Derby, Lord Curzon asked that the Conference of Ambassadors should take an early opportunity of considering Sir R. Graham's suggestion. It was brought up and adopted on June 23.

*Colonel von Tschischwitz to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*

*No. 1056/5.20 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, May 7, 1920

To the President, I.A.A.C.C., Charlottenburg.

In accordance with communications in the French Press on the occasion of your last visit to Paris, you made a report to the Council of Ambassadors, in which you maintained that the German Government are showing ill will in the carrying out of the Peace Treaty, and leaving no stone unturned in order to obstruct the tasks of your Commission. These communications coincide in part with the allegations in your letter of the 16-4-20 EAM 1486/39<sup>1</sup> and with the words addressed to myself in your note EAM 173 of the 24-4-20.<sup>2</sup>

I most seriously repudiate these charges. The German Government has the most earnest desire to carry out the conditions of Article 202 of the Peace Treaty with the utmost possible speed, and thereby to remove the occasion for continual lack of confidence. Obstruction is purposeless, as it does not improve matters, but on the contrary renders our position worse. I emphasised this attitude in my first conversation of the 17-1-20, and again to-day I abide by the same. Where recently there have been undesired delays in the carrying out of the Peace Treaty, the responsibility for such is due to your measures, as I will bear out in the following:

(1) It was not until two months after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty that you sent the Note containing exact instructions concerning the disposal of flying machines and motors falling within Article 202 of the Peace Treaty, and it was a further three weeks, i.e. 9-4-20, before the arrival of the list containing the places decided upon for the material to be delivered to.

Your note of the 10-3-20 No. 962/39<sup>3</sup> demands that certain types of flying machines and motors should be scrapped. As I have established in my note of the 13-4-20 No. 1069/4.2 Ref. G.,<sup>3</sup> this demand exceeds the stipulation of the Peace Treaty. I was not therefore obliged to comply with your demands forthwith and to issue orders at once for the scrapping. It was my right and my duty to take up this new question of scrapping which had arisen with the different Ministries, and to settle the conditions under which it was possible to comply with your demands.

Owing to the troubles in Berlin, this discussion was not able to take place until the beginning of April. The question was then dealt with in an exchange of notes which was carried out with the greatest possible despatch, and brought about on the part of the Associated Powers concurrence with the German proposal for the provisional scrapping of motors. This concurrence

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This letter complained that the I.A.A.C.C.'s instructions were either not sent on by Colonel von Tschischwitz or were countermanded by him, and declared that unnecessary obstacles were being placed in the way of the Commission.

<sup>2</sup> No. 58. The demand was presented to Colonel von Tschischwitz at the I.A.A.C.C.'s headquarters.

<sup>3</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

was made known to me on the 24-4-20. I then immediately issued the necessary instructions.

The blame for the delay lies therefore on your side. You must have known that the Peace Treaty laid no incumbency upon the German Government to scrap aircraft equipment, and you should therefore months before have put out a feeler to the German Government in this matter if you attached any importance to the quick carrying out of Article 202 of the Peace Treaty. On the part of Germany it was impossible to anticipate the question of scrapping, in as much as this was not provided for in the Peace Treaty.

(2) Instructions for transporting away were given, after you communicated to me the places stipulated for the delivery of equipment. That however was not done until 9-4-20; this delayed communication, as luck would have it, had no further consequences, as owing to disturbances throughout Germany I could not have given earlier instructions.

Also in the question of transporting away, the blame for the delay falls upon your Commission. In the case of a competent organisation the stipulated place for the inspected equipment could have been made known to my Commission after each inspection, that however was not done. You waited until all inspections had been finished.

Even to-day no clearness exists as to what is to be transported and where. It is true that your Lists 'B' have been drawn up; but for the actual carrying out the Commission has got to decide at each aerodrome and in detail, what equipment is to be removed and what state is to receive it. Your contention therefore, that the German Government has intentionally procrastinated in the carrying out of the Peace Treaty is inexplicable to me.

I have signified my readiness to carry out the transporting away, as you desire, although with regard to the regulation of transport it has been demonstrated to me by specialists that this method is unnecessary for the purpose in question. Your lists demonstrate the fact that on your part an expert in the matter of transport questions has dearly [clearly] not been consulted.

From the middle of February until the middle of April I in vain concerned myself for the despatch of an officer versed in transport questions by the Allied Powers for the thrashing out of such an important transport question.

It was not until 19-4-20 that a French major of the Inter-Allied Transport Commission arrived in Berlin from Wiesbaden. He made it clear at the very first discussion, that he was convinced that the method of transporting away proposed by the I.A.A.C.C. would incur considerable difficulties, and that its carrying out was in no way in proportion to the work to be undertaken.

Nevertheless, I raised no objection such as could have created the impression that I wanted a delay in the transporting away. The only efficient way of carrying out the transporting away, would naturally have been such a one as would have handed over the equipment in North Germany to England and Japan, that in the west to France and Belgium, and that in the south to Italy, and not such a method as would involve a sharing out at every small aerodrome of equipment between the five States.

A further delay occurred on your part, owing to the fact that your Sub-

Commissions and their officers have repeatedly attempted to issue orders and instructions when carrying out inspections. Under the Peace Treaty your officers are not entitled to do this. Also your officers have not a right to issue orders to German authorities. It would essentially have shortened inspections and other negotiations if your Sub-Commissions and their officers had always made use of the German Sub-Commissions and their officers as intermediaries.

The competence and duties of these latter is to investigate demands on the basis of the Peace Treaty and then to forward same for further settlement to departments concerned.

Your Representative at the discussions on the 1/4 and 1-5-20 expressed his concurrence with this interpretation. Therefore, the instructions to your officers have been made to include the instruction that their duty consists solely in control, and that they have to abstain from all direct intervention. If you had already issued instructions to this effect, many instances of friction and unpleasant misunderstanding would have been avoided.

(3) In your note of the 16-4-20 EAM/1486/39 you speak of counter orders which the German Government are supposed to have issued. Apart from the fact that there cannot be any question of counter orders, since no one but the German Government is entitled to issue orders to German Departments, I must reserve to myself the main responsibility for the entire carrying out of the Peace Treaty so far as concerns military aircraft equipment. It would lead to inconceivable results and would render impossible the smooth carrying out of the Peace Treaty if your officers were personally to take into their hands the carrying out of same. That, however, has in many instances been attempted. Lists 'A' and 'B' have been forwarded to various German Departments with a demand that the scrapping and the transporting away are to be immediately commenced. These Departments have naturally explained that they must await instructions for this from the authorities in charge of them. Unnecessary journeys, cases of friction and delays have been the inevitable result.

(4) Very considerable delays have occurred owing to the organisation of your Commission, which you have set up without taking into consideration German conditions and the way in which my own organisation has been set up as communicated to you. I have been obliged to adapt my organisation to yours, in spite of the fact that the latter is not in accordance with the aim in view: this I have had to do in order to make co-operation possible. Delays lasting numbers of days must necessarily result when one Sub-Commission is dealing with all the factories in Germany—so far as concerns aircraft equipment—from Berlin as the centre, and when for each minor inspection on every occasion journeys have to be undertaken from Berlin.

I think I have demonstrated by my arguments that the German Government does not merit the charge of having delayed the carrying out of the Peace Treaty. I must repudiate this charge of [*sic*] unless you adduce definite instances where, in your opinion, *ill will* can be brought home to the German Government.

Finally, I would draw attention to the fact that your arguments in Paris

stand in very marked contrast to the statement of the Minister Churchill, who according to the *Times* of the 13-4-20 stated that he was satisfied with the progress in the disarmament of Germany.<sup>4</sup>

VON TSCHISCHWITZ,

*President of the Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission*

<sup>4</sup> Presumably the reference is to the report, on p. 7 of *The Times* of April 16, of Mr. Churchill's statement in the House of Commons on German war material, in the course of which he said: 'I am quite satisfied that the course which is being pursued by the British and French Governments is conducing to one of the most important things which we have to do—namely, the disarmament of Germany.' Cf. Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 127, col. 1823.

## No. 67

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 10)*

*No. 556 Telegraphic: by bag [197153/7067/39]*

PARIS, May 8, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:

- ...<sup>1</sup> (5) The Conference approved the proposal by the Inter-Allied Military Mission of Versailles that the German Government should be told that they would be debited with the value of any war material which they had allowed to be exported to neutral countries, whereas according to the Treaty it ought to have been handed over to the Allies.
- (6) The Conference approved the proposal of the Inter-Allied Military Mission of Versailles that all hangars which the Aeronautical Commission of Control decide not to destroy, shall be distributed among the various Allied and Associated Powers in the proportions decided upon by the Supreme Council on the 21st [29th] September 1919.<sup>2</sup> It will rest with these Powers to decide what is to be done with the hangars thus allotted to them, the Commission of Control being in no way responsible for the dismantling, transport or reconstruction of the hangars.
- (7) On the recommendation of the Inter-Allied Military Mission of Versailles it was decided to reject the request made by the Lithuanian Government for permission to buy German war material.
- (8) The Conference approved the proposal<sup>3</sup> by the French Government to the effect that the German Government should be instructed to invite the Dutch Government to hand over the large supply of military equipment which had belonged to the German troops who had been

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume I, No. 67, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Put forward in a note of April 26 (not printed), a copy of which was forwarded to Lord Curzon under cover of Paris despatch No. 1413 of May 10.

dis-armed in passing through Dutch territory in November 1918. The transfer of this equipment to Germany is to be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the Military Commission of Control, and the Dutch Government are at the same time to be informed that the request by the German Government for this equipment is made with the approval of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. I took the opportunity of suggesting that the German Government should at the same time request the Dutch Government to hand over the aeronautical material which according to your despatch No. 1307<sup>4</sup> is equally lying in Holland. This was agreed to.<sup>5</sup>

- (9) On the strength of your despatch No. 1433<sup>6</sup> I informed the Conference that His Majesty's representatives in neutral countries adjacent to Germany had received instructions to concert with their Allied colleagues in addressing representations to neutral Governments on the subject of the export of German war material contrary to the terms of the Treaty. I suggested that in view of the similar export which was taking place from Germany to Finland as indicated by the telegrams contained in your despatch No. 1434<sup>7</sup> it would be desirable that Allied representatives at Helsingfors should be similarly instructed to make representations to the Finnish Government. The Conference approved this proposal. I request therefore that similar instructions may be sent to His Majesty's representative at Helsingfors.

In the meanwhile I shall be glad to learn whether the French and Italian representatives in the neutral countries adjacent to Germany have yet received instructions to make representations on the lines recommended by the Conference of Ambassadors.

<sup>4</sup> No. 52.

<sup>5</sup> The notes of May 13 and 26 consequently sent by M. Millerand to the German delegation are printed in English translation in Cmd. 1325 of 1921, Nos. 131 and 144.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 59, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 61, n. 2.

## No. 68

*Sir M. Findlay<sup>1</sup> (Christiania) to Earl Curzon (Received May 13)*

*No. 201 [197603/40276/39]*

CHRISTIANIA, May 8, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to Your Lordship's telegram No. 59 of the 27th ultimo,<sup>2</sup> and to my despatch No. 186 of the 30th ultimo<sup>3</sup> enclosing copy of an identic note addressed by the Representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy to the Minister for Foreign Affairs calling his attention to the fact that the export of German war material by Germany whether for military, naval, or aviation purposes was a breach of the Treaty of Versailles and requesting

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Christiania.

<sup>2</sup> No. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



him to cause such measures to be taken as might prevent Norwegian subjects from participating in this traffic.

Mr. Ihlen has now replied to myself and my Colleagues simply acknowledging receipt of the above Note. Both my French and Italian Colleagues had in the meantime pressed him to state what measures he proposed to take but he had avoided committing himself. I had unfortunately been unable to see Mr. Ihlen at his weekly reception but on receipt of his simple acknowledgment I arranged a meeting and pointed out that, though only a small amount of aviation material was believed to have been bought by private Norwegians, our Governments would hardly be satisfied without some clear indication of what the Norwegian Government proposed to do to prevent abuses. I hoped therefore that he would at any rate give me distinct verbal assurances in order to complete what had not been stated in his extremely laconic reply.

He then authorized me to inform Your Lordship that instructions were being sent to all the Norwegian departments in the sense desired and that the Department of Commerce was being instructed to inform all the various branches of commerce with a view to warning the public. As I assume that these instructions are being sent to the Customs Authorities as well as other Departments everything necessary would appear to have been done.

I have, &c.,

M. DE C. FINDLAY

#### No. 69

*Colonel von Tschischwitz to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*

*No. 1071/4/20 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, May 8, 1920

To the President, I.A.A.C.C. Berlin.

I have the honour to make the following report in answer to your communication EAM 1596/2 of the 23-4-20:<sup>1</sup>

(1) The entire German Military Flying Service has been demobilised. The Army no longer has any military aircraft at all at its disposal.

(2) The last remaining flying units as under have been demobilised.

Döberitz with Ordnance Department:

Königsberg,  
Stolp,  
Brieg,  
Grossenhain,

Paderborn,  
Böblingen,  
Schleissheim.

(3) All aircraft at all air stations—with the exception of Stolp—has [*sic*] been handed over in its entirety to the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably No. 56, although that is printed without any reference number in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Final Report.

At the flying station at Stolp the handing over of equipment has not yet been completed. The handing over which was already in course of progress had to be interrupted owing to the urgent departure on service affairs to Berlin of the representative of the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft (discussion concerning scrapping and delivery of aircraft). This handing over will be immediately communicated after completion within the next few days.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> No signature is here appended. A note in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Report adds: 'With the demobilisation of the unit at Stolp being reported about the 25th of the same month, the matter finally closed.'

## No. 70

*Colonel von Tschischwitz to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*

*No. 1141/4.20 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, May 10, 1920

To the President, I.A.A.C.C., Berlin-Charlottenburg.

In your letter of the 24-4-20 EAM/173,<sup>1</sup> you informed me that the Allied and Associated Powers concurred with the German proposals for the provisional destruction of aero engines. I have therefore issued instructions for this work.

Hitherto, however, I have neither received any written confirmation that the scrapped equipment is to be handed over to German industry, nor any communication concerning the procedure to be employed therewith.

I have issued instructions for the provisional destruction on the verbal assurance that the Allied Powers would arrange the sale in accordance with the conditions under which the German Government had declared themselves ready to carry out the destruction, which work they are not obliged to carry out under the Peace Treaty.

The German Government however, does not intend to carry out the final destruction of the aeronautical material, which involves exceptionally high costs, before on your part binding written undertakings have been given concerning the sale. Apparently the Allied Powers (I have also received no communication concerning this) intend to benefit from the aeronautical material by means of the Reparation Commission. I am unable to concur to [*sic*] any such proposal in this direction, and draw attention to Section 2 of the attached copy of memorandum from the German Government for the decision of the Council of Ambassadors under the date of 12-2-20<sup>2</sup> concerning the right of ownership of scrapped war material, which the President of the German Peace Delegation in Paris submitted to the Supreme Council in the middle of April.

As I attach the greatest importance to the expeditious carrying out of the stipulations of Article 202 of the Peace Treaty, I would ask that this question of final scrapping and sale of scrap be dealt with as soon as possible.

VON TSCHISCHWITZ

<sup>1</sup> No. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Final Report. This document was presumably that printed without a date as enclosure 2 in No. 109 of Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

## No. 71

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Colonel von Tschischwitz*

*EAM/2013/39 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, May 12, 1920

To the President, Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission, Reichswehrministerium, Berlin.

I have to acknowledge receipt of your No. 1056/5.20 of 7th May 1920.<sup>1</sup>

So long as you, representing the German Government, persist in your point of view re the unnecessary interposition of the German accompanying officers between the Commission of Control officers and the authorities at aerodromes and establishments which it is their duty to control, so long as the German Government does not take more energetic measures to prevent the exportation of aeronautical war material to neutral countries, to discover and punish those guilty of concealing aeronautical material in Germany, to carry out the terms of the Protocol, and other measures which I have demanded, so long must I remain dissatisfied with the willingness of the German Government to do all in its power to assist in the rapid and smooth execution of the work which it is my duty to control.

As regards the criticisms you offer concerning my administration and organisation of the Commission, I consider these uncalled for and naturally refuse to enter into any written argument with you on the question.<sup>2</sup>

Should you at any time wish to see me and discuss any points which would, in your opinion, lead to a more rapid solution of questions at issue, I shall always be most glad to accord you an interview.

E. A. MASTERMAN,  
*Air Commodore R.A.F.*

<sup>1</sup> No. 66.

<sup>2</sup> In a reply of May 21 (not printed) Colonel von Tschischwitz stated that he also reserved to himself the right to criticize Air Commodore Masterman's measures: 'In your letter you overlook the fact that both our Commissions are entitled to equal rights in the course of their service.'

## No. 72

*Second Report by Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan on the Armed Forces of Germany and the Work of the Effectives Sub-Commission of Control*<sup>1</sup>

[201508/179657/39]

*Secret*

LONDON, May 12, 1920

Since my report of 12th March<sup>2</sup> was forwarded to the War Office, the German Government have submitted to the Commission of Control a number

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this report of May 12 was communicated by the War Office and received in the Foreign Office on June 3: notes in this copy are referred to below as *Notes in original*. No record has been found of any summary having been communicated in advance as happened with General Morgan's first report (cf. No. 29).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 29.

of highly important documents on the subject of the transitional army (the *Übergangs-heer*), the police and the *Einwohnerwehren*, most of them representing answers to our *questionnaires* which were long overdue. These documents are illuminating and enable one to write with much more certainty as to the intentions of the German Government than was possible in my earlier report. In the third paragraph of that report, in dealing with the demobilization of the old army, I ventured to suggest that the evidence in our possession pointed to the existence of a subtle and ingenious plan in the *Reichswehrministerium* to preserve the cadres and organization of the old army, and in the later paragraphs<sup>3</sup> I pointed out that no steps had been taken by the German Government to abolish the legal obligation to the universal service. As will be seen later from an examination of the plans recently submitted to us by the German Government for the organization and distribution of the transitional army, this supposition is considerably strengthened, while as regards abolition of compulsory service the situation remains what it was—our *questionnaire* to the German Government is still unanswered and the laws relating to conscription still remain on the statute-book. If call-up notices were issued to-morrow, every man of military age in Germany would be under the legal obligation to obey them. Moreover, so far as our information goes, no steps whatsoever have been taken to enlist men on the 12 year term of engagement prescribed by the Treaty. The men serving in the transitional army are enlisted and trained on a short term (generally six months), with the result that the German Government is enabled, if it is so minded, to pass men through the ranks for short periods of intensive training and to build up a reserve in the same way as was practised by Scharnhorst after the Treaty of Tilsit.<sup>4</sup> Such a state of affairs may, of course, be defended on the ground that it is transitory. The point is, however, that the *Reichswehrministerium* have taken no steps to terminate it, and it is now clear to us that the German Government abandoned, almost as soon as it was formed, or, rather, expressed, its professed intention, conveyed to us in their Note of 11th February,<sup>5</sup> to proceed at once with the constitution of the new Peace Army of 100,000 effectives, 'independently of the question whether the Allied Powers will consent to a reinforcement of this number'. What they have actually done is to proceed with the constitution of a transitional army of twice that strength on the assumption that what was transitional might be allowed to remain permanent. Had this transitional army differed from the army of the Treaty merely in having double the number of prescribed effectives, no objection could have been taken, but, as will be seen later, this army is an altogether different army, conforming neither in its higher formations, nor in the number of its staffs,

<sup>3</sup> A note in the original here referred to two of the appendixes to this report of May 12. Since these appendixes are not here printed this and similar footnote references in the original to appendixes to either the first or second report have been omitted.

<sup>4</sup> *Note in original*: 'This expedient has also taken other forms (cf. paragraph 11 of the earlier report). It seems to be one that is constantly present to the mind of the German Government.'

<sup>5</sup> This note replying to Questionnaire III from the Effectives Sub-Commission of Control has not been traced in Foreign Office archives.

nor in armament, nor in the proportion of each arm of the service, to the principles laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. It remains to find a clue to the motive of this divergence. The clue will, I think, be found in a determination to preserve the system of conscription and at some convenient moment, after this Commission has been recalled, to restore it. This may seem a bold conclusion, but it is largely a matter of induction from many facts, the number and value of which will presently appear. This is not to say that anything like mobilization is to be apprehended at present or that any order to that effect would, as things are, command any degree of popular assent. The army is at the moment extremely unpopular in Germany, and, paradoxical as it may appear, the immediate effect of imposing on Germany a voluntrry [*sic*] army has been to make that army lose caste. In proportion as it has become voluntary it has come to be regarded as 'mercenary'.<sup>6</sup> Claims to elect officers, demands for higher pay, stipulations for representation by *Vertrauensmänner* (soldiers' delegates), although meeting with little success and less sympathy, have given the *Reichswehr* something of the character of a highly privileged and exacting trade union without the industrial standing which could command [?] commend] such claims to the public. The fact that all the higher commands have been, and still are, in the hands of officers of the old *régime*, many of whom were associated with the recent Kapp-Lüttwitz revolution, has tended to make the army still more unpopular—it is frequently stigmatized as a 'praetorian guard'—as has also its wanton treatment of the civilian population at the time. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, in view of the German demands for a larger army to secure peace, order, and good government that, as at present constituted and commanded, the *Reichswehr* is more calculated to provoke disorder than to suppress it. It is still, however, a potent instrument in the hands of reactionaries—the screen of civilian control is very thin. The fact that the German people are undoubtedly tired of 'militarism' does not appreciably diminish the danger of a military revolution. A political revolution, no doubt, depends upon opinion and is the work of a majority; a military revolution can easily be effected by a minority, especially among a confused, dispirited and listless people, for it rests on nothing but force. These speculations, though based on close observation of the political temper of Germany for a period now extending over eight months, may be disputable; what is quite clear is that, whether the danger of a military revolution is near or remote, the plans put forward by the German Government for the constitution of their army are such as can be explained by a desire to conserve as far as possible the old military system.

2. *Strength of the armed forces of Germany.*—Before proceeding with the analysis of the German plans for the new army, I submit an estimate of the present strength of the armed forces of Germany, a subject on which a great deal of rather wild speculation has appeared in the public Press. In paragraph 10 and in Appendix 'E' of my earlier report, I submitted certain estimates of these forces to date—namely, 12th March—and I ventured to express some criticism of the figures arrived at by General Barthélemy, the

<sup>6</sup> *Note in original:* 'An adjective frequently applied to it in the German Press.'

French president of the Effectives Sub-Commission. This total was 580,000. He has since informed me that he now agrees with me in thinking those figures too high, particularly as regards the *Sicherheitspolizei*, on which we are now much better informed. A German official return, which is dealt with later in this report, puts the number of this force at, approximately, 50,000, and there is no reason to think their figures are an under-estimate.<sup>7</sup> As regards the round figure of 100,000 representing details of the old army engaged in demobilization depôts, prisoners-of-war camps, &c., I see no reason to qualify what I have said in my earlier report as to these figures being purely speculative, and it is quite certain that from the fighting point of view this number, even if accurate, is largely negligible. All the investigations of demobilization centres by our District Committees go to show that many, if not most, of these men are men of long past service with the colours, some of them are disabled men unfit for general service; their employment is largely that of pay clerks, and, though most of them who are not 'demilitarized' might add to the ration strength of a unit, they would not necessarily add to its rifle strength. It is certainly misleading to put these men on the same footing as the 290,000 effectives then incorporated in the *Reichswehr*. I should be inclined therefore to write off some 140,000<sup>8</sup> from the figure of 580,000 put forward by General Barthélemy on 12th March and to reduce the number of 'effectives' of the German Army at that date to 440,000 or, to speak more strictly (excluding the potential reserves of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and *Zeitfreiwillige*), to 330,000, namely—

(1) Active Army—

<i>Reichswehr</i>	.	.	.	.	290,000
<i>Frei Corps</i>	.	.	.	.	<u>40,000</u>
Total	.	.	.	.	<u>330,000</u>

(2) Reserve Forces—

<i>Sicherheitspolizei</i>	.	.	.	.	60,000
<i>Zeitfreiwillige</i>	.	.	.	.	<u>50,000</u>
Total	.	.	.	.	<u>110,000</u>

As regards the effectives of the German Army at the present moment—namely, 12th May—these revised figures must be subject to further correction, as some progress has presumably been made with the reduction of the *Reichswehr* to a figure approximating to the 200,000 to which the German Army was to be reduced by 10th April.

As to this, information has been supplied to us on 2nd April when, in re-

<sup>7</sup> Note in original: 'In their return, however, the German Government admit that the figure does not include *Sicherheitspolizei*, who are still in process of formation in some of the smaller States.'

<sup>8</sup> Note in original: 'i.e., treating the figure of 100,000 men in demobilization centres as representing a personnel of no combatant value and reducing the figure of 100,000 for the *Sicherheitspolizei* to 60,000 at the most.'

sponse to repeated demands, the German Government supplied us with a copy of an Army Order, dated 6th March, for the reduction of the *Reichswehr*, to be completed by 1st April, to a transitional army (*Übergangs-heer*) of 200,000 men. This Order, which is extremely illuminating as to the intentions of the *Reichswehrministerium*, will be analyzed later in this report; for the present it is sufficient to deal with the figures of effectives given in the tables which accompanied it. These were: 7,985 officers, 191,299 other ranks, to which were added 490 officers and 16,229 other ranks, representing the forces in the neutral zone, giving a total of 8,475 officers, 207,528 other ranks. This, however, it is to be noted, was merely a scheme of reduction, and the Order, being dated 6th March, was issued before the Kapp-Lüttwitz disturbances. Those disturbances must have suspended its execution; they may, indeed, have been exploited, as was certainly the case with the *Free Corps*, to enlist more men. We have therefore addressed a demand to the German Government for particulars as to the actual strength of the Army at the present date, and as yet no reply has been received. One may reasonably assume that the *Reichswehr* musters at the present moment about 250,000 officers and men. As regards the *Free Corps* one cannot safely assume their strength to be less than it was on 12th March; we have no knowledge of any of these units being disbanded, it is notorious that the abortive revolution brought them a fresh accession of strength, and it has been discovered by the Berlin District Committee that they were still recruiting at Döberitz for some weeks after the revolution came to an end. These estimates would give the Army a strength at the present date of 290,000 officers and men.

To these must be added as reserves 60,000 *Sicherheitspolizei* and an uncertain number (on 12th March they were estimated at 50,000) of *Zeitfreiwillige*. According to the Army Order of 6th March, the latter were to be suppressed by 31st March. The *Zeitfreiwillige* were, however, very active during the disturbances of 13th-24th March, and we have reports, notably from Düsseldorf and Königsberg that, although not incorporated, they are not entirely suppressed.

In the foregoing estimates of the armed forces of Germany no account has been taken of the *Einwohnerwehren*. Their character was fully dealt with in paragraph 9 of my earlier Report, and more will be said as to the steps taken to dissolve or transform them in a later paragraph. No account is taken of them in the above estimate because they are not incorporated, nor can they, like the *Zeitfreiwillige*, be regarded at present as a mobilizable reserve. Moreover their quality varies so much as to make them, though not negligible, quite incalculable as a force of any military value. Many of them are men of 40 years of age or more, a large proportion only engage to serve within their commune and, generally speaking, our District Committees have not been impressed by their appearance from a military point of view. Numbers are therefore really no clue, and of them it may be said, what I wrote in my earlier Report of the police, that in view of the Effectives Sub-Commission, numbers are less important than armament and organization. Their military efficiency varies as to their political complexion; in Königsberg and East

Prussia they tend to be an instrument of the reactionary party, in the Ruhr of the Communist party, while in Bavaria they are a bourgeois organization equally opposed to both of these. It is quite conceivable that there are 500,000 of them with rifles, but it would be absurd to treat this as a 'rifle strength' of 500,000, militarily speaking, and the statements that have appeared in the English and French press on this point are ridiculous.

*The Transitional Army.*—As has been remarked above, the German Government on 2nd April, after repeated demands for information as to the instructions issued by the *Reichswehrministerium*, in conformity with the resolution of the Supreme Council, for the reduction of the German Army, furnished us with a copy of an Army Order,<sup>9</sup> dated 6th March, purporting to show the scheme in operation for the formation of the transitional army of 200,000 effectives. The German Government had been informed by General Nollet that this transitional army must conform in its organization to the principles laid down in Article 163 of the Treaty. This it does not do. The divergences are many and important and throw considerable light on the later Note of 20th April,<sup>10</sup> addressed direct by the German Government to the Supreme Council and not to the Commission, and a copy of which was only furnished to us by the Berlin authorities when it was too late to submit a critical analysis of it to the Conference at San Remo.

(a.) *Staffs.*—The first thing to be noticed is that the number of staffs is greatly in excess of that provided for by the Treaty. The Treaty provides for the army of 100,000 effectives—

Army Corps Staffs . . . . .	2
Staffs of Infantry Divisions . . . . .	7
Staffs of Divisional Infantry . . . . .	7
Staffs of Divisional Artillery . . . . .	7
Staffs of Cavalry Divisions . . . . .	3
Total . . . . .	<u>26</u>

The staffs of the transitional army of 200,000, if it conformed to the organization laid down by the Treaty, should amount to twice the prescribed number, namely, 52. In fact they amount to 76. The mere excess of numbers is, of course, unimportant, and the total number of effectives, including the neutral zone, corresponds very closely (199,284) to the maximum of 200,000 prescribed by Article 163 as provisionally modified by the Supreme Council. What is important is the policy behind it. A closer scrutiny will suggest a clue. The following table shows the scheme of the 76 staffs as compared with the scheme of the Treaty:—

<sup>9</sup> *Note in original:* 'This Army Order was accompanied by a number of annexes, charts and tables, showing the number of staffs and the composition and distribution of *Reichswehr* brigades. Some of these are in German manuscript and are almost illegible, while in other cases only one copy has been supplied. Copies will be forwarded later.'

<sup>10</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 110.



I.—German Scheme.				[II.—Treaty Scheme].	
Army Corps Staffs	.	.	2	$2 \times 2 =$	4
Staffs of Infantry Divisions	.	.	8	$7 \times 2 =$	14
Staffs of Divisional Infantry	.	.	20	$7 \times 2 =$	14
Staffs of Divisional Artillery	.	.	20	$7 \times 2 =$	14
Staffs of Cavalry Divisions	.	.	3	$3 \times 2 =$	6
Staffs of Cavalry Brigades	.	.	9	Not allowed.	
<i>Reichswehr</i> Brigade Staffs	.	.	14	Not allowed.	
Total	.	.	<u>76</u>		<u>52</u>

To understand the German scheme, it must be remembered that many months ago a territorial command organization was created on paper, ostensibly designed to conform with the ultimate execution of the Treaty. This organization provided for the division of the whole of Germany into two *Reichsgruppen Kommandos* (corresponding to the two army corps prescribed by the Treaty) and seven *Wehrkreis Kommandos*, which were advertised as the territorial basis of the seven infantry divisions prescribed by the Treaty.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, by a progressive scheme of reduction, the 43 brigades of the *Reichswehr* were being reduced to 20, each *Wehrkreis* administering two or more of these brigades. If the Treaty were conformed with, these brigades would ultimately have to be reduced to seven, or rather they would be transformed into seven divisions, as neither the brigade nor brigade staffs are recognized by the Treaty.<sup>12</sup> The fourteen *Reichswehr* brigade staffs in the German scheme are therefore unauthorized.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, the staffs for the seven infantry divisions prescribed by the Treaty are found existing side by side with these brigade staffs in the German scheme, and this provokes the question: why has it been thought necessary to conform with the Treaty in one respect while departing from it in another? The question is the more pertinent as the German authorities have not, as they might have done, created the full number of divisional staffs<sup>14</sup> (and also army corps staffs) to which they were entitled while they have created brigade staffs to which they are not entitled at all. The answer is, I think, that the conformity to the Treaty is

<sup>11</sup> *Note in original*: 'The 3 cavalry divisions were not territorially organized.'

<sup>12</sup> *Note in original*: 'The Treaty provides for 7 "infantry divisions," consisting each of 9 battalions (3 regiments) of infantry and 9 batteries (1 regiment of three groups) of artillery. It will be remembered that during the war an infantry division was similarly limited to 9 battalions (3 regiments) of infantry.'

<sup>13</sup> *Note in original*: 'If there are 20 *Reichswehr* brigades in existence, a critic of the scheme would naturally expect to find that in creating these unauthorized brigades [*sic*] the German authorities would create not 14, but 20. The explanation is that five of the *Wehrkreis* commands are each run by the staff of a brigade which is to be sought for under the *Wehrkreis* command staff. This accounts for 19; the remaining brigade staff is ear-marked for a divisional staff at Breslau.'

<sup>14</sup> *Note in original*: 'For the Peace Army they are entitled to 2 Army Corps Staffs, 7 Infantry Divisional Staffs, 3 Cavalry Divisional Staffs, and therefore *double these* numbers for the transitional army, whereas, they have in fact, as is shown in the preceding table, contented themselves already with 2 (instead of 4) Army Corps Staffs, 8 (instead of 14) Infantry Divisional Staffs, and 3 (instead of 6) Cavalry Divisional Staffs.'

merely assumed, and is intended to mask the departure from the Treaty which is real. Everything points to that departure being a move in the direction of preserving the organization of the old conscript army. The 20 *Reichswehr* brigade staffs (five of them masked as *Wehrkreiscommand* staffs) are the screen for the retention of the Army Corps Staffs of the old army. This is, it is true, an hypothesis, but it is the only hypothesis which fits the facts, and it will receive further illustration in the course of this Report. It must be remembered that these 20 'brigades' correspond territorially almost exactly to the 20 army corps of the old army which would have remained to Germany if conscription had not been abolished by the Treaty.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, it seems clear that there is no intention of transforming these 20 'brigades' into the 7 infantry divisions prescribed by the Treaty—the provision in the German scheme for 20 staffs for divisional infantry is suggestive on that point. The 20 *Reichswehr* brigades are the germ of 20 divisions; the 20 *Reichswehr* brigade staffs are the germ of divisional staffs, which by their territorial distribution may in turn expand into Army Corps Staffs.

(b.) *Number of units of each arm.*—There are marked divergences from the Treaty in the number and mutual proportion of units of each arm. The number of cavalry units is less than that prescribed by the treaty in order, apparently, to make room in the case of infantry for more. The following table will make this clear:—

I.—German Scheme.				II.—Treaty Scheme.	
<i>Cavalry</i> —					
Regiments	.	.	18	$18 \times 2 =$	36
Squadrons	.	.	89	$72 \times 2 =$	144
<i>Infantry</i> —					
Regiments	.	.	49	$21 \times 2 =$	42
Battalions	.	.	138	$63 \times 2 =$	126
<i>Artillery</i> —					
Regiments	.	.	20	$7 \times 2 =$	14
Batteries	.	.	147	$63 \times 2 = 126 + 9 \times 2$	H.A. = 144
Pioneer Battalions.	.	.	21	$7 \times 2 =$	14
Signal Detachments	.	.	20	$7 \times 2 =$	14

These divergences enable one to carry a step further the hypothesis formulated in the proceeding [*sic*] paragraph. The number (20) of artillery regiments and pioneer battalions support[s] the theory that what is contemplated is an army of 20 divisions. The increase in proportion of infantry is also remarkable. With the 20 battalions which the German Government claimed to retain permanently in the neutral zone, the new army would be able to muster 158 infantry battalions. This increase may be due to a desire to give the German Army the character less of a force for the maintenance of internal order, as prescribed in the Treaty, than of a field army—a theory which

<sup>15</sup> *Note in original:* 'The Peace Treaty has deprived Germany of territories which were formerly covered by 5 [*sic*] (Nos. V, XV, XVI, XXI) of the 25 corps of the old army.'

receives a good deal of support from the nature of the German demands put forward as to armament<sup>16</sup> but it is also capable of another explanation—namely, that the *Reichswehrmin[is]terium* aims at bringing the number of battalions up to as close a correspondence as possible with the total of regiments in the old army. This is the French view, and, if correct, it strengthens considerably my hypothesis of a scheme to preserve the organization and traditions of the old army. It would then be easy to give these battalions the same numbers as the regiments of the old army. With an army of 100,000 this preservation of identity would, of course, be impossible; it would be necessary to descend to numbering companies. At present I advance this as no more than a theory which, except that it receives countenance from the rest of the scheme, will require independent verification. The President of the Berlin District Committee has, however, reported that he believes that the battalions of the *Reichswehr* are, as a fact, being given the numbers of the regiments of the old army, and he is pursuing this train of investigation. There is a certain amount of evidence from other districts which support this theory, but it is nothing more than a theory at present.

(c.) *Armament*.—The German scheme provides for an armament (and corresponding formations) which is prohibited by the Treaty, namely, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft batteries and aeroplanes. These formations are immediately under the command of the *Wehrkreis* and are not incorporated in the brigades. There are four groups, *i.e.*, 12 batteries (in each group two howitzer batteries and one gun battery) of heavy artillery. There are also 15 anti-aircraft batteries. Furthermore, the scheme provides for 20 *Minenwerfer* batteries containing heavy trench mortars (which are prohibited by the Treaty), in addition to the normal establishments of one infantry trench mortar company for each infantry regiment. None of these formations can, by any conceivable theory, be adjusted to conformity with the Treaty. Moreover, in addition to the signalling detachment belonging to each of the 20 *Reichswehr* 'brigades' (the Treaty allows one such detachment to each division), each of the 49 regiments has a signalling detachment of its own. The total number—79 signalling detachments—is remarkable, for it would give the new army the complete signalling establishment of 20 divisions,<sup>17</sup> and it provides yet another link in the chain of evidence that what is contemplated in [?] is an army of 20 divisions. The 20 'brigades' have also each their divisional troops. With the higher commands disposing of the groups of heavy artillery, which they can allot to each division (the so-called 'brigade') according to requirements, we have all the elements of a field army.<sup>18</sup> The comparative obscurity in this scheme of the corps organization<sup>19</sup> does not matter: the

<sup>16</sup> *Note in original*: 'See, for example, paragraph 12 of my earlier Report.'

<sup>17</sup> *Note in original*: 'On the basis of one detachment to each infantry and each artillery regiment, as in the old army.'

<sup>18</sup> *Note in original*: 'The provision for an establishment of Railway "Companies" (four), which are not allowed by the Treaty, points to the same conclusion.'

<sup>19</sup> *Note in original*: 'As has been already observed, the *Reichswehrministerium* in its Army Order of 6th March has not availed itself of the permission to double the Treaty maximum of Corps Staffs in the case of the transitional army.'

German Higher Command discarded the corps as a tactical unit during the war. It was the division which was the unit of tactical manoeuvre.

*The German Note to the Supreme Council.*—A study of the German Note of April, proposing a permanent peace strength of 200,000 effectives, affords remarkable confirmation of the conclusions I have deduced from the Army Order of 6th March. These two documents—the Note and the Order—must be read together. The arguments advanced by the German Government in support of their claim will be dealt with later; for the moment it will suffice to examine the claim itself. It will be observed that the German Government ask authority for the constitution of an army of 12 divisions and 5 brigades of infantry. These brigades are admittedly ‘constituted as divisions.’<sup>20</sup> These 17 divisions represent an even closer approximation to the territorial distribution of the old army, account being taken of the territorial and other changes necessitated by the Treaty, than do the 20 ‘brigades’ of the Army Order of 6th March. It has been seen that the cessions of territory under the Treaty have reduced the old army corps districts to 20. But the occupation of the Rhineland and the neutralization of the adjacent ‘zone’ has displaced three other army corps<sup>21</sup> and confined the German army for the time being to 17 Army Corps Districts.

The German Note of 24th [20th] April, therefore, tends to confirm the suspicion provoked by a study of the German Army Order of 6th March—namely, that it masks a design to preserve the organization of the old Army. The demands made as to armaments are substantially the same as the armament actually assumed in the Army Order. When it is borne in mind that, as was pointed out in my earlier Report, the whole of the old army corps staffs have been retained under the guise of *Abwickelungsämter* (demobilization head offices) and likewise the railway section and the General Staff, that an enormous number of officers are still retained on the active list, under one category or another,<sup>22</sup> that the military Cadet Schools have been re-opened on almost exactly the same terms as before,<sup>23</sup> and that no steps have been taken to abolish the legal obligation to compulsory service, the suspicions excited by the two German documents of 6th March and 24th [20th] April approximate very closely to a conviction in the mind of any student of the situation. It is, I think, obvious that all the separate proposals of the German Government are parts of an ingenious whole representing the scheme of some extremely astute intelligence, and the only way to defeat it is to refuse the demand for a larger army and to confine the *Reichswehr* rigidly to the table of effectives laid down by the Treaty. The true solution of the problem of dealing with the internal disorders so skilfully exploited by the German Government in their Note lies not in an increase in the army, which played so large and sinister a part in fomenting them, but in an increase of the police—in other

<sup>20</sup> *Note in original:* ‘They differ from the 12 divisions only in the fact [that] they have one infantry regiment and one artillery group less.’

<sup>21</sup> *Note in original:* ‘The VIII Corps was formerly stationed in the occupied zone, the XIV and XVIII in the neutral zone.’

<sup>22</sup> *Note in original:* ‘See, for example, pages 7, 8 and 21 of the earlier Report.’

<sup>23</sup> *Note in original:* ‘See below.’

words, by placing the maintenance of civil order in the hands of civil forces divested of all military traditions and removed from the infection of all militarist ambitions.

*The arguments of the German Note.*—Much that is presented in the way of argument in the German Note to the Supreme Council is already familiar to the Commission of Control, as the same arguments in support of particular propositions have been addressed to them as are now addressed to a higher authority in support of the general proposition. For example, the prominent contention that police are useless, owing to their being tied to a particular locality, for dealing with concerted disorder on a wide terrain, which is now advanced to justify a larger army, has previously been addressed to this Commission to support the claims of the *Sicherheitspolizei*. The contention will not stand examination. The police forces of Prussia and the smaller States were, so far as regards the Land *gendarmérie*, never tied to a particular locality; they were always available for concentration in any part of the State and they are so still. The arguments advanced by the German Government for the employment of a large military force to deal with internal disorders are only tenable on the assumption that Germany is, and will remain, in a chronic state of civil war. The claim to retain 200,000 men with the colours in order to provide against the risks of unemployment attendant on demobilization is obviously an after thought, and it is obvious that if estimates can be voted for the maintenance of the extra 100,000 effectives they can equally be voted to provide them, when demobilized, with unemployment pay, as has been done in the case of the men previously demobilized. The contention that the army would be powerless for offensive purposes in the absence of a reserve would have more weight if the German Government had taken steps to suppress the *Sicherheitspolizei*, and to abolish the legal obligations of her vast numbers of trained men to come up for 'Control' and training when called upon.

The German Note contains one paragraph which demands the closest scrutiny, and the significance of which may not be apparent to anyone who is not acquainted with the present situation as regards enlistments in the *Reichswehr*. The third section of that Note, in supporting the claim to postpone the formation of an army of 100,000 men (*i.e.* the army of the Treaty) to 'an ulterior date,' says—

'The unity and the solidity of the army suffer in the highest degree by the uncertainty in which its members are on the subject of the future. *To select from now the members of the army of 100,000 is impossible*, for then one will be no longer able to count on those faced with the certainty of a near discharge.'

But if a selection is not made until some 'ulterior date,' no men will be attested on the 12-year term of enlistment prescribed by the Treaty. The 100,000 who are *ex-hypothesi* to enlist for 12 years under the Treaty will be unidentified; the transitional army instead of being transient, will become permanent, and 100,000 will be selected from it to fulfil a 12-year term only if and when the League of Nations, invoked in the German Note, and the German Government come to terms as to the time and occasion for the reduction

of the German Army. In this way the German Government will be enabled to prolong indefinitely their present practice of enlisting men for a short period (six months) of intensive training. Under this arrangement they will have in two years' time a newly-trained army and reserve of 800,000 men. So far as I know, no one has yet pointed out the danger that lurks in this paragraph of the German Note. In my opinion it is vital.

As regards Annex II. (the *exposé des motifs*) of the German Note, setting forth the alleged necessity of heavy artillery, railway troops and aviation *matériel*, very brief observations, based on our experience of recent civil troubles, will suffice. The German contention that in dealing with the rebellious elements in the population they have to encounter forces armed with guns of heavy calibre and experienced in the construction of field works is untrue. The rebels had at their disposal very little artillery in the Ruhr and in Berlin none at all; in the latter case, no guns of any calibre were employed on either side, and the rebellion was suppressed without them. The appeal to humanitarian sentiment in favour of heavy artillery, on the ground that its moral effect is so decisive as to save 'a great effusion of blood,' is little short of ridiculous to most of us who witnessed the wanton way in which the *Reichswehr* troops fired on crowds of harmless bystanders. As regards the Ruhr, there is, judging by the report<sup>24</sup> of a special mission despatched to that district by this Commission, very good reason to suppose that the disturbed situation there was exploited by the German Government to make a case for a larger army, and that no serious attempt was made to suppress the disturbances with forces which were both available and adequate. But the spectacular retreat of the *Reichswehr* troops, in response to orders, with the design of which they were not acquainted, and the necessity of which, militarily speaking, did not appear to exist, itself produced a demoralization which could be plausibly cited as a proof of military weakness.

*The Neutral Zone.*—It does not appear necessary to deal in any detail with the events during the month of March in the neutral zone, which have already been the subject of reports from other quarters, except in so far as they directly affect the work of control. The first request to be allowed to reinforce the troops in the neutral zone was addressed to this Commission on 15th March, when a request from the General Officer Commanding of *Wehrkreis* VI. to be allowed to send six battalions, two squadrons and three batteries was submitted to us. This request was referred to Paris.<sup>25</sup> On 27th March four battalions and four batteries of the 3rd Marine Brigade entered the neutral zone without our authorization. This was, however, little more than a technical violation of the Treaty, as three *Reichswehr* battalions had taken refuge in occupied territory. On 31st March, however, the strength of the troops in the neutral zone was increased to 23 battalions (an excess of three battalions), and 14 batteries. The Commission immediately addressed a Note to the German Government demanding the withdrawal of these surplus forces, but was met with an evasive reply. During the next few days a situation of considerable tension between the German Government and this Com-

<sup>24</sup> *Note in original:* 'A copy of this Report (dated Berlin, 11th April) has already been sent to the War Office.' Not traced in Foreign Office archives.      <sup>25</sup> Cf. Volume IX, No. 121.

mission developed, and frequent conversations took place. General Bingham was at this time on leave, and the writer of this report was, therefore, called upon to officiate as the acting head of the British delegation, and was responsible for the decisions jointly arrived at with General Barthélemy, who was acting as head of the French delegation in the absence of General Nollet in Paris. An interview took place on 2nd April with Herr von Haniel of the German Foreign Office, who stated that the German Government claimed complete liberty of action and accepted full responsibility. It was evident that an attempt was being made to ignore the Commission. On 3rd April we learnt that the number of battalions had been increased to 25 and the batteries to 19. On 5th April the *Reichswehrministerium* admitted the presence of no less than 31 battalions, 13 squadrons and 23 batteries in the neutral zone. By 8th April the number of battalions had risen to 36, the batteries to 29.<sup>26</sup> The Germans have attempted to excuse these departures by contending that the total effectives of these troops are not appreciably in excess of what the authorized 20 batta[l]ions would have been if they were up to strength, inasmuch as all the battalions were considerably below strength, and they have addressed to us a request that the authorized establishment shall be determined not by units but by effectives. They put the average strength of their battalions at 300 rifles. Our own information, however, goes to show that this strength is 500. The Commission have, as a matter of principle, refused to allow this departure. It is obvious that while we can control by inspection the number of units maintained it is practically impossible to check the number of effectives. The mere fact that the Germans could increase their batteries to fifteen times the number authorized, and yet claim to have made no substantial increase in effectives, shows the danger of such a concession.

On 8th April the German Government addressed a request to the Commission to be allowed to retain these troops on the neutral zone until 10th July, *i.e.*, they demanded an extension of the period for their final evacuation by three months. The Commission, however, were aware, from reports by our District Committees, that active recruiting for the force of special police to replace the troops in the neutral zone had been going on all over Germany for the past 8 weeks, and they were of the opinion that the German authorities ought therefore to be in a position to commence to effect the substitution of these police for the forces in occupation at once. They decided therefore to concede a much shorter extension of time than that asked for. The whole matter was, however, subsequently taken out of the hands of the Commission by its being referred to the Inter-Allied Council.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Note in original: 'The authorized number was 20 battalions and 2 batteries. On 17th April we were informed by the German Government that the numbers were 38 battalions and 30 batteries. Of these they desired to retain 29 and 12 respectively.'

<sup>27</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 2, minute 3, and No. 20, minute 6; also Volume IX, Chap. IV, *passim*. Note in original: 'The latest return of the forces in the neutral zone is to be found in a report by the Münster District Committee forwarding a return by the General Officer Commanding of *Wehrkreis VI.*, dated 28th April. According to the latter, there were, on 28th April, 25 battalions, 7 squadrons, and all batteries, representing a ration strength of 14,291. The number of guns is 44 *minenwerfer*, and 12 armoured cars.'

*Einwohnerwehren*.—The German Government, in a Note of 17th April,<sup>28</sup> broke a long silence on the subject of the *Einwohnerwehren*. No official intimation of their intentions had been conveyed either to the Allied Governments or to this Commission since 6th December, when the German Delegation addressed a Note to the Supreme Council claiming that this institution was not in contradiction with the Peace Treaty. On 17th April a reply was received to letters addressed by General Nollet on 8th March and 12th March.<sup>29</sup> In this Note the German Government renewed its protests that the *Einwohnerwehren* were merely a local police force, attempting to explain that the *Reichszentralstelle* was instituted simply to 'keep in touch' with the various organizations. They announced their intention of making an enquiry to ensure that 'the purely local test of public safety will be observed, and that all centralization, all military organization and all training will be avoided,' adding that 'the German Government reserve the right to make known the result of this enquiry in a later communication.' A circular, dated 8th April, and addressed by the Ministry of the Interior to the various States,<sup>30</sup> was attached, in which the States were called upon to carry out the measures demanded by the Commission. In this circular the States Government[s] were informed that all the rifles must be given up and 'some other form of armament' devised. The State Authorities were also advised 'to study some method of appealing to the labour classes where this has not yet been done.'

The Sub-Commission on Effectives has taken note of this document and the District Committees have been instructed to control the work of dissolution, or rather disestablishment, of the *Einwohnerwehren* in their districts by controlling the surrender of arms and reporting whether training has been abandoned. It is not proposed to interfere with the possession of pistols, hand-grenades and side-arms—weapons which are not within the category of stocks of arms limited by the Treaty.

It is not necessary to refute here the protests made by the German Government as to the civic and pacific character of the *Einwohnerwehren* and their independence of all central and military control, as this aspect of the subject was fully dealt with in my last report. A few observations may, however, be added as to the state of affairs revealed by the publication in the German papers of the demand made by General Nollett [sic] in his letter of 12th March. A lively agitation has arisen on the subject, generally taking the form of protests that the *bourgeoisie* would be defenceless against the wilder elements among the working classes; at the same time appeals have been made to the workers to join the new *Ortswehren* (local defence forces), as the *Einwohnerwehren* are called. Some of this agitation is undoubtedly one-sided and artificial; in Bavaria, in particular, the protests of the Prime Minister, Kahr, have been the subject of a good deal of criticism, and a leading Munich newspaper (the *Münchener Post*, of 12th April) declares that the real danger to the security of the Empire and the State lies, not in the dissolution of the *Ein-*

<sup>28</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 105.

<sup>29</sup> For General Nollet's letter of March 12 see No. 29, n. 9.

<sup>30</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 105.



*wohnerwehren*, but in the intrigues of the reactionary party, and that the latter are making capital out of this measure for their own purposes. In East Prussia all the reports from the Köni[g]sberg District Committee go to show that the *Einwohnerwehren* are merely a docile instrument in the hands of the reactionaries. It certainly does not appear to the Effectives Sub-Commission that their dissolution is likely to be attended with any of the fatal consequences threatened by a section of the German Press. So long as they are allowed to exist as a purely local special constabulary, armed with revolvers and hand-grenades (and it is the policy of this Sub-Commission to permit this), there is nothing to prevent their continuing to fulfil the purpose—namely, the protection of their own lines [*sic*] and property—by which the German Government has attempted to justify their existence.

We have at no time received any particulars from the German Government as to the strength of the *Einwohnerwehren*. It is, however, worthy of remark that a newspaper of moderate opinions (the *Acht Uhr Abend Blatt*, edition of the *National Zeitung*) in its issue of 9th April, states that the 'official figure' is two millions, that they have received one million rifles from the German Government, that Imperial funds amounting to two million marks had already been expended upon them, and that an advance of another 10 millions had been contemplated. The Effectives Sub-Commission cannot vouch for these figures but, as stated in my earlier Report, there can be no doubt that the total strength amounts to several hundred thousand. From information in the possession of General Bingham, it has been ascertained that 430,000 rifles have been issued. It is quite possible that the numbers given in the German press have been exaggerated in order to convey an impression that this institution has the national sentiment of the whole country behind it. As stated in an earlier paragraph of this Report, I am inclined to put the numbers at about 500,000.

*Police.*—The Sub-Commission has recommended that the police forces of Germany be allowed an increased strength of 33 per cent. over and above the ratio to population laid down in Article 162 of the Treaty. Since this recommendation was made to the Inter-Allied Council, a letter, dated 10th April, has been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarding, for the first time, a reply to our *questionnaire* No. IV., which was addressed to the German Government nearly six months ago. In this letter the German Government contented itself with dealing with the municipal police and gendarmerie, claiming for them an increase of strength, independently of the existence of the *Sicherheitspolizei*, an argument for the preservation of which had already been addressed to us in a memorandum summarized in my earlier report. The letter, however, furnished us for the first time with particulars of the strength of the *Sicherheitspolizei*, namely, 46,768, a figure which does not include the special police contingents to be furnished by Baden and Hesse to the neutral zone, to replace the military forces, nor does it include some of the smaller States whose *Sicherheitspolizei* are not yet formed.

In this letter the German Government give the figures for the municipal police throughout Germany as 75,000 in 1913, 91,000 in January, 1920, and

140,000<sup>31</sup> as the current police estimates. In other words, the current estimates provide for an increase of over 80 per cent. over the figures for 1913, although the population of Germany has decreased owing to the cession of territory by nearly 10 per cent. The increase is, therefore, vastly in excess of the 33 per cent. recommended by the Effectives Sub-Commission, but the Sub-Commission would not be indisposed to concede a greater margin than that previously recommended by them, provided it is clearly understood that the *Sicherheitspolizei* be transformed into a genuine gendarmerie, or force armed and organized after the pattern of the Royal Irish Constabulary, with the reservation that such a force must, like the municipal police, be under local control. It is quite certain that the *Sicherheitspolizei* cannot be tolerated in their present character as masked infantry divisions. This was a matter fully dealt with in my earlier Report; since it was written, further proofs, if such were necessary, have accumulated as to the real character and design of this force. There is a very strong reason to believe that the late Minister for Imperial Defence, Herr Noske, had formed the design, as regards the neutral zone, of discharging the effectives of the regiments authorized to occupy the neutral zone, if and when their withdrawal was insisted on by the Allied Governments, and then incorporating them *en bloc* in the special police which were to take the place of the regiments in question. Recruiting for the *Sicherheitspolizei* (whose numbers are now given by the German Government as 46,768) is still actively proceeding, and there is no indication of any intention on the part of the German Government to comply with the demands of the Commission in this respect.

*Schools.*—The position in regard to schools is very unsatisfactory. At the moment of writing, eight out of twelve non-commissioned officers' schools and six out of eleven non-commissioned officers' preparatory schools have been reported on by the District Committees as not yet closed. Presumably [*sic*] it is the intention of the German Government, in accordance with their earlier announcement, to 'transform' some or all of these schools into civilian educational establishments. This transformation will require to be very closely watched by the District Committees. In the case of the cadet schools, it is already obvious that the German Government, in defiance of the conditions of 'transformation' laid down in General Nollet's Note of 24th February, intend to reopen them under circumstances which will make it extremely easy to effect at a later date the restoration of their earlier character as military schools. This conclusion is based on an official statement made by the *Kultusministerium* in Berlin to the President of the Berlin District Committee, that all the cadet schools in Prussia would be re-opened on 1st May with the return of the whole of the former pupils, grouped as before: the Commandant of the Cadet Corps will continue in office for at least another five months and will be represented on the staff of each school. A report from the President of the

<sup>31</sup> *Note in original:* 'This figure includes the *Sicherheitspolizei*, but does not include the land gendarmerie. The latter are given as 12,091 in 1913 and as 16,309 on the estimates for this year. If we deduct the *Sicherheitspolizei* (47,000) the current municipal police estimates would represent 93,000, an increase of about 25 per cent.'

Munich District Committee states that the same policy is being pursued in Bavaria: in this case the same teaching personnel is retained. It may be remembered in this connection that on the occasion of the ceremonial closing of the chief cadet school at Gross-Lichterfeld[e] on 9th March, General Ludendorff and General Hoffman[n]<sup>32</sup> suggested in their speeches that the suppression of the institution was only temporary. The Sub-Commission propose to address a protest to the German Government calling upon them to conform to the conditions laid down by General Nollet which were described in paragraph 14 of my earlier Report.

In the Army Order of 6th March, which has been analyzed above, it is observed that provision is made for six schools in addition to 14 instructional camps. The Article 176 of the Treaty limits the number of military schools in Germany to 'one per arm' for the recruitment of officers, and the Commission informed the German Government, as long ago as 24th February, that this must be interpreted to confine them to four schools, *i.e.*, one each for artillery, infantry, cavalry and engineers. They were at the same time informed that artificer, armourer and signal officers might be instructed in one of the four special schools by special instructors. The *Reichsministerium*, however, adhere to their claim to six schools, and in a Note, dated 22nd April, have demurred to the arrangement authorized by the Commission. They contend that signal troops 'constitute a separate arm in Germany, and therefore require a separate school.' This Note has not yet been considered by the Commission.

*Demobilization and 'Demilitarization' of Personnel.*—It was pointed out in my earlier Report that the German Government had claimed to retain the whole of their demobilization (*Abwicklung*) organization for another two years, on the ground that its personnel was, or would be, completely 'demilitarized' (*entmilitarisiert*). Having regard to the fact that every army corps headquarters and every regimental depôt of the old army is represented in this organization, and that a large number of officers and a considerable number of men were still on the strength of it, the claim was one which required very careful scrutiny, as it might mask an intention to preserve the cadres and organization of the old army.<sup>33</sup> Since that report was written the German Government have issued certain 'provisions',<sup>34</sup> dated 22nd March, for the 'demilitarization' of this personnel. The effect of these provisions is disputable, and, as is pointed out in the analysis (Appendix 'A') attached to this report, no merely administrative changes of this kind executed by mere administrative circular can, in the absence of the necessary statutory changes in the laws imposing the obligation of universal service, be deemed satisfactory or conclusive. Until those changes, for which we have called, are made, it will be as easy by an administrative circular to restore the military character of this personnel as it was to take it away. It would appear, however, from a

<sup>32</sup> General Ludendorff was formerly First Quartermaster-General of the German Army and General Hoffmann formerly Commander-in-Chief on the Eastern front.

<sup>33</sup> Note in original: 'The subject was fully dealt with on pages 7-8 and 21-23 of the earlier Report.' See No. 29, paragraphs 2 and 3.

<sup>34</sup> Note in original: 'Bestimmungen über die Entmilitarisierung des Abwicklungswesen (Heeresverordnungsblatt Nr 24).'

circular of the *Heeresabwicklungshauptamt*, dated 9th February, that for the time being the demobilization centres are being officially instructed that their connection with the *Reichswehr* is to be severed. The circular contains a suggestive paragraph on this point:—

‘No demobilization depôt is obliged to take members of the *Reichswehr*, but those who leave the *Reichswehr* and volunteer to engage for the clerical service may be accepted. *The demobilization depôts ought not to be considered by the Reichswehr as a species of Ersatz Corps (Ersatztruppenteil) for the Reichswehr.* They have only to occupy themselves with the dissolution of the old army and have nothing to do with the *Reichswehr*.’

The views of the Effectives Sub-Commission itself could not be more succinctly expressed, and if this sentiment expresses the real policy of the German Government and finds concrete expression in the legislative changes which we have demanded from them, the Commission may reconsider its demand addressed to the German Government on 2nd March for the ‘complete dissolution’ of these demobilization centres.<sup>35</sup> The problem is a difficult one to solve, as there is considerable reason to believe that the German Government are pursuing a deliberate policy of transferring whole branches of army administration to civil departments merely in order to establish an outward conformity with the Treaty and to ‘fake’ the Army Estimates and the table of effectives accordingly.<sup>36</sup>

*Conclusion.*—It has, I think, been established in this Report that the Commission are now face to face with a highly ingenious and elaborate plan to defeat the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The most effective way to counter this design is to insist on the reduction of the army to the maximum of 100,000 effectives laid down in the Treaty; once that is done, the German design, secreted in their scheme for an army of 200,000, will fall to pieces. The legal obligation to universal service should be repealed. The 12-year term of engagement should be immediately put into operation. The process of disarmament should be accelerated as much as possible, particularly as regards the surrender of those rifles and heavy guns which the German Government have claimed<sup>37</sup> to retain, ostensibly for the

<sup>35</sup> *Note in original:* ‘I have already expressed, in my earlier Report, some dissent from the drastic policy, advocated by the French members, of the total suppression at so early a date of this organization. It is not possible at present to say definitely whether the German claim to continue it is a *bona fide* one. There are some passages in the circular referred to above which suggest that its connection with the *Reichswehr* is by no means terminated, and that it is intended to continue it for the purpose of supplementing the administrative organization of the army, e.g., “For the business of administration of the army the heads of the Commissariat Demobilization branches (*Abwickelungs Intendanturen*) are the only competent authority.” This is entirely in accordance with the policy exposed in my earlier Report of masking army services as civil services on the Estimates.’

<sup>36</sup> *Note in original:* ‘Illustrations of this policy were given in paragraph 3 of my earlier Report.’

<sup>37</sup> *Note in original:* ‘See paragraph 12 of the earlier Report. The *Reichswehrministerium* have lately, in a Note dated 16th April, and addressed to the Commission, renewed their claim to retain 2,000 heavy guns and 250,000 rifles.’

armament of their system of fortified works, actually for the maintenance of a field army. If these results are definitely achieved before the Commission of Control is recalled, the danger of a return to the old conscript system becomes so remote as to be relatively improbable. To revoke a decree 'demobilizing' the old army and to recall the men to the colours would be easy—it could be done in 24 hours, for what one decree has done another decree may undo. But to reintroduce into the German Parliament, if they have once been repealed, the whole code of statutes imposing the obligation to compulsory service and to pass them into law again would be difficult; it would excite prolonged Parliamentary opposition in Germany and afford a timely warning to the whole world of the design behind it. For the same reason Army Estimates, once reduced to the figures of 100,000 effectives, would be difficult to increase, and the German taxpayer, once accustomed to a modest expenditure on the army, would be slow to accept an extravagant one. In these respects the next two years may well determine the issues of peace and war for a whole generation.

J. H. MORGAN, *Brigadier-General*,

*Deputy Adjutant-General, Inter-Allied Commission of Control*

P.S.—Since the above report was written, the following developments have been reported to me from Berlin as having taken place during the period I have been on leave:—

- (1) A letter has been received by General Nollet, the President of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, from General von Cramon<sup>38</sup> in which the latter explains that the reduction of the Army, owing to interior troubles, has not been accomplished within the time stipulated (10th April), but that the result will be attained, at the latest by 14th May.
- (2) The Commission has decided to refuse the German claim to establish a signalling school, and a letter was addressed by General Nollet to the German authorities on 7th May to this effect.<sup>39</sup>

J. H. M.

LONDON,

*13th May, 1920.*

<sup>38</sup> President of the German Army Peace Commission.

<sup>39</sup> An 'Addendum' dated 'London, 17th May, 1920' is omitted, since, with the exception of the last three paragraphs it is identical with the section printed under the heading 'Article 173' in No. 110 below.

No. 73

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Barclay<sup>1</sup> (Stockholm)*

*No. 71 Telegraphic [198176/40276/39]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 18, 1920, 8 p.m.*

Naval Control Berlin report that on April 24th German S.S. 'Wittelsbach' left Kiel for Sweden carrying 2000 quintals munitions and large quantity of arms.

Please make enquiries and report by telegraph.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Stockholm.

No. 74

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 25)*

*No. 610 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, *May 22, 1920*

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning<sup>1</sup> under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:

(1) The German Delegation's note No. 167 of April 20th<sup>2</sup> had again raised the question of the ownership of destroyed war material which had been settled by the resolution of the Ambassadors' Conference of February 10th<sup>3</sup> (C.A.10.IV). The German Note contested the interpretation of the term 'surrendered' (livrés). I therefore suggested that the matter should be referred to M. Fromageot the French legal adviser, whose opinion I would accept in the absence of the British legal adviser. Both my Italian and Japanese colleagues stated their conviction that the sense of 'surrendered' was absolute, and the President referred to the text of the recommendation adopted by the resolution of February 10 which clearly stated that the material shall be disposed of under the superintendence of the Reparations Commission and the proceeds placed to the credit of the German Reparation account. Marshal Foch urged that, with a view to hastening German disarmament, now already far behind scheduled time, the Conference should not play into the hands of the Germans by entertaining protests of this nature. I therefore proposed that the German contention should be rejected unless M. Fromageot gave an opinion in a contrary sense within twenty-four hours. To this Marshal Foch readily agreed.

Marshal Foch also raised the question of the sale of war material destroyed by the German Government before the entry into force of the Treaty. I pointed out that we can only claim refunds in the case of material destroyed

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was evidently drafted on May 21.

<sup>2</sup> An English translation of this note is printed in Cmd. 1325 of 1921: No. 109, enclosure 2.

<sup>3</sup> No. 8.

after the resolution of the Supreme Council of August last<sup>4</sup> had been communicated to the German Government on the 22nd of that month. As this was a more difficult point, it was decided to refer it to M. Fromageot for consideration. . . .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Volume I, No. 40, minute 4.

<sup>5</sup> The remainder of this telegram reported discussion on other matters.

## No. 75

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 25)*

*No. 613 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, May 22, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions.

. . .<sup>1</sup> (8) M. Fromageot stated his opinion with regard to the question of the ownership of destroyed material, which was considered at the last meeting. (See my telegram No. 610, paragraph 1).<sup>2</sup> He showed that the German contention was unjustified, and the Conference accordingly decided to reply in this sense to the German note.<sup>3</sup>

M. Fromageot also explained the situation with regard to the sale of War material destroyed by the German Government before the entry into force of the German Treaty. (See my telegram No. 610, paragraph 1). He explained that this involved the whole question as to how far the provisions of the Treaty were retroactive. As this raises a question of principle, which may have far-reaching effects on other provisions of the Treaty, it was decided to ask M. Fromageot for a written opinion on the whole subject,<sup>4</sup> and in the meanwhile to postpone any decision with regard to the particular aspect of the question presented by the sale of war material.

<sup>1</sup> The first seven sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 74.

<sup>3</sup> This was done in a note of May 22, copy of which was transmitted to Lord Curzon by Lord Derby under cover of his despatch No. 1563. The text of M. Millerand's note in English translation is printed in Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 142.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 81 below.

## No. 76

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 28)*

*No. 630 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, May 26, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:

. . .<sup>1</sup> (7) The Interallied Military Committee of Versailles submitted to the

<sup>1</sup> The first six paragraphs reported discussion on other matters.

Conference the question of the disposal of German industrial machinery which although used for the manufacture of munitions of war, is capable of use for general purposes. The Conference agreed on the recommendation of the Military Committee that such machinery should be left to the disposal of the German Government, and that the Military Commission of Control should be entrusted with the duty of discriminating between machinery of general utility and machinery specially intended for the manufacture of munitions of war. The Conference added a stipulation to the effect that the retrocession [*sic*] of such civilian machinery to the German Government was not in any way to prejudice the rights to Reparation of the Allied Governments under Article 238 of the Treaty of Versailles and of Annexe 4 of the Reparation Clauses. It was also stipulated that the present decision was not to be considered as invalidating in any way the resolution of the Conference of Ambassadors on the 10th February respecting the enforcement of Article 168 of the Treaty of Versailles (See my telegram No. 162<sup>2</sup> paragraph 4 (*b*)). This decision was taken in conformity with the views of the Reparations Commission, representatives of which were present at the Conference and stated their views.

(8) The Interallied Military Committee of Versailles proposed to the Conference that in applying Article 169 of the Treaty of Versailles it should be understood that such war material which was not of direct military use, and which might be of use in peace time, need not be destroyed. The material which is thus not destroyed, being the property of the Allied Governments, can be sold under the supervision of the Reparations Commission, and the proceeds placed to the credit of Germany's reparation account. This proposal was agreed to.

The Military Committee of Versailles had suggested that any such material which Allied Governments might buy should be transported to the German frontier at the cost of the German Government. I objected to this stipulation as being vexatious and unjustifiable and was supported in this view by representatives of the Reparations Commission, who pointed out that in dealing with analogous cases of the transport of material to be delivered by Germany under the terms of the Treaty they had decided that the cost of freight incurred by Germany should be placed to the credit of her reparations account, thereby indicating that she was not liable for this charge. The Conference accordingly agreed to reject this part of the proposal put forward by the Versailles Council.

The question was then raised as to the manner in which payment should be made by Allied Governments purchasing any of this material. It was decided eventually to leave this question for the reparations Commission, but at the same time to communicate to them the views of the Conference as expressed in the course of the discussion, which were to the effect that it was undesirable that Allied Governments, instead of paying on the spot for material thus purchased, should merely debit the cost of purchase to their own account on the Reparations account, if the result of such a transaction were that they

<sup>2</sup> No. 8.



thereby acquired a more favourable position in the matter of Reparations than other Allied Governments who had not made such purchases.<sup>3</sup>

Representatives of the Reparations Commission were present also during this discussion and stated their views. . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The text of this decision relating to article 169 see Volume VIII, p. 454.

<sup>4</sup> The remaining paragraph reported discussion on another matter.

#### No. 77

*Mr. Barclay (Stockholm) to Earl Curzon (Received May 28, 7.47 p.m.)*

*No. 163 Telegraphic [200621/40276/39]*

STOCKHOLM, May 28, 1920, 3.57 p.m.

Your telegram No. 71.<sup>1</sup>

Consuls report that vessel referred to has not come to (? any) port in their district.

Acting Consul General at Gottenberg [*sic*] however reports on May 21st steamship 'Samarcand-Nan' was lying off Skaw as mother-ship of flotilla German mine sweepers. He is endeavouring to ascertain date of arrival there and suggests that Vice Consul at Frederickhaven [*sic*] might perhaps have information.

<sup>1</sup> No. 73.

#### No. 78

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 451 [199942/40276/39]*

*Secret. Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 28, 1920

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch, No. 476 of May 22nd, from His Majesty's Minister at the Hague, on the subject of an offer alleged to have been made by a German firm to supply aeroplanes to a Dutch firm.<sup>1</sup>

2. It would appear that the transaction is being carried out at least with the knowledge, if not the assistance, of the German Government.

3. I should be glad if Your Lordship would draw the attention of the Military Control Commission to the matter and report to me as soon as possible.

4. A copy of this correspondence is being forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State),

LANCELOT OLIPHANT<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The offer, according to Sir R. Graham's information, concerned 265 machines 'offered for delivery on the frontier with export licences guaranteed'.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Central European and Persia Department of the Foreign Office.

*Sir R. Graham (The Hague) to Earl Curzon (Received June 2)*

No. 486 [201177/40276/39]

THE HAGUE, May 28, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 436 Confidential of the 4th instant,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that I was requested to proceed to the Netherland Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, and the Secretary-General, in the absence of Monsieur de Karnebeek, handed to me the enclosed Note<sup>2</sup> giving the results of the investigation conducted by the Netherland Authorities into the question of the importation of arms and munitions from Germany into Holland.

Monsieur Patijn, when he gave me this document, said that it was the result of very careful and detailed enquiries which had been made into the matter, and that in most cases it disposed of the French allegations, while in others it showed that they were grossly exaggerated. He then held to me much the same language as had been used by Monsieur de Karnebeek on May 4th,<sup>3</sup> pointing out that the Netherland Government were not a party to the Peace Treaty, that it had never been officially notified to them and that if there was any cause of complaint it lay against Germany and not against the Netherlands.

I replied that it would be useless to enter into a juridical argument on the subject. We must look at it from a practical point of view. It was essential that this traffic should cease, and the action of the Netherland Government if they encouraged it, whether strictly legal or not, would certainly not be friendly. The Allied Governments were determined that the traffic should cease.

I have, &c.,

R. GRAHAM

<sup>1</sup> No. 65.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The note declared that the import, transit, and export of munitions and arms were prohibited by a Royal Decree of June 11, 1919, and that exceptions could be made only with the written authorization of the competent Royal Commissioner. In a certain number of instances permits to import had been granted in favour of the State or of armourers of good repute. Some transit permits had also been given. A number of items on the French lists did not, however, come under the definition of munitions or arms, e.g. unarmed aeroplanes, accumulators, ambulances, &c.; for them no import permit was required. An investigation had been made at the places mentioned in the French lists into the real destination of the goods referred to: 'Elle n'a pas établi qu'il y aurait eu importation clandestine ou sous un faux emballage d'armes ou de munitions. Elle a bien établi par contre que les listes étaient à beaucoup d'égards inexactes et qu'en général la destination des marchandises effectivement importées était absolument régulière.'

<sup>3</sup> See No. 65.

No. 80

*Lord Kilmaarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received May 30, 12 noon)*

*No. 311 Telegraphic [200648/4232/18]*

*Secret*

BERLIN, May 29, 1920, 7 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me today and told me confidentially that German Government had received information as to existence of 2 separate accumulations of hidden arms each alleged to consist of 1,000,000 rifles. Attempts were being made to sell these weapons for transport abroad. In one case present owner was Argentine Consul and Government had information that he had opened negotiations with a bank which had deposited 365,000,000 marks to his credit to be (? handed over) when sale was effected. Government had deputed a confidential agent to enter into negotiations as a private person with vendor ostensibly with a view to purchase. They hoped thus to learn location of weapons and to be able to seize them and prosecute offending parties.

In second case the would-be vendors required written statement from some foreign Government that weapons would be purchased on its behalf. He had thought of trying to engineer this either through Polish or Hungarian Governments but had decided that it was too dangerous. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he told me above in confidence lest rumours should leak out and endeavours [be] made to compromise German Government.

No. 81

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon (Received May 31)*

*No. 1648 [200772/7067/39]*

PARIS, May 29, 1920

The Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

*Name and Date*

*Subject*

Note by Mr. Fromageot 26 May 1920. Execution of the Treaty of Versailles.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 81

*Note sur la question de savoir à partir de quel moment l'Allemagne a été liée par le Traité de Versailles*

1.—La question de savoir à partir de quel moment l'Allemagne a été liée par le Traité de Paix de Versailles ou, en d'autres termes, à quelle date sont nées les obligations contractées par elle dans ce Traité, est d'ordre général.

Pratiquement cette question tire son intérêt du long délai qui s'est écoulé depuis le moment où l'Allemagne a signé, et quelques jours après, ratifié le Traité, jusqu'au jour où ont été accomplies les conditions stipulées pour l'entrée en vigueur. Les Alliés ont malheureusement constaté que, pendant ce délai, l'Allemagne avait cherché, de diverses manières et notamment par des aliénations plus ou moins déguisées, à se mettre hors d'état de livrer, remettre ou transférer aux Alliés tels ou tels biens, droits ou intérêts, tels ou tels objets, marchandises, matériel commercial, industriel ou maritime, dont le Traité lui imposait la livraison, la remise ou le transfert.

Les faits signalés, en ce qui concerne le matériel de guerre, en sont des exemples.

2.—On peut envisager trois dates comme point de départ des obligations de l'Allemagne: la signature du Traité, 28 Juin 1919,—la ratification par l'Allemagne, 9 Juillet 1919,—le procès-verbal constant que trois des Principales Puissances et l'Allemagne ont ratifié, 10 Janvier 1920.

3.—En ce qui concerne la signature, on peut considérer comme communément admis, qu'un Traité signé, mais sujet à ratification n'est parfait que par la ratification. Jusque-là, il y a seulement une promesse d'engagement.

Les obligations de l'Allemagne n'ont donc pas pris naissance le 28 Juin 1919.

A supposer qu'entre la signature et la ratification un État rende impossible ou compromette volontairement l'exécution du Traité signé, il ne commettrait pas à proprement parler une violation du Traité lui-même, mais il se rendrait coupable d'un acte de mauvaise foi engageant d'ailleurs sa responsabilité.

4.—En revanche, une fois la ratification régulièrement donnée, le Traité est parfait et obligatoire.

Si un Traité stipule que les ratifications seront échangées, il est clair que cet échange marque le moment où, de part et d'autre, les ratifications sont données; si le Traité fixe l'entrée en vigueur au moment même de cet échange, le Traité devient simultanément obligatoire et exécutoire.

Le Traité de Versailles ne stipule pas un tel échange, il prévoit que chaque Puissance *déposera* sa ratification *le plus tôt possible*, et il subordonne l'entrée en vigueur du Traité à la condition que trois Principales Puissances et l'Allemagne aient effectué ce dépôt, ce fait devant être constaté par un procès-verbal.

La ratification dûment déposée marque ici le moment où, pour la Puissance qui ratifie, le Traité est parfait, encore que son entrée en vigueur soit suspendue jusqu'à l'accomplissement de la condition stipulée.

Il en résulte que les obligations prises par l'Allemagne dans le Traité de Versailles, et parmi ces obligations celle de livrer le matériel de guerre, ont pris naissance et ont existé juridiquement dès le moment de la ratification, soit le 9 Juillet 1919 ou plus exactement le 11 Juillet, date du dépôt. L'exécution de ces obligations a été seulement suspendue jusqu'à l'accomplissement de la condition prévue. La formalité du procès-verbal constatant le dépôt des ratifications par trois des Principales Puissances et l'Allemagne constituait

une condition suspensive qui, conformément aux principes généraux du droit, a eu un effet rétroactif au jour où l'obligation est née.

5.—Cette solution est conforme à une opinion exprimée par le Comité juridique provisoire de la Commission des Réparations (Note du 26 Janvier 1920)<sup>1</sup> à propos de l'article 260 du Traité de Versailles.

H. FROMAGEOT

26 mai 1920

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## No. 82

*Peace Department of the German Foreign Office to Air Commodore Masterman  
(Berlin)*

*F.M./6335/57492 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, May 29, 1920

To the President I.A.A.C.C., Berlin.

The Peace Department of the Foreign Office has the honour to report, in reply to your note EAM/1606/39<sup>1</sup> addressed to Luftfriko at the Reichswehrministerium with reference to the handing over of aircraft material in the possession of aerial police units, that the rendering of the aircraft material, belonging to the police units, to the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft has been commenced, in order that it may be handed over, through the intermediary of this latter, to the Allied Governments. The material is stored in the air stations which have been in the occupation of the aerial police units.

So far as concerns the further demand in the aforementioned note, for the immediate withdrawal of the personnel of aerial police units from the air stations temporarily occupied by them, the German Government is not able to concur, inasmuch as this latter demand is not based upon any article in the Peace Treaty.

Apart from the fact that the quartering of the personnel of the air police units elsewhere is impracticable owing to the increasing lack of accommodation, the officials in question are urgently required for the guarding of the material which is to be handed over to the Associated Powers.

<sup>1</sup> No. 57.

## No. 83

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 4)*

*No. 1708 [201694/179657/39]*

PARIS, June 1, 1920

My Lord,

His Majesty's Ambassador transmitted to Your Lordship in his despatch No. 1225 of the 21st April a copy of a Note from the German Peace Delegation.

tion<sup>1</sup> requesting that notwithstanding the terms of the Treaty of Versailles the German Government should be allowed to maintain an army of 200,000 men. This request was considered by the Supreme Council at their recent meeting at San Remo, and a reply<sup>2</sup> returned to the German Delegation indicating that the matter would be considered by the Supreme Council when they met the Representative of the German Government at Spa. At that time it was contemplated that this meeting at Spa would take place at the end of May, which would presumably have allowed sufficient time for the German Government to make arrangements to carry out the decision of the Allied Governments before the 10th July which at present is the date on which the German Government are bound to reduce their army to 100,000 men. As however the meeting at Spa has now been postponed till the 21st June, the Allied Military Commission of Versailles consider it desirable that the decision of the Allied Governments shall, if possible, be communicated to the German Government before that date, lest they should be in a position to argue that they have not sufficient time before the 10th July within which to reorganize their forces in conformity with the Allied Governments' decision.

With this object in view they have drawn up for the consideration of the Allied Governments a scheme for reorganizing the German force so as to meet the German demand in so far as it appears justified.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of the report which General Sir C. Sackville West is communicating to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the subject.

Seeing that this scheme involves the reorganization of the police force throughout Germany, including the occupied territories, I am, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 1643 of the 20th ultimo,<sup>3</sup> forwarding a copy of General Sackville West's despatch<sup>4</sup> to the British Representative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission for any observations which he may desire to offer.

In the meanwhile I shall be glad to learn whether you desire that this question should be dealt with in due course by the Conference of Ambassadors.

I have, &c.,  
GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>1</sup> No. 110 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

<sup>2</sup> Volume VIII, appendix 4 to No. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. the covering despatch (not printed) to the report by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 83

*Draft report by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles*

*Translation*

PARIS, May 19, 1920

I

By his letter of 20th April,<sup>5</sup> the Chief of the German Peace Delegation presented to the Peace Conference a request by the German Government to

<sup>5</sup> See n. 1 above.

authorise Germany to keep an army of 200,000 men in place of the 100,000 allowed by the Treaty of Versailles.

This Army would be constituted as follows:—

12 Divisions of Infantry.

5 Infantry Brigades organised as Divisions but only having two regiments of Infantry and two groups of artillery, instead of 3.

3 Divisions of Cavalry.

Moreover, these units will be provided with heavy artillery and aviation material not authorised by the Treaty.

The reasons invoked to justify this request are based on the necessity of maintaining internal order and the guarding of the frontiers.

This demand cannot be entertained.

At the time of the elaboration of the Treaty it was admitted that the German Army could only be recruited by voluntary engagements of long duration, obligatory service being abolished. But the danger that an army of professional soldiers presents by its ability to form cadres for general mobilisation has caused the figure of the German Army to be limited to 100,000 men.

The proof of this danger has been signally given since the signature of the Treaty by Germany.

Germany has not yet legally abolished compulsory service; besides, under the names of *Zeitfreiwilligen* and *Einwohnerwehren*, she has organised reserves of several millions of men, has armed them, has prepared them for eventual employment, and has effectively used them with the *Reichswehr* at the time of the troubles in Berlin and in the Ruhr Valley.

It must be remarked besides that the organisation proposed by the German Government fore-shadows in fact the formation of 17 Divisions of Infantry, that is to say, the number of Divisions exactly equal to that of the former Army Corps Regions remaining within the new German frontiers. There would therefore be maintained a German military organisation of 1914, each Army Corps region being occupied by a Division, which by virtue of this constitution will be comparatively easy to double.

One will be, therefore, liable to see the reforming in a very short time of the equivalent of 17 mobilised Army Corps.

There is no more question to-day than there was in 1919 of authorising Germany to keep an Army of more than 100,000 men, recruited by means of long service engagements, nor is there any more reason to modify the organisation of this Army as fixed by the Treaty.

Nor can the modifications demanded on the subject of the armament of the German Army be admitted either. The arguments put forward by the German Government are worthless if the German population is deprived of the arms which have been imprudently delivered to it.

Finally the argument of the German Government, based on the necessary dispersal of an Army of 100,000 men, cannot be held to be valid if the stations of the military force are determined not in view of serving as cadres for general mobilisation, but solely for the purpose of serving as reserves for the police forces.

These military forces would be very much more easy to group together than police forces increased as it is proposed further on, and would allow the suppression of a large number of small garrisons.

It, therefore, appears that the clauses of the Treaty concerning the military forces which Germany is authorized to maintain should be maintained in their integrity.

## II

But on the other hand Germany should be authorised to have the necessary police forces.

It should be remembered that at the time of the elaboration of the Treaty it appeared necessary for the reasons indicated above, to limit to 100,000 men the effectives of the German Army. On the other hand, this figure has not been justified by the proof that it is sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of order.

To-day it has not yet been proved that an Army of 100,000 men, and the police forces maintained at their 1913 effectives, would suffice to maintain order, since up to now the German Government has had at its disposal to suppress internal troubles forces very much superior.<sup>6</sup>

To place Germany in a position which would not leave any doubt as to the maintenance of order, without increasing the strength of her permanent army, she should be allowed an increase of her police forces.

## III

### *What are the necessary Police Forces?*

In 1913, the German police counted for the whole of the territories of Germany (after reduction has been made for the effectives of the territory definitely lost to her) a total number of 80,000 men.

It was organized by '*Etat particulier*'; a number of the functionaries were under the administrative authority of their particular State, the others under that of the commune which employed them.

After the war this effective passed 92,000 men, as a total for the territories of Germany (after reduction is made for the numbers in the territories definitely lost to her). Moreover, since the war Germany has organised, outside the ancient police belonging to States, known as *Ordnungspolizei*, other police known as *Sicherheitspolizei*. This last is an imperial police centralised, recruited, armed, organised and instructed almost like the *Reichswehr* with which it has a clear affiliation, although it is under the Ministry of the Interior.

The numbers of this *Sicherheitspolizei* are actually 60,000 men. It is important to note that it is only recruited by short term engagements and that

<sup>6</sup> *Note in original*: 'The doubt that exists on this point has moreover been emphasised when one compares the military conditions made with the different ex-enemy countries by the Treaties which concern them, this comparison forcing it to be recognised that Germany finds herself from the point of view of effectives very much less favourably placed than other ex-enemy countries.'



its cadres are very carefully picked, which permits it to pass through its ranks and to rapidly instruct a large number of young recruits.

According to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control in Germany the German Government requests the maintenance of:—

- |  |                     |
|--|---------------------|
| (1) Its ancient police forces (Ordnungspolizei) with their |                     |
| actual effectives . . . . .                                | 92,000 men.         |
| (2) The Sicherheitspolizei . . . . .                       | 60,000 men.         |
| Or in round figures . . . . .                              | <u>150,000 men.</u> |

According to what is said above the maintenance of the Sicherheitspolizei will be equal to an augmentation of the Reichswehr with this further advantage that its mode of recruiting by short term engagements will allow the Sicherheitspolizei to become a veritable military school for the youth of Germany.

*The Sicherheitspolizei should then be suppressed*

On the other hand, it is not in the least inconvenient from a military point of view to allow an increase of the effectives of the Ordnungspolizei, on the condition that this police force keeps in its entirety its old character of 'police d'Etats', that is to say, administered by a regional administration, with an armament corresponding to its rôle.<sup>7</sup>

If the character of this local police is rigorously kept, the importance of the increase of the effectives to be accorded can be calculated on such a scale that the German Government will no longer have reason to make their case based on the maintenance of internal order.

This object would be attained if they are accorded as a total for the Ordnungspolizei 150,000 men, equal to the total of the actual effectives of the 'Ordnungspolizei' and the 'Sicherheitspolizei'.

Moreover, it appears convenient to allow the German Government the increase demanded in the strength of its gendarmerie (17,000 men in place of

<sup>7</sup> Note in original:

<i>Armament demanded by Germany.</i>	<i>Armament proposed by the Commission.</i>	<i>Armament of 1913.</i>
(1) <i>Personal arms.</i> Carbines, revolvers, 'arme blanche', grenades.	Personal 'arme blanche' Revolvers (personal) Rifles, carbines.	Sabres. Revolvers. Some carbines in case of trouble.
(2) <i>Collective armament.</i> Repeating pistols, light and heavy machine guns, minenwerfer, tiern howit- zers, flam[m]enwerfer, tanks, armed motor cars, aeroplanes, telephonic material. Mechanical transport.	In proportion of one third on [ <i>sic</i> ] the total effectives (State & Municipal police) Repeating pistols in pro- portion of one twentieth of the total effectives. Hand grenades.	

12,000 in 1913), the organisation of this corps rendering its military utilisation impossible.

It is consequently proposed that the Allied Powers should, as soon as possible, make known to the German Government:—

(1) that the military forces of Germany will be maintained at 100,000 men as fixed by the Treaty of Peace, with the organisation as laid down in that Treaty;

(2) that the Sicherheitspolizei will be dissolved within a short delay, the time to be fixed;

(3) that the Ordnungspolizei can be increased in such a manner as to reach a total for the whole of Germany of 150,000 men, it being clearly understood that this Ordnungspolizei will keep its character as 'police d'État' and will be organized, recruited and armed accordingly;

(4) that the gendarmerie can be increased to an effective of 17,000 men;

(5) that the Commission of Control will be charged, on the basis of these decisions, to regulate the detail of the organisation of this police force in agreement with the German Government, and to control the application of these measures.

#### No. 84

*Letter from M. Paul Cambon to Sir M. Hankey<sup>1</sup>*

[201997/7067/39]

FRENCH EMBASSY, LONDON, *June 1, 1920*

Dear Sir Maurice,

M. Millerand has asked me to transmit to Mr. Lloyd George the enclosed memoranda concerning Germany's violation of the Treaty of Peace. One of these documents refers to the financial and economic clauses,<sup>2</sup> the other to the military clauses.

The President of the Council of French Ministers has also instructed me to inform the Prime Minister of the wish of the Government of the Republic that His Majesty's Government should come to a decision with regard to the reparation claimed from Germany for the attacks against the personnel of the Allied Commissions of Control which took place in March last.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL CAMBON

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this letter and its enclosures was forwarded with a covering letter (not printed) by Sir M. Hankey to Lord Curzon on June 4 with the request that he would have them examined by the Foreign Office. Sir M. Hankey explained that it had been agreed at the Hythe Conference (see Volume VIII, No. 21, minute 2) that the list of Germany's failures to execute the provisions of the Versailles Treaty should be presented to the Germans before the meeting at Spa, but that it should first be forwarded for the approval of the British Government. In his reply of June 10 Lord Hardinge stated that the memoranda dealt principally with technical questions which were outside the competence of the Foreign Office and on which Lord Curzon was therefore not in a position to offer any useful comment. The matter of the reparation to be claimed from Germany for the assaults on Allied officers would, however, in Lord Curzon's opinion, require consideration by the Cabinet.

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. II below, No. 152.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 84

*Observations with regard to the execution of the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Peace  
No. 945/1*

VERSAILLES ALLIED MILITARY COMMITTEE, PARIS, May 26, 1920

*Clauses which have not been Executed*

*Alteration to German laws (Article 211)*

No law has yet been promulgated for the purpose of abolishing compulsory military service and the organisation of the reserves, nor for the organisation of the Reichswehr in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

In point of fact Germany would still be able, from the legal standpoint, to utilise all her man-power by means of a general mobilisation.

Furthermore, as the necessary measures were not taken in time, it might be impossible for the German Government to organize by the 10th July the army of 100,000 men provided for in the Treaty.

*Police Effectives: (Article 162)*

The German Government has created, *for the Empire as a whole*, a corps of Sicherheitspolizei, with *recruiting and organisation and its own military equipment*.

It has persisted in developing this institution, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 162 of the Treaty, the resolution of the Allied Governments dated 1st December, 1919,<sup>3</sup> and numerous representations by the Commission of Control.

No matter what decision may later on be come to by the Allied Governments with regard to police effectives necessary for maintaining order in Germany, no *military organisation* forbidden by the Treaty could be authorised for this purpose.

In order to settle these questions of (a) Alteration to be made to German laws, and (b) Number of police effectives, it is indispensable that a speedy reply be given to the German Government's request dated 20th April with regard to the maintenance of a permanent army of 200,000 men, thus rendering impossible any excuse for fresh shuffling on the part of the latter and for fresh delays in the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty.

*Clauses which are being Executed*

Delay is chiefly caused by objections to, or requests for deviations from, the Treaty put forward by the German Government, and which the latter uses as a pretext for deferring the execution of all or part of the military or air clauses.

In order to do away with this cause the Allied Governments should, when replying as above to the German Government, inform it that its request for deviations from the Treaty will not be considered by the Allied Powers.

By Order,

WEYGAND

<sup>3</sup> See No. 29, n. 6.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 84

*Memorandum on the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Peace*

1. *Clauses which have been executed*

*Article 180. Disarmament of fortresses, etc., within a 50-kilometre zone to the east of the Rhine.*

Disarmament of the Wesel and Istein fortresses took place by 10th March, 1920. The other fortifications within this zone are in occupied territory and were disarmed upon occupation.

2. *Clauses which are being executed*

(1) MILITARY CLAUSES

A. *Question of Armament and Munitions*

*Article 169 (By 10th March). Surrender of war material.*

(a) *German war material*

According to the Treaty of Peace, all German war material should have been surrendered to the Allies for destruction not later than 10th March. This has not been done. The principal causes for the delay being tardy arrival of lists of such material (the first lists having been received by the Commission towards the end of February), and insufficient means of destruction.

According to statements sent in by the German Government, the war material remaining to be destroyed on 5th January, 1920, amounted to

23,270 guns or gun-barrels;  
25,450 machine guns;  
1,464,900 hand weapons;  
273 flame-throwers.

On 10th May, the Commission of Control reported the destruction of:—

8,600 guns or gun-barrels;  
3,800 machine-guns;  
562,300 hand weapons.

Such destruction concerned (1) war material remaining to be destroyed as at 5th January, 1920 and mentioned above, and (2) war material which the Germans destroyed between the armistice and 5th January 1920, the destruction of which the Commission was really in a position to vouch for.

Consequently, the quantity of material remain[ing] to be destroyed is higher than the difference between the first and the second figures. Furthermore, this difference may become yet more marked, owing to:

Discovery of hidden material which may be made by the Commission;  
Reduction of the German army from 200,000 to 100,000 men;

Disarmament of the 'Sicherheitspolizei' and the 'Einwohnerwehren', who have about 500,000 rifles, of which General Nollet has been ordered (by the Versailles Allied Military Committee) to demand immediate delivery.

It should be pointed out that the total number of hand weapons which the Germans have to hand over to us in accordance with their lists is patently inadequate, even if the weapons available by reason of the disarmament of the 'Sicherheitspolizei' and of the 'Einwohnerwehren' are added thereto.

(b) *Non-German materials*

This material should have been delivered to the Allies, as their property, on or before 10th March.

Statements sent in by the Germans up to the present specify only:—

1,787 guns or gun-barrels;  
1,686 trench-mortars;  
6,300 machine-guns;  
626,000 hand weapons.

These figures are too small and cannot be accepted.

The V.A.M.C. has drawn General Nollet's attention to the points mentioned under (a) and (b).

(c) *War material other than weapons (harness, equipment, carts, etc.)*

Notwithstanding all demands made by the Commission of Control, the German Government has as yet given obviously insufficient particulars regarding war material—other than weapons properly so called—to be surrendered to the Allies.

(d) *Ownership of destroyed German war material*

The German Government has disputed the decision taken by the Ambassadors' Conference on 10th February,<sup>4</sup> according to which ownership of destroyed material was vested in the Allies.

At the request of the V.A.M.C., this decision has been once more confirmed (resolution of Ambassadors' Conference dated 21st May).<sup>5</sup>

*Article 168 (By 10th April). Closing down of non-approved war factories and arsenals; dismissal of personnel.*

*Privately-owned factories. Results attained:*—By 8th May, 1920, some 612 factories had been or were being visited; 341 had had notice to close down.

*State-owned factories and arsenals. Results to be attained:*—On 26th February, 1920, the Commission of Control authorised the German Government to retain 2 war factories for the manufacture of gunpowders, explosives, and ammunition respectively, and asked it to submit proposals on this basis. The German Government having, on 8th April 1920, proposed that 79 factories should be retained and this proposal having been considered inadmissible, that Government asked (on 24th April) that 40 factories should be retained. This request was likewise refused.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 8.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 74.

Reductions in the personnel of war factories and arsenals have taken place, but dismissal of the entire staff is dependent on the abolition of these establishments.

*Privately-owned factories.*—Up to the present, the Germans have only sent in the names of 2143 privately-owned factories manufacturing war material.<sup>6</sup> This figure is obviously too small.

*Violation of conditions.*—During a visit to the Krupp factories at Essen, the Commission of Control became aware of the clandestine manufacture of war material (sixty 77" guns and 180 ammunition waggons) for account of the German Government.

The Commission of Control gave orders that manufacture of this material should be suspended.

### B. *Question of Effectives*

*Articles 160 and 163 and Resolution of Supreme Council dated 10th [18th] February, 1920<sup>7</sup> (By 10th April). Reduction of German Army.*

#### *Former Army*

*Results attained:*—The Decree of 6th March, 1919, instituted the Reichswehr which was to replace the former army.

Dissolution of the former Army has taken place. The various bodies designed for preparation for war (mobilization departments of the Ministry for War, General Staff and Army Corps Headquarters Staff) have disappeared. There remain, however, the various offices winding up such bodies and the recruiting offices settling claims in connection with pensions and military services—who no longer deal with matters concerning mobilisation, as has been duly noted by the Commission of Control.

*Results to be attained:*—The personnel of offices concerned with winding-up was reckoned at 70,000 on 10th March. General Nollet summoned the German Government to abolish these offices by 10th April, but his action has had no effect.

#### *Present Army (Reichswehr)*

The German Government did not transmit to the Commission of Control the order issued by the Minister for Reichswehr (dated 3rd March), reducing the German Army to 200,000 men before the 2nd of April.

This order was not in agreement with the Treaty of Peace, and more particularly included an excess number of 50,000 men.

On the 17th and 22nd April 1920, the German Government was given explicit orders to bring its army of transition of 200,000 men into line with the provisions of the Treaty. The German Government issued instructions that these reductions should be made by the 15th May.

<sup>6</sup> *Note in original:* 'The 612 factories visited are included herein.'

<sup>7</sup> See No. 11.

Side by side with the regular army there still exist:—

*Free Corps.* (Marine brigades<sup>8</sup>) and some Free Corps with a total strength estimated at 40,000 men.

*'Zeitfreiwilligen'*. The German Government has given orders that these should be dissolved (except the corps existing in the Ruhr district and in Leipzig, which are necessary to maintain order). The dissolution of the *'Zeitfreiwilligen'* cannot yet be reported, however, and it may be said that the German military authorities are not using any haste to bring it about.

*'Einwohnerwehr'*. The German Government gave orders for its dissolution on 8th April,<sup>9</sup> but this order to the Governments of the various German regions was issued in such terms as render its execution improbable. It was more a suggestion to camouflage the Citizen Guards still further, by altering their armament and abstaining from military exercises, rather than an order for their abolition.

As a matter of fact, no abolition of this Guard has been noted, and no surrender of arms has been made.

*'Sicherheitspolizei.'* This continues to exist under its former organisation. The Germans acknowledge that it includes 50,000 men: the Commission of Control estimates its strength at 60,000.

To sum up, the former army had disappeared by the 10th May, but reduction of the new army to 200,000 men has not yet been carried out. Side by side with this new army are Free Corps and 2 Marine Brigades.

If the German Government has duly given orders that the *'Zeitfreiwilligen'* and the *'Einwohnerwehr'* should be dissolved, these orders have apparently not yet been carried out.

Also, nothing has been done to dissolve the *'Sicherheitspolizei'*.

The V.A.M.C. has instructed General Nollet to place these various violations of the Treaty of Peace on record.

#### *Article 176 (By 10th March). Abolition of Military Schools.*

As at 13th May, it was reported that this clause had been executed viz:—  
'94 military schools dissolved, the German Government having (in accordance with Article 176 of the Treaty) retained not more than one school per arm, or four schools'.

Since that date, it has been noted that so far as certain schools, and more particularly that of Gross-Lichterfelde, the largest school—are concerned, only the name has been altered, the pupils remaining and a large number of professors being retained (23 out of 60 at Gross-Lichterfelde).

The V.A.M.C. has instructed General Nollet to place these violations on record, and to see that this clause is carried out in its entirety.

<sup>8</sup> *Note in original:* 'One of these brigades said to have been dissolved.'

<sup>9</sup> See No. 72, p. 99 and n. 30.

## (2) AIR CLAUSES

*Article 199 (By 10th March). Demobilisation of air forces.*

The demobilisation of air forces should have taken place by 10th March. It was owing to the German Government which tried to evade this demobilisation by asking that air police forces should be retained—that demobilisation did not take place before 8th May. It is now being supervised.

The Ambassadors' Conference refused the request as to air police forces on 11th March.<sup>10</sup>

*Article 202 (By 10th April). Delivery of Aeronautical Material.*

All German aeronautical material was to have been delivered to the Allies, as their property, on April 10th at latest.

*Result attained:*—The Air Commission of Control has checked delivery of nearly all the German aeronautical material, amounting to:—

8,900 aeroplanes  
445 hydroplanes  
11 airships  
13,000 engines  
72 airship sheds  
23,000 metres of aeroplane sheds  
Destruction commenced on 3rd May, 1920.

## (3) GENERAL CLAUSES

*Article 208 [206]. Facilities granted to Interallied Commissions of Control for accomplishment of their missions.*

The German Government has not been able to guarantee to the Commissions of Control the facilities which were to have been granted in accordance with Article 206.

Numerous cases of the German Government's unwillingness to carry out the Treaty of Peace were recorded in Report No. 456/1 of 19th March.<sup>11</sup>

Since the end of April, the Commissions of Control have again met with a certain amount of resistance, by the Germany [*sic*] military authorities, regarding the execution of the military clauses. This resistance took on a well-defined form as from 1st May; it is due to an order issued by the Central German Bureau to its various representatives, and tending to make any unexpected exercise of control by the Commissions impossible.

At Breslau, Colonel von Luck, head of the German liaison service, informed the officers belonging to the Commission of Control that he had received instructions from Berlin that such officers were not to ask any direct questions of the units or services which they might visit, but were only to ask for a programme *communicated beforehand* to be carried out and to check the replies given in writing by the German representative.

At Wurtemberg [*sic*] and at Cassel, similar notifications were made to members of the Commissions of Control.

<sup>10</sup> No. 25.

<sup>11</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.



The insults and ill-usage offered to members of the Commissions of Control at Prenzlau, Dresden, Berlin, Bremen, Friesark [Friesack], and Wernitz were reported to the Ambassadors' Conference by Marshal Foch's letter of 12th March.<sup>12</sup> Nothing was done as an outcome of this letter.

A fresh insult is reported as having been offered to an officer belonging to a Commission of Control, viz:—

On 6th May, Lieut. Colonel de France, when inspecting the Minstur [Münster] camp, was the victim of a demonstration by soldiers belonging to the Ehr[h]ar[d]t marine brigade. Missiles were hurled at his car, the windows of which were smashed. Colonel de France was not hurt.

### 3. *Clauses which have not been executed*

#### A. *Question of Armament and Munitions*

*Articles 167 and 196 (By 10th March). Reduction of stocks of ammunition for artillery of fortified works which Germany may retain.*

The stock of ammunition for artillery of fortified works which Germany may retain is to consist of:—

1,500 rounds per piece for guns of which the calibre is 10·5 cm. and under;

500 rounds per piece for those of higher calibre.

The Germans, however, asked to be allowed to retain 5,246 pieces of artillery in these fortified works.

The Commission of Control required a considerable reduction of this figure on March 18th. On April 16th the German Government asked for a reversal of this decision. In its note of May 5th, the Commission of Control maintained its decision, but it has resulted in no execution of the article in question by the German Government.

The reduction of the stock of ammunition therefore remains in suspense until such time as the number of guns to be retained in the fortified works has been made to coincide with the figure fixed by the Commission of Control.

The V.A.M.C. has given General Nollet instructions to require without delay delivery of the surplus pieces of artillery in the fortified works, and, should delivery not be made, to take note of this violation of the Treaty of Peace.

*Article 170 (By a date not yet determined). Prohibition to import and export arms and war material.*

On several occasions, the last of which was March 11th, the Commission of Control called upon the German Government to prohibit *by law* the import and export of arms and war material.

No satisfactory reply has been made by the German Government to this categorical demand.

<sup>12</sup> See No. 30, n. 1.

## B. Question of Effectives

*Article 162 and the Resolution of the Supreme Council of December 1st, 1919. Abolition of the 'Sicherheitspolizei'.*

See Articles 160 and 163, 'Reduction of the German Army' in 'Clauses which are being executed'.

*Article 211 (By 10th April). Alteration of German laws, in conformity with the military clauses of the Treaty.*

No alteration has been effected in German law.

A decree published in the Official Gazette of the German Army abolished the military obligations of the Reserve Forces in peace-time, but no law has been promulgated abolishing compulsory military service or the Reserve, which continues to be mobilisable.

### ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 84

May 14, 1920

*Memorandum from the Naval Advisers on the 'Violations and breaches of the Naval Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles up to 10th May, 1920'*

1. *Article 168.*—The inspection of factories has been attended with numerous difficulties, owing to the ill-will of the German liaison officers, who created hindrances and difficulties whenever possible, with the object of hiding the existence of war material.

2. *Article 183.*—The German authorities state that the naval personnel was reduced on 10th March, 1920, in accordance with the provisions of this article, but this affirmation cannot [can only?] be considered satisfactory so long as that personnel is used for the purposes enumerated in that article, and does not serve in the Naval Brigades and other corps.

3. *Article 185.*—The warships should have been surrendered on 10th March, 1920. Although it is not possible absolutely to demonstrate that non-surrender of the warships at that date is a violation of the Treaty by the German Government, it is none the less certain—as proved by events—that the necessary arrangements for handing over the ships were not made.

4. *Article 192.*—The naval war material mentioned in this article should have been surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for destruction. The German authorities have broken the terms of the Treaty by destroying part of such material without informing the N.I.A.C.C.

5. *Article 209.*—According to the provisions of this article, the German authorities must furnish to the N.I.A.C.C. all documents and plans, etc., asked for by this Commission. Notwithstanding urgent representations by the N.I.A.C.C., no document or plan has been handed over. Furthermore, on 2nd May, 1920, the German authorities refused to hand over any plans or documents other than those which they might see fit to deliver. This attitude and its restrictions demonstrate an unmistakable intention not to carry out the obligations incurred under the Treaty.

*N.B.*—The political situation is responsible for the non-execution of the following articles, viz:—

1. *Articles 192, 195, and 196.*—The unsatisfactory state of discipline in the ports prevented inspection of material, ships, fortifications, etc.

2. *Articles 182 and 193.*—Unrest in the fleet prevented the sweeping of mines.

No. 85

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received June 7)*

*No. 376 [202148/179657/39]<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, June 2, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that Wolff's Telegraphic Agency yesterday communicated to the press a statement of which the following is a translation:—

‘The fact that up till now no executive law for the abolition of universal military service has yet been passed in Germany has given rise to misapprehension in different circles. In this connection we have received the following communication from a well-informed source:—

‘“Article 173 of the Peace Treaty determines that universal military service is to be abolished. The National Assembly has ratified the treaty. By this act the abolition of universal military service is legally carried into effect, and any earlier regulations to the contrary have become invalid. There is consequently no necessity for a special executive law.

‘“Apart from that there is no necessity for such a law, because the former Constitution, by which universal military service was established, has been repealed by the State Constitution of the 11th August, 1919. The old Army and Defence Regulations can only be considered as an executive law of the old Constitution. Their provisions *de jure* cease to exist after the new Constitution and the Provisional Defence Law came into force.

‘“It is only in consideration of these facts that it was possible to pass, among others, the law for the formation of a provisional Reichswehr and navy, and further the orders for demobilisation and disbandment of the Landsturm as well as the decree regarding retirement of soldiers on furlough.

‘“In the case under discussion it is again proved that all suspicions that Germany is systematically delaying the execution of the military provisions of the Peace Treaty are unfounded.”’<sup>2</sup>

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

<sup>1</sup> The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> This despatch was minuted by Sir E. Crowe, and initialled by Lord Hardinge, as follows: ‘Very Jesuitical. E. A. C. June 7.

H.’

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 636 Telegraphic: by bag [200757/7067/39]*

*Very urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 3, 1920*

Your Excellency's telegram No. 642, Section 7, of May 29th:<sup>1</sup> date from which the Treaty of Versailles is binding upon Germany.

I am advised that the following, which agrees in the main with M. Fromageot's conclusion,<sup>2</sup> is the correct view of the situation.

Under the terms of the treaty Germany accepted certain obligations. Her acceptance of these obligations [*sic*] was effected first by her signature of the treaty on June 28th. and secondly by her ratification on July 9th. After this ratification Germany's acceptance of the obligations of the treaty was complete and no further step on her part was necessary in order to make these obligations binding upon her. In view, however, of the fact that at that date the treaty was not 'in force', the German obligations had not to be carried out then, but at a date in the future, then uncertain, at which the treaty should come into force.

It results from this that, if Germany took any action between July 9th. and January 10th such as to render it impossible for her to carry out certain of these obligations when the time came for her to do so, such action would amount to a breach, not of the provisions of the treaty, but of the obligation which she had accepted to carry out its terms. This does not mean, in the case of the delivery of Articles stipulated by the treaty, that Germany was on January 10th bound to deliver every article which she would have been bound to deliver if the treaty had come into force on July 9th. An article existing on July 9th, might for instance have been destroyed by 'an act of God' before January 10th. If however in the interval Germany took a step (i.e., by destroying or selling the article), which rendered it impossible for her to deliver it on January 10th, such an act would have been a violation of the obligations which she had accepted at the time of signature and ratification.

I am advised however that this general principle is not in fact applicable to the particular matters mentioned in your despatch No. 1564 of May 22nd<sup>3</sup> arising out of article 169 of the Treaty.

That article, when read in conjunction with the preceeding [*sic*] articles of the same chapter of the treaty, merely imposes upon Germany the penalty of surrendering to the allies, for destruction by them, munitions and plant in existence at a given date over and above a specified amount. The scheme of that chapter is not that Germany is to hand over certain properties for the benefit of the allies, but that she is by a certain date to bring her armament down to a certain level under the penalty that, if she has not done so, the surplus is forfeit to the allies and is to be destroyed by them.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure in No. 81.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This transmitted a copy of a note of May 7 from Marshal Foch to the President of the Council of Ambassadors relating to the destruction of German war material.

There was therefore no obligation whatever upon Germany not to destroy the munitions or plant herself in the meantime, and no scope for the view that, from July 10th onwards, she was under an obligation not to put it out of her power to carry out her duty to surrender to the allies these materials after the entry into force of the treaty.

No. 87

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 9)*

*No. 674 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 5, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning, and again this afternoon, under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> (4) Marshal Foch submitted to the Conference his report<sup>2</sup> on the application of the German Government to be allowed to retain an army of 200,000 men (see my despatch No. 1708).<sup>3</sup> It was agreed that each Ambassador should submit this report to his respective Government, and ascertain whether it was to be dealt with by the Conference of Ambassadors. I shall be glad therefore for early instructions.

In the meanwhile I urged that it should be communicated to the Rhineland High Commission, for their views as regards the police force to be maintained in the neutral zone. I also suggested that it would probably be desirable that a separate figure should be fixed for the police force in the occupied territory, and that in any arrangements to be made with the German Government it should be considered separately from the police force of the rest of Germany. I understand from my Military Adviser that this is the view held by the War Office. Marshal Foch, while agreeing the principle of this suggestion, objected strongly to his report being communicated to the Rhineland High Commission for their opinion.

In view, however, of your despatch No. 643,<sup>4</sup> I considered it necessary to insist upon the Rhineland Commission being consulted as far as the police force was concerned. It was decided finally that Marshal Foch's proposal should be communicated to the Rhineland Commission, and that they should be asked to report as to the number and character of the police which they considered necessary to keep order in the occupied territory.

The Secretariat General communicated to the Conference a further note just received from the German Delegation, urging the importance of settling this question without further delay, instead of waiting for it to be dealt with by the Supreme Council at Spa. (Copy of this note is enclosed in my despatch No. 1754.)<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The earlier sections recorded discussion of other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure in No. 83.

<sup>3</sup> No. 83.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably an error for '1643'. See No. 83.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. For an English translation of the note see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 150.

(5) The Aeronautical Committee, supported by the Interallied Military Commission of Versailles, requested the Conference to interpret their resolution of the 10th February,<sup>6</sup> in such a way as to make it clear to the Reparations Commission that, in deciding that aeronautical material in Germany should be sold by the Reparations Commission and the proceeds placed to the German Reparation account, it is not in any way the intention of the Conference to prejudice the right of ownership which is vested in the principal Allied Governments by Article 202 of the Treaty. It was decided to address a letter to the Reparations Commission in this sense.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See No. 8.

<sup>7</sup> The resolution which the Conference of Ambassadors adopted and decided to communicate to the Reparations Commission was as follows:

'that the resolution taken by the Conference of Ambassadors on February 10, 1920 relative to the application of Article 202 of the Treaty of Versailles shall in no wise diminish the force of the resolution taken on September 29, 1919, by the Supreme Council and that in consequence the proceeds of the sale of the aeronautical material referred to in a letter from the President of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles dated February 7, 1920, (3rd question, ownership of unserviceable aeronautical material, paragraph B—see C. A. 10, IV) shall be attributed in its entirety to the Allied and Associated Powers in the proportion fixed in the resolution of the Supreme Council of September 29, 1919: the proceeds of those sales shall not be put to the reparations account.'

## No. 88

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received June 8)*

*No. 389 [202320/40276/39]*

*Secret*

BERLIN, June 5, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to the telegram No. 234 of June 1st,<sup>1</sup> from His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, which Your Lordship was good enough to repeat to me, I have the honour to report that I have by a fortunate chance obtained from an absolutely sure source, which I am, however, not at liberty to reveal, a copy of a letter which was sent on April 30th to the Spanish Consulate at Hamburg offering for sale between 3 and 4 million rifles and various other munitions of war. A translation of this letter, which is dated from Danzig, is enclosed herewith. I understand that its contents were communicated to the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.

I would particularly beg that this information be kept absolutely secret as its divulgence would have serious consequences for the source from which it was obtained.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

<sup>1</sup> See No. 94 below, n. 2.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 88

*Herr Erwin von Spreckhoff to the Spanish Consulate General (Hamburg)*

*Translation*

ZOPPOT (FREE STATE OF DANZIG), *April 30, 1920*

To the Spanish Consulate General, Hamburg.

I take the liberty of drawing the attention of His Spanish Majesty's Consulate General to the following offer:

There are for sale large stocks of German army equipment, in particular infantry rifles. A list of the articles for sale is enclosed in this letter. The prices are, according to the information I have received, to be regarded as extremely reasonable, and, as the offer concerns the latest model of the German Army, there ought to be no doubt as to the quality of the rifles.

The offer includes free delivery from a German town; the German export licence has already been obtained. The rifles can, in my opinion, be advantageously exported to South America, and I would therefore respectfully request the Spanish Consulate General to interest itself in the matter. Should the offer not be of interest to the Consulate General itself, I would be grateful if I could be furnished with the names and addresses of suitable Spanish firms with whom I could enter into communication. I would add that not fewer than 200,000 of the rifles will be delivered in one consignment.

The matter is an urgent one as it is improbable that such a favourable opportunity will re-occur for the purchase of such valuable goods, and I would therefore request the Spanish Consulate General to come to a speedy decision.

ERWIN V. SPRECKHOFF

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 88

ARMY EQUIPMENT

3-4 million army rifles, Model 98—the latest model of the German Army Administration—each with 200 bullets: M. 206 each

About	5,000 army saddles, complete	.	.	.	970	„
„	200,000 army knapsacks, with leather backs, made from waterproofed material	.	.	.	52	„
„	500 fore-riders' saddles	.	.	.	725	„
„	10,000 woollen blankets	.	.	.	76	„
„	200 pieces of breast harness for draught horses, made from substitute material with leather edging, of heavy strong workmanship	.	.	.	425 per pair	
„	1,800 white saddle pads	.	.	.	86 each	
„	1,500 brown saddle pads	.	.	.	80	„

Delivery free from German town, i.e. from warehouse.  
German Export Licence already obtained.

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 7, 3 p.m.)*

*No. 670 Telegraphic [202257/7067/39]*

PARIS, June 6, 1920, 10.40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 636 June 3rd.<sup>1</sup>

The view expressed in last three paragraphs places me in a difficult position.

The interpretation of the words 'livrer' and 'surrender' in Article 169 of Treaty of Versailles in absolute sense of transfer of ownership by Allies was unanimously adopted by Allied Military Commission as long ago as February last, and approved by Ambassadors' Conference (see paragraph 4a of Sir G. Grahame's telegram 162 February 10th).<sup>2</sup>

The German protest against this interpretation (see my Despatch No. 1392 May 7th)<sup>3</sup> was considered on May 21st by Conference and was unanimously rejected, subject to Monsieur Fromageot's opinion to be given within twenty four hours. The latter confirmed view taken by Conference (see paragraph one of my telegram May 22nd<sup>4</sup> and paragraph eight of my telegram 613 of same date).<sup>5</sup> The German Note was answered accordingly.

Neither during interval between original decision of the Conference and forwarding of German Note to Foreign Office nor after receipt by Foreign Office of my telegrams Nos. 610<sup>4</sup> and 613, did I receive any indication from Your Lordship that unanimous view of the Conference, their military advisers and Monsieur Fromageot, was regarded as untenable by His Majesty's Government. In the meantime Conference had twice informed German Government of their interpretation of the Document<sup>6</sup> 169 and rejected German protest. It was not apparent, until separate question of date upon which Treaty becomes binding on Germany and M. Fromageot's recommendation thereon were submitted to the Foreign Office in my telegram 642 of May 29th<sup>7</sup> for consideration, that decision of Conference of February 10th regarding interpretation of Article 169 was viewed<sup>8</sup> and an opinion directly contrary to that unanimously taken by Conference furnished to me. In the circumstances I do not see how I can well reopen at this stage the question of Article 169 before Conference, and I should be glad of Your Lordship's instructions on the point. I have informed M. Fromageot of the view expressed in your telegram, and I gather he disagrees entirely with those expressed in last three paragraphs: which are he points out precisely those put forward by German Government which Conference recently rejected.

I cannot refrain from drawing Your Lordship's attention to the serious difficulty which has arisen in this case (and may well arise again in other

<sup>1</sup> No. 86.

<sup>2</sup> No. 8.

<sup>3</sup> This transmitted the German note of April 20, see No. 74, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> No. 74.

<sup>5</sup> No. 75.

<sup>6</sup> This was amended in the Foreign Office to read 'article'.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

<sup>8</sup> The Foreign Office suggested 'disputed' as the correct reading.



matters connected with execution of Treaties) from absence of a legal adviser on my staff. If I am to reopen question of Article 169 and in any case in order to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of general questions raised in Monsieur Fromageot's Memorandum which does not appear quite to coincide with views expressed in the second and third paragraphs of Your Lordship's telegram under reference, I consider the drafting committee should be immediately reconstituted. As question is one which requires immediate settlement, I would urge a legal adviser from Foreign Office should be at once sent out to deal with question and that arrangements should be made for attaching to my staff someone who could generally advise me on legal questions continually arising from execution of Treaties.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> In a private letter of June 10 Lord Hardinge explained to Lord Derby that there was no possibility of arranging for a legal adviser to be permanently attached to his staff: 'it will probably be possible to send some one out, when a question comes up which must be referred to the drafting committee, for a day or two in order to deal with it. But to keep one of our legal advisers permanently in Paris, with the possibility of his having nothing to do for considerable periods, would, I am sure, be indefensible from the point of view both of time and of money.'

## No. 90

*Note communicated to Lord Hardinge by the French Chargé d'Affaires  
(Received June 7)*

[202314/179657/39]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, le 7 juin 1920

Le Gouvernement allemand a demandé la prolongation du délai expirant le 10 juillet prochain et accordé pour la diminution de l'armée allemande au chiffre de 100,000 hommes.<sup>1</sup> Le Comité Militaire Allié a, d'autre part, exprimé l'avis qu'il convenait de maintenir intégralement les stipulations du Traité concernant l'armée allemande et d'accorder une augmentation des forces de police à la condition de bien conserver à ces forces un caractère régional.

La Conférence des Ambassadeurs, saisie de la requête allemande et de la note du Comité Allié, a décidé de renvoyer ces documents à l'examen des gouvernements et d'attirer leur attention sur le caractère urgent de la question.<sup>2</sup>

Le Gouvernement français est fortement d'avis qu'il faut s'en tenir aux conclusions du Comité Militaire et il ne voit aucune raison d'accorder à l'Allemagne le délai qu'elle sollicite. Le Gouvernement allemand aurait dû prendre depuis longtemps les dispositions nécessaires pour la réduction de son armée et il espère une fois de plus de tourner le Traité de Paix.

En portant à la connaissance du Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères l'opinion très nette du Gouvernement français, le Chargé d'Affaires exprime le désir de connaître le plus tôt possible le sentiment du Gouvernement Britannique au sujet de cette question.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 83.

<sup>2</sup> No. 87, § 4.

No. 91

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 11, 10.55 a.m.)*

*No. 693 Telegraphic [202986/179657/39]*

PARIS, June 10, 1920, 8.10 p.m.

Sir G. Grahame's despatch No. 1708<sup>1</sup> and my telegram No. 674 paragraph 4.<sup>2</sup>

I should be glad of an early reply as Marshal Foch is pressing to have this question settled without any further delay.

<sup>1</sup> No. 83.

<sup>2</sup> No. 87.

No. 92

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 669 Telegraphic: by bag [202257/7067/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 10, 1920

Your Excellency's telegram No. 670 of June 6th<sup>1</sup> (date from which the Treaty of Versailles is binding on Germany) appears to be based on a misinterpretation of my telegram No. 636.<sup>2</sup>

The interpretation of Article 169, to which you refer as having been adopted in February last and since maintained, is that the words 'livrer' and 'surrender' imply a complete transfer of ownership, so that the articles surrendered under that Article become the absolute property of the Allies, and Germany has no further claim on them. There is nothing in my telegram to suggest any doubt as to this interpretation and I have no intention of raising any, as I entirely agree with it. The point made in the last three paragraphs of that telegram was that Article 169 does not involve any obligation on Germany to maintain *in statu quo* her existing war material between July 9th and Jan. 10th in order that it might be available for surrender to the Allies, and that there was nothing in the Treaty to prevent her destroying part of it between those dates, in which case the obligation to surrender would not arise in respect of the destroyed material. It would follow that there is no obligation on Germany to pay to the Allies the value of the material resulting from the destructions effected between these dates. I gather from your telegram that this view may not be generally accepted in Paris, but so far as I am aware this question now presents itself for the first time and I cannot find any previous decision which is inconsistent with our view. The question is therefore one for discussion, and I do not think that the previous decisions to which your telegram refers prevent you in any way from supporting our view, or indeed have anything to do with the present question.

At the risk of repetition I should like to make my point perfectly clear. The material surrendered under Article 169 becomes the absolute property of the Allies, as decided in February. The object of that Article, however, and the accompanying Articles was to ensure the reduction of German armaments to

<sup>1</sup> No. 89.

<sup>2</sup> No. 86.

the prescribed quantity. Any material existing in Germany when the Treaty began to operate, i.e. on January 10th, in excess of the quantity allowed, became the property of the Allied Powers in order that it should be destroyed. This, however, does not mean that Germany was not at liberty before that date to take steps to reduce her armaments by destroying some of this material herself, and it is only the material which remained after such destruction, and after deduction of the quantity allowed, which became the property of the Allies under Article 169. There is nothing in this view inconsistent with the contention which has been maintained hitherto, and which I have no desire to question, that the surplus material which on January 10th had not been destroyed became the absolute property of the Allies, and that Germany had no legal claim to the value of the proceeds of the destruction carried out by the Allies.

### No. 93

*Précis of the Third Report by Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan, dated 10th June, 1920, on the Armed Forces of Germany and the Work of the Effectives Sub-commission of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control*<sup>1</sup>

*Secret*

[C 113/113/18]

1. Information gathered since the last report of 12th May confirms the conclusions that the German Government intend to repudiate the abolition of conscription, and the substitution of a voluntary army of 100,000 men recruited for 12 years. This report shows that men are still enlisted for terms of 1 to 3 months, that the effectives are continually renewed, that the non-commissioned officers remain in excessive proportions, that a huge cadre of non-commissioned officers is preserved in the *Sicherheitspolizei*, and that the *Freikorps*, instead of being disbanded, are incorporated in the *Reichswehr* or passed into *Wirtschaftsabteilungen* under conditions resembling service in the *Reichswehr*. The District Committees have discovered that men on demobilization are given papers identical with those used before the war, reminding them of their obligation to come up if called upon. There is also in the demobilization and pensions organizations a complete machinery for the mobilization of all classes up to the 1920 Class. The excuses offered for the delay in the execution of these two obligations carry no conviction and are often contradictory, and even the pledges given as to the preliminary steps have not been redeemed, for instance, the statement made by General von Cramon in a letter, dated 20th April, that all the *Freikorps* had been disbanded, has been found to be untrue. The intensification of the control of local units has given rise to increased obstruction on the part of the German authorities.

<sup>1</sup> The précis of this report, together with the full report (not printed), was forwarded on July 1 by the War Office to the Foreign Office, where it was received the following day.

2. *Reduction of the Transitional army.*—In his letter of 20th April, General von Cramon announced that the reduction to 200,000 would be completed by 15th May. In the opinion of the Effectives' Sub-Commission, this reduction has now been carried out, and the effectives are not more than 200,000, including the force in the neutral zone.

The conclusion advanced in the last report, that the demand of the Germans to retain an army of 200,000 masks a design to establish an army in contradiction with the principles of the Treaty, is, on the whole, confirmed.

3. *Discharges from the Reichswehr.*—It would appear that considerable progress has been made in the 'discharge' of surplus effectives of the transitional army, and that the dissolution of the *Freikorps*, though not complete, is being achieved. The question remains, however, as to whether these men are definitely demobilized. They are allowed to leave the army at once or to become members of 'economic and labour detachments' (*Wirtschaftsabteilungen*), ostensibly organized to provide situations in civil life for demobilized non-commissioned officers and men. The semi-military constitution of these detachments, and the general conditions surrounding them, renders close investigation necessary, though it is perhaps doubtful whether their dissolution can be demanded under Article 177 of the Treaty.

4. *Zeitfreiwilligen and Einwohnerwehren.*—With one or two exceptions the *Zeitfreiwilligen* may be said to have ceased to exist as units. They were created by one administrative decree and dissolved by another, and there is nothing to prevent them being reconstituted with the same ease.

The *Einwohnerwehren* present a more difficult problem, both as regards what is politic and what is practicable. Practically nothing has been done by the German or State Governments in the matter of their dissolution or disarmament. The Sub-Commission has been assured that the force has been dissolved and the head office suppressed, but it is evident that the organization is self-supporting and has a local life of its own. In Bavaria, and possibly also in Saxony, though not in East Prussia, the *Einwohnerwehren* are not an instrument either of reaction or of Bolshevism, but a safeguard against both. The matter calls for serious consideration, as there is a danger that by a partial disarmament of one section of the population—the *Einwohnerwehren* are largely a middle-class organization—we leave it defenceless against the rest.

5. *Disarmament.*—So far as arms in the possession of individuals, as distinct from incorporated units, are concerned, the only way to deal with the problem would appear to be to demand the enactment of legislation on the subject, but it is doubtful whether the Government could, even if it would, enforce such legislation. Close liaison over this matter has been established between the District Committees of the Effectives and Armaments Sub-Commissions, but the task is a difficult one.

6. *Sicherheitspolizei and Police.*—So far as can be discovered, not the slightest attempt has been made to comply with the demands of the Commission on the subject of the *Sicherheitspolizei*, who remain a masked infantry organization. Recruiting proceeds actively at Königsberg, in which district the

Government are endeavouring to purge the force of reactionary elements, but without much success. In the Marienwerder and Memel areas the Allied troops, in concert with the Sub-Commission, have taken steps to disband the *Sicherheitspolizei* and substitute a mixed force of police under Allied control. As regards the *Gendarmerie*, the numbers given by the German Government may be considered an under-estimate, as in some districts 'auxiliary' *Gendarmes* are being raised. The Government has made no reply to the request for documentary proof that the eight-hour day has been extended to the police, and there is reason to suppose that no such system has been introduced in the *Sicherheitspolizei*, and it would appear that the German authorities have set themselves no limit to the expansion of this force. Information recently obtained does not add materially to the description of the force given in the first report of February, in which its essentially military character was emphasized. On two important matters—armament and training—the Sub-Commission have not been kept fully informed.

7. *Schools and training.*—The old military schools have, as such, been suppressed. The cadet schools have been reopened as public educational establishments or secondary schools, but instead of the pupils being dispersed, they have returned to the same establishments and constitute from 50–100 per cent. of the pupils of the new schools. The members of the new staffs are often identical with the old in the same proportion. The Government are attempting to disarm criticism by attempts, which may be genuine, to instil in the pupils democratic ideas, and in Saxony it is laid down that the pupils are to be drawn from all classes, but the effect of this is small. It is complained that while the military schools are, at any rate on paper, undergoing this transformation, the civil schools are becoming 'militarist' and in this the universities lead the way. The suppression of military schools other than cadet schools is more satisfactory. The officer schools, the non-commissioned officer and preparatory non-commissioned officer schools have gone, but it is doubtful if the Sub-Commission can prevent evasions, in the case of schools for the recruitment of officers, of the Article of the Treaty which limits such schools to 'one per arm.' A new *Lehr* Brigade has been formed at Döberitz and it is possible that this might become a central school in the tactical training of all arms for the whole army. General Nollet has asked to be informed of its purpose.

Training is now directed by the Department of the Forces (*Truppenamt*) and the Department of Defence (*Wehramt*) in the *Reichswehrministerium*. The organization of these departments appears to be undergoing constant changes and is not yet finally settled, but the old principle of Inspectors of Training is maintained. So far as the education and selection of officers is concerned, the *Reichswehrministerium* is at present only feeling its way. For the time being there is a surplus of officers. The Staff College (*Kriegsakademie*) has been suppressed, and it is a matter for speculation how the *Reichswehrministerium* will endeavour to find a substitute for it. As regards the selection of officers, the aristocratic character of the army is preserved, in spite of Herr Noske's promises of a democratic army.

8. *Mobilization and demobilization*.—As regards the probability—one might, perhaps, now call it the certainty—of the Government's intention to preserve the old system of conscription with a view to its revival, it is important to determine how far the machinery for putting the system into operation still exists. The Great General Staff is nominally and as such suppressed. For the time being, at any rate, the military hierarchy has been, in theory at least, subordinated to a responsible Minister. This has involved the disappearance, as independent organs, of the Military Cabinet and the Great General Staff, both of which have been absorbed by the *Reichswehrministerium*, in the departments of which and in the higher commands of the transitional army such of the officers of the former Great General Staff as are still serving are to be found. As regards 'organs of preparation for war' one such may be identified in the statistical department of the *Truppenamt*, the function of which is to collect data about foreign armies with the object of 'facilitating the work of the League of Nations'. Other sections of the Great General Staff have been transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. It seems, however, very doubtful whether any of the military clauses of the Treaty, except that dealing with associations, is likely to be so little permanent or so easily evaded as that which decrees the total suppression of the Great General Staff.

The preservation of the old Army Corps Staffs must now be looked for in the staffs of the 12 divisions and 5 reinforced brigades of the 200,000 army asked for by the German Government. Most of the demobilization offices have largely lost their military character, and it is not in these institutions, but in the centres (*Abwickelungsstellen*) subordinate to them, and still more in the cognate pensions' centres (*Versorgungsstellen*), that the machinery for a mobilization of the old army is to be looked for. There lies the danger, and it is a very real one. The activities of these two organizations are examined, and the reasons on which the above conclusion is based are set out in detail.

9. *Compulsory service*.—Further confirmation has been received of the view advanced in the preceding reports that not only is the obligation to compulsory service not abolished, but that the German Government have no intention of abolishing it, and the Effectives Sub-Commission are convinced that the German Government is seeking, under one disguise or another, to preserve the old army system, its cadres, its regiments, its non-commissioned officers and its recruiting registers.

## No. 94

*Sir E. Howard<sup>1</sup> (Madrid) to Earl Curzon (Received June 12, 11.30 p.m.)*

*No. 243 Telegraphic [203369/40276/39]*

*Confidential*

MADRID, June 11, 1920, 10 p.m.

My telegram No. 234<sup>2</sup> and your telegram No. 119.<sup>3</sup>

Military Attaché today saw German who is trying to sell these rifles. He states that they belong to German Government and were taken away from the Reds in Ruhr. They are deposited somewhere near Berlin and he has an option upon them. Price is 305 marks per rifle with 200 rounds per rifle.

German in question lives in Barcelona and we have his address.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Ambassador at Madrid.

<sup>2</sup> Of June 1, not printed. In it Sir E. Howard reported that a man named Emil Walther Franz of an address in Barcelona, had offered H.M. Consul General two million Mauser rifles. On June 11 and 18 the British Military Attaché had interviews with Herr Franz. A copy of Col. Baird's report concerning the second interview was forwarded to the Foreign Office by the Director of Military Intelligence on June 30.

<sup>3</sup> Of June 3, not printed.

## No. 95

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 14)*

*No. 695 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 11, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon (the Belgian Ambassador being present for item No. 9), and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> (8) The Conference considered a Note from the French and Italian Naval Advisers<sup>2</sup> concerning the delivery to Italy and France of the equipment belonging to the light cruisers and destroyers destined to be incorporated in the French and Italian fleets (See my telegram No. 214, paragraph 8).<sup>3</sup> The Supreme Council at San Remo on the 26th April decided<sup>4</sup> that the French and Italian representatives on the Conference of Ambassadors might invoke any breaches of the Treaty of Versailles in order to demand the handing over of this equipment in accordance with the resolution of the Conference of Ambassadors of the 26th February. The Note now presented to the Conference gives a list of breaches of the naval clauses of the Treaty and on the strength of these demands the immediate surrender of the equipment. Recognising that the French and Italians had made out their case I agreed in principle with this proposal, but pointed out that as there were many very

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. A copy was transmitted to the Foreign Office under cover of Paris despatch No. 1823 of June 11.

<sup>3</sup> No. 14.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 20, minute 4 and appendix 10.

important matters for which the German Government would have to be called into account when all the breaches of the Treaty are reviewed as a whole by the Supreme Council at Spa, the Conference of Ambassadors would be ill-advised to deal piecemeal with these particular breaches and thereby prejudice the general question which is to be dealt with by the Supreme Council at Spa. My French and Italian colleagues pressed that the Conference should give effect to the proposals forthwith, but I insisted that before agreeing to this course I would have to refer the matter to my Government. I would be glad to be furnished, therefore, with early instructions. A copy of the Note of the French and Italian Naval Advisers, giving a list of the breaches on which they base their claim, is enclosed in my despatch No. 1823.<sup>5</sup> . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See n. 2 above.

## No. 96

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received June 13, 3.46 a.m.)*

*No. 340 Telegraphic [203388/40276/39]*

*Very urgent*

BERLIN, June 12, 1920, 9 p.m.

My telegram No. 311.<sup>1</sup>

Finnish Minister has just informed me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has just approached him for assistance in carrying on negotiation for sham purchase of rifles. Agent of German Government is in contact with vendor who requires certificate from representative of foreign Government that purchase is on its behalf and Finnish Minister has been asked to provide this.

He does not like business and would not enter on it unless Finnish interests were also served. He asks whether in return for his assistance in catching those implicated we will authorize him to buy war material from German Government up to the value of twenty million marks.

I have consulted General Bingham who does not feel justified in giving him any assurance in view of fact that proposal of Marshal Foch for sale of any German war material to Finland was rejected by Conference of Ambassadors. I have told Finnish Minister who wanted immediate reply as offer is by way of only being open until 7 o'clock tonight that I cannot do anything without reference to Your Lordship. He asks that an answer may be given as soon as possible.

German Government seems to be really on track of enormous deal which implicates many people in important positions and Minister of Defence has already asked General Bingham if Commission of Control will further investigation by issuing to pseudo-purchasers a permit to import arms. He hoped thus to induce vendors to come into open. But Commission of Control do not consider that they can be parties to such a transaction.

<sup>1</sup> No. 80.



No. 97

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received June 13, 12.55 p.m.)*

*No. 341 Telegraphic [203389/40276/39]*

*Secret*

BERLIN, June 12, 1920, 11.10 a.m. [? p.m.]

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Finnish Minister subsequently returned and said that on reflection he quite saw I could [sic] not grant him permission to buy German arms without reference to His Majesty's Government. He therefore wished to alter his proposition to mere request that I would recommend to Gen[er]als Bingham and Masterman to give him necessary permission. I said I did not think that I could do this but would reflect on matter. He interrupted hastily to say that he did not require any answer. I then said that I must tell him frankly that I did not think there was much chance of his request being complied with because . . .<sup>2</sup> I knew Allied Government[s] were opposed in principle to allowing sale of arms by Germany to any other Power. He mentioned that figure of 20 million marks which he had quoted was hasty estimate and indicated he would be content with less. He repeated that he did not ask for answer and took his leave. I have the impression that he will grant certificate which German Government require for furtherance of their plans.

<sup>1</sup> No. 96.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

No. 98

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 195 Telegraphic [203388/40276/39]*

*Very urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 13, 1920, 12.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 340.<sup>1</sup>

His Majesty's Government cannot take any part in the scheme. There is special reason for not authorizing Finland at this moment to purchase the arms contrary to spirit and letter of the Treaty of Peace, since there is no guarantee against their being used in possible conflict with Bolsheviks. We are now pledged not to supply arms to border States for such purpose.<sup>2</sup>

It is however unnecessary for you to give this explanation to Finnish Minister. It will be sufficient to say that His Majesty's Government do not see their way to modify their attitude in regard to disposal of arms which must under Article 169 of the Treaty be surrendered to the Allies to be destroyed.

Repeated to Paris No. 687.

<sup>1</sup> No. 96.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume XI, Nos. 305 and 366.

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 14)*

*No. 697 Telegraphic: by bag [203551/179657/39]*

PARIS, June 13, 1920

My telegram No. 674 of June 5th, Section 4.<sup>1</sup>

Strength of German Police Force.

General Sackville-West gives me following summary of the meeting of the Military Committee of Versailles this morning to discuss this matter. Begins:—

A meeting took place at the Invalides this morning to discuss the question of the strength of the German Police Force. Two important documents had been received yesterday:—

- (a) The report of the Rhineland High Commission giving their views as to Police in the occupied areas.<sup>2</sup>
- (b) A telegram from General Nollet giving the 1913 figures for Police in the Rhineland and the plebiscite areas.<sup>3</sup>
- (c) The purport of Sir Harold Stuart's<sup>4</sup> report was that the question of the strength of the Police Forces in the occupied areas was entirely a matter for the High Commission to deal with, that they were entirely satisfied with the present situation and did not consider an increase as necessary.
- (b) The figures given for the Police Forces in all the plebiscite areas in 1913 amounted to approximately 1,500 Police and 700 Gendarmes, and in the Rhineland 6,000 Police and 800 Gendarmes.

In a former meeting to discuss this subject it had been proposed to allow the Germans an increase of 70,000 in the strength of their Police, thus making the total strength 150,000 for all German territory, except such districts as had been definitely lost to Germany.

The French section had prepared a fresh draft in view of the information since received, recommending that the Germans should be allowed a police force of 145,000 men for all German territory exclusive of the plebiscite and occupied areas in which the plebiscite and Rhineland authorities are responsible. This involved the diminution of 5,000 from the original figure of 150,000 and had been decided on in view of their [*sic*] being no longer any necessity to include the Rhineland police.

General Sackville-West pointed out that the French draft was not definite enough with regard to such plebiscite areas as might eventually return to Germany, and allowed of the Germans maintaining an excessive force there. The draft was, in consequence, changed, and it is now recommended that the Germans shall be allowed to increase their police force up to 150,000; this force to cover all German territory, inclusive of such plebiscite areas as may return to Germany but exclusive of the Rhinish [*sic*] occupied districts.

<sup>1</sup> No. 87.      <sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 111, enclosure.      <sup>3</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>4</sup> British High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

No. 100

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)*

No. 1996 [202308/40276/39]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 15, 1920

Sir,

With reference to Lord Derby's despatch No. 1646 of May 29th<sup>1</sup> in regard to German war material in Holland, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter<sup>2</sup> from Messrs Martin and Hancock, a Cardiff firm, in regard to the attempted sale of a part of this war material.

2. Messrs Martin and Hancock's letter shows that the German Government have, in at least one case, not retained the ownership of this war material and that it has passed into private hands.

3. You should inform the Conference of Ambassadors of this fact in order that they may consider what measures should be taken. The firm have been told<sup>3</sup> that His Majesty's Government deprecate their engaging in any such transaction.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)

CHARLES TUFTON<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. It enclosed a copy of M. Millerand's communication of May 13 to Dr. Göppert. Cf. No. 67, n. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Of June 7, not printed. It reported an offer of a quantity of war material by an (unnamed) German firm.

<sup>3</sup> In a letter of June 14, not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Assistant Secretary superintending the Western, the League of Nations, and General Departments.

No. 101

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 702 Telegraphic [204013/179657/39]

*Very urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 16, 1920, 12.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 693 (of June 10th).<sup>1</sup>

I agree to the question of strength of German army being dealt with by Conference of Ambassadors. Your Excellency should act upon the recommendations of your military advisers, to whom views of War Office have already been communicated direct in a letter dated June 5th.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to proposals on last page of Allied Military Committee's report,<sup>3</sup> Army Council consider that disbandment of Sicherheitspolizei should not take place until German Government has had time to organise an increased force of at least 150,000 Ordnungspolizei as recommended in report. Three months should be sufficient for this and it should be made clear to German Government that complete disbandment of Sicherheitspolizei must take place by end of this period.

<sup>1</sup> No. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure in No. 83.

Army Council also consider that German Government should be informed that drafting of discharged Reichswehr soldiers from transitional army of 200,000 men (which is to be reduced to 100,000 men by July 10th) into Sicherheitspolizei will not be permitted and that it should be expressly laid down that present strength of Sicherheitspolizei is at no time to be exceeded.

Your Excellency will realise importance of despatch of reply to German note of April 20th at earliest possible date.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The gist of this telegram No. 702 was conveyed to M. Paul Cambon on June 16 in a note replying to M. de Fleuriau's memorandum of June 7 (No. 90 above).

## No. 102

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 25)*

*No. 751 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 23, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning at the Quai d'Orsay, Monsieur Cambon being in the chair, and Count Vannutelli Rey replacing the Italian Ambassador who was absent:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (3) It was decided to approve two recommendations of the Aeronautical Commission:

(a) That the Germans should be required to furnish the labour necessary to destroy the aeronautical material which the Allies did not exercise their right to have removed to Allied countries.<sup>2</sup>

(b) that Germany should be held responsible for the destruction of zeppelins which ought to have been surrendered under the clauses of the Treaty.<sup>3</sup> . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> On June 26 Air Commodore Masterman wrote to the President of the Luftfahrt-Friedenskommission protesting at the delays in carrying out the destruction, where necessary, of aeronautical spare parts and accessories; and requesting that all personnel concerned should receive the necessary orders 'in order to avoid what has already so frequently occurred, viz. the local authorities informing the inspecting Officers that they are without orders from you on the subject'.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 53, § 7 of the enclosure.

## No. 103

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 28)*

*No. 1995 [206209/40276/39]*

PARIS, June 24, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 1932 (201625/W/39) of the 9th instant<sup>1</sup> regarding the retention by Germany of certain aeronautical material, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a memorandum from the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

representative of the Air Ministry here to General Masterman, president of the Interallied Air Commission of Control in Berlin, which shows how this question now stands. General Groves<sup>2</sup> points out to me that this memorandum shows the necessity of all details concerning this question being decided by the Interallied Air Commission of Control in Germany.

As regards the aerodrome at Gelenkirschen [*sic*] mentioned in your despatch under reply, General Groves states that it is considered by General Masterman to be too small to be of any use to the Allies for civil aviation purposes.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

<sup>2</sup> Group Captain Groves held the equivalent rank of Brigadier General.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 103

*Group Captain Groves (Paris) to Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin)*

1/B/24

PARIS, June 18, 1920

With reference to the question of hangars to be left *in situ* in Germany for the use of the civil aircraft of the Allies:—At a meeting of the Commission on Air Clauses held on the 11th inst. it was decided that each of the Allied representatives should put forward a scheme shewing the requirements of his Government.

But on examining the demands submitted, it was found that the total number of aerodromes upon which hangars would be required was so large that their retention would entail encouraging Germany to maintain the greater part of the aerodromes at present existing in her territory. Thus, if this plan were to be adopted, the Allies would, in the interests of their civil aviation, leave to Germany a network of aerodromes which she might use, not only for civil, but also for future military purposes. This result would thus militate against the principal object of the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty, which is to deprive Germany of her military aviation and of all facilities for reconstructing it.

In view of these considerations, the matter was again discussed to-day by the Commission on Air Clauses and it was decided to send you a summary of the general requirements of the Allies as regards facilities for civil aviation in Germany, and to leave it to your Commission to decide to what extent these requirements could be met, subject to the paramount necessity of placing Germany 'hors de combat' from the point of view of military aviation.

I attach herewith the summary referred to above,<sup>3</sup> shewing the Allies' requirements. When your Commission has decided how far these requirements may be met, will you please forward the list to me for transmission to the Commission on Air Clauses.

P. R. C. GROVES,

*Group Captain, R.A.F., Air Representative*

<sup>3</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

No. 104

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Herr Mertens*

*EAM/2895/2 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, June 24, 1920

To the Director Peace Department Foreign Office, Berlin. (Copy to Luft-friko).

*Aerial Police Material*

In reply to your No. F. M. 6931/64509 of 18th June,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to inform you that the German Government's request to be allowed to retain 28 aeroplanes and 6 seaplanes for aerial police purposes cannot be entertained.

The whole question, together with the German Government's arguments for the retention of Aerial Police Force material, has been most carefully considered in Paris, and a definite decision on the matter arrived at.

I am required to carry out the strict execution of the Treaty in this respect, and would therefore request you to cause the necessary information to be conveyed to those concerned, in order that no further delays may occur in the handing over of this material.

Two cases have recently occurred in East Prussia of refusal to hand over police material.

E. A. MASTERMAN,  
*Air Commodore, R.A.F.*

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

No. 105

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received June 26, 1.40 a.m.)*

*No. 373 Telegraphic [205923/179657/39]*

*Confidential*

BERLIN, June 25, 1920, 8.20 p.m.

American Commissioner has been told by Minister of Defence Gessler that the Allied notes on reduction of Reichswehr<sup>1</sup> have created a very serious situation. Dr. Gessler will go to Spa and make one last appeal for reconsideration. If he is not listened to he will resign his office as he considers Communist rising will be inevitable result and that Germany will be faced with second revolution.

Telegram from His Majesty's Consul General Cologne repeated to Your Lordship in my telegram No. 370<sup>2</sup> goes some way to confirming communist

<sup>1</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, Nos. 166 and 168.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume IX, No. 540, n. 2.

danger but I hear that British Military authorities at Cologne who were expecting trouble two days ago have since received more reassuring reports.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Sir E. Crowe minuted as follows:

'We cannot take any action at present.

'It seems clear that the German government have carefully-laid plans for evading the disbanding of the forces required by the treaty. This question is bound to come up at Spa. It is possible that in anticipation of the Spa meeting, disturbances will be got up in various parts of Germany in order to demonstrate that the German govt. require larger forces to maintain order.

E. A. C.

June 26<sup>3</sup>

This minute was initialled by Lords Hardinge and Curzon.

## No. 106

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Manners<sup>1</sup> (Lima)*

*No. 29 Telegraphic [205581/40276/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 25, 1920, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 60 (of June 21st.<sup>2</sup> Sale of arms by German firm to Peru).

You should inform Peruvian Government that His Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand reasons for which this proposal has been put forward. It involves breach of paragraph 2, Article 170 of Treaty of Versailles to which Peruvian Government themselves are a party.

Peruvian Minister was informed in this sense on May 26th.<sup>3</sup>

We do not understand your proposal to refer to the League of Nations a matter in which they are in no way concerned.

<sup>1</sup> Temporarily in charge of H.M. Legation at Lima.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Curzon's note to this effect is not printed. The Peruvian Minister had written to Lord Curzon on May 18 to enquire whether such a purchase of German arms would on principle be objectionable to the Allied Governments.

## No. 107

*Report on a visit to the Königsberg Effectives Committee, by Brigadier-General Morgan<sup>1</sup>*

*[C 1030/1030/18]*

*June 25, 1920*

I arrived in Königsberg on June 13th and left there on June 18th. The main object of my visit was to discover what was being done by the German Authorities with men 'discharged' from the Reichswehr; this involved enquiries into the Wirtschaftsabteilungen and the Sicherheitspolizei, also

<sup>1</sup> This report was forwarded on July 9 by the War Office to the Foreign Office.

into the work of the Demobilization Centres (the Abwickelungs[s]tellen). During my visit I saw, in addition to the Officers of the Effectives Committee, Captain Luise, an Officer formerly on the Great General Staff and now on the staff of the Festungscommandant, Mr. Rennie, the British Commissioner at Allenstein, and Colonel Hawker who is now Inspector General of the Sicherheitspolizei in the Plebiscitary territory of the Allenstein Regierungsbezirk.

### *'Economic detachments'*

It seems clear that in East Prussia the reduction of the Reichswehr and the dissolution of the Free Corps have not resulted in the surplus effectives being returned to civil life and that there is a plan for keeping them together in semi-military formations. The circular of the German Government of May decreeing the abolition of 'economic detachments' (Wirtschaftsabteilungen) has remained a dead letter in East Prussia. They continue to exist. Their function appears to be not so much that of finding employment for the men who are, nominally at least, demobilized as for keeping a record of them; in this respect they take the place of the Abwicklung[ss]telle[n]. The 'military passes' of all the men demobilized from the 20th Brigade, for example, are sent to the economic detachments through which, therefore, all the men have to pass. Captain von Kreutz, formerly Adjutant to Colonel von Diebitsch the C.O. of the Diebitsch Free Corps, with whom the idea of these 'economic detachments' originated, states that the detachments will all be dissolved on June 30th because the German Government will then have been allowed a permanent [*sic*] Army of 200,000 Effectives. Presumably therefore the organization will continue to exist if his assumption that the Allied Powers were going to sanction the German claim is not confirmed by that date. They may thus serve the purpose of keeping together in a semi-military formation the 100,000 men whom the German authorities will have to discharge from the Reichswehr when the reduction of the Army to 100,000 is definitely imposed upon them.

The men in these detachments no longer keep their arms but they receive the field bonus (Kampf Zuschlag) paid to the men of the Reichswehr. They are getting not 4 marks a day but 18 which is roughly the pay of a private in the Reichswehr. They appear to do very little of the labour task, which was the ostensible object of the organization to find for them and, as they undergo no training, they are idle for most of their time although they occasionally hire out their transport to farmers and traders.

I visited one of their camps at Seeraken; the only evidence of any agricultural zeal was the presence of some fowls and pigs. In most cases they are quartered in the Reichswehr barracks. A 'Verein' or Federation of the economic detachments and 'staffs' is being formed for the whole of East Prussia and is being subsidized by private subscriptions from the Junker landowners. This Federation is also to include the 'Genossenschaft' [*sic*]—a variation of the type which it will be difficult for the Commission to suppress as its military character is elusive. This variety is a sort of hybrid,



partly military, partly agricultural. The men of these 'Genossenschaftien' [*sic*] are usually men of the Free Corps Units; they sign an agreement not to dissolve without a unanimous vote of all the men to that effect—an ingenious arrangement by which the association preserves the appearance of being voluntary and temporary while, once formed, it is both compulsory and perpetual unless the authorities assume the responsibility of dissolving it. The leader is a Free Corps Officer and through him the association contracts with Landlords to supply their estates with labour. The men are paid by the landowner; they receive no pay from the Reichswehr. They have kept their horses and apparently their transport generally and the hire of these to the landlord is part of the contract. It is a matter of some significance that these contracts all conform to a model contract drafted by Captain von Kreutz of the 'Economic Staff'. His offices were the subject of a surprise visit by Colonel Langlois and the Effectives District Committee—a visit which partook of the character of a raid, as, while Colonel Langlois engaged him in conversation, the rest of the Allied Officers suddenly scattered and each made for a different bureau. In these a good deal of evidence was discovered of large subscriptions from the 'Heimat-bund' (a militant Junker organization which has received 600 rifles from one of the Artillery Depots) and of arrangements by which in return for the loan of horses and transport the landowners undertake to subscribe to the organization the sum they would otherwise have to expend on the purchase of steam-tractors and draft-horses.

### *Sicherheitspolizei*

Independently of the economic detachments many of the men discharged from the Reichswehr are passed into the Sicherheitspolizei and there seems good reason to suppose that the [*sic*] whole units of the Reichswehr are thus accounted for. For example, two Reichswehr squadrons which formerly garrisoned Darkehmen have been replaced by two squadrons of mounted Sicherheitspolizei. At Pillau Sicherheitspolizei have replaced the Reichswehr garrison. Large numbers of Sicherheitspolizei are found in towns or villages with a small population (e.g. at Stallupönen where with a population of 1,500 there are 200 Sicherheitspolizei, at Goldup and [*sic*] at Darkehmen) and their presence there can hardly be explained by the exigencies of police duties or the duties of Grenz-polizei (Frontier police). The Grenz-polizei are always stationed in posts of six men, the Sicherheitspolizei are never found in smaller units than a century. The Effectives of the Sicherheitspolizei are undoubtedly undergoing considerable accessions of strength; the number in East Prussia cannot be less than 10,000, and two officers, one on the Effectives Committee, the other on the Armaments Committee, put the number as high as 14,000. These figures do not include the force in the Allenstein district.

At Allenstein I was shown by Colonel Hawker a table of the strength of the Sicherheitspolizei in that district. They number 4155, including 49 officers. Careful enquiries have been made by the Plebiscitary Commission into the history of each man with a view to discovery whether he was qualified to

vote in the plebiscite (the qualification is birth or 15 years' residence) and these enquiries show that the recruiting of the force was very largely local; for example 2683 men were either born in [the] Bezirk or had resided there 15 years. But of the remaining 1472 a considerable proportion (1124) had resided less than two years. The character of the force remains what it was when the Plebiscitary Commission took it over, i.e. it has not been converted into a mixed force of Germans and Poles as had been done at Marienwerder, but is exclusively German. It is commanded by a German Colonel under the orders of the Commission as represented by Colonel Hawker. I interrogated a German Officer of this force as to the conditions of enlistment and he informed me that no officer or man was bound to serve in it for more than three months. In reply to my remark that I understood that the term of engagement was 12 years he insisted that this was not the case and that 12 years represented the maximum, not the minimum, period for which an officer or man could engage, his engagement being, apparently always, terminable at 3 months' notice. The officer explained that he could only speak for the rural Sicherheitspolizei who are under a Regierungs-president; of the urban Sicherheitspolizei, who are always under a police president, he knew nothing.

The arrival of the Plebiscitary Commission at Allenstein with its mandate to take over the government of the Bezirk has had the advantage of giving us a unique opportunity of acquainting ourselves from the inside with the organization, recruitment and training of the Sicherheitspolizei in a particular district and I have obtained a copy of the Training Instructions which were found by the Commission in the offices of the Regierungs president after he had made a hurried departure. I have seen a number of other papers dealing with the organization and recruitment of the force before it was taken over by the Plebiscitary Commission. Like the Training Instructions<sup>2</sup> they establish beyond doubt the intention of the German Government to make the force a Reichswehr reserve but a 'reserve' which is always incorporated and always in training. Indeed the identity with the Reichswehr is so close as to make the two forces practically interchangeable. Although theoretically under the orders of the Regierungs president the force received its orders from the Army authorities, originally from the G.O.C. of the *XXth* Army Corps and presumably at a later date from the G.O.C. of the Wehrkreis No. 1. After the plebiscite the officers and men were to return into the Reichswehr, in which places were to be reserved for them. The officers and men were originally chosen from the Reichswehr, grade for grade, except that no one below the rank of lance-corporal could join the Sicherheitspolizei from the Army and all the men must have served at least a year in the field.<sup>3</sup> They drew their rations from the Reichswehr, were housed in

<sup>2</sup> *Note in original*: 'The Instructions provide for "Reichswehr Training" for the Sicherheitspolizei. The men are to be trained in tactical exercises (described as Kleines Kriegspiel), and the Artillery are to engage in Battery training.'

<sup>3</sup> *Note in original*: 'A certain number were recruited from the police with not less than 8 years' service. Also provision was made for the admission as auxiliaries (Hilfswachtmeister) of a certain number of soldiers from the ranks, i.e. who were not "Gefreite" and of N.C.Os. who had not attained the required age of 22 years. All the officers were to be

barracks, and had their own transport. They appear never to have done police duty as that term is ordinarily understood—for example they were never posted in police stations but were always kept together in units of not less than a 'century', i.e. a hundred men. At the time they were taken over by the Plebiscitary Commission they were found in possession of nearly their full complement of the armament shown in the annexed tables<sup>4</sup>, including field guns, light howitzers (1916 model) and Trench mortars. They were then at that time engaged in tactical exercises, such as attacks on positions in the open country round Allenstein. The force was clearly meant to be a 'troupe d'élite' and to constitute a school of N.C.O. instructors. The elasticity of the conditions of enlistment would make it very easy to pass through its ranks a number of men who should be highly trained for a short period while retaining a Corps of N.C.O. instructors. We have thus in Allenstein had under our eyes a working model of what the Sicherheitspolizei in the other districts of Germany were intended to be and still is [*sic*].

### *The Reichswehr*

On June 17 I had a conversation with Captain Luise, formerly of the Great General Staff, and now on the staff of the Festungs-commandant, in the course of which we discussed various questions as to the effectives, state of discipline and term of enlistment in the Reichswehr. I asked him how it was proposed to find the officers and men for the 390 guns which the authorities now claimed as essential to the system of fortified works at Königsberg. He said they could find them in the Reichswehr and they could manage with two men per gun (an N.C.O. and a gun-layer), the rest would be 'civilisten'. I asked him what the pre-war establishment for such an armament would be and he replied 3900 officers and men. When asked how 780 men could be sufficient, he repeated 'there will be the civil[i]sten'. We then discussed the state of discipline in the Army and I asked him how the appointment of Vertrauensleute (soldiers' delegates) as intermediaries between the Commanding Officer of a company and his men, as also the abolition of the military jurisdiction, could be made compatible with discipline. He replied that the Vertrauensmann was not allowed to interfere in disciplinary matters but was merely the spokesman of the men in such matters as requests for leave. As for the proposed abolition of military jurisdiction this was mere 'newspaper talk'.

On the subject of the term of enlistment in the Reichswehr Captain Luise was enlightening. He said that there would be no difficulty at all in securing men for a 12 years' term of enlistment even for an army of 200,000 effectives; the state of the Labour Market made it easy enough to secure recruits. He not only thought a voluntary army with a 12 years' term of enlistment possible; he expressed a strong preference for it to conscription. Conscription, he explained, would mean the incorporation of undesirable revolutionaries from the old army or from the Reichswehr, grade for grade. At the time the regulation was issued (9th October 1919) the Sicherheitspolizei "officials" were still called officers; and majors in the force were to be chosen from Majors in the Army, Captains from Captains.'

<sup>4</sup> Not annexed to the filed copy.

tionary elements in the Army from the Ruhr and other industrial districts whereas by voluntary recruiting they would be enabled to get picked men of the agricultural class in East Prussia. He seemed, however, to regard the Sicherheitspolizei as an embarrassing [*sic*] rival in this respect—they were taking too many men who were wanted for the Army; men preferred the Sicherheitspolizei, he explained, because they had plenty of time to ‘go to sleep’ (einschlafen) there.

As a matter of fact, both the Reichswehr and the Sicherheitspolizei [*sic*] appear to be in a very fluid state in East Prussia and in neither force does any serious attempt appear to have been made to enlist men for more than three months at a time. Judging by the appearance of the men, the Sicherheitspol[i]zei is much the better disciplined and more seasoned force of the two, which is not surprising in view of the conditions as to rank and previous war service which are required of them. Moreover, training appears to be much more active among them. In the Reichswehr it is very intermittent and, although Colonel Langlois estimated that the Reichswehr Brigades in Wehrkreis No. 1 have renewed 50 per cent of their effectives since January last, it is doubtful if many of them have done a complete musketry course; they have, however, a big stiffening of N.C.Os. and I was told by Major Hennessey that there are many N.C.Os. serving as privates. The Reichswehr soldiers I saw were wearing the uniforms of regiments of the old army and in Schützen Regiment No. 1, two of the battalions of which have taken the names and wear the uniforms of old regiments (the 1st and 3rd Battalions are called the 1st and 3rd Grenadiers respectively), the men were of good appearance and physique.

### *General Remarks*

East Prussia presents a special case. It is the traditional stronghold, as in 1813 it was the refuge, of Prussian militarism and this tradition is now strengthened by political circumstances which tend to develop in its people a feeling that they have got to look after themselves. The territorial isolation produced by the creation of the Polish ‘corridor’ has, as a German officer remarked to me, made of East Prussia a political ‘island’. The economic policy of the Government, particularly its policy of Food Control (Zwangswirtschaft) which fixes maximum prices for agricultural products deeply resented as it is by this essentially agricultural community, has deepened this feeling of isolation from the rest of Germany into a sentiment very like estrangement. The ‘Polish question’ remains a question, for the Poles seem unable to let well alone. Their Consul at Königsberg has complained that ‘the British’ will make it difficult for the Poles to ‘take Königsberg’ because we are too favourable to the claims of the German Government to retain guns for the defence of the city. At Allenstein they industriously spread stories of German atrocities; when asked by the British Commissioner for evidence, an itinerant Consul produced a healthy looking Pole with the remark ‘Cet homme était trois fois massacré’. The provocative conduct of the Poles, their shrill complaints, their intemperate ambitions, have knit the

community still closer together and the Polish corridor, cutting off all direct railway communication with Berlin, is to Eastern Germany what the English Pale was to Ireland—'like a spear-point embedded in the living body it inflames all around it'. The result is an intense nationalism, none the less intense in that it often takes the form of a demand for provincial autonomy. The decrees of the Berlin Government, which, as a Socialist Government, is abhorrent to most of the people, are only obeyed when it suits the temper of the Province. Emissaries of that Government—a Reichs Kommissar named Borowski and a Herr Lubbring who was made Prefect of Police at Königsberg with authority over the Sicherheitspolizei of the whole Province—arrived some time ago with a mission to 'purify' the local administration and the Police of reactionary elements. They were met with stubborn opposition by the Landräte and the police officials and after the General Election they ignominiously retired. The provincial President, although a Socialist nominee, is believed to be playing into the hands of the G.O.C. of the Wehrkreis and the military party. The strong military feeling of the Province finds expression in all sorts of forms—in voluntary associations such as the Einwohnerwehren, the Heimat-Bund, the Kriegervereine, and the Genossenschaften. Organizations as to the spontaneity of which there can be no doubt. At Cranz I saw a 'Fest' of a Kriegerverein; men of good physique who, headed by a Reichswehr band, marched in excellent order through the streets. There are many such 'Verein[e]' and I was told that the books of the Artillery Depots showed that rifles had been issued to them. Probably most of the men of military age have a rifle in their possession.

The Einwohnerwehren here represent a type very different to the middle-aged and elderly men who, elsewhere, particularly in Bavaria, are concerned merely to protect their own homes against the Spartacists. Spartacism is not, and never has been, the present danger in East Prussia which it has been and is in Bavaria. The Einwohnerwehren in East Prussia, who have not only rifles but light and heavy machine guns, are nearly all men of military age, fit for general service. On the occasion of the Kapp 'Putsch' they all turned out in full kit and uniform and relieved the Reichswehr of guard duty. Colonel Langlois informed me that they include a special formation of picked men chosen to act as 'Stoss-truppen'. None of their arms have been surrendered. The temper of this virile community is well expressed in the remarks made by a local schoolmaster to one of our interpreters, an Alsatian, whom he mistook for a German; 'We must first crush Poland, this bug ('Wanze') which the Entente has stuck in the small of our backs; then we will settle our account with the French'.

J. H. MORGAN,  
*Brig. General*

No. 108

*Lord Kilmaonock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received June 28, 10 a.m.)*

*No. 378 Telegraphic [206294/179657/39]*

BERLIN, June 26, 1920, 7.45 a.m.

My telegram No. 373.<sup>1</sup>

I learn from person intimately acquainted with Doctor Gessler that latter was still hesitating to notify whether he would go to Spa but, that in view of statement in Havas Agency that possibility of negotiations on the subject of reduction of Reichswehr Corps exists he decided to remain in office. I am given to understand that he is ready to accept final reduction to 100,000 men but considers it impossible to carry out, at present moment, when country is passing through severe industrial crisis and unemployment is increasing. I am told that he honestly considers danger of trouble to be so great that he cannot be responsible for maintenance of order with reduced force prescribed by Allies. He argue(?s) moreover that to throw another 100,000 men out of employment at such a moment will be merely to force them to join either Communists or Nationalists.

Same source states that new Minister for Foreign Affairs and Gessler will be German representatives at Spa.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 105.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe minuted on this telegram: 'This means that the Germans will go to Spa. I have no doubt that they will eventually yield on the military question. E. A. C. June 28.' This minute was initialled by Lords Hardinge and Curzon. A new government, in which Dr. Simons was Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been formed by Herr Fehrenbach on June 25.

No. 109

*Lord Kilmaonock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received June 27, 10.35 a.m.)*

*No. 374 Telegraphic [206090/179657/39]*

June 26, 1920, 3.25 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

General Malcolm has received information that Commanding Officers of Reichswehr yesterday informed Minister of Defence that they refused to be responsible for reduction of their units to numbers demanded by Allies by July 10th.

It is currently reported that Doctor Gessler was on point of resigning yesterday and only decided to enter new Cabinet in view of assurances of support which he received from officers mentioned above.

It would seem that we may expect an agitation against reduction of Reichswehr on same lines as was produced by demand for surrender of war criminals but I am assured from a Socialist source that it will not have support of working classes.

<sup>1</sup> No. 105.

*Report on the Execution of the Military Articles of the Peace Treaty with Germany*<sup>1</sup>

[206846/40276/39]

*Secret*

- A.—Appreciation of the Situation by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control.  
B.—Detailed statement of progress up to date.  
Annexes to Report B.<sup>2</sup>

A.—APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BY THE INTER-ALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION OF CONTROL, 19TH JUNE, 1920

The following are extracts from the reports of the Sub-Commissions of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control regarding the general execution of the military Articles of the Peace Treaty:—

1. REPORT BY THE ARMAMENTS SUB-COMMISSION

Major-General the Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham reports as follows:—

‘I cannot put my finger on any definite violation of the Treaty, as regards the disarmament clauses, with the exception of the small incidents alluded to under Article 168, viz., the manufacture of 77-mm. guns at Essen; and under Article 169, the destruction by the German Government of war material between the 10th January and the 10th March.

‘Generally speaking, the disarmament clauses are being carried out. In my opinion, however, a state of internal chaos is preventing the disarmament being carried out as fully and as quickly as it would be if law and order prevailed in the country.

‘So far as the German Government itself is concerned, and the people themselves, I believe they are anxious to carry out the disarmament clauses quickly, but as regards the military party, they undoubtedly snatch at any interpretation of a clause which appears to favour their point of view, and which will allow them to increase the armament over and above that authorized.

‘Destruction of war material is being carried out under the supervision of the different district committees into which the Armament[s] Sub-Commission is organized, and while progress was very slow at the beginning, it is now improving. The German authorities have been and are still hoping for a larger army than the 100,000 men, and it is this, and a natural disinclination to give up their arms, which have caused the progress up to the present to have been slow. It has to be remembered that owing, first, to the *Auslie-*

<sup>1</sup> This report was circulated for information by the Secretary of State for War on June 28 and it was received in the Foreign Office on June 30. The four Appendices are not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Of these 23 Annexes 10 are not here printed; the remainder are covered elsewhere in this Chapter or in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

*ferungsfrage* (surrender of German officers)<sup>3</sup> and then to the general strike and rebellion, at least six weeks' work has been lost.

'The following four points must be held to, if the questions arise at the Spa Conference:—

- (i) The guns they are proposing to keep for the fortresses must be surrendered.
- (ii) No obstacles must be placed in the way of the work of the Control Commission, and the duty of the German liaison officers is to assist the Commission in its work, and not to hinder it; the right to go where they like and when they like, as laid down in Article 205, must be insisted on for the members of the Commission.
- (iii) The rifles, machine guns, &c., now in the country must be discovered and handed over.
- (iv) A law must be brought in at once preventing the export of war material, and the Germans must establish the strictest control on their ports to prevent this traffic.'

## 2. REPORT BY THE EFFECTIVES SUB-COMMISSION

The German Government has made an effort to carry out the reduction of its armed forces.

The measures taken are not exactly in accordance with Articles 160 and 163 of the Peace Treaty, but in principle they give satisfaction on the following points:—

- (a) The disbandment of the old army.
- (b) The formation of an army of 200,000 men (the German Government reported that the army would be reduced to this strength by the 15th May, and on the 10th June issued a statement by Wireless Press to the effect that this had been done and the forces in the neutral zone reduced to 10 battalions, 5 squadrons and 1 battery); in the matter of staffs and organization, however, this force does not comply exactly with the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

The German Government has also issued orders for the dissolution and disarmament of the unauthorized reserve formations (*Einwohnerwehren* and *Zeitfreiwilligen*).

The dissolution of the *Einwohnerwehren* is meeting with very strong opposition in the country, particularly in Bavaria, and there is no evidence to show that the measures of disarmament and disbandment are likely to prove effective.

General Nollet has written to the German Government demanding—

- (i) The formulation of proposals for the surrender of the arms of the *Einwohnerwehren*.
- (ii) Information as to the measures taken by the German Government to give effect to its decision of 8th April to suppress the *Einwohnerwehren*.

<sup>3</sup> i.e. those accused of war crimes.



On the other hand, nothing has so far been done to bring the police forces into conformity with the Peace Treaty, and to change the military characteristics of the *Sicherheitspolizei*; on the contrary, this force is being further developed.

No effort has yet been made to satisfy Article 211 of the Treaty, which demands that German laws should be brought into harmony with the military clauses of the Peace Treaty.

A letter from the German Government to the Commission of Control, dated 5th May,<sup>4</sup> states, however, that a new *Reichswehr* law has been submitted to the *Reichsrat*, which formally suppresses all former military laws, including compulsory service.

### 3. REPORT BY THE FORTIFICATIONS SUB-COMMISSION

The Fortifications Sub-Commission was completely organized with the whole machinery of control ready to supervise the immediate execution of the Articles of the Peace Treaty concerned, on the 10th January, 1920.

Although 5 months have elapsed since that date, to all intents and purposes the *real* work of dismantling has not yet been begun by the German authorities, although disarmament is practically completed.

The putting in hand of the work has been delayed by quibbling over the legal interpretation of certain Articles of the Peace Treaty, involving the questions of 'recording' and 'dismantling' of fortifications.

The general attitude of the German authorities seems to be well calculated to delay the execution of the Articles concerned. It appears to be one of passive obstruction, yielding gradually under pressure, and consuming time. It results that, as far as can be foreseen, the complete execution of the Articles in question is unlikely before the end of this year; and it is certain that it is not possible for them to carry out the work of dismantling the Rhine fortresses, in the unoccupied territory east of the Rhine, by the date on which the work is due for completion (10th July), under Article 180 of the Peace Treaty.

#### *Decisions of the Supreme Council at Boulogne, 22nd June, 1920*

The following decisions of the Supreme Council are given in Appendix IV (A):—

- (i) Decision regarding German disarmament and the reduction of the German Army to 100,000; also regarding the German Police and the export of war material.<sup>5</sup>
- (ii) Decision regarding the sale of surrendered German war material by the Reparations Commission.<sup>6</sup>

Appendix IV (B) contains the Note addressed to the German Peace Commission in Paris by the Conference of Ambassadors,<sup>7</sup> communicating the decisions of (i) above.

<sup>4</sup> See under *Article 173* below.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 36, minute 1 and n. 2, and minute 3 and n. 5.

<sup>6</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 36, minute 2 and appendix 2.

<sup>7</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 168.

B.—DETAILED STATEMENT OF PROGRESS UP TO 19TH JUNE,  
1920

*Article 42.—No Fortifications to be Maintained or Constructed West of a Line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine*

This is being complied with. (See also Article 180.)

*Article 43.—No Troops allowed in Neutral Zone. Permanent Works for Mobilization forbidden there. (Subsequently modified by Marshal Foch on 8th August, 1919,<sup>8</sup> and 20 battalions, 10 squadrons and 2 batteries allowed; this to be reduced to 10 battalions, 5 squadrons and 1 battery by the 10th June, and completely replaced by Police by the 10th July, 1920)*

(a) The portion of this Article which prohibits the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization was allocated recently to the Fortifications Sub-Commission of Control, with a note from General Nollet instructing the Sub-Commission to prepare a list of the type of works which should be destroyed.

The view of the British Section, supported by the legal opinion of Brigadier-General Morgan, was submitted through the President of the Fortifications Sub-Commission to General Nollet, that the Treaty does not authorize the destruction of these works, and the Commission could not call upon the German Government to undertake the destruction nor to incur the expense of removing or destroying such works. The Treaty only forbids 'upkeep,' and the works must consequently fall into decay.

General Nollet has forwarded a letter to the German Government stating that these works must disappear, either by destruction or by the removal of material, and requesting information about these works.

(b) On the 10th June the German Government issued the following statement by wireless press:—

'The reduction of the German Army to 200,000 men has been accomplished. From to-day there are only—

10 battalions,  
5 squadrons,  
1 battery,

garrisoned in the 50-kilometre zone on the right bank of the Rhine, in accordance with the Versailles Treaty.'

The Commission of Control has since reported that these reductions have been effected.

Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>9</sup>

*Articles 159, 160, 163.—Demobilization and Reduction to 200,000 by 10th April and 100,000 (7 Infantry and 3 Cavalry Divisions) by 10th July*

*Article 159. Demobilization.*—The German military forces have been progressively demobilized and it does not appear that any units or formations

<sup>8</sup> See Volumes I, No. 31, minute 6 and appendix E, and IX, No. 33, enclosure 2.

<sup>9</sup> The list which follows is not printed.

of the old army of any military value exist. A considerable number of officers and men are, however, still borne on the strength of the demobilization offices and dépôts (*Abwickelungsämter* and *-stellen*). This personnel was, according to a note of the German Government, dated 28th January, to be 'demilitarized' by 31st March. A regulation has been published in German 'Army Orders' of 22nd March announcing that the officers and men so employed were to be 'discharged from army service' on 9th April. The value of this regulation is dealt with under Article 173.

*Reduction.*—(See under Articles 160 and 163.)

*Articles 160 and 163.*—In virtue of these Articles, as modified in their operation by the resolution of the Supreme Council, the German Army should have been reduced to 200,000 effectives by 10th April. This was not done. In the opinion of the Effectives Sub-Commission, the strength of the German Army (*Reichswehr* and *Freikorps*) on the 10th May was 270,000, exclusive of the personnel of the demobilization offices and dépôts.

An Army Order, dated 6th March, communicated to the Commission on 2nd April, purported to provide for the reduction of the German Army by 1st April to—

8,475 officers, 207,538 other ranks (total 216,013), an excess of 475 officers and of 15,538 other ranks over the numbers (8,000 officers, 192,000 other ranks) prescribed.<sup>10</sup>

In reply to a request to be furnished with the actual number of effectives, a letter was received from General von Cramon undertaking that 'it shall be reduced to 200,000 by 15th May at latest.'

On the 10th June the German Government issued a statement by Wireless Press to the effect that the reduction of the army to 200,000 men had been accomplished.

The Commission of Control has since reported that this reduction has been effected.

*Section 2 of Article 160.*—Divisions' and Army Corps' headquarters are nominally organized in the army order referred to, in accordance with the Treaty. Actually, there is little real similarity (see under Section (3)).

The number and strengths of the units of infantry, artillery, engineers technical, &c., services and troops do not correspond with the table of the Peace Treaty. There is, in particular, an excess of infantry battalions, batteries and pioneer battalions.

*Section 3.*—The prohibition of the maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organizations for the command of troops has not been complied with:—

- (a) There are 14 *Reichswehr* brigade staffs. These are forbidden.
- (b) There are 9 cavalry brigade staffs. These are forbidden.
- (c) There is a considerable excess of staffs of 'divisional infantry' and 'divisional artillery.'

<sup>10</sup> Note in filed copy: 'The excess over 200,000 represents the forces in the neutral zone which the Germans maintained should not be included in the 200,000 army.'

The excess number of staffs amounts to 24.

There are certain formations forbidden by the Treaty, e.g., heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns.

- (d) The unauthorized reserve formations (*Zeitfreiwilligen* and *Einwohnerwehren*)<sup>11</sup> have officially been disbanded by the German Government, and orders have been issued for their arms to be handed to the *Sicherheitspolizei*. The *Zeitfreiwilligen* can be considered as definitely suppressed, but events alone will show if the suppression is genuine; the opposition throughout the country, particularly in Bavaria, to the disbandment of the *Einwohnerwehren* is very great.

#### *Organization for Preparation for War*

(a) The Great General Staff appears to have been abolished, but is represented by a Demobilization Office (*Abwickelungsamt*). Certain sections have been transferred to civil departments.

(b) The old Army Corps Headquarters are said to have been dissolved leaving nothing but their organs of demobilization.

(c) The recruiting offices are stated to have been 'demilitarized' and placed under a civil department to deal with pensions and claims of discharged soldiers.

(d) Administrative services. The number of officers employed in the *Reichswehrministerium* and in the administrations attached to it is stated by the German Government to be 440. This is well below the authorized number ( $300 \times 2$ , i.e., 600). Some sections have, however, been transferred to civil departments, e.g., 'Q' services to the Finance Ministry, Medical Services to the Ministry of Labour.

#### Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>12</sup>

*Article 161.—Administrative Services (civil personnel) to be reduced in each class to one-tenth of Establishment of Budget of 1913*

Owing to the transfer of services referred to under Article 160, no reliable particulars are forthcoming as to civilian personnel.

*Article 162.—Number of employees or officials of German States, such as Customs Officers, Forest Guards and Coastguards not to exceed strength of 1913, and not to be assembled for military training. The number of police only to be increased in proportion to increase of population*

The number of police exceeds the ratio laid down in this Article. Representations have been made by the German Government requesting an increase of 75 per cent. over the ratio prescribed in the Treaty. This question is still under consideration.

<sup>11</sup> *Note in filed copy*: 'The dissolution of the *Zeitfreiwilligen* was ordered for 31st March. A circular, dated 8th April, has been addressed by the German Government to all the States, ordering the dissolution of the *Einwohnerwehren* as prescribed by the Commission.'

<sup>12</sup> The list which follows is not printed.

The last clause of this Article, forbidding military training in the police, as also the second clause of the third section of Article 160 forbidding the 'maintenance of forces differently grouped,' is violated by the recruiting, maintenance and training of the *Sicherheitspolizei* (now 60,000 strong).

Exclusive of the *Sicherheitspolizei*, the strength of the police in territory remaining German was 80,000 in 1913, and is now 92,000.

As regards the gendarmerie, their strength was 12,000 in 1913, and is 16,000 at present. The question has been raised of increasing their strength to 17,000.

Germany has no special coastguards, such duty being performed by Customs officers. The latter and the forest guards have no military organization. Their strength has not been communicated to the Commission.

#### Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>13</sup>

*Article 164.—Armament allowed to Germany until admitted as a Member of the League of Nations—for 100,000 Army*

Owing to the alteration in the dates for the reduction of the German Army, and also to the late disturbances in the Ruhr district, it has not yet been reduced even to 200,000 men. Units are still being moved about the country, and until the army of 100,000 men is in its permanent stations, it will be impossible to arrive at the exact amount of equipment which will have to be handed over, and which is surplus to the amount authorized by Tables 2 and 3 of Article 169.

*Article 165.—Maximum number of Guns, Machine Guns, Trench Mortars, Rifles and amount of Ammunition allowed during the period of the reduction of the Army to 100,000*

Heavy artillery, anti-aircraft guns and aviation formations which are forbidden by the Treaty, still exist and have equipment. See also Articles 167 and 169.

*Article 166.—Maximum Stocks of Ammunition Authorized*

See also Article 164.

*Article 167.—Limitation of Armament and Munitions in Fortresses which Germany is permitted to retain*

Major-General Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham states—

This Article, owing to its wording, is, in my opinion, the most serious difficulty we have to face. The Germans claim that, by the word *armament* of the fortresses and strong places, they are allowed to keep a mobile defence for them. Accordingly they have sent in a list of the guns which they propose to keep for these 14 fortresses, amounting to 4,100 guns—field, light, heavy and anti-aircraft. The Commission of Control are reading this clause to mean guns in position in the fortresses for which positions have been genuinely prepared, similarly to the armament of the fortresses and fortifications mentioned in Article 196, paragraph 2, where the words used are: ' . . . those in

<sup>13</sup> The list which follows is not printed.

position at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.' The German Government have been informed that their claim cannot be admitted, and that only two of the fortresses—namely Pillau and Swinemünde, meet the above conditions. They have also been informed that as regards the fortresses of Königsberg, Cüstrin and Ulm, if they can furnish a statement showing that emplacements have actually been prepared in these fortresses, and what calibre guns they propose to use, we will re-examine the question.

The German Government are holding strongly to their interpretation of the clause, and state that there can be no object in allowing these fortresses to be left in existence if they are not permitted to keep guns in them. They also argue that these fortresses can be their only defence from attacks by Poland or Czecho-Slovakia. Our argument is that the Peace Treaty visualises an army of 100,000 men with 288 guns, and that to leave a mobile armament of 3,800 guns (armament of 34 divisions) is unthinkable. We have also informed the German Government that if these fortresses are to be armed in the manner in which they wish, they would require a personnel for the manning of the guns which could only be drawn from reserve troops, which reserve is unauthorized.

I repeat that I look on this clause as the most important of the whole of the armament clauses, and I hope that if the German Government bring up the question at Spa the demand will be refused.

NOTE.—Since the above was written, General Bingham has reported that the German Government have yielded under protest to the Allied contention that guns may only be retained in the fortresses of Königsberg, Pillau, Swinemünde, Küstrin and Ulm, and have now put forward a proposal for the retention of 836 guns in these five fortresses, which, although a reduction on their original proposals, is still considered excessive, and it is not intended to agree without further consideration.

#### Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>13</sup>

##### *Article 168.—Control and closing down of Factories*

The German Government have been informed that they may keep two factories for guns, two for machine guns and rifles and two for ammunition, and they have also been informed of the capacity for output to which these factories should be restricted.

They are arguing this decision and state that the above Article does not restrict the amount which they may be allowed to manufacture. The right of the Allied and Associated Powers to lay down the amount to be manufactured will be insisted upon.

The final decision regarding the classification of authorized war factories has not yet been arrived at.

The German proposals which have been received, and which cover 45 factories, cannot be admitted

As the question interests both the Naval and Aeronautical Commissions as well as the Military Commission it has been decided, on the suggestion of

General Bingham, President of the Armaments Sub-Commission, to carry out a joint investigation into this matter. Representatives of the three Inter-Allied Commissions have been deputed to do this.

Although in the second part of this Article it states that: 'Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions, or any war material whatever shall be closed down,' owing to the enormous quantity of factories in Germany, the work is only practically in its infancy. There are many thousands of factories in Germany—approximately 15,000 in Prussia alone—and the question is a matter of time.

Detailed inspections are being made, and instructions are being given as to the transformation or disposal of machinery. Up to the present, 1,048 factories have been inspected or are in the course of inspection, while 676 have been given a free certificate.

When fuller information has been received it is hoped that many of the smaller factories may be eliminated, and the only possible way we can compete with the work will be to deal only with the more important ones. The only incident of importance which is raising a certain amount of excitement is that of a preliminary inspection at Krupps at Essen, where it was discovered that they were completing an order for some 77-mm. guns. Manufacture has been stopped and an explanation has been obtained.

#### *Article 169.—Surrender of War Material*

Major-General the Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham states:—

The return given in Annexe No. 16<sup>14</sup> shows the amount of war material surrendered by Germany, also the amount destroyed by the German Government both before control and since control was instituted.

The list of guns is, in my opinion, satisfactory; the list of rifles and machine guns unsatisfactory. It is stated by the authorities that rifles and machine guns have been sold and stolen, and that owing to the disturbed state of the country it is impossible to discover their whereabouts.

By the decision of the Council of Ambassadors,<sup>15</sup> Article 169 of the Peace Treaty has been read that the material after destruction is the property of the Allies and is to be sold by the Reparations Commission, and the amount received credited to the German Reparation Account. This decision is causing much delay in the work of the Commission.

The second clause of Article 169 states that the surrender is to be effected at such points in German territory as may be selected by the Allied Powers, and that arms, munitions and war material will be delivered to the said Powers who will decide as to their disposal. Owing to the difficulties of transport this has been waived and material in the various depôts, some 160 in number, is being destroyed *in situ*.

*Re* the 3rd paragraph, with reference to armament, munitions and war material of non-German origin, lists have been furnished by the German Government, and it has been left to each nationality to dispose of its own

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

<sup>15</sup> See No. 8, § 4 a.

material as it thinks fit. On behalf of the British Government, I am making arrangements through an officer of the Ministry of Munitions Disposals Board to sell this material in Germany for the credit of the Disposals Board. The quantities surrendered—especially in guns—appear very inadequate in view of the losses which we know of. But, according to the statement of the German Government—which there is no opportunity of verifying—guns and gun-barrels were immediately broken up and used for raw material.

With reference to the question of the surrender of war material, we find that a considerable amount has already been destroyed by the Germans before the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and destruction continued up to the 10th March, when the lists of material were supplied to us, and on which date we assumed control of the material.

NOTE.—The Foreign Office take the view that the material surrendered under Article 169 becomes the absolute property of the Allies as decided by the Conference of Ambassadors on the 10th February, 1920. The Foreign Office holds, however, that the object of this Article and the accompanying Articles was to ensure the reduction of German armaments to the prescribed quantity and that any material existing in Germany when the Treaty began to operate, i.e., on 10th January, in excess of the quantity allowed, became the property of the Allied Powers in order that it should be destroyed. This, however, does not, in their view, mean that Germany was not at liberty before that date to take steps to reduce her armaments by destroying some of the material herself, and it is, therefore, only the material which remained after such destruction, and after destruction of the quantity allowed, which became the property of the Allies under Article 169.

Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>16</sup>

*Article 170.—Prohibition of Import and Export of War Material*

Major-General the Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham states:—

The German Government have informed the Control Commission that they have issued orders on the subject of import and export of material, but have not issued a law on the matter, and they have been requested to do so. There is no doubt that a large quantity of material has been stolen and sold to foreign countries.

My private information is that the German Government are doing their best to stop this export of war material, and state that *Schieber* (profiteers) in collusion with manufacturers have exported quantities of material, and the German Government have been unable to prevent it. They are, however, now taking steps to make more stringent regulations at the ports to attempt to stop this illicit export.

Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>16</sup>

*Article 171.—Prohibition of Gas and Tanks*

Major-General the Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham states:—

The manufacture of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases has stopped,

<sup>16</sup> The list which follows is not printed.



and so far as possible, steps are taken in the chemical factories to prevent further manufacture. As a matter of fact, these steps can only be successful to a very limited extent, as an article such as chlorine is employed in every day use.

The German Government have been informed that *Flammenwerfer* cannot be allowed in future, but they have written stating that *Flammenwerfer* do not come under the head of this article, as they are not asphyxiating or poisonous, and they are only for moral effect. This contention cannot be agreed to, and the German Government has been informed that the manufacture of *Flammenwerfer* cannot be permitted and have been requested to furnish a statement giving the number and location of all *Flammenwerfer* existing in Germany, whether in the hands of the troops or not, in order that the District Committees may control their destruction.

*Article 172.—Information required as to Chemical Preparations*

The documents asked for in the above Article with reference to the chemical and explosive secrets have been handed over to the Control Commission.

The German Committee of Experts have stated that they are prepared to answer any questions which the Commission of Control may wish to ask.

This clause has been completely carried out.

*Article 173.—Abolition of Compulsory Service*

A letter dated 5th May has been received from the German Government in reply to the letter of 8th March in which General Nollet called for the abolition of the laws relating to compulsory service. This is the first communication which the Commission of Control have received from the German Government on the subject. It embodies a Note from the *Reichswehrministerium* which is sufficiently important to reproduce in full. It is as follows:—

The old compulsory service army is dissolved. No control will be exercised over the men liberated (reserves). The new army will be constituted by voluntary enlistments, conformably to paragraph 2 of the law on the constitution of a provisional *Reichswehr*, dated 6th March, 1919.

The men belonging to the reserve are, by decree of 21st January, 1920, released from all military obligations and in consequence are subject to no military service.

For all practical purposes universal compulsory service is, therefore, in reality suppressed. The formal suppression of the former military laws is projected in the new law constituting the *Reichswehr* which has been submitted to the *Reichsrat* but which the National Assembly has as yet, in consequence of more urgent tasks, been unable to vote.

This is the first admission the Commission of Control have had of the truth of their contention that the legal obligation still exists.

A letter, dated 6th May, has also been received from General von Cramon enclosing a copy of the law on the formation of a provisional *Reichswehr* (6th

March, 1919), and of a law (dated 31st March, 1920), of one paragraph, prolonging this law 'until the expiration of the day on which the law on the *Reichsheer* (the Peace Army) shall be published.' This law did nothing to abolish compulsory service; it merely empowered the President to demobilize or dissolve (*aufzulösen*) the existing army and to form a provisional *Reichswehr*: General von Cramon also refers the Commission to the Orders published in the 'Army Orders Gazette' for the execution of this law. These decrees have been examined and they leave the question where it was. One of the most recent relating to the reserve (*Beurlaubtenstand*) appeared in 'Army Orders' of 24th April (No. 29) and, as before, merely released the reserve from 'all military relations' (*aus jeglichem Militärverhältnis*).

On the 1st June, Wolff's telegraphic Agency communicated to the German Press a statement, said to have been received from a well-informed source, to the effect that the National Assembly, in ratifying the Treaty of Peace, had legally carried into effect the abolition of universal military service, as laid down by Article 173 of the Treaty, and that thereby any earlier regulations to the contrary had become invalid.<sup>17</sup> As a consequence of this, and the fact that the former Constitution, by which universal military service was established, had been repealed by the Constitution of the 11th August, 1920 [1919], no necessity exists for a special executive law.

#### Decisions and Letters

1. Decisions of the Supreme Council at Boulogne, 22nd June, 1920, regarding compulsory service. (Appendix IV.)<sup>18</sup>

#### *Article 174.—Period of Enlistment for Non-Commissioned Officers and Men*

So far as is known, no steps have been taken by the German authorities to enlist non-commissioned officers and men for the prescribed period of 12 years. Men are enlisted and trained on a short term of 3 to 6 months.

In this respect the position is very unsatisfactory, but preliminary administrative measures regarding the 12-year term of enlistment have, however, been taken.

#### *Article 175.—Officers retained in the Army must serve up to the age of 45 at least; Officers newly appointed, for 25 years at least*

Officers as regards their engagement are in the same position as men in the matter of enlistment.

As regards clause 3 of this Article, it is uncertain whether officers who have previously belonged to the old army and are not retained in the new army have been released from all military obligations. Army Orders have been issued which purport to release officers and men from military 'relations'; these Orders are regarded by the Commission as worthless so long as the laws relating to universal compulsory service remain unrepealed.

<sup>17</sup> See No. 85.

<sup>18</sup> See n. 5.

*Article 176.—Limitation of Number of Military Schools*

Four schools have been authorized on the basis of 'one per arm.' A fifth (signalling school) was instituted but its suppression was called for by the Commission, and it was abolished on the 22nd May.

The schools for officers and student schools are understood to have been closed.

The cadet schools are being all reopened, ostensibly as civilian schools, but they contain a large number of former cadets, and have also retained a considerable portion of the former instructional staffs.

The suppression of the cadet schools has, therefore, not yet been thoroughly carried out in accordance with the instructions of the Commission, which ordered the dispersion of pupils and instructional staff.

The pupils of the non-commissioned officers' schools which have been closed are received at Annaburg where they constitute a school adjoining the school for soldiers' children. This is also not in agreement with the decision of the Commission.

With these exceptions the Commission of Control considers Article 176 has been completely carried out.

*Article 177.—Military matters forbidden in Educational Establishments and Associations of every Description*

According to a reply (dated 11th February) of the German Government there are no associations, societies, &c., occupying themselves with any military matters. The existence of unions of demobilized officers and soldiers is admitted, but it is contended that they concern themselves solely with the interests of their individual members. This is doubtful. University students, particularly in Berlin, played a prominent part in the recent military revolution, and are believed to have formed a considerable element in the *Zeit-freiwilligen*. (See Articles 159, 160, 163.)

All educational establishments are now under the Ministry of Education, except the four authorized schools, *vide* Article 176, but in the case of the cadet schools this transfer is believed to be more nominal than real, and the Commandant of the Cadet Corps is still exercising his functions.

*Article 178.—All Measures of Mobilization Forbidden*

Nothing is known of any 'measures of mobilization.'

The question of supplementary cadres is dealt with under Article 160.

General Nollet reported on the 15th April that according to reports from control officers, the *Versorgungsstellen* (Claims Offices) and *Abwickelungsstellen* (Demobilization Offices) were incapable of undertaking any measures of mobilization.

*Article 179.—Prohibition of German Military Missions Abroad, and of enrolment of Germans in Foreign Armies*

No German Military Missions abroad are known to exist.

Numerous reports have been received of Germans serving in the Bolshevik

armies in Russia,<sup>19</sup> but it has been found impossible to prove that any German Missions exist or that Germans have been enrolled with the knowledge and sanction of their Government.

*Article 180.—Dismantling of Fortresses and Field Works*

1. The dismantling of all fortified works in 'unoccupied' territory west of a line drawn 50 kilometres east of the Rhine is due for completion by the 10th of July, 1920. As far as can be foreseen the work cannot be completed by this date as the German authorities have not yet established any working organization on the ground which might enable them to complete the task within the period specified, and it is probable that all the work demanded will not be completed before the end of September.

In detail, the situation is as follows for each fortified place coming under this category:—

*Istein.*—Certain armoured turrets have been removed and concrete works on a minor scale have been demolished. Colonel Klotz of the German Peace Commission reported, on 11th May, that the trenches had been filled in and barbed wire removed for a distance of 20 kilometres along the Rhine. The work of dismantling was commenced before the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and the work of dismantling on a larger scale has now been given out to nine contractors, who were to have started actual work on the 1st June.

*Germersheim.*—No work has yet been commenced, but preparations are being made.

*Wesel.*—The work of dismantling is in hand, a number of breaches are being made in the parapets and masonry work is being blown up. This work is not considered sufficient.

The German Project has been returned to General von Cramon with a statement saying that it only fulfils very imperfectly the instructions contained in a letter of the 17th April and that it ought to be reconsidered in accordance with the principles laid down in that letter. No detailed reply was made to the Project stating exactly what was required.

An application for an extension of one month (viz., to 10th August) has been refused.

*Rastatt.*—Nothing has yet been done. The method of dismantlement is still under discussion, and a sub-commission is considering on the spot the amount of demolition work which should be insisted on.

*Upper Rhine.*—A number of works near Mülheim. Nothing has yet been done.

**NOTE.**—General Nollet has reported that Article 180 has been complied with in so far as armaments are concerned. It is generally held that the complete work of dismantlement of fortifications will not be finished before the end of September.

2. In *occupied territory*, where the period for execution of dismantling is to be fixed by the Allied Higher Command, proposals have been submitted

<sup>19</sup> See Volume IX, No. 30. n. 3.

recently by the Commission of Control that the period should be fixed as six months for the dismantling of the fortifications *in toto*, and three months from now for the concrete and masonry portions, as from the date of notification to the Germans.<sup>20</sup>

The difficulty and delay in obtaining from the German authorities particulars of these fortresses have delayed the proposals as to time limits for the execution of this work. It is on record that three months after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the Fortifications Sub-Commission was still without the particulars necessary to begin dismantling the fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine. No work has been done in these works to date.

3. As far as is known, no new fortification has been constructed in the zone concerned.

4. As regards the last paragraph of Article 180, which allows the Germans to maintain in its existing state the system of fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany, a long discussion on principle has taken place, the Commission of Control holding that it was necessary to visit and take records of these works to ensure they were not increased, whereas the German Government declined to share this point of view. Replies have now been received from General von Cramon and from the German Minister of Foreign Affairs with reference to the resolution of the Council of Ambassadors, dated 11th March, that the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control has the right to record, to verify and to visit the said fortified works.<sup>21</sup>

The German Government, in their reply, while not admitting that the decision of the Supreme Council is in accord with the text of the Treaty of Peace, agree to the demand regarding the inspection and examination of the fortresses remaining to Germany. General von Cramon has forwarded a list of all forts and fortified works of the coast fortifications and those on the southern and eastern frontiers, together with maps showing the position of all these forts and fortified works.

The British section consider that these documents afford all the essential information required to carry out the terms of the Treaty.

All available officers were to proceed during the week ending 29th May to inspect the fortifications in question with German liaison officers; the maps will be checked and reports submitted. No estimate can be given of the time required for this.

#### Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>22</sup>

#### *Article 195.—Ordering the Destruction of all German Coast Defences in the Western Baltic*

There is no knowledge of the erection of any fortifications in the Kiel rectangle (lat. 55° 27' N. and 54° 00' N. and long. 9° 00' E. and 17° [16] 00' E.),

<sup>20</sup> *Note in filed copy:* 'The German Government have now been notified that the period allowed for dismantling has been fixed for 10th September, 1920, for masonry work, and 10th December, 1920, for total dismantling.'

<sup>21</sup> See No. 25.

<sup>22</sup> The list which follows is not printed.

nor of the existence of any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic.

The whole of the guns have been completely dismantled, with the exception of two in turret mountings, and these are being dismantled.

All the more recently constructed batteries have been almost completely demolished.

All the look-out stations and command posts are either demolished or in a derelict condition. Work of dismantling of some kind has been undertaken in practically all the older type batteries and forts.

There are four gangs of workmen employed in blowing up gun platforms and masonry work, and although recently there has [*sic*] not been more than 150 men employed daily, it is anticipated that the work will shortly be pressed more vigorously.

A project showing the work at present contemplated by the German Government was received last week, and as it is incomplete it has been proposed to return it to Marshal Baron [? Baron Marschall] von Bieberstein<sup>23</sup> without detailed examination and criticism in a similar way to the reply sent as regards demolition work at Wesel.

The proposals from the Kiel District Committee have now been received and are under consideration.

The British section consider that the work of demolition of the fortifications and the removal of the guns has already proceeded as far as fulfils the reasons given in the first paragraph of Article 195, viz., 'in order to ensure the free passage into the Baltic of all nations, and the prohibition of installing any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic.'

The Sub-Commission is, however, unanimously of the opinion that the work of demolition should be carried further in order to make it apparent to all that the existing fortifications have been demolished and are useless and that the terms of General Nollet's letter No. 1736 of the 11th February to General von Cramon are complied with.

This letter laid down the following conditions for carrying out the dismantling, and these conditions had been agreed to unanimously by the Fortifications Sub-Commission and by the Council of the Commission:—

'In principle every system of fortifications, including the details mentioned above, and all isolated works occupying positions in themselves of military value will be completely demolished or rendered useless for defence or military occupation of any sort.

'As a general guide, it can be admitted that in obsolete (*anciennes*) fortifications, the demolition need not be complete, but all modern or recently reconstructed parts, shelters of all kinds, gun emplacements and concrete parapets must disappear.'

It appears that the French and other sections now desire a more complete demolition, involving extensive levelling of earthwork, which the British regard

<sup>23</sup> A member of the German Army Peace Commission.

as of no practical utility and as only causing unnecessary expense, which may diminish the total amount of the indemnity to be paid by Germany.

The British project for the completion of the dismantling of Kiel prepared last January anticipated the completion of the work by 31st August. It is now considered that the essential work should be completed by the end of September.

#### Decisions and Letters . . .<sup>24</sup>

*Article 196.—Coast Defences on the North Sea and Baltic, other than those Fortifications mentioned in Article 195, and in Section XIII (Heligoland) may be maintained in their existing state. No new Fortifications may be constructed*

1. The fortifications concerned, which may remain in their existing condition, come under the same category as those described in 180 (4) above, and the same remarks apply to them as have been made above. The documents necessary for recording purposes have been received from the German authorities, and the work of inspection is in hand and should be completed by 31st August to the satisfaction of the British section.

2. As far as is known no new fortifications have been constructed within the limits mentioned.

#### *Articles 203 to 208.—Military Commissions of Control*

*Articles 205 and 206.—Major-General the Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham states:—*

Serious differences have arisen with the Germans over the interpretation of these two clauses. By Article 205, the Commission maintain that they are at liberty to go where they like, when they like, and see what they like. The German Government have appointed liaison officers for each District Committee of the Commission of Control. These officers, acting under instructions from Berlin, have undoubtedly in several of the districts constituted an obstacle to the thorough carrying out of the work of control. They have maintained that officers of the Commission may only visit factories whose names have been supplied from German headquarters at Berlin, and insist on notice being given to factories and depôts before the arrival of the Mission. The Germans base their arguments on Article 206, which undoubtedly does state that the Allied Commission are to obtain their information through representatives of the German Government.

They argue that—

- (i) Owners of private firms are afraid of allowing free entry to their works, as they are of opinion that the Commission of Control are employing commercial agents to obtain trade secrets.
- (ii) In no country can private premises be entered without the permission of the owner.
- (iii) Persons with forged passes have obtained entry in their works under pretence of being members of the Commission of Control.
- (iv) The fact of the liaison officer being present avoids unpleasant incidents which may arise through discontented workmen, &c.

<sup>24</sup> The list which follows is not printed.

The Commission of Control maintain that the German Government must admit the principle that the members of the Commission of Control can go wherever they please and whenever they please, whether they are accompanied by a German liaison officer or not, and that his presence is not indispen[s]able to their visit to a factory or dépôt.

In a commission like the Commission of Control suspicion is aroused when the Germans try to put obstacles in the way of its free working.

I am of opinion that we must insist on our free rights, as mentioned above, and that once the German Government have agreed to this principle we can then come to arrangements wherever they can really prove that exceptional arrangements are necessary.

Needless to say, the liaison question is a great deal a question of personality, and in some districts we have had no trouble. In others trouble is continuous.

In the Frankfurt district, when the French entered Frankfurt, the French president of my District Committee unwisely ordered the German liaison officer to leave the town within 24 hours. The German officer and the authorities in Berlin maintain that he was insulted by the French Colonel, and they refuse to send back a liaison officer to Frankfurt until he has apologized. As he is an officer of another nationality, I have informed General Nollet that it is purely for him to deal with the French officer. Meanwhile, the whole of the work in that district is held up, and I personally cannot see when it will be resumed.

*Article 208 (last paragraph).*—All necessary documents for the dismantling of the Kiel fortifications have been received, and it is understood that sufficient information has been received for the work being carried out in the Rhineland.

The documents demanded for making records of fortifications remaining to Germany were very elaborate and they have not been supplied. It appears to be a question of opinion between the Allies and Germany as to how far documents may be demanded and should be supplied under this Article of the Treaty.

#### *Articles 211–213*

*Article 211.*—None of the legislative measures demanded by the Effectives' Sub-Commission for giving effect to the provisions of the Treaty has been taken, although the prescribed period of 3 months has expired. (*See also note under Article 173.*)

#### *Decisions and Letters*

1. Decision of the Supreme Council at Boulogne, 22nd June, 1920 regarding German legislation. (Appendix IV.)<sup>25</sup>

#### *Conclusion*

The essential points in connection with the disarmament of Germany and those which should be insisted upon at the Conference at Spa are given below in their order of importance.

<sup>25</sup> See n. 5.



(a) *The destruction of all war material in excess of the quantity allowed to Germany by the Peace Treaty*

This is a matter of urgency, especially as regards artillery. The question has been dealt with under Articles 167 and 169, and it has been pointed out that to allow Germany to retain a mobile artillery armament of 3,800 guns as originally claimed by her under Article 167 is impossible to contemplate.

(b) *The abolition of the laws enjoining universal compulsory military service in Germany*

Until formal measures have been taken by the German Government under Article 173, there will still remain all the legal machinery necessary to resuscitate at short notice the 'nation in arms.'

(c) *The period of enlistment of twelve consecutive years for non-commissioned officers and men of the German Army*

At present in contradiction to Article 174, trained soldiers are serving on short periods of engagement lasting from four weeks to six months, thus increasing the possibility of an unauthorized reserve.

(d) *The reduction of the German Army to 100,000*

The demobilization and reduction of the German Army in accordance with Articles 159, 160 and 163, have not been carried out. On the contrary, certain unauthorized formations, e.g., *Zeitfreiwilligen* and *Einwohnerwehren* exist, in addition to the army which has not yet been reduced to the limits laid down.

## No. 111

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 5)*

No. 2054 [C 373/113/18]

PARIS, June 30, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 697 of the 12th [*sic*] instant,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from Sir H. Stuart on the question of the strength of the German Police Force, which does not seem to have been forwarded direct to Your Lordship.

I venture to draw attention to Sir H. Stuart's opinion as to the inadequate strength of the Police Force in the Occupied area, as this appears at first sight to be in conflict with the report quoted in my telegram under reference. The latter report was however, not quite correctly quoted, as its substance was to the effect that the High Commission considered that management of Police Force in the Occupied area was within the competence of the Commission and that they did not therefore consider necessary any discussion with the German Government so far as the Occupied area was concerned (see Minute 664 of the Commission).<sup>2</sup> I have brought this matter to Your

<sup>1</sup> No. 99.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Lordship's attention in view of the apparent discrepancy between the two statements, and in case the matter should be raised at some later date.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 111

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)*

COBLENZ, *June 12, 1920*

*No. 856*

Sir,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt, on June 10th, of your despatch of June 2nd,<sup>3</sup> in regard to the proposed reduction of the German Army and the reorganisation of the Police Force throughout Germany.

The question of the strength of the Police Force in the Occupied Territory was considered at a meeting of the High Commission on June 9th, on receipt of a telegram to the President of the High Commission from the President of the Council of Ambassadors.<sup>4</sup> I beg to enclose a copy of the telegram which was sent to the President of the Council of Ambassadors in reply.<sup>4</sup>

The attitude of the High Commission was that, in accordance with paragraph 7 of the Replies made at Versailles on July 29th, 1919, by the Allied and Associated Governments to the German Delegation,<sup>5</sup> it was the duty of the High Commission to control the organisation of the Police Force in the occupied territories. The High Commission was of opinion that considerable danger might arise for the occupied [*sic*] Armies as a result of a presence in occupied territory of an organised Police Force dependent directly or indirectly upon a Ministry at Berlin. It was felt that the High Commission should settle, in consultation with the General Officers Commanding the various zones of occupation, what Police Force was required in any individual Municipality, District or Zone.

In view of the inadequate strength of the Municipal Police of Cologne, the High Commission recently sanctioned an increase of that force from about 900 to about 1,500 men, and it is understood that this force is being paid as to one third by the Municipality of Cologne and as to two-thirds by the State of Prussia. A small increase to the police force at Ludwigshafen has also been sanctioned by the High Commission.

The General Officer Commanding the British zone, and the Representative of the High Commission in that area consider that it will be necessary to recruit a special Police Force of 450 men armed with revolvers and sabres and intended primarily to consist only of Rhinelanders and for service in the local area only for the suppression of local disturbances. Unless some such force is created, the duty of suppressing riots will frequently fall on the troops

<sup>3</sup> See No. 83.

<sup>4</sup> Not attached to filed copy. The text of these telegrams not printed is, however, included in the minutes of the 34th sitting of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume I, No. 15, appendix A, document 1.

of occupation in the absence of German troops in the occupied territory, and both the Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine and myself are of opinion that it is desirable to avoid the necessity of employing Allied troops in dealing with local outbreaks, whether they are of a political or an economic origin. These men would constitute a separate force in no way dependent on orders received from Berlin. This proposal is still under consideration by the High Commission and the military authorities in the occupied territory. A copy of my Note on both proposals and of the Minutes of the High Commission is enclosed.<sup>6</sup>

The danger present in the minds of the Commission is that if an organised Police Force of say 10,000 men were sanctioned for the occupied area, the German authorities might also claim the right to maintain considerable bodies of local Police in the various towns and districts. Any additional police sanctioned for the occupied territory should in my opinion be local in character, and should not constitute a single force under unified command.

I have, &c.,

HAROLD STUART

<sup>6</sup> These do not appear to have been forwarded from Paris and are not printed.

## No. 112

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 3)*

*No. 785 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, July 1, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning, M. Jules Cambon being in the Chair:—

1. Two representatives of the Reparations Commission attended the meeting in order to discuss the question of the disposal of scrap material in the light of the decision taken at Boulogne on June 22nd.<sup>1</sup> The following points were discussed:—

a. The Italian Ambassador drew attention to his Memorandum proposing that this scrap material should be distributed to the Allies and not sold (see my telegram No. 778 of the 30th ultimo, Section 7).<sup>2</sup> Note was taken of this reserve.

b. The Reparations Commission claim the right under Article 243 of the Treaty to decide what is to become of the proceeds of the sale and are in favour of including these proceeds in the general reparation account. I said however, that I was not authorised to agree to this principle and insisted that as provided for in the Boulogne decision the proceeds should be included in a separate account and nothing should be paid out from that account until a decision had been reached by the Supreme Council as to its distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Volume VIII, No. 36, minute 2 and appendix 2.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

c. It was agreed to communicate to the Reparations Commission all relevant lists of material to be destroyed or to be retained by the Allies as well as resolutions of the Ambassadors' Conference on this question.

d. In regard to the date from which ownership of this material had passed to the Allied Governments, it was decided to accept July 11th, the date of the ratification of the Treaty by Germany, in accordance with the opinion of the Drafting Committee accepted at the Boulogne Conference on June 22nd.

e. Finally it was agreed that copies of any future decisions taken either by the Ambassadors' Conference or by the Reparations Commission on this question, should forthwith be communicated to the other, and that no important decision should be taken by either body without consultation with the other. . . .<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The remainder of this telegram related to another matter.

### No. 113

*Mr. Kidston (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received July 6, 12.20 p.m.)*

*No. 532 Telegraphic [C 579/59/18]*

*Secret*

HELSINGFORS, *July 5, 1920, 8.30 p.m.*

Berlin telegrams Nos. 3(40?)<sup>1</sup> and 341<sup>2</sup> and . . . 194.<sup>3</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs has given me a copy of a letter addressed to him personally from Berlin on June 24th offering arms and ammunition.

Letter has typewritten heading with name of Reichsgraf Von Oppersdorf and address (? Hinsinstrasse) 14 and is signed with initial J.A. and a name which looks like Ritter signing on behalf of writer.

It refers to abortive unofficial negotiations with Finnish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, assumes therefrom that Finnish Government are interested in the acquisition of arms and suggests that if this is the case further negotiations should be conducted with real owners in Hamburg. The Berlin firm it states is acting for an old established and reliable firm of arms exporters in Hamburg which is in close touch with writer.

Offer is for about 1,000,000 new infantry rifles 98 model with leather slings and 400 rounds for each weapon at 510 German marks per rifle and for 100,000 bayonets at 13.50 marks each. Rifles are to be delivered in Hamburg free harbour . . .<sup>4</sup> and necessary export permit. Deliveries of less than 200,000 cannot be entertained. Price of bayonets is quoted as 'being from Rhine railway station'.

It is expressly stated that all the goods have been taken over from the German Government. Early answer is requested.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet replied and proposes to leave matter severely alone unless His Majesty's Government wish him to take it

<sup>1</sup> No. 96.

<sup>2</sup> No. 97.

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain. It was suggested in the Foreign Office that it should read 'my despatch no.', i.e. Helsingfors despatch No. 194 of June 29, not printed.

<sup>4</sup> The text is here uncertain.

up in order to obtain further information. He begged me for a very early decision on this point and did not suggest that any *quid pro quo* in shape of permission to import arms should be given.

His Excellency tells me Government are very much perturbed by constant rumours of illicit gun running and especially by Hangö incident (my despatch No. 187)<sup>5</sup> and are even employing private detectives to endeavour to discover what is really going on.

Germans implicated in Hangö case are said to have confessed that this was only a trial trip and that if it had succeeded regular traffic would have been established. Suspicion has fallen on Finnish Ammunition Factory and on two brothers named Hackman with business establishments at Viborg and Helsingfors while in certain circles it is sought to connect General Mannerheim's<sup>6</sup> name and his recent visit to Berlin with traffic.

On the other hand it has been suggested to Military Attaché by a usually reliable informant that traffic was arranged by reactionary Russians General Gulevitch<sup>7</sup> and Colonel Tsellebrovsky [Tselebrovsky] in collusion with Colonel Ausfeldt<sup>8</sup> of Finnish Schutzkorps and that it is intended for eventual anti-Bolshevik action. Tsellebrovsky was personal assistant to Colonel Durnovo<sup>9</sup> here and is believed to be still in touch with him.

Minister for Foreign Affairs' close connection with Entente is so notorious that letter to him may be a blind intended to concentrate attention on supposed big deal while arms are really being smuggled extensively in small quantities at a time.

Despatch follows by bag.<sup>10</sup>

Repeated to Berlin.

<sup>5</sup> Of June 21, not printed. This despatch reported the discovery by the Finnish authorities earlier in June that a small German sailing vessel, the 'Merkur' of Rostock (captain, Baron Ernst v. Richthofen), had entered the port of Hangö without papers and was lying there with a cargo of machine-gun ammunition. The cargo was promptly seized in the name of the Finnish Government.

<sup>6</sup> Regent of Finland from December 1918 to July 1919.

<sup>7</sup> A former military representative in Finland of General Yudenich by whom he was dismissed in January 1920.

<sup>8</sup> A former German staff officer.

<sup>9</sup> Minister of War in the 'West Russian Government' formed in Berlin in October 1919.

<sup>10</sup> This despatch, No. 203 of July 6, is not printed.

## No. 114

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 2287 [C 122/59/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 5, 1920*

My Lord,

I have considered the proposal reported in paragraph 9 of Your Excellency's telegram No. 778 of the 30th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> that a further note should be

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

sent to the neutral Governments warning them against making purchases of German war material.

2. I am of opinion that no useful purpose would be served by addressing to the Governments in question any communication on this subject of which the terms should go beyond those of that already made to them in accordance with the decision taken by the Conference of Ambassadors at their meeting of April 21st last (see Your Excellency's telegram No. 486 of that date).<sup>2</sup> The proposed use of the words 'unfriendly act' would exceed the usual form of diplomatic communications to neutral and friendly powers.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> No. 51.

<sup>3</sup> Signature lacking from filed copy.

## CHAPTER II

# Reparation by Germany after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles

January 10—July 5, 1920

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

REPARATION questions and the establishment of definitive machinery for handling them had since July 1919 been the concern of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission which was appointed by the Allied Supreme Council on July 1 of that year. Records of meetings of this Committee have been printed in part, as appropriate, in Volumes V and VI of this Series.

On January 24, 1920, the Reparation Commission held its inaugural meeting. Except for the fact that France, like the other countries represented on the Commission, now had two delegates instead of one (i.e. a Delegate and an Assistant Delegate), the Commission was at first identical in membership with the Committee on its Organization. In accordance with the decision of the latter, taken on January 9, the representatives of the United States were invited to assist unofficially at all meetings of the Reparation Commission and to participate in all its discussions, but without the right to vote. Accordingly, after the Commission had constituted itself at its first meeting and elected M. Jonnart as its Chairman and Signor Bertolini as its Vice-Chairman, Mr. Rathbone and Mr. Logan took their seats.

The British Delegate to the Reparation Commission, Sir J. Bradbury, was directly responsible not to the Foreign Office, but to the Treasury.<sup>1</sup> This arrangement was confirmed by a Treasury circular of March 4, 1920, which laid down that, 'in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of official correspondence and with a view to keeping in close touch with the work of the British Delegate', the Foreign Office and H.M. Embassy in Paris should be furnished with copies of all such correspondence as was likely to interest them. It also recognized that, in addition to the questions of financial policy, which were the principal concern of the Treasury, questions of general foreign policy would arise on which the British Delegate would require to be instructed 'and upon which it is proper that the Foreign Office rather than the Treasury should have the deciding voice'; but, since it appeared desirable for the Delegate to remain responsible to the Treasury, it suggested that the directions of the Foreign Office should be communicated to him through the Treasury.

In view of this allocation of responsibility and also of the very considerable

<sup>1</sup> In this connexion see Mr. Waterlow's minute in n. 4 of No. 50 in Volume IX.

bulk of technical papers concerning reparation which were sent to the Foreign Office for information and not for action, it has seemed best for the most part to limit the documents printed in this chapter and in Chapter V to a selection of such correspondence and memoranda as had a bearing upon general foreign as distinct from more purely financial policy. The minutes of the Reparation Commission, which are voluminous, closely interdependent, and often highly technical, have accordingly not been included; and its lengthy and detailed report on the 'Work of the Reparation Commission up to June 1920 in relation to Germany', prepared with a view to the Spa Conference of July 5, 1920, has likewise been omitted. The extent to which the work of the Reparation Commission affected issues of high policy is, however, illustrated in several documents both in this volume and in Volume VIII, where the records are printed of the Allied Conferences of 1920 which considered the question of reparation.

### No. 115

*Note from the U.S. Ambassador in Paris to Earl Curzon*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 235 [179910/32842/39]*

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PARIS, *January 19, 1920*

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose to you, herewith, a copy of the letter which I have addressed this day to the President of the Peace Conference, setting forth the views of my Government with regard to the decision taken by the Supreme Council, on the 9th instant,<sup>2</sup> relative to the question of the amount of floating docks, floating cranes, etc., to be delivered by Germany as reparation for Scapa Flow.

With the assurance of my high regard, I have, &c.,

HUGH C. WALLACE

<sup>1</sup> Lord Curzon was then in Paris. This letter and enclosure were forwarded by Lord Derby to the Foreign Office on February 19 under cover of Paris despatch No. 499.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume II, No. 53, minute 1.

### ENCLOSURE IN NO. 115

*U.S. Ambassador in Paris to M. Clemenceau*

PARIS, *January 19, 1920*

Mr. President,

Your Excellency will undoubtedly recall the decision taken by the Supreme Council, on the 9th instant, relative to the question of the amount of floating docks, floating cranes, etc., to be delivered by Germany as reparation for Scapa Flow, and which reads as follows:

'It was decided:

(1) that the total of the reductions allowed for whatsoever cause, on the



original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, cranes, etc., as reparation for the Scapa Flow affair, should not in any case exceed the figure of 125,000 tons;

(2) that if the Council were agreed on that point, there would be no need to modify the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the letter to be delivered to Mr. von Lersner after the signature of the Protocol.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

I have now the honour to inform Your Excellency that my Government, to whom I hastened to communicate the foregoing decision, regrets to state that it cannot accept this decision of the Council.

My Government has always maintained that the Reparations Commission when established, should pass on the question as to whether the amount of floating docks, floating cranes, etc., to be demanded from Germany, is a proper requirement from an economic standpoint.

My Government cannot agree to the limitation of the discretion of the Reparations Commission by a decision that 125,000 tons should be the maximum reduction. It is possible that, in order not to impair Germany's ability to meet her obligations under the Treaty, a further reduction may be found to be necessary.

In conclusion, I beg to call to Your Excellency's attention that the Government of the United States considers it of great importance that this claim against Germany should not be treated as having priority over claims recognised by the Treaty of Versailles and that rights created by the Treaty should not be jeopardised by an indemnity for the sinking at Scapa Flow.

With assurances of my high regard, I have, &c.,

HUGH C. WALLACE

## No. 116

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received February 3)*

*No. 67 [175702/125881/1150 RH]*

COBLENZ, *January 31, 1920*

The British High Commissioner at Coblenz presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to [*sic*] Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit the undermentioned document.

### *Name and Date*

Desp: To Sec. of British Dept. Re-  
parations Commission Paris. Jan: 31,  
1920.

### *Subject*

*Saar Coalfields*: application by Ger-  
man Coal Commissioner for in-  
creased supply is rejected by High  
Commission.

*British Section of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission to the British Department of the Reparation Commission*

COBLENZ, *January 31, 1920*

Sir,

1. I am directed by Sir Harold Stuart to forward herewith Minute No. 94,<sup>1</sup> of the 5th sitting of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, regarding a proposal by the German Coal Commissioner that 37,000 tons of Coal (since increased, it is understood, to 53,000 tons) should continue to be supplied monthly for two months from the Saar Coalfields to the Palatinate, pending arrangements being made by the German authorities to furnish the amount from the Ruhr, in accordance with the distribution plan by which the Saar should cease to supply coal to the Palatinate as from February 1st., 1920.

As you will see, it was decided to inform the German Coal Commissioner that his proposal could not be dealt with by the Rhineland High Commission, and that the German Government would be held responsible for any troubles that might arise in Occupied Territory as a result of non-delivery of Coal.

A copy of this decision was to be sent by telegram to the Reparations Commission and to the Coal Commissioner at Essen.

2. Sir Harold Stuart would, however, like Sir John Bradbury to be informed that he associates himself with the French High Commissioner in the view that the proposal should be rejected, and the German Coal authorities informed that the coal must be supplied by them.

3. There is a most serious coal shortage in France, which is entitled to the Saar coal, and owing to the recent floods in the Rhine Valley, and the railway strikes in the Essen and Cologne railway districts, which occurred simultaneously during the first three weeks of January, very little coal has been sent to France from the Ruhr during the past month.

4. It is true that, for the same reasons, the deliveries from the Ruhr to the Occupied Territories will for the month of January, 1920, show a most alarming deficiency, estimated at 250,000 tons, of a total of 560,000 tons which should have been delivered. But whilst fully realising the seriousness of the position here, Sir Harold Stuart cannot, as yet, support a proposal that would, if carried out, deprive the French of coal [to] which they are entitled under the Peace Treaty.

5. In this connexion, it has been stated that during the cessation of barge traffic on the Rhine, the German coal authorities found it possible to move by rail, mainly to Unoccupied Germany, the whole of the production of the Ruhr coalfields, which remained normal throughout, notwithstanding the fact that practically no deliveries were made to France during this period.

<sup>1</sup> A marginal note here read: 'Not formally adopted.' The minutes of the fifth sitting were, however, adopted on February 4.

The Coal Sub-Committee at Essen<sup>2</sup> will be able to confirm or disprove this statement, which is repeated with all reserve, especially as it is not at present possible, here in Coblenz, to estimate exactly what bearing it has on the matter now under discussion.

6. A copy of this Despatch is being sent to the Foreign Office and to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

I have, &c.,

C. J. SAUNDERS,  
*Major*

<sup>2</sup> For the formation of this Sub-Committee of the Reparation Commission see Volume V, No. 186.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 116

*Delivery of Coal*

The High Commission took note of information supplied by the French High Commissioner to the effect that the German Coal Commissioner had informed the Coal Committee, on the 24th January, that for two months it would be impossible for the Kohlenverteilungsstelle at Cologne to supply 37,000 tons of coal from the Ruhr provided for monthly to take the place of the Saar coal and destined for the Armies and Railway Direction of Saarbruck. He requested that this deficiency should be covered by a continuance of consignments of the same amount from the Saar, otherwise he would be obliged to reduce the quantities allotted to the industries and public services of the Rhineland Territories.

The High Commission decided to inform the German Coal Commissioner:

(1) That this question could only be settled by the French Government to which it had been referred. Further it decided to point out to him that, by letter No. 986 dated January 6th, the German Commissioner was informed that the French Government was no longer able to contribute to the coal supply of the Palatinate by means of coal from the Saar.

(2) That, on the other hand, the German Coal Commissioner had previously submitted to the High Commission a scheme of coal distribution in which coal from the Saar did not figure in the reckoning for the supply to the Palatinate.

(3) That the High Commission had notified the German Government that that Government would be held responsible for any troubles which might arise in Occupied Territory as a result of the suspension of public services or key industries or the non-delivery of sufficient quantities of fuel either to the Armies or the railways, a state of affairs which the German Commissioner had had in view in his note to the Coal Committee.

The High Commission decided to inform the German Commissioner of that decision and to forward copies of the same by telegram to the Reparations Commission and to the Coal Committee at Essen.<sup>3</sup>

*January 28, 1920*

<sup>3</sup> A further copy of this minute was sent to the Foreign Office on February 27 together with some covering observations by Mr. Arnold Robertson, Deputy British High Com-

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 3)**No. 123 Telegraphic: by bag [175674/7067/39]*

PARIS, February 2, 1920

Proceedings of Council this morning . . .<sup>1</sup>

1. Proceeding to the Agenda M. Millerand stated that the undertaking of the German Government under the Treaty to deliver 20,000,000 tons of coal to France in deliveries of 1,600,000 tons per month had not been complied with. The first month's delivery had only amounted to some 300,000 tons or rather less than 1/5th of the stipulated amount. This was a serious breach of the Treaty as Germany undoubtedly possessed the coal. Her present consumption for a population of 60,000,000 was 8,000,000 tons per month while the corresponding consumption of France, with her population of some 40,000,000, was 3,250,000 tons. The French Government therefore proposed to make a formal demand for the execution of the Treaty in this respect direct to the German Government but wished to notify her Allies of this step.<sup>2</sup> I expressed my entire concurrence but enquired whether non-delivery was due to lack of transport. M. Millerand replied that if the coal were delivered it could be transported. The Council then formally approved the proposed action of the French Government. M. Millerand then raised the question of means of enforcing penalties in case of non-compliance and proposed a prolongation of the periods of occupation referred to in Article 429 of the Treaty. I observed that the effect of such penalties would be long deferred and suggested more immediate means such as might be found in the Treaty and in the Protocol of January 10th, but I expressed the hope that such immediate means would not be adopted without reference to the Ambassadors' Conference. M. Millerand emphatically expressed his accord with my observations. The Italian Ambassador had observed that, as some 700,000 tons were also due to other Allies under the same arrangement, any measures of coercion that could be devised should also refer to this supplementary amount if the Germans had failed to deliver it. The United States Ambassador remarked that the matter was one in which his Government had no participation. . . .<sup>3</sup>

missioner. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the direct haul from the Saar mines to the Palatinate was very short and that, practically, the best solution would therefore be to supply the Palatinate from the Saar. If, however, 'the means of transport by rail and water were sufficient to carry out the terms of the Protocol [see enclosure to No. 118 below, § 3 (b)], then it would be well to insist upon the Palatinate being given coal from the Ruhr mines'.

<sup>1</sup> Two introductory paragraphs relating to other matters discussed at the Conference of Ambassadors are here omitted.

<sup>2</sup> On February 13, Sir G. Grahame, under cover of Paris despatch No. 421, forwarded a translation of M. Millerand's note to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris declaring that, in accordance with Article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles, the time limits fixed for the evacuation of the occupied territories were suspended, and stating that further measures would be taken should the German Government continue to neglect their obligations in the matter of delivery of coal.

<sup>3</sup> The remaining sections related to other matters.

No. 118

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received February 17)*

No. 99 [179228/125881/1150 RH]

COBLENZ, February 14, 1920

The British High Commissioner at Coblenz presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to [sic] Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit the undermentioned document.

*Name and Date*

14th February 1920.

*Subject*

First Fortnightly Report on the Coal Situation in Occupied German Territories.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 118

*Report on the Coal Situation in Occupied German Territories by the British Department of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, February 1920*

1. General Survey.
2. Sources of supply.
3. Retrospect.
4. Detail as to present situation.
5. Labour.
6. Conclusion.

*Annexes<sup>1</sup>*

Table 'A' Distribution Scheme under Luxembourg Protocol.

Table 'B' Distribution Scheme for Occupied Zones under Versailles Protocol.

Table 'C' Further detail regarding supply.

*Report on the Coal Situation in Occupied Territory, February 1920*

I. GENERAL SURVEY

The Coal Situation in the Occupied Territories may be summed up as follows:—

As everywhere else in Western Europe, it is a hand to mouth existence, probably slightly better than in France and the remainder of Unoccupied Germany, much better than in Austria-Hungary, and much worse than in Great Britain.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

(a) The Coal Requirements of the Armies of Occupation are being adequately filled, and probably will continue to be, even if recourse has to be made, in isolated instances, to requisition.

(b) Railways receive sufficient to allow of a very fair service being run, and, being the chief carriers of Coal, are able to ensure the priority of their demands being met.

(c) Public Services, such as Electric Light and Gas Works, Power Works, Tramways etc., maintain with some difficulty an adequate service, which varies in efficiency with the distance they are removed from the Coalfield. There is no immediate fear of a general collapse in this direction, though every town, in turn, passes through a crisis when stocks in hand reach vanishing point.

(d) The same applies to Key Industries (Food Manufactories, Railway Truck Works, etc.).

(e) Domestic and Household Requirements are moderately well filled. Practically no cases have been reported of distress due to lack of fuel.

(f) General Industry, other than above, is lowest on the scale of priority, and as such, is receiving a very small proportion of its needs. The Distribution Scheme only Budgets for allowing it 30%. As a result, factories, one by one, are reducing their working time to fewer and fewer days per week.

This is steadily becoming more general, and though, as yet, there is no widespread unemployment which can be attributed to this cause, reports are becoming more frequent of factories having to close down entirely for a longer or shorter period owing to the lack of fuel. The pessimistic official view is that, before long, certain Industries will have to be entirely suspended, in order to enable more important ones to work at all.

The general position, which seemed to have reached its low water mark and become stabilized at the end of 1919, was unexpectedly shaken by two events which occurred at the beginning of January 1920, when the most extensive floods in the Rhine Valley for over a century prevented all Water Borne Traffic, and a partial Railway strike in the Essen, Elberfeld and Cologne Districts seriously hampered transport by rail.

It is as yet too soon completely to estimate the results and extent of the deficiencies in deliveries which can be directly traced to these catastrophies [*sic*]; in the present precarious situation such occurrences can be described as nothing else.

Statistics prepared on data available up to the 25th January indicate a deficiency to the Occupied Territories of 250,000 Tons on Intended Deliveries amounting to 800,000 Tons.

## 2. SOURCES OF SUPPLY

The Mines from which the Occupied Zones and the Near West of Germany draw their main supplies are as follows:

	<i>Average monthly pre-war output</i>	<i>Average present monthly output</i>
The Mines on the Right Bank of the Rhine in the Ruhr (Essen) Area, which are in Unoccupied Germany . . . . .	7,500,000 Tns.	5,750,000 Tns.
The Mines on the Left Bank of the Rhine in the Ruhr Area (Niederrhein) or (Bassin de Moers) in the Belgian Zone of Occupation . . . . .	320,000 „	250,000 „
The Mines around Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) in Belgian Zone . . . . .	200,000 „	190,000 „
Rhenish Brown Coal (Lignite): Briquettes only, in British Zone of Occupation . . . . .	500,000 „	440,000 „
The Sarre Coal Mines. In French Possession . . . . .	1,100,000 „	730,000 „

(NOTE: Above calculations are for average 25 day month.)

It is not possible within the limits of this report, to give a detailed account of the above named Areas, but as the Brown Coal Mines are almost entirely in the British Zone, and its main source of supply, a brief note on them will probably be of interest, apart from the fact that their development and extent is probably unique.

The production of Brown Coal in the Rhine District for the year ending 31-3-19 was as follows:

	<i>Tons</i>
(a) Amount briquetted, yielding 5,965,784 Tons Briquettes . . . . .	19,555,813
(b) Amount sold as Raw Coal . . . . .	2,621,666
(c) Amount used in generating electricity . . . . .	3,526,771
TOTAL . . . . .	25,704,250

NOTE: (i) 3·4 Tons Raw Coal yield 1 Ton Briquettes.

(ii) 1 Ton Briquettes equals in heating value 0·60 Tons Black Coal.

Nearly every allotment of Coal in the British and neighbouring Areas has its proportion of Brown Coal Briquettes, which have lately even been used largely for Gas Works.

More important still, there are large Electrical Power Stations which are situated in the immediate vicinity of the Mines, and receive the raw Coal direct into their furnaces by mechanical means.

This power is transmitted so far as the Dutch Frontier in one instance, and reinforces other Power Works near Solingen, in another case, which supplies the large Industrial Area there.

Again, the greater portion of the electricity used in Cologne is generated at one of these so-called Mines, which are really vast quarries and have no underground workings, and renders the City almost independent of Mineral Coal for all Public Services except Gas.

Of course, the inevitable penalty of these highly organised Industrial undertakings is present in these cases, inasmuch as they are very vulnerable to organised Labour movements.

A strike of a few workmen, in one of these large Power Stations, would paralyse Industry and Public Services over a very large Area.

Both the employers and workmen fully realise this, and negotiations over one point or another are almost always in progress.

For about a week at the beginning of January 1920, about half the total number of workmen employed in the Brown Coal Industry struck. A provisional Agreement was arrived at, but it is anticipated that before long a further trial of strength will take place.

One noteworthy point in connection with these Mines is that all the work is above ground.

This, in itself, renders the Brown Coal Industry a healthy occupation, and the miner an easier man to handle than the deep level worker of the other Areas.

### 3. RETROSPECT

A brief Recapitulation of the period between the commencement of the Occupation and the present date will assist towards clear understanding of the present situation.

During this time there have been two distinct administrations.

#### *Firstly*

From the Occupation to the 1st September 1919, when the distribution was governed by the Protocol of Luxembourg of 28/2/19.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Secondly*

From the 1st September 1919 onwards, when the Protocol of Versailles<sup>3</sup> came into force.

Under this the deliveries of Coal to the Allies under Article 236 of the Peace Treaty were commenced.

On the 3rd January 1920 the provisions of the Protocol were somewhat modified, so far as the Occupied Territories were concerned, by the Coal Committee of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission assuming a supervision of the distribution of the amounts allotted by the German Imperial Commissioner for the Occupied Zones.

To examine each of these periods in detail.

#### *(a) The Protocol of Luxembourg*

As the limit of advance of the Allied Armies did not embrace the Essen Area of the Ruhr Valley, and as the Occupied Zones were largely dependent on these Coalfields, some arrangement was necessary whereby they should receive an adequate proportion of coal for their needs.

<sup>2</sup> The text of this Protocol is printed in *Der Waffenstillstand 1918-19* (Berlin, 1928), vol. ii, pp. 239 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Volume V, No. 99, annex 2; see also (b) below.



Furthermore, prior to the Armistice, there had been a regular system of exchange of Coal between the Left and Right Banks of the Rhine, which the Blockade of Germany<sup>4</sup> had brought to an abrupt conclusion.

In addition, the Alsace Lorraine Smelting Works were in as urgent need of Coke from Essen, as the latter was in need of Minette (Iron Ore) from Alsace Lorraine.

It was therefore to the interests of the Allies as much, if not more, than of Unoccupied Germany, for a *modus vivendi* to be arrived at.

The Protocol of Luxembourg, which came into force on February 28th 1919, was the embodiment of this, and can be described as very favourable indeed for the Occupied Zones, who, whilst it was in force, were able to keep all their wants supplied and all their Industries working to full extent, whereas in Unoccupied Germany the greatest difficulty was experienced in maintaining even a restricted delivery.

Under this, the control of all Coal within the Occupied Territories was vested in the 'Commission Inter-Alliée de Répartition de Combustibles' under the Presidency of Commandant Aron, a French Officer.

This Commission performed its work exceptionally well, and deserves the greatest credit for the satisfactory state of things which prevailed during its régime.

Under the Luxembourg Agreement the Occupied Zones (not including the Saar) retained, with the small exception noted below, the whole output of the Mines in their Area:

Namely: The Mines of the Lower Rhine in the Belgian	
Zone, approximated monthly . . . . .	220,000 Tons.
The Rhenish Brown Coal Briquette output, approximated monthly . . . . .	470,000 „
The Aachen Mines (Proportion available) . . . . .	70,000 „
And Received from the Mines in the Ruhr Area on the	
Right Bank. . . . .	292,000 „
	<u>1,052,000 „</u>
Gave, in Exchange to Unoccupied Germany, of	
Brown Coal Briquettes . . . . .	50,000 Tns. Monthly
Raw Brown Coal . . . . .	90,000 „ „

A further clause in the Protocol, dealing with Alsace Lorraine, provided for the latter receiving from the Ruhr,

Of Coal . . . . .	Monthly	65,000 Tons.
And a <i>daily</i> amount of Coke of . . . . .	„	6,500 „

in exchange for a 1½ Tons of Iron Ore for each Ton of Coke delivered to the Lorraine Smelting Works. There was considerable difficulty in obtaining this Ore for the first month or so, but finally the exchange worked smoothly.

The Saar Coalfields continued to deliver Coal to those portions of the

<sup>4</sup> The blockade, initiated during the war, was raised on July 12, 1919 (see Volume I, No. 9, minute 5 and appendix C).

Occupied Zones, namely, the Palatinate and the Sarre, and Alsace Lorraine, all in French Occupation, which they had supplied prior to the Armistice.

These were supplemented by small deliveries from the Ruhr and the Briquette Works, and also sent [*sic*] about 17,000 Tons monthly to Unoccupied Germany.

Table 'A' attached shows deliveries and demands of the Occupied Territories (less the Saar Area) for August 1919, and will be useful as a comparison with the Distribution Scheme being worked on since January 3rd 1920, vide Table 'B'.<sup>5</sup>

No figures are at present available showing the exact distribution of Sarre Coal during the period prior to September 1919.

(b) *Protocol of Versailles*

On the 29th August 1919, an agreement was arrived at between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Government on the supply of Coal for reparation purposes, its provisions being embodied in the Protocol of Versailles which came into force on the 1st September 1919.<sup>6</sup>

Briefly—the Germans claimed that they were unable, owing to the disastrous condition into which their Coal Industry had fallen since the Revolution, to supply the 40 Million tons of Coal per annum stipulated in the Peace Treaty.

The Protocol of Versailles provides for the Germans supplying Coal at the rate of 20 Million tons per annum immediately after the date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

Should, however, at any time, the German Coal production increase above the figure named in the Protocol, (9,000,000 Tons monthly,) then  $\frac{3}{5}$  of the increase would be credited to the reparations account and  $\frac{2}{5}$  would be retained by the Germans for their own needs.

Furthermore, in order that deliveries [*sic*] during the period of transition i.e., immediately after Peace is ratified, should be eased, the Protocol provides for the Germans starting forthwith (as from September 1st 1919) deliveries of Coal to France, such quantities being credited to the reparations account, the object of course being, that by the time of ratification of the Peace Treaty, the Germans would be placed in a position to have accumulated a certain amount of Coal to their credit on which they could have drawn to make up for any deficiencies in deliveries during the first few months, which deliveries were to be at the rate of 1,666,000 Tons per month as a minimum.

The Protocol of Versailles did not stipulate that the Germans should deliver any specified quantity of Coal per month in the interval between the coming into force of the said Protocol, namely—September 1st 1919, and the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

The French, on the other hand, agreed that they would 'exchange' 100,000 tons a month of Saar Coal against 100,000 tons of Ruhr Coal, as it was evidently admitted that the supply of Coal to certain districts of

<sup>5</sup> These tables are not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Volume V, No. 99, annex 2.

Occupied Germany, namely in the Palatinate and Moselle Regions, could, in practice, only be supplied from the Saar.

The Germans claim that this latter part of the agreement has never been carried out by the French, on the grounds that the Germans never delivered anything like the amount of Coal which they expected them (the Germans) to deliver.

It should be noted that although no amount is specifically mentioned in the Protocol, nevertheless the French claim that at Versailles the Germans informed the Allied and Associated Governments that they expected to be able to deliver about one million tons per month until such time as the Treaty of Peace were ratified when deliveries at the rate of 1,666,000 tons per month would commence.

The German deliveries of Coal were roughly from 300,000 to 650,000 tons per month during the whole of the period September–December 1919.

The French therefore refused to carry out this part of the clause concerning supplies of Saar Coal, and delivered on an average from 2,000 to 2,500 tons per day, the bulk of which went to privileged consumers, such as Railway Companies, and Electricity Works.

On the 6th January 1920, the French Government officially notified the German authorities that all deliveries from the Saar would cease as from the 1st February, and that henceforth all consumers would have to be supplied from German sources alone, as the whole production of the Saar Mines was required to ease the Coal situation in France and Alsace Lorraine.

This question of Saar Coal has always been a very bitter bone of contention between the French and the Germans. The Germans claim that the difficulty is not so much supplying the Coal from the Ruhr, but in getting it distributed to points which they (the Germans) allege can only be reached from the Saar. Further they claim that their railway system is so disorganised and defective, that it is incapable of meeting the new demands that the situation arising from the total suppression of deliveries of Coal from the Saar would place on it.

But, on the other hand, under Article 45 of the Peace Treaty 'Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, the Coal Mines situated in the Saar Basin'. And, in view of the Coal situation in France one cannot but support the French in their contention that the whole of the production of these Mines should be devoted to bettering the position there, and that the Germans should supply the Palatinate, which, though Occupied Territory, remains Germany, from other sources, however great the difficulties.

The Protocol of Versailles stipulated that the whole of the Coal distribution for both the Occupied and Unoccupied Territory would be vested entirely in the hands of the German Authorities and would be regulated from the Reichskohlenkommissar's Department in Berlin, with the Proviso that the Occupied should receive no worse treatment than the Unoccupied Territories.

The C.I.R.C., therefore, ceased to exist, and the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission became responsible for supervising and co-ordinating the operations of the German Distributing organisations, which consisted of Distributing Centres (Amtliche Verteilungsstelle) one of which was situated at each of the Coal Mine Areas named in Para. 2, and each of which received their Instructions from Berlin direct.

This return to pre-Armistice conditions worked badly from the start, and complaints became so frequent and the situation so bad, that in December, after a Meeting between the Coal Committee of the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission and the representatives of the Reichskohlenkommissar, it was decided that the Coal distribution for Occupied Territory would be carried out by one Office situated in Cologne, which would be responsible for distributing all the Coal Allotted to Occupied Territory by the Coal Kommissar in Berlin.

This arrangement came into force on the 3rd January, and on the whole works more satisfactorily than the one it superseded.

This Office, the Amtliche Verteilungsstelle for Brown Coal Distribution, had, whilst the Protocol of Luxembourg was in force, been the German medium for transmitting all the instructions of the C.I.R.C. for the distribution of Coal. The placing of control in its hands was therefore, in part, a reversion to the old system, which had worked so well before.

The attached Table 'B' shows the plan of distribution for January 1920 and should be compared with Table 'A' so far as the portion which excludes the Palatinate and Saar is concerned.<sup>7</sup>

A very considerable decrease in amounts allotted will be noted, especially for Industry.

Data are not yet available to show how far the Programme has been completed.

#### 4. FURTHER DETAIL REGARDING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS SUMMARISED IN PARA. 1.

##### (a) *Needs of the Armies of Occupation*

As will be seen by the Programme of Distribution (Table 'B') these are estimated at 30,000 Tons Monthly, and are one of the first charges on the amounts available.

The amount is not large and there is no reason to apprehend that it will not be forthcoming by some means or other.

A complication in delivering the exact amount to be debited under this heading arises owing to the fact that a large proportion of the fuel is required by Householders, Municipalities etc. to enable them to meet their obligations in heating Billeets and other accom[m]odation, which are at the same time occupied by German civilians whose normal allowance of fuel does not cover the demands made on it.

This difficulty is met by allotting such Householders etc. an extra amount proportionate to the claims made on them.

<sup>7</sup> These tables are not printed.

The Armies have always a strong weapon for enforcing their demands for fuel, inasmuch as, by Article 6 of the Annex to the Peace Treaty regarding the Occupied Rhineland,<sup>8</sup> the Power of Requisition is reserved to the Armies of Occupation.

This, in the sense of making a sudden Confiscation of Coal on the spot, on a plea of urgency, is done by the Armies in varying degree.

The British have not so far had recourse to it.

The Belgian Army is stated to have requisitioned stocks at the pithead from the Mines in their Zone, and also to have seized barges on the Rhine.

The American Army certainly has requisitioned bargeloads of Coal in transit from the Ruhr, through its Zone, to destinations further up the Rhine.

The French Army has up to lately had but little recourse to this method of obtaining supplies; but should its demands not be satisfied, it will, naturally, stop barges destined for Unoccupied South Germany and requisition their cargoes. As the French Zone is furthest from the Coal producing Areas, it is extremely probable that the recent Transport difficulties will render this course of action necessary in the near future.

Naturally such a proceeding results in an inevitable dislocation of the Distribution Scheme, and reacts eventually to the disadvantage of all concerned.

For this reason the High Commission deprecates it whenever it can possibly be avoided, but as the main object of the Coal Committee is to ensure the maintenance of the Fuel Supply to the Armies, drastic measures have to be taken when others have failed.

#### (b) *Railways*

These are allotted 100% of the amount necessary to run a restricted service as compared to Peace time, namely 135,000 Tons per month, as being the chief carriers of food and all other necessities of life, besides Coal, it is essential that they should have the priority accorded them. Owing to the ever growing accumulation of rolling-stock requiring repair, their demands continue to grow and this must be considered a permanent factor in the situation.

The reserve stocks in the hands of the Railways are, as a rule, sufficient for 3 to 5 days' consumption. The continual unrest amongst railway workers, due amongst other causes to the steady rise in food prices, finds its expression in sporadic strikes at more frequently recurring intervals. Each of these retards the execution of the Coal Distribution Scheme and if a general strike occurred it would be months before a recovery could be achieved.

#### (c) *Public Services*

Though allotted sufficient to maintain an efficient service i.e., 60 to 80% of approximately 200,000 tons required, there is very rarely a reserve in

<sup>8</sup> For this Agreement see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, pp. 219-24.

hand of more than two or three days' supply, and in consequence these undertakings are at the mercy of any breakdown in the Transport system. As, however, they can be considered as necessary to the maintenance of the Armies of Occupation, it is of immediate interest to the latter to ensure that no complete breakdown should occur in any town where a garrison is maintained, and in cases where such appears imminent, the Army concerned usually takes matters into its own hands, either by requisitioning Coal as for Army use, or by diverting fuel from Industrial to Municipal consumption.

For instance, in December 1919, the Belgian Military Authorities requisitioned Coal on behalf of the Municipalities of five towns in their Zone for the use of the Gas and Electricity Works.

The Belgian Army maintained that as the demands for Coal had been duly made to the German Authorities and had not been met, the safety of the troops was compromised, and requisitioned the minimum quantities necessary, pending the arrival of the Coal assigned through the usual channels.

The British Army has also once or twice ordered Coal which was destined for Industrial purposes to be diverted to Municipalities, but in every case has made use of German Coal Authorities to select the fuel and carry out the actual requisition.

In October 1919, the French Military Authorities removed the Mayor of Wiesbaden from his Office and deported him, on the grounds that he had made insufficient provision for the Coal supply to the Town, and neglected to advise the French Authorities until it was too late for them to intervene. A Proclamation was placarded in the streets of Wiesbaden and Mayence informing the Population accordingly.

(d) Key Industries receive approximately 70% of their requirements and lead a hand to mouth existence similar to that of the Public Services, with this difference, that they have not the requisitioning powers of the Armies to fall back upon. As a rule, however, their stocks in hand are larger than those of the Municipalities.

#### (e) *Domestic Use*

Largely owing to the abnormally mild winter experienced up to date, no widespread distress has as yet been caused by lack of fuel. The system of Distribution is similar to that of Food, the country being divided into *Versorgungsbezirke* [*sic*] which generally correspond to the *Kreise*.

The allotment of each of these is calculated with regard to its special needs and situation and is a yearly amount, of which is obtained 1/12th monthly, irrespective of the Season.

An average amount is 3 cwt. per family per month, and in theory each Householder should store fuel during the Summer months for use during the Winter. Stocks however, are very small as compared with those usually held at this time of the year, as the monthly proportion has been

more than once reduced from that contemplated by the original Estimate, and now stands at 66%.

But it should not be overlooked that wherever troops are billeted the civilian population benefits considerably by the fact that the heating of their accommodation must be maintained.

(f) *General Industry*

According to the Germans the position so far as home supplies are concerned is so bad, that their Industry is being starved for want of coal. They allege that ordinary Industrial consumers can only be satisfied to the extent of 20 to 30% of their normal requirements, and the Official Distribution Plans are framed accordingly. It is quite obvious that no Industry could possibly operate, with its requirements only covered to the extent as named. On the other hand, although there is undoubtedly a certain amount of unemployment the position is not so bad as it would appear to be on paper. The question arises therefore, as to whether German Industry is not getting more than the Official Allotment of Coal, and getting it by irregular means at a high price. Newspapers such as the 'Kölnische Zeitung' often comment on the fact.

It should be noted that certain German Industries at the present moment can afford to pay enormous prices for their Coal, as they are obtaining correspondingly high prices for their finished manufactures, and the cost of the Coal in many instances is only a very small fraction of the total cost of the finished article. A proof of this is that American Coal has been imported and sold at relatively enormously high figures, and it is probable that German Coal obtained by irregular means is being dealt in.

On the other hand certain Works such as Glass, Cement, Chemical, and Brick Works etc. all of which consume large quantities of Coal to manufacture goods having a low selling value, are badly hit, and it is from the latter class of Industry that the great majority of Coal shortage complaints are received.

## 5. LABOUR

No report on the Coal Situation could omit a reference to the Labour elements and the effect which the continued fall, culminating in a recent collapse, in the value of the Mark and the constant rise in the price of food-stuffs has on the attitude of the Coal Miner. Each of these questions might easily form the subject of a Special Report and will be only briefly dealt with here.

The question of Foreign Exchange has now become one of the topics of the hour in Germany and it is therefore not surprising to find that Miners are sending protests claiming that the ever increasing cost of living is due to the above cause, and urging that Mining Companies should be obliged to pay wages in proportion. There is every reason to believe that this matter will be taken up vigorously [*sic*] by the Miners both in Occupied Territory and in the Ruhr, in the very near future.

At the present moment the German Government only manages to keep the price of foodstuffs down to 'possible' figures by heavy subsidies. For instance: The German Government for the period July to September 1919 granted credit of 1500 Million Marks to cover its share of the subsidies, but it should be noted that the average rate of exchange during the above-named period was roughly 70 to 90 Marks to the £, whereas at present it is more like 300 to 350 Marks. What the rate of subsidy would have to be at the present moment in order to achieve the same results is a matter that can be worked out from the above-named data.

The Coal Committee of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission has been considering for some time the question of miners' wages in connection with a proposal to increase the output of mines in Occupied Territory, and one of the suggestions that will be brought up for discussion is that the Mining Companies be allowed to raise the selling price of Coal (which at the present moment is fixed by the German Government) the increased revenue obtained being set aside to buy certain provisions and essential articles of clothing abroad, which would be sold to the Miners at a reduced sum.

The position is a very difficult one, as the result of raising the selling price of coal would have the obvious and immediate result of increasing the cost of living and production for the whole community.

It should be noted that the selling price of Coal is fixed by the Government at Berlin for the whole of Germany, which includes the Occupied and Unoccupied Areas.

The cost of living in certain Mining Areas of Unoccupied Germany is probably 20% to 40% lower than the cost in the Rhineland Provinces. This is one of the reasons that the Miners in Occupied Germany are finding it so difficult to obtain sufficient food at their present rate of wages.

## 6. CONCLUSION

The Coal Situation is critical, but not desperate. If there is no great Labour upheaval or general strike embracing Miners or Transport Workers there is no reason to foresee a general breakdown in the life of the community, due to lack of Coal, though Industry will have to be content with a very small proportion of its needs for some considerable time.

Similarly there are no conclusive reasons apparent why the already much reduced demands of the Allies under the Peace Treaty should not be met.

It should be remembered in this connexion that it is to the direct interest of every German, and of the German Press, to paint the situation in the blackest possible colours, in the hope of reducing, if only by a very small amount, the claims of the Allies in this direction.

But the margin of safety on which the whole system of production and distribution is being run, is so small, that it is impossible to estimate the disastrous results of even a short-lived breakdown in either.



No. 119

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received February 23)*

No. 46 [180211/9019/39]

BERLIN, February 17, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 72 of to-day's date,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that Your Lordship's despatch No. 103 of February 13th<sup>2</sup> only reached me this morning as the Messenger who brought it was delayed a day at Brussels owing to difficulties with his luggage. Immediately on receipt of the despatch in question I telephoned to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked that arrangements should be made for me to be received by the German Chancellor as soon as possible. I was informed in reply that His Excellency was still absent in the Ruhr district and the date of his return was uncertain, but that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be glad to see me at noon. I went accordingly at the appointed time . . .<sup>3</sup>

His Excellency added in the course of subsequent conversation that . . .<sup>4</sup> Now the German Government would be able to grapple with the problems of reconstruction whereby alone Germany would be enabled to carry out the work of reparation which was due to France and Belgium. He frankly acknowledged the wrong which had been done to those countries by the devastation which had been inflicted on them, and his remarks seem to me to be of some importance as an express recognition—perhaps given spontaneously for the first time—of the responsibility on the part of Germany to repair the ravage she has wrought.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

<sup>1</sup> Volume IX, No. 625.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. See Volume IX, No. 623, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> The passage which follows is omitted since the interview it reports is fully summarized in Volume IX, No. 625.

<sup>4</sup> The passage omitted is printed in Volume IX, No. 625, n. 3.

No. 120

*Letter from Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

[Confidential/General/363/17]

*Private*

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 19, 1920

My dear Eddy,

Last week, at a meeting of the Supreme Council, Millerand raised the question of the shortage in the German deliveries of coal to France as prescribed in the Treaty of Peace.<sup>1</sup> He alleged that the large deficit was accounted for in part by the fact that the Germans were selling to Holland, which they have no right to do until their obligations under the Treaty have been fulfilled up to the last ton.

<sup>1</sup> See Volume VII, No. 3, minute 3, and No. 4, minute 2.

The French, it appeared, had in their pockets a plan—worked out by Foch—for bringing the necessary pressure to bear on the Germans by occupying the Ruhr District. This did not suit our book at all, and we insisted on the whole matter being referred to the Reparations Commission. Nitti<sup>2</sup> supported us, and Millerand gave way with as good grace as possible, but with obvious reluctance.

The Reparations Commission exist, as you know, for the very purpose of seeing that the Germans fulfil the obligations of this nature imposed upon them by the Treaty; and they are manifestly the proper body to deal with the shortage in the deliveries of coal. They are, however, an international body and, apart from the French representative, may be relied upon to take into consideration any genuine difficulties or disabilities from which the Germans may be suffering—in short, to take an impartial view and not to insist upon the impossible.

It was for this reason that the French tried to rush us in London into military measures, just as they had previously tried—if I remember aright—to rush the Ambassadors' Council in Paris. It did not come off in this case, but they are more than likely to try it on again in others. You are doubtless already on your guard, but it will be useful to you to know of what happened here, as an example of the sort of question which might inspire the French to re-set their little trap.

Another point—though a minor one—is that neither the Supreme Council nor the Ambassadors' Council is presumably in a position to give 'instructions' to the Reparations Commission. With the ratification of peace and the resumption of diplomatic relations, the Germans are not bound to recognise the authority of the Supreme Council, and might well decline to do so except in cases where it is to their advantage. It would be better that matters concerning the Reparations Commission, whose authority as an independent body we are not anxious to diminish, should be raised by the national representative on the Committee itself.

Yours ever,

CURZON

<sup>2</sup> Italian President of the Council.

## No. 121

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 23)*

*No. 520 [180423/14798/39]*

*Confidential*

PARIS, February 21, 1920

My Lord,

I had the honour in my despatch No. 515 of to-day's date<sup>1</sup> to transmit a decree nominating Monsieur Raymond Poincaré, French Delegate on the Reparation Commission in succession to Monsieur Jonnart.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> M. Jonnart had resigned, it was said for reasons of health, on February 18.

It was known that Monsieur Poincaré was anxious to take an active part in public affairs, and his appointment to the Reparation Commission is received in France with great satisfaction. The public already realises the immense importance which the Reparation Commission will play [*sic*] in applying the Treaty with Germany and Austria and generally in connection with future conditions in Europe.

The 'Matin' in commenting on the appointment, summarises the functions of the Commission and states that there was only one man in France who was pre-eminently fitted for the post, and that was Monsieur Poincaré. The President of the Commission should, the 'Matin' says, have a profound and intimate acquaintance with the complicated mechanism of the Treaty with Germany, and should be, at the same time, a financial expert and a juris-consult of the first rank. It might have been feared that Monsieur Poincaré would have wished for some rest after his seven years' labour as President of the Republic<sup>3</sup> and have hesitated to assume such heavy duties as those which will fall upon the President of the Commission. Monsieur Tardieu, who is always explaining the Treaty, of which he was one of the authors, refused to accept it, while Monsieur Poincaré, who was not responsible for the Treaty, has come forward and placed his great authority at the service of his country.

I need hardly lay stress on the authority which Monsieur Poincaré is likely to exercise both in the Reparation Commission and on governing circles in France in the execution of his new duties. He comes to them with all the prestige of an ex-President of the Republic and a political record of the first order. He was, when not in office, one of the two or three greatest barristers in France. His great ability and industry carried him to the first place in his profession and in the service of the State. No one has been in the past a more uncompromising defender of French interests. At times his acts in this respect made him seem not to pay due regard to the susceptibilities of other Nations. His treatment of Italy for instance, when President of the Council in 1912, during the Turco-Italian war regarding the incident of the seizure of the steamers 'Carthage' and 'Manouba'<sup>4</sup> created enduring resentment in that country against France, is an example of this uncompromising tendency [*sic*]. As is well-known, he protested, in company with Marshal Foch, during the negotiations at the Peace Conference against Monsieur Clemenceau's policy of compromising with the American and British view on the question of a permanent occupation of German territory west of the Rhine by France.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

<sup>3</sup> M. Poincaré had vacated the office of President of the French Republic on February 18, 1920, and was elected President of the Reparation Commission on February 23.

<sup>4</sup> An Italian destroyer had intercepted the French steamer 'Carthage' on its way from Marseilles to Tunis and taken it to Cagliari. The steamer had on board a private aeroplane which the Italian authorities unloaded at Cagliari. The 'Manouba', another French vessel, bound for Sfax, had also been intercepted and obliged to disembark at Cagliari some Turkish officers who were aboard. M. Poincaré had taken a strong line over these incidents.

No. 122

Lord Kilmarnock (*Berlin*) to Sir W. Clark<sup>1</sup> (*Received March 6*)

[834/834/PID]

BERLIN, February 22, 1920

Dear Clarke [*sic*],

I am anxious to draw your personal attention to the matters mentioned in the enclosed memoranda:

- (a) by Dr. Watts, a technical member of General Bingham's staff.
- (b) Minute on the above by Robbins, our Assistant Commercial Commissioner.

It seems to me that something might be done along the lines suggested to help Germany get her industries going. Unless something is done matters will go from bad to worse, and the chance of her paying any indemnity will be nil. I know the Americans are working on the lines indicated—especially with regard to cotton, and they expect to make similar arrangements as regards rubber and machinery.

The Germans are making real efforts to increase production and the workmen are playing up well as regards coal. I think it would be worth our while to encourage this tendency as it *cannot* be in our interests that the country should collapse economically. I see Sir A. Geddes<sup>2</sup> said in a recent speech that our policy was to trade with Germany, but we have had no guidance from official sources and our Commercial Department would be most grateful for any indications you could give them as to the line they should follow.

Thelwall<sup>3</sup> is an excellent fellow and I get on with him very well.

KILMARNOCK

<sup>1</sup> Comptroller-General of the Department of Overseas Trade. The filed copy of this letter was sent privately by Lord Kilmarnock to Mr. Headlam-Morley, Assistant Director of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> President of the Board of Trade.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. J. W. F. Thelwall was Senior Commercial Commissioner in Germany.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 122

*Memorandum by Dr. Watts on commercial relations between England and Germany*<sup>4</sup>

During my visits to the various factories I have formed the opinion that the German chemical firms are most anxious to resume commercial relations with English or other firms, but the position at present is such that their relations cannot be resumed owing to the following reasons:—

1. The rate of exchange is so high as to render the purchase of raw materials from countries other than Germany prohibitive.
2. The scarcity of coal.

<sup>4</sup> This memorandum was addressed to Major-General Sir F. Bingham.

I am not quite clear whether this matter is one which should be taken up by this Mission, but perhaps this point of view might be brought to the notice of those concerned, (if this has not already been done,) in order that British manufacturers might be able to trade with Germany.

I understand that the question of stabilization of exchange is at present under discussion in England, but it appears to me that probably both German and English Manufacturers would be agreeable to an arrangement as follows:—

That the English Manufacturer should send the raw material to Germany to be worked up into the finished product, and this finished product be exported to England; the English firm would then pay for the actual work done in Germany. I believe the following feeling exists on this subject—The Germans are agreeable to this procedure but the English feel that they cannot trust the Germans with the raw material. There may be a certain amount of truth in this but it certainly would not apply to the occupied area.

Secondly it might be possible to select those products which required the least amount of coal for manufacture in Germany, or in those cases where much coal was required, the factories in Germany where orders are placed should be suitably selected for obtaining supplies of coal—e.g. Brown Coal Area, as there are large supplies of Brown Coal and a number of factories situated in the Brown Coal Area are altering the firing arrangements of their Boiler Plants so as to be able to burn Brown Coal. I do not know whether this suggestion has been put forward before, but I think it is worth considering, both from the point of view of trade in England and also of giving increased employment in Germany. The latter point is in my opinion of the greatest importance as increased employment will not only prevent the growth of Bolshevism in Germany but will enable Germany to pay the indemnity.

H. E. WATTS

11.2.20

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 122

*Draft memorandum by Mr. Robbins on the same subject*

With regard to the contents of Doctor H. E. Watt[s]'s memorandum, the two factors which are crippling German Industry, viz., Coal and Exchange, are well known and have been frequently discussed.

The arrangement whereby Raw Materials are supplied to Germany to be worked upon and then re-exported against payment for the labour involved during process of manufacture, has been reported upon by Mr. Thelwall in recent despatches.

Concrete offers submitted by German Industrialists anxious to conduct this form of business, which is designated locally by the generic term 'Veredelungsverkehr' have been forwarded to the Department for consideration. Reports of Dutch and other Neutral Interests, also of American co-operation on similar lines have also been transmitted for your information.

The German coal situation will improve with the weather conditions during the Spring and Summer, the Labour market is showing unmistakeable signs of returning to work in earnest and Industrialists are displaying increasing readiness to enlist foreign co-operation.

The lack of confidence alluded to in the attached memorandum is understandable but this would disappear if the position and opportunities were explained. Labour Leaders were conducted round the Trenches during the war to give them an insight into conditions; similar tours of industrial centres in Germany would have an enlightening effect.

Special German legislation will safeguard all rights and interests involved; adequate guarantees are forthcoming; facilities for transportation, import and export licences will facilitate these transactions as it is essential for German industry to receive the wherewithal to provide labour for the masses.

The advantages to be obtained include amongst others the following:—

- (a) Profit to the suppliers of raw materials from the sale of the manufactured product.
- (b) Control of German Industry and particularly of Germany's Export Trade thus eliminating dumping or similar competition.
- (c) Control of distribution of manufactured product to those markets which British Industry cannot supply owing to previous engagements elsewhere, and maintaining our hold on these outlets until such time as our Industry can resume deliveries. This will enable us to meet U.S.A. and Japanese competition in Indian, Chinese and South American Markets. It will be difficult to regain entry into such markets once they are satisfied from other sources.
- (d) By accumulating stocks of German products, either in Germany or elsewhere, we shall be able to make immediate deliveries to Russia when this country opens up. The hunger for all classes of goods will be insatiable. Russia may be described as having been Germany's best colony.
- (e) The assistance which is essential to bring about commercial and financial stability will be provided by this Veredelungsverkehr, thus avoiding the necessity of participating in an International Loan to put Central Europe on its feet.
- (f) An industrious Germany means peace within the Empire and the fulfilment of her Peace Treaty obligations will be rendered more possible.
- (g) The danger of U.S.A. penetration and subsequent domination of European Commerce will be eliminated.

I hope to be able to forward the details of a new Industrial bank, formed by the German Textile Industry and encouraged by the German Government, within a few days. This bank has for its object the promotion of this so called Veredelungsverkehr by acting as Trustee for the Foreign Interests and is

in the nature of a co-operative guarantee society embracing 80% of the Hosiery Trade.

Further matter bearing on the subject of this trade can be collected and forwarded for consideration if the principles involved are deemed compatible with British Commercial Policy. An inkling as to the probable course of the Government's policy with regard to commercial relations with Germany would be of great assistance at this juncture.

No. 123

*Mr. Lindsay<sup>1</sup> (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received March 8)*

*No. 279 [A 1157/1157/45]*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1920

My Lord,

It is not easy to exaggerate the importance of the effect on America of Mr. Keynes' book 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace'.<sup>2</sup> It was advertised beforehand by the printing in the periodical press of the writer's brilliant though cruel portrait of President Wilson—a man, be it remembered, without a friend; and for a considerable time copies were sold faster than they could be printed. It must by now have had an enormous circulation. Americans do not care for the political side of the Treaty. The disposition of frontiers and provinces in the complicated geography of Europe does not interest them. Shantung was a lot talked about but it never really roused them. Fiume fails to touch them. But here is a book in eminently readable style and talking the international language of economics. In Mr. Keynes' work America has discovered the Treaty; already several Senators have read long speeches in the Senate which are merely plagiarized from it; whether the picture the book gives is true or distorted does not much matter, it has decided for some time to come what opinion Americans of moderate education will hold about the Treaty of Versailles.

In the first place, it confirms what Americans had always suspected, that they are no match for the subtle and unscrupulous diplomatists of old Europe. In the second place and far more important, it shows that Germany, after being led to capitulate on conditions—formulated by an American President—that have been violated, is now being sucked dry. The spectacle of the nations of Europe scrambling for the blood of prostrate Germany offends both the idealism and the business-like instincts of the American people. It is difficult to see how an Irishman from the heart of Sinn Fein could have written better pro-German propaganda than Mr. Keynes' book.

It must not be imagined that there is at present much disposition in America to sympathize with suffering Germany but there are plenty of elements working to bring about that result and the tendency in that direction will increase

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. R. C. Lindsay, acting Chargé d'Affaires at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Published late in 1919. Mr. J. M. Keynes had been Principal Representative of H.M. Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference.

as the passions aroused by the war subside. Herself uninterested in reparations, America's tendency to withdraw from these European complications will be intensified. In addition there is likely to be created an increasing disgust at watching the process of exacting reparation. If for some years to come His Majesty's Government in matters of finance will be somewhat dependent on the good will of the American Government and public opinion it would perhaps be well to take any steps possible to save Great Britain from the reproaches that are likely to be cast at Europe.

To give an instance. A few weeks ago there was much talk here, started largely by Sir G. Paish,<sup>3</sup> about the necessity for enormous credits from America to Europe. Mr. Glass' statement<sup>4</sup> came out throwing cold water on these ideas, and saying bluntly that there was no nostrum for the present financial ills, that the time was past for loans between governments, and that the world must get to work and produce. Two days after this the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement was published in the papers here,<sup>5</sup> dated before Mr. Glass' letter, and affirming that it was contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government to raise any more loans in America. This had an excellent effect. It showed that His Majesty's Government was at one in their financial policy with America and it took Great Britain out of the ruck of the other European Powers.

Now writing solely from the point of view of Anglo-American relations, I think it would be wise for His Majesty's Government to follow a similar course in the matter of reparation. So far as it can be done consistently with loyalty to their Allies, His Majesty's Government should show that they do not desire, in the administration of the economic chapters of the peace, to take the extreme course likely to be favoured by other European Powers. They should somewhat ostentatiously dissociate themselves from cooperating in exacting from Germany concessions and reparations which, though justified by the Treaty, are really bad business for all concerned. I imagine occasions for adopting this attitude will arise. If they are taken His Majesty's Government will in the view of Americans be taken out of the ruck of other European Powers and will not fail in the end to profit thereby.<sup>6</sup>

I have, &c.,

R. C. LINDSAY

<sup>3</sup> Sir G. Paish, a former official of H.M. Government, was visiting the U.S.A. in the interests of the 'Fight the Famine' Council and of the Vienna Emergency Fund.

<sup>4</sup> The text of this statement of January 28 is printed in the *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the state of the finances for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1920* (Washington, 1920), pp. 80-84.

<sup>5</sup> This statement was also published in *The Times* of February 3.

<sup>6</sup> Lord Hardinge minuted: 'Of course he [Mr. Lindsay] is doing his duty [in sending home reports of the views formed at Washington], but he does not realise that we are already being abused by the French press for our lenient attitude towards Germany, in particular as regards reparation. It is interesting to know of the pernicious effect of Keynes' book on American public opinion. H.' This minute was initialled by Lord Curzon.



No. 124

*Letter from Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir J. Bradbury<sup>1</sup>*

[182949/14798/39]

TREASURY CHAMBERS, WHITEHALL, *February 26, 1920*

My dear Bradbury,

I enclose for your confidential information a memorandum of the General Staff<sup>2</sup> circulated to the Cabinet by Mr. Churchill and a note<sup>3</sup> upon it by myself. These papers were yesterday considered by the Cabinet. They thought it undesirable that I should give you any formal instructions on the subject or that you should raise it with your colleagues on express instructions from your Government. At the same time they agreed with the view expressed by the General Staff as to the desirability in the interests of the Allied Governments of maintaining the authority of the present German Government in preference to the only possible alternatives, and they agreed further in viewing with considerable anxiety the present economic position of Germany and the stagnation of her industrial life.

The provision of article 235 of the Treaty which contemplates that Germany shall be allowed out of her first payment such supplies of food and raw materials as may be considered necessary to enable her to meet her obligations for reparation was inserted in order to provide a remedy for this state of things, and they wished me to inform you personally that they are quite prepared for and will readily approve any arrangements which you and your colleagues on the Reparation Commission may make for the restoration of German industry in pursuance of this article. They attach great importance to the resumption of German economic life and production not only on political grounds but as being essential to the ability of Germany to meet the just claims of the Allies upon her.

Yours sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

<sup>1</sup> This copy of the letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer was received in the Foreign Office on March 4.

<sup>2</sup> Volume IX, No. 31.

<sup>3</sup> In the filed copy, which was a stencilled copy of the original, a footnote here gave numerical reference to the enclosure. This document has not been traced in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 125

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblentz) to Earl Curzon (Received March 18)*

*No. 170 [186222/125849/1150 RH]*

COBLENZ, *March 15, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 10th instant the High Commission, acting in accordance with the decision taken by the

Reparation Commission,<sup>1</sup> issued instructions to the Allied Armies, and to the Economic Sections, that the control and supervision, hitherto exercised upon the Dye Factories in Occupied Territory, should be immediately withdrawn. No further licences for Dyes, Intermediates or for Chemical Drugs will be issued by the High Commission, and the military control, which placed the Dye Factories in the position of bonded warehouses, will be withdrawn. In future all questions concerning dyes will be dealt with by the Reparation Commission, and the responsibility which rested upon the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, and lately upon the High Commission, ceases.

2. I enclose, for the information of your Lordship, copies (marked A) of the telegram<sup>2</sup> and letter<sup>3</sup> from the Reparation Commission, to which is attached a memorandum of the arrangement made by it with the German Authorities,<sup>4</sup> and copies marked B of the telegraphic instructions issued by the High Commission.<sup>3</sup> I hope within a few days to send to your Lordship a complete statement of all licences for dyes issued by the Rhineland Commission since the 12th July, 1919.

I have, &c.,  
HAROLD STUART

<sup>1</sup> At its meeting on February 23.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 1.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure 2.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 125

*Telegram from the Reparation Commission, Paris*

'President, The Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, Coblenz.  
Off Paris 35893 177 5/3 17/25.—

— C R 915—On February 24 we wrote you under number C R 752 as follows beginning of text: The Reparation Commission has the honour to inform you that in accordance with an agreement concluded on January 30th, 1920, relative to the delivery of dye-stuffs, as per enclosed copy, there is, from the point of view of reparations, no longer need for supervision of the dye-stuff factories. The Reparations Commission, therefore, respectfully requests you to discontinue the control exercised by you up to date over the dye-stuff factories in order to allow it to assure the rights conferred upon it by the Treaty of Peace signed: Theunis, Bertolini—end of text—

We have just received a telegram from von Wrinberg [? Weinberg] advising us that the control has not yet been lifted and requesting that orders be immediately given for the discontinuing of the said control—Signed—Secretary General of the Reparations Commission.'

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 125

*Accord intervenu le 30 janvier 1920 au sujet de la Fourniture des Matières  
Colorantes*

PARIS, le 10 février 1920

Le Gouvernement allemand prend l'engagement, en attendant la mise à exécution de l'accord dont les bases ont été jetées lors de la réunion de la Sous-Commission des Matières Colorantes de la Commission des Réparations du 28 Janvier 1920, mise à exécution qui devra être faite le 30 Avril 1920 au plus tard, que les diverses Usines de Matières colorantes situées en Allemagne livreront aux États-Unis, aux Royaumes Unis [*sic*], à la France, à l'Italie, et à la Belgique les matières colorantes que ces pays leur demanderont, par priorité sur toutes autres livraisons (allemandes ou autres) et ce à concurrence de 25% de la production journalière.

Les prix auxquels ces matières colorantes seront livrées seront les prix les plus bas auxquels ces mêmes matières colorantes ont été livrées pendant le même mois à un autre acheteur quelconque (allemand ou autre).

Ces fournitures seront portées au compte[?des] Réparations.

Comme contre-partie, la Commission des Réparations prend l'engagement de suspendre immédiatement le contrôle qui s'exerce actuellement sur les Usines de Matières colorantes. Elle se réserve toutefois le droit de rétablir ce contrôle dès que l'utilité lui en apparaitre [*sic*].<sup>6</sup>

BERGMANN<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> This provisional agreement is summarized on p. 481 of *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii. This volume deals at length with the dyestuff question between August 10, 1919, and December 29, 1920.

<sup>7</sup> President of the German War Burdens Commission (Kriegslastenkommission).

No. 126

*Note from Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador*

[186474/14798/39]

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 19, 1920

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the Supreme Council decided on the 9th instant<sup>1</sup> that it would be desirable, in the interest alike of Germany and of her creditors, that the total to be paid by her for reparation should be fixed at an early date. The last sentence of the Declaration of Economic Policy,<sup>2</sup> which was issued as a result of the conference held in London, runs as follows:

'They (the Powers) observe that under the Protocol to the Treaty a period of four months from the signature of the treaty was provided during

<sup>1</sup> Presumably this is an error for the 8th. For the meeting at which the final decision was taken see Volume VII, No. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Printed in Cmd. 646 of 1920.

which Germany should have the right to make proposals of the kind referred to, and they are agreed that in the circumstances as they exist to-day such period should be extended.'

2. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that instructions are being sent to the British delegate on the Reparation Commission<sup>3</sup> with a view to the Commission being moved to make to Germany the necessary formal notification of this extension. I have the honour to request that Your Excellency would be so good as to inform your Government of this fact and to suggest to them that they should send similar instructions to their delegate on the Reparation Commission.

I have, &c.,  
(for the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>3</sup> They were sent in a letter of March 20 from the Treasury to Sir J. Bradbury. But the Reparation Commission at its meeting on March 31 expressed doubts as to the competence of the Commission under the Treaty to extend the four months' period provided by the Protocol. They therefore referred the question to their legal service, which reported that the Commission had not the right to take the initiative in the matter since this would be to proceed to a veritable revision of the Treaty.

## No. 127

*Sir John Bradbury to the Treasury<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 16 [189322/14798/39]*

*B.R. 919*

REPARATION COMMISSION, PARIS, *March 20, 1920*

May it please Your Lordships,

I have the honour to state, for Your Lordships' information, that the Reparation Commission at its meeting yesterday, had under consideration the question of the agency through which those Articles of Part IX of the Treaty with Germany (Financial Clauses) should be carried out, which do not specifically assign the function of their execution to the Reparation Commission. In certain of these Articles the Reparation Commission is constituted the intermediary of the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, in Articles 248, 250, 254, 255, 256, 260. In other Articles included in Part IX, the Allied and Associated Powers are assigned certain functions, no agency being specified as competent to act on their behalf—though I may recall that as regards Article 235, and therefore by implication as regards Article 251, it has already been decided in practice that the Reparation Commission should act on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers in the matter of the supplies

<sup>1</sup> A copy of Sir J. Bradbury's letter was transmitted by the Treasury to the Foreign Office on March 31 with a request for their views. In their reply of April 12 the Foreign Office concurred in the Treasury's view that the administration of the clauses in question should be undertaken by the Reparation Commission acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments.

of food and raw materials which may be considered to be essential to enable Germany to meet the reparation obligations, with the reservation that His Majesty's Government may raise the question again at a later stage.

Thus in Article 249 the repayment of costs of the Armies of Occupation is to be made 'to the Allied and Associated Governments'.

In Article 259, which deals with the delivery, payment or transfer by Germany of various sums of money, securities, instruments or goods, the functions of receiving such sums of money, etc., are imposed on 'the Principal Allied or Associated Powers', or, in the case of clauses (1) and (3), on 'such authority as the Principal Allied or Associated Powers may designate', the Powers being further required to dispose of their receipts under the Article in a manner which they shall hereafter determine. In Article 261, Germany is required to transfer to 'the Allied and Associated Powers' all her claims on her former Allies.

The Reparation Commission debated the question of the modality of execution of these clauses at considerable length, and the discussion brought out clearly the feeling of the Commission that it was very desirable that an early decision should, if possible, be forthcoming on what was recognized to be an important issue. The Commission eventually decided that each Delegate should seek the instructions of his Government in the matter as a question of urgency.

There appear to be various ways in which the Allied and Associated Powers might elect to discharge their functions under the second category of Articles which I have enumerated. They might choose to proceed by means of the ordinary diplomatic channels. They might create a new body or bodies with special *ad hoc* powers. They might prefer to take advantage of the organisation and machinery of the Reparation Commission and invest it with authority to act as their agency under these Articles, designating it, *inter alia*, as the competent authority for the purposes of Paragraph[s] (1) and (3) of Article 259.

In this connection it is perhaps of advantage to recall that in the course of the Peace Conference proceedings the project of establishing an Inter-Allied Commission to carry out the Financial Clauses of the Treaty was abandoned, at the instigation of President Wilson, on the ground that such a body would merely duplicate the functions of the Reparation Commission.

The Reparation Commission is anxious that a decision should soon be reached as regards the machinery for executing the Financial Clauses, in order that it may proceed with the necessary organisation of its Services. I have, therefore, the honour to request that Your Lordships may be pleased to convey to me, the instructions of His Majesty's Government on this question at an early date.

I have, &c.,

JOHN BRADBURY

*Note from the Italian Ambassador to Earl Curzon (Received March 26)*

[188600/14798/39]

*Translation*

LONDON, March 26, 1920

The Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to inform him that according to information received by his Government, during the proceedings of the Reparation Commission of the 20th instant in Paris, President Poincaré communicated certain representations made to him by M. Bourgeois and Mr. Balfour<sup>1</sup> with a view to establishing agreements and communications<sup>2</sup> between the Council of the League of Nations and the Reparation Commission, likewise in view of the forthcoming financial Conference in Brussels.<sup>3</sup>

In view of the above-mentioned proposal, the Royal Government points out the desirability of keeping absolutely separate the respective action of these two bodies, whose functions and whose 'raison d'être' (finalità) are opposed to each other; all the more so, if it is desired to preserve intact the efficacy of the two institutions, and if it is not desired to take away from the League of Nations that independence which is for it a necessary condition of life. The Royal Government desires to point out that for these reasons it is not advisable to favour the proposal made by President Poincaré.

In submitting to the Government of His Britannic Majesty the views of the Government of the King with regard to so important a question, the Marquis Imperiali wishes to add that instructions in the above sense have been sent to the Royal Italian Delegate at the Reparation Commission.

The Italian Government would be exceedingly grateful if similar instructions could be sent by the British Government to their delegate on the above-mentioned Commission.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Representatives of France and the British Empire at the third session of the Council of the League of Nations.

<sup>2</sup> The original Italian word here was 'relazioni'.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 141 below, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> In a minute on the file Mr. Waterlow had urged the importance of working out 'an intelligible British policy for the financial reconstruction of Europe' with a view to co-ordinating various existing 'schemes'. Mr. Waterlow's minute had also referred to a recent proposal of his own for a standing interdepartmental committee (see Volume IX, No. 50, n. 4) which, he believed, would contribute to this end. Sir E. Crowe and Lord Curzon commented as follows:

'1. We are very incompletely informed as to the proceedings and policy of the Reparation Committee, which although dealing entirely with questions of foreign policy and affecting the political relations of this country with our late enemies, has been removed altogether from the control of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The projected discussion with the Treasury to which Mr. Waterlow refers in the concluding paragraph of his above minute [not printed], may help to remedy this unfortunate state of things.

'2. On the meagre information at present before us, I hesitate to formulate a definite opinion on the merits of the question raised by the Italian Ambassador.

'3. My first impression is that the Italian Government are right. I have, when in Paris, more than once discussed this point with Sir J. Bradbury, our representative on the Repara-

tion Commission. He strongly held the view, now expressed by the Italians, that the functions of the Commission, which are clearly determined by the treaty of peace, should be limited to giving effect to the object for which the Commission was created, viz. to regulate the manner in which Germany should effect the reparation stipulated for. The object is to obtain payment.

'4. What is now proposed, and what is to engage the attention of the conference to be called by the league of nations, is to devise measures which shall, among other things, set Germany on her feet sufficiently to enable her to pay. The Italians are right in pointing out that these are opposite functions. The Reparations Commission takes, the league of nations conference gives.

'5. Some case can always be made out for combining contradictory functions in one body. More generally it is good organisation to keep them distinct in different hands.

'6. It is another matter that some connection should exist on a higher plane. That connection in the present case is naturally formed in the body of the allied governments. The league of nations is not an "allied" body, in the sense in which the Reparation Commission is. The latter represents strictly and exclusively the allies who signed and ratified the peace treaty. The league of nations comprises these and every one else as well. This is, as Sir J. Bradbury has often pointed out to me, a fundamental objection to charging the Reparation Commission with general duties outside the ambit of the peace treaty.

'7. I look with some concern and anxiety on any proposal put forward under the name of "liaison". We have suffered terribly under the general absence of method and organization which under the name of "liaison" has promoted during the war the growth of scores of bodies and hundreds of agents of undefined functions who have introduced and perpetuated confusion in the government machinery. Where public departments and bodies are placed in properly defined positions towards each other, "liaison" is a matter of ordinary business routine, requiring no special organs.

'8. My provisional and tentative conclusions are that

'(A) the functions of the Reparation Commission and of the conference of the league of nations should remain altogether distinct.

'(B) that the league of nations, which represents the world at large, should have no direct relations with the Reparation Commission which represents the allies in the late war.

'(C) that the connection between the league conference, with the Reparation Commission, insofar as desirable, should be through the governments of those members of the league who are represented on the Commission, which alone will ensure that the Commission are not directed into courses not desired by the allies as distinguishable from other members of the league of nations.

'9. I should of course be quite ready to reconsider my views, if convincing arguments opposed to them are put forward. But in the first instance I would suggest our laying these views, so far as they may meet with the Secretary of State's approval, before the Treasury, and ask for information and advice. E. A. C. Ap. 4.'

'There appear to be two solutions

'(a) To leave all these bodies, Commissions, Conferences, with their undefined and overlapping powers, and to provide some machinery for coordinating and reconciling their conflicting efforts.

'(b) To insist that each does its own job, and nothing more, or perhaps rather to see that no two attempt to do the same job.

'I am inclined to the latter and I would like Sir E. Crowe's views, with which on the whole I am in sympathy, put before the Treasury. C. 5/4.'

Accordingly, it was after consultation with the Treasury that Lord Curzon sent the reply to the Italian Ambassador printed as No. 147 below.

No. 129

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 441 Telegraphic [189322/14798/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 12, 1920, 12.30 p.m.*

Following for Bradbury from Blackett.<sup>1</sup>

Your M107.<sup>2</sup> H.M. Government agree to administration of Financial Clauses by Reparation Commission on behalf of and as agents for them and appoint Reparation Commission as the competent authority for the purpose of paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 259. Letter follows.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mr. B. P. Blackett was Controller of Finance at the Treasury.

<sup>2</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. A copy of this confirmatory letter from the Treasury was transmitted to the Foreign Office on April 14.

No. 130

*Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon (San Remo)*

*No. 2 Telegraphic [191173/14798/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 16, 1920, 9 p.m.*

Following for Mr. Vansittart.<sup>1</sup>

British delegate on Reparation Commission reports to Treasury that the Commission has decided, for the time being, to limit their demands upon Germany under Article 260, to rights and interests which the Allied Governments are themselves willing to take over and he thinks it inadvisable at present to propose a demand for the delivery of interests in Turkish undertakings and concessions generally, or of railway interests generally, as we had suggested, unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to give an assurance of their willingness to purchase all the rights and interests so required.

We are again explaining<sup>2</sup> to Treasury why we attach importance to action being taken in regard to the railways.

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Eastern and Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. in a letter of April 26 in which it was said that the Foreign Office's request of March 12 (not printed) that the Reparation Commission should take immediate action to eliminate German interests in railway undertakings in Turkey 'was prompted by the suspicion based on certain information, that attempts were being made by the Germans to dispose of their holdings in undertakings, especially railways, in Turkey, before the terms of Article 260 of the Peace Treaty could be brought into operation, and further by the fact that negotiations . . . were in progress for co-operation between the British and French interests in railway development in Asia Minor, which had specially in view the acquisition by the Anglo-French Combine, through the Reparation Commission, of German interests in the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, the Haidar Pasha Port and Quay Co. and the Mersian [*sic*]-Adana-Tarsus Railway'.



**No. 131**

*Lord Kilmaarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received April 21, 11.10 a.m.)*

*No. 247 Telegraphic [193146/182853/18]*

BERLIN, April 20, 1920, 8.5 p.m.

Mr. Heatley, British Representative on the coal Commission at Essen informs me that the food situation there is very serious. Workmen say that they are willing to work more in order to increase production but are physically incapable of doing so on the present ration which does not exceed two pounds of bread a week. Potatoes have been procured for three weeks. Proposal has been made to Reparation Commission to allow export of certain quantity of coal to Holland in return for provisions but though the Commission is inclined to consider the matter sympathetically they say they can take no action unless requested to do so by the German Government. Mr. Heatley says that his views are shared by the other Commissioners.

Should I give a hint to the German Government that it would be well for them to approach the Reparation Commission officially? Objection to this course is that if the request is refused we may be regarded as having incurred some responsibility for its being made.

**No. 132**

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmaarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 136 Telegraphic [193146/182853/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 22, 1920, 6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 247 (of April 20th:<sup>1</sup> food situation in Essen).

You should not intervene in any way.

<sup>1</sup> No. 131.

**No. 133**

*Report No. 26<sup>1</sup> from the British Delegation, Reparation Commission, to the Treasury*

*B.R. 1098 [196170/14798/39]*

PARIS, April 24, 1920

May It Please Your Lordships,

1. In the absence of Sir John Bradbury, I have the honour to state, for

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this report was transmitted by the Treasury to the Foreign Office on May 5. In their covering letter the Treasury wrote as follows: 'If Lord Curzon concurs, My Lords would propose to inform Sir John Bradbury that His Majesty's Government consider that the Note of the Supreme Council of 17th January last has no bearing on the claim of Poland to Reparation. When the Note is read in conjunction with the financial agreement of September 10th 1919 [Cmd. 458 of 1919] and the declarations of December 8th 1919 [Cmd. 637 of 1920] to which it refers, My Lords consider that it can in no way be construed as an expression of opinion by the Supreme Council regarding the right of Poland to Reparation, but that it merely purported to set forth the advantages in respect of Reparation which Poland would gain by adhering to the declaration of the 8th December 1919, should her right to Reparation be eventually recognised.'

Your Lordships' information, that the Reparation Commission had under its consideration yesterday an application by the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference for the recognition of the right of Poland to restitution and reparation. A brief note of the history of this matter up to 7th January, 1920, as dealt with by the Committee on Organisation of the Reparation Commission and the Reparation Commission, is appended for convenience of reference.<sup>2</sup> It will be observed that it was recognised at the meeting of the Committee on Organisation of the Reparation Commission held on that date that the decision of the C.O.R.C. granting Poland the right to restitution required to be approved by the Reparation Commission.

2. The matter was further considered at a meeting of the Reparation Commission held on the 8th instant, when further documents (Annex 176 *a, b, c, d, e, f*) copies of which are also enclosed,<sup>2</sup> were submitted to the Commission. It will be noted that, while the Legal Service of the Commission by a majority opinion (Annex 176*b*) found that Poland was entitled to restitution as from the declaration of War by Germany in 1914 they did not consider that Poland was entitled to reparation. The British Member of the Legal Service, in a note appended to the above opinion (Annex 176*c*), expressed the view that the right of Poland to restitution in kind must stand or fall with the right to reparation. He did not put forward any reasoned opinion in support of this view, and he understood that the German Government had officially expressed willingness to meet the Polish claim to restitution. It was understood, however, from the Polish Delegate, who was present at the meeting of the Reparation Commission on the 8th instant, that the position is that, while the German Government has hitherto raised no objections in regard to the Polish claim to restitution, no official German consent has yet been given, and that the matter is still the subject of negotiations between the German and Polish Governments.

3. It was decided at that meeting, at the request of the Polish Delegate, to adjourn the discussion of the question in order to enable him to submit some further documents. Additional documents were in due course submitted by the Polish Delegate and are enclosed herewith (Annex 205 *a, b, c, d*).<sup>2</sup>

4. A further opinion was furnished by the Legal Service to the Reparation Commission in view of these documents and a copy of this is also enclosed (Annex 213).<sup>2</sup>

5. It will be observed that the Legal Service in this opinion unanimously expressed the view that the letter from the Supreme Council, dated 17th January 1920 addressed to the Polish Delegation,<sup>3</sup> which forms one of these further documents, and on which the Polish Delegate lays stress in his letter to the Reparation Commission of the 15th instant, as conveying a decision of the Supreme Council explicitly confirming the right of Poland to reparation, does not furnish any reason for modification of their original opinion, in view of the fact that in the agreement of 30th [10th] September, 1919, referred to, as modified by the subsequent declaration dated 8th December, 1919,

<sup>2</sup> Not appended to the file containing this correspondence, but to be found in the minutes (not printed) of the Reparation Commission. <sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 51, minute 8.

the question of whether Poland has the right to reparation is, in the opinion of the Legal Service, reserved.

This argument of the Legal Service appears to me, *prima facie*, to dispose of the Polish Delegate's contention that the Supreme Council's letter of 17th January 1920—which is concerned with the expenses of liberating the States arising from the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or to which territory of that Monarchy has been transferred—constitutes a decision of the Supreme Council confirming Poland's right to reparation, especially if regard be had to the fact that no power of interpretation is conferred on the Supreme Council by the Treaty. Nevertheless, it was considered by the Reparation Commission, when the matter was before it yesterday, that it was desirable, while maintaining the principle that the Commission alone has authority to interpret the reparation provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, that, as a preliminary to the further consideration by the Commission of the Polish Delegate's application, each Delegate should communicate with his Government enquiring what was the intention of the letter of the Supreme Council in question, which has not been communicated by the Supreme Council to the Reparation Commission.

6. I shall, accordingly, be glad to be informed what interpretation His Majesty's Government considers should be placed on the Supreme Council's letter in its bearing upon the claim by the Polish Delegation to reparation.

7. I may add that, in the course of the discussion yesterday, while expressing the opinion that there was no reason why Poland should not make such arrangements with the German Government as might be practicable for securing restitution of objects of which she had been deprived by Germany, I stated that if [I] felt difficulty, in view of the opinion of the British Member of the Legal Service (referred to in his reservation contained in Annex 176c), which had been privately communicated to me, in agreeing, on my present information, that Poland had a *right* to restitution. A copy of this opinion by Mr. Fischer Williams,<sup>4</sup> is transmitted for information. It is now being circulated among the other Delegates.

8. A copy of this Report has been sent to H.M. Embassy, Paris.

I have, &c.,

H. J. LEVIN [H. G. LEVICK]

<sup>4</sup> British Legal Representative on the Reparation Commission.

## No. 134

*Letter from Sir H. Stuart (Coblentz) to Mr. Waterlow*

[194879/4232/18]

COBLENZ, April 26, 1920

My dear Waterlow,

On the 24th April Mr. Heatley, the British member of the Essen Coal Committee of the Reparation Commission, came to see me and gave me some

interesting information regarding the state of affairs in the Ruhr Basin. His information lent strong support to the view I have frequently expressed that food is at present the key to the situation in the Ruhr. He told me, and what he said is corroborated by reports from other sources, that the ration of miners at Essen is 2 lbs. of bread and 2 lbs. of potatoes per head per week, with some lard and a few odds and ends of miscellaneous foods. There is no meat and the miners say they have forgotten how to eat meat. The meal that they take down into the mines is bread smeared with a little lard. At a mine which the Committee inspected the other day, 23% of the miners were absent, looking for food. The Committee received a deputation of 30 miners a short time ago and these men said 'We are neither Red nor White nor Black nor Blue: all we want is food'.

The Dutch recently proposed to lend sixty million gulden, to be earmarked for food for miners, on condition that a certain percentage of the output of the mines close to the Dutch frontier was reserved, on payment, for Holland, but the Reparation Commission turned down this proposal. The Dutch argued that if the miners got more food more coal would be produced, and the Essen Committee are unanimous in agreeing that this would be the case and, I think, in recommending the acceptance of the Dutch proposal; but the French members of the Reparation Commission are apparently too strong for their colleagues. The French are unable to transport much more coal than they are receiving now owing to the difficulties in handling it at the junction points in France at which it is received from Germany. They fear therefore that an increased output of coal from the German mines would benefit not French but German industry and they are determined that this shall not be brought about.

I gave all this information to my colleagues at a Private Meeting of the High Commission which was held on the 24th in Tirard's<sup>1</sup> room, and Tirard said he would make enquiries. I do not like the Germans and I would far rather help the French than help Germans, but one cannot support this dog in the manger policy. [Can you do anything at your end to get some spirit of reasonableness instilled into the Reparation Commission?]<sup>2</sup>

There is one other point in which I think *we* English are rather unreasonable. The French say that they can get more coal if they can get it by river to Rotterdam and from there by sea to France, but our contention is that such coal would then become German seaborne coal and the price would in consequence (under the Treaty) be increased to that of English seaborne coal. I can understand the importance of this contention for the protection of British interests, but surely we might without injury to those interests permit the exportation by this route of a limited amount which would in practice be used for French industries and not in competition with our bunker coal.

<sup>1</sup> M. Paul Tirard was French High Commissioner and President of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

<sup>2</sup> This passage in square brackets was omitted from the copy of this letter which, together with one of No. 131, was sent by Lord Curzon on May 4 to the British Delegate to the Reparation Commission asking for his views.

This coal question is somewhat outside my province, but industrial revival touches all of us and the getting of increased supplies of coal for France would greatly weaken the French case for harsh treatment of Germany, and in particular for the occupation of the Ruhr. Not that I think that there is any case for the last step in any event, for as I have said above one of the important causes of the failure of France to get more coal from Germany is her own inability to deal adequately with the transport question.

Yours [in much weariness]<sup>3</sup>

HAROLD STUART

<sup>3</sup> Omitted from the copy sent to Sir J. Bradbury; see n. 2 *ante*.

No. 135

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 1)*

No. 1306 [195315/14798/39]

*Very Confidential*

PARIS, April 28, 1920

My Lord,

I learn from a reliable source that Monsieur Poincaré, President of the Reparation Commission, recently attended a meeting of the French Parliamentary [*sic*] Commission of the Devastated Regions, and pointed out that, whereas by the Versailles Treaty the Reparation Commission had to notify to the German Government the financial demands to be made upon them by May 1st, 1921, by the French law respecting the assessment of damages, such assessment need not be completed before October 1921.

Monsieur Poincaré stated that it was necessary that he, as French Representative on the Reparation Commission, should be in possession of the French bill for damages at least as early as January 1921, in order to be in a position to put forward the French part of the demands by the 1st of May of that year.

I am also informed that considerable dismay has been occasioned in Parliament by what is believed to have been suggested at San Remo as regards fixing very shortly a total sum to be demanded from Germany. It is considered absolutely impossible, for instance, that an estimate of any such sum could be come to in time for the proposed meeting with the German Ministers at Spa next month.

It is thought that if an attempt were made to assess a lump sum forthwith, Monsieur Poincaré would declare that it is impossible, and, in the event of the proposal being maintained, would resign his position as President of the Reparation Commission.

I understand that he said to the Commission of the Devastated Regions the other day that its members must realise the difficulties which he encountered at the Reparation Commission. He is reported as having said that his Allied Colleagues did not work with him but against him.

Some competent observers of French politics believe that if Monsieur Millerand were defeated in the Chamber on some possibly minor question in the course of the next few months, the most likely successor to him would be Monsieur Poincaré, who would then endeavour to obtain Monsieur Briand's co-operation as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Monsieur Barthou has damaged his prospects—temporarily at any rate—of being asked to form a Ministry by his virulent speech against Great Britain last month in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>1</sup> At the present moment, however, Monsieur Millerand's position is considerably stronger than it was two months ago.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

<sup>1</sup> This speech was delivered on March 25: see *The Times* of March 26 and the *Journal Officiel* (Chambre des Députés, sess. ord. Janvier à Mars 1920), pp. 711–18. M. Barthou was President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber. Cf. Volume VIII, No. 14, minute 4.

### No. 136

*Note communicated by the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires*

*No. 2048 [195811/14798/39]*

LONDRES, le 3 mai, 1920

Une Commission d'experts financiers s'est réunie le 25 avril à San Remo<sup>1</sup> et a émis les vœux suivants.

1°) Voir fixer au plus tôt le montant de l'indemnité à payer par l'Allemagne.

2°) Faire savoir à l'Allemagne qu'elle peut présenter des offres en relation avec l'indemnité à payer.

3°) Faire procéder immédiatement à l'étude des points suivants:

a) La somme qui sera jugée acceptable par les Alliés.

b) La proportion qui reviendra à chaque Allié sur les paiements de l'Allemagne.

c) Méthode de détermination des paiements à faire par l'Allemagne en tenant compte de son relèvement économique possible.

Le Gouvernement Belge serait heureux de savoir:

1°) si le Gouvernement Britannique est d'accord avec les recommandations [*sic*] des experts financiers;

2°) quelle suite pratique il compte donner à leurs recommandations.

Un accord doit s'établir entre les Alliés sur certaines questions avant la réunion de la Conférence de Spa.

Le Gouvernement Belge demande à savoir si un contact ne va pas s'établir *dès maintenant* entre les Alliés à ce sujet.

<sup>1</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 14, minute 10.

Par suite de la date prochaine de la réunion de Spa, l'Ambassade de Belgique serait particulièrement heureuse d'être renseignée sur les points qui précèdent dans le plus bref délai possible.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In transmitting a copy of this note to the Treasury and asking what answer the Lords Commissioners would wish to be returned Mr. Phipps emphasized the 'great importance of taking steps to reach an inter-allied agreement on this subject without delay'. At the same time Lord Hardinge sent copies of the Belgian memorandum and of Mr. Phipps's letter to the Treasury to Sir M. Hankey and asked to be informed as soon as possible what decision as to procedure had been taken by the Cabinet. Lord Curzon's reply of May 26 to the Belgian Ambassador transmitted a copy of the announcement issued after the First Conference of Hythe (for the conference see Volume VIII, Nos. 21-23, and for the announcement Volume VIII, No. 23, note 4) and stated that plans for dealing with the matter referred to in the announcement and in the Belgian note were 'being examined with a view to their presentation to the Governments interested as soon as possible'.

### No. 137

*Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the Portuguese Minister in London*

[196381/14798/39]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 4, 1920

The Portuguese Minister called today and spoke with reference to two matters connected with Reparation:

(1) The first point he raised is explained in the attached telegram which I sent to Lord Derby, as the matter was clearly urgent (tel. to Lord Derby No. 516).<sup>1</sup>

(2) The second point raised by Sr. Teixeira Gomes was that since Portugal was vitally interested in the . . .<sup>2</sup> question of the reparation to be exacted from Germany, the Portuguese government hoped they would be given an opportunity of being heard, and of representing their views, in the course of the projected discussions at Spa on this subject. Portugal had no representation on the Reparation Commission, but the First Portuguese Delegate at the Peace Conference (Sr. Costa) would proceed from Paris to Spa in order to give any explanations desired, and to be available on the spot for personal consultation.

I made no reply on this point, beyond saying that I would inform the Secretary of State.

The Portuguese have a special position in regard to one important branch of reparation claims, and for this special position they obtained explicit recognition in § 4 of the annex to article 297 of the German treaty: namely the right of special compensation for acts committed by Germany in [Portuguese] territory (Anglola [*sic*] &c.) prior to the entry of Portugal into the war.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. It concerned the appointment of an arbitrator under clause 4 of the annex to article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles.

<sup>2</sup> One word of the text is here illegible.

The Portuguese are naturally anxious that these special rights should not be overlooked in any arrangements made or discussed with the Germans at Spa; and as, under the arrangement, Portuguese claims have a certain measure of priority, they are always apprehensive of the French advocating some plans by which those claims would be adversely affected.

It seems in the circumstances equitable that the Portuguese should be heard if and when anything is discussed which would have a bearing on their rights under the treaty.

I presume the Reparations Commission itself will either proceed in a body to Spa, or be itself represented there by some representative committee on which Sir J. Bradbury would have a place.

We might write to the Treasury requesting them to instruct Sir J. Bradbury to support the legitimate claim of the Portuguese on the point raised, and ask him to place himself in direct communication with Sr. Costa on the subject.<sup>3</sup>

E. A. C. May 4.

<sup>3</sup> Sir E. Crowe's memorandum was initialled by Lord Curzon and a letter was sent accordingly to the Treasury on May 6.

No. 138

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 7)*

No. 1371 [196520/14798/39]

*Confidential*

PARIS, May 4, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 1362 of to-day's date,<sup>1</sup> that Monsieur Poincaré now writes regular articles on the first and third Mondays of each month for the 'Matin' and on the first and fifteenth of each month for the 'Revue des Deux Mondes'.

His article in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' dated May 1st is not only concerned with how to make Germany pay what is owing to France, but discusses a number of political questions in a distinctly controversial manner, and in a tone which cannot be described as friendly towards the Allies. The article is very long, but an idea of the spirit in which it was written may be gained from the following extracts:—

'If the Treaty of Versailles has brought a great disillusionment to France, and if it did not put all the cost of the war on the conquered enemy, it is because our Allies so decided' . . .

. . . 'France has always been the Nation which has propagated the great

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This briefly summarized an article by M. Poincaré on the coming negotiations at Spa which appeared in the *Matin* of May 3. It also referred to an article published on the following day in the same paper which, Lord Derby said, might 'have been inspired' and which alluded to M. Poincaré's article as creating a sensation and sounding an alarm.



ideas which lead forward the human race, but she is touchingly unskilful ("d'une maladresse touchante") in the art of putting her qualities and her acts in a good light' . . .

. . . 'Many Frenchmen have found it hard to understand the admiration professed by certain of our Allies for the unity of Germany; however, the Treaty put aside the conception which favoured the institution of a German Federation and the restoration of its old liberties to the Rhineland, and France with a good grace accepted the *fait accompli*' . . .

. . . 'To reproach France to-day with an alleged imperialism, which all her conduct shows to be false, is to calumniate her intentions and to outrage truth' . . .

. . . 'Germany proposed to add a new and more audacious and more dangerous violation of the Treaty to other previous ones; and Mr. Lloyd George and Monsieur Nitti chose that very moment to try and move Monsieur Millerand to pity on the subject of the misfortunes of Germany, and to convince the French President of the Council that it would be a good thing to invite the Germans to San Remo' . . .

. . . 'A Treaty (of Versailles) in which the positive advantages of certain of our Allies are much greater than those of France' . . .

. . . 'Our Allies say to us, at the first attempt of the Germans to play the comedy of their helplessness, "there is a mistake, let us make a new Treaty less hard for Germany and let us be united in recognising that France, having been the nation to suffer most, must make the greatest concessions"' . . .

. . . 'Our situation has been completely altered for the worse at Constantinople and in Asia Minor. In Syria, Feisal has proclaimed himself King under our noses, and tries to push us gently out of the country by making use of the unfortunate concessions which we made to him at the request of our Allies' . . .

. . . 'We shall know later exactly to what extent the negotiations at San Remo relative to Turkey have had an effect on the negotiations concerning Germany, and if in order to obtain a small part of what was due to us, we have not been obliged to pay to others that which was not due to them' . . .

. . . 'Whatever may be said, it is revising the Treaty, and revising it completely, if Germany is given a supplementary delay to make offers of a composition sum, and certain of the conventions contemplated at San Remo for fixing the amount of the debt due to France appear to be entirely impossible of acceptance' . . .

M. Poincaré evidently considers that his position as President of the Reparation Commission in nowise renders it necessary for him to abstain from discussing in the press political matters and taking part in political controversies. He is already prepared to exercise pressure upon his own Government, if the latter do not see eye to eye with him as regards the manner of obtaining reparation from Germany.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

*Lord Kilmaunock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received May 10)**No. 253 [196975/4232/18]*

BERLIN, May 5, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me yesterday on the subject of the forthcoming meeting at Spa and expressed the fear that it would result in disappointment. He pointed to the disastrous condition of German finance and said he feared that any proposals which his Government could make would not be such as would be likely to satisfy the Allies, and especially the French Government. If on the other hand the German Government were to make an offer which subsequently proved impossible of fulfilment they would be exposed to the charges of a breach of faith. They would, he said, go to Spa and provide the Allies with a frank and honest statement of the financial situation, showing what their assets and liabilities were, and leaving it, I gathered, to the Allies to draw their own conclusions. He dwelt on the importance of Upper Silesia to the industrial life of Germany and hinted not obscurely that if that province were lost economic ruin must ensue.

Very similar language was held to me the night before by Herr Walter Rathenau, one of Germany's most prominent men of business who is moreover believed to inspire to a considerable degree the financial ideas of the Government. Count Poradowsky<sup>1</sup> has also endeavoured to impress on me the vital necessity of the retention of Upper Silesia by Germany.

I notice indeed so strong an inclination among German circles, including the minor officials of the Foreign Office, to declare that it is impossible for Germany to name a sum which she is prepared and able to pay as reparation, that it suggests that a *mot d'ordre* has been given in this sense. The impression which it is sought to produce is that Germany can pay practically nothing and that indeed she can hardly make both ends meet even if the claims of the Allies are disregarded.

Another subject which the Minister for Foreign Affairs touched on in connection with the Spa meeting, was that of disarmament. He expressed the opinion that a long-term standing army would always be a dangerous weapon in the hands of reaction and said that a simple militia would be far preferable from all points of view. He realised that the latter would be regarded as a possible danger by France, permitting as it did the passing of a larger number of men through the ranks in a comparatively short period, but he apparently hoped that technical means might be found for surmounting this difficulty. I may mention in this connection that I have reason to know that Socialist opinion, both German and Allied, considers that the small professional army allowed to Germany by the Peace Treaty is a mistake, and I understand that steps have been taken to impress this view on our own Labour party.

<sup>1</sup> This is probably a reference to Count Posadowsky, an Upper Silesian landowner and former Imperial State Secretary of the Interior, 1897-1907.

On the whole there is a distinct tendency to pessimism as to the probability of any tangible results being forthcoming from the meeting at Spa and a deliberate policy to represent Germany's case as so desperate that she can offer practically nothing by way of reparation. This is no doubt in some degree due to the natural reluctance of the bargainer to show his hand, and perhaps still more to a desire on the part of the Government to avoid raising expectations the non-realisation of which may have a marked effect on the elections. But it must be admitted that the present financial position of Germany is so serious that there are perfectly good grounds for taking a gloomy view of the situation.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

No. 140

*Sir A. Geddes<sup>1</sup> (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received May 7, 11.45 a.m.)*

*No. 324 Telegraphic [196678/180958/18]*

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1920<sup>2</sup>

Following for the Treasury and Board of Trade.

American attitude with regard to European credits.

From informal conversations held during last few days it is clear that Mr. Houston, new Secretary of United States Treasury, feels more strongly even than Mr. Glass that further direct advances to European countries by United States Government are to be regarded as out of the question. Further he is apparently inclined to discourage creation of facilities for extension of commercial credits on a large scale to European countries. It seems that he even doubts necessity for continuing facilities represented by 1,000,000,000 dollar fund of War Finance Corporation (see my despatch 900, December 9th).<sup>3</sup> There is a difference of opinion between Treasury and War Finance Corporation. Latter are in favour of possible credits and there are signs that fund may be more largely drawn on in immediate future by commercial banks and industrial corporations. Applications have already been received for accommodation from this fund up to a total of some 140,000,000 dollars.

We also learn of the existence of a project now being tentatively and confidentially discussed, under which some of the larger cotton shippers, copper producers, and packers' equipment corporations etc. would unite in offering to supply Germany on credit of a year or longer with supplies of cotton, copper, equipment and food against joint undertaking by German Government, German business men, and principal German Labour leaders, that industrial production would be vigorously resumed in Germany and a reasonable proportion of product set aside for export and for repayment of indebtedness. A lien on goods in process of manufacture would doubtless be

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Ambassador at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> The time of despatch is not recorded.

<sup>3</sup> This reference was later amended to read: 'D.O.T. No. 900 Overseas of December 9th, 1919, reporting the proceedings of the International Trade Conference in December 1919'; not traced in Foreign Office archives.

asked for as security but none of practical details have yet been worked out. Assumption appears to be that liabilities created in this way will rank in front of reparation.

It is expected by this group that Reparations Commission will raise no objection to course above outlined, but group apparently contemplate sending representatives to Paris to secure definite assurances.

You will realise of course that whole thing is still very vague but it seems desirable to advise you of project even in its embryonic stage and we shall inform you of its development.

#### No. 141

*Record by Earl Curzon of a conversation with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in London*

[197283/7067/39]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 10, 1920

The Ital[ian] Chargé d'Affaires handed me the accompanying note on behalf of Signor Nitti.

I told him of the uncertainty that existed as to the date of the Spa Conference and asked him to ascertain for me where, when and by whom Signor Nitti desired that the preliminary consultations should be held.

He promised to ascertain.

C.

#### ANNEX TO NO. 141

*Note from Italian Chargé d'Affaires in London*

No. 2208

*Urgent*

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to inform him that the Italian Government are of opinion that an exchange of views between the authorized representatives of the Allies, a few days prior to their meeting at Spa, would be expedient in order to consider, and come to an agreement on the most suitable line of action to be taken, especially with regard to the fixing of indemnities and their mode of payment on the part of Germany. As the question of the determination of a fixed sum for the indemnity will be probably put forward, it seems desirable that an understanding should be reached by the Allies as to the principles according to which the partition of the indemnity should be governed. The Italian Government do not see the possibility of any disagreement of the Allies on the principle that the partition should be made by taking into account not only the damages suffered, but also the economical and financial effort sustained by each nation in due proportion with its economical and financial potentiality.

The Italian Government believe that it would be necessary—also with a view of deciding on a possible line of action to be followed at the Brussels Conference<sup>1</sup>—that before meeting at Spa, all question of Debit and Credit between the Allies, respectively, on the one hand, and the Associate on the other, be examined, with a view to their regulation. For this purpose Signor Nitti is desirous of having an expression of the opinion of His Majesty's Government as to the advisability of inviting the United States Government to send a delegate at the proposed meeting of the Allied Representatives.

The Italian Government, especially during the last Conference have most warmly count[e]nanced the expediency of a rapid regulation [? of] the economical and financial relations with Germany, within the limits of German economical potentiality. They have been actuated in this by the consideration of the necessity of eliminating as far as possible all causes of eventual future conflict between victors and vanquished, so as to promote the consolidation of peace and the resumption of the economical activities of the world. Such a result is certainly of incalculable value also from a most stric[t]ly economical point of view. On the other hand, if with the aim of obtaining such a result further sacrifices should be considered necessary in regulating the relations between victors and vanquished, the Italian Government are of opinion that it would be only just to declare forthwith that such further sacrifices should be borne by the various countries in proportion to their potentiality.

The Italian Government in any case consider that it would be desirable that a preliminary understanding should be reached by the Allied and Associated Powers with a view of regulating beforehand all financial relations resulting from the war. They do not think it can be denied that the result that ought to be thus attained, would be that of enabling also victorious countries, which have sustained the gravest economical burdens and which were obliged to have recourse to foreign aid in order to intensify their effort in the war, to find in such a settlement the possibility of that further assistance on international markets which is indispensable for the reco[n]struction, consolidation and development of their internal economical and financial conditions.<sup>2</sup>

*London, May 10, 1920*

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the international financial conference to be convened in Brussels by the League of Nations. Originally to have been held at the end of May, it did not meet until September 24, 1920. See No. 358, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> At Lord Curzon's request Lord Hardinge on May 14 sent a copy of the Italian note to Sir M. Hankey for the Prime Minister's information. On May 22 Sir M. Hankey replied that Mr. Lloyd George was quite favourable to the Italian view that there should be a meeting preliminary to the conference at Spa.

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received May 17)*No. 278 [198298/7067/39]<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, May 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that the general tone of the German press on the subject of the meeting at Spa is one of considerable scepticism. Now that the first encouraging effect of the invitation has worked off, the tendency is to warn the public against basing any great expectations on the event. This tendency has been increased by the views expressed in the French press, and in some cases goes so far as to suggest that if the ideas of Paris are to prevail it is not worth the German Ministers' while to attend the Conference. A prominent industrial said to me yesterday that if the German delegates were not allowed to enter into discussion, but were simply to receive the terms of the Allies across the table, they would be bound to refuse to accept them and would leave the Allies to take such action as they might think fit. 'You may advance to Ussel [? Usseln]—on Berlin, if you like; but what will you do then?' he said.

I have not been able to obtain any really reliable information as to what, if any, proposals the German Government are likely to submit with regard to the payment of reparation, but there is an idea abroad in well-informed quarters that they will propose to earmark a certain proportion of the annual receipts of their Budget—it is said from 15 per cent. to 20 per cent.—for this purpose. The sum thus produced would, however, be so small at the present rate of exchange as to appear almost insignificant, and is estimated not to exceed half a milliard of gold marks per annum in value.

The prospects, therefore, of arriving at any practical result do not appear favourable. I fully realise the vital necessity of preserving a united front among the Allies, and the danger that unrestricted discussion would afford opportunity to the Germans of exploiting any differences of opinion which may exist. But I hope that it may not be found impossible to give the Germans an opportunity of stating their case. The Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that they intend to submit a full and frank statement of their financial position, and I venture to suggest that this statement should be received and examined by the Allied financial experts before any definite notification is made as to the amount which Germany will be required to pay. Prominent business men have assured me that the German working men are displaying an increased and even surprising, willingness to work, and I am told that Herr Stinnes,<sup>2</sup> for example, is confident that if Germany can obtain raw materials she will be able within a comparatively short time to re-establish her economic position. But, on the other hand, if the working class is to draw no benefit at all from its increased efforts, and the result is seen to be merely that

<sup>1</sup> The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> A prominent German industrialist.

the amount Germany has to pay is augmented to a crushing extent, a state of hopeless discouragement will supervene, and the factors which are now working towards a renewal of industrial activity will be extinguished.

The question of Upper Silesia will certainly be raised at Spa, and determined endeavours will be made to demonstrate that the retention of that province is a *sine quâ non*, without which German industry will be ruined and her capacity to provide for reparation will be totally destroyed.<sup>2</sup>

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

<sup>2</sup> On this Sir E. Crowe minuted on May 19, 1920: 'If the Germans are foolish enough to make proposals for modifying the territorial settlement as regards Upper Silesia, they are doomed to disappointment.' This comment was initialled by Lords Hardinge and Curzon.

No. 143

*Letter from Mr. Kerr to Earl Curzon*<sup>1</sup>

[196520/14798/39]

*Secret*

LYMPNE, KENT, May 16, 1920

Dear Lord Curzon,

The Prime Minister has asked me to say that he entirely approves of the general lines of the despatch which you suggested should be sent to the French Government in regard to M. Poincaré. He has, however, added one sentence in the last paragraph, which you will see in the annexed copy.<sup>2</sup>

He asks me, however, to say that, on Lord Derby's advice, he thinks that the best course is to let the French Government have it semi-officially. He has accordingly given M. Millerand an unsigned copy, of which he can make such confidential use as he likes. No official communication, however, in this sense has yet been made to the French Government, and he does not propose to make it unless M. Poincaré continues to abuse his position.

Yours sincerely,

P. H. KERR

<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt of this letter in the Foreign Office is unrecorded. Mr. Kerr was Private Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

<sup>2</sup> This sentence is printed between asterisks in the enclosure below.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 143

*Draft Note from Earl Curzon to the French Ambassador*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 13, 1920

Your Excellency,

The attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn to a series of articles which have recently appeared over the signature of Monsieur

Raymond Poincaré in the 'Matin' and in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' commenting upon the policy of the Allied Governments towards Germany and in particular upon that policy in the matter of reparations.

2. The articles in question are the 'Chroniques de la Quinzaine' in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' of April 1st, April 15th and May 1st, and the leading articles in the 'Matin' of April 19th and May 3rd entitled 'Sous le ciel bleu de San Remo' and 'La Voix des Ruines'.

3. The French Government will no doubt agree that the general tone of these articles can scarcely be described as favourable to the policy of the Allied Governments towards Germany; it appears indeed to bear small resemblance to that which the Allied Governments might reasonably expect from a high official, who is himself responsible for one of the most important branches of this policy.

4. I would draw attention in particular to the unfortunate passages in Monsieur Poincaré's article in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' of May 1st, in which he sees fit to deplore the decisions of the San Remo Conference in the execution of which he, as President of the Reparation Commission, must naturally play a large part.

5. In view of the close accord reached at San Remo between His Majesty's Government and the French Government in all matters relating to the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, His Majesty's Government feel assured that the French Government will share their opinion that the continuance of open and persistent attacks such as these upon the Allies in the public Press is not compatible with Monsieur Poincaré's functions as President of an important inter-allied body. \*Indeed, they must point out that the Reparation Commission is a body of a highly judicial character, which has to decide questions not merely between the Allies and Germany, but between the Allies themselves, and that for its President to write articles of this nature is undignified and improper, and must gravely prejudice the authority of the Commission and its reputation for impartial justice, both in Germany and Allied countries.\* They trust, therefore, that the French Government will take steps to see that this method of criticism is abandoned by their official representative. It would cause sincere regret to His Majesty's Government if, in the event of its continuance, they were driven, as they might easily be, to press for a change in the Chairmanship of the Reparation Commission.

I have, &c.,

**No. 144**

*Note from Earl Curzon to the Portuguese Minister*

[197758/14798/39]

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 17, 1920

Sir,

With reference to the point raised by you in conversation with Sir E. Crowe on the 5th [*sic*] instant<sup>1</sup> regarding the desire of the Portuguese Government

<sup>1</sup> See No. 137.



to represent their views on the question of the reparation to be exacted from Germany, at the forthcoming conference at Spa, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the claim of Portugal to special compensation for acts committed by Germany in Portuguese territory, for example Angola, before the entry of Portugal into the War, would, under Section four of the Annex to Article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles, fall to be met out of the assets of German nationals in Portugal, and would therefore not be directly affected by the discussion of the payments to be made by Germany to the Reparation Commission under the Reparation Clauses of the Treaty.

2. Should the Portuguese Government, however, desire to address a Note on the Subject to the Secretariat of the Supreme Council, I have the honour to inform you that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury will be pleased when they receive a copy of the Note, to take steps to bring it to the notice of the British Representative on any financial body which may be set up by the Supreme Council at Spa to deal with questions of this kind.

I have, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

**No. 145**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 18, 8.30 p.m.)*

*No. 594 Telegraphic [198600/14798/39]*

*Immediate*

PARIS, May 18, 1920, 6.25 p.m.

Monsieur Poincaré today offered his resignation of chairmanship of Reparations Commission. It has been accepted by Monsieur Millerand. Please inform Prime Minister.

**No. 146**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 20, 9.40 a.m.)*

*No. 600 Telegraphic [198892/14798/39]*

PARIS, May 19, 1920, 8.40 p.m.

From all I have heard Monsieur Dubois<sup>1</sup> is in every way eminently suitable as member of reparation commission. I presume that you will offer no objection and will agree to his being appointed president. If so I know unofficially that it would be much appreciated not only by Monsieur Dubois but also by French Government that he should be proposed as president by Bradbury.

If you agree will you please telegraph to latter at once giving him necessary instructions.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Deputy for the Seine department and successor to M. Clémentel as Minister of Commerce in the recent Clemenceau government.

<sup>2</sup> The Treasury telegraphed accordingly on May 21 and M. Dubois was elected at a meeting of the Reparation Commission that day.

**No. 147**

*Note from Earl Curzon to the Italian Ambassador*

[198200/14798/39]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 19, 1920

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's memorandum of the 26th. March last,<sup>1</sup> as to the question of the relations between the Council of the League of Nations and the Reparation Commission.

2. In reply I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government consider it desirable that the financial conference which is to be held at Brussels under the auspices of the League of Nations should receive any assistance that may be possible from the Reparation Commission. I understand that arrangements have already been made for that purpose.

I have, &c.,  
(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston),  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

<sup>1</sup> No. 128.

**No. 148**

*Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French Chargé d'Affaires*

[200500/14798/39]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 21, 1920

M. de Fleuriau mentioned to me privately today that M. Millerand had derived very useful assistance, in dealing with M. Poincaré, from the draft note<sup>1</sup> which Lord Curzon had prepared to address to M. Cambon respecting M. Poincaré's attitude towards this country and the allies in the matter of the German peace treaty.

It appears that M. Poincaré had, previously to the Hythe meeting, threatened that he would resign his chairmanship of the Reparation Commission, if the French government were to adopt the policy of accepting the payment from Germany of a lump sum in settlement of reparation. The first newspaper reports telegraphed from Hythe<sup>2</sup> had stated that this policy had in fact been adopted (later reports corrected this). M. Poincaré therefore felt bound to resign. But the question now was whether he intended to organize a political and parliamentary party pledged to resist such a policy and to attempt the defeat of M. Millerand's government, in order themselves to take its place. If M. Millerand [? Poincaré] contemplated such action, he would have to move at once, and the next 10-14 days should bring the matter to a head. Meanwhile however the fact that M. Poincaré's attitude had so unfavourably impressed H.M.G. as to produce Lord Curzon's draft note was a factor which would make it much more difficult for M. Poincaré to upset the French government by raising this reparation issue.<sup>3</sup>

E. A. C.

<sup>1</sup> No. 143, enclosure.  
21-23.

<sup>2</sup> For the First Conference of Hythe see Volume VIII, Nos.  
<sup>3</sup> This record was seen by the Prime Minister.

*Note from the Italian Chargé d'Affaires to Earl Curzon (Received May 28)*

*No. 1068 [200487/14798/39]*

*Translation*

ITALIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, *May 23, 1920*

My Lord,

On behalf of the Italian Government I have the honour to communicate as follows:

The news published since the Hythe meeting by the London and Paris press, and not contradicted by the British and French Governments, states that agreements have been arrived at between Great Britain and France for fixing the sum due by Germany for reparations and for its division among the Allies.

Inasmuch as the Italian Government, considering conditions in Germany, has several times expressed the opinion that, the Treaty of Versailles still remaining unchanged, the payment of the indemnity could only take place in agreement with Germany and commensurately with her financial capacity, it must now assert that it is still more necessary that the total of the reparations and the shares in which it will be apportioned be discussed by the Allies in common.

Since the percentage of distribution has never been finally settled officially, nor communicated officially to the Italian Government, the latter must make the most ample and formal reservations in regard to what the British and French Governments may have agreed on among themselves.

These reservations must be all the more explicitly formulated inasmuch as Italy is the country which has relatively suffered the most serious losses among the countries which have emerged from the war, not only because the loss of material property and the destruction wrought on her territory, although surpassed by what has occurred in France, represent all the same an enormous amount of lost wealth; but also because England has rapidly re-established her riches with direct and indirect profits accruing from the new political and economic situation of the countries of Europe and especially by the income derived from freights and supplying coal, and France gains territories with huge mineral and industrial wealth, while Italy instead gets nothing which can recompense her for the numerous economic losses she has sustained.

The situation brought about in Italy by the damages sustained through the war appears still more serious when the relative value of those damages is compared with the wealth of the nation. In spite of a rigid programme of strict economy and of taxation heavier than is found in the other States, Italy has emerged from the war in a more miserable state than any other country.

In sharing the indemnity due in justice to each one, it is right to consider the relative capacity to restore, in face of those relations<sup>1</sup> resulting from the war, the value of the losses sustained. Thus, for example, for the countries endowed with numerous mercantile vessels, the destruction of a fairly large part

<sup>1</sup> The original Italian text here reads 'in forza dei rapporti stessi'.

of the same may be compensated by the extraordinary increase in freights and the price of the remaining tonnage.

Italy, which entered the war freely and spontaneously without any material anticipations,<sup>2</sup> at a time when no part of her territory was invaded and no danger threatened her, would regard an unjust treatment with much grief, and desires that no deliberations of a final nature take place without all the elements of fact being adjudged and account taken of the effective losses suffered by all the Allies, who in the same manner as they have fought a common enemy on a united front should still act in solidarity towards the various conquered States as regards the liquidation of the war, for the adjustment of the mutual financial relations.

Although Italy believes in the necessity of using broad and moderate standards in fixing the indemnity, in the interests of Europe, and above all to safeguard the integrity of the Treaty of Versailles, whose execution is not possible if conceptions of justice examined and discussed at length are not maintained, it is no less true that what Germany shall pay as indemnity must be divided among the Allies proportionately and with justice.

The Italian Government brings the foregoing to the knowledge of the British and French Governments in the most friendly spirit, not only as guardian of the interests of the Italian people, of which it must be the jealous custodian, but also out of loyalty towards the Allies and to maintain the principle of strict unity between them, which principle could not be otherwise than weakened by a decision not taken in common.

I have, &c.,

G. PREZIOSI

<sup>2</sup> On this Lord Hardinge commented: 'It is rather a strong order to say that Italy entered the war "without any material anticipations" considering how she haggled over her frontiers before she could be induced to come in.'

## No. 150

*Note from the German Chargé d'Affaires to Earl Curzon*<sup>1</sup>

*No. A 672 [200969/14798/39]*

*Translation*

LONDON, May 27, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour on behalf of my Government to state as follows:

The Reparation Commission has begun with the presentation of the demand lists from the Allied and Associated Governments to be expected in accordance with Annex IV, paragraph 4, part VIII, of the Peace Treaty.

The delivery of the animals required in Paragraph 6 of Annex IV, part VIII, of the Peace Treaty took place at an earlier date. The experience acquired in that connection make[s] it appear absolutely impossible to carry out any further deliveries of animals. To prove this I venture to transmit the enclosed matter from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture,<sup>2</sup> from which will

<sup>1</sup> Handed to Lord Hardinge by Herr Sthamer on May 27.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

be seen the fatal effect on the health of mothers and children of the delivery of milch cows.

According to the fresh lists of claims now presented the Belgian Government has *inter alia* demanded 210,000 oxen and cows, 40,000 horses and 200,000 sheep. It is quite impossible to comply with this fresh demand. The detriment to the supply of milk and meat, to the breeding of oxen and horses, and to agriculture occasioned in an economic, social and hygienic aspect by the withdrawal of animal power is illimitable. Here if anywhere it is justifiable to beg for the consideration for Germany's social and economic life prescribed in the Peace Treaty in fixing the demands.

It must also be added that according to previous experience no Government in Germany would be able, opposed by agriculture, to carry into effect further large deliveries even on payment of the highest prices. The entire agricultural community, on whose healthy existence and capacity to produce primarily depends the re-establishment of the economic life of Germany, would offer decided resistance. Not even the ruthless use of armed power, of which Germany moreover, is not capable, could enforce the delivery of further large numbers of animals. If the attempt is made to use force, the sure result would be the collapse of the political and economic life and the stoppage of the supply of food.

In accordance with instructions I have the honour to beg Your Lordship in virtue of the foregoing statements to be good enough to cause the British Government to take steps to protect Germany from complete economic collapse, which will certainly result if Germany is compelled to comply with Belgium's monstrous demands for animals, which will be followed by those of the other States,

I have, &c.,

STHAMER

#### No. 151

#### *Memorandum communicated to Lord Hardinge by the German Chargé d'Affaires*

[200968/14798/39]

#### *Translation*

LONDON, May 27, 1920

The following action has been taken by Germany in the matter of the reconstruction of the districts of Belgium and France devastated by the war and of the ascertainment of the damages occasioned there:

Since July 1919 negotiations have been continuously proceeding with representatives of the French and also in some cases of the Belgian Government, for the purpose of examining the extensive range of the questions arising in regard to the reconstruction and the assessment of damages. In these negotiations were stated the conditions of a technical, legal and social nature on which German workmen could participate in the reconstruction in France

and material be supplied by Germany for these purposes. In continuation of these negotiations four journeys of inspection to the devastated areas of Northern France took place at the end of September. On October 2nd the result of the journeys was discussed with the French Government. The French representatives were the Minister Monsieur Loucheur and Monsieur Le Brun. At this meeting and the negotiations held in continuation an agreement was reached that the German labourers should work in France under the direction of the German Government as general contractor, and that definite areas should be assigned to the German Government for clearance work, which had to be undertaken first. These areas were to be fixed at a conference between the French Government and the prefects of the departments concerned.

The German Government repeatedly attempted during the winter to get the French Government to carry into effect the results of the conferences then held. The French Government however did not proceed further with the question of German participation in the rebuilding of the destroyed districts.

As regards the assessment of damages, the German Government addressed a note to the Peace Delegation on August 2nd, 1919, in which it suggested that the matter collected in Germany in regard to war damages in Belgium and Northern France should be re-examined by the assessment authorities of both parties jointly and supplemented by investigations on the spot, so as to obtain through the co-operation of the German authorities with those of the opposite side as complete and accurate as possible a picture of the extent and the amount of the damage done, which could be used as a basis for determining the sum to be paid as compensation. These proposals were refused by the Peace Conference in the latter's reply of August 21st, 1919.<sup>1</sup> The then French Minister Monsieur Loucheur informed the German Peace Delegation at the same time that a survey of the devastated districts for the purpose of assessing damages could only be considered after the ratification of the Peace Treaty. The question was then discussed anew at the end of September with Monsieur Loucheur, and an agreement was reached that the commissions which the German Government was to set up for the purpose of making arrangements for reconstruction in the various departments should at the same time have the opportunity of examining on the spot, in concert with the French authorities, the German matter dealing with the assessment of damages. This question also has however not been further proceeded with by the French Government in spite of continued insistence since last autumn on the part of Germany.

It having thus proved impossible to arrive at a joint comparison with the French Government of the existing matter in regard to the assessment of damages, the German Government had to proceed by itself to the completion of its own material as well as possible. It has concluded this work and communicated to the Peace Delegation of the Allies the results of what Germany has ascertained in regard to the material damages in Belgium and Northern France.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Volume I, appendix F to No. 38.

*Memorandum on the Execution by Germany of Parts VIII, IX, X, and XII of the Treaty of Versailles<sup>1</sup>*

[201997/7067/39]

It is beyond question that Germany has taken no initiative with regard to the execution of the provisions of Parts VIII and IX of the Treaty of Versailles and that she has adopted an attitude of passive resistance thereto, bringing into play every possible means of delaying execution when it has been demanded of her either by the Allied and Associated Powers or by the Reparation Commission. As, however, the exact meaning of the term violation of the Treaty, in the legal sense of the word, still remains a question of appreciation as regards the majority of the obligations undertaken, the use of the word has been intentionally avoided in the present note, which only deals, on the one hand, with the extent to which the clauses have been executed, and on the other, summarises the measures taken by both parties with a view to their execution.

## PART VIII

*Article 235.* This has not been executed in any way as regards payments in gold or securities.

The extent to which the clause has been executed as regards deliveries in kind will be dealt with under the heading of Annexes.

The Reparation Commission asked the German Government in a letter dated March 4, 1920, how it intended to meet its obligations under Article 235.<sup>2</sup> The reply has not yet been received.

The Reparation Commission authorised the German Government to requisition neutral securities in order to appropriate them to purposes of food supply (March 4, 1920).

*Article 236.* See the information given with regard to the Annexes.

*Articles 238 and 239.* Restitution has continued in accordance with the Armistice as regards industrial material. In the case of restitution of animals, furniture, works of art, etc., execution has not been begun.

The Reparation Commission has only recently decided to send to Wiesbaden an Interallied Sub-Commission charged with the immediate negotiation with the Germans of the protocols for the restitution of animals and objects other than those mentioned in the Armistice protocols.

The German Government has taken no initiative as regards restitution in execution of Article 238, and has refused the requests for restitution in advance made to it by the French and Belgian Restitution Services set up under the Armistice for objects other than industrial material, stating that it must await the decisions of the Reparation Commission.

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was part of a communication transmitted on June 1 by M. Paul Cambon to Sir M. Hankey, who forwarded it to the Foreign Office on June 4. For the covering letter from M. Cambon and the memorandum on the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, see No. 84.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume VII, No. 52, n. 3 for the text of this letter.

*Article 241.* The German Government does not appear to have passed any legislative measure or issued any regulations with a view to ensuring execution of the Reparation clauses of the Treaty (always excepting a law voted August 31, 1919, authorizing the issue of the bonds provided for in Annex II).

The German Customs Regulations have been drawn up entirely with a view to discouraging export to France, and especially to the Liberated Regions (see Part IX).

#### *Annex II, Paragraph 12*

*Delivery of Bonds.* This has not been executed.

As soon as the Commission was constituted, it proceeded to deal with this question, and on January 30 it entrusted its Financial Service with the study of the technical problems connected with the delivery of the bonds.

The Financial Service placed itself in communication with the Kriegslasten-commission in order to hasten settlement of these problems. A letter was addressed to it, in particular on March 8, concerning the wording of the bonds. The reply was received on May 12, and was satisfactory in principle. The Reparation Commission is about to reply, fixing the form which it intends to give the bonds.

#### *Annex III*

*Sea-going Vessels.* Germany must deliver 2,750,000 tons in round figures. She delivered 1,830,000 tons before the entry in force of the Treaty; since then, she has only delivered 16,000 tons.

Germany made an appeal to the Reparation Commission regarding the surrender of a certain number of ships. This request was refused on March 30, 1920. Since that refusal the number of vessels delivered in execution of the clause has been insignificant (16,000 tons).

*River Craft.* No execution has been effected as regards these craft, except in the case of vessels delivered by way of restitution, of which roughly 60% have been handed over.

Paragraph 2 of Annex III states that all ships mentioned in the Treaty are to be delivered within two months of the coming into force of the Treaty.

Not only does Germany not execute the clauses, but she reserves to herself the right to refer the question of the surrender of her merchant fleet to the Spa Conference. She induces neutrals to take action, and the Swedish Government has made representations in Paris, which it has doubtless repeated in London, with a view to arranging that Germany may retain the ships required for the transport of Swedish ore to German ports. The ships in question represent a considerable tonnage of boats of 1,600 tons and upwards.

The surrender of river craft by way of reparation has required the intervention of an American arbitrator, who has only just been appointed. Germany was asked on March 16, 1920, by the Reparation Commission to furnish a list of her river craft within one month. She has not yet replied.

Germany has therefore only partially executed her obligations by way of *restitution* while as regards *replacement*, she has taken no preliminary steps



whatever to prepare to fulfil them. The American arbitrator is to decide upon the method of surrender; he will arrive on June 2, and instead of having to consider a matter prepared and ready to hand, he will have to start or cause work to be started from the very beginning (see below [Part XII, p. 244], on the contrary, as regards Art. 357).

#### *Annex IV*

*Supplies for physical restoration.* No deliveries under this head, except one consignment of barley and oats for sowing. A spirit of complete obstruction on this point has been particularly evident. Germany had agreed as far back as July, 1919, to fulfil the clauses of Annex IV in advance.

The Reparation Commission recently forwarded to Germany the lists referred to in Annex IV.

Negotiations were entered into at Versailles between the Allied Governments and the German Delegation, with a view to contribution by Germany towards the reconstruction of the devastated regions. A preliminary list of indispensable materials, cement, bricks, tiles, glass, etc. was handed to the German Delegation at the first meeting; other lists were sent it shortly afterwards. Although they had entered into a formal undertaking to apply the terms of Annex IV of the Treaty in advance, the Germans have never replied to any of these requests in a manner capable of leading to a positive result.

As a matter of fact, during the course of these meetings, they stated that they were more particularly willing to collaborate in the reconstruction of the devastated regions, by undertaking vast building operations in those regions, for which they would not only supply the materials, but also the labour and, generally speaking, the management, the French Government doubtless retaining the functions of principal, but the German Government exercising every initiative as general contractor for the work. This scheme, the plans for which were worked out in great detail, involved giving the Germans such a hold over the reconstruction of the liberated regions, and the demands relative to the status of the German workmen in France were so imperious, that the matter obviously called for ripe consideration. In the end, negotiations regarding this general programme were suspended.

They were, however, continued uninterruptedly, during the whole period which elapsed between the signature and the coming into force of the Treaty, with respect to the deliveries in kind to be effected in advance execution of Annex IV. They were pursued simultaneously by the Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction, the Office for the Reconstruction of Coal Mines and the Ministry of the Liberated Regions. The history of these negotiations is the same in each case. The German Delegation receives the request and promises to proceed with the necessary investigations. After weeks or months, the reply—when it arrives—takes the form of attenuated offer, limited to certain kinds of supplies which are amongst the least indispensable and the least urgent, and accompanied by propositions of unacceptable prices.

Thus, for instance, the Ministry of the Liberated Regions received, on March 15 last, after six months of negotiations, a firm offer of joinery (doors,

window frames, etc.) The prices proposed were more than double those paid for goods purchased in France by the 'Service des Matériaux'.

In some exceptional cases, the prices suggested might be accepted, if it were a question of a free contract, not involving the application of the supplies to the Reparations account. But it is obvious that it is not possible, in return for some advantages of a secondary order, to prejudice to a very great extent by well-meaning acceptance of such offers, the method of calculation to be adopted by the Reparation Commission in fixing the value of the supplies delivered in execution of Annex IV, and all these offers, none of which is calculated to satisfy any vital requirements of the devastated regions, must be refused. There was one exception to this general rule; in the case of a consignment of barley and oats for sowing, the German Delegation agreed to the only possible course, namely, the subsequent determination of the prices by the Reparation Commission. The reason was that it was to the interest of Germany to introduce her seed barley and oats into France in order that they might become known. Two days later, in the case of a delivery of beet seed, as this reason did not exist, the German Delegation refused the same arrangement and demanded that the price should be fixed beforehand, and even then the contract could only be concluded if payment were made in cash and in francs.

Save for the single instance related above, and for some few deliveries of cattle (see below), Annex IV has hitherto remained a dead letter. This does not prevent the Germans from declaring that they are exhausted by the payments in kind that have been imposed on them or from making this declaration one of the most familiar themes of their press.

*Cattle.* Although a protocol relating to the delivery of cattle in execution of paragraph 6 of Annex IV was signed before the coming into force of the Treaty, so that the deliveries might commence immediately upon its entry into force and be completed within three months as stipulated in the Treaty, the deliveries effected up to May 1, 1920, have not amounted to more than some 20% of the quantities required.

Germany was to deliver to France, within three months following the coming into force of the Treaty, in equal monthly instalments, the following quantities of live stock:—

- 500 stallions;
- 30,000 fillies and mares (18 months to 7 years);
- 2,000 bulls (18 months to 3 years);
- 90,000 milch cows (2 to 6 years);
- 1,000 rams;
- 100,000 sheep;
- 10,000 goats.

These quantities represent approximately the tenth part of the cattle carried off or destroyed in the devastated regions by the Germans, and only constitute a delivery on account of the total restoration provided for in paragraph 2 of Annex IV (Reparation).

If the stipulated period had been adhered to, the delivery of the live stock would now have been completed.

The first train-loads of restored live stock passed the French frontier on March 6 last; even if this date were taken as the regular starting point of the operations the deliveries ought to have been completed at the beginning of June.

The report by the Inspector General, Mr. Leclainche, shows the present position as regards the restoration of live stock:—

‘On April 30, the following had been returned to France:—

3,858 horses out of	30,500, or 12·5%
19,210 cattle „	92,000, or 20·8%
27,950 sheep „	101,000, or 27·6%
4,095 goats „	10,000, or 40·95%

‘The attached table gives details of the live stock returned to each of the Receiving Centres.

‘Information received shows that horses are very difficult to obtain. The contemplated musters announced by the German Supreme Commission have been postponed on various pretexts or even for no reason at all, and, further, the only animals produced fail to correspond either in type or quality to those required.

‘As regards horned cattle, deliveries are made more freely. Precise details cannot, however, be given at present. While the territories on both banks of the Rhine and South Germany are delivering regularly, marked resistance is met with in Prussia. This is particularly noticeable in the East, East and West Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia. Incidents occur which testify to fierce hostility, if not on the part of the whole population, at least among certain elements. The Commissions are threatened in the hotels, and the German Commissioners make remarks of an unfriendly nature. This attitude is entirely different from that observable in the West and South, where the relations between the French and German Commissions are courteous.

‘The figures given in the attached table show that scarcely any restitution of any kind has been effected in former Prussia. There is no doubt that the instructions given by the German Commission at Frankfurt, that is to say, by the Government of the Reich, are not being obeyed.

‘It will be necessary to contemplate measures of coercion if this resistance persists.’

If the work of recovery is carried out so slowly on account of the ill-will, if not the hostility, of the Prussian authorities, it will take at least nine months in the case of cattle and 15 or 16 months in the case of horses, instead of 3 months. There is no doubt that the Prussian authorities are endeavouring by every means to elude one of the most precise clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. No serious reason for this can be put forward by Germany; the regions which are most refractory as regards delivery are probably those which contain the

best cattle for the restoration of the devastated regions, and the numerical importance of this line [*sic*] stock is such that, as stated in one of the previous reports of Inspector-General Leclainche, the supplies provided for are insignificant in proportion to those which exist.

*Agricultural material referred to in the Armistice* (Annex IV, paragraph 7). The deliveries of this material have been almost completed, 90% of the total having been received.

#### *Annex V*

*Coal.* Germany had agreed to begin deliveries of coal before the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace (Protocol of August 29), such advance deliveries to be written off after the entry into force of the Treaty at the rate of 300,000 tons per month.

The advance deliveries actually made amounted roughly to:—

1,000,000 tons from September 1, 1919, to January 10, 1920.

This quantity must therefore be added in the proportion of 300,000 tons per month to the deliveries made by Germany after the entry into force of the Treaty.

Germany has delivered to France since January 10, 1920:—

January 10 to 31	.	.	.	339,150 tons
February	.	.	.	604,818 „
March	.	.	.	583,349 „
April	.	.	.	660,500 „
May 1 to 10	.	.	.	324,869 „

*Note:*—These figures are arrived at after having made the necessary adjustment for deliveries of coke, in the proportion of 3 tons of coke to 4 tons of coal.

Immediately upon its constitution, the Reparations Commission provisionally confirmed the programme laid down in the Protocol of August 29, 1919, which was to ensure France a monthly tonnage of approximately 1,600,000 tons on the basis of present production. No effort at increase was made during the months of January, February and March. The first regular notice was given by the Reparations Commission for the month of April, calling for a supply of 1,140,000 tons for France; see the result above.

The Reparations Commission has fixed the amounts to be delivered to France for May, June and July at 1,450,000, 1,600,000 and 1,650,000 respectively.

*Sulphate of Ammonia.* Execution of the provisions relating to Sulphate of Ammonia is beginning.

A protocol for the delivery of sulphate of ammonia was prepared and agreed to by the German Government prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, and was approved by the Reparations Commission on March 1, 1920.

*Benzol and Coal Tar.* No deliveries have been made. The Reparations Commission has not yet completed the protocols relating to these deliveries, nor sent the German Government any firm order for the execution of the provisions with regard thereto.

## *Annex VI*

*Dyestuffs.* Execution of these clauses was begun before the entry into force of the Treaty. 4,000 tons have been delivered from existing stocks, about 25% of which has gone to France. Nothing has been delivered from the current production.

*Chemical Drugs.* No deliveries.

*General Note:*—Germany continues to export to neutral countries products set apart for restitution in kind which she has only effected in part or not at all. Thus she is sending coal to Switzerland and Denmark, timber to Switzerland, etc. She is prohibiting the export of timber to France and Belgium and the factories in Lorraine are obliged to buy in Switzerland timber which has come from Germany.

## *Annex VII*

*Cables.* No part of the terms of this Annex has been executed, nor has the Reparations Commission taken any measure with regard thereto.

*Article 245.* (Trophies, historical souvenirs, flags). The terms of this Article have not been executed. No demand has been made by the French Government except in the case of archives relating to Public Instruction. This demand was made some time since and Germany has made no reply.

## PART IX. FINANCIAL CLAUSES

*Article 248.* Information has been received from various quarters that Germany is exporting objects made of gold into Switzerland.

The Reparations Commission has taken no measures with respect to this.

Germany has placed various loans abroad which have not been communicated to the Reparations Commission; one arrangement only, made with Holland, was submitted to it for consideration, relating to export of coal. As a matter of course Germany should contract no loans nor export any products set apart for restitution in kind, without special authorisation from the Reparations Commission.

*Article 259.* This has not been executed.

*Article 260.* This has not been executed. It is reported that securities referred to in Article 260 have been offered on the London and New York markets.

In its letter of April 10, 1920, the Reparations Commission requested the German Government to furnish it, in conformity with the final paragraph of Article 260, with a list of the rights and interests referred to in that article. No reply has so far been made to that request.

*Article 261.* This has not been executed.

## PART X. ECONOMIC CLAUSES

The object of the economic regime established by the Treaty of Peace is to oblige Germany to apply the same treatment to the Allied and Associated States as that applied to any other most favoured foreign country.

Up to the present, Germany has contravened these provisions.

Having been prohibited by Article 269 from imposing, during a period of six months in the case of the majority of goods and during a period of thirty-six months in the case of certain other goods, any higher duties on imports into Germany than those which were in force on July 31, 1914, she conceived the idea of levying those duties at the gold rate as from July, 1919. This principle was admitted by the Supreme Council and the Reparation Commission (December 9, 1919<sup>3</sup>) although the result is that goods exported from France, Italy or Belgium into Germany are subject to duty three or four times heavier than was the case before the war, by reason of the depreciation of the franc and lire.

The other clauses of Chapter I of Part X have all been violated, both as regards import and export.

The question was brought before the Ambassadors' Conference and discussed by a Technical Committee, which rendered its report at the Meeting of May 12.

The Committee, which was composed of English, Belgian, French and Italian Delegates, considered, after study of the documents submitted by the various Delegations:—

*A. With regard to Imports:—*

(1) That certain cases might be adduced in which the conditions of granting or refusal of import licences might have been made with the purpose, and had had the effect, of placing the products of certain Allied or Associated countries at a disadvantage in favour of the products of other countries, or even of placing national exporters of certain products at a disadvantage, to the benefit of certain foreign intermediaries.

The Committee considered, however, that in the majority of cases of this nature, it was particularly difficult to obtain both the documents showing the views of the complainant and those of the beneficiary from the violation.

(2) That in particular the monopoly of wines and that of spirits have been exercised in a manner prejudicial to the products of certain Allied and Associated Powers and have allowed of certain measures of confiscation and taxation, the retroactive character of which aggravates their arbitrary nature.

(3) That products originating in and obtained from Alsace-Lorraine have, contrary to the provisions of Articles 68 and 268 of the Treaty of Peace, been submitted to import duty.

(4) That in the case of products of Alsace-Lorraine which, within the limits of the amounts notified to Germany, ought to be exempt from customs duty on presentation of certificates attesting their origin and place of export, import has been prohibited and (or?) the goods have been burdened with the onus of procuring a previous licence.

(5) That the application of the provisions of the Ordinance of March 22, 1920, with regard to the products of the Saar Basin is being effected contrary to the provisions of paragraph 31 of the Annex to Article 50.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume II, No. 39, minute 8.

*B. With regard to Exports:—*

(1) That, on the intervention of the German authorities or of syndicates established and controlled by those authorities, differential export tariffs have been established, varying either for reasons of political preference, according as they are applied to countries formerly allied to Germany, to neutral countries or to ex-enemy countries, or for reasons of economic preference, which it was precisely the purpose of Articles 265 and 266 to prevent.

(2) That export duties are imposed the existence of which has not been published and which confidential circulars suggest should be mentioned neither in contracts nor on invoices.

(3) That the benefits of certain products or raw materials are reserved, either by means of allocation or of preferential discrimination, to certain countries to the detriment of others, the industry or victualling of which are thus menaced.

(4) That numerous contracts concluded by nationals of the Allied or Associated Powers have been altered or broken at the direct or indirect instigation of the German authorities, who intervene by increasing the prices, demanding surcharges or premiums, stipulating for payment in the currency of the country of destination or some other foreign country, or by suspending export according to the fluctuations of exchange, and that, in certain cases, contracts have been thus broken to the advantage of buyers in other countries.

The Ambassadors' Conference approved the conclusions of the Report, according to which the commercial regime of Germany calls for a certain amount of adjustment, the nature of which was, moreover, described by the Technical Committee. The British Ambassador has asked for the consent of his Government to his participation in the adoption of a note to be sent to the German Government, calling the attention of the latter to the violations of the clauses of Articles 264 to 268 of the Treaty of Peace and pointing out the means of giving satisfaction to the Allies, while preserving the freedom of its commercial regime.<sup>4</sup>

An agreement was recently concluded (May 17) between the French and German authorities, regarding the execution of Articles 68 and 268. Goods from Alsace-Lorraine are, however, still subjected upon entry into Germany to formalities of a nature calculated to impede freedom of trade.

#### UNFAIR COMPETITION

No measures appear to have been taken by Germany to apply Articles 274 and 275 with a view to repressing unfair competition.

*Article 276.* In this article, Germany undertakes not to subject the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers to any charge, tax, etc. other or higher than those which may be imposed on her own nationals. The French and British Governments have in vain protested against the differential prices charged in Germany itself to foreigners, especially to nationals of those countries.<sup>5</sup> Thus in the case of the French Embassy in Berlin, the members of

<sup>4</sup> See Volume IX, No. 464.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. Nos. 277 and 548.

the Embassy have to have a special card permitting them to pay ordinary prices. Prices are increased in shops, hotels, and restaurants by secret orders from the German Administrative authorities to an extent double or even five times the amount of prices paid by Germans.

#### INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

*Articles 306 and 307.* Germany is seeking to evade the stipulations of Article 307 respecting patents, as is shown by the following note handed by the French Delegation to the Ambassadors' Conference<sup>6</sup>:—

'Under the terms of Article 307 of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles of June 28, 1919, a minimum period of one year after the coming into force of the Treaty, without extension fees or other penalty, must be accorded to the nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties, in order to enable such persons to accomplish any act, fulfil any formality, *pay any fees*, and generally satisfy any obligation prescribed by the laws or regulations of the respective States relating to the obtaining, preserving or opposing rights to, or in respect of, industrial property either acquired before August 1, 1914, *or which, except for the war, might have been acquired since that date* as a result of an application made before the war or during its continuance.

'Now, it is shown by reliable information received by the French Government that the administration of the German Patentamt, which, during the continuance of the war, granted no patent corresponding to applications made by French nationals prior to August 1, 1914, or subsequent to that date during the war, has just proceeded to grant a large number of patents coming within this category. The German administration alleges that the patents thus granted subsequently to the date of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace are not subject to the provisions of Article 307 of the Treaty, and that consequently the annual fees falling due from 1911 [*sic*] to 1919 inclusive are immediately demandable and must be paid within six weeks from the date on which the patent was granted.

'There is no doubt that this interpretation is manifestly contrary to the text of Article 307 as quoted above. This article refers, in fact, to rights of industrial property which, except for the war, might have been acquired since August 1, 1914, as a result of an application made before the war or during its continuance, and for the preservation of which a minimum period of one year is accorded, reckoned from the coming into force of the Treaty, in which to pay all fees prescribed by the laws and regulations without extension fees or other penalty. Under the terms of Article 8, paragraph 2, of the German Patent Law of April 7, 1891, the fee must, in theory, be paid for each patent at the beginning of the second year of its duration and of each subsequent year, and according to Article 7, the duration of a patent begins to run from the day of declaration of the invention, that is to say, of the deposit of the application. The object of Article 307 of the Treaty is to allow of the payment of fees which fell within a period of one

<sup>6</sup> This note was discussed on May 4 by the Conference of Ambassadors which agreed to refer the whole question to a conference of technical delegates of the interested Powers.



year, due during the war and were not paid when due, and it cannot be admitted that the German Administrative authorities are now able to declare that all these annual fees are payable immediately, on the pretext that the patents have only just been granted. At the very utmost, it might be admitted that the special fee of 30 Marks payable upon the granting of a patent is demandable within the ordinary period, upon advice being received that the patent has been granted. Any other method of procedure would constitute an obvious violation of the Treaty of Peace and cannot be allowed.

'On the other hand, the German Administrative authorities are also said to assert that in the case of patents refused during the war, by reason of the interested party having failed to reply to the objections of the Patentamt within the specified period, the refusal must be upheld and the only recourse open to the interested party is an appeal against the decision. This interpretation is also contrary to the terms of Articles 307 and 306, which stipulate for entire restoration of rights of industrial property and the according of a minimum period of one year in which to fulfil any formality and satisfy any obligation prescribed by the laws or regulations relating to the obtaining, preserving or opposing rights to, or in respect of, industrial property. Consequently, the original refusal must be considered null and void, and the procedure for the granting of patents must be resumed at the point at which it stood prior to such refusal. French nationals cannot lose the benefit of these two provisions, when their application has been refused by reason of the non-accomplishment of any formality within a prescribed period.

'It may be pointed out that the French Decree of January 27, 1920, accorded German nationals full and entire restoration of their rights, subject to the accomplishment of legal obligations within a period of one year.'

## PART XII

*Ports, Waterways and Railways.*—The provisions of Part XII of the Treaty of Versailles have not, properly speaking, been the object of definite violation by Germany. Their very general bearing and the distant date at which some of the undertakings are to be carried out, on the one hand, and the state of European communications and the difficulty of transmitting to the competent body information or complaints arising by reason of eventual German measures, on the other hand, do not allow of any instances being cited as contrary to the Treaty and provoked by Germany.

*Article 357.* The provisions of Article 357 (which provide for the cession of river craft and shares in Rhine navigation companies) have formed the object of negotiations between the French and German authorities. These negotiations have not yet had any result, and Germany is said to have expressed the intention of bringing the whole question of this Article up before the Spa Conference.

As regards Par. 3 of Article 358—by which this Power undertook to hand over to the French Government certain documents concerning the regulation

of the Rhine—these documents have not yet been handed over, notwithstanding various requests to do so.

Furthermore, the French Government has had no reply to letters in which it requested the German Government to furnish the names of its representatives on the Central Rhine Commission and to fix the spot where the Oder Commission is shortly to meet, which spot this Commission left it to the German Government to choose.

It should finally be reported that numerous sales of river craft or of appliances and installations in the port of Rotterdam have been made by German companies to various neutral countries, thus apparently depriving France of an important guarantee.

*Article 367. Movement of trains.*—Germany has opposed passive resistance to the application of articles concerning the movement of trains. She first brought forward the argument of technical difficulties, and then made inadmissible claims with regard to tariffs and the movement outside Germany of the coaches of the Mitropa Company, which belonged to the Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits and were sold by the German sequestrator of the latter company.

Active negotiation took place and resulted, on 20th May, in an agreement signed by the representatives of the German, Belgian and French Governments, which settled railway circulation across Germany to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and the East.

### No. 153

*Letter from Sir J. Bradbury (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain<sup>1</sup>*

[202240/14798/39]

*Private*

REPARATION COMMISSION, PARIS, June 2, 1920

My dear Chancellor,

At the invitation of Monsieur Dubois, the new Chairman, the various members of the Reparation Commission had a private conversation with him in his office yesterday morning in regard to the situation created by the negotiations at San Remo and Hythe and the attitude which the Commission ought to adopt towards them.

As you know, we were anxious for a long time to have such a conversation with Monsieur Poincaré, but, in spite of frequent requests, he managed to postpone it until the date of his resignation. It was therefore particularly satisfactory that the matter should have been taken up on the initiative of the new Chairman.

The proceedings were opened by the Belgian Delegate explaining that, as it appeared to be the unanimous desire of all our Governments to secure a more expeditious manner of determining the German liability under the Treaty than the machinery envisaged by the Treaty itself, he thought it would be generally agreed that it was the duty of the Commission to do every-

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this letter was forwarded by the Treasury on June 4 to the Foreign Office.

thing in its power to facilitate such arrangements, more particularly since, regard being had to the very wide powers of the Commission under the Treaty, it was not impossible that changes of procedure and method could be introduced by means of action by the Commission which otherwise might require a modification of the Treaty itself.

He also suggested that it would be very desirable, both from the point of view of the prestige of the Commission in the eyes of the Germans, and also from the point of view of the very real assistance which the Commission could give to the Heads of the Allied and Associated Governments in the negotiations, that the Commission should be summoned to take part officially in the Spa Conference.

I associated myself with Colonel Theunis' remarks, with the sole qualification that I thought it desirable not to put forward a request that the Commission should be officially present at Spa. I said that I thought that the Heads of Governments might find it embarrassing to have an international body like the Commission taking a formal part in the proceedings, and that it might be more convenient that each Head of Government should, if he saw fit, take the Representative of his Government upon the Commission with him as an adviser, it of course being understood that the various national Delegates would be free to consult together unofficially. I said, however, that I put forward this suggestion with some diffidence lest, in the peculiar position of the United States, it might be embarrassing to the American unofficial Delegate.

Mr. Boyden<sup>2</sup> said, however, that, as his presence on the Commission itself was purely unofficial, it was a matter of entire indifference to him in what particular unofficial capacity he might be present at Spa, and that, unless he were forbidden by his Government to go there, he would go in any case.

Colonel Theunis expressed himself as entirely satisfied with my suggestion, which, I think, commended itself also to the Chairman.

The Italian Representative also concurred.

Monsieur Dubois said that he was very glad to have this opportunity for a frank exchange of views on the general situation. He regarded it as most important to maintain the general structure of the Treaty, and he was entirely in agreement with the view that the least violent method of introducing necessary changes would be by making use of the Reparation Commission. He was as emphatic as any of us as to the impossibility of carrying out the assessment provisions of the Treaty as it stands by 1st May, 1921, and, while he naturally abstained from giving us any precise indication of what his own views or the views of his Government are in regard to a 'lump sum settlement', he accepted without demur the principle that the only question of serious importance was to fix the largest amount which Germany could afford to pay and the best method of making the payment available at the earliest practicable date, and that the total amount of damages (which was necessarily vastly in excess of such a sum) had little more than academic importance.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Boyden had succeeded Mr. Rathbone as U.S. unofficial delegate to the Reparation Commission on April 1.

He also concurred very definitely in the view which I expressed that the most useful first step would be to secure a completion of the arrangement for percentage distribution already arrived at between Great Britain, France, and Serbia<sup>3</sup> by bringing in the other Powers entitled to reparation, and he promised to take the matter up immediately with the French Government with a view to their nominating either himself or someone else to act with me in carrying out the necessary negotiations.

The general tone of the proceedings was, in my opinion and in the opinion of the American, Belgian, and Italian Representatives, most satisfactory. Indeed, I think on no single point did any real difference of opinion manifest itself between Monsieur Dubois' point of view and our own. The political position of the French Government of course still continues to be very difficult, and I doubt whether the attitude taken up by Monsieur Millerand in the debate in the Chamber last week has made his personal position any easier and it is possible that Dubois' own excellent intentions may be frustrated by instructions from his Government. On the other hand, it is an enormous advantage to have a French Delegate who is anxious to co-operate with his colleagues and will require, so far as his own Government is concerned in all probability, the application of the curb rather than the spur.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BRADBURY

<sup>3</sup> For the text of this agreement of January 13, 1920, see *Documents relatifs aux réparations*, vol. I (Paris, 1922), pp. 66-67; see also Volume VIII, p. 264.

## No. 154

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)*

*No. 240 Telegraphic [202016/14798/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 4, 1920, 7 p.m.*

Following from Prime Minister for Signor Nitti.

With reference to your telegram of May 27th,<sup>1</sup> Hythe Conference never dealt with question of distribution of German indemnity among Allies. That is fixed in the Treaty on the basis of reparation for damage actually done and pensions. The percentage arrangement relates only to an agreement arrived at between France and England for distribution of the proceeds of what comes to them in order to avoid each country having to contest the claims of the other. It is desirable in my judgment that the same arrangement should be made between all the countries which have reparation claims against Germany. I wired you a few days ago about the forthcoming meeting at Spa. I fully understand your difficulties, but you will also, I am sure, understand mine. I earnestly hope that you will be able to come to Spa on the 21st for I regard your presence there as indispensable.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> In his telegram No. 230 of June 7 (not printed) Sir G. Buchanan said that he had forwarded the Prime Minister's message in a private letter to Signor Nitti of June 6.

No. 155

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received June 6, 4 p.m.)*

*No. 226 Telegraphic [201922/14798/39]*

ROME, June 5, 1920, 9.40 p.m.

My telegram No. 224.<sup>1</sup>

Results of Hythe Conference and communication which Italian Government are said to have made to His Majesty's Government about it are being much discussed by press. Terms of latter have not been published and I am still without information on the subject from Your Lordship, but I am disposed to think that communication of it and press campaign are political movements on Signor Nitti's part adopted with a view to persuade country and Chamber of prejudice likely to be caused to Italian interests if he is turned out of office before Spa Conference. Official *Messaggero* has leader to-day dealing with percentages of indemnity to be allotted to each Power and pointing out that original Italian claim at Paris was for fifteen per cent but did not succeed. Article follows usual lines of argument that Italy's share, twenty per cent now to be divided between herself, Belgium, [and] Serbia will be quite incommensurate with her war losses and contribution to victory. Italy's chief concern is, it says, to obtain from England the same treatment as France.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

No. 156

*Earl Curzon to Sir J. Bradbury (Paris)*

*[201504/14798/39]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 5, 1920

Sir,

I am directed by Earl C[urzon] of K[edleston] to inform you that H[is] L[ordship] has received from the Portuguese Minister at this Court a copy of a memorandum as to the claims of the Portuguese Govt. for reparation from Germany,<sup>1</sup> which has also been sent to the British delegate on the Reparation Commission, to M. Millerand, to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris and to the Chairman of the Reparation Commission. Sen[h]or Teixeira Gomez gives expression in a covering note to the hope of the Portuguese Govt. that H.M.G. will support the claims of Portugal in this matter. He has, at the same time, communicated to Lord Curzon a copy of the letter, No. B.R. 1268, addressed by Sir J. Bradbury on the 27th ult.<sup>1</sup> to the Portuguese Minister at Paris, together with a copy of Sen[h]or Costa's reply of the 28th ult.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. It is gathered from Sir J. Bradbury's letter of the 27th ult. that the data supplied by the Portuguese Govt. are not of a nature to facilitate consideration of the Portuguese claims for reparation. It would appear in fact that the Portuguese delegate is under some misapprehension as to the exact scope of the reparation provisions of the Treaty of Versailles; this may well be due to the fact that Portugal, not having been represented on the Committee of the Peace Conference which prepared the reparation clauses, and not being represented on the Reparation Commission, may not have fully comprehended the intentions of the treaty.

3. I am to express Lord Curzon's hope that Sir J. Bradbury will continue to exercise his good offices in this matter and to assist, so far as he properly can, the Portuguese delegate by friendly discussion and advice as regards the best method of presenting and pressing their claim. It is, for reasons of general foreign policy, important that the Portuguese Govt. should feel that their case is receiving the most sympathetic consideration from H.M.G.

4. Copy of this letter, together with copies of the correspondence mentioned above, has been sent to the Treasury.<sup>2</sup>

E. A. C.

<sup>2</sup> On the file only the draft of this letter exists, initialled by Sir Eyre Crowe. In acknowledging it and confirming that Sir J. Bradbury would be glad to assist the Portuguese delegate so far as he properly could, Mr. Goodchild of the British Delegation to the Reparation Commission pointed out that Portugal had the right under Paragraph 3 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles to appoint a Delegate to be present and act as assessor when the claims and interests of Portugal were under discussion. He added that the Portuguese Government had, in fact, appointed Senhor Guiharaes to act in this capacity.

## No. 157

*Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received June 6, 8.20 p.m.)*

*No. 229 Telegraphic [201921/14798/39]*

ROME, June 6, 1920, 2.15 p.m.

President of the Council in speaking to me yesterday of Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs' mission to London<sup>1</sup> said that he was obliged to assert Italy's moral rights to an equitable treatment as regards division of Germany['s] indemnity.

He cherished few illusions as to reparation whether any of Allies was likely to receive from Germany . . .<sup>2</sup> should amount of indemnity be left undetermined, and should an attempt be made to extort maximum sum that Germany could possibly pay under pressure of an indefinite Allied occupation. Germany would in that case adopt an attitude of passive resistance in expectation that the longer the occupation lasted the more likely was it to provoke revolutionary movements in Allied countries.

<sup>1</sup> Count Sforza visited London June 8-11 to discuss with H.M. Government Italy's share of this German indemnity.

<sup>2</sup> The text is here uncertain.

*Letter from Sir J. Bradbury (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain<sup>1</sup>*

[203884/14798/39]

*Private*

REPARATION COMMISSION, PARIS, June 9, 1920

My dear Chancellor,

Herr Bergmann brought Dr. Melchior<sup>2</sup> to see me this afternoon, and we continued our conversation on the subject of Spa prospects.

Dr. Melchior told me that the financial experts who have been advising the German Government are definitely divided into two camps. One group is convinced that the atmosphere at the moment is quite unpropitious and are opposed to the German Government putting forward any proposal at all. The other group, to which Dr. Melchior himself belongs, is of opinion that the wisest policy is for the German Government to put forward a proposal for a fixed minimum annual payment for a period of years, to be increased in proportion to any growth which may take place in German national income above an agreed basic line.

Dr. Melchior himself does not think that an absolutely automatic criterion would be practicable, but he thinks that a method of calculation might be agreed upon, and the application of the agreed method to the actual facts of each year might be left to a tribunal, on which Germany would be represented.

This, of course, in substance is the 'Avenol Plan'.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Melchior was, however, very insistent on the notion that the minimum annuity must be a figure which Germany herself was convinced that she would be able to pay, and he urged that, in determining this figure, it was necessary to take account, not only of the economic power of Germany to create an exportable surplus, but also of actual Budget conditions in Germany, since the only means by which the German Government could get hold of such exportable surplus was by taxation, and that it might quite well be that the limits of practicable taxation would be reached before the theoretical economic possibilities were exhausted.

I said, in reply to this, that, though this contention might be correct as regards the situation at any given moment, I thought that the problem of tapping taxable wealth, if such wealth existed, was a purely mechanical problem which, given time, was capable of solution. I added that it appeared to me essential, if any real progress was to be made, that the German offer, if one was made, should be one which the Allies could regard as a serious offer, and that I thought that, from the German point of view, it was much better policy to take some risk of its being too large than to allow their sense of caution to make it appear ridiculous.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this letter was forwarded by the Treasury on June 12 to the Foreign Office where it was received on June 14.

<sup>2</sup> A Hamburg banker.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Volume VIII, No. 22, minute 2.

Both Dr. Melchior and Herr Bergmann left on my mind the impression that, in the event of the political atmosphere at the time of the assembly of the Spa Conference looking propitious, they are likely to do their best to secure the making of a serious offer.

Herr Bergmann thought that, on the whole, the elections were going in favour of the Coalition Government, but he did not think that the constitution of the new Parliament would be such as to leave its position anything more than precarious.

Dr. Melchior emphasized the difficulty of proposing specific figures before the fate of Upper Silesia has been settled. Both of them appeared to regard the result of the plebiscite as still very doubtful, though they thought that the chances in favour of Germany during the last few weeks had distinctly improved.

The present conversation does not add very much to my previous conversation with Bergmann, which I reported to you.<sup>4</sup>

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BRADBURY

<sup>4</sup> No copy of this report has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

## No. 159

*Sir A. Young<sup>1</sup> (Belgrade) to Earl Curzon (Received June 25, 11.15 a.m.)*

*No. 183 Telegraphic [205900/7067/39]*

*BELGRADE, June 22, 1920, 6.30 p.m.*

I have received following urgent memorandum from Serb-Croat-Slovene Government with a request from Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that I should communicate it to His Majesty's Government without delay.

The Conference at which representatives of Allied States and representatives of Germany will participate at Spa as also the preliminary conversations, have attracted serious attention of Royal Government seeing that questions will be discussed which have a vital interest for Serb-Croat-Slovene State, questions concerning indemnities which Germany and other enemy countries have engaged themselves to pay. The Royal Government take a very great interest in this question because economic future of State is intimately connected with damages suffered by Serbia, devastated and ruined by enemy occupation of 3 years' duration.

Royal Government desires to take part in the discussions in order to be afforded possibility of defending direct those vital interests which are guaranteed to this state in the first instance by Treaty of Versailles.

As right is clearly accorded to this State according to Treaty of Versailles to take part in discussion of these questions it appears impossible that such a discussion should have a valid result without participation and consent of this State and of other Allied States which have a similar right.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Belgrade.



Consequently Ministry for Foreign Affairs begs His Majesty's Legation to draw attention of His Majesty's Government to above facts in order that this State may also be invited to Spa and also to any preliminary conversations which may take place for this Conference between representatives of Allied Governments.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The full French text of the memorandum was communicated to Lord Curzon by the Yugoslav Minister in London on June 24. In his telegram No. 740 of June 19 Lord Derby reported that he had that day been visited by the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Trumbitch, and M. Pashitch, who begged him to represent to the Prime Minister their country's claim to attend (unofficially) the Conferences at Boulogne and Spa.

No. 160

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 2111 [200969/14798/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 22, 1920*

My Lord,

I transmit to you herewith, for Your Excellency's information, a copy of a note from the German Chargé d'Affaires<sup>1</sup> regarding the delivery of animals by Germany under the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

2. It may be convenient to take this opportunity to review the position under the treaty as regards the delivery of these animals.

3. Under Annex 4 to Part VIII, paragraphs 2 and 3, the allied and associated governments may within sixty days after the entry into force of the treaty, file with the Reparation Commission lists showing, *inter alia*, animals which have been carried off by Germany and which these governments, for the purpose of meeting immediate and urgent needs, desire to have replaced by animals of the same nature which are in being in Germany at the time of the entry into force of the treaty.

4. On the filing of these lists paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to Part VIII provides that the Reparation Commission must consider the number of the animals mentioned in these lists which are to be required of Germany. The Reparation Commission must at the same time take into account such German domestic requirements as it deems essential for the maintenance of the social and economic life of Germany, as well as the general interest of the allied governments that the industrial life of Germany shall not be so disorganised as to affect adversely her ability to perform the other acts of reparation stipulated. The Reparation Commission is to give the German Government an opportunity and a time to be heard as to their capacity to furnish the said animals and is to communicate its decision at the earliest possible moment to the German Government and to the allied governments concerned. The German Government undertakes to deliver the animals specified by the Reparations Commission.

<sup>1</sup> No. 150.

5. Further under paragraph 6 of Annex 4 to Part VIII Germany undertakes to deliver certain specified quantities of live-stock as an immediate advance on account of the animals referred to above. It appears from Herr Sthamer's note that this delivery has already been effected. It had to be carried out within three months of the entry into force of the treaty.

6. It is not clear from the second paragraph of Herr Sthamer's note whether, in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Annex 4, the Reparation Commission has yet taken into consideration the demand presented by the allied governments, and whether it has as a result, called upon the German Government for their observations as to their capacity to furnish the animals required, or whether the decision of the Reparation Commission referred to in Paragraph 4 of Annex 4 has already been communicated to the German Government.

7. In the latter case, provided the German Government have been heard as to their capacity to furnish the animals and provided that the Commission has reached its decision after taking into account the circumstances, which, under Paragraph 4 are to be considered before arriving at a decision, the provisions of the treaty in this connection have been carried out, and there would seem to be nothing inconsistent with its provisions in the fresh demand now made to the German Government. The demand with which the German Government is bound by the treaty to comply is not the demand put forward by the Belgian Government but the demand put forward by the Reparation Commission after hearing the Belgian demand and the representatives of Germany.

8. It is of course possible that matters are not so advanced, and that the German Government have only received the figures put forward by Belgium, and are so disturbed by them that they have taken the step of appealing to His Majesty's Government before the Reparation Commission has reached its decision.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

#### No. 161

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 25)*<sup>1</sup>

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [205839/14798/39]*

*Urgent and personal*

PARIS, June 24, 1920, 1.30 p.m.

French Press is beginning a campaign in regard to French share in German war indemnity and as to question whether French share, namely 55%, is to be regarded as a percentage or as a proportion. French public at any rate and I think their politicians also have always considered 55% allotted to France was a definite percentage and their disappointment if their expectations are not realised is likely to produce much ill-feeling and a renewal of attacks on

<sup>1</sup> The time of receipt is not recorded.

Prime Minister. 'Matin' this morning describes Mr. Lloyd George as having declared to Count Sforza that arrangement of December 13th 1919<sup>2</sup> never implied a percentage but only a proportion, namely that when France's share was eleven, England's would be five, but that these shares might refer to a number 'x' and not necessarily to number 100. It is most important and urgent that I should have early and authoritative information on this point since if 'Matin' statement is incorrect and definite percentage is really meant a communication which I would at once make to the Press on the subject would put a stop to a dangerous outcry which appears to me otherwise inevitable.

<sup>2</sup> Volume II, No. 61, appendix A.

**No. 162**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 2153 [203494/14798/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 24, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 915 of the 16th March last,<sup>1</sup> I have to inform Your Lordship that His Majesty's Government have decided to issue an amended white paper containing the agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers with regard to the contribution to the cost of liberation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 10th, 1919, together with the amending agreement of December, 1919.<sup>2</sup>

2. I shall be glad if Your Lordship will notify the Ambassadors' Council of the intention of His Majesty's Government and will send to the Foreign Office a copy of the amending agreement with the date and signatures.

3. The British delegate to the Reparations Commission considers that it would be most inadvisable to publish, while negotiations for similar agreements with other powers are pending, the agreement of January 13th last between the British, French and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments relating to the division of the payments made by Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. I understand that instructions are being given to Sir John Bradbury by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to take whatever steps may be open to him to expedite the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement; but in the meantime I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade<sup>3</sup> and requesting him to notify the Serb-Croat-Slovene

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> The publication was suggested by Sir A. Young in Belgrade despatch No. 146 of April 12, not printed. In fact only the amended agreement of December 8, 1919, was printed as Cmd. 637 of 1920.

<sup>3</sup> Under cover of Foreign Office despatch No. 303, of June 24, not printed.

Government of the proposed issue of a white paper amending No. 14 in the Treaty Series, 1919 (Cmd. 458) containing the original Liberated Territories Contribution Agreement and the amending agreement of December 1919, and stating, for Sir A. Young's information, that the publication of the agreement of January 13th will be postponed pending the conclusion of the comprehensive arrangements which are being negotiated by Sir John Bradbury.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

### No. 163

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Confidential/General/363/16]*

*Urgent. Personal*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 26, 1920, 1 p.m.*

Your personal telegram of June 24th.<sup>1</sup>

If the French claim that they are entitled to 55 *per cent* of total indemnity be correct it would follow that the British Empire is entitled to an absolute 25 per cent; that is to say the British Empire and France between them would have arranged, without having discussed the question at all with their Allies, to take between them 80 per cent of the indemnity, leaving only 20 per cent for the others, or 14 per cent if the arrangement with Serbia be included. It is impossible to contend that the French and British Governments could ever have made, or could now make, such an arrangement without consulting their Allies.

If the percentage view is gaining ground in France, the sooner it is knocked on the head the better. The longer it remains undisputed, the more serious will be the outcry when the French public are as they must be, eventually disillusioned. I leave it to your discretion to deal with the situation in the best way you can.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 161.

<sup>2</sup> The reply given in this telegram was suggested by the Prime Minister whom Lord Curzon had consulted by letter.

### No. 164

*Note handed to Lord Hardinge by the German Chargé d'Affaires, June 29*

*[C 192/192/18]*

*Translation*

GERMAN EMBASSY, LONDON, *June 28, 1920*

By a Note of the beginning of June the Reparation Commission ordered that an additional quantity of coal, to the amount of 200,000 tons, was to be supplied to Poland from the Upper Silesian coal, besides the 250,000 tons already delivered; of this the German consumers themselves are to bear

about 160,000 tons, and about 40,000 tons are to be deducted from the reparation deliveries to the Entente.

From the *legal* point of view there can be no doubt that the Reparation Commission exceeds its powers in issuing this order. The Reparation Commission has admittedly to examine Germany's productive ability, on the other hand it has not to interfere in German economic matters.

The *economic* position is as follows:—Before the order of the Reparation Commission, the Plebiscite Commission under General Le Rond<sup>1</sup> had already begun to intervene in the distribution of Upper Silesian coal, with the result that the delivery for the East of Germany, including Berlin etc., which is dependent on coal from Upper Silesia, hardly suffices to meet the most urgent requirements. The following sketch of the coal position in Upper Silesia, if the additional demand mentioned for Poland is to be insisted upon, is submitted (the main line consignment can be taken as a basis as the output hardly comes up to the quantity to be removed with the main consignment, in any case it does not exceed it).

For June the most favourable estimate for the main line consignment in Upper Silesia gives 7,200 wagons fresh output daily, this represents for 24 days' output a quantity of over 1,728,000 tons. According to the order of the Plebiscite Commission and the Reparation Commission, of this quantity a total of 1,125,000 tons was to be delivered to territories outside Germany, and 312,000 tons to the German railways, without Upper Silesia. After this there is left for Germany, without Upper Silesia, a total remainder [of] 291,000 tons. This quantity just sufficed for the so-called emergency programme which has been drawn up for East Germany which is dependent on Upper Silesian coal, and for which programme 290,000 tons are required. Hence, of this share nothing is left for the needs of agriculture, industry and domestic consumption. Therefore every deficiency of Upper Silesia coal must be made good by Ruhr coal. For this transposition of the coal distribution considerable transport of coal from West to East becomes necessary and that involves a serious further requisitioning of transport wagons and coal transport. Consequently the additional demand for Ruhr coal exceeds considerably the deficiency of Upper Silesian coal. A further reduction of the German ration of Ruhr coal is not possible. Therefore, of necessity and automatically, the deficiency of Upper Silesian coal has as a consequence the reduction of the delivery of Ruhr coal to the Entente. Germany is powerless against this.

If the above-mentioned additional supply of Upper Silesian coal to Poland is compulsorily carried out to the full extent of 200,000 tons, the reduction of the supply of coal to the Entente will be perceptible at about 250,000 tons monthly. As the Upper Silesian deficiency has not yet become fully apparent, this reduction too has not yet become so marked. The Reparation Commission was informed of the position described; by a Note of June 25 it has thereupon contended that Germany has violated the Treaty and stated that it has taken measures in accordance with Section 17 of Annex II

<sup>1</sup> President of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission in Upper Silesia and French representative thereon.

to Part VIII of the Peace Treaty, thus evidently in accordance with Section 18 it has proposed measures of reprisals to the States injured by the alleged breach of the Treaty (France, Italy, Belgium).

It must be emphatically maintained that the question arises, not of any breach whatever of the Treaty of Germany,<sup>2</sup> but of a calamity, against which Germany is herself powerless, due to an unauthorised order of the Reparation Commission.

<sup>2</sup> In the original, 'durchaus keine Vertragsverletzung Deutschlands . . .'

## No. 165

*Earl Curzon to Sir A. Young (Belgrade)*

*No. 130 Telegraphic [205900/7067/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 29, 1920, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 183 (of June 22nd:<sup>1</sup> Spa Conference).

You should, if a reply is required, say that His Majesty's Government do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by inviting the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to participate in Conference.

Should any question directly affecting them come up for discussion, it would of course be in power of Supreme Council to summon a Serb-Croat-Slovene representative to attend.

<sup>1</sup> No. 159.

## No. 166

*The British Delegate to the Reparation Commission to the Foreign Office  
(Received July 2)*

*No. B.R. 1324 [C 217/8/18]*

PARIS, *June 30, 1920*

Sir,

I am directed by the British Delegate to the Reparation Commission to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Oliphant's letter of the 5th instant, No. 201309/39,<sup>1</sup> transmitting a statement which has appeared in the 'Berliner Tageblatt'<sup>2</sup> as to the amount of reparation already made by Germany.

In reply, I am to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a series of statements have appeared in the German Press in regard to the value of the German deliveries, which, although not identical, are approximately of similar tenor to the statement in question.

The attention of Herr Bergmann, the President of the German Kriegs-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Of May 22. The statement was included in a short review article of a book by Dr. Kleefeld entitled 'The economic aspect of the reconstruction of Germany'. The figures of the amounts estimated to have been paid in reparation were taken from this book. Mr. Oliphant had enquired whether they were approximately correct.

lastenkommission, was drawn semi-officially by the Reparation Commission to figures of this nature appearing in the German Press, and the impression given was that he was not prepared to defend them. Copies of a letter from Herr Bergmann of 23rd instant on this subject, and of the statement to which reference is therein made, are forwarded herewith.

Herr Bergmann has laid some emphasis on the fact that the statement should be regarded as unofficial, and I am to request that, for the time being, it may be regarded by Lord Curzon as confidential. It will be observed that, in many cases, the values have been estimated on a moderate basis as compared with the figures which formed the subject of the letter under reply. They would none the less appear to remain largely inflated.

Copies of this letter and of the enclosures have been sent to the Treasury and to His Majesty's Embassy in Paris.

I am, &c.,

ANDREW McFADYEAN<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Secretary to the British Delegation, Reparation Commission.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 166

*Letter from Herr Bergmann to the Reparation Commission*

*W. Nr. 3318 No. 13/96*

DEUTSCHE KRIEGSLASTENKOMMISSION, PARIS, *June 23, 1920*

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 15, No. 13/96, in which you ask for a reply to letters [*sic*] No. 751 of March 5 [4], received from the Reparation Commission.<sup>4</sup> These letters were immediately submitted to my Government, but up to the present the preliminary work entailed by the reply has not been completed.

I have already the honour of explaining verbally that the German Government would request the Reparation Commission to deduct from the first 20 milliard gold marks, under the terms of Article 235, all deliveries and payments in kind effected by Germany up to date or before May 1, 1921; these amounts could then be credited to Germany's reparation account.

The German Government has for some time past been engaged in drawing up an accurate list of these amounts; this work is long and arduous. The list will, *inter alia*, contain a brief statement and estimate of the value of the Saar coalfields ceded to France, and also of the property belonging to the German Empire and to the German States which, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, have been transferred to other states and are to be credited to Germany's reparation account. In addition there will be given an estimate of payments in kind effected under the terms of Part VIII of the Peace Treaty (merchant fleet, livestock, machinery, coal, dyestuffs, cables, railway material etc.), surrender of non-military material (Article 250), the proceeds of liquidation of German undertakings abroad, Germany's credit with her former allies, the value of ceded river craft, etc.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume VII, No. 52, n. 3.

Up to the present it has not been possible to estimate the value of the majority of these payments in kind sufficiently accurately to permit of their being forwarded to the Reparation Commission as an incontestable basis for its decisions. The total value of these payments may, however, be estimated at 20 milliard gold marks.

As to the cost of the army of occupation, which, under the terms of article 235 is to be paid out of this sum, Germany had up to April 1, 1920, disbursed at least 500,000,000 gold marks for this purpose.

The German Government has in addition spent at least 2 milliard gold marks in the purchase of foodstuffs and raw material. Under the terms of Article 235, it will request that account be taken of sums thus spent when considering the 20 milliard gold marks referred to in that article.

The Reparation Commission knows that Germany is not in a position to make any large payments in cash. The limited funds available from foreign securities are to be devoted to the purchase abroad of foodstuffs and raw material necessary for food supplies. If Germany were deprived of these funds, so vital for the restoration of her industries, she would not even be capable of effecting the payments in kind stipulated in the Peace Treaty.

I presume that these general remarks will form the subject for discussion by the representatives of the various governments at the coming conference at Spa.

BERGMANN

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 166

#### *Value of Properties Ceded and Goods Delivered under the Treaty of Versailles*

##### *I. Mines of the Saar-Basin.*

The mines of the Saar-Basin formerly belonging to the Prussian State have been estimated at 900.190.000 gold marks. As also the other Saar mines, the estimate for which is still expected, come into account, this item may safely be valued at . 1.000.000.000

##### *II. Property of Germany and of the German States in the ceded territories as well as in the plebiscite areas:*

Precise calculations will soon be furnished. According to the data hitherto available the value of ceded property of Germany and of the German States amounts to about . . . . . 6.800.000.000

##### *III. Reparations*

###### *(a) Merchant ships:*

According to rather accurate statements the pre-war value of the merchant ships now delivered amounted in July 1914 to 1,5 milliard gold marks. Very cautious estimates of the actual value arrive at a minimum value of . . . . . 4.000.000.000  
Accurate calculations under way are expected to show that the real value is considerably higher.



(b) *Animals:*

The animals being in the course of delivery have a value of at least . . . . . 180.000.000  
This figure also is to increase considerably after receipt of detailed calculations at world market prices.

(c) *Machines:*

Handed over until April 1st 1920 to the value of 10.000.000

(d) *Coals:*

Until April 1st 1920 4.000.000 tons of coals in round numbers have been delivered calculated at 50 gold marks a ton . . . . . about 200.000.000

(e) *Dyestuffs:*

Until April 1st 1920 dyestuffs have been delivered to the value of . . . . . about 3.000.000

(f) *Cables:*

The value of the German cables at the time of the outbreak of war amounted to gold marks . . . 66.260.000  
to be deducted therefrom the State cables (Art. 156 para. 3) Tsingtao to Shanghai, Tsingtao to Chefoo, Emden to Brest, from off Cherbourg to Brest, totalling .  
1.610.000  
remainder 64.650.000

(g) *Railway rolling stock:*

In leaving out of account the rolling stock captured in war, the value of the material handed over (5000 locomotives ready for use, 150000 wagons with appliances and 5000 camions) amounts to approximately . . . . . about 750.000.000

IV. *Expenses of the divers Interallied and Associated Commissions:*

Hitherto payments has [sic] been effectuated to the value of . . . . . about 9.000.000

The above expenses have been made for:

(1) The administrative bodies of the Plebiscite Areas, inclusive of International Commissions.

(2) Commissions for defining the new frontier lines.

(3) The Interallied Commissions charged to search for missiong [*sic*] persons.

(4) Expenses of the Reparation Commission.

(5) Expenses caused by the delivery of cattle.

(6) Expenses of the Coal Commission at Essen.

(7) Expenses of the Interallied Commissions of control for Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

sum total 13,015[?6].650.000

To be added the following deliveries and performances, the value of which cannot yet be estimated even approximately:—

V. *Material of non-military value left behind and handed over in accordance with the Armistice.*

The data hitherto available does not yet allow of arriving—even approximately—at a correct estimate of their value. The figures which have been given vary between 3 and 7 milliard gold marks. The correct figure probably is an intermediate one.

VII. *Credit balance of German rights and properties abroad.*  
Not yet known.

VII. *Claims upon Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey.*  
Value cannot yet be given.

VIII. *Assumption of German debt by other power[s] on account of ceded territories.* Art. 254.

The Reparation Commission will yet have to establish the basis for the calculation.

IX. *Value of the ceded river craft.*

X. *Value of the ceded tugs and barges in the ports of the Elbe, Oder, Memel and the Danube.*

XI. *Value of the tugs and vessels in the ports of the Rhine, as well as of the berthing and anchorage accom[m]odation at Rotterdam.*

XII. *Value of the railway rolling stock handed over on the lines of the former Russian Poland.*

*Value of deliveries to be made until May 1st 1921*

I. *Coal.*

Taking as a basis the quantities delivered of late (40,000 tons per working day, with 25 working days

per month) one arrives, calculating an average price of 50 gold marks a ton, for the period from April 1st, 1920, till May 1st, 1921 (13 months) . about 550,000,000 [sic]

## II. Dyestuffs.

It is highly probable that during the period from April, 1920, until May, 1921, dyestuffs will still be delivered at least to the same amount as have already been furnished until the beginning of April, 1920 .

3,000,000  
553,000,000

*Expenses that, according to Article 235 of the Peace Treaty, may be met out of the first 20 milliards*

### I. Supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs.

Under the Brussels Agreement<sup>5</sup> an amount of 1,055,000,000 gold marks has been spent. The figures of the amounts subsequently spent for foodstuffs, etc., by the German Government will shortly be available. The total sum may, with some certainty, be estimated to be at least. . . .

2,000,000,000

### II. Expenses for the Armies of Occupation.

The expenses made by Germany, up to the present time, amount, cautiously estimated, to at least .

500,000,000

To be added thereto the further expenses until May 1st, 1921 . . . . .

500,000,000  
3,000,000,000

<sup>5</sup> Of March 13 and 14, 1919. See D. Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924 f.), vol. xvii, pp. 197-214.

## No. 167

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received July 2, 6.45 p.m.)*

*No. 389 Telegraphic [C 246/41/18]*

BERLIN, July 1, 1920, 5.40 p.m.

Following is resumé of statement published in midday paper as coming from 'Circle of German Delegates and experts for Spa'.

Conference will not in its outer form be great historic and solemn state occasion like Versailles Conference but rather modest business conference. If it arrives at no result former state of affairs i.e. 'Uninterpreted validity' of Treaty of Versailles will simply continue to exist. But if it fulfils its object it will last some time. If no understanding is attained for basis of negotiation it will come to end in few days. There can be no question of Germany

making completely worked-out proposal for reparation. German Republic hopes that after mutual exchange of fundamental views they will have opportunity to present their figures which expose impossibility of demands of Peace Treaty in view of economic and labour conditions and necessities of life in Germany. If it is possible to secure consideration of these figures and their consequences negotiations will naturally be extended.

This will be critical point of conference and if Allies refuse to examine German explanation and simply present their own proposals for acceptance Germany will be confronted with necessity for making new and difficult decisions.

#### No. 168

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received July 2, 12.55 p.m.)*

*No. 450 Telegraphic [C 212/41/18]*

WARSAW, July 1, 1920, 8.45 p.m.

I hear from reliable Polish official and private sources that at Spa Conference Germany will make a declaration that unless Upper Silesia remains German she will not be in a position to meet her financial obligations resulting from Peace Treaty.

#### No. 169

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Lord Hardinge (Received July 3, 11.35 a.m.)*

*No. 394 Telegraphic [C 270/41/18]*

BERLIN, July 2, 1920, 5.30 p.m.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.<sup>1</sup>

After compliments His Excellency said that at Spa one of two things might happen.

If Entente put forward a bald demand for a certain indemnity above ability of Germany to pay, German delegates would return to Berlin and submit the whole matter to Parliament.

If, on the other hand certain agreement of principle was reached by Conference after hearing declarations of German delegates then examination of figures in detail might be proceeded with by Technical Committee or Committees. German Government would in this case send their technical advisers to Spa. They were not bringing them in the 1st instance as they were numerous, no accommodation had been reserved for them and they could not wander about the streets. German Government would furnish fullest proof of their statement.

<sup>1</sup> Lord D'Abernon had that morning arrived in Berlin to take up his post as H.M. Ambassador.

Doctor Simons added that ability on the part of Germany to pay depended in large measure upon a settlement of Upper Silesia question and supply of coal thence.

He added that as a man of law and an ex-judge he realized to highest degree obligation to fulfil contracts and that Germany would do her utmost. But physical impossibilities existed for everyone and there were certain limits which no German Government could exceed. What those limits were depended to a large extent upon possibilities of German production. These had been reduced by war, by absence of manure for crops, by absence of adequate appliances for production, and lately by rise of exchange which had made export business more difficult.

In reply I told His Excellency that I was not acquainted with detailed programme for Spa but that it appeared highly desirable that German delegation should convince Entente at earliest moment of their sincere desire to fulfil engagements, and of their determination to do their best to carry out Treaty.

Doctor Simons appeared to think that discussion of figures with German technicians would be carried out between myself and French Ambassador as we had special knowledge.

I ventured to suggest to him that Reparation Commission, which was very able body, had matter in hand and that there might be advantages in keeping indemnity question somewhat distinct from ordinary diplomatic business. My part in matter would naturally be a question for His Majesty's Government to decide.

Repeated to Lord Curzon, Brussels.

#### No. 170

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received July 3, 12.15 p.m.)*

*No. 397 Telegraphic [C 274/248/18]*

BERLIN, July 2, 1920, 9.40 p.m.

I was received this evening by Chancellor.

His Excellency said that he regarded Spa primarily as an opportunity of convincing Entente of absolute goodwill of Germany to carry out her treaty obligations and to pay indemnity in so far as her available means permitted.

Once confidence on this point was established precise amount, mode of payment, dates etc. could be settled by experts.

Amount must depend on Germany's capability to pay and this depended on her economic restoration, on industrial and social tranquillity, on raw material and on sufficient food.

Hungry stomachs made for unrest: his motto was plenty of food and plenty of work.

'As to "revanche", in God's name, idea is ridiculous with a people as beaten as we have been.' All he wanted was to increase productivity of Germany and to restore her economic force.

His Excellency is evidently afraid of being met at Spa with a pistol at his head by demand for a fixed figure of indemnity and of not being allowed opportunity to set forth his case.

Chancellor makes excellent impression on me as to honesty and goodwill.

### No. 171

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Brussels)*

*Unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [C 324/41/18]*

BERLIN, July 4, 1920

German Delegates left last night for Spa. Up to last minute it is uncertain whether they will offer fixed annuity for indemnity (probably 50 million pounds), or make general declaration as to willingness to pay utmost of which they are capable, leaving amount to discussion of experts. On Friday<sup>2</sup> they had decided to offer fixed sum; to-day it is doubtful.

I think it very important that formal and decisive debate at Spa should be preceded by personal interview with Chancellor and Foreign Secretary so that Your Lordship may form personal impression as to good faith and willingness to pay.

My own view is not unfavourable. There can be no doubt as to appalling difficulty of financial position and of vigorous effort which is being made to . . . (? debate)<sup>3</sup> at Spa . . .<sup>3</sup> avoid bankruptcy.

Politically complete break at Spa on indemnity question would seriously endanger present Ministry and might give us a worse one.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 399 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 4 at 10.10 p.m.      <sup>2</sup> July 2, 1920.      <sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain.

### No. 172

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Brussels)*

*Unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [C 429/41/18]*

BERLIN, July 4, 1920

Copies of three Statistical Statements entitled respectively:

1. Memorandum on German solvency for the purpose of taxation
2. Economic capacity of Germany
3. Chargeable taxation in Germany

have been handed to me here.

Though unsatisfactory in point of form, notably memorandum on 'economic capacity of Germany'<sup>2</sup> and though in tendency highly partial

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 400 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 5 at 12.45 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this memorandum was left at the Foreign Office by Herr Sthamer on July 2 and ten further copies were transmitted by him on July 7. A note by a Belgian technical expert, M. Maurice Frère, on the same subject was included as document No. 22 in Part IV of the Reparation Commission's *Report on the Work of the Reparation Commission up to June 1920 in relation to Germany, prepared with a view to the Spa Conference etc.*

they contain information of undeniable importance and many facts of undoubted veracity. Delivery of these documents only two days before Spa is highly inconvenient but Your Lordship may desire my impressions.

Most important statement is perhaps 'chargeable taxation in Germany' as it throws clearest light on financial position. Following features impressed me:

1. Failure of Germany to impose taxation during war and enormous increase in taxation voted since armistice.

2. Very heavy rates of taxation now in force including almost unbearable charges on capital and commerce.

3. Almost incredible total of floating debt, its rapid increase month by month since armistice, large total of currency notes in circulation and increase of these notes month by month since armistice (latterly at a somewhat reduced rate).

4. Energy shown in increasing taxation during 1919 to 1920 even allowing for factor of altered value of money, factor which makes comparison between present and past extremely difficult. Making full allowances for this it must be recognised that Germany has made an enormous effort to avoid bankruptcy. Even now no one here contemplates possibility of bankruptcy although financial situation is extremely perilous.

5. Result of new taxation must be seen before any opinion can be given as to solvency. Unless taxes come in well enough to keep Government in funds and to avoid any further increase in floating debt and in paper money, position will become very critical.

6. Incidentally vigorous endeavour to increase revenue made during 1919 and 1920 goes to disprove contention that uncertainty as to amount of indemnity must paralyse efforts towards financial recuperation.

### No. 173

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Spa)*

*Unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [C 461/45/18]*

BERLIN, July 5, 1920

It would simplify discussion if Germany's economic desires were classified by her delegates under three heads.

- (A) Not requiring any revision of Treaty either as to text or interpretation.
- (B) Requiring modification of interpretation or method of execution but no revision of text.
- (C) Revision of text.

This would appear best line in reply to Memorandum on Economic Capacity of Germany.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 402 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 5 at 7.10 p.m.

*Note on the German Situation by Mr. Waterlow*

[C 704/8/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 5, 1920

## I

The present moment is opportune to record, without technicalities, the essentials of the position as to indemnities, so far as it can be understood on the fragmentary information that has been vouchsafed to the Foreign Office.

2. It appears to have been provisionally agreed at Boulogne<sup>1</sup> to propose to the Germans that their total liabilities (exclusive of the cost of the armies of occupation) should be capitalised in the form of annuities rising from £150 million a year to £250 million a year and spread over forty-two years. This is to be put to them as a counter-proposal to the inadequate offer which they are expected to make. If they reject the proposal, it is not evident how a break can be avoided, since inter-allied negotiation in the face of the Germans appears to be ruled out as unedifying.

3. My personal opinion, which is shared by economists of repute, is that the £150 million to £250 million scheme is far beyond not only what the Germans will honestly think that they can pay, but what they in fact can pay. But it does not matter whether that opinion is well founded or not. The real question is: What inducement have the Germans to accept any allied proposal other than one which should be so moderate and reasonable as to tempt them for its own sake?

4. The usual answer is that, once their total liability is known, they will be able to raise money to buy food and start their industries, operations which the present uncertainty makes impossible. But, unless the total fixed is so moderate as to leave very large assets at their disposal, it seems highly improbable that any one, the neutrals or America, will lend them money. It is hard to imagine a less attractive recipient of credits than a Germany burdened with an obligation which she thinks excessive and liable to violent interference on the part of the French if she fails to fulfil that obligation.

5. The fact seems to be that, unless the annuity scheme is an integral part of a larger scheme for an international loan in which Germany is to participate, the Germans would gain nothing by accepting it. They might gain by accepting a relatively moderate scheme based on the annual figure of £50 million which Berlin telegram No. 399<sup>2</sup> indicates that they are considering. Otherwise, unless they are at once to pocket part of the proceeds of an international loan, there is no reason why they should, and some reason why they should not, wish to exchange their present treaty obligation to pay an infinite sum for an obligation to pay a finite but impossible sum.

6. Thus the Spa conference seems likely to break up quickly on the indemnity question, unless (a) the allies have agreed to reduce their scheme to figures which the Germans think reasonable, or unless (b) it is proposed

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Volume VIII, No. 31, appendix, and No. 34, minute 1.

<sup>2</sup> No. 171.



to graft an international loan with German participation on to the Boulogne annuity scheme. Of these alternatives (*a*) is improbable. As to (*b*), the intention may be to offer to the Germans a share in a loan to be arranged by the League of Nations financial conference at Brussels. But I have seen no hint of this.

7. It is hard to see in what other way the realities of the situation can be met. An impossibly large annuity scheme, taken by itself, only meets the unrealities: it is useful as political window dressing, but it cannot re-start German economic life or balance the French budget or do any real good to any one. The two immediate and imperative practical necessities are that the French should touch large sums of ready money and that the Germans should do the same, and the only way to effect this is by ourselves, the Americans and the neutrals in practice paying the German indemnity for some time to come. If this can be arranged by an international loan 'camouflaged' by the Boulogne annuity scheme, well and good.

## II

8. On the assumption that the situation is as set out above, it may be presumed that the Prime Minister and Sir J. Bradbury are proceeding on these lines. But it is worth while to consider what will happen if no agreement is reached on the indemnity question.

9. Probably nothing will happen for a long time. The allied Prime Ministers will return to their respective capitals with their political positions strengthened. They will be able, with some show of reason, both to denounce the Germans and to say that the alliance has been cemented, both popular cries. The position of the German Government also will be strengthened.<sup>3</sup> That they will 'join the Bolshevists', as has been hinted, is unlikely, at any rate for the present; nor is it clear what joining the Bolshevists could now mean. For some time to come, perhaps for years, the course of events may be expected to be much what it has been during the past twelve months: allied, chiefly French, recriminations against the Germans; uneasy movements in Germany and increasing famine; perhaps another French occupation of Frankfort.<sup>4</sup> The German Government may be expected under economic and other pressure, internal and external, to swing gradually to the right. In time a reactionary coup d'état, or even the peaceful access of a reactionary Government, to power, might well provoke a communist revolution, which would prepare the ground for a bankrupt and desperate Germany to 'join the Bolshevists' in earnest. The union of German capacity and Russian resources under such conditions (for the Polish 'barrier' would not last long) would not require many years to become a serious menace to Western Europe. Probably the Germans could reorganize Russian transport in a year.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Waterlow here added the following footnote: 'Lord D'Abernon however thinks that it will be weakened (telegram No. 399)' [i.e. No. 171].

<sup>4</sup> For the French withdrawal from Frankfort see Volume IX, Chap. V.

10. In any case it would be a mistake to assume that failure to reach an agreement at Spa (if failure there is to be) does not matter because nothing startling happens at once. The success even for years of a temporising policy is no guarantee that it will not produce critical results which might have been prevented had the forces at work been appreciated in time. We are all too apt to believe that because nothing happens nothing ever will happen.<sup>5</sup>

S. P. WATERLOW

<sup>5</sup> Lord Hardinge minuted: 'I believe Mr. Waterlow's conclusions to be quite correct. Of course the Germans will not accept the proposed scheme of payments unless the pill is gilded by their share in an international loan, or by some other device. Unfortunately this, like other questions, has been camouflaged for political purposes, of which the election cry of 1918 is one of the most prominent. H.' A copy of Mr. Waterlow's note was at Mr. Harmsworth's suggestion sent to Lord Curzon at Spa. In it the last sentence of Lord Hardinge's minute was omitted.

### CHAPTER III

## Correspondence and Memoranda relating to German Problems other than Allied Military Control and Reparation

July 6–December 31, 1920

#### No. 175

*Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Spa) to Mr. Nicolson<sup>1</sup> (Received July 13)*

[C 1161/13/18]

SPA, July 9, 1920

Dear Nicolson,

I have discussed the case of Rücker and Gallus<sup>2</sup> with the Attorney General. He admits that there is no strong case against either of these officers, and has promised me to communicate himself direct with the Admiralty as soon as he returns to London (which will be in a few days' time) to express the opinion that both officers should be immediately released.

You might, in anticipation of this, prepare some official or unofficial communication from the F.O. (you may use Lord Curzon's name, he fully approves) to the Admiralty, so as to get them to order the release as quickly as possible.

E. CROWE

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> For the case of Commander Rücker see Volume IX, Nos. 646, 658, 664. Engineer Gallus (ibid., No. 646) had been detained by the British military authorities in Malta for alleged ill treatment of British prisoners of war in Kelebek camp near Adana in Turkey. The German Chargé d'Affaires had been pressing for his release as well as for that of Commander Rücker.

#### No. 176

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12)*

No. 2223 [C 1108/1108/18]

PARIS, July 10, 1920

My Lord,

Attention has been drawn in numerous despatches from this Embassy to the ardent wish of the French to occupy the Ruhr valley. The great mass of

public opinion in France sees in that occupation not only the surest guarantee for the exaction of the full reparation owed to this country by Germany but also the most effective means of restoring the economic situation of France.

The actual mention of the Ruhr valley in the declaration<sup>1</sup> presented by the Allies to and signed by the German delegates at Spa is therefore justifiably regarded here as a great personal triumph for Monsieur Millerand, and the French Press is even somewhat inclined to look upon its future occupation as a definitely settled decision. The terms of that declaration in so far as they refer to the penalties to be exacted in the case of the non-execution of the German undertakings have, in fact, given here the greatest—if a somewhat restrained—satisfaction. That expression has not been more openly given to this satisfaction in the Press is probably due to the fear lest the occupation be eventually not realised.

Monsieur Herbette in this connection has an interesting article in to-night's 'Temps' on the subject. After regretting that the Allies should have consented to a six months' delay in respect of disarmament and adding that Monsieur Millerand only gave way on this point on condition that the penalties for non-execution be definitely specified, he admits the value of the Ruhr clause provided (1) that the Allied Governments are agreed if necessary to enforce the penalty automatically without any further discussion, (2) that they have already determined on the territory, namely the 'inestimable' Ruhr, to be occupied, and (3) that the possibility when the time comes of one of the Allies being unable to provide the required contingent of troops do [*sic*] not delay or prevent such occupation; in a word, provided that the execution of the penalty be a purely mechanical act and be not hindered by any political considerations.

If these conditions be fulfilled, Monsieur Herbette considers that the French objective is indeed a step nearer attainment ('alors nous approchons effectivement du but'). If on the contrary the penalty is only to be enforced after fresh discussions either between the Allies or with Germany, then, he says, but one more stage has been accomplished along the tortuous path which has already been followed between the occupation of Frankfort and the declaration of San Remo,<sup>2</sup> and no one can tell what real progress has been made.

I have quoted Monsieur Herbette's observations at length as I believe that they correctly represent the views of the majority of Frenchmen in this matter. Their ultimate objective, in any negotiations with Germany for the execution of the Peace Treaty, is undoubtedly the Ruhr valley. The specific mention of its possible occupation in an allied communication to Germany is a great cause for jubilation in this country and a triumph for the diplomacy of Monsieur Millerand. It will undoubtedly have greatly strengthened the latter's position in the country and in Parliament. If therefore the satisfaction which is certainly aroused by his success be not more openly expressed

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the 'Protocol of Spa Conference respecting Armed Forces in Germany' (Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 190); see Volume VIII, Chap. VIII.

<sup>2</sup> Volume VIII, appendix 4 to No. 18.

it is due to the doubts which Monsieur Herbette has voiced as to possible future Allied disagreement in regard to the eventual enforcement of the clause in question.

I have, &c.,  
(For H.M. Ambassador)

NEVILLE M. HENDERSON<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

No. 177

*Lord Kilmaunock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Spa)*

*Unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [C 1363/45/18]*

*Very confidential*

BERLIN, July 14, 1920

I have just had long private conversation with Dr. Stresemann<sup>2</sup> and Captain Arnold Rechberg.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Stresemann gave no hint that People's Party were contemplating leaving the Government and his whole attitude did not appear to indicate that such a course was contemplated. His chief preoccupation seemed to be with danger of Bolshevik advance to German frontier. In connection therewith he said it was of small importance whether Allies allowed Germany one or two hundred thousand men. What mattered was whether we were prepared to displace<sup>4</sup> Germany in resistance to Bolsheviks for which at least 400,000 men were necessary . . . <sup>5</sup> were not ready to help, Bolsheviks would certainly advance to the Elbe, where they would consolidate themselves and eventually penetrate to the Rhine. He regarded coal and economic questions as negligible by comparison. Captain Rechberg returned to his old plan of an alliance between Germany and Allies for combating Bolshevism. Both he and . . . <sup>6</sup> Germany would be ready to consent to occupation by French of 'a couple of fortresses' as a guarantee that Germany would not turn against France. They were anxious for Anglo-German and possibly French co-operation in subsequent restoration or exploitation of Russia industrially. They (? appeared to) (? prescribe) combined action by Germany and Allies against Soviet Russia and I was given to understand that Ludendorff[f] would be ready to serve under Foch.

I asked if such action would not meet with (? opposition) among German workmen. Stresemann replied that state of siege would be declared and leaders of strikes shot. He stated that *mot d'ordre* had been given to communists

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed to Spa and repeated as No. 418 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 15 at 11 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Founder and leader of the German People's Party.

<sup>3</sup> A well-known German industrialist and writer on economic and diplomatic subjects (see Volume IX, Nos. 81, 98).

<sup>4</sup> It was suggested in the Foreign Office that this word should be 'support'.

<sup>5</sup> The text is here uncertain. The words 'If we' were suggested in the Foreign Office.

<sup>6</sup> The text is here uncertain.

to remain quiet until Soviet troops were at frontier. No disturbances were therefore to be anticipated for some weeks.

Ludendorf[f] was said to be in possession of information to the effect that after occupying Warsaw Bolsheviks intended to attack Hungary before turning their attention to Germany. Czecho-Slovakia was also believed to be ripe for a Bolshevik outbreak.

Altogether there was no sign of ill-temper exhibited yesterday by Rechberg at his interview with (? Major) Hedley<sup>7</sup> and I think that military section will wait to see how situation develops before adopting any decisive attitude. Their alternating moods suggest that they are (? at last) a little doubtful of the extent of their influence.

Stresemann stated that he had requested German Government to ask Allies definitely at Spa whether, if Germany disarmed, they were prepared to guarantee her against possibility of attack by Bolsheviks. He was much perturbed that Herr Simons did not appear to have done this.

<sup>7</sup> A member of the British Military Mission in Berlin.

### No. 178

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received July 21)*

*No. 388 [C 1885/1837/18]*

COBLENZ, July 19, 1920

My Lord,

The reports of the negotiations at Spa which appeared in the newspapers of the 15th instant announced that unless the demands of the Allies on the subject of the delivery of coal by Germany were accepted the Ruhr Basin would be occupied immediately by Allied troops. It may interest Your Lordship to know how this news was received in the Occupied Territory and in the Ruhr.

I am assured by the representatives of the High Commission in the *Kreise* of the British zone which border on the Ruhr district that the threat of occupation produced no excitement in their charges nor is there any evidence that the people of the other parts of the Occupied Territory were seriously perturbed by the prospect of this advance of the Allied forces. My information, obtained from various sources, indicates, however, that the miners in the Ruhr itself were greatly excited. They interpreted the threat to mean that they would be compelled by military force to work longer hours, that their trades unions would be suppressed, and that they would not be permitted to strike. Reference was made to recent French action at Ludwigs-hafen where certain prominent trades unionists were summarily convicted by the French military courts and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. These convictions had no connection with strikes or any labour matter but were for complicity in acts of espionage. Many workmen, however, are convinced that this is a mere cloak and that the real offence of those inculpated was that they were labour leaders. Holding this belief the miners are suspicious of the treatment they would receive from the French military

authorities, and it is said that many of them would leave the district if it were occupied.

On the other hand I have been assured that the miners had little political objection to the threatened occupation and that they would accept it quietly if they were satisfied that their liberties would not be curtailed, and that they would not be required to work extra shifts and that they would receive sufficient supplies of good food and an adequate wage. A further condition was that the coloured troops should not participate in the occupation.

There is, however, some evidence that the extremist section of the miners would oppose the occupation with its consequential control of the working of the mines and prevention of all revolutionary disorder, for they would regard these circumstances as a serious and direct obstruction to the furtherance of their Communist schemes.

In answer to my enquiries about the attitude of the mine officials—managers, engineers, and the like—I was told that it was doubtful what course they would take. Some of my informants believed that many of these officials would leave the district but others thought that if they were well-paid and well-treated they would remain. It is, however, believed that they would be used as agents for propaganda against the Allies and that there was certain to be friction between them and the allied military officers and civil functionaries.

I have given instructions for the prosecution of further enquiries and I will communicate to Your Lordship in due course such additional information as I may receive. I will only add that if there is any prospect of the Ruhr being occupied by Allied troops it is desirable to make it clearly known to the miners beforehand that the occupation will not involve any interference with their trades union organisations or any prolongation of their hours of work by means of extra shifts or otherwise, while it would on the other hand secure for the miners an adequate supply of good food.

I have, &c.,  
HAROLD STUART

No. 179

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received July 23, 12.15 p.m.)*

*No. 428 Telegraphic [C 2211/1897/18]*

BERLIN, July 22, 1920, 7.8 p.m.

General Malcolm has been informed by Gutchow<sup>1</sup> that latter has seen Kopp Bolshevik representative here<sup>2</sup> who stated Bolsheviks do not intend to invade Germany for three reasons.

<sup>1</sup> Minister of War, March–May, 1917, in the Russian provisional government; see also Volume IX, No. 51.

<sup>2</sup> M. Vigdor Kopp had, since February, 1920, been recognized by the German Government as a Soviet emissary concerned with the care of Russian prisoners of war in Germany. He had recently been authorized by the Soviet Russian People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to undertake economic negotiations with the German Government (see Volume IX, Nos. 51, 58 (enclosures), 86).

1. They consider armed attack would result in uniting Germany against them.

2. They think that if communism is to come in Germany it will do so from within.

3. They need German products and realise from their own experience that communism results in a decrease of production.

American Commissioner has had indications that Ludendorff is desirous of getting into touch with him and that he has ideas for an understanding between Germany, Russia, and America. Mr. Dresel believes Ludendorff to be at heart greatly afraid of Bolshevism.

I understand martial law has been proclaimed in East Prussia. German Government are stated to have information that Russian forces in neighbourhood of frontier consist only of ragged bands of irregular cavalry.

### No. 180

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received July 23, 10 a.m.)*

*No. 431 Telegraphic [C 2212/1897/18]*

BERLIN, July 22, 1920, 9.30 p.m.

German Government are evidently watching events in Poland very closely and it seems probable that they will endeavour to draw such advantages as they can from the situation. German declaration of neutrality<sup>1</sup> is probably card in this gamble and will enable Germany to put obstacles in the way of delivery of German war material to Poland if, as is believed to be the case, Allies intend to supply Poland with munitions of war surrendered under Treaty of Peace. Germany will moreover doubtless argue that such munitions of war are handed over to Allies for destruction and not for delivery to another Power. For any facilities of [?or] assistance which she may be asked to render whether directly or indirectly she will undoubtedly require compensating advantages.

I have ventured to draw Your Lordship's attention to above considerations as it seems to me that attitude of Germany may shortly be a matter of vital importance. I am inclined to think that she will prove obstructive in small matters in the hope that her assistance may become essential to us in the end and that she will then be able to extort her own terms. For this reason I submit whole question of Germany's relations to Bolshevik question calls for immediate careful consideration.

If Bolsheviks succeed in occupying Poland and establishing a Soviet Government then effect will be so great in Germany that a strong communist movement appears extremely probable. If this is successful it will mean that whole of Western and Central Germany and probably also Ruhr will become Bolshevik and supply material for an (? enormous) Red Army recruited on

<sup>1</sup> The German Government had, on July 21, issued a declaration of Germany's neutrality in the Russo-Polish war.



lines with which Bolsheviks have made us familiar. Bavaria might hold out for a few months but must eventually succumb. If on the other hand reaction is less violent than many people expect result may be long drawn out struggle between capital and labour which will finally develop into civil war and breaking away of Bavaria and perhaps of Rhineland. Ultimate effect will however probably be much the same in either case.

Only practical means of avoiding some such development appears to be for Allies to give a free hand as regards military matters to circles which are opposed to Bolshevik movement here.

Most potent objection to such a policy is fear that result would be strong Germany imbued with old spirit of militarism. It may be held that this danger is greater than any that would be involved by spreading of communism in Germany. But against this must be set fact that a communist Germany would not by any means mean a weak Germany. Events have shown that Bolshevism is as aggressive as imperialism and that there are essential facts which drive it into militarism. Perhaps most serious danger with which we are confronted is that of a close understanding or even alliance between Germany and Russia. Forces in Germany which are opposed to Bolshevism—and they are considerable—may shortly face us with question as to whether or not we will permit them to fight ‘common enemy’ untrammelled by shackles of Treaty of Peace. If we say no, Germany, whether reactionary or communist circles gain the upper hand, will endeavour to conclude an arrangement with Russia (who may by then be contiguous) and present us with solid blockade<sup>2</sup> opposition with which it may prove impossible for us to deal.

<sup>2</sup> This passage was amended in the Foreign Office to read ‘block of opposition’.

## No. 181

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Lord Hardinge (Received July 24, 3.30 p.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [209768/43654/38]*

BERLIN, July 23, 1920, 8.40 p.m.

Information . . .<sup>1</sup> indicates that there is great activity among Russians here, who seem to be preparing a fresh Baltic manoeuvre. Various groups which have been anxious to obtain assistance from French and British sources seem to have been pushed aside by group leaning on Germany, of which Biskupsky<sup>2</sup> is head. They are stated to dispose of considerable forces in East Prussia, Lithuania and Lettland—chiefly remains of Bermondt troops<sup>3</sup>—and to contemplate advance into Russia when Soviet offensive in Poland reaches its limit. They apparently hope, in conjunction with various organisations already existing in Russia, to raise the country behind the Soviet army, and

<sup>1</sup> A few words are here omitted.

<sup>2</sup> For the activities in Berlin in the autumn of 1919 of this Russian general see Volume III, No. 79, n. 3 and No. 82.

<sup>3</sup> See Volume III, Chap. I, *passim*.

they believe that, once national object of defeating Poland is attained, Brussiloff<sup>4</sup> will be ready to join them. French, who have been backing Savinkoff,<sup>5</sup> are being kept in the dark as to new development in direction of German assistance and may endeavour to stop movement altogether when they find out. I gather that if movement is successful, German great industries will be found to be behind it, and that they would welcome our co-operation in industrial exploitation of Russia, if we are prepared to participate before they become too strong.

I am not sending this officially . . .<sup>1</sup> but as it has been communicated to me I transmit it to you as it seems very important that you should know of it immediately at present juncture.

<sup>4</sup> The former Commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, whose offer of services to the Red Army had been accepted in May, 1920.

<sup>5</sup> M. Boris Savinkoff, a former member of the Kerensky government, was now organizing military formations from Russian refugees in Poland.

### No. 182

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Smallbones (Munich)*

*No. 40 [C 1079/2/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 23, 1920*

Sir,

I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 39 of July 2nd<sup>1</sup> in regard to separate diplomatic representation of foreign powers in Munich.

2. Should Mr. Timm or any other person again approach you in the manner reported in the concluding paragraph of your despatch, you should make it clear that questions of internal German politics are matters on which His Majesty's Government can express no opinion.

I am, &c.,

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> Volume IX, No. 555.

### No. 183

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received July 25, 4.30 p.m.)*

*No. 439 Telegraphic [C 2180/1897/18]*

*Very confidential*

BERLIN, *July 24, 1920*<sup>1</sup>

My telegrams Nos. 418<sup>2</sup> and 431.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Hamilton, who is Berlin correspondent of Daily News and Manchester Guardian, has brought me a document which has been handed to him by Captain Rechberg and which appears to emanate from Ludendorf[f]. It contained (? Rechberg's) proposals to following effect.

<sup>1</sup> The time of despatch of this telegram is not recorded.    <sup>2</sup> No. 177.    <sup>3</sup> No. 180.

1. In view of danger threatened by Bolshevism to existence of all peoples of Central and Western Europe, an offensive and defensive alliance to be concluded by Governments of England and France with Germany.

2. Treaty of Versailles to be suspended till end of this struggle. Afterwards new arrangement of Europe to be arrived at. Germany to be assured of its (? entire) frontiers with exception of Alsace-Lorraine and part of Schleswig which has fallen to Denmark. Germany to participate equally with France and England in reconstruction of Russia on lines proposed by Rechberg. Germany's obligations as to reconstruction of Northern France and Belgium to remain unaltered. 'Friendly' occupation of Rhineland to continue. France to have right of 'friendly' occupation of fortresses in interior of Germany.

3. German Government to provide army of 1,500,000 men to be placed under command of Generals Ludendorff[f] and Hoffmann. Munitions to be provided by Entente.

4. England to provide foodstuffs for duration of struggle with Bolshevism. Mr. Hamilton seems much impressed with these ideas, and whilst regarding some of them as unpracticable [*sic*] considers British Public opinion might, with help of section of press to which he belongs, be brought to accept them in their broad outline if case were taken to eliminate more reactionary tendencies [*sic*] which they display. His special preoccupation is danger of a Russo-German Alliance, which would upset whole balance of power in Europe and which, if we reject German advances, may well come into existence. He is writing to his editor and to Mr. Philip Kerr on above lines.

Whilst I realise proposals described above must appear somewhat chimerical at first sight I have been considerably impressed to learn that they have found so large a degree of acceptance from a person representing a body of opinion of so radical a character as does Hamilton.

I have therefore thought it advisable to transmit them to Your Lordship, as although they would lose much of their significance if an armistice is concluded between Poles and Bolsheviks they are interesting at all events as indicating lines on which influential sections of opinion in Germany are working. Ludendorff[f] is undoubtedly being pulled in two directions and he may have to choose between an Entente and a Russian Orientation.<sup>4</sup>

Repeated to Warsaw.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Hardinge minuted: 'It was not worth telegraphing.'

## No. 184

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received July 27, 10.25 a.m.)*

*No. 133 Telegraphic [C 2345/2345/18]*

*Urgent*

COLOGNE [? COBLENZ], July 26, 1920, 7.40 p.m.

French High Commissioner received report on Sunday<sup>1</sup> that Doctor Dorton [Dorten] of Rhineland movement fame<sup>2</sup> had been arrested at Wiesbaden on

<sup>1</sup> July 25, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume V, Nos. 176 and 270 and Volume IX, No. 42.

Saturday afternoon by party of police from Frankfort armed with revolvers who forced Dorton into motor car and carried him off to Leipzig.

According to Wiesbaden police, this arrest was made in execution of a warrant of June 1919. German Commissioner here who was summoned by High Commission said he must admit that arrest had been made in manner not normal. The High Commission, considering that this removal of Dorton had for its object the flouting of Allied authority and evasion of provisions of Article 31 Ordinance 2 now replaced by Ordinance 27<sup>3</sup> have informed German Commissioner that Dorton must at once be brought back to Wiesbaden and have suspended Regierungspresident and Chief of Police at Wiesbaden pending an enquiry into their complicity.

<sup>3</sup> The ordinances issued by the High Commission are printed in *The Official Gazette of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission* (1920).

### No. 185

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received August 3)*

*No. 49 [C 2894/2/18]*

MUNICH, July 26, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the F.O. telegram No. 12 of the 23rd instant<sup>1</sup> instructing me to call privately on the French Minister. I had already received instructions from Lord Kilmarnock on the 18th to call on M. Dard officially, but not in uniform, and these I had at once carried out. I mentioned to him that I had received instructions to call but did not use the expression 'officially'. I have since seen him daily and have done my best to establish close and cordial relations. M. Dard has been good enough to meet me more than half-way.

The French Government base their action in appointing a Minister at Munich<sup>2</sup> on the last sentence of the preamble of the Peace Treaty to the effect that 'official relations with Germany, and with any of the German States, will be resumed'. This interpretation appears to the Germans somewhat far-fetched. It has also been pointed out in the local press that the allied powers could have vetoed article 78 of the German constitution, if it was considered incompatible with the Peace Treaty, in the same manner as the clauses providing for the incorporation of Austria in Germany were vetoed.

From the manner of M. Dard's appointment I gather that the French Government wished to create an accomplished fact both against their allies and against the German government. I understand that he was sent post haste to Munich and that his government had not ascertained whether His Majesty's government or the Italian government would take similar action. His appointment was only announced verbally by the French representative at Berlin to the Bavarian Minister there. When he arrived here he asked for

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> M. Dard had presented his credentials on July 17.

an interview with the Prime Minister without stating the object of his call. When received he presented himself in mufti and produced his letters of appointment.

The result has been universal resentment. The fact of the appointment was resented by the Democrats and the Majority Socialists and the way it was carried out offended the susceptibilities of those parties who were otherwise prepared to welcome it. Even the Independent Socialist paper raised for once its voice in unison with its *bourgeois* brethren.

I do not wish to suggest that it was beyond French diplomatic tact to carry through the appointment with at least the tacit approval of the conservative and reactionary parties. But it appears to me that the French Government are pursuing two incompatible objects. M. Dard tells me on the one hand that it was thought that a French diplomatist would find the atmosphere more congenial at Munich than at Berlin and that it would therefore be easier to re-establish from here normal relations with at least a part of Germany. On the other hand he considered his appointment a matter of prestige. Partly in order to prove again that the German Constitution is governed by the Peace Treaty and partly as a tit-for-tat because the Treaty of Frankfort restricted the rights of French diplomatic representation in Germany. It would have tickled the vanity of the man in the street and reminded him of the good old days to see the French Minister calling in state on the Head of the Bavarian State. It filled him with impotent rage to see 'diplomatic cuffs', as one paper called it, being administered by the mailed fist of a gentleman in morning coat and top hat.

M. Dard has assured the Prime Minister, and has repeated that assurance to me, that his government will do nothing to encourage separatist tendencies. This is a wise decision as the Bavarians will certainly not move in a direction indicated by the French. He also tells me that he will make it quite clear to Dr. Heim<sup>3</sup> that Southern Germany will not be allowed by his Government to absorb Austria as a reward for separation. He fears that such separation would only be temporary and that the final result of such a 'deal' would be to strengthen Germany's military potentialities by an addition of some ten millions of population. His own solution of the 'German problem' seems to be that the French should permanently hold the left bank of the Rhine as a strategic precaution. He also thinks that the Ruhr district should be occupied by the French. He despairs of obtaining reparation from Germany by way of payments and would consider that district as a part payment. He also thinks that Germany deprived of sufficient coal within her boundaries will be unable to prepare for a possible war of revenge. He does not consider separation practical politics as he thinks that German national sentiment is too strong to allow of a permanent disruption of the Empire. It is perhaps not within my competence to express an opinion on a question of high policy. I therefore crave Your Lordship's indulgence if I state that I consider such a policy incompatible with a stable and peaceful Germany. The frontier of the Rhine would create an irredentist problem incomparable [*sic*] in magni-

<sup>3</sup> A leader of the Bavarian People's Party.

tude with the late problem of Alsace-Lorraine [*sic*] and would make political peace impossible. Permanent economic dependence on France, which the control of the Ruhr district connotes, especially if the Silesian coal fields go to Poland, would lead to desperation in Germany. I am persuaded that in that case even the parties of 'law and order' would welcome a Bolshevik upheaval and close co-operation with the Russian Soviet government.

A political debate has taken place in the Landtag in which M. Dard's appointment loomed somewhat largely. The Prime Minister in his program [*sic*] laid particular stress on his loyalty towards the Empire. I had occasion to see a draft of his program as drawn up before M. Dard's arrival and I noticed that those expressions of adherence [*sic*] to the idea of unity were added subsequently. The question of the disarmament of the *Einwohnerwehr* he dealt with in vague and conciliatory terms. This was a remarkably sudden change after his recent, almost defiant, statement reported on in my despatch No. 43.<sup>4</sup> Also Dr. Hilpert, the leader of the *Mittelpartei*, was curiously emphatic in his professions of loyalty towards the Republic and the Constitution, though he admitted and proudly professed his monarchical convictions. The leader of the Democrats referred to a statement which M. Millerand, according to the press, had made in the French Chamber to the effect that the French Government had not appointed a Minister in Munich in order to encourage separatist tendencies but that it wished to see Bavaria developing independently of Prussian hegemony. He 'invited M. Millerand and his minister to devote their attention to more important matters'.

Herr von Kahr was attacked for returning M. Dard's call though it was tacitly recognised on all sides that he could not refuse to receive him or to accept his letter of appointment.

The Majority Socialists at the end of the debate brought in a formal resolution regretting that the Prime Minister had not, within the limits prescribed by international courtesy, raised a formal and dignified protest when he received M. Dard. It also called upon the Bavarian Government to request the central government to approach the Supreme Council with a view to getting him recalled. The resolution was not voted on and will, of course, not be acted upon.

M. Dard has been granted full diplomatic privileges and there is no reason to fear that he will experience any serious inconvenience though his correspondence with the Bavarian government may be delayed by constant reference to Berlin. He informs me that Herr Simons has said to the French representative at Berlin that 'the Peace Treaty is yours and its interpretation is therefore also yours'.

I have ventured to report in detail on this question because it appears to me to be one of policy. Also should His Majesty appoint a Minister here it may be possible to profit by the experience gained.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

<sup>4</sup> Of July 10, not printed.

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 3)**No. 621 [C 2812/45/18]*

BERLIN, July 27, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 442 of to-day's date<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that at yesterday's meeting of the Reichstag the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a speech on Germany's foreign policy. The main features of Herr Simons' address were as follows:—

'...<sup>2</sup> In this connection the solution of the Eastern problem is one of extreme importance. It was the duty of Germany on the outbreak of war between Russia and Poland to declare her unconditional neutrality. There is no question of obstructionism and antagonism to Poland as has been suggested in the 'Times'.<sup>3</sup>

'With regard to two trains which had been stated to contain troops and munitions for Poland, one which was held up at Dresden was found to contain certain ex-legionaries. The other which was held up at Marburg contained munitions in virtue of the Treaty of October 22nd.<sup>4</sup> Notice has been given not to accept any more such trains, but this one reached German territory before notice was received.

'In the war between Russia and Poland we desire to remain neutral, but the Peace Treaty makes it difficult for us to do so. We are determined to forbid all transports across German territory destined for either of the combatant Powers. A decree in this sense was issued on July 25th by the Government. It is true that we are bound by the Treaty to deliver considerable quantities of arms and munitions to the Entente, but it would be contrary to the Treaty if this material was transported to Poland since it should properly be destroyed. It is a mistake to say that our declaration of neutrality constitutes a recognition of the Soviet Government, since that Government was recognised by Germany when the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk were entered upon, and since then no interruption in that recognition has taken place. The fact that we have renounced all our treaties with Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles does not alter the fact that we still recognise the Soviet Republic. Nor have we any reason to treat that Government as a pariah. We have suffered too much ourselves as pariahs. I do not share the general opinion on the events in the East. I do not believe that the Soviet Republic will attack Germany by way of massacre and incendiarism, for what she needs is economic support. She has through exaggerated application of the Council's [*sic*] idea destroyed a great part of the economic strength which is necessary to restore economic stability. I know Tchitcherin<sup>5</sup> personally and I

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> The passages omitted referred to other matters.<sup>3</sup> The reference is possibly to articles in *The Times* of July 23 and 24, 1920.<sup>4</sup> For 'Marburg' ? read 'Magdeburg'; cf. Volume VIII, No. 80, minute 9. The 'Treaty of October 22nd' is a reference to the Provisional Economic Agreement of October 22, 1919, between Poland and Germany: see Volume VI, No. 236.<sup>5</sup> Soviet Russian People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

am not one of those who see in Russia nothing but universal chaos. Reports which I have received tend to show that a tremendous effort of reconstruction has been carried out in Russia—an achievement which we should do well to take as an example. If you knew how the problem of the coordination of opposing interests and of the simplification and unification of power sources is being grappled with in Russia you could not fail to be inspired with respect for the constructive energy of the experts who have been entrusted with the task. Mr. Lloyd George has said that Germany is faced with a certain temptation to throw herself into the arms of Russia, in order to evade the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles. Such is not our intention, for then Germany would only become the battlefield on which the struggle between Eastern Bolshevism and Western Imperialism would be fought out. The consequences for Germany, would be similar to those which resulted from the 30 years' War. We wish Poland as little harm as we do Russia. We have no wish to cooperate in wiping Poland off the map. We are bound to live as neighbours of the Poles even if the Polish State is destined to lose its full independence. But I believe that Poland must look forward to a very troubled future if she aims at acting as a barrier between Russia and Germany. She should rather aim at acting as a bridge between these two countries. For this reason I deplore the policy of chicanery and petty injustice adopted towards us by the Polish Government. Under these circumstances our authorities cannot behave towards Poland as they would in normal times. The Polish Minister is fully in agreement with me on this point. The fears expressed by the French press as to our alleged intention of interfering in the present war are chimerical. I am curious to see whether the Entente will commit the same mistakes during the new peace negotiations as they did at Versailles and reckon without Germany. If they do the peace in the East will be a house of cards even more unstable than the Peace of Versailles. . . .<sup>2</sup>

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

### No. 187

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received August 2, 5 p.m.)*

*No. 136 Telegraphic [C 2754/2345/18]*

COBLENZ, July 31, 1920, 4.45 p.m.

At meeting of High Commission on July 30th deputy French High Commissioner in absence of Tirard put in a note in which he stated that he was instructed by his Government to demand immediate removal from office of *Regierungs* President and police Director of Wiesbaden for complicity in arrest of Doctor Dorten by Frankfurt police. In my telegram No. 133 of July 26th<sup>1</sup> I reported these officials had been provisionally suspended from office pending enquiry but French now admit there is no evidence which

<sup>1</sup> No. 184.



would justify legal proceedings. The French case for removal appears to be that officials either knew of intention to arrest Dorten or by their ignorance showed incompetency. Roussellier was supported by Belgian deputy High Commissioner in absence of Jacquemyns<sup>2</sup> but American representative and I could not accept above case as sufficient ground for removal for we think it very probable that Wiesbaden officials were for obvious reasons deliberately kept in ignorance by Frankfurt police. Nor can we agree that such ignorance is evidence of incompetency. We drew Roussellier's attention to Article 5 of Ordinance No. 29 and he is going to see whether he can obtain evidence to support charge of complicity or incompetency.

Roussellier further asked that surrender of Frankfurt police officers who arrested Dorten should be demanded under Article 3 of Ordinance No. 2. I opposed this as I do not consider Frankfurt police can be held to have contravened any ordinance of High Commission since in opinion of my legal adviser arrest with a view to judicial proceedings is not a punitive measure within the meaning of Article 3 of Ordinance No. 27.<sup>3</sup> Belgian and French take opposite views but American legal adviser and representative agree with us. Moreover Article 3 of Ordinance No. 2 which goes beyond Article 4 of (? agreement) is of doubtful validity and I consider it unwise to raise that issue on so weak a case as this.

In my opinion German Government have acted correctly in ordering Dorten to be returned to Wiesbaden but French are greatly excited and Tirard who is on short leave is being recalled to Coblenz. Matter will probably come up again on Monday<sup>4</sup> or Tuesday and it will strengthen my hand if I can say that His Majesty's Government approve my action. Politically any undue activity by Allies over this case is much to be deprecated for it will naturally be interpreted as interested support of Rhineland republican movement.

<sup>2</sup> Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns, Belgian High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. W. V. Cooper noted in the margin: 'He means Article i. § 3' [i.e. of Ordinance No. 27].

<sup>4</sup> August 2, 1920.

## No. 188

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 4, 6 p.m.)*

*No. 456 Telegraphic [C 3087/1897/18]*

BERLIN, August 3, 1920, 12.20 p.m.

Belgian and Polish Ministers at recent dinner with Minister for Foreign Affairs had frank conversation with His Excellency. Latter stated that Germany's declaration of neutrality was intended to provide her carrying out the terms of the treaty of peace but not going beyond them and indicated that she had no intention of allowing the passage of troops nor of agreeing to supply to Poland the arms surrendered under treaty of peace which must be destroyed.

On Polish Minister suggesting that as Poland was creation of the Treaty her defence might be regarded as coming within objects thereof and that Germany might well stretch a point in this direction, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Germany was not likely to go beyond her actual obligations as long as she was 'treated as pariah'. Belgian Minister gained clear impression that German Government intend obstruction of the Allies in every way they can in Polish question in hope we shall eventually be forced to ask their assistance when they hope to be able to impose their own terms.

Dr. Simons animadverted strongly on fact that Germany has no invitation to attend proposed Conference in London on Russian questions and he has to-day given Press interview on this subject, summary of which I am sending in a separate telegram.<sup>1</sup>

German journalist, who was present at the above-mentioned dinner, has suggested to me that it is very desirable that Germany should be invited to the Conference. If the Allies do not do this of their own accord he thinks it probable Soviet Government will make suggestion and thereby gain credit for it. I am personally strongly of the opinion Germany should be invited.

Italian Ambassador considers Germany will not in any case range herself on the side of the Allies against the Bolsheviks but that she will on the contrary endeavour to establish—or maintain—intimate relations with them as her position would be enormously strengthened by extended economic relations with Russia. He has received reports that peasants in South Russia have really sown much more grain than was believed and thinks in a year or two Russia will be able to resume her old rôle of supplying Europe with wheat. He points out that if Germany attains predominance of trade with Russia she will be able to snap her fingers at Allies whose only real arm against her is blockade. He does not therefore believe that Germany will ever really take sides against Russia and thinks that Belgian Minister is mistaken in interpreting conversation of Minister for Foreign Affairs as indicating that Germany is really playing to obtain concession in direction of revision of Treaty in return for adoption by her of a definite policy of co-operation with Western Powers.

Repeated to Warsaw.

<sup>1</sup> No. 189. For the proposals to hold a conference in London see Volume VIII, Chaps. IX and X.

## No. 189

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 4)*

*No. 462 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3089/1897/18]*

BERLIN, August 3, 1920

Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday stated he thought it would be very regrettable if Eastern questions were settled at London Conference without participation of Germany.

Germany had more experience than anybody else of these questions and it would be natural she should be consulted. But ought she to engage in an adventure in which her participation was not desired? Although she had not right to demand invitation she ought to place at disposition of European Governments her good offices for Eastern question. No invitation had yet been received. He had good reason to believe that desire was to discuss matters alone first. Germany had no Treaty with Russia nor with Border States. But she could conclude any Treaty she liked with Soviet Government. He would not however sign Treaty with Soviet Government unless he had assurance that latter were ready to execute their engagements to Entente.

Paragraph with regard to Mr. Churchill's speech.<sup>1</sup> Moment had not yet come to make an effort at any price to enter League of Nations. For moment Germany ought not to allow herself to be used as valet to help Military aims of other nations.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably this is a reference to Mr. Churchill's article in *The Evening News* of July 28; cf. Volume VIII, No. 85, n. 7.

## No. 190

*Earl Curzon to Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz)*

*No. 91 Telegraphic [C 2754/2345/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1920, 6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 136 (of July 31st.<sup>1</sup> Arrest of Doctor Dorten), received last night. Your action approved.

<sup>1</sup> No. 187.

## No. 191

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 7, 4.50 p.m.)*

*No. 465 Telegraphic [C 3277A/1897/18]*

*Very confidential*

BERLIN, August 6, 1920, 3.30 p.m.

After dinner tonight<sup>1</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs told me he had received very serious news from England to the effect that section of Cabinet which favoured war with Russia had gained upper hand. In one way he hoped effect would be good as it might give pause to Soviet Government in its attack on Poland, but situation as regards German neutrality would be very grave. He was absolutely determined upon this neutrality at all costs as any departure from this policy would mean civil war in Germany and he preferred possibility of a fresh war on the Continent to that of civil war.

He referred to French flag incident which he had mentioned in his speech

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was drafted on August 5.

in Reichstag, reported in my telegram No. 463<sup>2</sup> and said that he believed France was inclined to use this as a pretext for war. People would not be keen on war for the sake of Poland but flag might be used as a pretext for raising their enthusiasm. He had had a very stiff conversation with French Chargé d'Affaires on the matter yesterday. I said I thought he took too pessimistic a view to which he replied that Spa had given him cause for pessimism. He had learnt there that not only Marshal Foch but certain French industrials headed by Monsieur Tardieu desired war as they wished to complete destruction of Germany. He might be indiscreet in telling me this but I had asked him his grounds for his pessimism.

I enquired whether he still intended to leave for Switzerland tomorrow. He said it depended on whether an armistice was arrived at. Tomorrow would be, he thought, decisive day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to me to be unduly pessimistic but he may have been trying to impress me with gravity of situation. He has spoken and written so much in last few days that it is difficult to know how much weight to attribute to his many-sided utterances.

Incidentally he said he had reliable news that Bolshevik troops were very tired and in (? need) of rest. They were making great efforts to get to Mława with masses of cavalry and to attack Polish Corridor. Cavalry on wings were well disciplined but gave impression of being worn out. Infantry in centre were not worth much.

I have since heard that Minister for Foreign Affairs gave interview to correspondent of 'Daily Express' in much the same sense.

Repeated to Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> Of August 5, not printed. A German had removed the flag from the French Embassy at Berlin on July 14. In accordance with a demand made by the French Chargé d'Affaires it had been rehoisted and saluted by a company of Reichswehr. The company, however, had sung 'Deutschland über Alles' as they marched away and this had led the French to demand further apologies.

## No. 192

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 7, 9.5 p.m.)*

*No. 475 Telegraphic [C 3285/1897/18]*

*Secret*

BERLIN, August 7, 1920, 4.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 439.<sup>1</sup>

Captain Rechberg has handed to member of Military Mission a fresh proposal for an alliance between Germany and Allies against Bolsheviks. In view of success of latter considerably greater claims are put forward as compensation for German co-operation. Two chief points of difference from former proposal are (1) that Treaty of Versailles would be abolished instead of being merely suspended.

<sup>1</sup> No. 183.

(2) That Allies are asked to evacuate left bank of Rhine. In other respects proposals follow closely those handed to Mr. Hamilton.<sup>2</sup>

Captain Rechberg declares that Ludendorff would be able to raise necessary forces and alleges that President of the Republic is prepared to join struggle against Bolshevism and is confident that he could carry most of the Majority Socialists with him.

I would point out that these proposals have not been made direct to me but given privately to a member of Military Mission. Rechberg has however (? simultaneously) asked me to lunch on August 9th to meet Ebert's private secretary. He makes no mention of object of this meeting and I have accepted as it seems to me to be of greatest importance to learn whether President is really at the back of these proposals. I shall of course be careful not to commit His Majesty's Government in any way but I should be grateful if Your Lordship would give me instructions before date mentioned as to line I should follow if question is raised.

In view of frequent suggestions in German Press that Military Mission is 'negotiating' with Ludendorff I have advised Major Hedley not to meet General Hof[f]mann who has expressed desire to see him. I myself refused to meet General last week at a lunch to which I was invited.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See No. 183.

<sup>3</sup> In a minute Mr. Phipps wrote that Captain Rechberg's proposals were ludicrous. Lord Curzon commented: 'The proposals are far from ludicrous. But it is not for us to do anything at this stage. C.'

### No. 193

*Mr. Beaumont<sup>1</sup> (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received August 10, 2 p.m.)*

*No. 40 Telegraphic [C 3501/1897/18]*

MARIENWERDER, August 9, 1920, 8.30 p.m.

There are strong indications here that some kind of understanding exists between Germany and Bolshevik Government.

Declaration of neutrality is being used to the full extent in order to prevent military supplies from reaching Poland. Protest of German delegation against destruction of arms surrendered to troops of occupation (Paris telegram to me of August 8th)<sup>2</sup> is not justified either by alleged excitement here or by danger of Bolshevik aggression.

Grounds for German policy would be sufficiently explained by the desire regarding Corridor and upset of Treaty of Versailles.

<sup>1</sup> British Commissioner on the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Derby's telegram No. 939 of that date (not printed) to the Foreign Office (repeated to Marienwerder) referred to a German note to the President of the Peace Conference protesting that Italian troops at Marienwerder were destroying the arms surrendered by the Einwohnerwehr and the carbines of the Sicherheitspolizei. It declared that these weapons were indispensable for the maintenance of order and the defence of the frontier and that their destruction was causing the greatest unrest among the local population.

Line of Russian advance towards Mlava shows Warsaw may not be only objective of invasion. Such an object would no doubt be worth small risk of Bolshevik propaganda being successfully spread in Germany.

Repeated to Paris.

#### No. 194

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 10, 6.40 p.m.)*

*No. 476 Telegraphic [C 3504/1897/18]*

*Confidential*

BERLIN, August 10, 1920, 2.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 475.<sup>1</sup>

I met Herr Meissner, Ebert's Private Secretary, as arranged but he did not raise question of alliance against Bolsheviks and I gathered President knew nothing about scheme. Latter is apparently strongly opposed to Bolshevism and is carrying on a good deal of quiet propaganda against it.

Herr Meissner did not seem pessimistic and thought after Warsaw was taken there would be a breathing space. If however Bolsheviks attacked Germany latter would he said, be powerless to resist. He seemed to think Ludendorff's influence was not very strong.

There was some general talk about combatting Bolshevism and Meissner said it would be necessary to win over German working classes by propaganda. Then it might be possible to do something, but it would have to be under political leadership of men like Ebert or Noske with Generals such as Ludendorff and Hoffmann employed merely as technical experts. He seemed to think Ludendorff himself was regarded with too great suspicion by working classes for it to be possible for him to take the lead. Altogether he did not seem to think present moment favourable for action.

He stated that independent Socialists were now using all their influence to excite the masses against France.

He mentioned that Noske, who is now Oberpräsident at Hamburg,<sup>2</sup> was rapidly gaining confidence of working classes there.

<sup>1</sup> No. 192.

<sup>2</sup> A note on the jacket of the file corrected this to Hanover.

#### No. 195

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 2715 [C 3291/2345/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 11, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies of two telegrams, Nos. 137 and 139<sup>1</sup> of August 3rd and August 6th respectively, from His Majesty's Representative on the Rhineland High Commission.

<sup>1</sup> These telegrams are not printed.

2. In view of the fact that the German Government immediately released Doctor Dorten and have further through the German Commissioner expressed their regret at his apprehension and undertaken to call to account the persons responsible, I shall be glad if you will make strong representations to the French Government, urging upon them the extreme undesirability, at the present moment of general tension, of adding to the excited state of feeling in Germany by putting forward the demands referred to in Sir H. Stuart's telegram No. 137,<sup>2</sup> and request them to instruct Monsieur Tirard accordingly.

3. Copy of the telegram which has been addressed to Sir H. Stuart on this subject is enclosed herein.<sup>3</sup>

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>2</sup> These demands are also mentioned in No. 187 above.

<sup>3</sup> Of August 9, not printed. This telegram informed Sir H. Stuart that, in view of his telegram No. 139, no further action was necessary and that Lord Derby was being directed to urge the French Government to instruct M. Tirard not to press his previous demands.

## No. 196

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 2722 [C 3222/1897/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 11, 1920*

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith a copy of a note from the Polish Chargé d'Affaires,<sup>1</sup> together with the reply<sup>2</sup> sent to him, in regard to the consequences of the German declaration of neutrality.

2. As regards the first point raised by the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, the interpretation of Article 116 of the Treaty of Versailles, I am advised that this article contains no more than a renunciation by Germany of all the advantages which she obtained by the treaty of Brest Litovsk. The article in question contains no provision such as would prevent her from recognising the Soviet Government or from maintaining an attitude of neutrality in the event of war between Soviet Russia and another power.

3. As regards the interpretation of Article 375 of the Treaty of Versailles, I would draw Your Excellency's attention to the minute by Sir C. Hurst on the French Ambassador's note of August 4th,<sup>3</sup> copy of which, as Your Excel-

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure below.

<sup>2</sup> Of August 11, not printed. This merely said that the points raised were receiving earnest consideration.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This note enclosed a draft of a telegram which had, on the instructions of the Council of Ambassadors, been prepared for despatch to the French Ambassador in Berlin providing him with arguments to support the contention that the Allies had the right to send troops and munitions across Germany to Poland. In his minute Sir C. Hurst, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office and a member of the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference, wrote as follows:

lency will observe from the enclosures, has already been communicated to the French Chargé d'Affaires here.

4. As regards the interpretation of Article 169, Section III, I am advised that this is the first occasion upon which it has been alleged that war material was captured from the Polish Army, which Germany was bound to restore under paragraph 3 of Article 169. If the facts are as stated and the war material can be identified, I am advised that Poland is entitled to its restoration. It should in this connection be noted that Germany's obligation was to return it within two months of the entry into force of the Treaty. As, however, Germany is in arrears with regard to the performance of all the obligations imposed upon her by the military clauses of the treaty, this time limit will not prevent the return of the material, provided that Germany has been made aware that she was in possession of material which would have to be restored to Poland under the article in question. I do not, however, consider that it is necessary to raise this point at the moment.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

'The draft telegram to Berlin bases the right of the Allied Powers to send troops across Germany to Poland upon Article 375 of the Treaty of Versailles and upon the Spa Protocol of April 4, 1919 [*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxiii, pp. 469-70], which is kept in force by Article 212 of the Treaty. Examination of the terms of the Spa Protocol shows that it was concerned only with the transport of General Haller's army which consisted of Polish troops. It appears to have constituted a special application of Article 16 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918 [*ibid*, vol. cxi, pp. 613-24], under which the Allies had free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier either *via* Danzig or the Vistula. The transport of General Haller's army by these routes being impracticable, arrangements were made by the Spa Protocol to transport them by land. The terms of the protocol itself show that it was concerned only with a special transport of Polish troops which was expected to be completed in a period of about two months. In these circumstances it does not seem to justify a demand for the transport of Allied troops across Germany at the present time.

'CECIL J. B. HURST  
6th August, 1920.'

ENCLOSURE IN No. 196

*Note from the Polish Chargé d'Affaires to Earl Curzon (Received August 6)*

*No. 4114*

LONDON, August 6, 1920

My Lord,

I am instructed by my Government to inform Your Lordship that the German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw has communicated to the Polish Government the decision of the German Government to maintain a state of neutrality with regard to the advance of the Soviet armies into Poland, and that, as a result of this decision, the German Government must prevent the transport through Germany of war material despatched from France to Poland.



I have the honour to communicate to Your Lordship that the Polish Government consider it impossible to accept this decision of the German Government on the following grounds:

1. The fact of declaring neutrality by the German Government with regard to the Soviets would imply a recognition of the Soviet Government on the part of Germany. The recognition of the Soviets by Germany, which took place at the Conference in Brest Litovsk in 1918, was subsequently cancelled by Article 116 of the Peace Treaty, signed at Versailles on June 29 1919.

2. Should it be admitted that the German Government has the right of declaring their neutrality with regard to the Soviets, notwithstanding the above-stated provision of the Treaty of Versailles,—even such an interpretation would in no way grant to the German Government the right of refusing transit to transports of war material, should such transport be demanded by the Allied Powers on the basis of Article 375 of the Treaty of Versailles.

3. In accordance with Article 169 (III Section), Germany is bound to place at the disposal of the Allied Powers war material of foreign origin. This stipulation would appear to provide for the return by Germany of war material taken by the Germans from Allied Armies during the war. This latter case arises in connection with war material and military equipment taken by the Germans from the Polish Army Corps of General Dowbor Musnicki in 1918 in Poland.

I have the honour to ask Your Lordship on behalf of my Government to obtain that the Articles 116, 169, 375 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles be applied and enforced in connection with the decision of the German Government to refuse transit through Germany of transports of war-material destined for Poland, as well as in the case of demanding the return of war material taken by the Germans during the war from Polish military units.

I have, &c.,

JOHN CIECHANOWSKY,  
*Chargé d'Affaires*

#### No. 197

*Colonel Tallents<sup>1</sup> (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 13, 6.40 p.m.)*

*No. 294 Telegraphic [C 3794/1897/18]*

*RIGA, August 12, 1920<sup>2</sup>*

Joffe<sup>3</sup> left Riga August 11 for Moscow. He said in different conversations that he was in a hurry to take up a new post connected with peace negotiations but outside Russia. He remarked independently that a Russo-German

<sup>1</sup> British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces.

<sup>2</sup> The time of despatch of this telegram is not recorded.

<sup>3</sup> M. Adolph Abramovitch Joffe was the chief Soviet representative in the recent Russo-Lithuanian negotiations at Riga.

treaty was likely to be made soon. Having regard to Kapp's<sup>4</sup> presence in Moscow I infer that he may be destined for negotiations in Berlin.

Repeated to Copenhagen, Berlin, Helsingfors, Posen, Reval and Kovno.

<sup>4</sup> This is presumably in error for Kopp. See No. 179.

### No. 198

*Mr. Kidston (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received August 14, 11.50 a.m.)*

*No. 570 Telegraphic [211694/4/56]*

*Secret*

HELSINGFORS, August 13, 1920, 7 p.m.

At a party on board H.M.S. 'Caledon' this afternoon Minister for Foreign Affairs led me aside and told me that Germans had sent a Member of Reichstag of People's Party to Helsingfors to warn Finnish Government against danger of throwing in their lot with Entente since Germany had already made or was on the point of making an arrangement with Russia which would result in cancellation of Treaty of Versailles.

His Excellency had received this news just before coming off from Prime Minister. Just had interview with German envoy (? who) (? said he did not) know latter's name or any further details but would tell me more to-morrow.<sup>1</sup>

Repeated Riga, Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> In his telegram No. 571 of August 14 (not printed) Mr. Kidston stated that the German in question was Dr. Fritz Mittelmann of Stettin. In Berlin telegram No. 492 of August 19 (not printed) Lord Kilmarnock reported that Dr. Mittelmann had been disavowed by the German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

### No. 199

*Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received August 23)*

*No. 437 [C 4562/1196/18]*

*Confidential*

COBLENZ, August 21, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward to Your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan, Commissioner at Cologne, reporting a conversation with the Oberbürgermeister of Cologne<sup>1</sup> on the present political situation and especially the growth of Bolshevism in Germany. Such information as I have at my disposal leads me to concur in the views of the Oberbürgermeister that the 'National Bolshevik' movement has considerably progressed in Germany during the last few weeks, and that this movement is of an anti-French, if not, indeed, of an anti-Entente character.<sup>2</sup> This was confirmed to me yesterday by Herr Koch, Minister of

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Konrad Adenauer.

<sup>2</sup> In his despatch No. 737 (not printed) of August 20, however, Lord Kilmarnock, after summarizing an article on the growth and changes of National Bolshevism in *Die Freiheit* of the same date, wrote as follows: 'It is perhaps worthy of remark, that the National Bolshevik movement, in spite of its alleged gains in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, would appear to have suffered reverses among the working classes', and he instanced condemnations of it by Communist Workers' Party (K.A.P.D.) meetings. For a previous reference to 'National Bolshevism' see Volume IX, No. 443.

the Interior, and Herr von Raumer, Minister of the Treasury. It is partly due to the results of the Spa Conference and the shortage of coal in Germany, which will lead to a considerable increase in unemployment; partly to the burdens and discomforts of occupation, billeting, requisitioning, &c., and partly to general underfeeding. The success of the Bolshevist forces, and the general conviction that Poland will ultimately be over-run, has strengthened the Communist Party. The immense taxation which will be required to meet the Allied demands is, according to the German Ministers, giving rise to a feeling of indifference towards Bolshevism among large sections of the population, who feel that they have nothing further to lose, and would welcome an alliance with Russia which would relieve them from the burdens imposed upon them by the Treaty of Versailles.

I agree with the Oberbürgermeister of Cologne that it would be a mistake to under-estimate the effects of this feeling akin to despair, and I also agree with him that the better feeding of the working classes would tend to minimise the danger arising from it, though much, of course, depends upon the policy pursued by France and upon the military successes of the Bolsheviks.

It is, no doubt, part of the policy of the German Government to endeavour to frighten the Entente with the menace of Bolshevism in Germany, but I am convinced that this menace has latterly become more real. Anti-Entente and especially anti-French propaganda, carried on by organisations like the 'Heimatsdienst' and the 'Beamterbund,' is, moreover, taking effect in many directions and such propaganda finds fruitful soil in the Occupied Territories.

I have, &c.,

HAROLD STUART

ENCLOSURE IN No. 199

*Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan to Sir H. Stuart*

COLOGNE, August 20, 1920

*Secret*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that this morning I received a visit from the Oberbürgermeister of Cologne, who came to give me his views on the present political situation, mainly in regard to Bolshevism.

A week ago, I asked him what his views were as regards the growth of Bolshevism in Germany, and he then informed me that he considered there was grave danger of the power in Germany going further into the hands of the Left. In the conversation of to-day, he informed me that he was still further convinced that this was the case. The Bolshevism which he feared was not a Bolshevism which concerned itself mainly with upsetting the existing order of things in Germany, but rather a Bolshevism based on a national idea and directed against the Entente. From information at his disposal he was convinced that the National Bolshevist movement had made great progress in Germany during the last month, partly owing to the Russian successes

and the prospect of an alliance with Russia, and partly owing to the growth of anti-Allied feeling in Germany. He felt that it would be a grave mistake on the part of England to under-estimate this danger which he regarded as being very real.

He considered that the Communist movement was making great strides in this Area, more so than in any other part of Germany. This must be attributed very largely to extensive propaganda from extreme U.S.P.<sup>3</sup> and Communist sources.

The only remedy that he could see for this state of affairs was to fill the stomachs of the working classes. If they could be filled with food for two months, he thought that the danger would certainly be minimised, if not entirely removed. When I pointed out to him that Germany, as a whole, is being better fed now than any previous time during the past four years, he replied that this was certainly true to a limited extent, but that food conditions generally in Germany were still far from satisfactory, and he quoted the poor quality of the bread as a proof.

As a comment on the above, I would point out that the information I have received from the Oberbürgermeister in the past has been generally correct, though he has a tendency to look on the black side of things.

I have, &c.,

R. S. RYAN

<sup>3</sup> i.e. Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei (Independent Social-Democrat Party). This was generally known as the Independent Socialist Party or U.S.P.D.

## No. 200

*Mr. Robertson (Coblentz) to Earl Curzon (Received August 25)*

*No. 438 [C 4796/1113/18]*

*Confidential*

COBLENZ, August 21, 1920

My Lord,

As Your Lordship is no doubt aware, the relations between the French Civil and Military Authorities of Occupation and the local German officials in the Rhineland have for some time past given rise to considerable comment and not a little anxiety. It may, therefore, be of interest that I should forward to Your Lordship the enclosed copy of the instructions<sup>1</sup> which were issued, on July 11 last, to the French Commander-in-Chief, General Degoutte, by M. Tirard, the French High Commissioner, and which the latter has courteously communicated to me for my confidential information. These instructions, which appear to me to be of an enlightened and conciliatory character, were cordially endorsed by the French Commander-in-Chief and also by the French Prime Minister. M. Tirard points out in them that the Occupation of the Rhineland is not intended to make one part of Germany expiate the crimes and devastations committed by the whole country. The Occupation is merely a guarantee and a measure of security.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

I would draw your special attention to the paragraph which states: 'no attempt should be made to "franciser" the Left Bank of the Rhine. This population is German and France is not in the habit of annexing people against their wishes. No attempt, moreover, should be made to interfere with the internal politics of the people of the Rhineland'.

Though it is no doubt true that these instructions have not been fully carried out by some of the subordinate French officers and officials, they are evidence, I submit, of the spirit which animates the President of the High Commission. We have at present no evidence that a similar spirit obtains in German Government circles nor amongst the German local officials, rather the contrary. Both the Government and the local officials appear to be obsessed with the idea that the French intend either to retain the Rhineland or to set up an independent buffer state, and this idea affects their attitude towards the French Authorities of Occupation. The French, on their side, are profoundly suspicious of German propaganda and they complain of persistent obstruction and ill-will on the part of the German local officials. All my information goes to show that hatred and suspicion of the French, not only in this area but throughout Germany, has very greatly increased in the last few months amongst all classes of the population, due partly to the efforts of the 'Heimatdienst'. In view of this state of feeling, any occupation of the Ruhr would, in my opinion, be a more formidable undertaking now than it might have been a few months ago, and would probably have as its result a national rally on a large scale and a definite alliance with Russia.

I have, &c.,

ARNOLD ROBERTSON

## No. 201

*Note from the German Chargé d'Affaires to Earl Curzon (Received August 21)*

*B. No. 4203 [C 4483/13/18]*

*Translation*

LONDON, August 21, 1920

By a note dated August 12 last (No. C. 3151/13/18)<sup>1</sup> from Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the British Government declared its willingness to allow Lieut. Commander Rücker and Engineer Gallus to return to Germany, provided they and the German Government undertook that they would return to British custody, if required so to do.

The German Government has, of course, no objection to Messrs. Rücker and Gallus making the declaration required of them. As regards itself, however, that Government considers it absolutely impossible to undertake forcibly to return Messrs. Rücker and Gallus to confinement in England should they, contrary to all expectation, break the promise given by them. Its reasons are those contained in the Memorandum transmitted to the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The decision to release on conditions was taken after further representations had been made by the Foreign Office to the Admiralty and the Lord Chancellor.

representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on November 5, 1919,<sup>2</sup> and in the Note from the Chairman of the German Peace Delegation in Paris dated January 25 last (No. 88).<sup>3</sup> Co-operation of the German authorities would rather confine itself to obtaining, through the German representative in London, the solemn promise of these two officers to return to Germany immediately on being released from captivity, to place themselves at the disposal of the Court at Leipzig,<sup>4</sup> not to leave Germany before being released from their obligation, and to return to England immediately on being required to do so by the British Government.

The German Government is absolutely convinced that the giving of their word of honour will in itself be a reliable guarantee for the fact that, if required by the British Government, these officers will again place themselves at the disposal of the latter. It also believes that the judgments of the State Tribunal will, in the matter of persons brought before it to answer the charge of offending against the laws and customs of war, be so inspired by high principles, impartiality and justice, as to render it unnecessary for the British Government to make use of its reservation concerning the return of the two officers in question.

The German Government is, therefore, confident that the British Government will have no hesitation in contenting itself with a renewed solemn promise by both these officers (obtained through the German diplomatic representative), in lieu of the official German undertaking demanded in the communication referred to above.

<sup>2</sup> Volume VI, enclosure in No. 256.

<sup>3</sup> Printed in English translation in Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 20.

<sup>4</sup> In a previous note of August 3 the German Chargé d'Affaires had informed Sir E. Crowe that according to official information received from Germany measures had been taken to bring Commander Rücker to trial at Leipzig as soon as possible after his return.

## No. 202

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 27, 7.30 p.m.)*

*No. 517 Telegraphic [C 4963/1196/18]*

BERLIN, August 27, 1920, 2.15 p.m.

Press reports from Breslau state that demonstration by German nationalists resulted in attacks on Polish and French Consulates and hotels in which Allied officers are lodged.

At Fürstenwalde seaplanes, torpedoes and bombing apparatus which had been handed over to Interallied Commission in accordance with Peace Treaty have been destroyed by workmen on pretext that they were going to be sent to Poland.

At Stuttgart disorders have occurred in connection with collection of 10% tax on wages and Daimler and other works have been closed by order of Government and measures taken for their protection by police force.

*Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 28, 9.45 a.m.)*

*No. 520 Telegraphic [C 4987/45/18]*

BERLIN, August 27, 1920, 9.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 489.<sup>1</sup>

Tension which had been evident last week had somewhat subsided owing to miserable failure of communist Putsches at Velbert and Coeghen [Köthen] whilst Polish successes though not viewed with particular pleasure from a sentimental point of view by any section of German opinion had a distinctly damping effect in extreme circles. Excitement is however again increasing and evidence of inflammable state of public opinion is afforded by events at Breslau, Fürstenwalde, and Stuttgart (see my telegram No. 517).<sup>2</sup>

Attitude of Germans towards Allied officers on Control Commissions has undergone change for the worse and an incident of some gravity involving deliberate insult to officers of Royal Air Force has been notified to me by General Masterman.<sup>3</sup> Rumours of activity are current in military circles and it is (? even) stated that Germans are making preparation to resist by force any attempt by Allies to occupy Ruhr. Events in Upper Silesia are causing considerable excitement and this has been increased by communiqué issued at Lucerne<sup>4</sup> and apparent intention of Allies to take strong action at Danzig.<sup>5</sup> I feel it my duty to point out that such action will produce strong repercussion in Germany and that danger of internal situation will be materially increased. Strong sections of working classes are violently opposed to any assistance being given to Poland and seem prepared to go to any lengths to prevent it. If force is used at Danzig it will bring about community of interest between these elements and reactionary nationalists which may have serious consequences. Communist Party has issued manifesto calling for the establishment of workmens' councils and of a blockade of Poland.

Repeated Warsaw, Danzig and Coblenz.

<sup>1</sup> Of August 19, not printed. This telegram reported that there were signs that the internal calm which had recently prevailed in Germany was coming to an end.

<sup>2</sup> No. 202.

<sup>3</sup> Two British officers on their way from Jüterbog to Berlin on August 23 had been jeered at and insulted by a platoon of Reichswehr and their commanding officer.

<sup>4</sup> For this communiqué see *The Times* of August 24, 1920, p. 10, and for the Anglo-Italian Conversations at Lucerne see Volume VIII, Chap. XII.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 89.

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 31)**No. 780 [C 5219/45/18]*

BERLIN, August 27, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that the 'Dresdner Anzeiger' on the 22nd instant published a long extract from an article which had originally appeared in the Majority Socialist review 'Der Firn,' by Herr August Winnig, the former Majority Socialist Oberpräsident of the Province of East Prussia. In the course of this article Herr Winnig enters into interesting considerations regarding the growth of the national movement in this country. He estimates that nine-tenths of the rising generation employed in non-manual work are now supporters of the National Party: the remainder are supporters, not of the governmental democracy, but of the Independent Socialists and the Communists. 'The tendency towards the Right has, however', he goes on to say, 'affected even wider circles. Pronounced opponents of the political system of the Imperial era voted for the Right at the last elections. These persons are the same whose votes a year and a half ago created the democratic constitution of Weimar. The greater portion of the thinkers of all classes have shifted to the Right; it would be foolish to class them as reactionaries, or to pretend that the parties of the Right consist entirely of land-owners, industrial magnates and bloated profiteers.'

Herr Winnig's statements receive confirmation from a widely different quarter. The clerical 'Germania' on the 15th instant published a leading article complaining that 'a very considerable proportion of the so-called educated classes were turning their backs on the Centre Party' and joining the National Party, where they found equally strong support of the Christian idea combined with far greater prominence given to the national idea. 'This movement', the 'Germania' concluded, 'is especially strong among Catholic University students.'

There can be little doubt that the Universities are permeated with a strong national sentiment, generally accompanied by anti-semitism. Too much importance need not, perhaps, be attached to the readiness displayed by students to organise rowdy demonstrations in connection with incidents such as that of the French Embassy flag, or to the violence of the sentiments expressed at the great meetings of Students' Associations held this summer: but it is more significant that the proceedings connected with the Magdeburg false news bureau<sup>1</sup> revealed the fact that the Escherich organisation drew a large proportion of its members from the ranks of the students at Halle and other universities.

A further point which calls for remark in this connection is the 'national' tendency displayed recently by the Majority Socialist Party. The official attitude of the party and the comments of their press organ 'Vorwärts' re-

<sup>1</sup> See below, No. 277, n. 2.



specting the questions of the Sarre, the right bank of the Vistula and Upper Silesia, have been distinctly inspired by the 'national idea'. The Majority Socialist Party in Upper Silesia even went so far as to join the *bourgeois* block, including the German Nationals, in threatening a general strike as a protest against the recent Polish activities.

Since the above was written, I have received striking confirmation of the spread of nationalist feeling among the working classes from Herr Barth, one of the leaders of the Majority Socialist Party, who states that the movement is very pronounced. At a lecture which he recently gave on German neutrality to an audience which included many Communists and Independent Socialists, he asked the rhetorical question, 'Would one voice be raised for a war in aid of Poland?' The audience replied with a united shout: 'No: but against France.'

I have, &c.,  
KILMARNOCK

No. 205

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 31, 2.30 p.m.)*  
*No. 527 Telegraphic [C 5246/1897/18]*

BERLIN, August 31, 1920, 10 a.m.

My telegram No. 502.<sup>1</sup>

I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs who says that there is no Doctor Gross on the staff of German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only person of that name he knows belonged formerly to Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and came to Paris with a message from Doctor Bauer<sup>2</sup> for Count Rantzau<sup>3</sup> during peace negotiations.

Herr Simons assured me that there was not a word of truth in the story that Germany was thinking of entering into an entente with Russia and Hungary any more than with so-called 'Little Entente' (Austria [? Roumania], Czecho-Slovakia, and Serb-Croat-Slovene [*sic*]). He further volunteered emphatic denial of reports of secret treaty between Germany and Soviet Government, draft of which was alleged to have been taken to Moscow by Kopp. What had happened was that, as Kopp had not full power to carry on negotiations, Simons had given him letter to Tchitcherin who[m] he knew personally, stating that time might be approaching when economic relations might be

<sup>1</sup> Of August 22, not printed. This telegram had commented on a story reported by Mr. Athelstan Johnson in his telegram No. 475 of August 18 from Budapest to the effect that Dr. Gross, described as an Under Secretary in the German Foreign Office, had been in Budapest on behalf of his Government and had confirmed that there was an agreement between Russia and Germany, whereby Posen was to return to Germany after Poland had been defeated and whereby the two powers would together reshape Central Europe.

<sup>2</sup> Formerly Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, former Head of the German Peace Delegation.

officially resumed, but before this could take place satisfaction must be given for murder of Count Mirbach.<sup>4</sup> He had also made proposals for giving assistance in fighting epidemics.

Similar offer had been made to Poland. Proposal had also been made to both Powers for settling questions of frontier locally without necessity of referring in every case to Berlin, Moscow and Warsaw.

Repeated to Budapest.

<sup>4</sup> German Ambassador to Soviet Russia, assassinated in Moscow on July 6, 1918.

No. 206

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 825 [C 5278/5278/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 1, 1920*

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of the text of a resolution<sup>1</sup> in regard to the execution of the Spa agreements adopted by His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government in the course of the recent meeting at Lucerne between Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Giolitti.<sup>2</sup>

2. I request that Your Lordship will consult the Italian Ambassador as to what action he is taking in accordance with this resolution, and that you will ask His Majesty's Ambassador immediately he returns to Berlin to lose no time in making a similar communication to the German Government.

3. In the meantime I would suggest that Your Lordship should consult the British representatives on the Military Commission of Control and on the permanent delegation of the Reparation Commission, which is understood to have been set up in Berlin in accordance with the Annex to the Spa coal protocol,<sup>3</sup> as to the exact progress which has been made by the German Government in fulfilment of their obligations contracted at Spa.

4. Pending the return of His Majesty's Ambassador, I see no objection to Your Lordship letting the German Government know that you have received these instructions.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 88, minute 1.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister of Italy since June, 1920.

<sup>3</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 194.

No. 207

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 836 [C 5004/1897/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 6, 1920*

My Lord,

I have read your telegram No. 522 of August 28th<sup>1</sup> and previous telegrams and despatches from Your Lordship on the subject of German policy towards Soviet Russia.<sup>2</sup>

2. A study of these papers shows that the German Government, the reactionary and militarist elements in Germany and the leaders of the Majority-Socialist party all at one time feared the effect upon internal order in Germany of the Bolshevik advance and of the possibility of the establishment of a Soviet régime in Poland. Your Lordship's telegrams Nos. 439 of July 24th<sup>3</sup> and 475 of August 7th<sup>4</sup> even show that certain members of the reactionary party were at one time considering the possibility of military action against the Bolsheviks with allied help.

3. It is no less evident from these papers that, whatever might have been the policy of the German reactionary party, military action against Soviet Russia would not have been supported by the German working classes or by the Majority Socialist party. Even however had public opinion in Germany been more favourably inclined towards action of this nature, Your Lordship no doubt realises from study of the current telegram sections and print<sup>5</sup> and from the British Press that no section of opinion in this country would at the present moment give any support whatever to schemes such as these outlined to you by Captain Rechberg.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This reported the views of Herr Barth, one of the leaders of the German Majority Socialist Party.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Nos. 177, 180, 181, 183, 186, and 192.

<sup>3</sup> No. 183.

<sup>4</sup> No. 192.

<sup>5</sup> Selections of recent telegrams and dispatches circulated confidentially to H.M. Representatives abroad.

No. 208

*Mr. Ramsay (Stockholm)<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon (Received September 8, 11 a.m.)*

*No. 250 Telegraphic [C 5807/2414/18]*

*Confidential*

STOCKHOLM, *September 7, 1920, 8.50 p.m.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day gave me to understand that Germany is prepared to join League of Nations if assured of a welcome from a majority but she could not take risk of rejection by applying herself. His Excellency stated that Germany was moreover prepared to join without Russia which was most important.

<sup>1</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Legation at Stockholm.

He asked me to act on this hint and I should be glad to be instructed what reply to make when he again raises the question.

**No. 209**

*Note from Earl Curzon to the German Chargé d'Affaires*  
[C 5897/13/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 9, 1920*

Sir,

With reference to your memorandum No. B 4203 of August 21st<sup>1</sup> in regard to the case of Lieutenant Commander Rücker and Engineer Gallus, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government are prepared to release these officers immediately upon receipt of an undertaking given by each of them through you to the effect that they will (a) return to Germany immediately upon being released from captivity and place themselves at the disposal of the Leipzig Court, (b) return to this country immediately upon being required to do so by His Majesty's Government, and not leave Germany until they are released from this obligation.<sup>2</sup>

2. I would take this opportunity to impress upon you that His Majesty's Government, in making this concession, have been largely influenced by the observations contained in the third paragraph of your note under reply, in which you express the belief of the German Government that the judgments of the Leipzig court will be so inspired by high principles, impartiality and justice as to render it unnecessary for His Majesty's Government to demand the return of these two officers.

I have, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> No. 201.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter of September 24 Lord Curzon was able to inform the Cardinal Secretary of State, who had made representations on their behalf, that orders had already been given for the release of the two men.

**No. 210**

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon*  
(Received September 11, 12.15 p.m.)  
No. 541 Telegraphic [C 6139/5278/18]

BERLIN, *September 10, 1920, 2.10 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 825<sup>1</sup> received September 9th.

I have consulted Italian Ambassador who has received no instructions in the matter. He is telegraphing to Rome.

I presume that until he receives answer I should not take action on paragraph 4 of Your Lordship's despatch under reference.

Meanwhile I would respectfully enquire whether French Government are

<sup>1</sup> No. 206.

aware of action to be taken and whether I am authorised to inform French Ambassador. (? If not) I fear His Excellency will resent being left in the dark. I am not clear whether resolution is to be communicated textually to German Government or only general sense. Second half of first sentence paragraph 2 in particular emphasizes very strongly divergence of view between British and French Governments on the one hand and French (*sic*)<sup>2</sup> Government on the other hand. Whilst I realise fully that it is highly desirable to do anything to relieve apprehensions of German Government as to probability of further occupation of German territory I feel bound to point out serious effect which may be produced by giving impression of want of solidarity amongst Allies. Mere fact that communication of this nature is made by only two of the Governments concerned will inevitably be interpreted in this sense but (? sentence) to which I have ventured to call attention would render such effect much more palpable.

<sup>2</sup> In the Foreign Office the first 'French' was corrected to read 'Italian' and the word '*sic*' was struck out.

## No. 211

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Ramsay (Stockholm)*

*No. 124 Telegraphic [C 5807/2414/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 14, 1920, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 250<sup>1</sup> (of September 7th).

If and when Minister for Foreign Affairs again raises the question of the admission of Germany to the League, please say that until Germany has given 'effective guarantees of her sincere intention' to observe her Treaty obligations, it is evident that the Assembly are unlikely to agree to her admission. The fulfilment of German obligations under the Spa disarmament and coal agreements would, however, undoubtedly do much to convince the Assembly of Germany's good faith.

<sup>1</sup> No. 208.

## No. 212

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 310 Telegraphic [C 6139/5278/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 18, 1920, 8 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 541 (of September 10th).<sup>1</sup>

Please convey a friendly warning to the German Government, giving the substance of the Lucerne resolution,<sup>2</sup> but avoiding any reference to the declared intention of the British and Italian Governments not to consent to the occupation unless it is necessary to enforce the Treaty.

The communication being thus circumscribed, we consider it unnecessary that you should inform your French colleague.

<sup>1</sup> No. 210.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 88.

No. 213

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received September 21, 10. 20 a.m.)*

*No. 551 Telegraphic [C 6860/5278/18]*

BERLIN, September 20, 1920, 8.50 p.m.

Your telegram No. 310.<sup>1</sup>

I gave friendly warning to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in the sense of your instructions. His Excellency assured me that German Government were doing their best to carry out Spa agreements. Coal deliveries could be met though he added with some bitterness at price of starving their own people. With regard to disarmament he foresaw great difficulties both from Nationalists and Communists and he feared that attempt to secure surrender of arms by population would lead to serious disturbances and bloodshed. Force left to Government was not sufficient to carry out business properly but the (? new) disarmament Commissioner was acting with energy and already some six hundred thousand rifles and a large number of machine guns had been collected. This official had recently been in Bavaria and was now in Ruhr Valley district so that his activity was being impartially applied both to Conservative and Communist regions.

His Excellency displayed considerable apprehensions as to intentions of French Government who he said were bent on finding a pretext for further occupation of German territory. He knew that orders had been given to French officers to make preparations for such action and that officers of other Allied Powers in occupied territory had received similar instructions. I impressed on him that best way to avoid this contingency was for German Government to give proof of their goodwill in carrying out Spa agreements and assured him that warning I have conveyed was meant in a friendly spirit.

Italian Ambassador has not yet received similar instructions.

<sup>1</sup> No. 212.

No. 214

*Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon (Received September 24)*

*No. 671 [C 7162/8/18]*

BRUSSELS, September 21, 1920

My Lord,

I had the honour to inform Your Lordship in my telegram No. 108 of to-day's date<sup>2</sup> reporting a conversation with the President of the Council on the subject of his action with regard to the Geneva Conference,<sup>3</sup> that I would report in a despatch the reasons for which he was opposed to the occupation of the Ruhr Basin.

<sup>1</sup> Sir G. Grahame had been promoted to be H.M. Ambassador at Brussels on August 24, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> No. 383.

<sup>3</sup> For this Conference see Chap. V, *passim*.

The following is the gist of His Excellency's observations which were delivered with the greatest emphasis and even vehemence:—

'I believe that if a conflict breaks out between England and France, it will result in France proceeding to occupy the Ruhr Basin. I consider that this would be a cataclysmic event. It would need at least one hundred thousand men and think of what that would cost! The Ruhr Basin is a very difficult region to occupy; there would be troubles of every kind amongst the miners. We should have to ensure supplies of food for them—that would be another class of expenditure. They would certainly stop working, for a time at any rate, and I confess I do not see how the Allies could force them to work properly. The immediate result would be stoppage or great curtailment of the coal supply. The small amount that would be forthcoming would be needed for the region itself in the first instance. Such coal as was obtainable after that would certainly be taken by the Allies, with the result that there would be no coal for the other parts of Germany. The industrial population there would be thrown on the streets owing to the closing of manufactories. That would produce a nice mess in the internal affairs of Germany! There would probably be a revolution and disorder everywhere. I feel so strongly on the subject that I should make it a Cabinet question if I were pressed to proceed to the occupation of the Ruhr Basin. I would rather resign than do so. And I should be pressed and that is why I am so anxious to avoid a conflict between France and England, and the possibility of France going into the Ruhr Basin without England. I consider the occupation of the Ruhr Basin would be a general catastrophe.'

I observed that I had noticed in the *Procès-Verbaux* of the Spa Conference<sup>4</sup> that General Maglinse, Chief of the Staff of the Belgian army, had not appeared at all enthusiastic when Marshal Foch was developing his scheme for the occupation of the Ruhr Basin. Monsieur Delacroix replied that this was the case and that General Maglinse was perfectly aware of the risks inherent in such an operation.

Monsieur Delacroix did not mention the designs which are attributed to France by many competent observers, namely that many Frenchmen who advocate the entry of French troops into the Ruhr Basin have in their mind's eye the taking possession of Essen and desire thereafter to establish their domination over Germany for an indefinite time while working for such political objects as the disjunction of the Rhine provinces from Prussia and the dismemberment of the German Reich by separatist movements in South Germany.

No doubt Monsieur Delacroix is aware that these designs exist in France, but I did not feel that I as yet knew him well enough to sound him as to his opinion on these matters, nor to inquire his view as to the strength of this current of opinion in France and as to the likelihood of those who direct it obtaining the upper hand in this or some other French Ministry.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 71.

When Monsieur Delacroix was speaking to me on the subject of the occupation of the Ruhr Basin in this manner, he had doubtless in mind isolated action on the part of France, and not a joint allied occupation which might conceivably be rendered inevitable by some grave misdemeanour on the part of Germany.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE GRAHAME

**No. 215**

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard<sup>1</sup> (Rome)*

*No. 447 Telegraphic [C 6860/5278/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 24, 1920, 7.30 p.m.*

Berlin telegram No. 551 (of September 20th:<sup>2</sup> Communication of Lucerne resolution to German Government).

Please remind Italian Government of the terms of the resolution reached at Lucerne by the Prime Minister and Signor Giolitti under which the British and Italian Governments agreed to urge German Government through their Ambassadors at Berlin to carry out the Spa agreements as completely as possible.

Please urge that the Italian Ambassador at Berlin be instructed accordingly.

Repeated to Berlin No. 316.

<sup>1</sup> Counsellor in H.M. Embassy at Rome and acting Chargé d'Affaires.

<sup>2</sup> No. 213.

**No. 216**

*Lord Kilmaarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received September 25, 9 p.m.)*

*No. 555 Telegraphic [C 7231/5278/18]*

BERLIN, *September 25, 1920, 2 p.m.*

My telegram No. 551.<sup>1</sup>

Italian Ambassador received his instructions yesterday but nothing was said about omitting any part of the substance of Lucerne resolution. Communication however was not to be a formal one and he wrapped it up in conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He found latter very apprehensive and quite convinced, from line recently taken by General Nollet in disarmament question, especially in regard to East Prussia, that French are determined to find pretext for occupation of Ruhr. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that such action would meet with armed resistance

<sup>1</sup> No. 213.



from workers, who would moreover refuse to work extra shifts which are being worked at present. Italian Ambassador shares this opinion as to probable effect of occupation. French authorities on the other hand believe operation could be carried out without creating serious trouble.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Waterlow and Sir E. Crowe minuted as follows:

'We shall have Belgian support in opposing an occupation of the Ruhr. S. P. WATERLOW, Sept. 27.'

'But we are practically bound to agree to it if the Germans do not fulfil the terms of the Spa agreement. E. A. C. Sept. 27.'

After these minutes had been initialled by Lord Hardinge, Lord Curzon added: 'No. It was one of possible alternatives. Other areas were left open. C. 27/9.'

## No. 217

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 317 Telegraphic [C 7050/58/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 25, 1920, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 543 (of September 10th).<sup>1</sup> Property of German nationals established in the United Kingdom since resumption of commercial intercourse).

Credits and other property of German nationals established in United Kingdom since date of resumption of commercial intercourse will not be regarded as liable to seizure or retention under sections 3 and 4 of part 10 of the treaty.

This does not apply to debts arising out of pre-war transactions and becoming payable to German nationals before coming into force of treaty.

You are authorised to make public announcement to this effect.<sup>2</sup> Please report effect which it has in Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The announcement was published by the Wolff Bureau on October 6. Cf. No. 385 below.

## No. 218

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 910 [C 6861/1897/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 27, 1920*

My Lord,

I have to inform you that Sir Eyre Crowe, in speaking to the Counsellor of the German Embassy on September 24th with regard to the reports contained in Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams Nos. 829<sup>1</sup> and 848<sup>2</sup> of September 10th and September 20th relative to the situation in East Prussia, drew attention to the gravity of the position created by the negligence or connivance of the German authorities in that area.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Sir H. Rumbold was H.M. Minister at Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> No. 291.

2. Mr. Dufour assured Sir Eyre Crowe that he was convinced that the German Government were most anxious to prevent any laxity upon the part of the authorities and people of East Prussia regarding the passage of either Russians or Germans across the Lithuanian or Polish frontier. He pleaded also that the government at Berlin were unfortunately not in as strong a position, as they should be, to enforce their will, owing to the fact that the Allies had refused permission for the increase of the German armed forces beyond the numbers stipulated in the treaty. Sir Eyre Crowe declined, however, to enter into any discussion on this point, merely observing that if the German government were really determined to prevent these dangerous proceedings—which savoured very much of the former enterprise of General von der Goltz and his Baltic legionaries<sup>3</sup>—they would undoubtedly find means to do so.

3. Mr. Dupour [*sic*] said he would at once telegraph to Berlin to emphasize the great importance which His Majesty's Government attached to this matter.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>3</sup> See Volume III, Chap. I.

#### No. 219

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)*

*No. 68 [C 8372/741/18]*

MUNICH, *September 28, 1920*

My Lord,

An event of outstanding importance in Bavarian politics has been the recent meeting of the Bayerische Volkspartei at Bamberg. The party has undergone a certain amount of *malaise*, perhaps as a consequence of too great a success at the elections for the Landtag. Dr. Heim has been engaged in a personal quarrel with Professor Schlittenbauer until now his right-hand man in the co-operative peasant society on which his material hold over his followers is based and his trusted lieutenant in matters politic, which has led to an open breach, as far as the co-operative society is concerned. More important, a small section of the party has seceded and formed a Christian Socialist party. It is led by men of little political consequence, three of whom are secretaries of Christian Trade Unions, Herr[en] H. Bittschiller, F. Fackler and W. Bosbach. A better-known name is that of Herr Kral who belongs to the extreme Catholic wing in the Centre Party and some years ago founded a catholic news agency known as 'Juta' which however failed commercially. In November 1918 he attempted, without success, to found a 'catholic people's party' ('Katholische Volkspartei'). I do not think that much importance need be attached to this secession. The new party is said to embrace

only some 2,000 members whereas the parent party boast of over 1,700,000 members. It is however symptomatic in this sense that it shows that the christian trade unionists are uneasy under the present agrarian leadership and at the same time have no love for the Centre Party of Herr Erzberger's conception, to which party malcontents in the Bayerische Volkspartei might be expected to revert.

In this connection it may be of interest to mention the formation of the 'German national socialistic workmen's party' ('Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei'). It is making itself rather conspicuous at Munich by frequent meetings and lectures and still more by the posters announcing these. They are extremely violent in tenour [*sic*] and usually anti-semitic; on one occasion the French Minister here was chosen as a subject of attack. Herr[en] Anton Drexler and Adolf Hitler figure as the organizers of these activities. They appear little known but they must have funds at their disposal as one display of posters on a low computation costs M. 10,000. This party appears to be the socialistic tail of the 'Mittelpartei' and it is not inconceivable that it is secretly financed by Herr Stinnes and his friends. Its socialism is no doubt of the negative, anti-capitalistic kind which does not frighten the present-day German millionaire.

Both these parties have this in common that their socialism is subordinated to another idea, that of catholicism in the one case and that of nationalism in the other. This bewildering mass of parties which seems to be tending towards *quot homines, tot sententiæ* may be partly due to the absence of responsible political life in the past history of Germany. It certainly testifies to the incapacity of the Germans for compromise which to my mind is due to their complete lack of a sense of humour, a conception for which no equivalent exists in the German language. It is also possible that the German character has remained substantially the same since the days of Tacitus and that particularism and federalism now take the place of inter-tribal warfare and that the political entity now affects the wilderness which the primitive household wished to place between itself and its nearest neighbours.

At Bamberg Dr. Heim was able to assert his complete ascendancy over his party. In part this may have been due, as one of his followers told me, to the fact that for once he was able to control his habitually vile temper and to harangue without using his whips and scorpions. It was probably still more due to the fact that the soil is now receptive in Bavaria for the federalistic teaching which he started in the constituent assembly at Weimar.

The following program was unanimously agreed to, only about 3% of the delegates abstaining from voting; their number would have been greater but Dr. Heim cleverly insisted that the names of the abstainers should be recorded.

"The "Bayerische Volkspartei'", while adhering loyally to the German Empire, looks upon a federalistic development of its constitution as the sole guarantee for its re-construction and prosperity. The party therefore demands:

'1. A federalistic form of government for the Empire and the reintro-

duction of the Federal Council (Bundesrat) with rights equal to those of the Reichstag.

'2. The right of the individual States to determine themselves their form of government and their constitution.

'3. No further diminution of the independence of the States through new laws and regulations.

'4. That the governmental offices already established by the Empire in the States be made to fit in as far as possible with the governmental system in those States.

'5. The execution of imperial laws through the States.

'6. The right of the States to conclude treaties with foreign powers in matters within their competence.

'7. That the power of levying taxes be guaranteed to the States through the right to levy their own taxes besides the right to additions to the imperial taxes. That all taxes and imposts, including customs dues and taxes on consumption, be levied and administered by the States. The extention [*sic*] of the right to levy taxes on the part of the communes for the purpose of meeting their own requirements.

'8. Decisive influence on the part of the States in the affairs of the post office, the railways and the public waterways within their territories.

'9. That water power be developed by and left in the hands of the States.

'10. That the military forces on land be organised in federalistic contingents. The independent right of the States to declare a state of siege in their territories for the purpose of public security and order and to dispose over their contingents for this purpose.

'11. The right to order independently the whole of the educational system of the State with due regard to guarantees which are to be given in the whole of Germany that education shall be in accordance with the wishes of those entitled to it. Also the right to control scientific literature.

'12. The safeguarding of the Bavarian State Property against further encroachments on the part of the Empire.'

It is obvious that Germany, if this program were carried out in its entirety, would not revert to a political state of Bismarckian conception but to one more closely resembling that in existence before the Franco-German war. Such is no doubt the intention of the party, at least to the extent that they wish to do away with Prussian hegemony. The program was endorsed by Herr von Kahr in a speech in which he laid it down that the 'Empire can only be federalistic or it does not exist at all'. He also spoke of the necessity of a Bavarian foreign policy not only in the interests of Bavaria but in those of Germany. He again emphasised his and his party's loyalty towards the Empire. These protestations may appear vain in face of the demands put forward. To my mind however they are sincerely meant. Herr von Kahr and his friends do not wish to separate from the Empire and to form an independent Bavaria. They merely conceive that they have found the road to salvation and that in striking out on it they are leading the rest of Germany not departing from it.

It is of interest to note that the demand for the re-establishment of the monarchy has not been openly put forward. It is contained in the second paragraph of the program. The 'form of government' of course meaning republican or monarchical. It is felt that it would at present be difficult to create a federation consisting partly of republics and partly of principalities, even if the position of the Free Cities in the late Empire can be quoted as a precedent. There is however no doubt that the demand will be put forward when the time appears to have come.

Rumours have been current in Berlin that the monarchy would be proclaimed on the 25th instant the day of the Einwohnerwehr festival. They appeared to me improbable and I also received a formal assurance from Herr von Kahr that they were without foundation. The Bayerische Volkspartei is imbued with the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. It is not one of the failings of that body to risk the attainment of an object through hasty impatience; and the time has not yet come.

Herr von Kahr will probably have little difficulty in defending this program in the Landtag. The party press has already tried to weaken its effect by claiming that it is merely a statement of political principles and not a plan of action for immediate execution. He will no doubt take up the same attitude. Moreover the federalistic aims are not likely to give offence to members of the coalition government except to the Democrats and even their defection would not seriously embarrass it.

It is also interesting to note that Dr. Heim has now definitely laid down his views as regards the adhesion of German Austria to Germany in a letter written to Dr. Rosegger, the son of the poet. He stated that he wished Austria to join Germany as an independent federal state. (The view that he desired it to unite with Bavaria and thus become a part of Germany was therefore either erroneously attributed to him or he has changed it.) That Austria should itself be built up as a federal state and then join Germany as a separate entity guarding her complete internal independence with a few exceptions such as jurisprudence, communications etc.

The program of the Bayerische Volkspartei is therefore now fairly clearly defined.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

**No. 220**

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmaconnock (Berlin)*

*No. 914 [C 7252/2/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 29, 1920*

My Lord,

The Counsellor of the German Embassy enquired of Sir E. Crowe on September 18th whether it was true that His Majesty's Government had recently agreed with the Italian Government to appoint ambassadors to Munich and Hamburg.

2. Sir E. Crowe replied that His Majesty's Government had, so far as he knew, arrived at no such agreement with the Italian Government. There had been a question of appointing ministers (not ambassadors) to Munich and Dresden (not Hamburg). At present however, His Majesty's Government had not decided to do so.

3. Mr. Dufour raised the subject again on September 22nd. He said that the German Government were very anxious to receive from His Majesty's Government some assurance that they did not propose to appoint a minister to Munich at least for the present.

4. Sir E. Crowe asked what difference such an appointment would make to the German Government seeing that the principle was already settled and accepted by the Bavarian Government owing to the fact that a French legation had been established and recognised at Munich.

5. Mr. Dufour replied that German opinion was more reconciled to the French taking this course, because it was realised that this corresponded to an old French tradition. Moreover the feeling against France in Bavaria was sufficiently strong to prevent any idea from gaining ground that the recognition of a French legation at Munich signified an advance in the direction of a separate and independent Bavarian state. The impression might be different if the other Allies and notably the British Government also set up separate legations at Munich. The German Government therefore earnestly hoped that the British Government would not do so.

6. Sir E. Crowe then informed Mr. Dufour confidentially that whilst His Majesty's Government could not do anything to impair their right under the treaty to appoint diplomatic representatives to Munich or to the capitals of other states in Germany, they had no intention at present of doing so in fact, but would be content with suitable consular representation.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
ERIC PHIPPS

**No. 221**

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)*

*No. 969 [C 8185/45/18]*

BERLIN, October 2, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in order to take leave of him before proceeding to England.<sup>1</sup>

In the course of conversation His Excellency said that the matter which was causing him most pre-occupation at the present moment was the state of affairs in Upper Silesia. He repeated, what he has frequently said before, that if that district were lost to Germany the result would be economic ruin for her. He said he was in favour of a large measure of autonomy being

<sup>1</sup> Lord Kilmarnock went on leave on October 4.

granted to the province with adequate safeguards for the minorities in different districts.

Referring to the proposed Conference at Geneva, he said he was quite ready for preliminary discussions to take place between experts and that the persons who took part in such discussions on behalf of the Allies might well be the Representatives on the Reparation Commission acting as individuals. He asked me to make it clear that he did not consider the recent visit of Professor Bonn<sup>2</sup> to London as doing away with the necessity for further semi-official conversations. The Professor had only dealt with one particular subject, that of index figures, but there were many other important points on which preliminary *pourparlers* were desirable.

With regard to Bavaria, His Excellency did not seem particularly pessimistic. There was, he said, undoubtedly a strong monarchist movement there but the divisions between the different factions were such as to diminish the danger very considerably. As far as disarmament was concerned he thought that the difficulties would be capable of solution provided that the Government were successful in disarming the more radical districts in the north of Germany and the Ruhr. If once the *bourgeoisie* were convinced that the Communists had been obliged to surrender their weapons they would display far less disinclination to part with their own means of defence. Good progress was being made in Berlin and several small depots of Communist arms had been discovered and seized and a good proportion of workmen had handed in rifles as they found the rewards tempting in view of the prevalent distress whilst many of them were only too pleased to get rid of weapons which they were by no means keen on using. I have since heard that the Disarmament Commissioner has informed the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission that 600,000 rifles have already been surrendered by the population. Dr. Simons said it was believed that there were large depots of Communist arms in Dortmund and other places but it was difficult to discover them. He stated that a good many Russian Bolsheviks had managed to get to Berlin from East Prussia, after crossing the frontier, and were carrying on propaganda with a view to exciting the extremists here against the French.

Whilst the above conversation is fairly reassuring as to the immediate future, I find a pretty general impression in well-informed quarters that the winter is not likely to pass without serious disturbance. The Italian Ambassador is of opinion that the split in the Independent Socialist Party will result in a large number of the workmen going over to the Communists. The latter, whom he described as having hitherto been 'leaders without an Army', would thus gain a strong accession of numbers and would in all probability feel bound to try what they could do. They would probably wait until the privations of the winter had produced their full effect, and disturbances were to be expected in January or February. According to His Excellency's information the Government are fairly confident of being able to suppress the movement if it comes to a head.

<sup>2</sup> A German economic expert and representative of the German League of Trades Unions.

I have just received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Frankfort-a-Main stating that there is a considerable movement in Würt[t]emberg in favour of independence and separation from Prussia. It is believed that at least 60% of the population are sympathetic to this policy. If this is so the danger of the separatist movement in Bavaria must be regarded as considerably increased. There is evidence of some nervousness in certain Left circles on this subject and the Putsch which was rumoured to take place on the 27th ultimo is now alleged to be in preparation for the middle of the present month. Those sort of reports have, however, been so frequently shown to be without foundation in the past that one hesitates to attach great importance to them. It is, however, of course always possible that they will prove one day to be correct.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

No. 222

*Sir M. Findlay (Christiania) to Earl Curzon (Received October 6, 7 p.m.)*

*No. 225 Telegraphic [C 8109/2414/18]*

*Most confidential*

CHRISTIANIA, October 6, 1920, 2.35 p.m.

Last week Professor Nansen<sup>1</sup> called on me and urged that it was most advisable that Germany should be invited to join League of Nations, and that preliminary steps to ascertain whether German Government were prepared to apply, and whether principal members of League were prepared favourably to consider their application, should be taken at once. He believed His Majesty's Government were in favour of Germany joining League, but that French Government were entirely opposed to it. He thought His Majesty's Government might welcome a proposal from a neutral Power, perhaps Norway, and that question should be brought up in Geneva, but it would be disastrous if Germany applied and was refused, as she would never apply again, and would ultimately join Russia, where Allies were now unpopular with all parties, in opposition to League of Nations.

He asked for my opinion.

I said I was not in a position to give one, and it would be obviously most unadvisable for Norway or any other friendly neutral to take initiative without ascertaining whether such actions were welcome and likely to be successful. If such action were likely to cause serious friction between Great Britain and France, as Professor Nansen anticipated, I thought His Majesty's Government would not consider it either welcome or advisable. In any case such enquiries should be made in London.

When I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday he referred to this subject, saying he wanted my private opinion and I replied in the same sense. He did not appear to have decided to enquire in London.

<sup>1</sup> Professor Nansen, the well-known explorer, was appointed Norwegian delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations at the end of October, 1920.



I trust my language may be approved.<sup>2</sup>

I gather Nansen may possibly go to Geneva as one of the Norwegian Delegates.

Repeated to Stockholm and Copenhagen by post.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Curzon minuted:

'Approve Sir M. Findlay's language, and say nothing more.

'The question of the admission of Germany cannot be raised without involving that of Austria Bulgaria & other applicants.

'I would let sleeping dogs lie, and leave the initiative, if it be taken, to come from others.

'Our general attitude will of course be sympathetic.

C 7/10.'

### No. 223

*Mr. Seeds<sup>1</sup> (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 18)*

*No. 1018 [C 8878/2/18]*

BERLIN, October 13, 1920

My Lord,

In reply to Your Lordship's despatch No. 931 (C 7728/2/18) of the 6th instant<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to report that I asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs today whether he could give me any information on the subject of the proposed establishment of a Legation of the German Reich at Munich.

Herr von Haniel said that the Central Government considered it necessary to have a Representative in Munich, and perhaps later on in other State capitals, to act as a sort of liaison officer with the local Government. In order to spare the susceptibilities of the Bavarian Government, the Representative would not be called a Commissioner, which title savoured too much of Control, but would have the rank of Minister, though strictly speaking the German Government could not send a diplomatic agent to what was merely a part of Germany. No appointment would be made at present as the sanction of the Reichstag had still to be obtained.

Your Lordship will have received the despatch No. 69 of the 28th ultimo<sup>3</sup> from His Majesty's Consul at Munich on this subject in regard to which I would only observe, with reference to the second paragraph, that Herr von Haniel did not confirm the suggestion made by Mr. Smallbones as to any intention of the Central Government to establish direct relations between the Reichs representative and the foreign diplomatic officers in Munich. Indeed the Under Secretary laid stress on the fact that the new Minister was not to represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: he would figure not in the budget of that Ministry but in that of the Reichs Chancellor.

<sup>1</sup> Acting Chargé d-Affaires at Berlin, October 4-21.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This despatch asked for observations on an article in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 26 concerning the proposed establishment of a legation of the German Reich at Munich.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Herr von Haniel stated that the Reichs representative would not enjoy diplomatic immunity from taxation, but agreed that in practice he would be a very good imitation of his pre-war Prussian colleague.

I was careful not to allude in any way to the question of possible British representation at Munich, nor did Herr von Haniel raise the point. I venture however to suggest that, in anticipation of the Reichstag agreeing to the Government's proposal, His Majesty's Government should consider whether the situation thereby created would not justify the appointment of a regular British diplomatic Representative at Munich. The German Government would probably urge that their Minister was an envoy only in name, and would renew the objections they have already made to His Majesty's Government. Nevertheless the presence in Munich of German and French Ministers, both politically active in divergent directions, may be held a sufficient reason for the re-establishment of a British Legation, apart from the importance which Bavaria may at any moment assume as a conservative counterpoise to a Communistic North Germany.

I have, &c.,

WILLIAM SEEDS

**No. 224**

*Mr. Robertson<sup>1</sup> (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received October 18)*

*No. 509 [C 8948/4394/18]*

*Secret*

COBLENZ, October 13, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 199 (C. 6976/4394/18) of 23rd September, 1920,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to report as follows on the activities of the Heimatdienst in the Occupied Territory.

The activities of the Heimatdienst in the Occupied Territory seem to be all directed from Frankfort, at any rate for the French Zone of Occupation, where local branches, dependent on Frankfort, have been discovered in Wiesbaden, Mainz, and other towns. It has secret offices and committees in all four Occupied Zones, in the Saar Basin, and in Alsace-Lorraine. Since one of the chief avowed objects of the service is to affect the voting in plebiscite areas in favour of Germany, it has a control over such leagues as the Saar Union, the Loyal Upper Silesians in Cologne, and the Union of North Sleswick in Leverkusen. Its agents are drawn from all classes—Government officials, local political leaders, Trade Union leaders, and newspaper editors. On the Saar it influences Trade Unions, the press, Chambers of Commerce, and sporting societies, as is proved from the papers seized on the Reichstag Deputy, Ollmert.

While the avowed object of the Heimatdienst is to educate the public by means of propaganda in favour of the constitution and against Spartacism

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Robertson had succeeded Sir H. Stuart as High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission on October 5.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. It had called for a report on the Heimatdienst in occupied territory.

and reaction, to prevent the loss of the plebiscite areas, to combat separatist and anti-Prussian movements, and even to resist the penetration of French influence, it is proved that its efforts have been actively directed against the Allied Armies of Occupation, and, in particular, the French.

Its agents have been instructed to keep up a state of tension between the public and the French, and to exploit for political purposes strikes and disaffection in the Occupied Territory which may be caused by shortage of food or coal, or the inevitable inconveniences and even hardships which result from the Occupation. The press has been filled with propaganda, especially about alleged atrocities by French coloured troops. For this purpose the Frankfort office founded an organ called the 'Neue Rheinische Korrespondenz',—excluded from the Occupied Territory by the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission in October, 1919,—which reappeared in November as the 'Westdeutsche Zeitungsschrift'. Propaganda is also spread among the people by pamphlets, and in personal conversation.

Beside its propagandist activities, the Heimatdienst is a service of information about the Armies and other Authorities of Occupation. The papers seized last June by the British Military Authorities in a raid on the Heimatdienst premises of Julius Becher, in Cologne, though on the whole they do not give very conclusive results, at least prove that this office was doing espionage work, in that photographs of intercepted letters written by or to British officers were found.

Moreover, its propaganda is not confined to the German public. Pamphlets have been discovered which were intended for the population of Alsace-Lorraine (e.g. 'Zehn Jahre Minenkrieg im Frieden') and further for the troops of all four Armies of Occupation—'Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe' (extracts from speeches by Jaurès) for the French, and 'The Starving of Germany' and Rudmann's 'Hunger' for the British and Americans.

Agents are particularly instructed to create dissension between the French on the one hand and the British and Americans on the other. Attacks on the British and Americans are not to be so violent as those on the French. The Americans are to be made to feel that France wants to keep [the] Rhineland in defiance of the Peace Treaty, and this aggression must be represented as a danger to America and Great Britain. This policy seems to date from the spring of 1920, but already in October, 1919, 'The World of Trade' was started under the auspices of the Heimatdienst,—a paper written in English and German, and intended to influence 'Anglo-Saxon' opinion against the French. The Heimatdienst does not seem to have displayed much activity against or among the Belgians, although it has ramifications at Crefeld, Aix, and München-Gladbach.

These are the general activities of the Heimatdienst. Since the spring of 1919, when it organised resistance to Rhenish Separatism and began its campaign against the French in the Occupied Territory, it has made four serious efforts to damage the influence of the Allies.

The French regard it as morally certain, if not legally proved, from the confessions and documents of the agents Weber, of Treves, and Anders, of

Kreuznach, whom they arrested, that the Saar troubles in October, 1919, were the work of the Heimatdienst. Groger, the chief of the Frankfort office, was in the district at the time, and in relations with the Landrat of Haltern.

In the same month—October, 1919,—a meeting was held at Coblenz, at which it was decided that the Executive Committees of the Heimatdienst in Ludwigshafen and other towns should present an ultimatum to the Occupying Authorities, and on its rejection declare a general strike about December. All the points of the ultimatum were of a political nature, and were intentionally made unacceptable: liberty of the press and meetings; immediate recognition of all laws passed in Berlin; freedom of movement; release of arrested persons and return of those deported; soldiers not to carry arms except on duty, etc. A circular was drawn up containing a violent appeal to insurrection. The movement collapsed, apparently on account of the arrest by the French in December of Kuntz and Goetzer, agents of the Heimatdienst at Wiesbaden.

During the occupation of Frankfort in April, 1920, the French raided Groger's Heimatdienst office, and seized the papers which have furnished most of the evidence on this subject. They did not, however, take action until after the German elections, when, on June 12th., they arrested Sittinger, Schaeffer, and Feich, the leaders of the Executive Committee at Ludwigshafen. There were demonstrations and some strikes in that district during the next few days, and on the 18th. June the Executive Committee of Workers and Employees of the Palatinate, sitting at Mannheim, ordered a general protest strike throughout the Palatinate for the next day. The documents in the possession of the French show that these disturbances were not spontaneous, but the work of the Heimatdienst, which took the opportunity to carry out a plan, already prepared, for a big coup. Since the day of the strike—the 19th.—was a Saturday, and a half day, on which a cessation of work would not be of great importance, it is thought that the Heimatdienst authorities saw that their scheme had failed, and simply tried to save their face. The French not only brought in troops, but informed the public by proclamations that the whole affair was engineered by the Heimatdienst, and that their own action was directed, not against the workers, but against Pan-German espionage; thereby they conciliated the Independent Socialist elements,—keen opponents of the Heimatdienst. The three men arrested admitted that the Heimatdienst had fooled them for its own Nationalist purposes. The strike on Saturday was far from universal, on Monday everyone was back at work, and other arrests in this connection aroused no protest.

Finally, the French have conclusive documentary evidence that the strike in the Saar Basin of August, 1920, was the work of the Heimatdienst.

The above information is practically all drawn from documents which fell into the hands of the French during their occupation of Frankfort, and as a result of the arrest of Herr Ollmert at the time of the recent Saar troubles. These documents were courteously communicated to me by the French High Commissioner on the understanding that they should be treated as highly secret. From British sources I have no information save that obtained as a

result of the arrest of Julius Becker [*sic*], alluded to above, and these, as I have stated, gave no very conclusive results.

The French evidence appears to me to be important enough to warrant mistrust of the Heimatdienst, in spite of its apparently innocent character as a Patriotic Society. I am inclined to doubt whether its more sinister activities are actually known to the German Government, although it is more than probable that they are directed from Government offices in Berlin.

I have, &c.,

ARNOLD ROBERTSON

No. 225

*Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Earl Curzon (Received October 25)*

No. 766 [C 9560/1837/18]

*Secret*

BRUSSELS, October 23, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a despatch which I have received from Brigadier-General Lyon, Military Attaché to this Embassy, reporting a conversation with the *Sous-Chef* of the Belgian General Staff with regard to the rôle which the Belgian army would play if the French advanced into the Ruhr Basin.

General Lyon quotes the *Sous-Chef* of the General Staff as having said:—

‘In the event of the French advancing into the valley of the Ruhr, the Belgians are also obliged by their Agreement with them to cross the Rhine.’

I do not think that the officer in question meant to say that, if the French advanced into the Ruhr Basin, as they have threatened to do should Germany not fulfil her obligations, the Belgians would be obliged to move also. The Belgian Prime Minister told me on August 27, as I reported to Your Lordship in my despatch No. 627 Confidential, of that date,<sup>1</sup> that the recent Franco-Belgian Military Agreement was merely one between the Military Authorities of the two countries laying down what measures should be taken on either side to meet unprovoked aggression. Moreover, General Maglinse, the Chief of the General Staff of the Belgian Army, told General Lyon on the 6th September, as reported to Your Lordship in Mr. Parr’s despatch No. 656 of September 14,<sup>2</sup> that the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement which he had signed was a defensive one and that the Belgian Government had guarded themselves against the possibility of being dragged into war by reserving to themselves the right not to co-operate with the French unless Germany was, in the opinion of the Belgian Government, the aggressor.

I therefore take what was told by the *Sous-Chef* of the Belgian General Staff to General Lyon to mean that the military measures described by him as having to be taken in conjunction with the French, applied to:—

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Volume XII, No. 38. Mr. Parr was First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Brussels.

- (a) When unprovoked aggression on Belgium or France should have taken place, or
- (b) If joint occupation of the Ruhr Basin were agreed upon for some reason or other between the Allies, or at any rate between France and Belgium.

General Lyon's information is interesting if only as showing how ever-present the possible occupation of the Ruhr Basin is to the minds of the French Military Authorities, for measures have evidently been discussed with the Belgian General Staff in view of the eventuality of a French advance into the Ruhr Basin.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE GRAHAME

ENCLOSURE IN No. 225

*General Lyon, Military Attaché, to Sir G. Grahame*

BRUSSELS, October 23, 1920

Sir,

With reference to Your Excellency's despatch to the Foreign Office, No. 671 of 21st September,<sup>3</sup> I have the honour to submit the following remarks on the military aspects of the occupation of the Ruhr basin, as a result of a conversation that I had this morning with the sub-chief of the Belgian General Staff.

He stated that in the event of the French advancing into the valley of the Ruhr the Belgians are also obliged, by their agreement with them, to cross the Rhine. The rôle which was originally proposed by the French for the Belgian army was not approved by General Maglinse. It has now been altered so that the French would, in the event of an advance taking place, occupy the whole of the industrial region of the Ruhr basin. The Belgians on the other hand would move forward to the North of the French in the direction of Haltern and occupy a purely agricultural country, where the special difficulties of dealing with an industrial population would not be encountered.

As a military operation this would not present any difficulty other than a slight lengthening of the line of communications. The troops pushed forward would however have to be replaced by others in the territory now occupied, and it is probable that the operation could not be carried out without calling to the colours men who have already been trained. This would no doubt be an unpopular measure in Belgium, and is a political rather than a military objection to an advance being made beyond the Rhine.

I have, &c.,

F. LYON, *Brigadier-General,*

*Military Attaché*

<sup>3</sup> No. 214.

No. 226

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)*

*No. 1077 [C 9837/13/18]*

BERLIN, October 24, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that in accordance with Your Lordship's instructions I have drawn the earnest attention of Dr. Simons to the delay which has occurred in bringing prisoners before the Leipzig Tribunal under the conditions agreed to. Dr. Simons promised to look into the matter and to give me at an early date further detailed information regarding the position. He stated that according to his information the delay proceeded in the main if not altogether from the fact that full statements of the charges and copies of the evidence in support of them had not yet been furnished by the Entente Powers.<sup>1</sup>

If the information promised by Dr. Simons is not forthcoming in a short time I propose to take further action in the matter.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Brookes minuted on the file that the British evidence had been handed to the German Ambassador on October 21.

No. 227

*Note from the German Ambassador<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon (Received October 27)*

*No. A 1860 [9694/58/18]*

*Translation*

LONDON, October 25, 1920

The German Ambassador begs to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the following:—

According to the provisions of paragraph 11 of annexe to Article 296 of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, the British Government demands payment in cash of the monthly debit balances struck by the Clearing Offices. This obligation was acknowledged by declaration of the German Government handed over on June 21, 1920.

Accordingly, a payment in cash amounting to about £5,000,000 in all was paid to the British Clearing Office, in accordance with the balance struck by the Clearing Office for July-August and September. According to a preliminary estimate, the October balance will represent about £4,000,000 to the debit of the German Clearing Office. There will also be a substantial German debit for the following months.

In addition to this, the State Clearing Office will also have to settle considerable debit balances in favour of France arising out of the large claims for Alsace-Lorraine. Although only about Frs. 1,000,000 had to be paid for the

<sup>1</sup> Herr Sthamer had presented his letters of credence as German Ambassador on October 14, 1920.

balance struck in September, the balance for October will presumably represent a debit of about Frs. 40,000,000 for the State Clearing Office. It is to be anticipated that the balance struck during the next few months will be even more unfavourable for Germany.

The effort to obtain the necessary bills of exchange has already led to great difficulties with regard to the balances already struck, and was one of the chief reasons for the continued fall in the value of the Mark. The connection between the fall of the Mark and the obtaining of paper for settlement of the debit balances has also been cited as unquestionable in the British press. Should the increasing debit balances for the next few months continue to be demandable in cash, the consequences would be more and more unfavourable. Payment in cash of the debit balances would make it impossible for the German Government to arrive at any adequate policy with regard to its bills of exchange, and would in particular render the programme of obtaining supplies from abroad—which has already been reduced to a minimum—quite impossible.

The commercial and political consequences hereof do not require exposition.

In view of these circumstances, the German Government is obliged to beg the British Government most earnestly not to insist for the present on the monthly settlement of the German debit balances.

The position appears so critical to the German Government that it cannot undertake the responsibility of postponing the settlement of this question until general negotiations take place with regard to the reparation obligations. The German Government therefore suggests that the debit balances should for the present be carried forward to the next month's account. An intimation to this effect will be transmitted to the French Government.

In view of the urgency of the question, Mr. Sthamer would be grateful if the Earl Curzon of Kedleston would be so good as to let him have a speedy reply.

#### No. 228

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28, 9.40 a.m.)*

*No. 1250 Telegraphic [C 9785/13/18]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, October 27, 1920, 10.55 p.m.

My telegram No. 1242.<sup>1</sup>

War Criminals.

Monsieur Cambon spoke to me privately on this subject at Ambassadors Conference this morning. He expressed the regret of French Government that our case<sup>2</sup> had been forwarded to Leipzig without waiting to consult with them at Meeting of Committee now fixed for November 5th.

<sup>1</sup> Of October 25, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the case against the seven Germans whose names occur in the *Première Liste* printed in Volume VIII, No. 20, appendix 11, document 4. See also Volume IX, Chaps. VII and VIII, *passim*.



French Government hoped that if Dossiers have actually been delivered to Supreme Court at Leipzig His Majesty's Government will take immediate steps to suspend action on them pending consultation on November 5th. when common action can be decided upon.

I understand that French interpret Spa resolution<sup>3</sup> in sense that no Dossiers should be sent until asked for by Supreme Court at Leipzig. Also your telegram No. 1115<sup>4</sup> which I communicated to Monsieur Cambon gave him impression that our case would be sent to Leipzig only after agreement with French.

Please inform Attorney General.

<sup>3</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 189; cf. Volume VIII, No. 54, and No. 56, minute 2.

<sup>4</sup> Of October 19. This informed Lord Derby that the British case was now ready and could 'be forwarded to the Leipzig Court without delay', but continued, 'Attorney and Solicitor General feel, however, so strongly the desirability of acting with the French that, if the French case is in a similarly advanced position, they are prepared to come over on Friday [October 22] to see M. Jules Cambon and discuss common action with him'. Lord Derby saw M. Cambon on October 20 and in his telegram No. 1222 of that day reported that although he would be 'perfectly ready to discuss the matter with the Attorney-General' the receipt of a Belgian note 'objecting to procedure and asking for delay' led him to think that no meeting 'could advantageously be held before November 3rd or 4th'. The meeting did not in fact take place until November 10: see No. 234 below.

## No. 229

*Mr. Barclay (Stockholm) to Earl Curzon (Received November 5)*

*No. 814 [N 1947/1164/38]*

*Confidential*

STOCKHOLM, October 29, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Mr. Ramsay's despatch No. 662 of August 28<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that the 'Dagens Nyheter' of the 25th instant stated that the negotiations concerning the delivery of German locomotives to the Soviet were about to break down, owing to some hitch as to the mode of payment, and the paper connected this with Monsieur Lomonosoff's<sup>2</sup> sudden departure for Russia on the 21st instant. I asked Baron Palmstierna<sup>3</sup> whether he knew and could tell me anything on the subject and the following is what I gathered from him confidentially.

It appears that Kopp on behalf of the Soviet in Berlin endeavoured to make a contract with the Trade Unions in Germany for the construction of some 1800 locomotives. Negotiations broke down and he turned to Krupps and a preliminary contract was made. Part of the Agreement was that the Soviet should send gold to Germany as guarantee. It seems they got frightened lest the Allies should lay claim to the gold and both they and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Lomonosoff, a railway expert and a member of the chief department of the Soviet Russian Commissariat for Communications, had been engaged in trade negotiations in both Sweden and Germany.

<sup>3</sup> Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

the Germans were seized with uncertainty as to whether the transaction would be in full accord with the Peace Treaty (Art. 248). They thereupon approached British Banks and asked whether they would guarantee them against seizure, or whether they would be prepared to purchase the gold. This the Banks refused to do and the Russians and Germans turned to Sweden. Representatives of both parties came here early this month and made enquiries as to depositing Kronor 260 million at the Nordiska Handelsbanken. They first addressed themselves to the Riksbank and offered to sell the gold. They were so anxious for the deal that they offered it at Kronor 2,500 per kilo whilst the price at the time in London was actually about Kronor 3,300. They also asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would give guarantees that the Swedish Government would not seize the gold. Baron Palmstierna made enquiries and discovered that the object of the parties was to make Sweden a buffer for German-Soviet dealings. He therefore declined to give any official support to these dealings and issued a warning to private individuals against affairs of this kind. The Riksbank who had in the meantime applied to the Government for information turned down the offer, thereby losing six or seven million kronor on the difference of the price of the gold alone.

To make the offer even more tempting the Soviet Agents offered to pay a further kronor 37 million down in gold for agricultural machinery to be manufactured in this country and to give orders amounting to kronor 5 million a month from January 1 next.

In view of the economic situation here and the growth of unemployment the temptation was, it seems, very great, but the Government nevertheless decided that it was their duty not to countenance such affairs.

It will be interesting to see in which direction the Soviet and Germans now turn.

I have, &c.,  
COLVILLE BARCLAY

## No. 230

### *Memorandum on the admission to the League of Nations of Germany and other states not mentioned in the annex to the Covenant*<sup>1</sup>

[C 10345/2414/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 2, 1920

. . .<sup>2</sup> 15. *Germany.* The general question of ex-enemy States turns largely on the attitude of His Majesty's Government to an application for admission

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was prepared at the request of Mr. Fisher, delegate of the British Empire to the League of Nations Assembly, who wrote to Lord Curzon on October 25 that, as the question of the admission of Germany to the League of Nations was to come up at the Assembly of the League at Geneva, the Prime Minister had asked him to obtain from the Foreign Office and the War Office 'as complete a Memorandum as possible, showing how far the Germans have fulfilled and are fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty of Versailles'. It was sent on November 3 for circulation to the Cabinet.

<sup>2</sup> The first fourteen paragraphs were concerned with states other than Germany.

on behalf of Germany. In all probability either Sweden, Norway or Denmark will propose at the Assembly the admission of the German Republic to the League. The Scandinavian Inter-Parliamentary Union has indeed passed a resolution (12th. meeting, August 18th. 1920) 'that all civilised States should accede to the League of Nations, and that no obstacle should be put in the way of any State to prevent it from joining the League should it wish to do so'. On the other hand, the German Republic may herself apply for admission, which is however unlikely unless a favourable decision is counted upon as more or less certain.

16. An important point to bear in mind is whether it will be possible to keep Germany out of the League, if an application for membership is received. There will be about forty members present at the Assembly, and, to be successful, an applicant must poll two-thirds of the votes. In other words, fourteen votes at least would be wanted to deny Germany admission. The States which we know definitely to be opposed to Germany in this matter are France, Belgium and Poland, and if the British Empire with its six votes sided with the opposition, no doubt five other States could be found to act similarly. If the British Empire voted in favour, however, it is more than doubtful whether France and Belgium could muster a sufficient number of opposing States to keep Germany out. The casting vote lies in all probability, therefore, with the British Empire.

17. The Covenant provides (Article 1) that a candidate for admission must 'give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces, and armaments'. Once a State has complied with the general condition as to guarantees and with the particular condition as to armaments, and has been admitted by the vote of the Assembly it is entitled to full membership of the League.

18. As regards the general condition, there are various points on which it may well be urged that Germany has not yet given effective guarantees of her bona fides. The political and economic clauses of the Treaty either have been or are in process of being carried out. But there are parts of the Treaty, such as those dealing with disarmament, reparations and the punishment of war-criminals which have not been fulfilled. Possibly such non-fulfilment is due rather to Germany's political and economic difficulties than to any deliberate intention to evade her Treaty obligations. But the question whether, as regards disarmament, reparations, and war-criminals, the steps she is taking to carry out her obligations constitute in fact 'effective guarantees' of her good intentions is one respecting which it is clearly desirable that the Allied Governments should act on a common view. It would accordingly be well to discuss it in the first instance with the French Government.

19. It is understood that the War Office have been asked to prepare a memorandum as regards the military conditions, and the Admiralty, Treasury and Board of Trade are also being consulted.

20. It would, in any case, clearly be difficult to admit Germany until the military, naval and air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles have been carried

out as far as they have to be executed within a fixed period. The period prescribed will not terminate until February 15th 1921 (the date fixed at Spa last July) and until the naval, military and air commissions of control have reported that they are satisfied that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles have been scrupulously carried out, His Majesty's Government should not, it is submitted, give their vote in favour of any application by or on behalf of Germany, and if the question of admission is raised the representatives of the Allied Governments should press at least for an adjournment of its consideration to a future meeting of the Assembly.

21. It would from a general political point of view probably be advisable to come to an agreement with France and Belgium and possibly Italy on all the points raised in this memorandum.

22. Consultation with the Dominions would also be desirable. It would create a deplorable impression if on such a question, for instance, as the admission of Germany and Austria to the League of Nations, the Dominions did not vote in the same sense as the Imperial Government.

#### No. 231

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1196 Telegraphic: by bag [C 9980/13/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1920*

Your telegram No. 1250 of Oct. 27.<sup>1</sup>

My telegram No. 1115 of Oct. 19<sup>2</sup> indicated that the Law Officers of the Crown were prepared to go to Paris on Friday, Oct. 22, if need be, in order to discuss matters for common action with the members of M. Jules Cambon's Committee. These matters arise upon certain communications received from the Court at Leipzig in respect of which it is desirable, in the opinion of the Law Officers, that the Allies should—if possible—frame a common policy.

The Law Officers were undoubtedly ready, if their visit had been arranged as proposed, to hand to M. Jules Cambon a copy of the dossiers relating to the seven cases for which the British Empire has assumed responsibility.

Unfortunately, the reply from Paris was to the effect that a meeting of M. Jules Cambon's Committee could not be held on the day suggested, or within a day or two of it, but must be postponed as far as Nov. 5.

It never occurred to the Law Officers that that circumstance afforded a reason for delaying the transmission to Leipzig of the materials obtained in the seven cases above-mentioned. On the contrary, there appeared to be every reason why those materials—which will probably give rise to further requests for information—should be transmitted without any avoidable delay.

By the agreement made at Spa it was decided, in order to avoid delay, that communications should be made directly between the Attorney-general

<sup>1</sup> No. 228.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 228, n. 4.

in London and the Attorney-general in Leipzig. In the opinion of the Law Officers, this agreement did not involve the inference that the dossiers should be exchanged between the Allies before being presented to the Court at Leipzig.

The questions on which common action after discussion is desirable are clearly indicated in the papers which have now been transmitted from Paris to London, among which may be noted the important question how far the agreement made at Spa debars the Allies from making replies to questions submitted from Leipzig with regard to other accused persons unless and until the trials are completed of the 45 persons whose names were submitted for preliminary action by the High Court at Leipzig.<sup>3</sup>

These and kindred questions the Law Officers hope to discuss at a meeting of M. Jules Cambon's Committee: but they did not understand that there was any reason why the dossiers in the 7 cases should not be sent to Leipzig as soon as they were ready.

As regards the suggestion that H.M.G. should take immediate steps to secure that the Court at Leipzig should suspend action on the seven British cases until some future day, the Attorney-general thinks that, unless this step is regarded as unavoidable, it would be somewhat unfortunate, especially as the receipt of the British dossier in Leipzig may well give rise to requests for further information, which in their turn will involve a further lapse of time.

<sup>3</sup> In his despatch No. 2528 of August 6 Sir G. Grahame had reported that at a meeting on the 5th the War Criminals Committee had considered the interpretation of the Spa resolution, since the Leipzig Court had requested information regarding names not included in the list of 45. M. Jules Cambon had 'stated' that there was no doubt in his mind that the Spa resolution only applied to the 45 cases', and a resolution in this sense had accordingly been approved by the Committee.

## No. 232

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 10)*

*No. 1141 [N 2228/1164/38]*

BERLIN, November 6, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report further on the subject of the locomotive contract with Russia following my despatch No. 1109 of November 1, 1920,<sup>1</sup> and Mr. Seeds' despatch No. 1064 of October 21, 1920.<sup>1</sup> Security and mode of payment still remain the principal difficulties and the Dutch banks who have been brought into the transaction in order to assist with the financial problem do not appear so far to have arranged any satisfactory solution. Apart from the financial difficulty distrust of the Soviet is so strong with many of the German Syndicate that they are extremely sceptical of the contract being carried out even if it is signed. Some of the Stinnes group say that in no case would they deliver locomotives to the Soviet Government as they consider such a proceeding would only encourage Bolshevism.

Regarding English participation; the North British Locomotive Company

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and Messrs. Vickers are both reported to be fully acquainted with the projected transaction. Neither is very keen about participating, one great difficulty being the higher cost of production in England as compared with Germany. Messrs. Vickers' representative in Germany is meeting the Director of their foreign department at Cologne this week and has promised to sound one or two German firms, including Krupps, as to their attitude towards British co-operation in this Russian locomotive order. Messrs. Vickers' representative is reported to have said that in no case would co-operation for this one transaction be possible; it would have to be on a much wider basis—the present Russian business being merely the first step.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

No. 233

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 12)*

*No. 1144 [C 11057/45/18]*

BERLIN, *November 8, 1920*

My Lord,

Your Lordship will probably desire me to give some account of the general political aspect of Germany at the present moment and to state my views regarding the probability of any considerable political disturbances in the shape of a 'Putsch', either from the Right or from the Left. It would be rash to be over-confident in making any prediction regarding the probability of events of this kind, since they may well occur without much previous warning in a country where, like Germany, there is on each wing a small extreme party who consider any means legitimate to upset the existing order. The danger increases where, as is the case here, each of these extreme parties, although violently opposed to the other in respect of its real objectives, would possibly co-operate in an explosive act of violence. Notwithstanding these evident possibilities the best opinion here seems to be that the chances of disorder during the coming winter are decidedly less than they were twelve months ago. The country has settled down to work to a considerable extent; the Government, though not strong, is stronger than it was. Party animosities no longer absorb the entire activity of party organisations as they did at the beginning of the present year. There is, therefore, somewhat more room left for the restoration of German national feeling.

The great difficulty, and perhaps the real danger, lies in the financial problem. Under present conditions the lot of the lower middle classes and of those whose means of livelihood are either fixed salaries or fixed incomes is extremely hard. In some cases their incomes have not increased at all, while the cost of living has gone up from eight to ten times what it was. Even in the case of those who are best off the income or salary has not been raised in anything like full proportion to the increased cost of living. Both upper and middle classes are infinitely worse off than labour, and if they had not been found so strangely speechless in all countries it would be a cause for

surprise that their discontent with the present conditions has not found louder voice in Germany.

As regards the working classes, wages, although they have not gone up to the full extent of the rise in the cost of living, have been raised incomparably more than salaries. Working-class conditions are certainly not good but general discontent appears less prevalent than earlier in the year. There can be little doubt that the failure of the Soviet Armies in the Battle of Warsaw greatly discouraged the extreme parties in Germany, both Socialist and Kappist, while the unfavourable reports brought back from Russia by German workmen who had lived there have prevented the extreme sections of labour from gaining the recruits they expected. Personally I should view the chances of grave labour disturbances in Germany as largely dependent upon the gain or loss of prestige by the Soviet Government in Russia. If the Soviet military star is again in the ascendant, the chances of trouble in Germany will be increased enormously. I believe indeed that tranquillity is even more dependent on this issue than upon the causes more usually alleged—such as a hard winter or food prices.

The disbandment or disarmament of the Orgesch and Einwohnerwehr organisations will also be a factor of potential trouble both at the moment of execution and in ulterior consequences.

The best opinion appears to be that the nett result of the proceedings at the Halle Conference<sup>1</sup> was rather favourable to order than hostile to it, since the Majority Socialist Party will be strengthened while the secession to the Communist Section is not sufficient to render it an immediate danger under existing conditions.

My personal experience of Germany is so short that Your Lordship will kindly consider the views expressed above rather as a recapitulation of what appears to be the soundest opinion here than as a result of personal observation.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>1</sup> This Independent Socialist Party Congress (October 12 to 16) had split over the question of co-operation with the Communist Third International.

## No. 234

*Extract from the report of a Meeting of the Inter-Allied Committee concerned with war crimes, held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on November 10, 1920<sup>1</sup>*

[C 12778/13/18]

...<sup>2</sup> 2. The question was then raised of the reply to be sent to various Notes which had been received by the different Allied Powers from Germany con-

<sup>1</sup> This *procès verbal*, together with the annex printed below, was forwarded on December 1 on behalf of the Attorney General to the Foreign Office where it was received on the following day.

<sup>2</sup> The first section of this report related to the request of the Bulgarian Government for permission to bring war criminals before Bulgarian courts instead of handing them over to the Allies for trial.

taining requests for information regarding cases outside the 45 selected cases in which permission had been given to the German Government to conduct the trials at Leipzig.

The following documents<sup>3</sup> were placed before the members of the Committee, of which copies are attached hereto:

1. Note by French representatives on the proposed reply to the German Delegation.

*Annex 1.* Letter sent by M. Cambon to the various representatives on the Committee.

*Annex 2.* Resolution of the Committee of the 5th August, 1920.

*Annex 3.* Note by the French Delegation thereon.

*Annex 4.* Proposed reply to German Delegation.

*Annex 5.* Reply to [*sic*] M. Rolin-Jacquemyns (Belgium) to M. Cambon's letters (*Annex 1*).

2. Proposed reply to German Delegation drafted by Belgian representative as an emendation of *Annex 4*.

After some discussion, it was unanimously decided that the reply as drafted by the Belgian representative, should be sent to the German delegation, which stated that information could not be given regarding any cases outside the 45 selected cases except in the customary manner through the diplomatic channel, and that as regards cases outside the 45 the Allied Governments reserved their full rights under the Treaty of Peace.

3. The Attorney-General mentioned that the German Authorities had stated that in the case of certain individuals on the selected lists they were unable to take action, and cited the case of Lieut. Commander Pützig [*Patzig*], who was said to be resident in the City of Danzig, and to have ceased to be a German citizen.<sup>4</sup>

He enquired whether the Committee thought that in such a case, another name should be substituted for that of any accused person on the selected list who for any reason could not be brought before the Court at Leipzig by the German Authorities. His own view was against such substitution.

M. Cambon and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns were both of the opinion that substitution would tend to prolong the proceedings indefinitely, and that we should be better advised to adhere to our list of 45 without any additions or substitutions. And it was so decided unanimously.

4. The Attorney-General proposed, and it was unanimously agreed, that if interrogatories or requests for further evidence were submitted from Leipzig upon the dossiers severally submitted by the Allies, such matters should, for the sake of despatch, be dealt with in each case by the particular country

<sup>3</sup> With the exception of the annex printed below these documents do not appear to have been forwarded to the Foreign Office.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum (not printed) to a similar effect on the present position of 'proceedings now pending before the Chief Public Prosecutor, in connection with cases referred to in the "First List of Persons arraigned by the Allies before the Supreme Court, Leipzig"', was transmitted to Lord Curzon by the German Chargé d'Affaires in London on November 12. For the list of forty-five names, see Volume VIII, No. 20, appendix 11, document 4.



concerned according to its most convenient practice, without any attempt at a common or uniform tribunal or method.

5. Certain other matters were referred to, but it was decided that, if need be, M. Cambon should convene a further conference on a later day upon his own initiative, or at the request of any member of the Committee.

#### ANNEX TO No. 234

##### *Commission des Coupables. Annexe IV*

##### *Projet de lettre à la délégation allemande de la Paix (Texte amendé)*

Vous avez bien voulu, par une série de lettres datées du 30 juin au 17 juillet, me demander de faire parvenir au Procureur Général de la Cour de Leipzig les renseignements qu'il sollicite sur un certain nombre de ressortissants allemands, poursuivis par la justice allemande sous l'inculpation d'actes commis en violation des lois de la guerre.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir qu'aucune des personnes mentionnées dans vos dites lettres n'étant comprise dans la liste d'inculpés annexée à la lettre du 7 Mai 1920,<sup>5</sup> pour lesquels un mode spécial d'information a été admis par le Protocole de Spa du 9 juillet 1920, le Gouvernement français ne saurait, en ce qui les concerne, donner suite à votre demande.

En dehors des cas visés par la lettre susdite, et pour lequel[s] ce mode spécial d'information a été accepté, le Gouvernement français entend ne pas se départir, quant aux renseignements à fournir à la justice allemande, de la procédure habituelle des commissions rogatoires régulièrement adressées par la voie diplomatique.

Il ne sera pas donné suite toutefois aux commissions rogatoires et moins encore aux demandes d'information de la justice allemande visant des inculpés portés sur la liste de coupables transmise le 3 février 1920 et non compris dans [la]<sup>6</sup> liste spéciale des 45 cas faisant l'objet de la lettre du [7]<sup>6</sup> mai précitée, le Gouvernement français entendant maintenir intacts à leur égard les droits qui lui sont reconnus par articles 228 à 230 du Traité de Versailles.

<sup>5</sup> For an English translation of this letter see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 124.

<sup>6</sup> The filed copy was here torn.

#### No. 235

##### *Earl Curzon to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)*

*No. 1059 [C 11554/1897/18]*

*Secret*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 18, 1920*

My Lord,

I should be glad to receive Your Excellency's observations on the following extract from a recent . . . Report:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A confidential reference is here omitted.

'On the 4th May, this year, a secret agreement was signed by Schlesinger<sup>2</sup> on behalf of the Germans and Reich<sup>3</sup> on behalf of the Soviet Government. The three principal points of this agreement were:

(a) That if the neutrality of Germany were violated by the Entente sending military support to Poland, the German Government would not obstruct the open recruiting of German officers and men for the Soviet army.

(b) If the neutrality of Germany were not broken, the German Government binds itself to support the Lithuanian army with arms and instructors and experts of Lithuanian origin, to assist the Russian Lithuanian army [? against] the Poles. In return for this the Germans were to have certain timber concessions in Lithuania and the instructors were to have grants of land in Lithuania.

(c) The Soviet Government in return binds itself to return the Dantzig corridor to Germany.'

2. Schlesinger is alleged in the report to be a member of the 'unofficial department' of the German Foreign Office and to be in close touch with the Bolsheviks.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

<sup>2</sup> For Herr Schlesinger see also Vol. IX, Nos. 51 and 58.

<sup>3</sup> This word should probably read 'Kopp'. See No. 179, n. 2.

## No. 236

*Note from the German Chargé d'Affaires to Earl Curzon*  
(Received November 20)

No. A 2133 [C 11748/58/18]

*Translation*

GERMAN EMBASSY, LONDON, November 19, 1920

Your Excellency,

In accordance with instructions from my Government I have the honour to communicate the following Note:—

The British Government has refused<sup>1</sup> the request of the German Government to be allowed until further notice to carry forward regularly to the next monthly account, the debit balances resulting against Germany in the Clearing Office transactions and will accordingly insist in future on immediate payment in cash of the monthly debit balances, in accordance with paragraph 11 of the Annex to Article 296 of the Peace Treaty. A similar reply has been returned by the French Government to the application addressed to them.

<sup>1</sup> According to a minute of November 20 by Mr. Waterlow the British Government in refusing the German request on November 12 had followed the lead of the French Government.

The German Government cannot regard the matter as finally disposed of by this attitude of the two Governments. If the German Government decided, in spite of startling exchange developments, to pay in cash the balances due in November, and if they succeeded in obtaining the necessary bills, it must not be concluded therefrom that they would be able to act similarly in the case of the December settlement. They must, on the contrary, point out in all seriousness that, in the present condition of affairs, they will not be able to undertake the responsibility of saddling the German Bill brokers in the following month also with such a huge sum for Clearing Office transactions. They therefore deem it their duty, to represent once more in detail the extraordinary difficulty of the financial conditions here in question.

According to the information in the possession of the German Clearing Office, up to the end of September German claims against Great Britain were given as amounting approximately to £21,000,000 (21 million pounds sterling) and British claims against Germany, roughly £35,500,000 (35½ million pounds sterling), leaving a debit balance on the German side of about £15,000,000 (15 million pounds sterling).

According to British estimates however Germany's position is represented as even more unfavourable. Thus British claims amount to at least £53,000,000 (53 million pounds sterling); German claims, on the other hand, amount to only £30,000,000 (30 million pounds sterling), so that the German debit would total at least £23,000,000 (23 million pounds sterling), of these £23,000,000 (23 million pounds sterling) so far £9,000,000 (9 million pounds sterling) have been paid.

In relation to France, excluding Alsace-Lorraine, German claims which have been notified amount roughly to frs. 175,000,000 (175 million francs), against French claims amounting to, roughly, frs. 152,000,000 (152 million francs), yet Germany must, by reason of the first balance in November, pay France frs. 27,500,000 (27½ million francs). It is true that for the future a large German debit balance in relation to France is not to be expected. On the other hand German applications registered in regard to Alsace-Lorraine amount only to frs. 18,500,000 (18½ million francs) approximately, while the Alsace-Lorraine clearing office has notified frs. 420,000,000 (420 million francs). Of the German debit arising therefrom frs. 47,000,000 (47 million francs) were paid in November, so that for future months a German debit of at least frs. 360,000,000 (360 million francs) must be counted on.

Similarly Germany will have to pay to Belgium, via the Clearing Offices, considerable sums in cash, as German claims, approximately frs. 13,500,000 (13½ million francs), are confronted by Belgium's claims of approximately frs. 77,000,000 (77 million francs).

The effect of the demands on the exchange market in consequence of these payments can be understood if the exchange position in Germany is pictured at the time when this unexpected additional demand came on the scene. After the agreement at Spa Germany had prepared for food imports during the period from September 1920 until 1921 which necessitated, over and above the advances to be paid to Germany for Coal deliveries in accordance

with this agreement, the purchase of Bills of Exchange to the amount of Mks. 500,000,000 (500 million Marks) weekly. These purchases however exceeded what the Mark was capable of bearing, as is evident from the steady decline of the Mark since August. On August 1st, the dollar stood at Marks 42·30, on August 16 at Marks 46·70, on September 1st at Marks 49·70, on September 15th at Marks 61 and on September 30th at Marks 62·25. From the beginning of October the downward trend of the exchange has been intensified owing to the fact that in consequence of a bad wheat harvest in Germany more wheat and maize have to be imported than was anticipated in the first instance. Instead of 150,000 tons of wheat and 40,000 tons of maize monthly, 225,000 tons of wheat and 120,000 tons of maize must be imported monthly, so that in October not Marks 500,000,000 (500 million Marks) but about Marks 700,000,000 (700 million Marks) were to be applied weekly for the purchase of bills of exchange for the importation of foodstuffs. On top of this development came the provisions for the Clearing Office procedure which according to the above statements has necessitated the purchase of bills of exchange up to Marks 2,300,000,000 (2 milliard, 300 million Marks) for the three months September, October and November. Thus it is not to be marvelled at that the Mark exchange from October 1st onwards has become steadily worse and that the dollar stood at Marks 70·25 on October 15th, at Marks 77·45 on November 1st and at Marks 87·25 on November 12th.

In the last few weeks, the situation has repeatedly arisen that Bills of Exchange were no longer to be procured for any sum worth mentioning, even when higher prices were offered without regard to the effect on the market. Further, in consequence of the payments, to the Clearing Offices of Great Britain and Alsace-Lorraine, there existed for a whole week the danger that payment for shipment papers for the incoming wheat could not be effected. If this danger were once to become a reality the faith of the International Wheat Trade in the punctual payment of German Government purchases would be shattered and the collapse of the German bread supply be involved.

These facts prove that in spite of the advances on the coal deliveries there can be no question of an improvement in the food conditions and even the maintenance of the existing food conditions is placed in doubt if the Clearing Office payments must continue to be made. Between August and September Germany was not able to improve her food position by the coal advances conceded to her, as the Bills of Exchange to be converted into ready money for the debit balances absorbed approximately these advances. In future, circumstances will probably take an even worse form, so that then the total amount of the German debit balance would exceed the total of the coal advances.

There is no hope that these conditions will change during the next few months. In consequence of the depreciation of the Mark the weekly amount in paper marks to be devoted to the payment of [*sic*] necessary foodstuffs has risen still further above the above-mentioned figure of Marks 700,000,000 (700

million Marks). For the whole economic year from August 15, 1920 until August 15, 1921 a sum of 3,000,000,000 (3 Billiards) in gold Marks, in addition to the advances in the coal deliveries, is required solely for the importation of food controlled by the Government. This sum in Gold Marks represents at 70 Marks to the dollar an amount in Paper Marks of about Marks 51,000,000,000 (51 Billiard Marks) or Marks 1,000,000,000 (1 milliard Marks), weekly. It is out of the question to place Marks to such an amount on foreign bill markets. The import programme, already based on the most urgent requirements, will therefore nevertheless have to be reduced. It would however be completely demolished if the Clearing Office payments were to be added.

In considering the general German economic position, in addition to the food supply requirements there must of course be considered in addition the needs of the market on account of the payment for the import of necessary raw materials. These necessities require at least the same sums as the food programme, but probably considerably exceed it, as up till now the export receipts have not been sufficient to defray the requirements for the importation of raw materials and as the exports have now in addition suffered an appreciable loss owing to the continued delivery of 2,000,000 tons (two million) of coal monthly, it is meanwhile not at all clear in regard to the importation of raw materials, how the necessary bills of exchange are to be procured.

The German Government sees one way only out of these difficulties and that is that the monthly German debit balance be regularly carried forward until further notice to the following monthly accounts. They have proved by making payments up to the present that in the fulfilment of their obligations under the Peace Treaty they have gone up to the bounds of possibility. According to the position of the bill market described, further demands for Clearing Office transactions would overstep every limit.

I have, &c.,

ALBERT DUFOUR-FERONCE

No. 237

*Earl Curzon to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)*

*No. 345 Overseas. Telegraphic [N 3240/1164/38]*

*Very urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 24, 1920, 5 p.m.*

Following for Thelwall.

Please wire specific particulars of any instances of actual trading transactions between Germany and Russia which have come to your knowledge during the past few months.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In his telegram No. 587 of November 17 (not printed) Lord D'Abernon had reported a statement recently attributed to Dr. Simons that 'Germany had already made deliveries to Russia to value of several millions'.

No. 238

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon*  
(Received November 26, 9.45 a.m.)

*No. 593 Overseas. Telegraphic [N 3240/1164/38]*

*Urgent*

BERLIN, November 25, 1920, 8.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 345.<sup>1</sup>

Following from Thelwall (Begins).

Only reliable specific instance of trading transaction between Germany and Russia which has come to my notice is that reported in my despatch No. OTB 660 of October 27th<sup>2</sup> where metal [Metall] Gesellschaft sold lead which was paid for in marks. These were by a German banker who had evidently received Russian credits through an agent. I am quite certain that business goes on between these two countries but it is practically all of a smuggling nature via the Baltic and not by firms of any importance. I am again making enquiries since your telegram received. (Ends).

<sup>1</sup> No. 237.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

No. 239

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon*  
(Received November 27, 11.45 a.m.)

*No. 597 Telegraphic [C 12317/1113/18]*

BERLIN, November 26, 1920, 9.20 a.m.

French Ambassador called on me this morning and stated that he had received telegram from Paris in following sense.

It is inadmissible that German Ministers should come to territory occupied by Allied troops<sup>1</sup> and under protection of their flag and of their arms taking [sic] part in Public meetings in which they declare they are determined not to agree to clauses of Treaty of Peace. Please arrange urgently with your American, British and Belgian colleagues a joint or simultaneous representation to German Government.

I shall be indebted if Your Lordship will give me instructions on above subject.

I assume that text of speeches made has been communicated by Rhineland Commission so that Your Lordship can judge of their general tenour and of precise phrases used.

<sup>1</sup> The German Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook a journey in the Rhineland from November 14-16 and made a series of public speeches.

No. 240

*Earl Curzon to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)*

*No. 350 Telegraphic [C 12324/1113/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 27, 1920, 4 p.m.

French Ambassador has drawn attention<sup>1</sup> to speeches recently delivered by German Minister for Foreign Affairs at Aix-la-Chapelle and other places in occupied territory. They had followed similar and equally violent speeches of other German Ministers, including that of Minister of Interior (see Mr. Robertson's despatch to Your Excellency No. 548)<sup>2</sup> and the Chancellor. French Government consider it intolerable that such speeches should be made under the eyes of the allied armies of occupation and have instructed their Ambassador at Berlin to consult with his allied colleagues with a view to a joint protest to the German Government. French Government hope that we will cooperate.

I have received similar communication<sup>3</sup> from Belgian Ambassador. Belgian Government are particularly anxious that any representations to German Government should include protest against declaration said to have been made in these speeches impugning League of Nations decision as to Eupen and Malmédy.<sup>4</sup>

With exception of above mentioned offensive speech by Minister of Interior only speeches by German Ministers in Rhineland of which we have reports are those made by Chancellor and Foreign Minister at Cologne on November 15th. These are milder in tone.

Before deciding whether to send instructions to you in sense desired we should like to have summary of speech alleged to have been made at Aix and also to know what view you take as to the precise step to be taken.

<sup>1</sup> In a conversation with Sir E. Crowe on November 25.

<sup>2</sup> Of November 15, not printed. This enclosed a translation of the report, printed in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of November 7, of a speech made in the Reichstag on 'The Burdens of the Occupation' by Herr Koch, Minister of the Interior.

<sup>3</sup> Of November 26, not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See *Procès-Verbal of the ninth Session of the Council of the League of Nations* . . . , pp. 7, 35.

No. 241

*Colonel Ryan<sup>1</sup> (Coblentz) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28, 6 p.m.)*

*No. 178 Telegraphic [C 12336/1113/18]*

COBLENZ, November 27, 1920, 7.10 p.m.

The speeches of German Ministers referred to in my despatches Nos. 548<sup>2</sup> and 553,<sup>3</sup> taken together with subsequent speech at Aachen, left the impression that German Government was developing a campaign of propaganda

<sup>1</sup> Deputy High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission since October 5, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 240, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Of November 18, not printed.

against Treaty of Versailles in general and the occupation in particular. This view is now confirmed by report of the proceedings of the meetings of Parliamentary Committee of the Occupied Territory which took place at Berlin on 19th November with Von Starck<sup>4</sup> as Chairman. In this meeting it was decided to circulate the speech of Minister of the Interior as a pamphlet in Germany and further to have it translated for circulation abroad.

The High Commission takes serious view of probable effects upon occupied territory of this action of German Government. It considers that in view of fact that questions of Malmédy, Eupen, and coal deliveries are included in this propaganda in addition to question of occupation, any protest on its part through Von Starck would not be within its competence and would moreover lack weight.

It therefore feels that situation which has now arisen would be best dealt with by representations of Allied Governments in common through their Embassies at Berlin.

The High Commission is most intimately concerned with this propaganda against occupation, which has been made in occupied territory during recent visit of Ministers, a propaganda which can have dangerous results in inflaming the minds of inhabitants against occupying authorities.

I would suggest to Your Lordship that intimation be made to German Government that no future Ministerial visits to occupied territories should take place unless (? Ministers) be made to abstain from speeches directed against Allies and Treaty of Versailles.

The Belgian and French High Commissioners are informing their Governments in a similar sense with a view to a common action being taken in Berlin.

Repeated to Paris and Berlin.

<sup>4</sup> German Commissioner for the Occupied Rhineland Territories.

## No. 242

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28, 3.20 p.m.)*

*No. 600 Telegraphic [C 12330/1113/18]*

*Confidential*

BERLIN, November 27, 1920, 8.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 597.<sup>1</sup>

I understand that American Commissioner has telegraphed to Washington that while speeches on Rhine were ill-timed, provocative, and tactless, he does not find any direct declaration that Germans will refuse to carry out Treaty of Peace.

He advises not to make too much of matter (? and) thinks that it (? is, omitted) sufficient if French Ambassador tells Minister for Foreign Affairs privately what Allies think of tone adopted.

On the other hand Belgian Minister has received instructions in the same sense as French Ambassador.

<sup>1</sup> No. 239.



*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29, 10.30 a.m.)*

*No. 603 Telegraphic [C 12419/1113/18]*

BERLIN, *November 28, 1920, 8.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 350.<sup>1</sup>

Speeches made at Aachen by Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs may be summarized as follows:—

1. Peace of Versailles which does not deserve name of Peace will nevertheless be carried out by us as has already been shown by our coal deliveries and above all by our disarmament.

2. Aachen suffers severely by its position on frontier by occupation and especially by detachment of Eupen and Malmédy, method of which I cannot regard as legally justifiable. Unfortunately it appears to have been already decided railway line between Raesen<sup>2</sup> and Kalterherberg should be given to Belgium.

Only League of Nations as a whole and not League of Nations Council is competent to decide on such questions; and even if League of Nations itself is not guided by principle of self-determination Germany can only regard such a decision as temporary. Our task for the future may be deduced by considering past history especially that of Aachen. Plans of Charlemagne and Napoleon for founding an empire failed owing to National idea.

French Ambassador when asked which passage he considers particularly reprehensible indicated following words spoken at Düsseldorf:

'It must be our task at Brussels to state preliminary conditions under which alone Germany can make a binding offer on question of reparations' and following words down to conclusion of paragraph (see my despatch No. 1170, paragraph 7, of November 16th).<sup>3</sup>

In my judgment these words do not constitute direct declaration that Germany will not carry out Versailles Treaty so that I should deprecate a joint declaration to German Government in precise form suggested by Paris.

I also dislike phrase 'À l'abri de nos armes' which can only be considered ironical.

<sup>1</sup> No. 240.

<sup>2</sup> This word was amended on the file copy to read 'Raeren'.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The 'following words' alluded to were these: 'These preliminary conditions are threefold:—(1) Germany, considered as an economic body, must not be further mutilated, and in particular Upper Silesia must not be taken from her; (2) Obstacles must no longer be placed in the way of our economic activity throughout the world; (3) The gigantic cost of the Armies of Occupation must be diminished. I trust that at Brussels the necessary foundations will be laid on which a definite result can be built at Geneva. I would add that Germany would prefer to continue in her present state of uncertainty rather than to undertake obligations impossible of fulfilment.' The speeches at Düsseldorf were delivered on November 14. For the conference at Brussels on reparation see Chap. V, No. 411, n. 3.

On the other hand general tone of German speeches is tactless and provocative and has already led to articles in some newspapers slightly (*sic*) laughing at Entente. See also Ryan's telegram No. 1172 to F.O.<sup>4</sup>

I should therefore advise individual representations by allies regretting tone of speeches delivered in occupied territory as calculated to delay the growth of confidence and restoration of relations which Entente desire. Such declarations appeared particularly unfortunate at present moment when owing to satisfactory execution of Spa obligations an improvement of general position had commenced.

I see no objection to making special mention of Eupen and Malmédy.

I also see no objection to a joint representation as distinguished from individual representation but it will take time to agree upon a probably emasculated text—each power will have to leave out what it most wants to say and I doubt America joining.

<sup>4</sup> This number was amended on the file copy to read 178, i.e. No. 241.

#### No. 244

*Earl Curzon to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)*

*No. 357 Telegraphic [C 12419/1113/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 1, 1920, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 603 (of November 28th.<sup>1</sup> Speeches of German Ministers in the occupied territory).

Please concert with your French and Belgian colleagues in making a joint representation to the German Government on the lines suggested in Coblenz telegram No. 178 (of November 27th).<sup>2</sup>

On general grounds we prefer this course to the alternative of individual representations suggested in your above-mentioned telegram.

Repeated to Coblenz No. 121.

<sup>1</sup> No. 243.

<sup>2</sup> No. 241.

#### No. 245

*Lord Hardinge (Paris)<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon (Received December 4)*

*No. 1366 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, *December 2, 1920*

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>2</sup> (8) The Conference had before it two German notes protesting that the Rhineland High Commission was exceeding its administrative functions.

<sup>1</sup> Lord Hardinge had succeeded Lord Derby as H.M. Ambassador at Paris on November 27.

<sup>2</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

Copies of these notes are enclosed in my despatch No. 3585 of to-day's date.<sup>3</sup> The Conference decided to reply to the German delegation to the effect that the Rhineland High Commission was fully competent to deal with these complaints. The German note<sup>4</sup> had already been communicated to the Rhineland Commission who have in a letter to the Conference of Ambassadors (also enclosed in my despatch No. 3585) explained the merits of the case and the action which they propose to take. The draft note to the German Government enclosed in the Commission's letter of November the 2nd is apparently intended merely for purposes of information and has not been sent to the German Government. In the meanwhile Mr. Robertson, in a despatch addressed to Lord Derby, copy of which is likewise enclosed in my despatch No. 3585, makes it clear that he is in agreement with the point of view maintained by the High Commission as a whole. . . .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This despatch and its various enclosures are not printed.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. note No. 399 of October 5, 1920.

<sup>5</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

#### No. 246

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 6, 6.15 p.m.)*

*No. 612 Telegraphic [C 13126/1113/18]*

BERLIN, December 6, 1920, 3.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 608.<sup>1</sup>

Joint note regarding Rhineland speeches was handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs today by my French and Belgian colleagues and myself. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated matter concerned Chancellor and the Cabinet as well as himself so that no reply was possible until he had consulted them.

<sup>1</sup> Of December 4. This contained a translation of the French text of the joint note suggested in No. 241 above. It read as follows: 'Rhineland High Commission have informed Governments whom they represent of excitement aroused amongst inhabitants of occupied territory by speeches which have recently been delivered there by German (? Cabinet) Ministers.

'Belgian, British and French Governments consider it highly regrettable that members of German Government should have seen fit to make it [*sic*] occupied territory public declarations calculated to cause discontent and to [the text was here uncertain; the French text reads 'remettre en discussion'] question of execution of Treaty of Versailles. They protest in particular against passages disputing decisions on the subject of Eupen and Malmédy. Belgian, British and French Governments have instructed their representatives in Berlin to call earnest attention of German Government to grave consequences which such expressions of opinion may have on the maintenance of public order for which Allied authorities in occupied territory are responsible. They have instructed their representatives to inform German Government that (? official) tours in occupied territory by German Cabinet Ministers or Ministers of German Federal States can only be authorised in future on condition that these High Officials abstain from all attacks on Allied Governments or authorities and on Treaty of Peace.' For an English version of the final corrected French text see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii, p. 337.

I hear confidentially that American commissioner has received instructions in following sense.

‘Owing to America’s special position we cannot join in Allied protest, but you may, if you consider it advisable, take an opportunity of a private conversation with Doctor Simons to say we consider it inexpedient on the part of Germany to create occasions for French protest.’<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 336.

### No. 247

*Lord D’Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 7, 11.35 a.m.)*

*No. 614 Telegraphic [C 13202/1113/18]*

BERLIN, December 6, 1920, 8.20 p.m.

My telegram No. 612.<sup>1</sup>

American Commissioner has now made private representation to Minister for Foreign Affairs as authorised respecting Rhineland speeches.<sup>2</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to the effect that whole matter had been carefully discussed by Cabinet before speeches were made—that it was necessary to make them in view of Public opinion—and that in his personal opinion effect had been beneficial.

He added that the joint note would be considered by Cabinet tomorrow and that an official answer would then be sent.

<sup>1</sup> No. 246.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii, pp. 337–8.

### No. 248

*Lord D’Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 10)*

*No. 1253 [C 13497/1897/18]*

*Secret*

BERLIN, December 6, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship’s despatch No. 1059 (C 11554/1897/18) of November 18<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that I have made enquiries of General Malcolm and Major Breen<sup>2</sup> on the subject of the . . .<sup>3</sup> Report in question and that their opinions are as follows:

General Malcolm thinks it most improbable that Schlesinger should have had anything to do with an agreement of the kind indicated. He was an important man during the early days of 1919 as he was put into the Reichswehr Ministry by the Soldiers’ and Workmen’s Council to superintend the Officers. Incidentally he was very useful to the British Military Mission at that time.

<sup>1</sup> No. 235.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the British Military Mission in Berlin.

<sup>3</sup> A confidential reference is here omitted.

As things have calmed down he has gradually become less important and is now in charge of all arrangements for the exchange and transport of prisoners of war between Germany and Russia. In this capacity he has a great deal to do with Kopp and in the early part of this year he paid a visit to Russia to meet representatives from Moscow and arrange details. He is believed on that occasion to have signed a written agreement which was supposed only to deal with the particular business in hand. It is probable that he discussed commercial relations but of this no proof has been found.

The following incident which is reported on reliable authority tends to show that his attitude is not unduly favourable to the Bolsheviks.

Some little time ago, Kopp requested permission for representatives from the different Russian prisoner of war camps to come to Berlin to hold a Conference, probably with the object of organising the Bolshevik propaganda among the prisoners. Schlesinger was instrumental in facilitating this meeting but when the Delegates had congregated in Berlin, he arranged that they should all be sent back to Russia immediately, thus frustrating the attempt to extend and unify their organisation in the camps.

Schlesinger is also believed to have been concerned in the refusal by the German Government of permission for Bela Kuhn [*sic*] to cross Germany on his way to Russia. (See Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 655 of August 2nd).<sup>4</sup> Some further information on his activities and antecedents is contained in Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 65 of February 24th.<sup>5</sup>

Major Breen, who knows Schlesinger fairly well, does not think that he now carries much weight and does not believe that there is any truth in the report of the alleged agreement signed by him.

I have, &c.,<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Volume IX, No. 58.

<sup>6</sup> Signature lacking from filed copy.

## No. 249

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 14)*

*No. 1267 [C 13804/1113/18]*

BERLIN, *December 11, 1920*

My Lord,

Your Lordship will probably desire that I should submit some brief observations on the reply of the German Government of 8th December<sup>1</sup> to the joint Note of Belgium, France and England, of 6th December.<sup>2</sup>

In my opinion the tone of the German reply is fairly satisfactory. It would have been unreasonable to expect Dr. Simons to promise textual compliance with the Allied demand; indeed his own career as Minister would have ceased if he had done so too explicitly.

<sup>1</sup> An English translation was printed in *The Times* of December 11. Under the translation forwarded to him by Lord D'Abernon on December 10 Lord Curzon minuted: 'It is very insolent. C 12/12.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 246, n. 1.

Reading between the lines I anticipate with some confidence that the nett result of the joint Note will be that no further speeches will be made for some time in Occupied Territory by German Ministers. They are not willing to submit their observations in advance to Allied censure: on the other hand they will certainly be unwilling to expose themselves to the measures of force which might be taken by the military authorities of the Occupied Area, if they exceeded the prescribed limits. They will therefore either not visit Occupied Territory, or not speak in it, or, if they do speak, they will probably conform to the prescriptions indicated in the Note of the Entente.

It is noticeable that in this morning's Press very small notice is taken of the German reply, while no special criticism is made of the precise wording of the Joint Note of the Entente, now published *in extenso* for the first time.

Unless new developments occur in the Reichstag the incident may be considered as closed in, on the whole, a satisfactory manner. I do not propose, unless specially instructed, to pursue further the exchange of Notes on this subject with the German Government.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

## No. 250

### *Note from Earl Curzon to the German Ambassador*

[C 13553/58/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 13, 1920*

Your Excellency,

With reference to Mr. Dufour-Feronce's Note No. A. 2133<sup>1</sup> of November 19th relative to the German Government's desire for the postponement of the settlement of monthly debit balances by the German Clearing Office, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government are unable to accede to the request of the German Government in its present form, since to do so would amount to the abandonment of the stipulation laid down by the Treaty of Versailles for the payment of balances monthly upon which the Clearing Office scheme is based.

2. I would, however, draw Your Excellency's attention to a proposal recently put forward by the Controller of the British Clearing Office to the German Representative attached to that Office, to the effect that the Clearing Office would select the larger claims received from the German Office on account of debts due to German nationals for consideration in priority to the claims for smaller amounts. The Controller of the German Clearing Office agreed to this proposal and to such extension of time as might, in consequence, be found necessary, for dealing with the smaller claims.

<sup>1</sup> No. 236.

3. It is anticipated that the execution of the above proposal will materially reduce the balances against Germany arising in the immediately succeeding months, and will thus assist the German Government to overcome the exchange difficulties referred to in the Note under reference.

I have, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

**No 251**

*Letter from the Attorney General to the Foreign Office (Received December 14)*

[C 13786/13/18]

ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, LONDON, *December 13, 1920*

Sir,

I am directed by H.M. Attorney General to submit for the information of the Secretary of State a statement of the present position of the proceedings which are to be taken against German War Criminals in the High Court of Leipzig in accordance with the agreement concluded at Spa.

It will be remembered that a long list of accused persons was originally delivered to the German Government on the 3rd February 1920, but that in consequence of the arrangement subsequently made under which the High Court of Leipzig was entrusted with the conduct of the proceedings in a limited number of selected cases, a short list of forty-five persons was handed to the German Government<sup>1</sup> annexed to a letter of the 7th May last. To this list H.M. Government contributed seven names:—

Patzig	(Hospital Ship 'Llandovery Castle')
Neumann	(Hospital Ship 'Dover Castle')
Werner	(S.S. 'Torrington')
Neumann	(Cruelty to prisoners of War at Pommerensdorf Camp)
Trienke	
Müller	(Cruelty to prisoners of War at Flavy-le-Martel Camp)
Heinz[e]	(Cruelty to prisoners of War at Friederich [ <i>sic</i> ] der Grosse Mine at Herne)

In accordance with the arrangements made at Spa a volume containing the evidence against these persons was handed on the 21st October last to the German Ambassador in London for transmission to the Attorney General of the High Court at Leipzig.

A number of communications have been received from the Attorney General of the High Court at Leipzig, in some cases giving the accused persons' [? person's] statement of the facts and asking for evidence to be taken, and in other cases stating reasons for which in his view proceedings cannot

<sup>1</sup> For the short list of accused persons see Volume VIII, appendix 11 to No. 20, document 4.

be successfully continued against the person accused. In many of these cases the name of the person concerned appeared on the long list of persons accused, but was not included in the list of forty-five persons, delivered on 7th May last.

At the Conference held at Paris on the 10th November last,<sup>2</sup> it was decided that requests for information in the cases outside the list of forty-five persons should not be complied with, until the cases included in that list had been adequately dealt with by the German Authorities; and the German delegation was so informed in a formal Note which was accordingly presented to them. In these cases a reply in the same sense has been returned to the Attorney General of the High Court of Leipzig, and it is not proposed to take any further action in these cases.

It will be observed that Captain von Bothmer, Lieutenant Commander Neureuther, Cruiser Captain Hans Adam, and probably Lt. Commander Steinbrinck appear to be in a position to prove that they were not responsible for the outrages with which they are charged, and there seems to be some doubt whether Admiral G. A. von Müller can be held responsible for the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare which is understood to be the subject of the charge against him.

The position with regard to the seven persons named by H.M. Government in the shorter list is as follows:—

1. *Lieutenant Commander Patzig*

The Attorney General of the High Court at Leipzig has intimated that he understands that this officer is a resident in the free city of Danzig, and that the German Authorities would not in that case be competent to continue proceedings against him. Further enquiries as to his whereabouts are apparently being made by the German Authorities. It will be remembered that this case was the subject of my communication of the 27th October,<sup>3</sup> and of Mr. Oliphant's letter of the 11th November last (C. 10589/13/18)<sup>3</sup> and subsequent communications.

An opportunity did not present itself of discussing at the Conference in Paris the action to be taken in cases in which War Criminals have lost their enemy nationality under the Treaty of Peace, and this question still awaits decision. In view of the exceptional inhumanity exhibited in this case it is desirable that further action should if possible be taken to bring Commander Patzig to justice, and in the event of the German authorities maintaining their inability to deal with this officer it will be for consideration whether it is not possible for steps to be taken to secure his surrender to this country for trial.

2. *Lieutenant Commander Neumann*

In this case the Attorney General of the High Court at Leipzig has intimated that in sinking the Hospital Ship 'Dover Castle' Commander Neumann acted in accordance with superior orders, and that in his view this defence is an answer to the charge made against him.

A copy of the communication from the Attorney General at Leipzig was

<sup>2</sup> See No. 234.

<sup>3</sup> These letters are not printed.



submitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for their observations and a copy of their reply is enclosed.<sup>4</sup>

A reply has been returned to the Attorney General at Leipzig that his view cannot be accepted, and that this officer must be brought to justice.

3. *Lieutenant Commander Werner*

In this case the Attorney General of the High Court at Leipzig asked for further information and submitted a statement by a German prisoner of war at Marseilles to the effect that he had seen the S.S. 'Torrington' in that port shortly before her destruction bearing the insignia of a Hospital Ship and loading munitions of war. No difficulty was found in demonstrating the falsity of these allegations; but the statement of the witness in the case of the 'Torrington' is of interest, indicating, as it does, the facility with which the German Government can produce evidence of this character and its worthlessness when submitted to a critical test.

Captain Starkey, the only British witness in this case, is expected to arrive in England in about six weeks time, when there will be an opportunity for the German Authorities to take his evidence upon oath if they desire to do so. The Attorney General at Leipzig has been so informed and there would appear to be no reason why this officer should not be brought to trial upon the material which has been furnished to the German Government.

4. In the cases of Trienke and Neumann, the Attorney General at Leipzig asked that statements should be taken from a number of persons whose names were given. His letter of request was despatched before receipt of the volume of evidence handed to the German Ambassador on the 21st October, and the information contained in that volume to a large extent complies with his request. Statements cannot be taken from the further witnesses named until further particulars are given which will enable them to be identified, and it now rests with the Attorney General at Leipzig to supply these particulars.

5. In the cases of Captain Emil Müller and Heinz[e] requests have been made for evidence against the accused to be furnished. The letters making these requests were despatched before the receipt of the volume containing the evidence supplied by H.M. Government, and the evidence in that volume deals with these requests.

A copy of all the relevant correspondence is attached<sup>4</sup> and duplicate copies of some of the longer documents can be furnished if required.<sup>5</sup>

I am, &c.,

R. W. WOODS

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Sir E. Crowe and Lord Curzon commented as follows:

'This is only what was to be expected. I do not think there is any chance of justice being done by the German Court. E. A. C. Dec. 17.'

'Nevertheless it is very serious, and will call for allied action. C 18/12.'

*Report on German propaganda with the object of modifying the Treaty of Versailles<sup>1</sup>*

[C 14617/484/18]

*Secret*G.H.Q., BRITISH FORCES ON THE RHINE, *December 16, 1920*

Propaganda continues vigorously in the newspapers and speeches of all Parties. A year ago the statement that France and Belgium demanded so many locomotives and other rolling stock, that Germany would have to practically shut down railway transport and starve, gained general credence.

As soon as it was seen that the delivery of this forfeited rolling stock was not to be avoided the Press campaign ceased and ample new locomotives and trucks appeared. Nothing has been heard of this matter since, and there has certainly been no shortage.

Coal was the next item to be exploited in the Press. The Allies' firm stand at Spa and the fear of an occupation of the Ruhr ensured the coal deliveries to France, Belgium and Italy, but the newspaper outcry was equal to that about the rolling stock. The coal deliveries would cause the bulk of German factories to shut down and hundreds of thousands would be thrown out of work etc.

As the inevitability of the coal deliveries being adequate becomes more apparent the newspaper propaganda seeks fresh channels and the milch cow question and the cost of the occupation supersedes rolling stock and coal.

Meanwhile such papers as 'Simplicissimus' 'Der Wahre Jakob' 'Jugend' and others, which have previously undergone periods of suppression in occupied territory, are carrying on a vigorous illustrated propaganda against the Allies in general, and France in particular, of a particularly coarse and offensive nature.

There is no doubt that the milch cow agitation will also die a natural death so soon as the delivery is recognised as inevitable, and the 'costs of occupation' propaganda has probably not yet got into its full stride. It has been pointed out by one or two 'Left' papers that this latter grievance is not justified and that not only are the costs of the occupying troops to Germany internal but that the hard cash brought from home and expended by these troops in Rhineland amount[s] to very large sums.

Such large and seemingly excessive claims are paid for damages done by troops in billets in the British Area that one is forced to the conclusion that the Germans have not yet realised that such generosity is to be met by their own Government and is not chargeable against the War indemnity.

A new grievance for propaganda purposes will doubtless crop up if available. If not available then the old questions of Malmédy, coloured troops, or some other subject will be brought back to life.

<sup>1</sup> This report was forwarded on December 22 by the War Office to the Foreign Office where it was received on the following day.

Judging from the above, and judging also from political speeches by ministers and others, it seems clear that an intensive propaganda campaign is in progress with the object of upsetting the Versailles Treaty.

Various reports indicate that this campaign will get into full swing in the New Year.

R. S. PEARSON,  
*Captain*

#### No. 253

*Mr. Seeds (Munich)*<sup>1</sup> to *Earl Curzon (Received December 20, 10.30 p.m.)*

*No. 41 Telegraphic [C 14329/14160/18]*

MUNICH, *December 20, 1920, 1.20 p.m.*

My telegram No. 40.<sup>2</sup>

I learn from Minister of Finance that Loan is being negotiated by Groves, American Commercial Commissioner at Zurich. Money is to be devoted to development of Bavarian Water Power. State-owned undeveloped Water Power to serve as security for Loan with possibly State forests as to . . .<sup>3</sup> He proposes to carry through Loan without consulting Bavarian Parliament.

Loan will presumably imply large contracts to the country giving it. Submit to (? your approval) that British finance interests should at once be approached confidentially with a view to competing for Loan, e.g. Barclay's Bank who are interested in German development. It is advisable that negotiations should be at present confined to finance and be carried on through this Consulate General, as I gather Bavarian Minister of Finance would refuse to entertain direct proposals from British sources while he is negotiating with Americans.

Repeated to Berlin No. 31.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Seeds had been appointed H.M. Consul-General for Bavaria and the Bavarian Palatinate on November 1.

<sup>2</sup> Of December 17, not printed. This reported that the Bavarian Minister of Agriculture had informed Mr. Seeds in confidence that the Americans were offering a loan of two milliard marks to the Bavarian Government for the purchase of food and raw materials. Copies of this telegram and of Mr. Seeds's No. 41, printed above, were sent to the Treasury and the Board of Trade by the Foreign Office who suggested that the matter should, if thought desirable, be brought to the attention of British banks.

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain.

#### No. 254

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 23)*

*No. 1314 [C 14587/45/18]*

BERLIN, *December 20, 1920*

My Lord,

Recent events as reported in my despatch No. 1303 of the 16th instant<sup>1</sup> show a tendency towards increasing resistance on the part of the Germans

<sup>1</sup> No. 335 below.

with regard to the demands of the Allies for fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Peace. It is not impossible that the situation may develop into an acute stage and it will then be necessary to consider what steps can be taken to bring pressure to bear on the German Government. Unfortunately the only means of doing so appear[s] to be the threat of the occupation of the Ruhr and this would be so serious a step that almost any alternative would be preferable. The reimposition of the blockade is obviously no longer possible.

The object which, I submit, we are aiming at is to secure the execution of the Treaty without reducing Germany to chaos. If we reduce her to chaos, we risk hurting ourselves as much as, if not more than, we shall hurt her. Germans are beginning to realise that we know this and to bank on it. They know we do not want chaos, firstly because it would render reparation impossible and secondly because it would mean grave danger of Bolshevism spreading to Germany and infecting the Western Powers.

The question arises whether the time has not come for a considerable change of policy on our part. Germany to a certain degree resembles a schoolboy who has been punished so often that he has become callous to blows and no longer really fears the application of the rod. In such cases a different treatment is frequently found to give better results: viz. the institution of a system of rewards for good behaviour rather than of punishment for bad. Might it not be possible to work out some scheme on these lines—a sort of Borstal system for Germany. The following suggestions occur to me:

That a definite promise should be given to Germany that certain alleviations would be granted to her at the end of, say, every six months provided that the Allies were satisfied that during that period she had fulfilled her obligations. These alleviations might take the form of—

1. Reduction of the term of occupation by the Allied Armies.
2. Reduction of the size of the Armies.

Thus for every six months of satisfactory behaviour, the term of occupation might be reduced by, say, one year and the size of the armies by, say, 1/10th. This after all is only an extension of the principle contained in Article 451 [431] of the Treaty of Versailles.

This would give the Germans something to work for and would enormously strengthen the hands of those saner forces which are anxious to do their duty in bringing about a satisfactory condition of affairs. Any individual, party or organisation guilty of obstruction would be openly branded as unpatriotic and as the direct cause of the postponement of a definite amelioration in the situation.

The advantages of such a policy are obvious: we should get rid of the harmful state of insecurity which is produced by recurrent threats of strong action. We should have on our side all the best currents in the nation: above all we should introduce the element of hope into the situation. On all hands one hears the cry 'Give us some hope. We have nothing to look forward to: whatever happens things can be no worse than they are: whatever efforts we

make our lot will not improve.' At present there is nothing very tangible we can give: little immediate material improvement in the conditions of life is possible: but we can give hope. The psychological effect of hope would be tremendous. The material side of such a policy would also be by no means unappreciable. A reduction in the cost of the Armies of occupation would benefit German finance and increase the possibilities of securing reparation. (I would not advocate that the saving on this head should be definitely earmarked for the Allies—that would mean that we benefitted [*sic*] directly whereas I look rather to the indirect increment we should obtain by improving the general situation of the country.)

The mode of application would be difficult. The Germans would have to be convinced that it was 'a fair deal': that if they carried out their share of the bargain, the Allies would not shirk theirs. Perhaps the best method would be for the Allies to announce the scheme as a provisional experiment for six months with the promise that if it worked satisfactorily for that period it should become permanent.

A broader solution would be that the Council of the League of Nations should be asked to act as arbiters. They would then meet every six months, when the Allies would present to them a record of how far the conditions of the Peace Treaty had been fulfilled during the preceding term. Any complaints would be adjudicated on and the council would decide as to whether Germany had earned her good conduct prize or not. Their decision to be promulgated within a given period—say 6 weeks. It might even be possible to arrange a sliding scale whereby minor infractions would be punished by—say—halving the amount of relief afforded.

This scheme seems to me to contain enormous possibilities. It would introduce a judicial element into the execution of the Treaty: it would show a readiness on the part of the Allies to display impartiality by admitting neutral influences to participate in the task: and it would afford opportunity for the League of Nations to strengthen its position by the performance of a definite and delicate task.

I am fully aware of the difficulties which stand in the way of the realisation of these suggestions. They are, I fear, somewhat crude in form and in the absence of His Majesty's Ambassador I put them forward with some diffidence. Only the very real and imminent danger of a fresh crisis arising in the near future has led me to submit them at once to Your Lordship's consideration, as they seem to me to contain at least the germ of a possible solution of the difficulties with which we are confronted.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

No. 255

*Note from Earl Curzon to Monsieur de Fleuriau*

[C 13918/1113/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 23, 1920*

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum dated the 15th. instant,<sup>1</sup> proposing that instructions should be sent to the Inter-allied Rhineland High Commission to inform the German Commissioner in the occupied territory that any German ministers who in future deliver provocative speeches in that territory will become the object of such action as the allied authorities may think fit to take to ensure the maintenance of order and the safety of the allied troops.

2. The proposed instruction does not make quite clear what precise steps the High Commission is to take in the event of a German Minister proceeding to a repetition of the offence. It being in any case the duty of the High Commission to ensure order and the security of the allied forces, His Majesty's Government presume that the Commission will, if occasion arises, not be found wanting in this task. In these circumstances I should be glad, before concurring in the course now proposed, to receive some further explanation of the intentions of the French Government in the matter.

I have, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This memorandum was communicated by M. de Fleuriau to Lord Curzon and received at the Foreign Office on December 16. In it the French Government said that they did not think that the German note called for any reply, but they submitted for the consideration of the British Government a draft instruction to the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. For a similar communication to the U.S. Government see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920*, vol. ii, pp. 340-1.

No. 256

*Mr. Robertson (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received January 8, 1921)*

No. 593 [C 583/66/18]

COBLENZ, *December 29, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's despatch No. 252 (C 13744/1113/18) of December 14<sup>1</sup> in regard to the suspension of certain German newspapers by the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This transmitted to Mr. Robertson a copy of a memorandum relating to the suspension of newspapers unofficially communicated by the German Embassy on December 13.

I have the honour to forward to Your Lordship herewith a statement showing the exact action taken in regard to the newspapers referred to.

It is not quite correct to state that newspapers are 'suspended', unless they are actually published in Occupied Territory. When they are published in Unoccupied Territory they may be excluded from the Rhineland for such period, up to a maximum of three months, as the High Commission may see fit, under Ordinance No. 13 which amended Article 13 of Ordinance No. 3.

I can assure Your Lordship that the action of which the German Embassy complains is only taken in exceptional cases and after careful consideration. No member of the High Commission is in favour of the suppression or exclusion of newspapers except for grave offences. It is obvious that the display on newspaper stands and the general circulation in occupied territory of newspapers that grossly and unfairly attack the armies of occupation or the Governments of the Allied Powers cannot be tolerated in the interests of public order or of the improvement of relations between the occupying forces and the inhabitants of the Rhineland. Considerable ill-feeling has been aroused amongst the troops by articles of the kind for which the newspapers, referred to by the German Embassy, have been excluded, and I submit that it is too much to expect the occupying authorities to allow calumny and gross misrepresentation to be spread in the Rhineland where they are responsible for the safety of the armies. The High Commission carefully distinguishes between fair comment and malicious propaganda and they are prepared to justify their action in every case.

Your Lordship will notice that the newspapers have, in the majority of cases, been excluded for attacks on the black troops and upon the French generally. These attacks have been of a peculiarly gross character and quite unjustified by the facts. The German Government would be better advised in exercising a controlling influence over the press which they are known to have, rather than in making complaints to the Allied Governments against the action of the High Commission in carrying out an unpleasant duty.

I have, &c.,  
ARNOLD ROBERTSON

#### ENCLOSURE IN No. 256

<i>Title</i>	<i>Offending article</i>	<i>Treatment</i>
<i>Bayerische Staatszeitung</i> (consisting of a purely official sheet and a news portion). Published in Unoccupied Territory.	'The Black Disgrace' 3.6.20. 'Departure of the Senegalese Brigade' 3.6.20. (Comment.) 'German Students against the Black Disgrace' 3.6.20. (manifesto.)	Excluded from Palatinate by local representative of I.A.R.H.C. for 3 days about 10.6.20.

<i>Title</i>	<i>Offending article</i>	<i>Treatment</i>
	<p>'The Black Disgrace' (Protest of Rhineland Association of Women) 27.6.20.</p> <p>'Sufferings of Palatinate Officials' 17.7.20.</p> <p>'An Arbitrary Act of the I.A.R.H.C.' (arrest of Landrat of Neuss) and article on 'Atrocious French annexation Policy on the Saar' 17.8.20.</p> <p>'The Campaign against the Black Ignominy' 26.9.20.</p>	<p>do.—about 1.7.20. (The official portion was allowed to circulate.)</p> <p>I.A.R.H.C. did not suspend but protested to German Commissioner 20.9.20.</p> <p>Excluded from Palatinate 3 days by Representative of I.A.R.H.C. about 20.8.20.</p> <p>Excluded from O.T. by I.A.R.H.C. for a month from Nov. 15. On 2.12.20 the I.A.R.H.C. on the appeal of the German Commissioner, allowed the circulation of the purely official part.</p>
<i>Frankfurter Zeitung.</i> Published in Frankfurt (Unoccupied Territory).	<p>'Coloured Troops of Occupation and Censorship' 18.6.20.</p> <p>'Rapes in the Occupied Territory' 6.8.20 or 8.8.20.</p> <p>'The Plight of Rhineland' 22.8.20.</p>	<p>Excluded from Palatinate by local Representative for 3 days.</p> <p>Excluded from Wiesbaden &amp; Rhenish Hesse by local Representative for 3 days.</p> <p>I.A.R.H.C. excluded from O.T. for one month from 3.9.20.</p>
<i>Mittagsblatt</i> (portion of the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> brought out to evade the prohibition of the <i>F.Z.</i> ).	..	I.A.R.H.C. excluded this paper from O.T. and prolonged the prohibition of the <i>F.Z.</i> to 18.10.20.
<i>Rheinische Nachrichten.</i> Published in Braubach (O.T.).	<p>Sentence 'the Declaration addressed by the Allies to Germany is coarse in tone—i.e., worded in the usual French way' 30.4.20.</p> <p>'American Protest against the Black Troops' 1.7.20.</p> <p>'French Revenge on German Prisoners of War' 22.7.20.</p>	<p>Prohibited in Kreis St. Goarshausen by local Representative for 3 days.</p> <p>do. (for the 4th time).</p> <p>do. I.A.R.H.C. prohibited for 15 days from 1.9.20.</p>
<i>Neue Badische Landeszeitung.</i> Published Mannheim (Unoccupied).	<p>'Mangin—Degoutte' (Foch's knavish plans, Dorten &amp;c.) 27.4.20.</p> <p>'Ill-treatment of Alsations in French Barracks' 16.4.20.</p> <p>'Coloured Troops in O.T.' 26.5.20.</p>	<p>No action taken.</p>



<i>Title</i>	<i>Offending article</i>	<i>Treatment</i>
<i>Neue Badische Landeszeitung.</i> Published Mannheim (Unoccupied).	'French difficulties in the Palatinate' (French oppressive measures in the Ludwigshafen strike). Quotes protest of Rhenish-Westphalian Press Conference against black troops. 'Triumph of the people of Gleiwitz (Upper Silesia) against the French' 18.6.20. 'French dishonour graves of German soldiers' 22.7.20. 'French Justice' (brutalities in O.T. and Frankfurt) 21.8.20. 'The Real Culprits' (the Breslau affair) 1.9.20.	Excluded from Palatinate by local Representative for 3 days.  I.A.R.H.C. excluded from O.T. for 1 month from 5.9.20. Excluded from Palatinate for 3 days. No further action in view of above exclusion for one month.
<i>Essener Allgemeine Zeitung.</i> Published Essen (Unoccupied).	'In Coblenz Jail' (an untrue attack on American prison methods &c.) 8.8.20.	I.A.R.H.C. excluded from O.T. for 3 months from 15.9.20.
<i>Solinger Volksblatt.</i> Published Solingen (O.T.).	Article against black troops, 11.8.20.	I.A.R.H.C. prohibited for 15 days from 20.9.20.
<i>Trierer Zeitung.</i> Published Treves (O.T.). <i>Rheinische Rundschau.</i> Published Coblenz (O.T.).	Article against the French in Upper Silesia 23.8.20. (These are two editions of the same paper).	I.A.R.H.C. suspended for 1 month from 1.11.20.
<i>Freie Wort.</i> Published Essen (Unoccupied).	Violent articles against the 'French Bandits and cut-throats', the 'British slaverdealers' [ <i>sic</i> ], on their brutality in O.T., black troops &c. 8.8.20, 18.8.20, 29.8.20. An extremely monarchist paper.	I.A.R.H.C. excluded from O.T. for one month from Nov. 1 because of article on 29.8.20.
<i>Süddeutsche Monatshefte.</i> Published Munich (Unoccupied).  29.12.20.	Heft No. 9. 7th year, was devoted to 'Die Franzosen' e.g. an article 'Criticism of French methods of warfare' (breach of international war [ <i>sic</i> ], atrocities &c.); and on O.T.	I.A.R.H.C. excluded from O.T. for 3 months from 1.9.20.

*Mr. Robertson (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received January 3, 1921)*

*No. 594 [C 66/66/18]*

COBLENZ, *December 29, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward to Your Lordship herewith copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> which the High Commission have addressed to the Reichskommissar, warning him that should German Ministers again make speeches in the Rhineland, such as those complained of by the Allied Embassies at Berlin, they will, in the same way as any other person, render themselves liable to the measures taken by the High Commission to assure the maintenance of public order and the security of the Allied troops.

The Belgian and French High Commissioners have received instructions from their Governments to send a communication in the above sense to the German Commissioner and they informed me that similar instructions were being sent to me by Your Lordship. It was at first intended to send to the German Commissioner a Note signed by all the three High Commissioners, but as the American Commanding General expressed his desire to associate himself with our action, and as, owing to the delicacy of his position, he could not himself sign a Note, it was finally decided that it should be sent in the name of the High Commission as such.

As the Note, in effect, merely warns the German Commissioner that Ordinances of the High Commission must be obeyed even by German Ministers, I did not think it necessary to ask Your Lordship for instructions to associate myself with it, and I trust that the action of the High Commission will meet with your approval.<sup>2</sup>

I have, &c.,

ARNOLD ROBERTSON

<sup>1</sup> Of December 28, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> After a minute proposing approval of Mr. Robertson's action by Mr. Wigram had been endorsed by Mr. Waterlow and initialled by Sir E. Crowe, Lord Curzon commented as follows: 'But I would prefer not to approve of Mr. Robertson's action, since in fact I disapprove of it. I would therefore, as the late Lord Salisbury's hall porter once remarked, say "nothink to nobody". C 4/1.'

## CHAPTER IV

### Allied Military Control of Germany

July 6–December 31, 1920

No. 258

*Mr. Barclay (Stockholm) to Earl Curzon (Received July 20)*

*No. 541 [C 1760/59/18]*

*Confidential*

STOCKHOLM, *July 10, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's Despatches No. 178 Confidential of the 14th ultimo<sup>1</sup> (202536/39) and No. 182 of the 16th ultimo (203103/39)<sup>1</sup> respecting the importation of German aeroplanes into Sweden, I took the opportunity of the arrival of two further German machines reported in the Press to have landed at Malmö on June 30th from Köingsthal [? Königstal], and at Lindö, Norrköping, on the 6th instant, to mention the matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to call his attention to the fact that he had not replied to the Note of protest from the Allied Legations of the 29th of April (See my Despatch No. 354 of April 29th 1920).<sup>1</sup>

Baron Palmstierna replied that as Sweden was not a party to the Treaty of Peace, she was naturally not bound by it; the Allies had no redress against Sweden but against Germany. He would however tell me privately that he had gone into the matter carefully and had ascertained that the Swedish Government had not brought [*sic*] any German aeroplanes.

In answer to my question as to whether it would be possible for the Swedish Government to furnish me with a list of German aeroplanes imported into Sweden, of which the Customs Authorities must have cognizance, he said that this was not possible, for aeroplanes paid duty under Article 1098 of the Tariff, as 'Vehicles'. They were not entered as aeroplanes even in the detailed Customs Reports which he had studied.

I have, &c.,

COLVILLE BARCLAY

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received July 19)*

*No. 43 [C 1631/113/18]*

MUNICH, July 10, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 28 of this day<sup>1</sup> reporting on the attitude taken up by the Bavarian government towards the disarmament conditions signed by the German representatives at Spa.

I called on the Prime Minister this afternoon in order to ascertain more clearly the intentions of his government. His Excellency told me that the news that the Einwohnerwehr was to be disarmed had caused great excitement in the whole of Bavaria and that he and his cabinet had decided to issue the statement, of which I gave the substance in the telegram mentioned above, in order to calm public opinion. I said that to take up at present so uncompromising an attitude and to express it in so unequivocal language would, in my opinion, make it all the more difficult to carry out later the undertaking given on behalf of the whole of Germany. He replied that he was not yet in possession of the official text of the protocol or agreement signed and that he was therefore not in a position to discuss it in detail.

Herr von Kahr was very strongly of the opinion that the German delegates at Spa should have refused to accept the disarmament conditions. He said that the question of the desirability and necessity of maintaining the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr might be considered one of opinion, though he had no doubts himself, but that the impossibility of disarming it was a matter of fact and that, as a[n] honest man, he would not have signed an agreement which he knew that he could not fulfil. He added that he was persuaded that the French would sooner or later occupy the Ruhr district and that the time and occasion of that event were a matter of little importance.

I enquired what attitude his government would take up when the central government, as may be anticipated, requests it to disarm the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr. He replied with irony and bitterness that he will ask the government at Berlin to make a start by disarming the working classes in the Ruhr district and that they should then, on the strength of the experience gained there, devise a scheme which might be applicable to the rest of Germany.

I also gathered at this interview that the statement made in the Landtag at Stuttgart<sup>2</sup> and the statement issued in the press here had not been pre-arranged between the governments of Württemberg [*sic*] and Bavaria.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram reported the gist of a Bavarian Government statement to the effect that it had repeatedly made representations to the Central Government that the Einwohnerwehr and Sicherheitswehr could not be dispensed with and that the Allied demands for their disbandment should be refused. The statement added that the news from Spa had not caused the Bavarian Government to alter its attitude.

<sup>2</sup> This statement was reported by Mr. Smallbones to have been equally uncompromising.

It appears to me that the Bavarian government could have 'calmed public opinion' by making a much less unequivocal pronouncement. I have in fact good reason for stating that it had decided on a statement of the kind issued, before public opinion had time to express itself. Herr von Kahr and the party which he represents seem to feel that they have again been betrayed by Berlin and they are probably prepared to take this opportunity of dissolving the irksome partnership.

The new Landtag will meet on the 15th instant and the cabinet, which is practically formed, will then present itself. I learn that its program is distinctly 'federalistic', it may, by then, become disruptive.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

No. 260

*Mr. Leslie (Reval) to Mr. Porter (Libau)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 11 Telegraphic [C 1849/59/18]*

REVAL, July 16, 1920

Following for Senior Naval Officer Baltic.

Polish Military Attaché informs British Military Representative that ship containing 400,000 rifles and 200,000,000 cartridges bought by Bolsheviks in Germany will sail from either Hamburg or Lübeck for Reval. Name of ship and date of sailing unknown.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Riga and as No. 151 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 18 at 9 p.m. Mr. J. E. P. Leslie was H.M. Consul at Reval, and Mr. A. E. Porter temporary Vice-Consul at Libau.

<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Office sent a copy of this telegram to Lord Kilmarnock on July 21 and requested him to inform the Commission of Control.

No. 261

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 21, 9.50 p.m.)*

*No. 838 Telegraphic [C 1897/1897/18]*

PARIS, July 21, 1920, 6.40 p.m.

I went this morning with D'Abernon, Hankey and Radcliffe<sup>1</sup> to see President of the Council and Weygand. D'Abernon read your telegram to Soviet Government<sup>2</sup> to which President of the Council made no comment or criticism. He at once agreed to association of a French delegation with British one.

<sup>1</sup> Lord D'Abernon, Sir M. Hankey, and General Sir P. Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations, War Office, were members of the special British mission which was being despatched to Poland jointly with a French Mission.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 59, n. 6.

Weygand will be the military member and civil one will be nominated this afternoon. D'Abernon then made statement as to scope of mission and procedure to be adopted and this was accepted. President of the Council read letter<sup>3</sup> he had just received from Göppert, head of German Delegation in Paris, stating that as Soviet troops were now within comparatively easy distance of frontier, it was necessary to take steps to defend Germany. Göppert suggested that it would be necessary to arm portion of German population to serve behind screen of regular German troops: he asked that this should not be considered as being contrary to Spa agreement and he further asked for permission to move these troops through plebiscite areas of Marienwerder and Allenstein. President of the Council said he would see Göppert: he was not disposed to agree to proposition but would temporize.

The question was then raised as to whether Germany would sell some of her war material to Poles. It was pointed out that general principle adopted so far with regard to such material was that it was not permissible for Germany to sell material which under Peace Treaty has to be destroyed, but that such decision might now be modified:<sup>4</sup> on the other hand Germany might refuse to sell. President of the Council said he would sound German Minister on the subject.

Meeting was most cordial and harmonious and delegation will leave tomorrow, Friday evening.<sup>5</sup>

D'Abernon has seen this telegram and wishes me to add that he was entirely satisfied with interview.

Will you kindly telegraph me immediately your views on Göppert's proposal.

<sup>3</sup> This letter dated July 21 is not printed. A copy was transmitted to the Foreign Office under cover of Lord Derby's despatch, No. 2378 of July 26.

<sup>4</sup> For reference to the Polish note of July 13 requesting such a modification see Volume XI, No. 361, n. 4.

<sup>5</sup> In his telegram, No. 839 of July 21, Lord Derby said 'For "Friday evening" please read "Thursday evening"'.  
  
**No. 262**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 814<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [C 1993/1897/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 22, 1920, 10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 838.<sup>2</sup>

His Majesty's Government consider that Allied troops should be withdrawn from plebiscite areas in East Prussia immediately and that Reichswehr troops should be allowed to advance to German frontier for purposes of defence provided German Government make it clear to Polish Government that such movement is purely defensive and submit to Allied authorities

<sup>1</sup> A note on the file makes clear that this telegram was concerted by the Prime Minister and Mr. Kerr.

<sup>2</sup> No. 261.

details of strength of forces which they propose to send through Polish corridor.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time His Majesty's Government consider that Allies should refuse request of German Government to arm population in East Prussia in view of the fact that a large proportion of the inhabitants are already said to be armed and that there is a strong body of Einwohnerwehr and Sicherheits-polizei in the country.

<sup>3</sup> The substance of the French reply to H.M.G.'s suggestion is contained in No. 387 of Volume XI.

## No. 263

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)*

*No. 872 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, July 26, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this afternoon, M. Jules Cambon being in the chair:

. . .<sup>1</sup> (2) The Conference considered Sir R. Tower's despatch No. 108 to the Conference of Ambassadors of June 29th<sup>2</sup> regarding the destruction of air material at Danzig. It was decided to send instructions to Sir R. Tower to hand over this material to the Aeronautical Commission of Control for destruction. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In this despatch Sir R. Tower, League of Nations High Commissioner and Temporary Administrator of the Free City of Danzig, said that he was unwilling to proceed to the destruction of all this material unless instructed to do so by the President of the Conference of Ambassadors.

## No. 264

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received August 3)*

*No. 50 [C 2895/59/18]*

MUNICH, July 26, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that I have received reliable information to the effect that 40 railway trucks of 5 tons each containing small arms passed through Brannenburg near Kufstein, the Austrian frontier station, a few days ago. My informant thought it probable that those arms were to be concealed in the mountains in view of the impending disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr. It is also possible that they are intended for the peasants in the Tyrol. I have reported in my despatch No. 38 of the 1st. instant,<sup>1</sup> on page 8, that arms are supposed to have been distributed in this manner.

<sup>1</sup> Volume IX, No. 553.

I informed at once the senior British officer on the Inter-Allied Commission at Munich who promised to take the necessary steps to have the matter investigated. I also mentioned it to the French Minister in order to show that I wish to co-operate with him cordially.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

## No. 265

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received July 28, 10.30 a.m.)*

*No. 590 Telegraphic [C 2377/1897/18]*

WARSAW, July 27, 1920, 4.30 p.m.

Following from Lord D'Abernon, begins:—

General Bingham reports that immediately on his return from Spa General von Seeckt<sup>1</sup> interviewed German Liaison Officers who deal with Mission of Control for disarmament. He informed them that if any officer put slightest obstruction in the way of disarmament he would take strongest measures against him even to expulsion from the Army.

General Bingham is informed that he had sent similar orders to Reichswehr Commanders. The Spa Conference has, if anything, helped work of Commission, and spasmodic opposition to it that has been encountered is becoming less evident.

In General Bingham's opinion German Government is doing its best to carry out disarmament terms but bribery and corruption are rampant in German offices and there is no question that missing rifles (number perhaps two millions) are being handled by a secret organisation and gradually exported both to Russia and to Poland.

General Bingham believes Harbour-Master at Hamburg is in pay of smuggling export syndicate.

<sup>1</sup> Chief of the German *Heeresleitung* (Army Command).

## No. 266

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 257 Telegraphic [C 2307/59/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1920, 6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 448 (of 29th July:<sup>1</sup> Signature of additional disarmament protocol).<sup>2</sup>

Through an oversight original disarmament protocol of July 9th<sup>3</sup> contained no clause providing for the enactment by Germany of legislation prohibiting

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For the French text see *Documents relatifs aux réparations* (Paris, 1922), vol. i, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 190; see Volume VIII, No. 52, n. 5.



the export of war material in accordance with her obligations under Article 170 of the Treaty.

Spa Conference therefore decided to draft an additional protocol to cover this omission. A clause was also inserted<sup>4</sup> intended to ensure the fulfilment of Articles 201 and 202, by providing for the prohibition by Germany of the manufacture and importation of air material until three months after the complete fulfilment of Article 202. This clause would have been unnecessary if Germany had carried out the provisions of Article 202.

The Secretary-General of the Conference was instructed to communicate this additional protocol to the German Delegation with the necessary explanations. I gather, however, that these explanations were never given.

In any joint representations, therefore, which you, with your Allied colleagues may make to the German Government as to the desirability of immediate signature, you should see that the circumstances, in which the additional protocol was drafted, are made plain. You should also if necessary point out that neither of these provisions imply any amendment to the treaty. They are intended only to ensure the execution by Germany of treaty obligations which she has already accepted.

Copies of both protocols follow by bag.

<sup>4</sup> According to a lengthy minute by Sir C. Hurst, dated July 29, this clause was inserted as a result of representations made to the Drafting Committee by the Commission on the Aeronautical Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

#### No. 267

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 7, 8 p.m.)*

*No. 467 Telegraphic [C 3279/3273/18]*

BERLIN, August 5, 1920, 2.15 p.m.

In the course of investigations which are being carried on by General Bingham in connection with seizure of arms it has transpired that there are Irish revolutionaries in Berlin who are trying to buy machine guns.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to a confidential report, forwarded to the Foreign Office by the War Office on September 16, Sinn Fein agents and the German Irish Society were negotiating with Messrs. Benthien and Brunck of 67 Behrenstrasse, Berlin, for the purchase of more than a 100 million marks' worth of machine guns and small arms. Messrs. Frankel and Puls, licensed dealers in arms, of Hamburg, were also said to have sold 500,000 rifles, &c., to Sinn Fein during March, 1920.

#### No. 268

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 9)*

*No. 926 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, August 5, 1920

In accordance with the decision taken at the meeting of the Ambassadors' Conference of the 26th ultimo to adjourn it (see Lord Derby's telegram

No. 872, paragraph 14,<sup>1</sup> of that date), M. Cambon summoned this morning a meeting of representatives of the various Embassies to consult with them on questions which in his opinion required to be dealt with at once.

In Lord Derby's absence at Evian, I attended, and there were also present representatives of the United States, Italian and Japanese Embassies.

. . .<sup>2</sup> (6) Monsieur Cambon brought before the meeting the German Note, substance of which was communicated to you in the Paris telegram No. 899 of August 1st,<sup>1</sup> and in which the German Government request to be allowed to send Reichswehr troops into Allenstein territory, to maintain neutrality. Monsieur Cambon asked that the Embassies should obtain as soon as possible the views of their respective Governments with regard to this request.

General Desticker<sup>3</sup> took the opportunity to point out that according to the German request the German Government were to be authorised to send as many troops as they thought fit to Allenstein. He argued that in any case the Allied Governments should stipulate that the numbers to be sent to Allenstein should be fixed by General Nollet. It was felt by the meeting that these various questions affecting Allenstein needed decisions on the part of the various Governments. The views of His Majesty's Government have already been requested in the Paris telegram No. 912.<sup>1</sup> . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> Assistant Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch.

## No. 269

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 6, 11.30 p.m.)*

*No. 936 Telegraphic [C 3235/1897/18]*

PARIS, August 6, 1920, 9.25 p.m.

German delegation have sent a note No. 322 to President of Peace Conference dated August 5th,<sup>1</sup> substance of which is as follows:—

Refers to request for formation of voluntary force for defence of East Prussia made in its note of July 21st.<sup>2</sup> (see my despatch No. 2378<sup>2</sup> of August<sup>3</sup> 26th) and states that though frontier has not been violated by Bolshevik troops, fighting is proceeding close to it and Bolshevik propaganda is spreading; that population are seriously alarmed and are spontaneously forming local militia for their own defence. This movement cannot be prevented and in order to avoid its becoming irregular, German Government are organising it in those places where temper of population renders it necessary. Object is purely defence and maintenance of order and German Government hope that Allies will approve their action.

Refers to German delegation's note of July 30th (see my telegram 899 of August 1st)<sup>1</sup> requesting that Inter-Allied plebiscite commission in Allenstein should, in concert with German commission, call Reichswehr troops into

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 261, n.3.

<sup>3</sup> Emended on the filed copy to read 'July'.

plebiscite area. No reply has been received and no troops have so far been sent in. But as it is impossible in present circumstances to leave area without military protection German Government will be obliged to send troops into those parts of territory where their presence may be required owing to departure of Allied troops.

Copy of Note by bag tonight.

Repeated to Allenstein.

## No. 270

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 263 Telegraphic [C 3273/3273/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 7, 1920, 10 p.m.*

Report has been received<sup>1</sup> that Mr. John Gaffney formerly American Consul at Munich is sending arms from Augsburg to Stettin whence they are sent to Ireland by Mr. R. Dummer. Other consignments are sent by Carl Bernhardt of Hamburg to Irish Oversea Trading and Shipping Company of Dublin.

Please inform Commission of Control.

<sup>1</sup> In an autograph note from M. de Fleuriau communicated by him to Sir E. Crowe on August 6.

## No. 271

*Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the German Chargé d'Affaires*  
*[C 4209/1897/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 7, 1920*

The German Chargé d'Affaires in handing me the attached note<sup>1</sup> today, summarized and explained it as follows.

On June 21, the German Govt. approached the conference at Paris with the request that no objection should be raised to the formation in East Prussia of local volunteer forces for the protection of their homes in case of violation of the frontier by the Russians, such volunteer forces to be also employed where necessary for the strengthening of the regular frontier troops.

M. Millerand is stated to have informed the German Chargé d'Affaires at Paris that if such volunteer forces were to be formed spontaneously by the inhabitants, there could hardly be any objection.

Since then, these local organisations have assumed considerable proportions, in view of the growing apprehension, among the population, of a Russian invasion.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

In these circumstances, the German government have instructed their administrative representation in East Prussia to take control of their bodies and superintend this formation where the need for them is felt.

The German government ask the Allied governments to intimate their assent to these measures.

Further, the German govt., as notified to the conference on July 30, ask that the inter-allied Plebiscite Commission at Allenstein be authorized to arrange with the German authorities for the introduction of German regular troops to any part of the plebiscite area as from which allied troops are withdrawn. The German govt. will feel compelled to send in their troops if at any place the withdrawal of the allied forces renders it necessary to afford special protection.

Mr. Sthamer added that according to a communication received from the Italian government, the Italian troops would be withdrawn on the 9th,<sup>2</sup> and that in all probability the withdrawal of the British troops would follow immediately.

I said that I could not make a definite statement, but thought it likely that by the time the allied troops were withdrawn, the work of the Plebiscite Commission would be finished, so that the districts could simultaneously be handed over to the administration of the country in whose favour the plebiscite had decided. Should this be the case the German government would automatically be in a position to move their troops into the areas handed over to them. (This is what we have instructed Lord Derby to urge upon the Ambassadors' conference.)

Mr. Sthamer was urgent for the earliest possible decision.

In a short general conversation which followed, Mr Sthamer asked that we should place full confidence in the loyal intentions of his government. They were determined on the one hand to keep out the Bolshevik danger from East Prussia by all the means in their power. On the other hand they would not tolerate any recrudescence of the adventures such as had created so much difficulty in the past, when the German government was faced with the von der Goltz intrigues and the Kapp 'Putsch'.

He had moreover the impression that there was some improvement in the Polish situation. It was still probable that the Moscow government wanted peace especially as a victorious Russian army having conquered Poland, might easily be found a dangerous rival to the existing Soviet oligarchy.

E. A. C.

<sup>2</sup> For the withdrawal of Italian troops see Nos. 631 and 632 below.

*Note communicated by the French Chargé d'Affaires to Earl Curzon  
(Received August 11)*

[C 3559/1897/18]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES, 9 Août, 1920

Monsieur Millerand a reçu, en qualité de Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, une lettre en date du 5 Août<sup>1</sup> du Président de la Délégation allemande de la Paix.

Dans ce document, le Gouvernement allemand se déclare obligé, en raison des circonstances actuelles, de prendre en main l'organisation des milices de Prusse Orientale que la population se disposerait à former spontanément pour protéger les frontières contre l'invasion bolcheviste. Monsieur Göppert fait connaître que le Président de la Prusse Orientale a été autorisé à procéder à cette organisation dans les districts où les demandes et où l'état d'esprit de la population l'y obligent.

La lettre adressée à Monsieur Millerand ajoute: 'Le Gouvernement allemand croit pouvoir espérer que les Gouvernements alliés voudront bien approuver les mesures prises.' Se référant ensuite à sa lettre du 30 Juillet,<sup>2</sup> Monsieur Göppert déclare que le Gouvernement du Reich sera obligé d'envoyer des troupes dans les parties du territoire où par suite du départ des troupes alliées le besoin s'en ferait sentir.

Sur le premier point, Monsieur Millerand estime qu'il n'est pas possible, sans violer les clauses du Traité et le Protocole de Spa sur le désarmement, d'autoriser le Gouvernement allemand à constituer des milices locales dans la province la plus imbuë d'idées militaires. Le Gouvernement français demande donc au Gouvernement britannique de bien vouloir envoyer à son Représentant à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs des instructions lui prescrivant d'inviter en termes formels le Gouvernement allemand à révoquer les ordres donnés au Président de la Prusse Orientale et à faire dissoudre d'urgence les milices déjà constitués.

La proposition tendant à l'envoi de forces allemandes dans les zones de plébiscites dès le retrait des forces alliées fait ressortir le désir du Gouvernement allemand de prendre largement contact avec les forces russes. Monsieur Millerand y voit une raison nouvelle pour maintenir les contingents alliés à Marienwerder et à Allenstein. L'opinion du Gouvernement français sur ce point a été exprimé à diverses reprises au Gouvernement britannique soit à Lord Derby par Monsieur Millerand lui-même, soit à Lord d'Abernon par Monsieur Jusserand,<sup>3</sup> soit au Foreign Office par Monsieur Paul Cambon (Note de cette Ambassade en date du 25 Juillet dernier).<sup>4</sup> Monsieur de Fleuriau a été invité à attirer de nouveau l'attention de Lord Curzon sur cette situation et à affirmer que le Gouvernement français était moins que

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See No. 269.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. See Nos. 269 and 271.

<sup>3</sup> French Ambassador in Washington and civilian member of the special French mission to Poland (see No. 261).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

jamais partisan de l'évacuation des zones de plébiscite d'Allenstein et de Marienwerder.

Le Chargé d'Affaires de France saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à Sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères les assurances de sa très haute considération.

No. 273

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 12)*

*No. 2580 [C 3685/59/18]*

PARIS, August 10, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 2287 (C 122/59/18) of the 5th ultimo<sup>1</sup> regarding a Note warning Neutral Governments against the importation of German War Material, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an amended text of the Note from which the expression 'unfriendly act' is omitted.

The Secretariat General have telegraphed this to the French Representatives in all the neutral countries whose names appear in the annex to the Pact of the League of Nations with instructions that it is to be presented to the neutral Governments concerned by the Doyen among the Allied Representatives. This manner of presenting the note is in accord with the precedent established by the decision of the Conference in regard to the communication of Treaties to neutral Governments. (See my telegram No. 751 of June 23rd, section 7.<sup>2</sup>)

I have, &c.,

(For Sir G. Grahame)

ORME SARGENT

<sup>1</sup> No. 114.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The Foreign Office on August 17 sent a circular telegram to H.M. representatives the countries concerned informing them of the action of the Secretariat General of the Conference of Ambassadors. In a subsequent letter of September 4 to Mr. Sargent Mr. Phipps said that Sir M. Findlay had suggested that the British representatives in the countries concerned should in future be consulted before such notes were despatched: 'We agree that this is a very reasonable request and will take steps to see that it is done here in future. Will you please do the same at your end?' For Mr. Sargent's reply see No. 290 below.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 273

*Allied Note to Neutral Governments regarding the export of German War material to Neutral Governments*

*August 9, 1920*

L'attention des Principales Puissances Alliées [*sic*] a été depuis plusieurs mois constamment attirée sur l'exportation de matériel de guerre allemand vers les pays neutres. Le plus souvent ce matériel y est simplement entreposé pour le compte de maisons allemandes ou bien il est réexporté vers des régions où les hostilités sont encore en cours.

Déjà les Gouvernements alliés sur la demande de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs sont intervenus auprès de certains Gouvernements neutres pour leur montrer les dangers auxquels ils s'exposent en se désintéressant de cette question. Il ne semble pas que ces démarches aient été suivies d'un plein effet.

Le fait de ne pas intervenir efficacement pour arrêter ce trafic permet à des factions politiques allemandes de constituer en terrain neutre des dépôts d'armes qui peuvent être utilisés par elles le cas échéant et, de plus, facilite l'approvisionnement en armes des régions du monde où l'œuvre de pacification se heurte aux plus grandes difficultés. Il ne saurait vous échapper qu'une telle politique est difficilement compatible avec les devoirs de la neutralité et est de nature à faire peser sur le Gouvernement qui la pratique une très lourde responsabilité.

D'autre part, il n'est pas contestable que ce trafic est contraire aux stipulations du Traité de Versailles. Les Principales Puissances alliées ne mettent pas en doute la volonté qui anime votre Gouvernement de respecter ce Traité dont le texte lui a déjà été communiqué; elles comptent qu'il voudra bien prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que les clauses de cet acte international soient strictement observées sur votre territoire.

Toute autre attitude ne pourrait que nuire aux bonnes relations entre les Principales Puissances alliées et votre Gouvernement.

#### No. 274

#### *Note from Earl Curzon to the French Chargé d'Affaires*

[C 3559/1897/18]

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 12, 1920

Sir,

With reference to your memorandum of August 9th<sup>1</sup> in regard to the organisation by the German Government of a militia in East Prussia, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government consider that the German Government have already in the Reichswehr, Sicherheitspolitzei and Einwohnerwehr sufficient armed forces in East Prussia, and that they should create no new forces.

2. His Majesty's Government accordingly consider that the reply to the German Delegation's note of August 5th should be to the above effect. They feel, however, that the despatch at the present juncture of a definite demand to the German Government to disband the militia which they have organised, would serve no useful purpose as the German Government would probably be unable to comply even if they wished to do so.

3. As regards the request of the German Government for permission to send armed forces into the Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscite areas, the French Government are already aware that His Majesty's Government are urging that the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of July 26th relative to the plebiscite results in these areas<sup>2</sup> should be notified to the

<sup>1</sup> No. 272.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 620 below, n. 4.

German and to the Polish Governments on August 15th.<sup>3</sup> As the German Government will have the right immediately these plebiscite results have been formally notified, to send armed forces into those portions of the former plebiscite areas allotted to Germany as into all other parts of German territory, it appears to His Majesty's Government that no reply to this latter request of the German Government is necessary.

I have, &c.,  
(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>3</sup> See No. 631 below.

**No. 275**

*Sir R. Graham (The Hague) to Earl Curzon (Received August 16)*

*No. 640 [C 3946/59/18]*

THE HAGUE, August 12, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 486 of 28th May last,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship, herewith, a Note from the Military Attaché to this Legation on the subject of the continued leakage of war material from Germany into Holland. I agree with Colonel Temperley in the opinion that this leakage is not taking place on any extensive scale. At the same time, it undoubtedly exists. I propose, again, to call the attention of the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs to the matter at the earliest opportunity.

The French Chargé d'Affaires visited me recently, and communicated to me the resolution by the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris deciding that an Allied Note should be addressed to the Neutral Governments calling their attention to the unfriendly character of this traffic in arms with Germany. He also communicated to me a copy of the Note which the Japanese Minister, as Doyen of the Allied Ministers here, will present to Monsieur van Karnebeek on the subject. Monsieur Otchiai, with whom I am keeping touch in the matter, informs me that he is presenting this Note to Monsieur van Karnebeek this afternoon.

I have, &c.,  
R. GRAHAM

<sup>1</sup> No. 79.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 275

*Memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Temperley*

*August 12, 1920*

The leakage of war material from Germany into this country continues. The volume of material here quoted is not great, but the tendency is significant. The creation of small flying schools and aerodromes in this country supplied with smuggled German aeroplanes and German pilots and mechanics



and located near the frontier has two advantages (1) it evades the Treaty of Versailles and prevents the aeroplanes falling into Allied hands (2) the machines can readily be reintroduced into Germany at a critical moment.

(a) A small aerodrome with hangers and 6 machines at Cuyck [Cuyjk] a/Maas. Mechanics are all ex-German Flying Corps. Hans Lutz, ex-pilot of German Flying Corps, is manager. The owner of the enterprise is a Dutchman by name Van Eyken.

(b) A similar enterprise with 4 machines at Hengeloo [Hengelo] called the A.M.I.T. More machines are expected here.

(c) A similar enterprise on a much larger scale at Ede owned by Carley, a well-known German spy. I have not any details of the number of machines here, but they could easily be obtained.

(d) A letter from a Delft firm which came into my hands, offering 700 German aero engines for sale, as under:

From B. H. Croon & Co. Delft.

We have pleasure to inform you we can offer you 700 aero engines consisting of Benz 150 H.P., Mercedes 160 H.P., and Arhus 200 H.P. Approximate weight of motors 4 Kgs. per H.P. Each engine complete with 2 Z.H.6 magnetos, carburettors, tubing and 12 plugs per engine.

*Price* Delivered in Germany 15,000 Marks each.

*Delivery* Immediate.

*Conditions of Motors.* New.

No difficulties will be placed in the way of exporting the motors.

(e) The Marine Department is expecting 12 20 centimetre guns from Krupp to be delivered shortly for the cruisers Java and Sumatra, now under construction. 8 of these guns have already been delivered, but I have not yet been able to ascertain whether they were delivered during the war or subsequent to the Versailles Treaty.

A. C. TEMPERLEY  
*Lieut.-Col.*  
A.M.A.

## No. 276

*General Nollet to Lieut.-General von Cramon*

*No. 964 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, August 12, 1920

To Lieut.-General von Cramon, Military Representative of the German Government to the I.A.M.C. Berlin.

It has been brought to my knowledge that an order No. 1.322/7.20.IV H-Friko dated the 24th July 1920 and signed by the Chief of the Military Staff General von Seeckt, contains the following paragraph:

'According to the terms of Article 206 paragraph 2, it is to be understood

that visits cannot take place except in the presence of a German officer, as accredited representative of the German Government. This right has been recognised by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control.

'From this it results that the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control is bound to allow the German Liaison service to put accompanying officers at the disposal of the Control officers, notifying it in time of the date of the visits. . . .'

Not a single note issued by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and sent by me to the German Government justifies the above point of view.

Everything on the contrary formally contradicts it.

The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control protests against the meaning of the order of the 24th July mentioned above. I have the honour to demand the correction of this order.

NOLLET

Forwarded for information to the I.A.A.C.C.

No. 277

*Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received August 17)*

*No. 692 [C 4050/3942/18]*

BERLIN, August 13, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to the sixth paragraph of my despatch No. 690 of yesterday's date,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship the following details regarding the so-called 'Escherich' organisation, or, as it is frequently abbreviated, the 'Orgesch':—

Herr Escherich, a man of 50 and a forestry commissioner ('Forstrat') by profession, is the commander ('Landeshauptmann') of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr. He has held this appointment since that body, which had originally been raised somewhat sporadically after the Munich Soviet rising of 1919, was given a centralised organisation. Recently Herr Escherich has attempted to extend his organisation in two directions: Northern Germany and German Austria. He personally visited the Tyrol and in a speech delivered at Innsbruck [*sic*] declared himself ready to affiliate the local Heimatwehr to his own Bavarian Einwohnerwehr. At the same time attempts were made to create similar affiliated bodies in Northern Germany. The idea underlying this policy was no doubt the belief, which is said to be shared by Herr von Kahr and Dr. Heim, and other leading Bavarian politicians, that Bavaria is the centre of law and order from which the whole of Germany will one day be rescued from Bolshevism and reorganised.

So far the facts are fairly well established. Quite recently, however, a number of controversial statements have been published regarding the 'Orgesch' which can only be accepted with a certain reserve. According to an article appearing in 'Freiheit' on the 5th instant, an agreement was reached between the 'Orgesch' and the Ministry for Defence on the 12th

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

June last. By this agreement the 'Orgesch' was to receive official recognition and financial support from the State. The 'Orgesch' on its part was to lend its assistance to the Government in the event of disturbances of the public order and to work under the command of the military authorities. Further the 'Orgesch' was to be organised in four commands, which were to be subordinated to the Reichswehr Group Commands:—

1. North-Western Command, Headquarters, Hanover.
2. North-Eastern Command, Headquarters, Berlin and Hamburg.
3. Hesse Command, Headquarters, Marburg.
4. Southern Command, Headquarters, Munich.

On the 5th instant Herr Escherich himself published a statement declaring that his organisation represented all classes, that it stood for law and order against the use of violence whether from the Right or the Left, that the organisation in Northern Germany was largely unarmed, and that it was at the disposal of the constitutional government for use in the interests of law and order and for the protection of life and property.

On about the same date the Government issued a declaration to the effect that they had no relations of any kind with the Escherich organisation. Similar declarations were issued by the Prussian Government and by the Ministry for Defence. The Prussian Minister for the Interior further stated that he had issued express orders for the suppression of the organisation. Herr Noske, who is now Oberpräsident of Hanover, has in fact given instructions for the combating of the organisation in his province.

Herr Escherich yesterday gave an account of his aims in a speech delivered before the representatives of the Munich press. He stated that he wished to make his organisation a strong organisation of the moderates uninfluenced by party politics. The disaster of Spa had rendered the Einwohnerwehr impossible. 'We must, however,' he went on to say, 'have a strong barrier with which to oppose the Red flood from the East. My organisation must not remain insular (*sic*) and Bavarian; it must stretch from the sea to the Brenner. My organisation is an officially registered association including all self-protective unions founded on a moderate basis. Our highest aim is to proceed against every attempt at violence whether from the Right or the Left, if necessary arms in hand. The danger of Bolshevism still persists. In East Prussia national Bolshevism is gaining ground. The Reichswehr is tainted; the Government is weak and tied by party considerations.'

With regard to the relations of the Escherich organisation with the Magdeburg false news centre described in my despatch No. 690 of yesterday's date,<sup>2</sup> the official investigations have established that about three weeks ago Representatives of the 'Orgesch' at Schaper's<sup>3</sup> suggestion, appointed the Magde-

<sup>2</sup> In this despatch Lord Kilmarnock reported the discovery of an organization, with headquarters at Magdeburg, whose object was the dissemination of false reports regarding imaginary armed risings on the part of the Left Radicals. Cf. No. 204.

<sup>3</sup> A Magdeburg barrister who was an agent of the false news centre and of the local Stahlhelm organization.

burg false news centre as their local Intelligence Agency. Since that date a regular exchange of information took place between Jansen, the ex-commander of the Berlin Einwohnerwehr, and Altmann, the Magdeburg *agent provocateur*. A certain Becker was at the same time Berlin intelligence agent of the 'Orgesch' and of the Magdeburg false news centre. In the meanwhile the central headquarters of the 'Orgesch' have officially stated that their relations with the Magdeburg centre were limited to a temporary exchange of information between that centre and one of the 'Orgesch' subordinate authorities.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

No. 278

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received August 23)*

*No. 59 [C 4606/113/18]*

MUNICH, August 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that the local socialistic press stated recently that Dr. Escherich, the leader of the Bavarian 'Einwohnerwehr', has also been made the head of the Tyrolese 'Heimatwehr'. It appeared to me that such close co-operation might make the task of disarming the Bavarian force all the more difficult as it might allow of arms being freely passed over the frontier.

I have had an interview with Dr. Escherich in order to ascertain his views. He informs me that there has been a certain amount of co-operation, already since the 'Kapp Putsch' in March last, between the two organizations. The 'Heimatwehren' have been organized on lines laid down by him and it was agreed that the respective forces should be mutually allowed, if occasion arose, to operate in each other's territories up to a line some 15 to 20 miles beyond the frontier.

At a recent meeting of the Tyrolese 'Heimatwehren' it was decided to invite him to become their chief in case of an emergency. This appointment he has accepted. He claimed at the same time that he in no way interfered with the internal organization of the 'Heimatwehren' and even that he was not aware of their strength or the extent to which they are armed. This may be literally correct but I presume that the doctor's staff is better informed as to the Austrian organization. Otherwise his taking supreme command in case of an emergency would not be likely to produce greater efficiency.

He claimed that his organization is non-political, in the sense of party politics, and only aims at the maintenance of law and order. It is principally directed against 'Bolshevism' and combats it not only with arms but by propaganda work. In Bavaria it is synonymous with the Einwohnerwehr. In the rest of the empire it is being built up under the name of 'Orgesch' (organization Escherich).

Dr. Escherich is by profession an official in the Bavarian forestry department. He seems to be of a somewhat adventurous disposition. In 1913 he crossed and made a map of a little-known part of the Muni district in the Spanish colony of Gambia [Guinea]. He was wounded twice during the war and seems to take a pride in fearlessness. I asked him how the disarming of the Einwohnerwehr would be carried out in Bavaria. He replied that a certain number of arms would be given up and only enough retained to allow the Einwohnerwehr to achieve their purpose of maintaining law and order.

I have also discussed this question with Herr von Kahr. His Excellency blandly informed me that he was waiting for the 'sacred formula', to be uttered by the central government, which would cause the communists and other radicals to give up their arms. He added that the large army which occupied Munich last year was unable to recover the 40[,000] or 50,000 rifles the communists are believed to possess and that he would watch with curiosity the efforts of the commissioner for disarmament to achieve a better result.<sup>1</sup> His government, he said, would not proceed with the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr until it was certain that 'the other side' is disarmed. A similar statement has been made by Dr. Escherich to press representatives. Your Lordship has no doubt received reports on the passage of the Disarmament Bill in the Reichstag and it is therefore not necessary for me to draw attention to the action of the representatives of the Bayerische Volkspartei on that occasion.<sup>2</sup> I have no reason to doubt that the Bavarian government and Dr. Escherich mean what they say in spite of the statement made by the Bavarian minister at Berlin in the Reichstag. It appears to me quite unlikely that the communists will give up such arms as they may possess and still more unlikely that the present government will ever be satisfied that they are completely disarmed. A serious situation may therefore arise unless the allied powers are prepared to allow the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr to continue armed.

This question has again given an impetus to the centrifugal forces in Bavaria which manifest themselves also in other directions.

Dr. Schlittenbauer informs me that the control by Berlin over imports and exports is becoming unbearable. There are apparently large quantities of boots and of agricultural machinery which could to advantage be exchanged for Hungarian barley and wine. Business with Serbia and Bulgaria is also possible. But the central government refuses to give the necessary import and export licences, partly because of the Socialists' fears that all exports tend to raise the price of commodities, partly out of favouritism shown to firms in Berlin. He tells me that it has been decided in Bavaria to start trading with South Eastern Europe towards the end of this month in defiance of the

<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the law of August 7, 1920 (see *Reichs Gesetzblatt* of August 11, 1920, p. 1553) for the disarmament of the civil population the German Government had appointed Dr. Peters Federal Commissioner for Disarmament.

<sup>2</sup> These representatives had voted against the Bill as a protest against the proposed disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr.

existing import and export regulations. He only apprehends that as the Bavarian railways now belong to the Empire the goods may be seized by order of the central government.

These economic difficulties are used by his party, the Bayerische Volks-partei, to propagate the desirability of a feudalistic [? federalistic] Germany. His solution of the problem is to dismember Prussia by the creation of a Rhenish state and by that of a central German state which, in the main, would consist of the Prussian province of Saxony. He added, significantly, that he is glad that a French Minister has now arrived in Munich which made it possible 'to negotiate directly'. He cannot conceive that France would not be prepared to make concessions if once Prussian hegemony ceased in the Empire.

He and his party are also in favour of a second chamber to be elected or selected from an economic point of view so as to represent the interests of the various classes, trades and professions. The idea is described as an attempt to free politics from economic questions, and to free economics from politics. It is not made quite clear which chamber is to hold the purse strings which is of the essence of parliamentary control. Professor Schlittenbauer and his friends would probably like to see them entrusted to the economic chamber in which the expert and the official would have preponderating influence.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

#### No. 279

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received August 122, 9 p.m.)*

*No. 728 Telegraphic [C 4490/59/18]*

WARSAW, August 20, 1920, 9.5 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that a considerable number of rifles of Mauser pattern dated 1920 have been captured from Bolsheviks. In addition to this he stated that he was in possession of positive proofs that more war material of German manufacture has quite recently been shipped to Reval for Soviet Army. He feels therefore that whilst Poland is practically boycotted with regard to delivery of munitions and war material either through Czecho-Slovakia, Germany, or even Danzig, the only route now available being a most tortuous one through Balkans, Soviet Government is in fact not so boycotted and can secure delivery of German material.

*Air Commodore Masterman (Berlin) to Marshal Foch (Paris)*

[Confidential/Germany /27/1]

*Compte rendu N° 13 au sujet de l'exécution par l'Allemagne des clauses aériennes du  
Traité de Paix*

BERLIN, le 21 août 1920

1° Jusqu'au 20 août 1920, il est arrivé aux stations-frontières le nombre suivant de wagons chargés de matériel pour les Alliés: 663.

Le total des wagons expédiés jusqu'ici des aérodromes et usines s'élève à 764.

Les listes «B»<sup>1</sup> publiées jusqu'ici fixent à 2.604 le nombre total des moteurs à livrer.

76% environ d'entre eux ont été livrés jusqu'à ce jour.

Le total des avions à livrer s'élève à 574 d'après les listes «B».

73% environ d'entre eux ont été livrés jusqu'à ce jour.

La destruction des avions a été effectuée pour 75% d'entre eux.

La destruction provisoire des moteurs a été effectuée pour 59% d'entre eux.

2° On attend encore une décision de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs faisant connaître si elle approuve mes propositions au sujet des compensations à exiger pour la destruction des Zeppelins.<sup>2</sup>

On espère faire opérer la livraison du dirigeable L.-61 pour l'Italie et L. Z.-113 pour la France, dans le courant du mois.

3° On a quelque peu progressé dans la question des abris et hangars.

La Commission des Réparations est en pourparlers pour conclure des contrats de vente des hangars du Gouvernement avec des Sociétés et des particuliers qui se chargeront de la démolition.

On est encore en train d'étudier la question des hangars appartenant à des Sociétés privées et à des particuliers, c'est-à-dire n'étant pas la propriété du Gouvernement.

4° Les règles adoptées à l'égard du matériel aéronautique non déclaré s'appliquent d'une manière satisfaisante et sans difficulté. Les Commissions Militaires et Navales sont sur le point d'adopter une manière de procéder identique.

Jusqu'à présent, il n'a été découvert[e] qu'une partie de matériel à la suite de la loi décrétée par le Gouvernement allemand le 24 juin 1920, et dont la validité expirait le 5 août 1920.

On continue comme précédemment les perquisitions suivant les renseignements qui nous parviennent, indépendamment des opérations de vérification du matériel qui a été déclaré maintenant à la suite de la loi citée plus haut.

5° Le Gouvernement allemand nous a adressé des plaintes au sujet des retards apportés par la Commission des Réparations à la vente du matériel aéronautique détruit dont elle est chargée.

<sup>1</sup> These contained instructions for the delivery or disposal of material by the German Government.

<sup>2</sup> Sec No. 286 below, § 10.

Il est impossible de détruire les hangars tant qu'ils contiennent du matériel.

Il est à craindre que ces reproches soient en partie justifiés. Il semble que la Commission des Réparations ne se rende pas tout à fait compte de l'étendue des opérations dont elle est chargée. Il ne semble pas d'ailleurs qu'à Berlin la Commission des Réparations possède l'organisation nécessaire pour résoudre le problème d'une manière satisfaisante.

6° Le Gouvernement allemand n'a jusqu'ici adressé aucune réponse aux demandes renouvelées dans lesquelles j'ai exigé des satisfactions pour les incidents qui se sont produits avant la contre-révolution du mois de mars dernier.

7° Le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas accepté les mesures de restriction imposées par la Conférence de Boulogne, qui a interdit toute construction pendant un délai de trois mois après l'achèvement des opérations de destruction et de livraison du matériel aéronautique.

Bien qu'on n'ait pas directement porté à ma connaissance des travaux de construction en cours, la situation actuelle n'est pas tout à fait satisfaisante.

8° On estime que, conformément au Protocole de Spa, la plus grande partie des opérations de livraison et de destruction du matériel aéronautique sera achevée pour le 31 août.

On envisage la réduction des effectifs de la Commission pour la fin du mois de septembre 1920. J'attends l'approbation des propositions que je vous ai envoyées à ce sujet.

## No. 281

*Mr. Kidston (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received August 23, 5.45 p.m.)*

*No. 578 Telegraphic [C 4635/59/18]*

*Secret*

HELSINGFORS, August 23, 1920, 2.50 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that one of German ships engaged in repatriation of Russian prisoners of war from Stettin to Björkö recently arrived with a big gun on board.

Attempt was made to land it and Germans on being asked whom it was consigned to replied that it was for Finnish Government. Gun was sent back to Germany on same ship.

Minister for Foreign Affairs cited this to me as another instance of attempt to involve Finnish Government in this illicit arms traffic.

Commodore informed.<sup>1</sup>

Repeated to Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> The Senior Naval Officer in the Baltic had arrived at Helsingfors on August 7 with instructions to consult with Mr. Kidston on the situation caused by the Soviet Russian advance in Poland. Cf. Volume XI, Nos. 395 and 402.



*Herr Göppert to General Nollet*

*Ref. F. 9.786 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

*Extract*<sup>1</sup>

AUSWÄRTIGES AMT, BERLIN, *August 31, 1920*

General,

In the Protocol of Spa of the 9th July the German Government engaged itself to fulfil a number of conditions by the 1st of September 1920. . . .

The German Government has furthermore undertaken the obligation of carrying out by the 31st August 1920 the handing over and the destruction of all aircraft equipment with the exception of sheds and hydrogen plant. A complete report concerning the fulfilment of this obligation will be forwarded as soon as the progress in handing over and destruction is able to be computed as on the 31st August. As has already been communicated to General Masterman in Reichswehrministerium Luftfrikko communication, copy of which is hereby attached,<sup>2</sup> this report cannot be carried out before the 6th September 1920.

The German Government has finally undertaken the obligation of carrying out the payments provided in the Protocol of the 10th January by the 31st August. In accordance with this Protocol Germany has to pay to the Allied and Associated Governments the value of the exported material in accordance with the decision and assessment computed by the I.A.A.C.C. as laid down in Article 210 of the Peace Treaty and which is to be made known.

This fixing of the sum has been communicated in the letter of the President of the I.A.A.C.C. General Masterman of the 25th August.<sup>2</sup> The value of the exported aircraft material is therein computed at 50 million marks; General Masterman has however reserved to himself the right should it be necessary, later on to demand a higher sum. The sum fixed will be paid in the course of the 31st August by the Imperial Treasury to General Masterman. The German Government is however of the opinion that the sum of 50 million marks is far too high. The decision arrived at by General Masterman as communicated in his letter of the 25th August is based upon assessment.

The appropriate documents for such an assessment, as he himself remarks, have not yet been placed at his disposal. Also the German Government is not in a position to actually state the amount and the value of the aircraft material in question, as there is no doubt that considerable quantities of such material have found their way abroad without the knowledge of the German authorities in an illegal way, which is partially to be traced to the fact that an adequate supervision of export from the occupied areas is not sufficiently provided for. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the following figures that the assessment of the I.A.A.C.C. must be too high.

The entire profit which the State has made from the sale of aircraft material

<sup>1</sup> Only this abridged form of this letter appears in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Reports.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Reports.

amounts roughly to 31.2 million marks. Of this about 1.5 million marks would [sic] be attributable to exports. The majority of the material which has not yet been sold for export purposes has doubtless remained in the country. As however proportionately small quantities of aircraft material only can from the beginning have been in the possession of private individuals, it appears out of the question that the exported material can attain to the figure in question.

The German Government which is responsible to the German people for the utilisation of State money, must accordingly request to have the facts communicated to it on which the assessment of General Masterman is based. It also attached great importance to this because it has also been put in the position of having to trace any irregularities which have occurred to punish those guilty in accordance with their responsibility.

It is of course ready to put at the disposal of the I.A.A.C.C. all documents which can be of use for the tracing of material exported.

I am, &c.,

GÖPPERT

### No. 283

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 8)*

*No. 1071<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic: by bag [C 5810/1897/18]*

PARIS, September 6, 1920

(2) It was decided to reject the request of the German Government for 5,000 additional troops which they allege to be necessary in order to guard the Russian troops which have taken refuge in East Prussia. (See your<sup>2</sup> telegram No. 1047.<sup>3</sup>) In accordance with a recommendation made by the Military Commission of Control the German Government will be informed that as the present numbers of the Reichswehr [? and] police amount to 350,000 they ought to be amply sufficient, and that even if the re-organisation of these two forces, which is at present proceeding, renders it difficult to detach 5,000 men for this work, it ought to be possible to draw on the cavalry for this purpose, since their re-organisation is completed. The Allied Governments therefore cannot agree to the creation of this force of 5,000 men unless it is drawn from the present effectives of the Reichswehr and police force. The question can be considered further when the Reichswehr have been reduced to 100,000.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram, reporting decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors at their meeting on September 6, does not appear on General file 199; sections 2 and 3 are filed under C 5810 and C 5811/1897/18.

<sup>2</sup> This word was amended in the Foreign Office to read 'my'.

<sup>3</sup> Of August 31, not printed.

Further, the German Government is to be informed that the Russian troops are to be dis-armed and their arms destroyed under the superintendence of the Military Commission of Control, as they would otherwise constitute an addition to the arms allowed to Germany under the Treaty.

Lastly, the Polish Government are at the same time to be asked to give all facilities to enable Russian troops to be conveyed across the corridor from East Prussia to Germany. As a matter of fact, I understand that the Polish Government have already allowed the transport of a large number of these Russian troops, of whom about 10,000 are said to have already reached Cassel.

(3) The Conference considered the various German Notes enclosed in my despatches Nos. 2518, 2663, 2768, and 2863<sup>4</sup> requesting authority to organise a special militia to guard the Russian interned troops. The Conference decided to refuse this request, and to demand the disbanding of the militia already formed, as being contrary to the Treaty and to the Spa Protocol; but in accordance with your telegram No. 981,<sup>5</sup> paragraph (2), it was agreed that the German Government should be given a period—its length to be specified by General Nollet—within which to disband the militia so as to permit the previous completion of evacuation of Russian prisoners now in East Prussia.

Finally it was decided to remind the German Government that military questions of this nature should be submitted in the first instance to the Military Commission of Control and not to Conference of Ambassadors. This rule was laid down in the note from the Conference to the German Delegation of the 23rd April.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Despatches of August 7, 19, 28, and September 7 respectively; not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Of September 4, not printed.

<sup>6</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 111.

## No. 284

*Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*

*No. 414 Telegraphic [C 5345/59/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 7, 1920, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 728 (of August 20th.<sup>1</sup> Alleged export of German war material to Russia).

British representative on Commission of Control suggests that Polish Government should make official complaint to German Government and to Conference of Ambassadors giving date of manufacture of weapons captured from Soviet troops. A shipment of war material from Germany is known to have been effected quite recently though destination is not known. As you are aware Commission of Control make every effort to stop all such shipments which are contrary to Article 170 of Treaty of Versailles.

<sup>1</sup> No. 279.

No. 285

*Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen<sup>1</sup> (The Hague) to Earl Curzon*  
(Received September 10, 3.25 p.m.)

*No. 158 Telegraphic [C 6070/59/18]*

THE HAGUE, September 10, 1920, 1.37 p.m.

Military Attaché reports following from reliable source.

Ernest Convosmann of 26, Princess-Egracht [*sic*]. The Hague is offering for sale 257 German aeroplane engines which should have been surrendered to Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission.

Price asked is 12800 Marks per engine 50% of which are new, types being Mercedes and Benz. It is expected that they will be offered to Fokker at Amsterdam if firm they are now offered to does not accept.

Engines are stored in big factory in or near Berlin and would probably cross frontier at Zavenaar.

One thousand similar ones were recently found at Hamburg.

<sup>1</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Legation at The Hague.

No. 286

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 1082 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, September 10, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Cambon, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires being also present, and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> 7. The Conference considered the various notes which had been addressed to them by the Belgian Embassy, and also a memorandum from this Embassy, on the subject of certain naval guns which were abandoned by the German Government before the Armistice and which subsequently to the armistice were wrongfully removed into Holland. (See my despatch No. 2888 of to-day's date.<sup>2</sup>) The evidence adduced by the Belgian Government was not very conclusive, and in any case the Conference recognised that it was not competent to make representations on the subject to the Dutch Government. It was decided, therefore, that if and when the Dutch Government send back to Germany the German war material at present in Holland the Military Commission of Control should make arrangements for sending on these guns to Belgium instead of having them destroyed like the rest of the war material. There is, however, no immediate prospect of German war material in Holland being sent to Germany, as the German Government have as yet taken no action on the note addressed to them by the Conference of Ambassadors on the 13th May (see my despatch No. 1646<sup>3</sup>) requesting them to

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. For this note see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 131.

invite the Dutch Government to return this war material to Germany. It was decided to press the German Government to take action in this matter.

. . .<sup>4</sup> 10. The Conference was asked to consider the report of the Aeronautical Committee respecting the reparation exacted from Germany for the illegal destruction of zeppelins which ought to have been handed over to the Allied Powers. I submitted this question to Your Lordship in my telegram No. 995,<sup>5</sup> but as I have received no answer I presume His Majesty's Government do not see any objection to this matter being dealt with in the manner proposed. I raised at to-day's meeting the question as to whether it would not be preferable to exact a pecuniary indemnity from Germany instead of asking them to build further zeppelins for the Allies but it was explained that General Masterman was in favour of the latter course and that the Germans were understood to be willing to accept it. In these circumstances I did not think it necessary to maintain my objection and the Conference approved the scheme of reparations proposed. As there is no stipulation in the Treaty of Versailles which compels the German Government to make this reparation, it will be necessary to embody the present decision in a Protocol to be signed by the Allied Governments and the German Government, in the same way as was done in the case of the coal arrangement at Spa. . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>5</sup> Of August 18, not printed. The report proposed that the German Government should replace the military zeppelins destroyed by surrendering two civil zeppelins already in existence, and by handing over to the Allied Governments two out of every three commercial zeppelins which Germany might build in the future, until the tonnage of the destroyed military aeroplanes had been made good.

## No. 287

### *Note from the German Ambassador to Earl Curzon*

A 1504 [C 6547/59/18]

#### *Translation*

GERMAN EMBASSY, LONDON, September 14, 1920

In view of press reports issued by the Polish Press Bureau in Brussels—according to which official British circles are said to have been informed that the Poles had taken a number of German Mauser rifles from the Red troops, which that Bureau looks upon as a proof of illicit trade and of the relations existing between Germany and the Soviet Republic—the German Ambassador begs to draw the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the points set forth below.

It is a well-known fact that the Russians formerly took some tens of thousands of German prisoners, who were naturally disarmed. It is also well known that, in the autumn of 1918, large quantities of German arms fell into the hands of the Bolsheviki in South Russia and Lithuania when the German troops withdrew.

Lastly, very large quantities of arms and ammunition were, by order of the International Baltic Commission, handed over to Lithuania by the

Russo-German Bermondts troops when they withdrew from the Baltic provinces, and a large proportion of the same may well have got into Russia. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that the Poles should possess<sup>1</sup> German rifles, but this fact can in no event justify the conclusions drawn by the Polish Press Bureau.

<sup>1</sup> In the original German the words are 'erbeutet haben sollen'.

## No. 288

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 17)*

*No. 1102 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, September 16, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of M. Paléologue and the following questions were discussed:—

...<sup>1</sup> 13. In accordance with the decision of the Conference of the 21st July (see my telegram No. 837, paragraph 1<sup>2</sup>) a note was addressed on July 24th to the German Government<sup>2</sup> calling upon them to deliver to the Naval Commission of Control the material required for the armament of the light cruisers and destroyers intended for incorporation in the French and Italian fleets, which is at present stored in Germany. No official reply has been received to this note, but from semi-official correspondence with Admiral Charlton it is evident that the German Government are resolved to refuse to deliver up this material except on an undertaking that it shall be destroyed in accordance with the Treaty. In order to bring the matter to a head the Naval Advisers proposed to-day to the Conference that the German Government should be asked to reply officially to the note of July 24th. I said that I was quite prepared to agree to this course if my French and Italian colleagues desired it, but I felt bound to point out that if a further note was sent it would only give an opportunity to the German Government to protract the discussion and would inevitably end in a rebuff. I observed that in the Treaty the Germans appear to be justified in claiming that this material should only be given up for destruction. There was nothing in the Treaty which compelled them to give it up by way of compensation or as a penalty for non-execution of other stipulations of the Treaty. The fact was that the Treaty did not provide any means for imposing penalties on Germany for non-execution and this was recognised by the Supreme Council at Spa when they concluded the coal agreement with the German Government, and has been recognised by the Conference of Ambassadors when they proposed to conclude an arrangement with Germany whereby the latter shall compensate the Allies for their illegal destruction of zeppelins (see my telegram No. 1082 Section 10<sup>3</sup>). Moreover, in the present case the Supreme Council at San

<sup>1</sup> The first twelve sections reported discussion on other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> No. 286.

Remo, when deciding to ask the Germans to hand over this material, stipulated<sup>4</sup> that the infractions of the Naval Clauses of the Treaty as set forth in the report of the Naval Advisers of May 14th (see my despatch No. 1823<sup>5</sup>) should not be mentioned as the reason for making this demand.

Admiral Le Vasseur agreed that it had been intended that the non-execution of these articles should be dealt with together with other infractions of the Treaty by the Supreme Council at Spa. Unfortunately this has not been done with the result that the Conference of Ambassadors has been left to settle this question separately with the German Government. I suggested that in these circumstances that [*sic*] the whole question should be referred back to the Supreme Council, since it was they who at San Remo decided the policy of the Allied Governments. The Conference however preferred to address a further note to the German Government and I acquiesced in this course.

The French and Italians maintained that the decision of the Supreme Council desires the Germans to hand over the whole equipment belonging to these ships and not merely the guns and war material. I pointed out that this interpretation was a mistake due to the difference of meaning between the English word 'armament' and the French 'armement' and that it has always been understood that only the armament in the English sense was to be demanded from the Germans. Moreover, it was only this armament which had been stored by the Naval Commission of Control pending the decision of the Allied Governments and it would in practice now be impossible to trace the rest of the equipment of these vessels, even if the Germans agreed to hand it over.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Volume VIII, No. 20, minute 4 and appendix 10.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

## No. 289

*Air Commodore Masterman to Major Wagenfuhr<sup>1</sup>*

*EAM/4.877/39 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, September 16, 1920

To the President, Luftfahrt Friedenskommission, Reichswehrministerium, Berlin.

In your letter No. 2.219/9/20/1A of 9th September 1920<sup>2</sup> you explain the position of the operation of destruction and transport of aeroplanes and motors at date of 31st August 1920 and you give me the reasons, which according to you have delayed the execution of the Clauses of the Spa Protocol.

I am prepared to admit that if the I.A.A.C.C. was assured that Germany did not possess to-day any other material than that acknowledged by her, one might say that the stipulations contained in the Spa Protocol have in a great way been respected and that one has all reason to believe that the contract will be carried out with a certain delay, it is true, that for the reasons some of which are justifiable [*sic*].

<sup>1</sup> Representative of the President of the German Air Service Peace Commission.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

But for the Commission to have a complete appeasement, it is indispensable that the question of material still hidden in Germany be completely cleared up.

The German Government has certainly published a law inviting firms in possession of aeronautical material to make a first declaration of it before the 5th August 1920, under penalty of a fine and prison.

This law has certainly yielded some results, but it has not been entirely operative, seeing that since the 5th August 1920 the I.A.A.C.C. has met with material after making search at 20 different firms.

The Sub-Commission of Bavaria points out to me that 600 motors and 150 aircraft, declared by the B[ayerische] V[erwartungsstelle für] H[eeressgut] on 20th May 1920 as sold to some firms are not to be found.

It has besides been proved that aircraft travel between Germany and Russia and one has found on a pilot forced to land in Poland, an order, defining the duties of the pilots charged with the liaison with Soviet Russia, signed by General von Horn, and dated Breslau (20th July 1920).

One has the right to be surprised that some military aviators still use military aeroplanes, and receive orders from a general in the German Army.

Lastly, I hand you herewith a list of persons who are still carrying on business in aeronautical material.<sup>3</sup>

These persons propose to sell aeronautical material, to whoever will deposit in a bank a guarantee, before making known the place where the material is stored.

Consequently I ask you:

(1) To let me know what steps have been taken against the organisers and performers of the liaison by aircraft between Germany and Soviet Russia.

(2) To give the necessary orders for the dissolution of the secret formations which have been employed in this liaison work and which exist round about Breslau.

(3) To continue to carry out the search for still hidden material and especially to compel those people who have offered aeronautical material for sale to hand it over.

(4) To bear in mind the settling of all questions concerning the delivery of airships, the delivery or destruction of observation balloon material, and of material for hydrogen gas, and W[ireless] T[elegraphy].

It is in the interest of the German aeronautical industry for the German Government to make a real effort towards terminating as soon as possible, the delivery or the rendering unserviceable of known and still hidden material in Germany, in order that I may be able to fix the date of the commencement of the three months' time limit, at the expiration of which, *civil aeronautical construction* in Germany may start again.

It should be clearly understood that the responsibility of the German Government regarding material will not cease until the final destruction after sale has been completed.

E. A. MASTERMAN,  
*President I.A.A.C.C.*

<sup>3</sup> Not printed in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Final Report.



**No. 290**

*Letter from Mr. Sargent (Paris) to Mr. Phipps (Received September 20)*

[C 6737/59/18]

PARIS, September 18, 1920

My dear Phipps,

Your letter of September 4th<sup>1</sup> (see 3685/59/18) regarding the note to be addressed to various neutral Governments on the subject of the export of war material from Germany.

I quite agree with you that the Conference of Ambassadors were trying to be altogether too zealous and efficient when they drew up this note and sent it off to neutral countries all over the world without consulting the men on the spot beforehand. The right course I think would have been for them to send their draft note to the allied missions and to have authorised the latter to amend it as they saw fit to meet local conditions and requirements. We are suggesting to the Conference that this authority should be at once given to the Allied representatives in those countries where the note has not yet been presented and that the Conference should adopt this procedure in all future occasions where they wish to address a communication to a neutral Government.

Yours ever,

ORME SARGENT

<sup>1</sup> See No. 273, n. 2.

**No. 291**

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received September 21, 10 a.m.)*

*No. 848 Telegraphic [C 6861/1897/18]*

WARSAW, September 20, 1920, 7.43 p.m.

Major Mockett of British Military Mission who has recently returned from a tour in Lithuania including points on East Prussian frontier and Vilna states positively that Bolshevik soldiers interned in East Prussia have been passing thence unarmed into Lithuania at rate of about two train-loads a night and are being sent through Vilna in direction of Vileika. Connivance of German authorities is (? obvious) and I venture to suggest desirability of strong representations at Berlin, and such instructions as may be thought advisable to Commission of Control.<sup>1</sup>

Lithuanian contention which is plausible is that these men are in position of escaped prisoners of war whose passage to Russia once on their territory, they have no right to impede and they say that with their forces concentrated on Polish and Russian frontiers they cannot spare the men to furnish adequate frontier guards to prevent ingress.

<sup>1</sup> For Polish representations on this subject see Volume XI, No. 518.

Major Mockett has further satisfied himself that a large number of armed Germans, not less than 2,000, have passed through from Lyck to join Bolshevik concentration in Grodno region. These men are called Spartacists but come mainly from Freebooters who played a sinister part in Baltic States last year and they avow intention of aiding Bolsheviks to fight Entente and especially England.

Repeated to Berlin.

**No. 292**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 3141 [C 6692/59/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 20, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to section 10 of your telegram No. 1082 of September 10th<sup>1</sup> in regard to the reparation to be exacted from Germany for the illegal destruction of Zeppelins in the summer of 1919, I have to inform Your Excellency that the Cabinet recently decided<sup>2</sup> that it was undesirable to demand additional Zeppelins from Germany on behalf of this country, as the necessary equipment and facilities for their use and storage are not at present available.

2. I request that Your Excellency will accordingly ask the Conference of Ambassadors to modify their decision of September 10th and propose that the British claim upon the German Government for reparation shall take some other form than that of the surrender of air ships.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> No. 286.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum on this file indicated that the decision was taken on the night of September 14.

**No. 293**

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Smallbones (Munich)*

*No. 54 [C 6446/113/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 20, 1920*

Sir,

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of your despatch No. 65 of August 31st<sup>1</sup> in regard to the disbandment of the Einwohnerwehr, I am directed by Earl Curzon to inform you that General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Mission of Control, in his note of March 12th last<sup>2</sup> addressed to the German Government in the name of the Allied Govern-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> No. 29, n. 9.

ments, demanded the suppression of the Einwohnerwehr throughout Germany. In a note of September 2nd last,<sup>3</sup> General Nollet also asked for information regarding the surrender of arms collected from the Einwohnerwehr.

The 'Orgesch' organisation clearly comes under the same category as the Einwohnerwehr and it must therefore be disbanded in accordance with Article 177 of the Treaty of Versailles.

I am, &c.,

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>3</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 294

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 3201 [C 6957/4430/18]

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 25, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Your Excellency's telegram No. 1118 of September 21st<sup>1</sup> in regard to the occupation of Duisburg, Mannheim and Karlsruhe,<sup>2</sup> I am advised that the maintenance of these posts is justified by no treaty right.

2. The relevant texts are:

(1) Article 428 of the treaty of Versailles, which stipulates that the territory west of the Rhine and the bridgeheads shall be occupied for five years;

(2) Article 1 of the Rhineland Convention, which further defines the occupied territory by reference to Article 5 of the armistice convention of November 11th, 1918, and to Article 7 of the supplementary convention of January 16th, 1919,<sup>3</sup> and,

(3) The two armistice articles just mentioned, of which the former defines the bridgeheads, while the latter reserves the right to occupy the Strasburg sector.

3. When the matter comes up at the Conference of Ambassadors I should accordingly be glad if Your Excellency would represent that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the allied governments have no right to insist on the maintenance of these posts, apart from some special arrangement with the German Government such as that which I understand has been made in the case of Duisburg.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Office telegram No. 295 of September 1 to Berlin explained that small Allied detachments had been on the right bank of the Rhine since the armistice in order to guard the offices of the Navigation Commission. Cf. Volume IX, No. 550.

<sup>3</sup> This supplementary convention is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, pp. 896-9.

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 4)*

*No. 1154<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic: by bag [C 7806/1897/18]*

PARIS, October 2, 1920

(8) The Conference considered the note from the German Delegation enclosed in my despatch No. 3043,<sup>2</sup> requesting that notwithstanding the orders of the Conference of Ambassadors the German Government should be allowed to maintain the militia which was organised in East Prussia at the time of the Bolshevik invasion of Poland (See my telegram No. 1071 of September 6th, section 2<sup>3</sup>). It was decided that this question was one which should be dealt with by the Military Committee of Control. The German Note will therefore be forwarded to the Commission of Control for advice.

I took the opportunity of calling attention to the escape into Lithuania of Bolshevik soldiers interned in East Prussia, as reported in your despatch No. 3184 of the 23rd ultimo.<sup>3</sup> I was informed that the Military Commission of Control were already investigating this matter. Pending the result of the enquiries I did not therefore propose that a formal protest should be made to the German Government, as instructed. The facts however given in your despatch are being comm[unicate]d to the Commission of Control. It would seem that about 48,000 out of a total of 50,000 Russian prisoners have now been transported from East Prussia into Central Germany. On the other hand the German Government, who now maintain that they only have 50,000 such prisoners, informed the Polish Government originally, when applying for facilit[i]es to transport these prisoners across the corridor, that they amounted to 70,000. The Military Commission of Control have been instructed to ascertain how the Germans account for the extra 20,000.

(9) In accordance with instructions contained in your despatch No. 3141,<sup>4</sup> I brought before the Conference the question of compensation to be required from Germany for the illegal destruction of zeppelins. In order to meet the views of His Majesty's Government the Conference decided that instead of the compensation taking the form of compelling Germany to build further zeppelins for the Allied Governments, the following scheme should be adopted:

The zeppelins 'Bodensee' and the 'Nordstern', which are actually in existence, are to be confiscated by the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control as compensation for two of the zeppelins destroyed, and must be handed over to the Allied Powers in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Supreme Council on September 29th 1919.<sup>5</sup>

Secondly, the German Government are to be called upon to hand over to the Allied Powers the value of the rest of the dirigibles destroyed. In order to

<sup>1</sup> This telegram, reporting a decision of the Conference of Ambassadors at their meeting on October 2, does not appear on the General file 199. Section 8 is filed under C 7806/1897/18 and sections 9 and 10 are filed under C 7807 and C 7808/59/18 respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Of October 1, not printed. The German note (not printed) was dated September 30.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> No. 292.

<sup>5</sup> Volume I, No. 67, minute 2.

calculate the sums to be paid the Commission of Control will make an estimate, from the plans which must be handed over to it, of the value of each of the zeppelins destroyed. The dirigibles destroyed will then be classified in their order of value and fictitiously allotted to the Allied Powers and Belgium by the Commission of Control in accordance with the above procedure.

Lastly, the German Government will be allowed the alternative of handing over to any Allied Power a dirigible of a civil type, which is to be constructed, instead of making payment in specie, in any case in which the Allied Power concerned consents to this exchange.

(10) I called the attention of the Conference to the difficulties which have been raised by the Allied representatives in various neutral capitals with regard to presenting the note drafted by the Conference of Ambassadors calling upon the neutral Governments in question to prevent the import of war material from Germany. (See your despatches Nos. 2966, 3078 and 3137<sup>6</sup>). The Conference approved my suggestion that the French Government, acting on behalf of the Conference of Ambassadors should inform their representatives in these neutral countries where the note has not yet been presented, that they are authorised to modify the original note according to their discretion.

Monsieur Cambon took the opportunity to point out that the German Government had never replied to the note from the Conference of May 13th (see my despatch No. 1646 of May 29th<sup>7</sup>) calling upon them to re-request the Dutch Government to hand over German war material at present lying in Holland. It was agreed that the German Government should be pressed for a reply,<sup>8</sup> and that in order to avoid further delay they should authorise the Allied Governments to approach the Dutch Government direct on the subject. At the same time further representations will be made to the Dutch Government through the Dutch Minister in this capital, with a view to inducing them to put a stop to the export of war material from Germany into Holland which recent reports show to be still continuing.

<sup>6</sup> Of September 2, 13, and 20, not printed. These transmitted to Lord Derby copies of two telegrams and a despatch from Mr. Wingfield, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at San Sebastian.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 286, n. 3.

<sup>8</sup> In his telegram No. 1223 of October 20 (not printed) Lord Derby reported that the Conference of Ambassadors had had before them a reply from the German Government but had referred it to the Allied Military Committee of Versailles and to the legal advisers, in view of the technical and legal questions which it raised.

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)*

*No. 70 [C 8374/113/18]*

MUNICH, October 2, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to the Foreign Office despatch No. 54 of the 20th ultimo<sup>1</sup> and my previous reports on the subject of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr.

A number of shooting competitions have been arranged by the organization which all partook of the nature of patriotic and nationalistic festivals. That held by the Chiemgau section was especially noticeable through a speech made by Herr von Kahr in which he bade it continue and prosper.

A large competition took place at Munich from the 24th to the 30th ultimo at which some 6,000 men competed. On Sunday the 25th an impressive ceremony took place. Some 70,000 Einwohnerwehr men arrived in Munich from all over Bavaria and marched under flying colours and with bands playing to the 'Königsplatz' where speeches were delivered by Herr von Kahr, Herr Escherich and the Second Mayor of the town. The latter is a salaried official and a conservative whereas the First Mayor is elected and a majority socialist. A resolution that the town should extend a welcome was only passed because the majority socialists abstained from voting, thus showing that even they are not prepared to oppose the organization actively.

The men as they marched through the throngs of loudly cheering people impressed me as the flower of Bavarian manhood. There were certainly some old men amongst them but not in a greater proportion than perhaps one in twenty. The majority appeared to be from twenty-two to twenty-eight years old. The parade was obviously intended to stimulate the idea of the Einwohnerwehr and to intimidate the radical sections of the population. Each man had been supplied with ten rounds of ammunition and it is not improbable that a counter demonstration would have been welcomed as an opportunity for showing the mettle of the 'Wehr' men.

Herr von Kahr in his speech insisted that the Einwohnerwehr is an instrument of law and order created during the perils of the communist regime. He ended by demanding an oath that they 'be a united people of brothers and that they shall not separate whatever the danger and stress of the times'. The other speeches were of the same tenour. At a banquet held subsequently Dr. Escherich announced that the gathering could be held annually in future and that Nürnberg has been chosen for next year's meeting.

Herr von Kahr has told me that the question of inviting the foreign representatives at Munich to the festival was seriously considered but that the intention was abandoned because he apprehended that some of us might consider the invitation a *mauvaise plaisanterie*.

<sup>1</sup> No. 293.

It is quite clear that the Bavarian government has not the slightest intention of disbanding the Einwohnerwehr nor do I believe that it seriously contemplates disarmament though a certain number of rifles may eventually be handed over. This attitude is defended on the ground that its preservation is a question of life and death for the existing order of society and that the evils threatened at Spa are minor ones compared with those arising from a communistic outbreak. It is stated that disarmament of the radicals is making very little progress and that, moreover, people who wish to give up their arms to obtain the reward of M 100 are waylaid by communistic agents and offered M 300 for a rifle. These facts are adduced to show that the danger of an outbreak is not imaginary.

Also it seems to be held that the French government has made up its mind to occupy the Ruhr district and that that event will take place with and without the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr. It is further argued that in the case of occupation the Einwohnerwehr will be all the more necessary in order to deal with disturbances likely to arise out of unemployment which will set in sharply owing to the scarcity of coal.

A deputy who is in the inner councils of the Bayerische Volkspartei has expounded to me a thesis which appears to be of interest in this connection. He said that the salvation of Germany can only come from within through a national and spiritual revival. He thought that the occupation of the Ruhr district would not be an unmitigated evil though involving terrible hardship. He welcomed the employment of black troops by the French and thought that every case of reported rape is an invaluable propaganda weapon. He had just returned from Upper Silesia and there gathered the impression that antagonism to the Poles had consolidated the Germans, independently and in spite of party divisions, in a manner which would have been impossible without pressure from without. He refused to believe that sixty millions of Germans could be permanently kept under and he thought that steam would be raised the quicker, the tighter the lid was screwed down.

Reports have been frequent in the local press that the French government has consented that the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr should not be disarmed. In particular it was stated that this decision was reached on the strength of a report furnished by General de Metz.<sup>1</sup> M. Dard, the French Minister, has assured me on his word of honour and in his official capacity not only that no such concession has even been hinted at by him but that he has informed Herr von Kahr under instructions from his government that as regards the Einwohnerwehr the strict execution of the terms of the Peace Treaty and of those laid down at Spa would be insisted upon.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

<sup>1</sup> 'Délégué Supérieur' at Speyer in the French zone of occupation of the Inter-Allied High Commission in the Rhineland.

No. 297

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 6)*

*No. 1163 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, October 5, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions:

. . .<sup>1</sup> 5. The Conference considered the note received from the German Delegation stating that they were ready to hand over the equipment which is to be replaced in the five light cruisers which are to be incorporated in the French and Italian Navies. (See my telegram No. 1102, Section 13<sup>2</sup>). While yielding on the main point, the German Government, in their note, suggest that the value of this equipment should be charged to Germany's credit on the Reparations Account. While deciding that this suggestion should be negatived, it was agreed that the Conference should wait until they had information to the effect that the material had actually been delivered by the German Government, before they notified the latter that they could not accept their suggestion as regards placing the value of the material to Germany's credit. Copy of the German Note is enclosed in my despatch No. 3061.<sup>3</sup> . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 288.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

No. 298

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)*

*No. 1175 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, October 8, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions. The new Japanese Ambassador was present for the first time.

. . .<sup>1</sup> (4) The Conference approved the recommendation of the Military Commission of Control to the effect that the German Government's application for permission to maintain a special militia in East Prussia should be rejected (see my telegram No. 1071<sup>2</sup> paragraph 2 and my despatch No. 3082 of October 6th<sup>3</sup>). I informed the Conference of the views of the War Office as set forth in your telegram No. 1055<sup>3</sup> and it was agreed to accept October 15th as the date on which the disbandment of the militia must be completed.<sup>4</sup> It was also agreed as suggested in the War Office telegram that the

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 283.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> On October 14 in his despatch No. 3139 (not printed) Lord Derby transmitted translations of two notes (of October 8 and 12) from the German Delegation stating that the disbandment of the local guards had been completed on October 1st, and that the frontier guards would be dismissed on the 8th; also that the Oberpräsident of East Prussia's ordinance concerning the formation of a voluntary police force or militia had been abrogated.



German Government should be warned that requests of this nature must be addressed to the Commission of Control in the first instance, and moreover, that they must be made in time to admit of their due consideration and not, as in the present case, at so late a date as to present the Allied Governments with a *fait accompli*. . . .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

## No. 299

*Air Commodore Masterman to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs*

*EAM/5.994/2 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, October 8, 1920

Excellency,

With reference to your letter No. F. 9.650 of 31st August 1920,<sup>1</sup> to which was attached a copy of your letter No. F. 9.786 of 31st August 1920 addressed to General Nollet,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to reply as follows to your remarks on the correctness or otherwise of the sum of fifty million marks demanded by me and paid by you in virtue of the aeronautical material exported from Germany which thus escaped confiscation, and so contravening Article 202 of the Peace Treaty. The estimate was based on our knowledge that *not less* than 1,000 aeroplanes, complete with motors, and in addition *not less* than 1,000 motors, not to mention other aeronautical material of value, have been exported from Germany.

Our estimate of the value of the above material amounts to sixty-four million marks, but in order to be on the low side with the first claim I reduced the amount claimed to fifty million marks.

I agree with your remarks that much material has probably been exported without the knowledge of the German Government, and also as to the extreme difficulty of arriving at a correct estimation of the total quantity of material actually exported.

I have to point out however that according to my information, this export of aeronautical material still continues, that I have never been informed as to any action taken by the German Government to stop this traffic by instituting a stronger form of control at frontier stations, that inspections [*sic*] of firms' books has been refused my officers and that offers of sale of aeronautical material to other countries continue to be made to this day, thus proving that a certain amount of material, in spite of the Government's proclamation of the 24th June, still eludes the control of this Commission.

I can only see one way of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion of the matter, viz: as follows:

The German Government must in my opinion possess definite records of the actual numbers of aeroplanes and motors in their possession at the conclusion of hostilities.

Taking this as starting point, knowing the number of aeroplanes and motors

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> No. 282.

found or reported to the Commission, and ignoring for the present other aeronautical material the value [of] which may nevertheless be considerable it should be a comparatively simple matter to account for the difference.

That unaccounted for, may be taken as forming some data on which the final claim could be settled.

I should be glad to hear whether you are prepared to agree to the above proposal.

E. A. MASTERMAN,  
*Air Commodore R.A.F.*

### No. 300

#### *Memorandum from the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft to its branch offices<sup>1</sup>*

*A.K.9.Tgb.No.IV a/37.251 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, October 8, 1920

To all Branch Offices.

The Berlin Branch has ascertained with regret that the oft repeated instruction to the effect that permission can only be granted to Entente officers to enter the Company's premises when accompanied by German liaison officers, is not yet fully understood.

The Berlin branch orders once more that in no case can Entente officers be allowed to enter the premises unaccompanied by German liaison officers.

Representations of Entente officers to the effect that Interallied officers who are personally known on the Company's premises have the right to enter unaccompanied by German liaison officers will not be recognised by the Branch.

The Branch represented this to the Prussian Sub-Commission a long time ago, with the request that I.A.A.C.C. be informed of the instructions of the Branch, and this was done, according to information received from the Prussian Sub-Commission.

Any assertion to the contrary by Entente officers therefore does not correspond with the arrangements already made.

The strictest attention to the foregoing instruction is urgently requested.

Reichstreuhand-Gesellschaft. A/G.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this circular letter was enclosed in Luftfriklo letter No. 3,060 of October 12 to the I.A.A.C.C. In his reply of October 15 Lt.-Col. A. B. Burdett wrote: 'As regards the statement made that Entente officers are not to visit establishments without an accompanying German officer, I have to inform you that these officers of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission have the right to visit any establishment with or without a German accompanying officer, and I request that you will make this point clear to all concerned.'

*Mr. Seeds (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 18)*

*No. 1020 [C 8920/59/18]*

BERLIN, October 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Munich communicating a protest by the Bavarian Prime Minister against the demand by the Inter-Allied Naval Commission of Control for the destruction of Diesel motors.

The Press has lately published numerous similar protests emanating from labour as well as from employers' associations, stress being laid on the fact that these motors are adaptable to peaceful use and are of special value in view of the coal shortage. The question was raised at a meeting of the State Economic Council, Herr Stinnes amongst others being loud in his complaints, and a representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that the German Government had lodged a protest with the Council of Ambassadors. The Majority-Socialist Party, at their Congress in Cassel, passed a motion condemning the action of the Naval Commission, and the president of the meeting, the ex-Chancellor Hermann Müller, expressed the hope that their protest would be re-echoed by the Socialists in the Entente countries.

I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter received from Admiral Charlton<sup>1</sup> to whom I submitted Mr. Smallbones' despatch for observations.

I have, &c.,

WILLIAM SEEDS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In this letter Admiral Charlton said that the German Government had already protested through their representatives at Paris to the Conference of Ambassadors and that the matter was *sub judice*.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 301

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)*

*No. 15*

MUNICH, October 9, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that a statement has appeared in the papers to the fact that the Inter-Allied Naval Commission has visited the Augsburg-Nürnberg Motorenwerke and demanded the destruction of Diesel-motors which might be used for submarines.

The Bavarian Prime Minister has asked me to present to His Majesty's government that this demand if insisted upon will have serious economic consequences. He states that these motors are now intended for factories, for the purpose of generating power, and that some of them have already been mounted. Owing to the shortage of coal they are indispensable and their

destruction would cause much unemployment in the factories where they are now used and for which they are intended. He wishes me to submit that there cannot be any reasonable suspicion that they might be used for submarines and suggests that as a safeguard the motors should be numbered so as to allow the members of the Commission to trace them and verify the fact of their unobjectionable employment.

I venture to recommend this proposal to Your Excellency's favourable consideration. The question is causing much ill feeling which it might be possible to avoid without endangering allied interests.

I have, &c.,  
ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

No. 302

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received October 19)*

No. 74 [C 9058/113/18]

MUNICH, October 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report, with further reference to the Foreign Office despatch No. 54 of the 20th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> that I have had an interview with the Bavarian Prime Minister in the course of which I stated the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the question of the Einwohnerwehr as laid down in that despatch.

His Excellency in reply again assured me that it is not the intention to convert the organisation into a citizen army as an aggressive weapon but that, on the contrary, it would be disarmed as soon as the authorities felt convinced that the danger of a Bolshevistic rising no longer existed. Unfortunately I did not gather that that conviction is likely to be arrived at within the time limit fixed at Spa.

As regards suppression of the Einwohnerwehr Herr von Kahr held that the organisation will not constitute a violation of article 177 of the Treaty of Versailles when it is disarmed. He added that he looked upon it as a very useful instrument for promoting social intercourse between the various classes of society and thus creating the spirit of brotherhood between them. For this purpose he considered the shooting competitions and social gatherings to which they lead indispensable.

There is no doubt that His Excellency is tenacious of purpose, but it is doubtful whether this tenacity is due to pigheadedness or whether he is really the strong man he considers himself to be. He has adopted, with conviction, the position of an apostle of the gospel of law and order and he seems prepared to take for himself and his country the consequences which that rôle may involve. His attitude is appreciated by a large following, and, at present, he is without question the most popular man with the greatest number of Bavarians.

I have, &c.,  
ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

<sup>1</sup> No. 293.

*The German Minister for Foreign Affairs to Air Commodore Masterman*

*No. F.11042/106931 [Confidential/Germany/27/1]*

BERLIN, *October 14, 1920*

To the President, I.A.A.C.C.

'In your Note EAM/4791/2 of 10th September,<sup>1</sup> you state that the question of Aerial Police in Germany has already been carefully studied by the Commission, and that it has been decided at Paris in the sense that the police in Germany are neither to fly nor to possess any aeronautical material.

'This note takes it for granted that this decision has already been communicated to the German Government. This however is not so.

'The Foreign Office proposed in its letter No. 6931 of 18th June<sup>2</sup> the release to the German Government of a number of aeroplanes and seaplanes for the police, to be obtained from the aeronautical material due to be surrendered. This proposal was refused by the Commission of Control in its note of the 24th June No. EAM/2695 [2895].<sup>3</sup>

'In my note of the 23rd July addressed to General Nollet,<sup>4</sup> attached to my letter No. 9931 of 2nd September,<sup>1</sup> and which dealt with the general question of the police, the Foreign Office seized the opportunity to present generally its point of view in the question of the equipment of the police with aeroplanes.

'No answer has been received on this subject. The Foreign Office is therefore compelled to believe that there is a misunderstanding with reference to the note EAM/4791/2 of 10th September.

'The interpretation held by the German Government, as expressed already on several occasions, is that as soon as it obtains new aeroplanes, it will be within its rights to organise squadrons for training the aerial police.

'Neither the Peace Treaty nor the Spa Protocol contain any clauses restricting the rights of Germany in the employment of aeroplanes for such purposes. Taking into account the development of aeronautics, it must more and more be reckoned with that aeroplanes will be used for smuggling and that some criminals will endeavour more and more to escape by means of the air.

'The police have therefore equally need of aeroplanes. These are also necessary to supervise the execution of police aerial laws (traffic, etc.), and in order to hinder unauthorised flights.

'Further they are indispensable for reconnaissance work in case of internal troubles.

'The German Government is unable therefore to give up the use of aviation for its Police.'

<sup>1</sup> Not printed in the I.A.A.C.C.'s Final Report.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 104, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> No. 104.

<sup>4</sup> Not here printed, an extract only being printed in the Final Report of the I.A.A.C.C.

No. 304

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Seeds (Berlin)*

*No. 962 [C 8374/113/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 15, 1920*

Sir,

I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from H.M. Consul-General [*sic*] at Munich,<sup>1</sup> as to the attitude of the Bavarian Government towards the Einwohnerwehr.

I should be glad if you would call the serious attention of the German Govt. to the aspects of the Bavarian movement described in Mr. Smallbones' despatch, and warn them of the grave responsibility in which it threatens to involve them.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> No. 296.

No. 305

*Mr. Seeds (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 20, 3.30 p.m.)*

*No. 567 Telegraphic [C 9155/113/18]*

BERLIN, *October 19, 1920, 5.30 p.m.*

Munich despatch No. 74, October 13th.<sup>1</sup>

I believe French Commission of Control here are about to raise in an acute form at Paris question of disarmament in Bavaria with all it implies in way of action in Ruhr district.

Bavarian attitude in regard to possible Bolshevik danger is not likely to have been rendered more favourable to disarmament by large number of votes given to Moscow at Independent Socialist Congress in Halle and it is hard to see what effective measures German Government can take to disarm Einwohnerwehr in the circumstances.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 302.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Curzon minuted: 'I spoke seriously about this to the German Ambassador at the Palace last week, and told him that Bavaria was building a bridge for the French to the Ruhr. C 20/10.'

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 25)**No. 1066 [C 9523/113/18]*

BERLIN, October 21, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Mr. Seeds' telegram No. 567 of the 19th instant,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that, according to information received from General Bingham, the official report sent to Paris by General Nollet did no more than merely call attention to the impossibility so far of disarming the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria, without laying any great stress on the matter. General Nollet has however gone to Paris and there seems reason to fear that his presence in that capital may serve to bring the question into prominence.

Mr. Seeds took an opportunity this morning to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it was true that the Bavarian Prime Minister was coming to Berlin to-day to discuss the question. Herr von Haniel said that the German Government had been disagreeably impressed by what they considered the unnecessary advertisements of the strength of the Einwohnerwehr constituted by the recent shooting competitions and demonstrations. They had therefore asked Herr von Kahr to come to Berlin at once in order to impress on him the undesirability of such proceedings from the point of view both of internal and foreign politics. Herr von Kahr had declared himself unavoidably prevented from complying with their request at the moment, but it was hoped he would come shortly.

Mr. Seeds said that His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn of this action taken by the Central Government as they had instructed him (please see Your Lordship's despatch No. 962 of the 15th instant<sup>2</sup> received to-day) to lay the seriousness of the situation before the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Herr von Haniel said that the German Government were fully alive to the danger to their own interests involved in such aggressive displays, but he went on to state that to suppress these parades was a very different matter from disarming and disbanding the force itself. Bavaria had had ample opportunity of appreciating the delights of Communism and was determined to dispense with them in the future; it was certain that Bavarian public opinion was practically unanimous in support of the Einwohnerwehr, and in these circumstances what was the Central Government to do? The use of force was inconceivable and the German Government was powerless for the present.

I have, &amp;c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>1</sup> No. 305.<sup>2</sup> No. 304.

No. 307

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 25)*

No. 3215 [C 9498/41/18]

PARIS, October 23, 1920

The Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, dated the 14th October, on the execution of the Spa protocol and the agreement at Boulogne by Germany.  
(Copy sent to Berlin.)

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 307

*Le Maréchal Foch, Président du Comité Militaire Allié de Versailles, à Monsieur le  
Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs*

N° 1670/1

PARIS, le 14 Octobre 1920

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint, copie de la note établie par le Comité Militaire Interallié de Versailles indiquant les conditions dans lesquelles l'Allemagne a, à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre 1920, exécuté le Protocole de Spa (9 Juillet 1920) et la note de Boulogne (22 Juin 1920).

Je vous prie de vouloir bien la porter à la connaissance des Gouvernements Alliés.

P.O. le Général de Division,

Chef d'État-Major,

DESTICKER

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 307

*Exécution par l'Allemagne à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre du Protocole de Spa (9 Juillet 1920)  
et de la note de Boulogne (22 Juin 1920)*

*Protocole de Spa (9 Juillet 1920)*

Le Protocole de Spa, d'une part, avait imposé à l'Allemagne:

1° de procéder *immédiatement* au désarmement des Einwohnerwehren et de la Sicherheitspolizei;

2° de publier une proclamation exigeant la livraison *immédiate* de toutes les armes se trouvant aux mains de la population civile en prévoyant, en cas de contravention des pénalités efficaces, et de prendre toutes mesures législatives nécessaires à cet effet;

3° de prendre *immédiatement* les mesures nécessaires pour abolir le service militaire obligatoire et pour organiser l'armée sur la base du service militaire à long terme, ainsi qu'il est prévu dans le Traité;



4° de livrer aux Alliés, à fins de destruction, et d'aider à la destruction de toutes les armes et du matériel militaire en excédent sur les quantités autorisées par le Traité;

5° d'avoir réduit pour le 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre 1920 l'armée allemande au chiffre de 150,000 hommes comprenant *au maximum 10 brigades de Reichswehr*.

6° d'avoir retiré de la zone neutre pour le 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre 1920 les forces militaires autorisées à y séjourner jusqu'à cette date pour participer au désarmement de la population civile.

#### *Conférence de Boulogne (22 Juin 1920)*

La note de Boulogne, datée du 22 Juin, d'autre part, imposait à l'Allemagne:

1° de dissoudre dans un délai de 5 mois, c'est-à-dire pour le 22 Septembre au plus tard, la Sicherheitspolizei.

2° de mettre *sans aucun retard* sa législation en conformité avec les clauses militaires du Traité, ainsi que le prescrit l'article 211.

3° de prendre des dispositions légales pour interdire l'exportation du matériel de guerre conformément à l'article 170.

4° de supprimer effectivement les formations d'Einwohnerwehren, le protocole de Spa loin de supprimer ces conditions, les a au contraire renforcées.

Les conditions dans lesquelles le Gouvernement allemand a rempli les obligations qui lui étaient imposées par le Protocole de Spa et la Conférence de Boulogne sont indiquées ci-dessous, telles qu'elles ressortent des rapports du Général Nollet.

#### *I—Clauses exécutées*

##### *Réduction de l'armée allemande à 150,000 hommes pour le 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre (Spa le 9 Juillet)*

Le Gouvernement allemand a déclaré que la réduction de son armée à 150,000 hommes était terminée le 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre.

Le Contrôle de cette réduction par la Commission Militaire est en cours.

Le projet de réduction de l'Armée, adressé par le Gouvernement allemand à la Commission Militaire Interalliée de contrôle, faisait ressortir toutefois que la réduction des unités inférieures à la Brigade n'était pas proportionnée à la réduction des effectifs. Il prévoyait en effet:

36 régiments d'infanterie au lieu	de 32
106 Bataillons	„ 95
113 batteries	„ 95
12 bataillons de Pionniers	„ 10

et par contre le nombre des dépôts et des régiments de cavalerie était inférieur au chiffre prévu par le Traité.

A la suite de la réclamation adressée par la C[ommission] M[ilitaire] I[nteralliée de] C[ontrôle] le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaître qu'il allait réduire également le nombre des unités; cette réduction est en cours.

### *Évacuation des forces militaires de la zone neutre (Spa le 9 Juillet 1920)*

Les forces militaires allemandes de la zone neutre ont été retirées; l'évacuation de la zone neutre a été constatée par la C.M.I.C.

### *II — Clauses dont l'exécution n'a été commencée qu'avec retard et n'est par conséquent pas terminée*

#### *Désarmement de la population (Protocole de Spa)*

Ce n'est que dans le courant du mois d'Août que le Gouvernement allemand a pris les mesures légales nécessaires pour assurer le désarmement de la population. (Loi du 7 Août et règlement d'application du 22 Août.)

Ces documents prévoient que la livraison des armes devra commencer le 15 Septembre et être terminée le 1<sup>er</sup> Novembre, et que la loi du 7 Août n'aura plus d'effet à partir du 31 Mars 1921. Ils édictent des pénalités efficaces en cas de non exécution. Toutefois, les textes présentent certaines lacunes que la C.M.I.C. a relevées. Le Gouvernement allemand a répondu aux observations adressées par la C.M.I.C. par une note du 28 Septembre qui est à l'étude.

Au 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre, l'application de cette loi avait provoqué la livraison de:  
500,000 fusils, 650 mitrailleuses, 8 canons—chiffres insuffisants.

#### *Abolition du service militaire obligatoire. — Organisation de l'armée sur la base du service militaire à long terme. — Application de l'article 211 du Traité (Protocole de Spa et Conférence de Boulogne)*

La loi abolissant le service militaire obligatoire et organisant l'armée sur la base du service militaire à long terme a été promulguée le 21 Août.

Cette loi présente encore de nombreuses lacunes:

En particulier, elle ne précise pas que le chiffre de 100,000 hommes ne pourra être dépassé, ni le chiffre des officiers comptant dans l'armée, elle n'indique pas que le service dû aux États confédérés est aboli, elle prévoit bien que le service sera de 12 ans, mais omet de préciser que les 12 ans de service devront être ininterrompus ce qui permettrait de préparer des réserves.

La C.M.I.C. a invité le Gouvernement allemand à rectifier en conséquence le texte de la loi, et à la compléter de façon à ce que la législation militaire allemande soit conforme aux prescriptions de l'article 211 du Traité.

#### *Destruction du matériel de guerre (Protocole de Spa)*

La destruction du matériel de guerre n'est pas terminée. Elle se poursuit toutefois normalement, et porte actuellement sur:

24,000 canons (en chiffres ronds)  
56,000 minenwerfer  
50,000 mitrailleuses ou tubes  
1,520,000 armes portatives

### *Désarmement de la Sicherheitspolizei*

Le désarmement de la Sicherheitspolizei vient seulement de commencer : la police a livré un certain nombre de canons.

Mais les conditions dans lesquelles le désarmement de la S[icherheits] P[olizei] doit s'opérer, sont tellement imprécises encore, que son contrôle ne peut être fait efficacement. La Commission de contrôle a réclamé des précisions à ce sujet au Gouvernement allemand.

### III—*Clauses non exécutées*

#### *Désarmement des Einwohnerwehren (Protocole de Spa)*

Le désarmement des E.W. n'est pas pratiquement commencé. Les documents indiquant les conditions dans lesquelles s'opère ce désarmement viennent d'être adressés à a [sic] la C.M.I.C. Ils sont à l'étude.

#### *Dissolution de la Sicherheitspolizei (Conférence de Boulogne)*

Le décret prescrivant la dissolution de la S.P. prussienne a été signé le 4 Octobre. Ce décret adressé le 7 Octobre à la C.M.I.C. ne fait ressortir aucun désaccord avec le texte de la note de Boulogne.

La C.M.I.C. a invité le Gouvernement allemand à ordonner que la même mesure soit prise dans les autres États du Reich.

Ce n'est que lorsque tous les États allemands auront adressé leurs décrets de dissolution de la S.P. que la C.M.I.C. pourra efficacement voir si les forces de police de l'Allemagne répondent bien à la note de Boulogne.

En fait, la dissolution de la Sicherheitspolizei qui devait être terminée pour le 22 Septembre, n'est pas encore commencée.

#### *Suppression effective des formations d'Einwohnerwehren (Conférence de Boulogne)*

#### *Interdiction de l'exportation et de l'importation du matériel de guerre (Conférence de Boulogne et Protocole de Spa)*

A la suite de nombreuses protestations de la C.M.I.C., le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaître le 17 Août à la Commission qu'il comptait prendre, pour application de l'article 170 du Traité, les mesures réclamées par la C.M.I.C. Toutefois, la liste des prohibitions qu'il présentait était incomplète : la C.M.I.C. l'a invité le 12 Septembre à adopter la nomenclature établie par elle et à promulguer dans le plus bref délai une loi interdisant tout trafis [sic] de matériel de guerre.

En résumé, le Gouvernement allemand a exécuté les clauses pour lesquelles le Protocole de Spa fixait au 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre la date de l'exécution (évacuation des forces militaires de la zone neutre — réduction de l'armée allemande à 150,000 hommes — réduction faite sous réserve de contrôle en cours).

Par contre, le Gouvernement allemand a pris des mesures tardives ou dilatoires pour exécuter les clauses que le Protocole de Spa, sans fixer de date ferme, déclarait exécutoires *immédiatement* (désarmement des Einwohnerwehren et de la Sicherheitspolizei, livraison des armes par la population

civile, abolition du service militaire obligatoire et organisation d'une armée sur la base du service militaire à long terme).

Par suite, ces Clauses sont simplement en cours d'exécution, *trois mois* après la signature du protocole de Spa; l'une d'elles — le désarmement des *Einwohnerwehren* n'a même pas reçu un commencement d'exécution.

Quant à la note de Boulogne imposant à l'Allemagne:

de dissoudre dans un délai de trois mois — soit pour le 22 Septembre au plus tard — la *Sicherheitspolizei*.

d'interdire les exportations et importations de matériel de guerre.

de supprimer efficacement les *Einwohnerwehren*.

elle est restée lettre morte et l'Allemagne 9 mois après la mise en vigueur du Traité dispose en outre de l'Armée régulière de toutes les forces militaires interdites par le Traité.

Le C[omit ] M[ilitaire] A[llié de] V[ersailles] prend acte de cette situation et en rend compte aux Gouvernements alliés.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sir E. Crowe minuted: 'This is a formidable indictment—not unforeseen—of the German government and shows that the French government will have no difficulty in establishing that the conditions settled at the Spa conference are very far from having been fulfilled.

'This may foreshadow a French proposal for the occupation of the Ruhr before long. We ought to be prepared for such an eventuality. E. A. C. Oct. 27.' The minute was initialled by Lord Curzon.

## No. 308

*Aide-Mémoire communicated by the German Ambassador to Earl Curzon  
(Received October 26)*

[C 9848/59/18]

*Translation*

GERMAN EMBASSY, LONDON, *October 26, 1920*

In principle, Germany is quite prepared to carry out in its entirety the obligation for surrender of all the military and naval aeronautical material imposed by Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace. According to the provisions of Article 202 (Par. 3), this material—which, apart from aeroplanes, sea-planes and dirigibles, includes the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, sheds for dirigibles and shelters of every kind for aircraft—will only be liable to surrender in so far as it is or was intended for military purposes. The Chairman of the German Peace Delegation in Paris recently handed a note to the Conference of Ambassadors on behalf of the German Government,<sup>1</sup> in which it was stated that this provision did not apply to part of the buildings and installations of the aircraft industry. Some of these were privately owned and were never used, nor intended for, military purposes. This was more particularly explained in a communication from the Minister for Foreign

<sup>1</sup> This note of October 18 is not printed.

Affairs in Berlin to the Chairman of the Interallied Aeronautical Mission of Control dated September 8, 1920.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, the reply of September 14<sup>2</sup> of the Mission of Control, declining to consider this objection, was never received.

In addition to the buildings and installations which, in the opinion of the German Government, are not liable to surrender because they were never used nor intended for any military purpose, there are a number of installations in Germany, the destruction of which, without the excuse of military necessity would be very prejudicial to German economic existence. In this group are included various airship sheds which have already been, or are intended to be, taken over for industrial purposes. Their destruction would entail closing down the works and therefore dismissing numerous work-people. A part of these airship sheds is suitable for dwelling-houses for workers in coal-mining districts; if they were not surrendered, execution of the obligations undertaken at Spa would be rendered easier.

In a note dated June 22,<sup>3</sup> the Conference of Ambassadors prolonged the period provided for in Article 201 (which had expired on July 10), during which the manufacture of aircraft, parts of aircraft, and engines for aircraft was forbidden, until a period of three months after that, when the entire aircraft material deliverable under Article 202 had to be surrendered. The Spa Protocol of July 9 fixed the time of delivery for aircraft material, etc., at August 31, the date for sheds and shelters being February 15, 1921. The time-limit would, therefore, not expire before May 15, 1920 [1921], at earliest.<sup>4</sup>

On August 4, the German Government handed to the Belgian Minister at Berlin a memorandum protesting against extension of the time-limit, which was precisely fixed by the Treaty of Peace. No answer has been received up to the present.

Destruction of the aircraft installations, etc., in Germany and prohibition of the air industry for a period longer than that referred to in Articles 201 and 202 cannot, in the opinion of the German Government, be at all in the interests of England and the Allies. It would rather be undoubtedly to their interest if German air industry and flying were maintained. Part XI of the Treaty of Peace provides that Germany should in future be able to keep up a settled air service intended for civil purposes and should play an important part in international air communications. This not only corresponds to the central position of that State and the extent of its territory—which, for technical reasons alone, can only be flown over by foreign aircraft if it possesses within its territory the required installations for landing, repairs, etc.,—but, as a direct consequence of the obligations laid upon Germany by Part XI of the Treaty of Peace with regard to aerodromes, regulations for control and examination, etc., it follows that the adhesion of Germany to an international Air Convention is specifically implied.

There can be no doubt that, for financial reasons, Germany would hardly

<sup>2</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>3</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 165.

<sup>4</sup> This date was confirmed by the Conference of Ambassadors on December 2, 1920, as reported by Lord Hardinge in § 4 (not printed) of his telegram No. 1366 of that date.

be in a position for many years even to provide for and maintain the installations required for international air traffic, if the Entente does not shew sufficient consideration for German air communication serving civilian purposes, when interpreting and applying the provisions of Part V, Section III. The guarantees obtained by the Allies in Part XI of the Versailles Treaty with regard to air passage over Germany will be worthless, if German flying and German flying industries are to be suppressed.

In this connection it may be mentioned that the fact that flights by the airships 'Bodensee' and 'Nordstern' were forbidden, aroused great bitterness of feeling among German workmen, who then threatened to prevent the surrender of military airships. It was only after a great deal of difficult negotiation that the Government succeeded in quelling a strike which had been caused by that reason. This bitterness will be aroused once more, if the Entente insists on prolongation of the period within which the building of aircraft is forbidden.

On the other hand, the more consideration and understanding are shewn to Germany in regard to the question of allowing her to retain plant, installations, etc., connected with non-military flying, the more will that country be able—by reason of its geographical position—to co-operate with greater efficiency than any other countries in the development of international flying. There can be no doubt that the British Government is of the opinion that a close community of interests exists between Germany and the Allies with regard to international flying. In this connection we may cite a note, dated May 21, 1920, in which the British Representative at Berlin expressed the wish that Germany might adapt her meteorological service to the rules for meteorological observation accepted by the signatories of the Paris Air Convention.

The more favourable conditions requisite for the maintenance and development of flying in Germany as part of international flying, should also include the proviso that Germany should not be obliged to break up all the sheds and shelters on the left bank of the Rhine and within the neutral zone. This would, however, involve cancellation or mitigation of the resolution passed by the Ambassadors' Conference on July 27 [24], according to which Germany was forbidden to retain any sheds or shelters on the left bank of the Rhine or within the neutral zone for the use of civil aircraft.

### No. 309

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 1)*

*No. 1085 [C 10186/59/18]*

BERLIN, October 27, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Mr. Seeds' despatch No. 1032 of October 15,<sup>1</sup> I have the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This enclosed a further despatch from Mr. Smallbones on the subject of Diesel engines.

honour to report that there has been a great hubbub in the German press lately regarding the alleged intention of the Naval Commission of Control to destroy all Diesel motors whether they are suitable for submarines or whether they are intended for commercial use, the accusation made or implied being that the Commission were serving English commercial interests and endeavouring to impede and hamper industry in Germany. Newspapers of all shades of opinion are vociferous in their complaints, and the reactionary organs have gladly made use of the agitation to point to the 'British peril' and to raise a clamour for which, to their regret, our policy since the conclusion of peace has given them no excuse. The official 'Allgemeine Zeitung', in an article of which I have the honour to enclose a summary,<sup>2</sup> went so far as to accuse Admiral Charlton of acting on behalf of private British interests, but the Government have conveyed to him an apology and the paper has published a retraction.

I saw Admiral Charlton and he gave me the facts, stating that there was no truth in the accusations made. He said that the intention of the Commission was to destroy only Diesel motors intended for submarine work. I told Admiral Charlton that, while all machines adapted for use in submarines must be destroyed in accordance with the Treaty, it was most undesirable to allow the impression to get abroad among the German public that any unfair use was being made of the Treaty to injure German industrial recovery. We discussed what action could suitably be taken to prevent this impression getting abroad and decided to make the following semi-official communication to the Wolff Bureau, which will probably appear to-morrow:

'From certain articles in the German Press there appears to be a large amount of misunderstanding and misapprehension with regard to the destruction of Diesel Motor Engines. There is no intention whatever of interfering with or damaging any Diesel Engines other than Submarine Diesel Engines, nor is there any intention whatever of destroying the Diesel Industry of Germany.

'The matter has been referred to the Allied Governments and is, therefore, "sub judice".

'Pending the decision of the Allied Governments the destruction of all Submarine Diesel Engines has been suspended.'

Admiral Charlton has shown me correspondence on the subject, including a Reference Sheet dated October 14 from the Head of the Naval Section in Paris, and his own Report thereon to the Admiralty of the 23rd instant,<sup>3</sup> to which I venture to refer Your Lordship for details. The question as to whether the existing Diesel engines are liable to destruction turns on the interpretation of Articles 188, 189, and 192 of the Peace Treaty and is presumably one for the Naval Inter-Allied Control Commission. As regards the regrettable exaggerations of the German Press, however, it is clear from Admiral Charlton's report that only six of the threatened motors are now in industrial use, as auxiliary plant only, and that there has never been any

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> No copy has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

intention to prevent the future construction of Diesel engines for such use: the accusations as to nefarious British designs aiming at the ruin of a German industry are therefore totally unfounded.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

P.S. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to His Majesty's Consul at Munich.

**No. 310**

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received November 5)*

*No. 83 [C 10489/59/18]*

MUNICH, October 29, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that according to the Münchener Post of this day the 'Volkszeitung' of Innsbruck of the 27th instant has stated that an attempt was made on the 26th instant to send 25 small and 46 large cases containing rifles, machine guns and ammunition from Garmisch-Pa[r]tenkirchen to Innsbruck. It is said that these goods were the property of the Einwohnerwehr organization and were intended for the Heimatwehren. The consignment was apparently stopped through the vigilance of the socialist railwaymen and has been seized by the Tyrolese authorities.

It is also stated that the 'Orgesch' has now established a bureau at the Hotel 'Sonne' at Innsbruck to act as a liaison office with the Heimatwehren. This is not improbable in view of the statement made by Herr Escherich as to co-operation between the Einwohnerwehr and Heimatwehr reported in my despatch No. 59 of the 13th of August last.<sup>1</sup> He would probably decline responsibility for the sending of arms to the Tyrol though he has admitted to me that the ill-advised ardour of some of his followers had led them to send a few rifles there.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

<sup>1</sup> No. 278.

**No. 311**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 1, 11.45 a.m.)*

*No. 1267 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, October 30, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> (4) The Conference, on the recommendation of the Interallied Military

<sup>1</sup> The first three sections related to other matters.



Commission of Versailles, decided to adhere to their resolution of October 2nd and to reject an alternative scheme proposed by General Masterman for exacting compensation from the German Government for the destruction of certain Zeppelins. (See my telegram No. 1154, Section 9<sup>2</sup>). In view of the manifest difficulties of estimating in terms of commercial airships the value of the compensation due to each allied Government, I had suggested in the first instance that all the Allied Governments should accept monetary compensation. As I was unable to obtain the concurrence of my colleagues, I stipulated that in the event of any Allied Government insisting on taking their compensation in the form of commercial airships it should be clearly understood that such Government should be responsible for making all the necessary arrangements with the German Government for the construction of these airships and that the Commission of Control was not to intervene beyond estimating the amount of compensation due to each Government. My main object in insisting on this stipulation was to make sure that the Aeronautical Commission of Control should not be maintained for the purpose of supervising the construction of these airships which may be a matter of years and which may give rise to a great deal of correspondence and argument. It was agreed however that if the German Government fail to carry out their obligations in this matter, the Allied Government affected would be able to count on the moral support of the Allies.

Marshal Foch called attention to the fact that the German Government had failed to offer the apologies required by the Aeronautical Commission of Control for the insults to which various members of the Commission were subjected in March last although they had offered them in the similar case of the Naval and Military Commissions of Control. The Conference decided therefore to address an immediate demand on this subject to the German Government. They are at the time to be asked to give satisfaction for the affronts committed on the members of General Niessel's staff in the Baltic provinces in the Autumn of 1919. (See my telegram No. 277 Section 1<sup>3</sup> of March 11th). . . .<sup>4</sup>

(7) The Conference considered a series of questions put by Admiral Charlton as regards the precise character of the equipment which the German Government are to hand over in connection with the light cruisers and destroyers which are to be incorporated in the French and Italian fleets (see my telegram No. 1163 paragraph 5<sup>5</sup>). The Conference decided on the recommendation of the Naval Advisers that this equipment is to include reserves of ammunition and guns corresponding to the quantities allowed to the German fleet and also fresh guns to replace those now in the vessels which are reported to be unserviceable, provided that they have been rendered unserviceable by neglect or sabotage and not merely on account of their wear and tear. On the other hand the legal advisers are to be asked whether the term 'equipment' is to be regarded as covering navigational and other auxiliary gear.

<sup>2</sup> No. 295.

<sup>4</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> No. 297.

*Memorandum on the execution by Germany of the military articles of the Peace Treaty of Versailles*<sup>1</sup>

[C 11607/113/18]

Secret

GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE, *November 5, 1920*

CONTENTS:

- I. The vital Military Articles of the Peace Treaty.
- II. Progress in the execution of the vital Military Articles of the Treaty.
- III. General Summary.
- Appendix A.—Note on the execution of each separate Military Article of the Treaty.

I. THE VITAL MILITARY ARTICLES OF THE TREATY

The military articles of the Treaty were framed to provide exhaustively both for the immediate disarmament of Germany and for the limitation of the strength and power of expansion of the German Army in the future.

The vital basis for ensuring the removal of any actual German military menace for a considerable period can, however, be summarized briefly as follows:—

- (a) *The surrender and destruction of all war material in Germany in excess of the quantity allowed by the Treaty.*
- (b) *The abolition of the laws constituting universal military service in Germany, and the establishment of a system of voluntary enlistment for the future German Army.*
- (c) *The reduction of the German armed forces to the establishments laid down in the Treaty.*

In addition, the decisions of the Boulogne and Spa Conferences (June and July, 1920) provided for:—

- (1) The disarmament of the civil population in Germany.
- (2) The dissolution of all unauthorized military forces in Germany.
- (3) The reduction in the armament of the German police and the demilitarization of the police forces.
- (4) The prohibition of the export of war material.

These decisions were generally covered by the various clauses of the Treaty, but their importance has greatly increased since the Treaty was framed.

The progress made by the German Government in the execution of the vital military articles of the Treaty is shown in Part II below.

A note on the execution of each separate military article of the Treaty is given in Appendix A.

<sup>1</sup> This document was transmitted by the War Office to the Foreign Office, where it was received before November 13.

## II. PROGRESS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE VITAL MILITARY ARTICLES OF THE TREATY

### (a) *The surrender and destruction of War Material in Germany in excess of the quantities allowed by the Treaty* (Articles 168, 169, 170)

1. *General.*—At the outset, considerable difficulties were experienced by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in effecting the surrender and destruction of war material owing to the obstructive attitude of many of the officers and minor officials; the disorder resulting from the Kapp 'Putsch' in March, 1920, caused further delay, the work of the Commission being, in fact, entirely stopped for several weeks.

Subsequent to the Spa Conference, and with an increase in the technical means of destruction, very great progress has been made in the work of the Commission.

(1) The most important factor in making impossible any fresh aggression by Germany has been the destruction of the very large number of guns existing at the time when Control first commenced. Up to the present, 28,790 guns have been surrendered, of which 26,365 have been destroyed. In addition, 6,000 guns in various stages of construction have been destroyed at Krupps and other factories. Only 2,425 guns remain to be destroyed, of those which have been surrendered; at the present rate of destruction (average 1,500 each fortnight) these will all have been destroyed by the 1st December.

In addition, General Bingham estimates that about 850 guns remain to be surrendered by the *Reichswehr* and *Sicherheitspolizei*, and from the armament of inland fortresses.

The surrender and destruction of guns can be considered most satisfactory.

(2) The totals surrendered in *Minenwerfer* (10,623), loaded shell (31,263,065 rounds and 33,154 tons) and small-arm ammunition (394,896,600 rounds), and the progress in destruction of this material, are quite satisfactory.

(3) The number of machine guns surrendered (70,503) is less satisfactory and a large number of these must still be in the hands of unauthorized forces and of the civil population; 11,000, however, are reported to have been handed in to the German Government since the institution of the special measures for the disarmament of the civil population.

The destruction of surrendered machine guns (46,395) is satisfactory.

(4) The number of rifles surrendered (2,231,919) is far below what it should be, and it is considered that considerably over 2,000,000 rifles are still in the hands of the civil population or illegal organizations; it is now, however, reported that 1,750,000 rifles have been recently handed in to the German Government for surrender to the Commission of Control.

This question is fully dealt with below, in its relation to the disarmament of the civil population and of the unauthorized local forces.

2. Table showing the progress in surrender and destruction of war material up to 28th October, 1920:—

Nature of material	Total surrendered up to 28th October	Total destroyed up to 28th October	Remaining for destruction on 28th October
1. Guns and barrels of all kinds . . . . .	28,790	26,365	2,425
2. Shells, loaded . . . . .	tons—33,154 31,263,065	tons—6,524 16,595,142	tons—26,630 14,667,923
3. Minenwerfer . . . . .	10,623	6,334	4,289
4. Machine guns . . . . .	70,503	46,395	24,108
5. Small arms (rifles and carbines) . . . . .	2,231,919	1,686,843	545,076
6. Small arms (ammunition) . . . . .	394,896,600	168,078,500	226,818,100

3. *Surrender of arms by the Reichswehr and Sicherheitspolizei.*—Arms surrendered between 16th September and 28th October:—

	Reichswehr	Sicherheitspolizei
Guns . . . . .	112	219
Machine guns . . . . .	1,541	389
Small arms . . . . .	62,719	11,860

These surrenders, which are included in the totals of the table in paragraph II. 2 above, are considered satisfactory.

4. *Surrender of Arms by the Einwohnerwehr (Civic Guards).*—In general, little progress has been made in the surrender of arms by the *Einwohnerwehren* throughout Germany.

Up to the present only 17,650 rifles have been surrendered by the *Einwohnerwehr*, which, probably, has at least 800,000–1,000,000 rifles distributed amongst its members, or in the hands of men belonging to former units of this organization, but now officially disbanded.

The question of the disarmament of this force is fully discussed below under subheading II (c).

5. *Disarmament of the Civil Population.*—In accordance with the Spa Protocol, the German Government, in August, passed a law making it obligatory for the civil population to hand in all arms in their possession. Premiums were paid for all arms handed in by the 21st October, and immunity from punishment for arms held illegally was guaranteed up to the 1st November. Severe penalties were threatened to all who retained arms in their possession subsequent to the 1st November.

The success of this measure cannot be fully gauged until the complete returns have been compiled for all districts.

In a sitting of the *Reichstag* of 28th October, Dr. Peters, the Disarmament Commissioner, stated that disarmament results were so far satisfactory; up to the present the following arms had been surrendered:—

890 guns.  
11,635 machine guns.  
1,750,000 rifles and carbines.<sup>2</sup>  
11,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition.

It is not yet known how many of these rifles represent actual surrenders, and how many are rifles seized by the German police in the last few months. No information is available as to how many of these are modern German rifles and how many are old pattern German rifles or captured foreign rifles of modern pattern. All surrendered arms are being handed over to Control for destruction.

Although these figures are extremely satisfactory, it is certain that a large number of arms have not been handed in. The surrenders in the danger centres of the industrial districts, and in Bavaria and the country districts generally, are believed to have been negligible.

It remains to be seen what steps the German Government can now take to carry out forcible searches for arms on a large scale.

It is considered that the German Government have so far done everything possible to ensure the surrender of arms by the civil population. If the results are as reported above, it shows a most praiseworthy effort on the part of the German Government to fulfil their Spa undertaking, in which they have spared neither trouble nor expense.

6. *The Export of War Material.*—The export of war material is forbidden by Article 170 of the Treaty.

There have been numerous reports of attempted smuggling of arms from Germany, and at the Boulogne Conference, Germany was called on to pass the necessary laws to forbid the export of war material in accordance with Article 170.

The German Government have so far only issued administrative decrees forbidding the export of war material, and contend that this is sufficient. The Commission of Control are impressing on the German Government the necessity of passing the legislation required by the Allies.

Meanwhile, the German police have in certain cases taken action to prevent the export of war material.

7. *Manufacture of war material.*—Article 168 prohibits the manufacture of war material, except in factories authorized by the Allies.

The manufacture of war material has been restricted by the Commission of Control to the minimum necessary for the replacement of stocks for the 100,000 army.

Up to the present 2,673 German munition factories have been inspected; 2,108 have been given a free certificate by the Commission.

This progress is considered satisfactory.

<sup>2</sup> *Note on filed copy:* 'It is believed that 600,000 of these rifles are in the hands of the *Einwohnerwehr*, and, though notified to the German Government, have not actually been handed over.'

(b) *The abolition of the laws constituting universal military service in Germany and the establishment of a system of voluntary enlistment for the future German Army* (Articles 173 and 174)

1. In August, 1920, the *Reichstag* passed a law abolishing the obligation of compulsory service in the *Reich*.

The Commission of Control objected to certain legal technicalities in this law, and amendments are to be included in the new German *Wehrgesetz* (Defence Law), which is being laid before the *Reichstag* this autumn and which will repeal all previous laws relating to compulsory service.

Meanwhile, in actual fact, compulsory service has ceased to exist in Germany and the *Reichswehr* consists entirely of voluntarily enlisted men.

This is considered satisfactory.

2. The law abolishing compulsory service, mentioned above, contained a clause to the effect that all men in the new 100,000 *Reichsheer* (Federal Army) are to be enlisted for 12 years' service.

The Germans are now enlisting men for 12 years' service with the Colours, from the men in the 150,000 Army, which is in course of reduction to 100,000 by the 1st January, 1921.

In accord with the Commission of Control, non-commissioned officers and men enlisting for 12 years in the 100,000 Army are being permitted to count the time spent in the old army, and in the transitional *Reichswehr*, as part of their service with the Colours. This is considered satisfactory.

(c) *The reduction of the German armed forces to the establishments laid down in the Peace Treaty* (Articles 159, 160, 162, 163, 177)

1. *Reichswehr*.—By the decision of the Spa Conference, the time limit for the reduction of the *Reichswehr* was extended as follows:—

To 150,000 by 1st October, 1920.

To 100,000 by 1st January, 1921.

The Commission of Control report that the reduction to 150,000 has been carried out; further reductions are now in process.

This is satisfactory.

2. *Police and Gendarmerie*.—(1) The Treaty laid down that the strength of the German Police and *Gendarmerie* was not to exceed the 1913 establishments, with an allowance for the increase in population.

(2) The Boulogne Conference permitted the German Government to increase the Police and *Gendarmerie* up to the following maximum establishments:—

Civil Police	.	.	.	.	.	150,000
Gendarmerie	.	.	.	.	.	17,000

These establishments are to include police forces in the Neutral Zone and in the occupied territory.

(3) The Boulogne Conference stipulated that the German Police must be demilitarized, the *Sicherheitspolizei* disbanded, and the armament of the police reduced to that sanctioned by the Commission of Control.

(4) On the 4th October the Prussian Government issued a decree for the dissolution of the *Sicherheitspolizei*, and for the transformation and reorganization of the Prussian Police Force. The armament of the new *Schutzpolizei* is considered satisfactory. The Commission of Control consider that the system of command and organization of the new police force satisfies the stipulations laid down by the Commission.

The Württemberg and Baden Governments have similarly reorganized their police forces; reorganization is in progress in the other States, and reliable information is not yet available as to the extent to which it has already been carried out.

The disbandment of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and the demilitarization and partial disarmament of the police forces are considered satisfactory.

3. *Unauthorized forces* (Article 177).—(1) There are still numerous illegal armed organizations in Germany; the steps taken by the Federal Government to disarm and disband such organizations have so far had little effect.

(2) In April, in response to the demand of the Commission of Control, the Federal Government issued a decree dissolving the *Reichszentrale der Einwohnerwehr* (Federal Headquarters of the Civic Guards) and requested the various States to disband this force. The *Einwohnerwehren* were subsequently officially disbanded in Prussia, Saxony and some of the smaller States, but no progress was made in recovering the arms issued to the various units.

In Bavaria and Württemberg, on the other hand, no attempt has been made by the authorities to disband the *Einwohnerwehr*: the State Governments have, on the contrary, made every effort to support this organization.

(3) In Bavaria, the *Einwohnerwehr* has become a national question. The force is stated to be between 300,000 and 400,000 strong; 50,000 men, apparently all armed, were present at the Munich rifle meeting in September, when the Bavarian Premier, v. Kahr, and Dr. Escherich proclaimed to enthusiastic meetings that under no circumstances would the *Einwohnerwehr* be disbanded.

The Bavarian *Einwohnerwehr* contains all the law-abiding and best elements in the Bavarian population; the country is still obsessed with a fear and hatred of Bolshevism, due to the Soviet *régime* in Munich in April, 1919, and the general public feels that a disbandment of this force would mean a certain return to the previous state of lawlessness and disorder. The Bavarian Government is at present certainly not in a position to disband the *Einwohnerwehr*, even if it were desirous of so doing. The Bavarian Government is dependent on the *Einwohnerwehr*, and could not exist in opposition to it.

Further factors operating against the disarmament of the *Einwohnerwehr* are the widespread belief in Bavaria that the French Government will tacitly waive their objections to this disbandment of the force in Bavaria, and also

the Separatist and Monarchist tendencies which find some support in the *Einwohnerwehr*.

(4) Conditions in Württemberg are generally similar to those obtaining in Bavaria, the mentality of the people resembling that of the Bavarians; the population is not industrial, and is generally law-abiding.

(5) During the summer a large number of branches of a society known as the *Orgesch* appeared in Prussia and the other northern and central states. (*Orgesch* = *Organization Escherich*, is an anti-Bolshevik society, avowedly formed with the objects of supporting law and order, the rights of property and the Constitutional Government, and combating any attempt at a Right or Left *Putsch*. Its organizer is Dr. Escherich, the creator of the Bavarian *Einwohnerwehr*.)

The *Orgesch* was declared illegal by certain Prussian authorities, but the Society has been trying to obtain a legal reversion of this decision, and Dr. Escherich has addressed a strongly worded open manifesto of protest to the Federal President. Press reports now state that the Prussian Minister of Justice has declared that the *Orgesch* Society does not contravene the decrees forbidding illegal armed organizations, in accordance with the Treaty, and is therefore within the law. The members of this Society, mostly members of the former *Zeitfreiwilligen* and *Einwohnerwehren*, are certainly to a large extent in the possession of arms.

*Note.*—Confusion is liable to arise in press reports between the *Einwohnerwehr* and the district branches of the *Orgesch*. In States such as Bavaria and Württemberg, where the *Einwohnerwehr* has not been officially disbanded, the *Orgesch* Society is merely a patriotic organization of citizens, most of whose members probably belong to the *Einwohnerwehr*. In Prussia and the other States in which the *Einwohnerwehr* has been officially dissolved, the *Orgesch* has more ambitious aims; the Society proposes to take over all members of the former *Einwohnerwehr*, and to provide for a service of law and order such as the local *Einwohnerwehren* formerly provided.

(6) Recently a number of so-called Limited Liability Associations for protection (*Selbstschutz* organizations) have also been formed in North German towns. These are merely the *Einwohnerwehr* under a different title, and are certainly in possession of arms.

(7) In East Prussia, the unauthorized local forces are also strong, and are supported by the bulk of the population of the province. This is due to the isolated situation of the province, and the general fear of Bolshevik or Polish aggression.

(8) The *Spartacist* elements in the industrial districts, and the peasants in the country districts have so far shown little or no sign of handing in their arms; it is certain that the organizations of both these classes are in possession of arms to a considerable extent.

(9) From the above, it is obvious that, as regards the disbandment of unauthorized local forces and armed organizations, the situation is far from satisfactory.



This can hardly be ascribed as in any way due to the German Government. Germany is still suffering from the shock of the revolution, and the frequent armed risings in 1919 and the spring of this year.

The opposing parties are filled with hatred and suspicion, and both Reactionaries and the *Spartacists* are afraid to hand in their arms, for fear of being left defenceless in face of their enemies.

The *Einwohnerwehr*, and the *Orgesch* and *Selbstschutz* organizations are mainly composed of those elements in the population whose chief wish is to preserve law and order.

(10) These unauthorized formations present no immediate military danger to the Allies; the only danger is that in the future they may form the basis for a gradual rebuilding of a National Army in Germany. The danger of unauthorized formations has been consistently emphasized by the General Staff, who, mindful of the events of 1806-13, have been and are still anxious to prevent the establishment of any system that may eventually result in the re-establishment of a National Army in Germany. It must not be forgotten that, like the French and other Continental nations, the Germans are accustomed to universal compulsory military service, and have long regarded it as an advantage and indeed as a necessity.

(11) As conditions in Germany, and in Central Europe generally, improve, and with the gradual removal of the Russian Communist menace, it is considered that the protective local forces such as the *Einwohnerwehr* and *Orgesch* will tend to dissolve, due to the disappearance of the factors which caused their creation.

Improved food conditions and the supply of raw materials should remove the danger of outbreaks from the *Spartacists* and the unemployed.

The gradual strengthening of the constitutional government in Germany should make any chance of an armed *coup d'état* by the extremists of either side certain of failure, and therefore unlikely.

Without any such gradual improvement in the general situation, it is considered that no action by the Allies will be really effective in disarming the civil population and bringing about the actual dissolution of the unauthorized protective forces. Re-imposition of the blockade would almost certainly bring about a general Communist rising, and possibly the disappearance of any form of settled government in Germany. Military action, such as the occupation of the Ruhr, would probably lead to a *coup d'état* by the reactionaries, and civil war and anarchy in Germany.

### III. GENERAL SUMMARY

(a) The following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing statement:—

1. The surrender and destruction of arms in Germany, with the exception of those held by the civil population and *Einwohnerwehr* (i.e., rifles and, to a certain extent, machine guns) is proceeding satisfactorily and is nearing completion.

2. The German Army will shortly be reduced to the Treaty Establishment; the force is voluntarily enlisted, and Germany has been deprived of the power of building up a large potential reserve by means of a short service army.

3. Germany has ceased to be a military danger to the Allies for a considerable period of time.

Her power of preparing a National Army, capable of tremendous expansion at the outbreak of war, has been removed; the guns essential for the armament of such a National Army have been destroyed.

4. The German Government has in the main carried out the military clauses of the Treaty, as far as lay in its power, and has worked loyally with the Commission of Control, in spite of obstruction by subordinate military authorities.

General Bingham reports that he considers the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control can be reduced by two-thirds at the end of March, 1921.

5. The only real violations of the military clauses of the Treaty are:—

(1) The failure to disband and disarm the *Orgesch* and the Bavarian and Württemberg *Einwohnerwehren*.

(2) The failure to disarm the civil population.

(3) The export of war material.

In the case of (1), the German Government is not strong enough to carry out the disbandment and disarmament of these organizations, the regular armed forces having already been reduced, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty and of the Spa Conference; the same applies to (2), although the German Government has, by its recent measures, given evidence of a real intention to secure the disarmament of the civil population, apparently with surprisingly good results. As regards (3), the German Government can hardly be held responsible for the smuggling that has been going on, though no doubt many minor officials are among the offenders.

6. In general, therefore, the execution by the German Government of the military clauses of the Treaty has been satisfactory, and the main object of these clauses has been attained, i.e., the removal of the menace of German aggression, at all events for a considerable period.

(b) In coming to a decision as to the policy to be adopted towards Germany, with the general object of the restoration of peace and order in Europe at the earliest possible time, the following points regarding the present situation in Germany call for consideration:—

1. The disarmament of the unauthorized forces and of the civil population in Germany will never become actually effective until the country

settles down, and the law-abiding elements of the population are no longer afraid of armed outbreaks from the Extremists of the Left or the Right.

2. After the revolution the military and nationalist spirit in Germany was largely broken. Now there is a real danger of a revival of militarism and of nationalist feeling; this is partly due to exasperation at the policy of continual pinpricks by certain of the Allies, the situation in Upper Silesia, the huge cost of the Commissions of Control and of the Armies of Occupation, the economic burdens of the Treaty, and in certain cases the injudicious behaviour of some members of the Allied Commissions in Germany.
3. Conditions in Germany cannot become normal until food and economic conditions and the supply of raw material are improved.
4. Germany will never settle down to live in peace with her neighbours until she feels that she is no longer an outcast from the society of nations, and that she will receive a fair hearing in international disputes.

#### APPENDIX A

##### NOTE ON THE EXECUTION OF EACH SEPARATE MILITARY ARTICLE OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

1. *Article 42.—No Fortifications to be Maintained or Constructed West of a Line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine*

This is being complied with.

2. *Article 43.—No Troops allowed in the Neutral Zone. Permanent Works for Mobilization forbidden there*

1. The German troops evacuated the Neutral Zone by 1st October, 1920, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council at Spa.

2. Permanent works for mobilization are not being maintained in the Neutral Zone.

3. *Articles 159, 160, 163 (as modified by the Spa Conference, July, 1920).—Demobilization and reduction to 150,000 by 1st October, 1920, and to 100,000 (7 Infantry and 3 Cavalry Divisions) by 1st January, 1921*

*Article 159.*—1. The German military forces have been progressively demobilized, and no units or formations of the old army, of any military value, exist.

2. The Demobilization Staffs were reduced on 1st October from 1,600, with 52,000 *employés*, to 57, with 12,000 *employés*. This personnel has been demilitarized. The German Government wishes to maintain these 57 Demobilization offices till 1st April, 1921; the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control has, however, only sanctioned their retention until 1st January, 1921.

*Articles 160 and 163.*—1. The German Army (*Reichswehr*) has been reduced to 150,000 by the 1st October; the reduction of the Army to the *Reichsheer* of 100,000 is now proceeding.

2. The 100,000 Army is being organized in accordance with the Treaty, as regards command, staffs and units; the 150,000 Army organization showed a slight divergency from the Treaty organization. The attention of the German Government has been drawn to this fact by the Commission of Control, and the few surplus units are being reduced.

3. The Great General Staff has been dissolved; certain sections, such as the topographical and historical sections, have been transferred to Civil Ministries.

4. The question of the military personnel in the War Ministry and the Administrations is at present under discussion between the German Government and the Commission of Control. A number of administrative services have been transferred to Civil Ministries, e.g., 'Q.' services to the Ministry of Finance; Medical services to the Ministry of Labour; former recruiting offices to a civil department dealing with pensions and claims of discharged soldiers.

4. *Article 161.—Administrative Services (civil personnel) to be reduced in each class to one-tenth of Establishment of Budget of 1913. (An increase in the number of officials was sanctioned at Spa)*

A control of the civilian personnel is difficult, owing to the transfer of certain services to civil departments. (*See paragraph 4, under Article 160.*)

The Commission of Control is engaged in investigating the question of civilian personnel.

5. *Article 162.—Number of employés or officials of German States, such as Customs Officers, Forest Guards and Coastguards, not to exceed strength of 1913, and not to be assembled for military training. The number of police only to be increased in proportion to increase of population*  
(*Germany was allowed 150,000 police, plus 17,000 'Gendarmerie', by the Boulogne Conference, June, 1920*)

1. The German Police Force and the *Gendarmerie* are being satisfactorily reorganized, in accordance with the decisions of the Boulogne Conference, and the stipulations of the Commission of Control.

For full details, *see* Part II, subheading (c), paragraph 2, of the foregoing Memorandum.

2. Germany has no special Coastguards, such duties being performed by Customs officers. The latter and the Forest Guards have no military organization.

6. *Article 164.—Armament allowed to Germany until admitted as a member of the League of Nations—for 100,000 Army*

1. The German armament is being reduced in proportion to the reduction of the *Reichswehr* and *Sicherheitspolizei*.

2. The final inspection by the Commission of Control cannot be carried out until the 1st January, when the Army is finally reduced to the 100,000 establishment.

7. *Article 165.—Maximum number of Guns, Machine Guns, Trench Mortars, Rifles, and amount of Ammunition allowed during the period of the reduction of the Army to 100,000*

See Articles 164, 167 and 169.

8. *Article 166.—Maximum stocks of Ammunition authorized*

See Article 164.

9. *Article 167.—Limitation of Armament and Munitions in Fortresses which Germany is allowed to retain*

1. The German Government desired to retain a large stock of guns, machine guns, *Minenwerfer*, rifles and war material, including mobile armament, in the 14 fortresses on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany.

2. The Commission of Control decided that:—

(a) Guns can only be allowed which are actually in position or for which genuine positions actually exist.

General Bingham considers that this decision should be modified in the case of Königsberg, owing to its isolated position in East Prussia, and would allow about 150 guns for this fortress. A similar view was expressed by Marshal Foch at the Spa Conference. The Germans will probably appeal to the Conference of Ambassadors regarding Königsberg.

(b) No stocks of surplus rifles, machine guns and *Minenwerfer* may be retained in the fortresses.

3. The surrender and destruction of surplus armament in fortresses is proceeding satisfactorily.

10. *Article 168.—Control and closing down of Factories*

1. The German Government have been informed that they may keep two factories for guns, two for machine guns, and two for rifles; they have also been informed of the capacity for output, to which these factories are to be restricted.

2. The following table shows the situation as regards German munition factories:—

<i>Total number of factories known to the Commission of Control</i>	<i>Factories inspected</i>	<i>Factories given a free certificate</i>
5,385	2,673	2,108

This Article is being executed satisfactorily.

11. *Article 169.—Surrender of War Material*

The surrender and destruction of war material is proceeding satisfactorily, with the exception of the question of arms in the possession of the civil population.

For full details, *see* Part II, subheading (a) of the foregoing Memorandum.

12. *Article 170.—Prohibition of Import and Export of War Material*

1. The German Government has issued administrative decrees forbidding the import and export of war material. The Commission of Control does not consider these to be sufficient, and has demanded that the German Government should introduce legislation forbidding such export and import, and also providing for adequate penalties in case of breaches of this law.

2. There have been frequent reports of the export of arms from Germany to Soviet Russia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Holland, South America, Lithuania and Ireland. No definite proof of such transactions has, however, been obtained, and there has been nothing to prove Government complicity.

13. *Article 171.—Prohibition of Gas and Tanks*

This has been complied with; a few *Flammenwerfer* may still be in the hands of certain *Reichswehr* units.

14. *Article 172.—Information required as to Chemical Preparations*

This information has been supplied to the Commission.

15. *Article 173.—Abolition of Compulsory Service*

Compulsory service has ceased to exist in Germany; the *Reichswehr* are now recruited by voluntary enlistment only.

16. *Article 174.—Period of Enlistment for Non-Commissioned Officers and Men*

The regulations for the enlistment of the new 100,000 Army conform to this Article.

17. *Article 175.—Officers retained in the Army must serve up to the age of 45 at least; Officers newly appointed for 25 years at least*

1. The terms of service of officers in the new 100,000 Army conform to this Article.

2. Officers discharged from the Army in consequence of the reduction have been freed from all military obligations.

18. *Article 176.—Limitation of the number of Military Schools*

1. The German military schools have been reduced to one per arm; all other military schools have been abolished.

2. The former cadet schools have all been re-opened as civilian schools; they contain, however, a large number of former cadets and a proportion of the former instructors.

19. *Article 177.—Military matters are forbidden in Educational Establishments and Associations of every description*

This Article is violated by the numerous unauthorized forces and illegal organizations existing in Germany to-day.

This question is fully dealt with in Part II, sub-heading (c) of the foregoing Memorandum.

20. *Article 178.—All measures of mobilization forbidden*

1. Nothing is known of any measures for mobilization.

2. The Demobilization Staffs of the old Army were reported by the Commission of Control in April, 1920, to be incapable of undertaking any measures of mobilization.

21. *Article 179.—Prohibition of German Military Missions abroad, and of enrolment of Germans in Foreign Armies*

1. No German Military Missions are known to exist abroad.

2. There have been frequent reports of German officers serving with the Russian Bolshevik Army; no definite proof has been obtainable, and it has been impossible to prove that any German Mission exists, or that Germans have been enrolled with the sanction or knowledge of the German Government.

3. Recently it has been reported that Germans have been trying to enlist in the Lithuanian Army; this is being investigated.

4. A recent report states that Colonel Kundt of the German Army has recently arrived in Bolivia as an Instructor for the Bolivian Army. The French Minister has protested to the Bolivian Government.

22. *Article 180.—Dismantling of Fortresses and Field Works in the Neutral Zone and in the Occupied Territory*

1. The dismantling of fortifications and field works is progressing satisfactorily; the disarmament of these works is complete.

2. No new fortifications have been constructed in the Neutral Zone.

3. The fortresses which are permitted to remain in their existing state have been inspected.

23. *Article 195.—Ordering the Destruction of all German Coast Defences in the Western Baltic*

The fortifications on the Western Baltic have been disarmed; the work of dismantling is proceeding satisfactorily.

24. *Article 196.—Coast Defences on the North Sea and Baltic, other than those fortifications mentioned in Article 195, and in Section XIII (Heligoland) may be maintained in their existing state. No new fortifications may be constructed*

1. The fortifications on the North Sea and on the Eastern Baltic have been inspected.

2. No new fortifications have been constructed.

25. *Articles 203-208.—Military Commissions of Control*

1. The Commission of Control have experienced considerable difficulty with the German authorities, chiefly regarding the questions of working through German liaison officers, and the right of the Commission of Control to make surprise visits and inspections.

The Commission of Control have upheld their point of view, and the German Government have promised to issue instructions to the subordinate authorities.

2. In general, the work of the Commission of Control has proceeded satisfactorily. Obstruction has come rather from local military authorities than from the German Government.

26. *Article 211.—Bringing German legislation into conformity with the Military Articles of the Treaty*

1. For a long time no steps were taken by the German Government to enact the necessary legislation. In August a law was passed abolishing compulsory service, fixing the establishment of the army at 100,000, and establishing a system of voluntary service of twelve years with the colours.

2. The Commission of Control consider certain amendments and additions necessary, and these are being included in the new German *Wehrgesetz* (Defence Law), which is being laid before the *Reichstag* this autumn.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Sir E. Crowe wrote on November 13 a fairly long commentary on this memorandum expressing his dissent from 'the War Office impression that by helping Germany back to normal and settled conditions—which is in itself most desirable for general political reasons—we shall eliminate the danger of a revival of the military and nationalist spirit in that country'. His minute was initialled by Lord Curzon.

No. 313

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 12)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 1143 [C 11056/113/18]*

BERLIN, November 6, 1920

My Lord,

It may be of convenience to Your Lordship if I endeavour to make a succinct statement of the progress achieved in the disarmament of Germany and if I give my view of the present military strength of Germany under the new conditions. With a view to affording Your Lordship a clear picture of the precise position I have asked the officers specially charged with disarmament to make me short reports upon the present position. These reports I now enclose.<sup>2</sup> They comprise a report on the disarmament of the Navy by Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Charlton, N.I.A.C.C. for Germany; on the

<sup>1</sup> This despatch was printed for circulation to the Cabinet.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



military position by Major-General the Honourable Sir F. R. Bingham, M.I.A.C.C. for Germany; and a report on the disarmament of the Air Force by Air Commodore E. A. D. Masterman, I.A.A.C.C. for Germany. These reports may be summarised very briefly as showing that disarmament has already proceeded in the more important and vital sections of military preparation to such an extent that it would now be impossible for Germany to undertake hostilities against the Entente with any reasonable hope of success.

Thus, Admiral Charlton reports that all warships to be surrendered under the Peace Treaty have been delivered; all the submarines have been made innocuous; and the German Navy reduced to six battleships, six light cruisers, twenty-four destroyers and torpedo-boats (most of which ships not being however in commission), with two battleships, two cruisers and eight destroyers and torpedo-boats in reserve. The personnel of the navy has been reduced to the numbers laid down in the Treaty.

General Bingham states that over 40,000 guns have been surrendered or destroyed including those lost in the German retreat and given up under the Armistice, and that by the end of this year Germany will probably be left with only 373 guns and a small amount of fortress artillery. As to rifles, 2,200,000 have been surrendered to the Control Commission who are also gradually receiving a further million recently given up by the civilian population; the *Einwohnerwehr* still retain about 600,000 and General Bingham estimates that about another million rifles are still in the hands of civilians. In the opinion of General Bingham the surrender of machine-guns is satisfactory, but it is difficult to say what numbers are left. The numbers of the army have been reduced to 150,000 and the further reduction to 100,000 is in progress.

Air Commodore Masterman reports that the destruction of aircraft may be considered completed to the extent of about 85% and the destruction or removal of hangars, hydrogen plants, &c., to about 12%.

I do not know to what extent the advanced stage reached in disarmament is generally realised in England but it appears to me to be an essential and even dominant factor in any review of the political condition of Europe. It would seem to affect to a very vital degree the policy we should adopt towards such questions as the application of severe pressure towards further army reductions or towards the disbanding of the *Einwohnerwehr*. It would also seem to affect in some measure the amount of insistence which should be applied to Germany as regards further confiscation of rifles. In future it is the opinion of the competent officers that the only additional arms delivered up will be those now in the hands of the more law-abiding citizens from which [*sic*] the *Einwohnerwehr* and similar organisations are recruited, while the rifles in the hands of the Communists connected with Moscow will not be forthcoming.

A policy of some tolerance in this special direction need not—and I think should not—involve any weakening of the pressure on Germany to deliver up all the larger and more technical war material, such as guns, sights,

aeroplanes, air appliances, and submarine specialities. The two classes are absolutely distinct and need not be treated on absolutely identical lines. So far from tolerance in one direction making strictness in another more difficult—an argument which has sometimes been advanced—it appears to me to make it on the whole more easy, provided the matter is handled with adequate skill.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

No. 314

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 9)*

*No. 1307 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, November 8, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and discussed the following questions, the Belgian Ambassador being present for the first question:—

1. On July 24th (see my telegram No. 862 section 6)<sup>1</sup> the Conference decided that the war material which the Military Commission of Control in Germany has been authorised to sell, through the intermediary of the Reparations Commission, instead of destroying, must not be sold out of Germany since that would constitute an infringement of Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles. The Reparations Commission have since then claimed the right to sell such material outside Germany, on the ground that the prohibition contained in Article 170 was only intended to apply to the German Government and not to the Allies who were therefore free to sell this material wherever they liked. They also argue that a distinction can be made between war material which under all circumstances remains purely war material, and other material which is only war material so long as it is in the form of military stores or supplies but which becomes purely civilian material (and therefore not covered by Article 170) as soon as it is dispersed among the civilian population. Representatives of the Reparations Commission attended the Conference today in order to put forward the above views. The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Versailles has maintained the view that Article 170 renders it impossible to allow the export of this material, and they point out that if exported the German Government would be able to maintain that not being war material in the sense of Article 170 the Allied Governments had no right to have taken possession of it in the first instance. Marshal Foch supported this view at the Conference this morning. I agreed with him and pointed out the practical dangers of allowing this material to be exported. For instance, the Allied Governments would have no control over the material once it was in a neutral country and there would be nothing to prevent its being collected together and thereby reassuming a purely mili-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

tary character for subsequent export for the use, say, of the Russian Army. On the other hand, so long as the material is not dispersed in Germany the Military Commission of Control can see that it is not brought together again by the German Government for military purposes. I was supported in my view by the Belgian Ambassador, but the Italian Ambassador was inclined to support the view of the Reparations Commission. The Conference being unable in these circumstances to arrive at any conclusion, it was decided to invite Marshal Foch and M. Maucière, representative of the Reparations Commission, to consult together with a view to finding a compromise...<sup>2</sup>

6. I proposed to the Conference in accordance with your despatch No. 3374 of the 14th. October<sup>3</sup> that the allied Governments should drop the second paragraph of the supplementary disarmament protocol of Spa which provides for the extension of the time limit under Article 202 of the Treaty of Versailles within which the manufacture and importation of aeronautical material is forbidden. On the recommendation of Marshal Foch, the Conference decided to go still further and to drop the whole protocol on the ground that the signature by the German Government of the first part of the protocol was no more necessary than that of the second. The first part pledges the German Government not to export war material. Marshal Foch argued that the German Government is already bound in this respect by the Treaty of Versailles, and that it is quite unnecessary to obtain their signature to a special protocol on the subject. In these circumstances I agreed with my colleagues that the whole protocol should be dropped.

7. The Conference approved proposals by the Inter-Allied Military Committee at Versailles on the following questions:—

Proposal to confirm the decision of the Military Commission of Control with regard to the armament of the fortified works which Germany is to be allowed to keep.

8. To refuse to allow the German army to be armed with revolvers except in specified cases.

9. To refuse to allow Germany to keep an aerodrome at Königsberg.

10. To refuse to allow her to keep an aerial police. . . .<sup>2</sup>

13. The Conference approved the text of a note to be addressed to the German Government with regard to the compensation to be paid by the latter for the illegal destruction of Zeppelins (see my telegram No. 1267 of October 27th. Section 4).<sup>4</sup> Copy of this note is enclosed in my despatch No. 3353.<sup>5</sup>

14. The Naval Commission of Control having furnished the further information asked for as regards the possibility of using German submarine Diesel [*sic*] engines for commercial purposes in Germany (see my telegram No. 1223 Section 11)<sup>3</sup> the Conference approved the joint note to be addressed to the German Government to the effect that the Conference are prepared to leave these engines at the disposal of the German Government, on the understanding that they can only be used for commercial purposes as pro-

<sup>2</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> No. 311.

<sup>5</sup> Of November 9, not printed.

vided for in Article 189 of the Treaty of Versailles. To ensure this object the German Government is to be asked to furnish a report on the 1st. of February<sup>6</sup> showing the location of these engines and distinguishing those in commercial use and those that are in store. If on receipt of this report it is definitely established that these engines are being used commercially, the Conference is prepared to reconsider the question of allowing them to be treated as outside the scope of Article 192 of the Treaty of Versailles and as merely subject to Article 189. Copy of this note and of the Naval Advisers' Report is enclosed in my despatch No. 3354.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> On another copy (C 10744/59/18) these words have been struck through and replaced by 'not later than March 31st 1921'.

<sup>7</sup> Of November 10, not printed.

### No. 315

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 15)*

*No. 1324 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, November 12, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> 2. On the recommendation of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, the Conference decided to reject two German protests against decisions of the Aeronautical Commission of Control to demand the surrender (1) of certain railway material on the ground that it is covered by Article 202 of the Peace Treaty; (2) of certain hangars which the German Government claim were never used for war purposes and are therefore not covered by Article 202 of the Treaty.

3. The Conference had before it a draft reply to be [*sic*] prepared by General Weygand and M. Fromageot in answer to the German protest of June 10th regarding the maintenance of allied detachments in Duisburg, Mannheim and Karlsruhe (see my telegram No. 1140 Section 11 of September 29th).<sup>2</sup> Copy of this draft is enclosed in my despatch No. 3388 of today's date.<sup>3</sup> The Conference were prepared to approve this draft, especially when General Weygand explained that in order to avoid any further misunderstanding with regard to the character of these posts, the interallied Military Committee of Versailles had decided that the size of the allied detachments was to be reduced as much as possible, that they were only to carry such arms as are carried by the German police, and that they were to wear a special badge indicating the non-military character of their duties. Having regard

<sup>1</sup> The omitted section related to another matter.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In this Lord Derby had asked whether Lord Curzon adhered to the views he had set out in No. 294 'notwithstanding the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles quoted by Marshal Foch in justification of the continued occupation of these towns' (see Volume IX, No. 550).

<sup>3</sup> No. 316 below.

however to the views expressed by His Majesty's Government in your despatch No. 3201 of 25th September,<sup>4</sup> I said I must reserve approval but that unless I notified the Secretariat to the contrary before next Thursday,<sup>5</sup> the consent of His Majesty's Government might be assumed. I should be grateful therefore to be furnished as soon as possible with the views of His Majesty's Government. I would point out that I have never received a reply to my telegram No. 1140 Section 11. . . .<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> No. 294.    <sup>5</sup> November 18.    <sup>6</sup> The omitted sections referred to other matters.

### No. 316

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 15)*

*No. 3388 [C 11201/4430/18]*

PARIS, November 12, 1920

The Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

*Name and Date*

*Subject*

Marshal Foch's No. 221/M.T. 5th  
November, 1920.

French occupation of Towns on the  
right bank of the Rhine.

### ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 316

*Marshal Foch to M. Leygues*<sup>1</sup>

PARIS, le 5 Novembre 1920

*No. 221/MT*

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint le projet de réponse à la note allemande No. 226 datée du 10 Juin 1920,<sup>2</sup> relative à l'occupation par les Alliés de certains ports de la rive droite du Rhin.

Ce projet a été établi d'accord entre M. Fromageot et le Général Weygand conformément à la résolution du 29 Septembre 1920 de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.

P.O. Le Général de Division  
Chef d'État-Major,  
WEYGAND

<sup>1</sup> French President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> For an English translation of this note, see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 154.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 316

*Draft reply to the German note of June 10*

Monsieur le Président,

Par note 226, du 10 Juin 1920, vous m'avez demandé, au nom du Gouvernement allemand, le retrait des détachements alliés qui ont été maintenus après la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix dans les ports de Duisbourg, Mannheim et Karlsruhe.

Cette demande était basée sur le fait que la présence, sur la rive droite du Rhin, de ces détachements considérés comme troupes d'occupation serait contraire aux dispositions de l'article 428 du Traité de Paix et de l'Article 7 de la Convention additionnelle du 16 Janvier 1919, qui fixent, avec précision, les limites territoriales des zones d'occupation alliées.

La question est tout autre:

Ces détachements ne sont nullement des troupes d'occupation, mais des postes de contrôle dépendant de la Commission Interalliée de Navigation de Campagne qui ont été installés par application des dispositions de la clause I de la Note annexe No. 2 à la Convention d'armistice du 11 Novembre 1918, maintenue en vigueur par l'Article 212 du Traité de Versailles.

Pour surveiller la navigation sur le Rhin, il est nécessaire d'avoir le long de la rive droite des postes établis aux confluent, de façon tout à la fois à permettre le contrôle de la navigation et, en même temps, à ne pas gêner celle-ci. Tel est le cas et le caractère des postes établis à Duisbourg, Mannheim et Karlsruhe.

Dans ces conditions, les Puissances Alliées estiment qu'il n'y a eu, de la part du Gouvernement allemand, qu'un malentendu que les explications précédentes doivent aplanir.

No. 317

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 17)*

*No. 1158 [C 11471/113/18]*

BERLIN, November 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have had several conversations with General Bingham, the English Representative on the Disarmament Commission, and have discussed with him the problem of German armaments after the Disarmament Commission has completed its work. There appears to be some danger lest, after completing the disarmament of Germany—an operation which will come to an end some time next year—the German Government will be free to build up again, without serious control or restriction, the whole military fabric which has been destroyed at the cost of such great efforts.

Article 213 of the Treaty of Peace appears to be the only Section of the

Treaty of Versailles which bears upon the subject of control of armaments after the conclusion of the disarmament operations.

It runs as follows:—

*'Article 213.*

'So long as the present Treaty remains in force, Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary.'

I understand from General Bingham that he has had private conversations on the subject with General Nollet, but they have arrived at no proposal of a sufficiently satisfactory character to put forward. General Nollet is rather of opinion that Article 213 is adequate and that further action in the matter can be delayed until two or three months before the conclusion of the work of the Disarmament Commission. This view, however, I am unable to share.

General Bingham's present view is that the League of Nations should have at its disposal a Committee, sitting at the League's Headquarters, composed of members of all the Nations who are party to the League, and comprising, if thought necessary, some of the members of the present Commission of Control, who would, from their previous experience, render special service. The Committee would get their information from intelligence sources as well as from the Military Attachés in Germany, and could request the German Government to give the facilities alluded to in Article 213 of the Treaty of Peace.

The object of the present despatch is, however, not to advocate this scheme, or any other special scheme, but to draw Your Lordship's attention to the subject with a view to the formulation of some definite policy, and an endeavour to obtain agreement on that policy from the French.

In my view the subject is urgent, as the occasion of a request by Germany to enter the League of Nations might well be a suitable opportunity for connecting that event with acceptance by her of certain safeguards. It is also possible that an occasion may be found in the near future when it will be opportune to discuss with Germany her acceptance of a better and more definite scheme of permanent control than is established under Article 213, against the grant of certain facilities or delays in the Einwohnerwehr and Orgesch questions.

The position appears to be as follows:—we have under the Treaty of Versailles and the decisions of the Spa Conference greater powers than we require to use for the moment, or than it would possibly be wise to use for the moment.

On the other hand, in the further future we lack the necessary powers and sanctions for the long maintenance of the guarantees which the cause of general peace requires. It might, therefore, be possible to spread the butter rather thinner and come to some agreement which would be advantageous to all parties and which would, at the same time, serve the cause of European peace.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

No. 318

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 18)*

*No. 1167 [C 11673/10613/18]*

BERLIN, November 15, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies of the various reports submitted at the weekly meeting held here this morning.

I would add, with reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 1145 of the 8th instant,<sup>1</sup> that the temporary absence of Colonel Ditmas has delayed the enquiry into the coal conditions in Germany, but I hope shortly to transmit statistics on the subject.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 318

*Memorandum by Captain P. G. E. Warburton on the dissolution of the Orgesch*

*November 10, 1920*

General Nollet addressed a note to the German Government on October 12th<sup>2</sup> continuing previous correspondence on the subject of disarmament of the population, with special reference to armed protective organizations (Selbstschutz organization). The note asks for information as to the measures which are to be taken to accelerate the disarmament of these organizations, which a German note of September 28th 1920<sup>3</sup> says will be carried out by March 1st, 1921, and to dissolve them. General Nollet also asks to be informed of the total numbers of weapons reported by these organizations to the Disarmament Commissioner and of the numbers of 'heavy weapons' surrendered by them to him.

This note has given fresh life to the already much-debated question of the Orgesch. It is impossible to obtain any reliable estimate of the strength of this organization. It had its origin in a local rural organization set up by Dr. Escherich in the spring of 1919 to protect his immediate neighbo[u]rhood from the raids of the Communists, then in power in Munich. From this, the organization has spread, not only in Bavaria, where the heads of the State have openly recognized and praised it, but throughout Germany and in German Austria. The avowed object of the Orgesch is to fight Bolshevism, and its supporters maintain that its dissolution would be the signal for a Red Terror. Outside Bavaria, the

<sup>2</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives. For a German translation of this note see *Deutscher Geschichtskalender Ausland Juli-Dezember 1920* (Leipzig, 1921), pp. 27-28.

<sup>3</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.



societies affiliated to the Orgesch bear many different names, 'Jungdeutsche Orden', 'Gross Hessischen [*sic*] Wirtschaftsbund', 'Flurschutz', 'Heimabwehr', 'Landbund Sachsen' etc., The closeness of their relations with the central organization probably varies considerably. Some of these societies are perfectly open, while others are more or less secret.

It is therefore easily comprehensible that estimates as to the strength of the movement vary considerably. Dr. Escherich was reported in the *Strength* Press as having stated, on October 9th, that his organization numbered 1,700,000 men in all, including 65,000 in Berlin. Herr Lehmann Russbült, a Pacifist, told me that Orgesch claims 800,000 members. The estimate given to me by the Prussian Minister of the Interior on November 9th, puts the strength of Orgesch and its affiliated societies in the whole of Germany at 300/400,000, and this is probably fairly correct.

It has been widely thought that the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr was identical with the Orgesch in Bavaria, but this has recently *Orgesch and Einwohnerwehr* been energetically denied by the Bavarian bourgeois press, which says that they are only united in the person of their common chief, Dr. and Landeshauptmann Escherich. Further, a sharp difference is drawn between the policies of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Orgesch in the official organ of the former, 'Heimatland', of November 6th 1920. The objects of the Einwohnerwehr are declared to be purely negative, viz:—to protect the Government chosen by the majority of the population and to protect private property. In theory, therefore, they accept anyone, who does not oppose the established constitution by force, as a member, (although, in practice, there is no doubt that its composition is overwhelmingly reactionary). On the other hand, Orgesch declares itself to be an organization for the reconstruction of Germany and seeks to unite all patriotically-minded (Vaterländisch Gesinnten) for this object. It recently published a ten-point programme, of which the chief headings are; strengthening of State authority, settlement of social conflicts, bridging over class differences, fighting illegal dealing and profiteering, increasing the will to work, and improving the morals of the official classes. Behind the patriotic propaganda conducted by members of the organization can often be detected the idea that Germany may some day be able to recover by force of arms what she lost by the treaty of Versailles.

Resistance to the dissolution of Orgesch has depended on Bavaria as its *Resistance to dissolution* main pillar of strength and the decided statements made on this point there are said to have been prompted by an idea that France would favour concessions. The leaders have probably now realised that this idea is erroneous and energetic steps have been taken to represent to the Bavarians that a refusal to give way on this point will entail an occupation of the Ruhr area by the French. There are some slight signs of a less intransigent [*sic*] attitude in the Munich Press. An ex-Staff Officer, now a member of the Munich Orgesch and Einwohnerwehr, said to a friend ten days ago 'the Einwohnerwehr can go to the devil; the first thing is the unity of the realm'.

While the less extreme papers, such as the 'Augsburger Volkszeitung' are saying that Bavaria realises, and will frustrate, France's plans to gain possession of the Ruhr and turn the rest of Germany against Bavaria, the papers of the Right, such as the Royalist 'Bayerische Kurier' are underlining the difference between the Einwohnerwehr and the Orgesch. Therein may lie the road to an understanding. The concession of small rural volunteer guards might bring the Bavarians to agree to the dissolution of the centralising organization. The leading article in the Democratic 'Frankfurter Zeitung' of November 5th, while condemning Orgesch, distinguishes clearly between this and the Einwohnerwehr, and expresses some sympathy for the Bavarian anxiety to retain the latter.

The Bavarian Minister President, von Kahr, speaking in the Landtag on November 10th, laid great stress on the vital necessity of preserving the unity of the German realm and of being reasonable and conciliatory. He then said that it was necessary for the Einwohnerwehr to retain the arms, which they had, 'until they had completely fulfilled their task', for a disarmament and dissolution of these organizations would be the signal for an attack by the radical elements. The Einwohnerwehr, not being a military formation, did not come under the Peace Treaty. Concluding, he said, that Bavaria and the Reich wished to carry out their obligations under the Peace Treaty, and that he hoped that a way would be found, which would accord with the interests of the Reich, Bavaria, and the Allied Powers.

It is rumoured that von Kahr will come to Berlin very shortly and confer with Reichs representatives and General Nollet<sup>4</sup> on the subject of the Einwohnerwehr and Orgesch.

<sup>4</sup> In fact Herr von Kahr visited Berlin towards the end of the month and was seen by General Nollet on November 27, when, in what General Nollet called 'a long exposé, very carefully drawn up', he explained his views concerning the origin and development of the Einwohnerwehr. In reporting the conversation in a letter of the same day (C 14774/113/18) to Marshal Foch, General Nollet added:

'It is interesting to compare the information which has just reached me from the District Committee of Königsberg with the declarations of the Bavarian Prime Minister on the aims of the people's guards.

'This information comes from a friendly informant who appears to be a member of the Orgesch, and confirms what I have already told you on all points.

'It draws strict attention to the organisation of the Ortswehren, Grenswehren [*sic*], Selbstorganisationen [*sic*] and all Vereinigungen [*sic*] grouped under the control of the Orgesch.

'The latter, a centre of activity and propaganda, publicly distributes an ambitious programme for the reconstruction of Germany. It is not armed, and therefore will be very difficult to attack. But its offspring,—bodies which have not yet surrendered their arms and which are engaged in military exercises, falls directly under Article 178 of the Treaty. It is true that we must expect that these chameleon-like organisations will re-appear after their dissolution, under different denominations, but with almost identical organisation.

'The Orgesch and its dependents constitute a real danger for peace. Under cover of maintaining order, which at the moment nothing threatens, and which the forces allowed by the Spa Protocol are amply sufficient to guarantee, [?] they are in fact preparing the mobilisation of a national army.

Meanwhile, in Prussia, Saxony, Hesse, Württemberg, and elsewhere, the State authorities have banned, and are apparently proceeding strongly against the Orgesch.

*The Orgesch  
outside Bavaria*

Interviewed on November 9th, Herr Severing, Prussian Minister of the Interior, expressed his conviction that he would be able to dissolve the Orgesch in Prussia and disarm its followers successfully.

*Prussia* With regard to the Prussian Minister of Justice's decision that the veto on Orgesch is illegal, with which the parties of the Right have made great play, Severing said that this decision had been taken, when he was absent from Berlin, without any of the evidence on which he had based his action. This evidence was submitted to the Minister of Justice on November 8th and he expected a revision of the verdict.

*Conclusion* While the knowledge of the existence of a strong armed force may, to some extent, discourage revolutionary outbreaks, it also greatly provokes the opposing faction, in this case the Communists. The Orgesch is represented to the masses, not as a counter-measure to the Red Army, but as an organization definitely intended to carry out a reactionary movement at the expense of the proletariat. Such propaganda has doubtless been of great value in the recruiting of the Red Army. Distrust of the Right is probably too deeply instilled in the masses for a dissolution of the Orgesch to achieve any immediate weakening of the Communist organization now, but [it] would, at least, reduce the risk of a conflict being provoked by hot-headed action.

'It is true that the Monarchists to-day make some reservations while expressing their pretensions. From this point of view, the recent declarations of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria are an interesting manifestation of their tactics. Nevertheless, without being haunted by memories of 1813, one can say that the people's guards seem to be a powerful instrument in the hands of the military party for preparing the restoration of the monarchy, the first step on the road to a War of Liberation.

'I attach to this letter [*Note in filed copy: 'Not attached'*] an analysis of an article in the Berliner Tageblatt dated November 25th reporting an interesting conversation between the Forstrat Escherich and the Saxon Prime Minister, an article which goes to prove that the idea of the Wehrens which I have exposed above, does not materially differ from that of the Saxon Government, which is closely following the procedure of the Orgesch.'

#### ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 318

*Intelligence summary by Lieut.-Colonel Longhurst from November 6-12, 1920*

[C 12078/12078/18]

*November 12, 1920*

#### (a) *Reichswehr*

Since the 1st October when the army was reduced to 150,000 effectives, further reduction has been in progress and the present strength is probably considerably below the above figure. The re-organisation on the 100,000 basis is a complicated business and it has not been found possible rigidly to insist that the reduction in effectives must be accompanied proportionately

and simultaneously by a reduction in the number of units. The main lines of the organisation of the seven Infantry Divisions are however now established; certain discrepancies with the Peace Treaty establishment at present exist which will be a matter for special notice when the Control of the 100,000 army takes place.

The engagement for 12 years is provisional pending the promulgation of the new law now awaiting consideration by the Reichstag. No men are now being enlisted on a short term engagement. There appears to be a slight excess of Officers in the Staffs of Divisional Commands but this was foreseen and is not unjustifiable in view of the complexity of the work thrown on these Command Staffs by the transformation of the Army.

There is also an excess of Senior Officers in most of the Regimental units, compared to pre-war establishments:—for instance the Stellenbesetzung für das Reichsheer shows 6 Majors to each Regiment.

This is only partially explained by the German Government and will call for attention later; the only ground on which the preponderance of senior officers in the Reichsheer could apparently be challenged would be that it violated the provisions of Article 178 of the Peace Treaty as regards 'supplementary Cadres' on the assumptions that these surplus senior officers were to constitute a Cadre for reserve regiments on the same basis as the old pre-war Army.

#### *(b) Police*

The Organisation of the Police in Execution of Article 162, as amended by the Boulogne note is proceeding.

An increase of strength over and above the 1913 standard was conceded by the Allied Governments on condition that the character of the Police organisation should be purely 'local and municipal'.

A scheme was put forward by the Prussian Ministry of Interior for the creation of an Imperial Police (Reichs Schutz Polizei) 80 per cent of the cost of which was to be borne by the Empire and the remaining 20 per cent distributed between the respective States and their Communes.

The scheme envisaged the displacement in Prussian rural districts of the Regierungspräsident by the higher authority of the provincial Oberpräsident.

It was not accepted by the Commission of Control, for besides not being sufficiently 'local' it would have facilitated the preservation of the Sicherheitspolizei as a mobile semi-military force.

The draft of the scheme recently issued by the Prussian Ministry of Interior, of which the outlines have been reported, was submitted to the Sub-Commission of Control and completed after much discussion with the latter. It seems to be an honest attempt to conform to the principles laid down at Boulogne. The disappearance of anything like a military hierarchy in police organisation has been secured. The term of engagement is for fourteen years, which prevents the police being used as a means of building up an Army reserve by engaging men for a short period and passing them out after train-

ing. It is to be noted that this is a distinct achievement on the part of the Effectives Sub-Commission as, owing no doubt to an oversight, the Treaty of Versailles had omitted to prescribe any terms of engagement for police.

The housing of the police caused some discussion; to meet the needs of discipline, organisation and efficiency and to enable Prussia to use the large number of spare barracks economically in view of the general shortage of housing accommodation, 'as far as police interests make it necessary the police may be lodged in buildings specially assigned'.

The Prussian decree from a legal point of view is excellent; its execution has to be confirmed and it is undoubtedly a fact that the control of the new Police will be a very much more difficult task than that of the Army with its records, orders, returns etc. 'Our success in securing the disappearance of the military Character of the Police may prove the measure of our difficulty in checking the number of its effectives'.

At present it is not known to what extent the Sicherheitspolizei has been actually dissolved. Control of the dissolution has begun.

As regards the other 15 States, Württemberg, Hesse, Baden and Lübeck have issued decrees on the Prussian model. Bavaria has prepared a draft decree only and those of the other States are awaited.

#### (c) *Einwohnerwehr*

The question of the Einwohnerwehr continues to present difficulties. 'No solution short of actual disarmament is likely to be satisfactory.'

A large number of documents, copies of decrees etc. of various States, purporting to abolish Einwohnerwehr have been received from the German Government. They are all of doubtful legal value. In Bavaria nothing has been done. Saxony say they are awaiting the issue of new negotiations with the Allies. The 'Ortschutz' in this State not only claims to possess arms, but the custody of these arms is subject to the Control of the police; a condition which would render useless the attempts of the Commission to control the armament of the latter.

'Upon this question of arms, the whole problem turns. It would seem impossible to prohibit the formation of special constabulary as the term is understood in England.'

#### (d) *Foreign Enlistment*

In view of the recent rumours of the movement of soldiers or ex-soldiers into Lithuania, a letter has been addressed to the German Government, inquiring what steps had been or would be taken to give effect to provisions of Article 179 of the Peace Treaty which requires the German Government to take appropriate steps 'to prevent their subjects from enlisting in the army of any foreign power.'

#### (e) *Orgesch*

The following additional information has been obtained from a French Source.

The organisation is generally affiliated to the Landbund and is supported, partly at any rate by private subscriptions from Land Owners, manufacturers, and banks.

The Orgesch is endeavouring to absorb all 'Schutz' Verbände formed by the Right Parties but on the other hand endeavours to avoid observation by the adoption of various titles in different districts.

In Bavaria an association under the name 'Orka' is in close touch with Orgesch and its head recently visited Vienna to cooperate with the Selbst Schutz organisations there.

In Württemberg details are not available but Orgesch is said to be organised in 317 groups, comprising 5,200 men.

It is not clear whether the Orgesch is a separate entity or whether it is represented by the Jung Deutsche Orden which has also close relations with Escherisch [*sic*]. The Jung Deutsche Orden was founded in University circles of Cassel and Marburg and has extended its activities over the whole of Hesse, Hesse-Nassau and to Frankfurt a/Main and Darmstadt.

In the Neutral Zone there is little information. At Frankfurt the Jung Deutsche Orden has 3 Companies each of 2/3,000 men. At Düsseldorf 600 copies of alleged mobilisation orders were distributed by post.

### *Brunswick*

A local Society has been traced which is in close touch with Escherisch [*sic*] but there are no details.

In Saxony strength of Orgesch is estimated at 200,000, which is probably an exaggeration.

The 'Stalholm' [? Stahlhelm] Society is in close touch with Orgesch, and also a Society formed at Halle from the Mitteldeutsche Treubund which was dissolved at Birna.

At Liebenwerda there is an armed organisation affiliated to Orgesch.

In Silesia the Heimat Schutzverband is affiliated to Orgesch.

In Pomerania the Güterschutz, Flurschutz and certain remains of the Free Corps, probably under Lieutenant Rossbach are considered to form part of the Orgesch.

In E. Prussia, Hauptmann Pren's Society, said to number 40,000 is undoubtedly a branch of the Orgesch. . . .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The remaining paragraphs were principally concerned with party politics and the economic situation in Saxony.

*Notes on the 'Stahlhelm' (steel helmet) organisation<sup>1</sup>*

[C 12100/484/18]

ARMY OF THE RHINE, November 15, 1920

It is reported from various sources that a new society known as the 'Stahlhelm' has been formed, having branches in Hannover and Bremen. This society has incorporated the following organisations:—

- (a) Der Deutsche Offizier[s-]Bund.
- (b) Vereinsnationalegessinter [*sic*] Frontsoldaten.
- (c) Deutsch-Nationale Handlungsgehilfen-Verband.
- (d) Verein Ehemaliger Einjährigen.
- (e) Akademiker Gruppe der Deutschnationale[n-] Volkspartei.

It is a military organisation of soldiers of the old German Army with former officers in command. It aims at a prevention of a 'Left Putsch', and the overthrow of the Government.

*Leaders*

The head of this society is said to be General Senft von Pilsach, and another of the chiefs is the liaison officer of the West Saxony Orgesch.

*Connection with Orgesch*

The Press states that Orgesch and the Stahlhelm are one and the same organisation. It is reported that this society was in secret communication with the H.Q. of the Orgesch at Munich.

At the meeting of the Stahlhelm in Bremen it was expressly stated that the Orgesch and Stahlhelm were synonymous.

*Organisation*

At the meeting at Bremen it was stated that the members would be organised into agricultural bodies and that the necessary arms and equipment are available.

In Saxony the Stahlhelm is said to be formed into groups and platoons, and has plans for mobilisation in case of any trouble.

*General*

This society is reported to be in close touch with the Orgesch Society, and with the Reichswehr.

According to the press the assembly place was fixed at Frankenberg (N. of Chemnitz, Saxony), and the local R.W. were to undertake the equipment and arming of the members.

The R.W. authorities in Saxony repudiate the statement made that the Stahlhelm and the R.W. are closely associated.

<sup>1</sup> These notes formed section 3 of the Rhine Army military notes of November 15, a copy of which was forwarded by the War Office to the Foreign Office where it was received on November 25.

*Sir R. Graham (The Hague) to Earl Curzon (Received November 19)*

*No. 838 [C 11624/59/18]*

THE HAGUE, *November 16, 1920*

My Lord,

Reports have recently reached me from Amsterdam that a German named Rosefeld [? Rosenfeld], who is a member of a Tobacco firm at Frascati, Kamer 41 in that town, with the help of an assistant named P. Frommers, is trying to dispose of a large amount of German war material deposited in this country. This material comprises rifles at Kattenburg and Hembrug, aeroplanes at Gilse Rye, cannons at Delft, machine guns near Ymuiden and cartridges near Moordrecht.

I found that the existence of these dépôts was well known to the British and French Military Attachés at The Hague and to Mr. Wood, the Passport Control Officer at Rotterdam, and that they were under supervision. Most of these arms and material were considered to be that taken from the fugitive German Army which passed through Limburg in 1918.

I thought it well that no possible opportunity should be afforded of disposing of these arms and material without our knowledge. I therefore saw the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 9th instant just before his departure for Geneva, and conveyed a strong warning to him on the subject. I said that, leaving aside the question of whether this German war material ought to be in Holland at all, the matter of its disposal must be one of grave concern to His Majesty's Government. It must in no circumstances be allowed to reach Ireland or other such undesirable destination, and I trusted that the Dutch Government would take every possible precaution to ensure this. Monsieur de Karnebeek replied that he felt certain that all necessary precautions had been taken, but he promised to make enquiries on the subject and to tell me the result. I furnished His Excellency in a private letter with the names and particulars given above.

I have now the honour to transmit, herewith, a private note<sup>1</sup> which I have received from Baron van Heeckeren of the Dutch Foreign Office in which he informs me that the names of the persons implicated in the attempt to dispose of the arms are well known to the Dutch authorities, and that, as these Authorities are perfectly aware that all the interned German war material has to go back to Germany, they have categorically refused any authorisation for such material to be sold.

This assurance appears to be satisfactory but I shall not fail to keep a close watch on the subject.

I have, &c.,

R. GRAHAM

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



**No. 321**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*  
*No. 1239 Telegraphic: by bag [C 11215/4430/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 17, 1920*

Your telegram No. 1324 Section 3.<sup>1</sup> (Maintenance of allied detachments on the right bank of the Rhine outside the bridgeheads).

We do not wish to raise any objection to the draft reply enclosed in Your Excellency's despatch No. 3388 of November 12th.<sup>2</sup> The matter can be further considered if and when the Germans object to the proposed solution.

The reason why Your Excellency's telegram, No. 1140 of September 29th.<sup>3</sup> was left unanswered was that we were informed that the matter was to be considered by the Drafting Committee.

<sup>1</sup> No. 315.

<sup>2</sup> No. 316.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 315, n. 2.

**No. 322**

*Mr. Smallbones (Munich) to Earl Curzon (Received November 22)*  
*No. 89 [C 11879/113/18]*

MUNICH, *November 17, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that a political debate has taken place in the Landtag which started on the 9th instant and was closed last night.

The three representatives of Coburg<sup>1</sup> have now taken their seats. They belong to the Mittelpartei, Democrats and Majority Socialists respectively. A split has taken place in the Independent Socialist party, five members adhering to Moscow and the Third International. Of these, three—Sauber, Schmidt and Hagemeister—are still imprisoned on account of their activities during the 'Soviet' government at Munich. Herr Eisenberger, one of the two Communists, has recently been sentenced to two years' imprisonment on account of a revolutionary speech.

The House now consists of:—

Mittelpartei	.	.	.	.	.	.	20
Bayerische Volkspartei	.	.	.	.	.	.	65
Bauernbund	.	.	.	.	.	.	12
Democrats	.	.	.	.	.	.	13
Majority Socialists	.	.	.	.	.	.	26
Right Independents	.	.	.	.	.	.	15
Left Independents	.	.	.	.	.	.	5
Communists	.	.	.	.	.	.	2
							<hr/> 158

The Mittelpartei has therefore become the third largest party and is entitled to nominate the second Vice-President.

<sup>1</sup> From July 1, 1920, the Duchy of Coburg had been included in Bavaria.

The Majority and Independent Socialists recently accused the Munich police of maintaining a gang of roughs for the purpose of doing away with persons who betrayed the existence of stores of munitions to the Inter-Allied Commission. At their instance the Landtag appointed a committee to investigate this charge. It was found to be untenable. The political debate was started with a discussion of the result of this investigation in which the majority socialists beat a hasty retreat whereas the independents made their case worse by dragging in irrelevant gossip. The conservative parties would have had it all their own way if Dr. Schweyer, in charge of the Ministry of the Interior, had not shown deplorable ignorance of the Bavarian constitution, which aroused the whole House to opposition, by claiming the right of arrest within the precincts of the House on his own authority. Even so the socialists suffered a defeat coupled with ridicule which is likely to injure their chances at the next elections.

The two questions of real interest which stood to debate were the Bamberg program [*sic*] of the Bayerische Volkspartei, reported on in my despatch No. 68 of the 28th of September last,<sup>2</sup> and the question of the Einwohnerwehr. The spokesman of the Bayerische Volkspartei and Herr von Kahr took up the attitude that that program only represented the party's aspirations but that in its immediate political action it held itself bound by the coalition program which professes loyalty to the Constitution of Weimar. The other coalition parties were satisfied with this declaration and expressed their confidence in Herr von Kahr's government though the Democrats did so with a bad grace and with reservations. But even they warned Berlin that the abuses resulting from unification were breeding a serious situation.

Unification and centralization are perhaps unnatural to Germany in her present condition. They are part of the socialistic creed and therefore prevailed automatically when the socialists took charge of the affairs of the nation. Unification is normally a sign of national strength, it denotes the giving up of individual interests for the attainment of a common ideal. In Germany the individual and the individual community appear to have, at present, little of the unselfishness requisite for national unity and their main object is self-preservation. A victorious war would no doubt have shorn the German states still more of the vestiges of *de facto* independence and it seems a historical anomaly that they should have given up in the hour of defeat those privileges which they were not even prepared to surrender to Bismarck. It appears to me likely that federalistic ideas will gain ground *pari passu* with the decline of socialism unless, indeed, a strong nationalistic wave should intervene.

As regards the question of the Einwohnerwehr Herr von Kahr took up the attitude that it does not constitute an infraction of the Peace Treaty and that not even the terms of Spa can condemn Bavaria to suicide. He promised that it would be disarmed as soon as conditions permitted but stoutly maintained that its disarmament at present would inevitably be followed by a communistic rising. His attitude was emphatically approved by all the coalition

<sup>2</sup> No. 219.

parties and there is no chance of the formation of an alternative Government to carry out disarmament. Nor would a fresh election produce a more amenable house. The Majority Socialists stated that they had proposed in July to the government the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr and the formation of an unarmed and decentralized local force but that their proposal was rejected. The Independent Socialists ridiculed the fears of a rising of the proletariat.

The question is, to my mind, one of great difficulty. The continuation of the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria probably constitutes a lesser evil than the occupation of the Ruhr district as it is not a military danger. The danger would consist in the moral effect a waiving of the terms of Spa would produce in Germany. If Bavaria, single handed, is able to defy the Allies successfully the opinion might gain ground that defiance on the part of a united Germany will reverse the decision of the Allies on any point. Furthermore, the success of what is no doubt the most reactionary Government in Germany would not be slow in making itself felt at the next general election and might produce a government dangerously self-confident.

To avoid this dilemma I venture to submit with due diffidence that Bavaria should be allowed to maintain a strictly limited number of Einwohnerwehr and a strictly limited number of rifles. This concession which would amount to a differentiation between Bavaria and the rest of Germany might be made on the ground that Bavaria has suffered from terrorism and that it is not the intention to expose her again to the same danger.

I have &c.,

ROBERT T. SMALLBONES

### No. 323

*Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)*

*No. 1249 Telegraphic: by bag [C 11415/2018/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 22, 1920*

Lord Derby's telegram No. 1163, Section 5.<sup>1</sup> Equipment of light cruisers and destroyers to be incorporated in the French and Italian navies.

The position is that last June we agreed to support our Allies in making on Germany a demand apparently inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles (viz. that the equipment should be handed over instead of being destroyed) on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Council at San Remo<sup>2</sup> that this could be demanded by way of reparation for a breach by Germany of some specific clause in the naval provisions of the Treaty.

The demand seems, however, to have been made without reference to any such breach of Germany's treaty obligations (which indeed, as we understood from the Admiralty at the time, would always have been a weak ground). The Germans having now protested and put forward the counter-

<sup>1</sup> No. 297.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 20, minute 4.

proposal contained in their note of October 1st, which formed the enclosure in Lord Derby's despatch No. 3061 of October 5th,<sup>3</sup> there seems nothing to be done but to try to secure agreement for the alternative to destruction suggested by the Germans viz., that the French and Italians should be allowed to use the equipment and debit its value against their reparation accounts.

It appears from Lord Derby's above-mentioned telegram that the Conference of Ambassadors have rejected this proposal, but that the Germans are not to be so informed until the equipment has been actually delivered. In the meantime the interpretation of the term 'equipment' has been referred to the legal advisers (see Lord Derby's telegram No. 1267 of October 30th, Section 7).<sup>4</sup>

The Admiralty now suggest that the German counter-proposal should be pressed upon the Allied Governments rather than that His Majesty's Government should be a party to enforcing a demand which is not in accordance with the Treaty. In this connection they have sent to us copy of a letter which Admiral Charlton wrote to Lord Derby on October 19th,<sup>5</sup> protesting against the decision of the Conference of October 5th.

We are disposed to agree with the Admiralty that the German position is well-founded. Do you see any objection to re-opening the question in the sense suggested?

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> No. 311.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

## No. 324

*Earl Curzon to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)*

*No. 1068 [C 11471/113/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 22, 1920*

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 1158 of the 13th instant,<sup>1</sup> reviewing the question of the arrangements to be made to give effect to article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, under which Germany undertakes to give facilities for any investigation of her armaments which the League of Nations may consider necessary.

While I concur in Your Excellency's view that it is desirable that some arrangement for the purpose indicated should be made in due course, I would point out that the question what machinery should be set up to give effect to article 213 is entirely a matter for the Council of the League of Nations. In this connection I enclose herein a copy of a letter which I caused to be addressed to the Offices of the Cabinet on October 19 last, in which is set out my view as to the relation between that question and the work of the

<sup>1</sup> No. 317.

Commissions of Control.<sup>2</sup> The whole question is already under consideration.

Copy of this correspondence has been sent to H.M. Ambassador at Paris and to the representative of this department at Geneva.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

<sup>2</sup> This letter, signed by Mr. Eric Phipps, referred to a proposal 'stated recently to have been made by Monsieur Bourgeois that the Permanent Advisory Commission of the Council of the League of Nations . . . should make early arrangements to take over the functions at present being exercised by the Inter-allied Control Commissions as regards the supervision of the disarmament of Germany'. Mr. Phipps pointed out that these Commissions would automatically disappear when the military, naval, and air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles had been fully executed, but added: 'It does not, however, follow that their functions if indeed there should remain any to transfer—will or should be assumed by the Permanent Advisory Commission of the League of Nations. It may well be that the Council of the League, should it at any time decide to embark on a particular enquiry under article 213 of the treaty, would desire to make use of the Permanent Commission as its expert advisers for this specific purpose; but it need hardly be pointed out that this is a different matter from the proposal put forward by Monsieur Bourgeois.' He added that it was difficult to believe that the suggestion made by Monsieur Bourgeois—if correctly understood—reflected the considered opinion of the French Government.

#### No. 325

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 26)*

*No. 1187 [C 12247/113/18]*

BERLIN, November 23, 1920

My Lord,

It may be of interest to Your Lordship if I state succinctly my views<sup>1</sup> on the principal questions, having a military bearing, which are now under discussion.

The presence here of Generals Bingham and Malcolm, both of whom have shown unusual ability and judgment in the discharge of their several functions, enables me to speak on these matters after hearing competent military advice.

The principal questions are:—

1. The further prosecution of disarmament;
2. The disbandment of the Einwohnerwehr;
3. Occupation of the Ruhr.

With regard to these questions:—

1. *As to Disarmament*

I think it essential to push on with the utmost energy the destruction of the larger war material, including aeroplanes, submarines, guns, minenwerfer, &c.

<sup>1</sup> A summary of these views is printed in Lord D'Abernon's *An Ambassador of Peace*, vol. i (London, 1929), pp. 92–93.

I consider the confiscation of rifles and small arms as belonging to a totally different category. Without in any way abandoning the demand for the surrender of these I should advise a somewhat less energetic and categorical attitude than as respects larger material. Although Dr. Peters says that he can get hold of large quantities of rifles now in the hands of Communists and their friends, I rather doubt whether this is so in fact, and I should fear to disarm the orderly sections of the population, leaving arms in the hands of the extreme Socialists and Spartacists.

## *2. As regards the disbandment of the Einwohnerwehr and the Orgesch*

It is difficult to decide whether these organisations make rather for order or for future trouble. They are at bottom monarchical and military, although they deny it, since there is no question that the large majority of the members of these forces, and certainly the whole of the officers, belong to one or other of the parties of the Right. Whether they would assist a new Putsch or not may be doubtful: there would probably be a different result in different parts of the country. On the other hand, in the event of further successes by the Russian Soviet, which would undoubtedly lead to a new outbreak of communism in Germany, it can be regarded as certain that both the Einwohnerwehr and the Orgesch would powerfully serve the cause of order. In my judgment the danger from the Left far exceeds the danger from the Right, and I should be inclined to risk whatever danger there may be of the Einwohnerwehr and Orgesch giving undue assistance to a reactionary outbreak, which would hardly threaten any permanent danger, in order to have their support of the cause of order in the more probable event of a communistic outbreak. This danger—in the opinion of the military officers and in mine—will be largely dependent upon events in Russia and Poland.

It does not appear to me that any violent decision or decisive action on our part is required for the moment. The German Government are reported to be negotiating with the Bavarian Government in favour of the partial disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr and in favour of a reduction of their numbers. We can afford to await the result of these negotiations.

## *3. With regard to the Occupation of the Ruhr*

All the evidence I receive goes to prove that the occupation of the Ruhr would be regarded by all parties in Germany as an act of violence dictated by the desire to break up Germany. Grave labour troubles would probably ensue and the orderly progress of the process of restoration in Germany would be violently disturbed. On these grounds, therefore, I am strongly against the Ruhr occupation or of creating any situation which would lead to or justify it.

There is a further reason against it, namely, that if carried out, our most powerful means of compulsion on Germany would cease to exist. The menace of the occupation of the Ruhr undoubtedly keeps the German Government up to the mark. Once executed, this means of pressure would not exist, and we should be embarrassed to know what to substitute.

I have discussed these questions with Generals Bingham and Malcolm, whose views do not widely differ from those expressed above. The Commission of Control, as such, are bound to ask for the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr, but it is quite open to them not to press it in too peremptory a manner and to give time for the German Government to exercise its influence on the Bavarians.

There can be little doubt that at one time some French agents rather encouraged the Bavarians to maintain and develop the Einwohnerwehr, but that was at a time when they thought Bavaria would separate from the Reich. Now, the same agents have swung round and are among the loudest in demanding prompt and categorical action.<sup>2</sup>

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>2</sup> 'Agreement' with Lord D'Abernon's views was expressed in Foreign Office despatch No. 1108 to Berlin of December 2 (not printed) and on December 24 the Army Council, who had been asked for their views, expressed their 'complete agreement'. Meanwhile, Lord D'Abernon had, in his despatch No. 1204 of November 25, reported a conversation that he had held that afternoon on the subject of the Einwohnerwehr with Herr von Kahr, the Bavarian Prime Minister. This is not here printed, since its main points have been summarized in Lord D'Abernon's *An Ambassador of Peace*, vol. i, pp. 94-95.

#### No. 326

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 25, 10.45 a.m.)*

*No. 592 Telegraphic [C 12091/12091/18]*

BERLIN, November 24, 1920, 8.20 p.m.

Attack took place at (? Cuxhaven) on November 19th. by German troops on two British and two French officers who were visiting Grimmerhorn Naval Barracks to check arms. Details have been telegraphed by Admiral Charlton to Admiralty.

#### No. 327

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28, 6 p.m.)*

*No. 602 Telegraphic [C 12331/12091/18]*

BERLIN, November 28, 1920, 1.50 p.m.

My telegram No. 592.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral Charlton has demanded the following measures.

(A) A full apology from German Government for incident.

(B) Immediate dismissal and severe punishment of Commandant.

(C) Full enquiry into incident with a view to arrest and punishment of principal offenders.

<sup>1</sup> No. 326.

(D) Payment of compensation for damage done to uniforms of officers who were assaulted.

With regard to (B) Admiral Charlton demands that punishment to be inflicted on Commandant should be notified to him in presence of four officers who were assaulted.

If these demands are promptly complied with by German Government I suggest that no further action is required.

Should a favourable answer not be received in three days I propose with Your Lordship's sanction to take matter up and insist on immediate satisfaction.

Charlton has already received letter from Minister of Defence expressing his regret at incident but he is unable to accept this in settlement of matter.

**No. 328**

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 13)*

*No. 1260 [C 13665/113/18]*

*Confidential*

BERLIN, December 7, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a report by Major-General Malcolm upon a recent visit paid by him to Bavaria.

In connection with paragraph 6 the General informs me that since his Report was written he has had an opportunity of discussing the Einwohnerwehr question with Herr Meissner, the Chief of President Ebert's personal Cabinet. This gentleman states that the German Government desires to bring about a solution on the lines suggested in the present and former Reports, i.e., decentralization and gradual reduction, the force to be placed under the recognised civil authorities instead of being, as is at present the case, a more or less private concern. It appears that Herr von Kahr assented to these proposals but said he must be given time to prepare people's minds.

In these circumstances I do not see any insuperable difficulties to arriving at a reasonable compromise.

Your Lordship will doubtless have noticed from Mr. Seeds' despatch No. 95 of the 2nd instant<sup>1</sup> that the Bavarian Government propose to pay a subsidy to the Einwohnerwehr.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



BERLIN, *December 2, 1920*

1. I left Berlin for Munich on Friday evening, November 26th, and returned to Berlin on the morning of Wednesday December 1st. While there I saw many leading people of different political and social views and had every opportunity to inform myself fairly thoroughly as to the present situation. Among them were M. Dard, French Minister Plenipotentiary, Monsignor Pacelli, Papal Nuncio, Minister President v. Kahr, Dr. Escherich [*sic*], Herr Timm, leader of the Majority Socialists in the Landtag, Herr Auer a prominent Majority Socialist and generally regarded as one of the most respected and influential men in Bavarian politics, and Herr Oswald, Minister for Social Affairs.

2. I divided my enquiries into four categories:—

- (a) Political,
- (b) Industrial,
- (c) Social,
- (d) Einwohnerwehr.

I will take these headings in the above order. . . .<sup>2</sup>

6. *The Einwohnerwehr*. For the moment at all events all other Bavarian questions sink into insignificance in comparison with that of the Einwohnerwehr. It is impossible to talk for more than five minutes with anyone without the importance of the Einwohnerwehr being dragged into discussion. Such varied subjects as the valuta, the drought, and children's underclothing all seem to be dependent upon the maintenance of this force.

Never is one allowed to forget that for several weeks there was a 'rate [*? Räte*] Republik' in Munich, and that at the last elections 23,000 people voted Communist; rather more than in Berlin.

This is undoubtedly true, but it does not, in my opinion, justify the constant recruiting which goes on in defiance of the Versailles Treaty and the Spa Agreement. Dr. Escherich, who spoke most frankly, told me that he has about 300,000 in Bavaria, mostly armed. This is, I think, an increase of about 70,000 since Spa; and at the same time the Communist danger has decreased.

In dealing with this question Herr v. Kahr is in a difficult position. Himself a Protestant he draws his strongest support from the Catholic Volkspartei. He unites other parties with his own by his courage in taking over the responsibility of Government in the difficult days after the Kapp putsch, and by his steadfast resolution to maintain order. If he weakens markedly in the Einwohnerwehr question he will be in danger of losing his position. Being without personal ambition I do not think he would regret being out of power, but the Volkspartei will not easily give way.

Nevertheless before I left Munich I had formed the opinion that many people would be ready to accept a compromise. Everybody, except the

<sup>2</sup> Sections 3, 4, and 5 are omitted.

extreme Left, is against immediate abolition; but few, I think, would want to maintain the force in its present form for ever. It is realised by thinking people that the question is not one for Bavaria alone, and it should not, I think, be impossible to reach a solution on the lines of decentralisation and gradual reduction.

I gathered that this is also the opinion of Monsignor Pacelli and M. Dard although neither made any very definite statement.

7. In conclusion I may say that my general impression on leaving Munich is that things are better there than in any other part of Germany. Bad times are ahead, but not so bad as those through which she has already passed. The internal difficulties, political, industrial and social, and even the Einwohnerwehr are not so very serious. The real problems are external, namely the Polish danger and the drought, neither of which can be solved by Bavarian statesmen, but both of which may solve themselves.

• N. MALCOLM, *Major-General,*  
*Chief of the British Military Mission.*

## No. 329

*Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 10)*

*No. 3653 [C 13501/113/18]*

PARIS, December 8, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Lordship's despatch No. 3829 (C. 11879/113/18) of November 24th<sup>1</sup> regarding the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria, and would take the opportunity of informing Your Lordship of the views recently expressed on this subject to a member of my military staff by General Desticker, Assistant Head of Marshal Foch's staff.

In General Desticker's opinion the Bavarians are trying to justify the maintenance of an armed Einwohnerwehr as a necessary measure of internal security. But it was for that purpose that the Allies had, after due consideration, decided to allow the formation in Germany of a civil police force of 150,000 men, i.e. double the pre-war strength [*sic*]. Consequently the proportion of the force allotted to Bavaria could be raised by transferring the necessary number of men from the Einwohnerwehr to the police: the rest of the Einwohnerwehr should be disbanded.

I am inclined to concur in this opinion and consider that it would be time enough to examine a further increase if the number of police already authorised should prove inadequate. The police must clearly only be armed as such and I venture to think that no concession should be made which would

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

permit of the maintenance of an armed auxiliary organisation such as the Einwohnerwehr, as any such concession would seriously affect the value of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles generally.

I have, &c.,

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

No. 330

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 16)*

*No. 1269 [C 13950/113/18]*

BERLIN, December 11, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward to Your Lordship a translation of a Note from Dr. Simons to General Nollet,<sup>1</sup> regarding the Einwohnerwehr.

I understand from General Bingham that General Nollet's first impression of this note was unsatisfactory, and that he regarded it as a blank refusal to comply with the demands of the Allied Commission.

My own view of Dr. Simons' reply is widely different, and I should hope that, on further consideration, General Nollet will modify his first impression.

Special attention may, I think, be directed to passages in Dr. Simons' Note which expressly state that the Einwohnerwehr is only a provisional arrangement deriving its justification from the abnormal state of affairs, a state of affairs abnormal both on account of the exceptional active danger from Communistic agitation, and the exceptional passive danger caused by the absence of a fully organised police force. It is fully admitted by Dr. Simons that as soon as these transitory conditions pass, the justification for the maintenance of the Einwohnerwehr falls.

There is no reason to dispute the correctness of Dr. Simons' view that present circumstances are exceptional and that somewhat special precautions of a transitory character are, in truth, justified and necessary.

It appears to me sufficient for the Entente in reply to Dr. Simons to take note of the extremely valuable admissions made and to translate the admissions of principle into specific obligations of execution both as to the amount and date of the reductions of the Einwohnerwehr.

The declarations of Dr. Simons regarding the delivery of arms, the full admission that the disarmament undertaken at Spa applies no less to the Einwohnerwehr than to other elements of the population, appear to me also valuable to the essential portions of the Entente case.

In my judgment Dr. Simons goes rather far in his arguments respecting the non-military character of the Einwohnerwehr organisation, but I do not attach any excessive importance to this question, in the absence of guns and

<sup>1</sup> Of December 9, not printed. For the German text see *Deutscher Geschichtskalender, Ausland, Juli-Dezember 1920* (Leipzig, 1921), pp. 42-46.

of the larger appliances of warfare. Since these last have been in so large a measure destroyed by the Disarmament Commission, the existence of a *quasi* military organisation—although it cannot be lost sight of—is infinitely less important than if heavy military equipment was in existence.

In my despatch No. 1187 of 23rd November<sup>2</sup> I argued this point so fully that I will not now return to it, but the views stated therein have a direct bearing on the Einwohnerwehr question and might be referred to in supplement of what is said above.

In view of the general approval of the views stated in my above-mentioned despatch, contained in Your Lordship's despatch No. 1108 of the 2nd instant<sup>3</sup> I propose to show the draft of this despatch to General Bingham as an indication of the line which might possibly be taken, with advantage, in future discussions with General Nollet.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>2</sup> No. 325.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. See No. 325, n. 2.

### No. 331

#### *Air Commodore Masterman to the Allied Military Committee of Versailles*

[*Confidential/Germany/27/1*]

#### *Memorandum on the production of Civil Aircraft in Germany*

BERLIN, December 11, 1920

I have long felt that a difficult situation would arise as the work of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control drew to its close, and the Germans became free to commence the construction and use of civil aircraft.

Construction is forbidden by the Decision of Boulogne.<sup>1</sup> This decision is not admitted by the German Government and certain firms are constructing. Neglecting the situation thus produced for the moment, the question arises: 'When could permission be given to the German Government to allow construction to commence?'

The Commission is charged with the task of reporting to Marshal Foch the date on which it considers the Peace Treaty as regards delivery or disposal of aircraft material to have been executed.

Will the Commission in any reasonable period be able safely to do this?

The opinion of the members of the Commission at present is that the date cannot yet be foreseen on which they could report with conviction that the provisions of the Treaty had been satisfactorily executed, owing to the supposed existence of unknown quantities of hidden aeronautical material. Opinions on the quantity existing vary very considerably.

The present situation may therefore drag on indefinitely, with all the difficulties attendant on infractions, open or concealed, of the prohibition

<sup>1</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 36, minute 3.

to construct, bringing with them serious responsibilities for the Allied Powers, who will either have to see their instructions being disregarded without taking any action, or otherwise will be compelled to take strong and decisive action to see that their orders are enforced.

The German Government complain that the decision of Boulogne is a unilateral decision, and it is a question for consideration whether this decision should be upheld, if necessary by force, or whether any attempt should be made to arrive at an agreement with the German Government on the matter.

Turning now to the question of civil aviation in Germany after construction has been permitted, it is evident from what has been said above that if construction is delayed in accordance with the present decision, there will be no obvious reason for the Commission of Control being in Germany at the time that general construction commences, since this will not be until three months have elapsed after the Commission has reported that the Treaty has been executed.

It might therefore be assumed that the Commission of Control will not be charged with controlling in any way the production of civil machines.

On the other hand, a general feeling exists that future civil aviation in Germany must be controlled in some way or other, to prevent evasion of Article 198, and the creation by Germany of a fleet of so-called 'civil' machines readily convertible into military machines, if necessary, with consequent danger to the peace of Europe.

It is desired to know whether the authorities foresee the prolongation of the Commission of Control for this purpose, or whether its duties will terminate on the execution of its present work.

The Allied Governments should decide, and if prolongation is determined on, the German Government must be informed.

Such a step would, of course, inevitably give rise to strong protestations on the part of the German Government.

If the Commission is to be charged with this duty, it will be necessary from henceforth to consider the organisation necessary, obtain permission of the various Governments for the retention for long periods of the necessary officers and men, and generally to take the matter in hand.

Civil aviation in Germany is at present in a state of suspended animation. Once a free rein is given to the German Government in the matter, rapid development may be expected.

Aerial routes with neighbouring countries will be established, machines will be built for export, agreements will be entered into with civil aviation societies in other countries, and any efficient control is going to be a most difficult, if not an impossible, matter.

The situation must however be faced, and the Allied Governments must ask themselves whether they are prepared to attempt this, once more looking into what steps, if any, they would be in a position to take in the event of the control being ignored or evaded.

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 20)*

No. 1294 [C 14224/113/18]

BERLIN, December 14, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that at the weekly meeting at this Embassy of the heads of the various British Missions in Berlin, the opinion expressed by the chief British Representatives on the Naval, Air and Military Control Commissions was that the attitude of the Germans had recently become distinctly stiffer in all their respective spheres. The most important instances of this tendency were (1) the German reply on the subject of the *Einwohnerwehr*,<sup>1</sup> (2) their refusal to accept the ruling of the Commission on the question of the number of guns to be allowed for the defence of the fortresses, (3) their refusal to accept the allied view on the recommencement of construction for civil aviation. The Naval Commission were also experiencing some resistance on the subject of fortress guns and mine defences, especially in the Baltic.

There is, I think, some danger that the cumulative effect of these refusals may create a state of irritation among the organs responsible for the execution of the Treaty which may lead to a demand for strong action in order to ensure the execution of the clauses in question. It is an unfortunate fact that practically the only means of pressure on the German Government which are available consist in the occupation of the Ruhr, and I need not remind Your Lordship how fateful the consequences of such a step would be. It would, I venture to think, be a mistake to allow the combined effect of these three questions, each of which taken by itself is of comparatively minor importance, to lead us into any action, the consequences of which would be so incalculable. I submit that the most practical course is to deal separately with each question and endeavour by argument and moral suasion to induce the German Government to modify its attitude in each individual case.

One naturally seeks for an explanation of the tendency on the part of the Germans to take a stronger attitude *vis-à-vis* to the Entente. This may perhaps be found in a general revival of national feeling which seems to be taking place in the country. Evidence of this is forthcoming in many directions and doubtless accounts for the strong line taken up by some of the party leaders in their recent speeches. The Government too probably feels bound to take this tendency into account and considers it necessary to assume a stronger attitude in order to avoid losing the support on which it rests. The recent speeches of German Ministers in occupied territory<sup>2</sup> are possibly a reflection of this current. The approach of the Prussian elections is probably a contributing factor and renders all parties anxious to exploit the patriotic feelings of the country in the hope of securing additional support at the polls. A further explanation may be that the Germans now realise how reluctant several of the Allies would be to proceed to the occupation of the Ruhr and

<sup>1</sup> See No. 330.

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. III, Nos. 239-47 and 249.

count on this reluctance to enable them to offer a show of resistance in carrying out their obligations.

Some minor obstructions may, in Admiral Charlton's opinion, proceed from the fact that the liaison officers think the disarmament is going on too fast and that they are in danger of losing their comfortable billets which in present conditions are a great consideration to them. For this reason they are interested in protracting the discussions as much as possible and this human element may perhaps account for some incidents which are generally ascribed to more recondite causes.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

No. 333

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 16, 10.20 a.m.)*

*No. 628 Telegraphic [C 13946/12091/18]*

BERLIN, December 15, 1920, 8 p.m.

Your telegram No. 380.<sup>1</sup>

After a certain amount of shuffling Minister for Foreign Affairs called on Admiral Charlton this morning and offered full apology on behalf of German Government for Cuxhaven incident. German Government have also agreed to pay compensation demanded for damaged uniforms. Minister for Foreign Affairs handed Admiral note replying to demands of Commission and I have been promised (? a) copy as soon as it has been translated. Admiral understands that there is some difficulty about demand for punishment of officer in charge of barracks as he has been found not guilty by Committee which was appointed to examine matter. Other officers however have been found guilty of complicity and will apparently be punished.

I will telegraph again when I receive text of note which has not reached me up to 7 p.m.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Of December 4, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Translation of the note was enclosed in Berlin despatch No. 1311 of December 17.

No. 334

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 16, 6.55 p.m.)*

*No. 629 Telegraphic [C 14002/113/18]*

*Urgent. Confidential*

BERLIN, December 16, 1920, 2 p.m.

General Nollet's reply to German Government on Einwohnerwehr question<sup>1</sup> is very stiff and uncompromising. I hear it has caused much perturbation in Government circles and is regarded as a bombshell in Bavaria.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. A German translation of this note of Dec. 11 is in *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, vol. cit., pp. 47-49. The note rejected the German Government's arguments (see No. 330) and concluded by re-emphasizing 'the principle of the immediate disbandment and disarmament, in accordance with the Peace Treaty' and by 'once more' insisting that the German Government should communicate without delay the measures they proposed to take.

A good source states that Herr Von Kahr's position is seriously threatened and that a Bavarian Government crisis is probable which may lead to much confusion.

German Government are instructing their representatives at Allied capitals to approach Allied Governments with view to obtaining concessions. I venture to urge that whole question should be carefully examined in light of Lord D'Abernon's despatch No. 1269<sup>2</sup> which should have reached Your Lordship by now.

I only received text of General Nollet's note yesterday and I am forwarding it today<sup>1</sup> with comments which I hope Your Lordship will take into consideration before any decision is arrived at as to future policy on this question. Line adopted by Military Commission of Control does not at all harmonise with general approval of Lord D'Abernon's views contained in your despatch No. 1108.<sup>4</sup>

Repeated to Brussels for Lord D'Abernon.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> No. 330.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 335.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 325, n. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Lord D'Abernon had arrived in Brussels on December 12 as British delegate to a conference on reparation problems (see No. 339, n. 1, and No. 411, n. 3).

### No. 335

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 20)*

*No. 1303 [C 14257/113/18]*

BERLIN, December 16, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Lord D'Abernon's despatch No. 1269 of December 11th<sup>1</sup> and my despatch No. 1294 of December 14th,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of the reply addressed by General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Mission of Control, to the German Government on the question of the Einwohnerwehr<sup>3</sup> and to offer the following observations thereon.

Naturally enough General Nollet raises objection to the declaration that the German Government do not consider there is any legal obligation on them to disband the so-called self-protective organisations, but as they admit in a further passage that the immediate disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr is one of the obligations undertaken by Germany at Spa and intimate their intentions to carry it out as soon as conditions are sufficiently favourable, much of the sting is taken out of the declaration. The question of disarmament is rather a debating point and of comparatively minor importance compared to that of disarmament. The attitude adopted in regard to it may probably be ascribed to the exigencies of internal politics.

General Nollet further quotes Dr. Simons as having stated that the Communist danger may be considered henceforth as dominated in Germany.

<sup>1</sup> No. 330.

<sup>2</sup> No. 332.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. See No. 334, n. 1.



Whilst this statement may be true as regards the internal position, it needs qualifying if external influences are taken into account. A renewed Bolshevik attack on Poland and the appearance of Soviet armies on the German frontier would in the opinion of most observers result in fresh outbreaks of violence, and though the German forces were in fact successful in maintaining order this Autumn, they might well prove insufficient, reduced as they have since been in numbers, should the Bolsheviks adopt a more aggressive policy than they were able to do on that occasion. Moreover, the manifesto published by the German Communist Party, a summary of which was transmitted to Your Lordship in my despatch No. 1293 of December 15th,<sup>4</sup> indicates that their attitude would be far more active in support of the Bolsheviks than it was during the course of the last struggle in Poland.

I am aware from Sir Percy Loraine's<sup>5</sup> telegrams that the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs does not consider a fresh attack from Russia as at all probable, but this opinion is by no means shared by the Polish Minister here who told me recently that he had received information from 3 different and generally reliable sources that the Soviet Government had recruited large numbers of Chinese who were concentrating at Ekaterinoder [*sic*]. Confirmation of this information was given by the Archbishop of Wilna who was present during the conversation.

I am not of course able to judge which of these views is correct but as long as any possibility of a fresh Bolshevik advance exists the danger of Communist outbreaks in Germany cannot be safely regarded as definitely removed.

In this connection I may mention that a prominent German industrial told me recently in conversation that in his opinion, formed from observation in the extensive works in which he was interested in different parts of Germany, the workmen had become far more communistically inclined than was realised in Government circles. All eyes he said, were now turned towards the East which seemed to the masses to offer the only hope of betterment of their position. Much impression had been created by Zinoviev's propaganda during his recent visit<sup>6</sup> whereby the workmen had been informed that their only chance of escaping from the burdens of the Treaty of Versailles was by joining hands with the Bolsheviks. But little interest was now taken in the efforts of the Government at Brussels and elsewhere to obtain mitigation of the terms of peace. Hope centred on Russian aid and it was not believed that the British proletariat would consent to any active measures having for their object the prevention of the union of the Russian and German proletariates. These ideas, my informant declared, were not only prevalent among the workmen but had largely permeated other classes such as the small officials and ex-officers.

Whilst these views are in direct contradiction to those generally expressed

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Warsaw.

<sup>6</sup> M. Zinoviev, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, had attended the German Independent Socialist Party Congress at Halle in October.

and accepted as correct, I quote them as showing that opinion is not unanimous on the question of the Communist danger. They come from a source in close touch with considerable numbers of the working classes, and though I am not inclined to attach cardinal importance to them they show at least that there is room for doubt on the subject.

The German press states that the German representatives at the Allied capitals have been instructed to bring the question to the notice of the Allied Governments and opportunity for further discussion will then be afforded. I venture to express the hope that the considerations brought forward above may not be lost sight of.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

No. 336

*Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Earl Curzon (Received December 17, 6.30 p.m.)*

*No. 172 Telegraphic [C 14079/113/18]*

BRUSSELS, December 17, 1920, 3.58 p.m.

Lord Kilmarnock's telegram No. 629.<sup>1</sup>

I desire to support Lord Kilmarnock's view.

It appears to me that General Nollet's reply is inopportune and does not take sufficient account of alteration of circumstances. Problem can be adequately met by pressing specific reductions by certain fixed dates supplemented by specific deliveries of arms and suitable stipulations as to future constitution.

Repeated to Paris and Berlin.

Above from Lord D'Abernon.

<sup>1</sup> No. 334.

No. 337

*Aide Mémoire communicated by the German Ambassador to Earl Curzon  
(Received December 18, 1920)*

*[C 14379/59/18]*

*Translation*

GERMAN EMBASSY, LONDON, December 17, 1920

The Commission of Control has, in contravention of Articles 167 and 180 of the Peace Treaty, issued instructions in regard to the armament of German fortifications, whereby no guns at all are permitted to 11 German fortresses, including Kuestrin, and absolutely insufficient armament for the other three fortresses.

Koenigsberg is to have about 20 heavy guns, i.e. only one gun for a line of defence of several kilometres.

In spite of the strongest objections Germany has relinquished 9 fortresses and greatly restricted its applications in regard to the remaining 5 fortresses.

In spite of these restrictions and in spite of all representations, the Ambassadors' Conference has demanded the complete execution of the orders of the Commission of Control.<sup>1</sup> The German Government has been obliged to make arrangements and order the surrender of over 300 heavy guns.

This order does not at present extend to the guns with which Kuestrin is equipped and to the part of the systematic armament of Koenigsberg which the Commission of Control declared to be superfluous.

The German Government has notified the Commission of Control that application will shortly be made to the Ambassadors' Conference for the grant of a delay to Germany in delivering up the guns at Kuestrin and Koenigsberg, until the position on the German Eastern frontier has become clearer.

Since the Ambassadors' Conference occupied itself with this matter, the position there has greatly altered. News of a concentration of Russian troops at the Polish-Russian frontier prove[s] the imminence of the danger of a renewed outbreak of the Russian-Polish war and a menace to East Prussia and the Polish corridor.

To disarm Koenigsberg and Kuestrin would remove the last possibility of offering resistance to an invading adversary.

The German Government therefore begs the British Government to cause its representative to support the German application at the discussion at the Ambassadors' Conference and to vote for it.

<sup>1</sup> No. 314, § 7.

### No. 338

*Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 23, 4 p.m.)*

*No. 1407 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, December 22, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:

. . .<sup>1</sup> 6. The German Government have requested the Allied Governments to renounce their right to seize as part of the merchant tonnage to be surrendered to the Allied Governments, the war vessels which Germany has been authorised to convert into merchant ships. The Reparation Commission have agreed to waive their rights in this matter (see Lord Derby's telegram No. 1223 of October 20th),<sup>2</sup> and the Conference accordingly decided to inform the German Government that those war vessels which are being converted into merchant ships will be left to Germany. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections reported discussion on other matters and on some minor questions of control.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

No. 339

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 24, 1 p.m.)*

*No. 632 Telegraphic [C 14706/14706/18]*

BERLIN, December 23, 1920, 8 p.m.

I took an opportunity today to say to Minister for Foreign Affairs that I hoped continuance of favourable atmosphere which seemed to have been created at Brussels<sup>1</sup> would not be jeopardised by attitude of German Government with regard to numerous questions which were now occupying attention of different control commissions. I said that speaking personally and unofficially to him I could not conceal the fact that it seemed to me by no means impossible that cumulative effect of recent incidents in this (? connection) would give impression to Allied Governments that Germany was deliberately adopting a stiffer attitude with regard to carrying out of Treaty of Peace. Doctor Simons assured me that this was neither their desire nor intention but confessed that it was unfortunate that a number of differences of opinion should have arisen almost simultaneously as to interpretation of certain clauses. I told him that in my opinion most unfavourable impression had been created by note on Einwohnerwehr question and especially by fact that German Government had not even evinced slightest intention of reducing its numbers or armament by any specific date. Doctor Simons said that question had caused him more thought and difficulty than any he had to deal with since assuming office.

Bavarians were a very stiff-necked race and it would be physically impossible to disarm peasants by force. If it were attempted they would resist and Reichswehr could not be trusted to march against them. It would have to be done by persuasion and kindness. Reason why he had not indicated any dates by which a reduction would be carried out was that he did not wish to make promises to allies unless he was sure of being able to carry them out. He intended to go to Bavaria in January with the commissioners of disarmament to endeavour to induce Bavarian Government to do their utmost to comply with the terms of the treaty.

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> A conference of financial experts to discuss reparation problems had opened at Brussels on December 16 (see No. 334, n. 5).

No. 340

*Mr. Gosling (Frankfort) to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 18 [C 14967/59/18]*

*Secret*

FRANKFORT ON MAIN, December 23, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to the despatch addressed to me by Lord D'Abernon, Number 15 of the 2nd instant,<sup>2</sup> instructing me to obtain information con-

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this despatch from H.M. Consul-General at Frankfort was sent to the Foreign Office, where it was received on December 29. <sup>2</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

cerning an order stated to have been given by the German Reichswehr Minister to Eugene Laubhold of 8 Bahnhof Platz, for certain military equipment, which His Excellency believed to be destined for Russia, I have the honour to report as follows:—

Eugene Laubhold is a firm of questionable reputation dealing mainly in oils and, it is believed, in military equipment which was stolen or discarded by the troops at the time of the German Revolution.

Laubhold is, in fact, a 'Schieber'<sup>3</sup> and the police have for some time past been interested in his affairs. He has a brother who is an Alsatian by birth and who, I understand, was the means of supplying the information, quoted in the said despatch, to the French Authorities.

It would appear that Laubhold has, in fact, been given an order for the equipment in question by the firm of von Heeringen in Berlin. The late Minister for War is the virtual head of this firm, which apparently, like that of Laubhold, has a somewhat doubtful reputation.

Captain von Heeringen, the son of the late Minister, is also a member of the firm. He was on the General Staff during the war and an officer of some distinction. He is now suspected of monarchist proclivities and intrigues.<sup>4</sup>

Captain von Heeringen has of late visited Frankfort with some frequency, presumably on business connected with his firm and possibly that of Laubhold.

According to information which I have received and which I have good reason to consider reliable, the amount of the order as stated in Lord D'Abernon's despatch is correct.

The goods are reported to be intended for Lithuania, possibly for the Government of that State, or perhaps with even greater probability, for the German mercenary bands which have, I am informed—though I have no exact information on this head—been formed either by German prisoners in Russia, or by German ex-soldiers who have crossed the frontier. It would seem, indeed, that some movement is on foot in Lithuania the details of which are not well known, at any rate in this part of Germany.

My information would indicate that the order given to Laubhold by the firm of von Heeringen in Berlin is in the nature of some private undertaking with which the German Government itself is not concerned. This is, indeed, probable, as the German Government presumably still has in its possession considerable stores of military clothing and equipment.

No orders for leather goods, such as saddles, belts etc. would appear to have been given to any of the leather manufacturers at Offenbach, which is in the vicinity of Frankfort and the centre of that industry.

I am expecting further information on the subject which I will report in due course.

I have, &c.,  
CECIL GOSLING

<sup>3</sup> A profiteer.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum enclosed with a letter of September 14 from the Air Ministry to the Foreign Office contained a reference to a report dated July 22 that 'a certain von Heeringen, a relation of the well-known general, was intending to start an Air Service between Germany and Russia, for the purpose of transporting monarchist propaganda'.

No. 341

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 26, 5 p.m.)*

*No. 633 Telegraphic [C 14738/113/18]*

BERLIN, December 26, 1920, 2 p.m.

Military Control Commission have received fresh note<sup>1</sup> on Einwohnerwehr question from German Government who requests [*sic*] that it may be forwarded to Council of Ambassadors. This has been done and I understand that Commission have put forward recommendations that following demands shall be made in reply:

1. That within a fortnight of receipt of reply by German Government all machine guns and half rifles in hands of Einwohnerwehr shall be surrendered.
2. That within another month one half of remaining rifles be surrendered.
3. That all rifles be surrendered within a further month.

This gives ten weeks from receipt of reply for effecting complete disarmament. If these demands are sanctioned by Council of Ambassadors and put forward to German Government a very serious crisis will arise. They will not be complied with except under threat of severe action and perhaps not then.

Question we have to ask ourselves is whether we are prepared to make such threats and eventually to put them into effect. If we merely make them and then do not carry them through effect will be worse for our prestige than any reasonable postponement of surrender of arms.

I understand that General Bingham was in favour of somewhat longer delays but had to yield to views of majority of Commission.

I have seen Mr. Seeds who tells me state of opinion of Bavaria makes question very difficult.

Majority of population regards Berlin and North as likely to 'go Bolshevik' (in which term they apparently include any advance towards Socialism) and are determined to retain sufficient force to resist spread of such tendencies to Bavaria. Question to their minds is not only one of maintaining internal order but also of repelling Communistic or even Socialistic aggression from outside. Moreover many peasants live in isolated farms and say they require their arms for personal defence.

It will be a long and difficult business to convince them of the contrary.

<sup>1</sup> Not here printed. For the text of this German note see *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, vol. cit., pp. 61-64.

No. 342

*Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 28)*

*No. 1420 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, December 27, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning and considered the following questions:

...<sup>1</sup> (3) The Conference considered a report by General Nollet with regard to a compromise arrived at with the Reparation Commission respecting the sale of German war material outside Germany (see Mr. Lindsay's telegram No. 1354, paragraph 8<sup>2</sup>). General Nollet was inclined to urge that all exports should be prohibited but the Conference decided to confirm the compromise submitted to them on November 24th. ...<sup>1</sup>

(6) In accordance with your despatch No. 3374 of the 14th October,<sup>3</sup> my predecessor proposed that the Conference of Ambassadors should not proceed further with the protocol drawn up by the Supreme Council at Spa providing for an extension of the time limit under Article 202 of the treaty of Versailles, in which the manufacture and importation of aeronautical material is forbidden. The reason for this was that owing to the alleged satisfactory progress in the delivery and destruction of aeronautical material this extension of time limit appeared no longer necessary. This was agreed to. (See Lord Derby's telegram No. 1307, Section 6<sup>4</sup>.) Since then the position in Germany seems to have changed, for the Aeronautical Commission of Control have now found it necessary to summon the German Government to stop the manufacture of civil aviation for a further period, and have based their demand on the decision of the Supreme Council taken at Boulogne on June 22nd, where it is laid down that this manufacture and importation shall be prohibited during the three months following the date on which Germany shall have handed over all her aeronautical material.<sup>5</sup> Just as the German Delegates refused to sign the Spa Protocol so the German Government have now refused to recognise the validity of the Boulogne decision. The matter was accordingly referred to the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, who today recommended that the Conference of Ambassadors should summon the German Government to carry out the decision of the 22nd June. Marshal Foch urged strongly that the Allied Governments were fully authorised to make this demand without obtaining the consent of the German Government. No suggestion was made however as to how the German Government were to be compelled to stop this manufacture, if they continued to refuse to take the necessary measures. General Masterman was also present and pointed out that the German Government were already manufacturing civil air-craft, and that if the Commission were not enabled to stop this their position would be very much weakened. He suggested that, having regard to the German objections to the Boulogne decision, some working compromise might be arrived at with the German Government in view of the law which they have recently passed for the delivery of hidden aeronautical material.

The Supreme Council at Spa appears to have held that any extension of the time limit provided for in Article 201 constituted a modification of the treaty which would require the concurrence of the German Government,

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Of November 24, not printed. The compromise permitted the sale of material exported as a direct result of sales by the Reparation Commission. Mr. Lindsay had been transferred from Washington to Paris in August, 1920.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> No. 314.

<sup>5</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 36, minute 3 and n. 5.

since they drew up a protocol which they invited the German Government to sign. In these circumstances I demurred to the course proposed by the Military Committee of Versailles, and informed the Conference that I would have to refer to my Government the question as to whether they wished the abortive protocol at Spa to be revived, or whether they are prepared to tell the German Government that the Allied Governments intend to enforce, without their concurrence, the decision of the Supreme Council as communicated on the 22nd June. General Masterman's proposal for a compromise is also worthy of further examination.

The question is largely a legal one, namely, whether by starting to manufacture civil air-craft the German Government are violating the treaty or not. By adopting the recommendation of the Military Committee of Versailles I felt that I should be accepting the view that they were violating the treaty, and this would have implied that the Conference should as a next step consider the measures to be taken to compel Germany to carry out this treaty obligation, and the penalties to be exacted in the case of further resistance.

The question has been accordingly adjourned in order to enable me to consult my Government, and I trust therefore that I may be furnished with the necessary instructions at an early date. I enclose herewith copy of the correspondence on the subject submitted by the Military Committee at Versailles, including General Masterman's proposals on the subject.<sup>6</sup> The legal case against the Germans does not appear to me to be very strong, and under these circumstances perhaps a compromise on the lines suggested by General Masterman might be the best solution.

(7) The Conference accepted a ruling by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles regarding the photographic and telegraphic apparatus which are to be handed over under Article 202 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(8) The Conference decided, on the recommendation of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, to reject a further request by the German Government to be allowed to maintain an aerial police (see Lord Derby's telegram No. 1307 paragraph 10<sup>7</sup>).

(9) The Conference adopted a ruling by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles regarding the armament which Germany is allowed to maintain in her coastal fortifications.

(10) The Belgian Ambassador called attention to the fact that the Arsenals at Spandau and Erfurt are being transferred into factories for the manufacture of sporting rifles. The Conference decided, on the recommendation of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, to obtain a report from the Military Commission in Germany, as to how it is proposed to deal with these arsenals. The Belgian Ambassador also called attention to the continued activity of the Arms Factory at Danzig, which is alleged to be manufacturing guns for South America. It was decided in this case to invite the League of Nations to request the High Commission at Danzig to obtain further information on this subject, and to urge the Free City to stop this

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. The correspondence was enclosed under cover of Lord Harding's despatch No. 3830 of December 27.

<sup>7</sup> No. 314.



manufacture; and on the other hand to request the League to appoint without further delay the Chairman of the Harbour Board provided for in the Polono-Danzig Convention,<sup>8</sup> as until he is appointed the Allied Commission which is to distribute Government property between the Free City and Poland (see Lord Derby's despatch No. 3577<sup>9</sup>) cannot start to function, and until it does the future of the Arms Factory, which is covered by Article 107 of the Treaty of Versailles, cannot be settled. The Conference laid down at the same time that the manufacture of arms in the territory of Danzig is undesirable, and that the machinery in the factory should eventually be transferred to Poland. . . .<sup>10</sup>

12. Marshal Foch submitted to the Conference the correspondence between the German Government and General Nollet with regard to the disarmament of German self-defence forces (see my despatch No. 3811 of December 24th<sup>11</sup> enclosing General Nollet's report and my telegram No. 1400, December 19th<sup>11</sup>). Marshal Foch pointed out that it was essential to submit this correspondence at once to the Allied Governments since the approach of the 1st of January, the date fixed by the Spa Protocol on which the German army should be reduced to the hundred thousand men, renders it necessary for the Allied Governments to review again the military situation in Germany. Monsieur Cambon proposed that each Ambassador should refer this correspondence to his Government with the view to an early agreement being arrived at by the Allied Governments as to the course of action they should adopt on this subject. In order to expedite matters he suggested that the Conference should instruct the Allied Military Committee of Versailles and the Naval Advisers to draw up at once for transmission to the Allied Governments a general report on the extent to which military, aeronautical and naval clauses of the Treaty and of the Spa Protocol have been carried out up to the end of the year. This was agreed to.

I enclose in my despatch No. 3831<sup>12</sup> copy of a further note on this subject which the German Ambassador had addressed to the French Government and of which he communicated a copy to me direct, and also to Monsieur Cambon as chairman of the Ambassadors' Conference.

<sup>8</sup> Article 19. The text of this Convention in English, French, and Polish is printed in *Zbiór dokumentów urzędowych*, Part I, 1918-20 (Danzig, 1923), pp. 100-10.

<sup>9</sup> Of December 2, not printed.

<sup>10</sup> The omitted section related to flights by German aircraft over neutral territory.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed. The enclosure was a version in French of the note from the German Government referred to in No. 341.

### No. 343

*Lord Kilbarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 28, 11 p.m.)*

*No. 637 Telegraphic [C 14887/113/18]*

BERLIN, December 28, 1920, 5.40 p.m.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent for me last night and shewed me telegram which is being sent to German representatives at Paris, Rome

and London instructing them to call attention of Allied Governments to situation which is threatening owing to questions which have recently arisen with Control Commission. These incidents together with debate on December 23rd in French Chamber and especially M. Raiberti's<sup>1</sup> letter to Marshal Foch, he said produced impression on German Government that Commission are anxious to find pretexts for accusing German Government of not fulfilling their obligations undertaken at Spa in order to afford justification for occupation of the Ruhr. He instanced a fresh note<sup>2</sup> just received from the Military Commission of Control on the subject of 'Sicherheitspolizei'. German Government had been under the impression that Commission were quite satisfied with the steps which had been taken towards reorganization of that body, and the receipt of a peremptory note on the question had come as a complete surprise. If this latest note were (? published) it would cause such an upheaval of public opinion that it would make it extremely difficult for conversations at Brussels to be continued in the same conciliatory spirit as hitherto.

Germany would ask herself whether it was worth while to do her utmost to find means of arriving at a settlement if Allies were determined to find pretexts for accusing her of evading her Obligations. If this latter hypothesis were true she might as well give up trying and leave Allies to do their worst.

I said on the contrary, as I had already told Minister for Foreign Affairs, impression which I had anticipated would be produced on Allies by incidents to which he referred was that Germany was deliberately adopting a stiffer attitude with regard to fulfilment of Obligations.

I asked whether he could give tacit assurance that such was not the case and he pledged me his word of honour that no such intention existed on the part of German Government.

Action of German Government in sending above-mentioned instructions to their representatives seems to me very illuminating. They would appear to desire to forestall any action which Allies may contemplate by throwing onus of producing a crisis on us and it is interesting to note that they endeavour to turn the tables on us by themselves (? insisting) that conversations at Brussels will be prejudiced by incidents with Control Commissions. They seek thus to give the impression that in their opinion success of Reparations' negotiations is of more importance to Allies than to themselves.

<sup>1</sup> M. Raiberti had succeeded as French Minister for War M. Lefèvre who had resigned on December 16.

<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Office had not received a copy of this note and telegraphed to Paris (F.O. No. 1322) on December 29 to ask Lord Hardinge to send one as soon as possible. For a German translation of this note see *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, vol. cit., pp. 64-65, and for the German reply printed under the date of December 24, *ibid.*, p. 65.

No. 344

*Lord Kilmaarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 28, 11.15 p.m.)*

*No. 638 Telegraphic [C 14888/113/18]*

BERLIN, December 28, 1920, 7.50 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

I have seen French Ambassador who tells me Minister for Foreign Affairs called on him on December 26th and spoke in much the same sense about note on 'Sicherheitspolizei'. French Ambassador replied he had no competence to interfere in a question which purely concerned Control Commission. In view, however, of political bearing of matter he consented to draw attention of his Government to the question on condition Minister for Foreign Affairs also raised it with other Allies' representatives. This was presumably reason why Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke to me as he did also to Italian Ambassador and Belgian Minister.

I also pointed out to Von Haniel that I had no competence to interfere in question of Sicherheitspolizei but said that I would inform His Majesty's Government of what he had said.

French Ambassador is inclined to think German attitude may be manoeuvre to cover a change of front when conversations are resumed at Brussels. He hears that though Herr Bergmann was extremely conciliatory some of German experts were much reserved and believes Stinnes is anxious to wreck negotiations.

German Government have just published communiqué stating various difficulties have arisen with Control Commissions with regard to police but that these must rest on a misunderstanding which Ministry for Foreign Affairs are endeavouring to remove.

<sup>1</sup> No. 343.

No. 345

*Lord Kilmaarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received January 3, 1921)*

*No. 1359 [C 48/13/18]*

BERLIN, December 29, 1920

My Lord,

In view of the situation created by the recent incidents between the Control Commissions and the German Government it seems probable that it will shortly become necessary to consider the question of what, if any, penalties shall be imposed by the Allies on Germany for non-compliance with the conditions of the Treaty of Peace. Almost any alternative would be preferable to the occupation of the Ruhr and I venture therefore to make the suggestion that, if it is considered necessary to inflict some penalty, it should take the following form:—

The Allies to declare that, as the conditions of the treaty have not been faithfully carried out by Germany, they consider that sections (1) and (2) of article 429 have lost their force and that the occupation of the Cologne and Coblenz bridgeheads will not be restricted to five and twelve years but will be continued for an extra period of one and two years respectively (or such period as is considered adequate to compensate for the non-fulfilment by Germany of her obligations). It might be added that this decision will be subject to revision in six months time if, in the interval, the Allies are satisfied with the progress made towards the carrying out of their demands. This procedure, while inflicting a penalty which we are in a position to enforce without damage to Germany's industrial situation or to our own interests, would introduce in a different form the principle proposed in my despatch No. 1314,<sup>1</sup> the direct adoption of which would, I realise, scarcely be possible at a moment when Germany is being accused of breaches of the Treaty.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

<sup>1</sup> Of December 20, not printed.

**No. 346**

*Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)*

*No. 4169 [C 15001/113/18]*

*Secret and confidential*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 30, 1920*

My Lord,

I learn from a secret but absolutely reliable source that instructions have recently been sent by the German Government to their representative at Tokio to notify the Japanese Government of the request which the German Government are making to the Conference of Ambassadors to grant an extension of time for the surrender of the guns in the fortresses of Küstrin and Königsberg.

2. The German Minister at Tokio has at the same time been instructed to endeavour to persuade the Japanese Government to instruct their representative at the Conference to vote in favour of granting their request.

3. I should therefore be glad if Your Excellency would report in due course as to the attitude of the Japanese representative when this question comes before the Conference.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

*Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received January 3, 1921)*

No. 3865 [C 71/13/18]

PARIS, December 30, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 1420, paragraph 12 of December 27th,<sup>1</sup> respecting the disarmament of the unauthorised German military organisation[s], I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum, together with translation, which has been communicated to me by the German Ambassador here, on the subject of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr.

From the heading it would appear that this memorandum was prepared on the instigation of the Bavarian Prime Minister and intended for His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Dr. Meyer [Mayer] did not explain when sending it to me whether it had already been communicated to Lord D'Abernon or not.

My Military Advisers point out that the statement in this memorandum is not true when it says that the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr has no connection with the regular military organisation. General Nollet's reports of the 27th November, 11th December and 18th December, enclosed in my dispatch No. 3811 of 24th December,<sup>2</sup> make it clear that there is a definite and undisguised connection between the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Army (Reich[s]wehr), with a special liaison organisation between the two bodies. Similarly in East Prussia, two staff officers of the regular army are charged with seeing to the administrative requirements of the 'Self-Protection' organisation.

Thus all these organisations are susceptible of facilitating mobilisation i.e. they are directly opposed to Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles.

I have, &c.,

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

<sup>1</sup> No. 342.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 347

*Memorandum on the Bavarian Einwohnerwehren (Militia) prepared on behalf of the Minister President von Kahr*

*Translation*

MUNICH, December 4, 1920

The Einwohnerwehren are a necessary defensive organisation of the peace-loving elements of the population of Bavaria, constituted to meet the need of the moment, and were yet accepted by the Socialist Ministers. Once this need is past, the armed Einwohnerwehren will disappear automatically. For the following reasons the time for their dissolution has not yet arrived:—

The internal political situation of Bavaria and of the Reich must still be considered highly critical. Recently on the Party Day of the Independent

Socialist Party at Halle the Bolshevik circles with cynical frankness showed the whole world what aims they are pursuing and the forcible means by which these are to be attained. The spread of radical views among the masses together with the increasing collapse of economic conditions and the effects of the Treaty of Versailles, which are only now beginning to be felt, give reason to expect a decisive struggle between order and revolution. The Left Radical elements are obviously seeking this with all their power, and are now especially encouraged by the success of the Russian Bolsheviks against Wrangel's army<sup>3</sup> and in expectation of the decisive struggle still to come between Russia and Poland.

It cannot be denied at the present time that the revolutionary elements have provided themselves with weapons of all kinds for this combat. In Bavaria this danger must be counted as definite. It has been proved that the Left Radical elements of the population of Bavaria have troubled little or not at all about the disarmament law. The large majority of the weapons surrendered in Bavaria came from the peace-loving inhabitants. The number of revolutionaries at present in Bavaria is estimated at from 2-300,000; during the last elections in June 1920, a total of 54,000 communist votes was counted in Munich and the neighbourhood alone. It is clear that in the event of a large revolution these figures would be very considerably increased.

In the face of such dangers the State forces at the disposal of Bavaria at present are wholly inadequate. The Bavarian Reichswehr which numbers only from 11-12,000 men does not count. It is not under the Bavarian Government and, in particular in the case of extensive disorders in the Reich, would have to join the main army and probably be used outside Bavaria. Moreover, its present value is depreciated by the fact that its strength is at present being decreased. The Bavarian government police in barracks are at present being reorganised afresh. They number about 5-6,000 men and are being increased to a final strength of 9,600 men. This figure will be reached by April 1, 1921, at the earliest. It is not yet certain whether by that time their internal organisation also will be adequate. This government police, however, is both now and for the future insufficiently armed. On a basis of the conditions imposed by the Allied States, it has at its disposal, for instance, only 40 machine guns on armoured cars and no guns or *minenwerfer*. Under present conditions, moreover, the police are not strong enough to resist revolution, as regards either numbers or arms.

The Bavarian Government has no other State forces at its disposal. Local police forces and gendarmerie are powerless against a mass rising, as experience in the past years has repeatedly shown.

*At the present time, therefore, the Bavarian State is wholly dependent on the help of its voluntary Einwohnerwehren.* Their disarmament at the present time might once more plunge the Bavarian people in incalculable misery and most seriously endanger the existence of the German Reich.

*The constitution of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehren* gives every assurance that

<sup>3</sup> General Wrangel had succeeded General Denikin as head of the *de facto* White Russian Government in South Russia.

this organisation has no object in view other than the support of constitutional government by the maintenance of public law and order. Like fire brigades, they are private organisations for the public good and are based on the voluntary membership of their members. The administration is in principle honorary and is run by individuals freely chosen for the purpose from the organisation and by its members.

The Einwohnerwehren are in no sense a *military organisation*. They possess no general staff and no relations with the military. There is no talk of their development or completion according to military methods. In many cases the Wehren are composed of men of every age with no knowledge of arms and unfit for military service, and in particular of a number of very old men. Their members wear no uniform, but serve in civilian clothes and only wear a white and blue band on the arm as a distinguishing mark in case of need.

The Einwohnerwehren have no connection with military departments. They rather form a *purely civilian institution* to complete the civilian police, which is too weak under present conditions. The whole organisation of the association is therefore exclusively under the control of the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, as the highest police authority. The administration of the Einwohnerwehren is purely an executive organisation for the orders issued by that Ministry.

The members of the Einwohnerwehren follow their usual pursuits in times of peace. They are only temporarily *called up* when disorders arise and the available State forces are not sufficient to suppress them. The Wehren are not called up and employed by their own leaders, but exclusively by the government and communal police authorities. The latter also give the leaders of the Wehren quite definite duties and see that these are carried out. They also regulate the fusion and cooperation of various bodies of Einwohnerwehren Gaue (districts), if the situation calls for united action on the part of the Wehren. Thus the Einwohnerwehren form no State in the State, but when used are as subordinate to the police authorities as any policeman. While they are being used they possess the same rights as the police or gendarmerie; they are assistants to the police. Unauthorised acts on the part of the Einwohner associations on their own initiative are thus debarred and would entail the most severe legal punishments.

*Einwohner administrative offices* are kept permanently running solely as a preparation for cases when it may be necessary to call up the Einwohnerwehren, and for purposes of administration and payment and other business of the association. They are constituted exactly like the official police organisation of the country, to which they are subordinated if the members are called up. Thus the head administration of the Einwohnerwehren is directly under the Ministry of the Interior, the district administration of the E.W.B. is under each local government, &c. At the head of the administrations are honorary leaders (for the most part not officers); the employees are appointed from the head office and are paid from State subsidies. These E.W. administrations are not commanding authorities, nor do they decide the use to which the

association is to be put, but they are purely administrative departments. They have no military connections and are for the most part composed of civilians. In 1920 *the State subsidy* amounts roughly to 12 million Marks. This sum also, which is so extraordinarily small in view of the present value of money, proves that there can be no question of a military organisation.

The *total strength of the Einwohnerwehren* varies considerably owing to the fluctuations in membership: at the present time it amounts to perhaps about 300,000 men. The following are approximately the weapons available:—190,000 rifles and carbines (98 or 88), 3,000 machine guns (including 2,000 light guns), 44 light guns and 34 light *minenwerfer*. There are no military uniforms and equipment (trains).

The following are eligible for *membership* of the association:—every German and foreigner of German race, without distinction of politics or position, who stands for law and order, is faithful to the government, is physically strong and of good repute, and is not under 18 years of age. A committee consisting of about from 4 to 9 members of the Wehr, chosen by the other members, decide matters connected with the reception of new members. On his entry the member undertakes all the obligations arising out of the constitution and aims of the Einwohnerwehren (use of his services when the Einwohnerwehren are called up—obedience to the commands of the proper leaders of the Wehr, &c.). No oath in any form whatever is taken. The new member only recognises the regulations of the association by signature.

As, therefore, the election of members does not depend on political views, but rather all politics are in principle banished from the Einwohnerwehr, it is impossible to give, even approximately, the strength of the various parties in the Einwohnerwehr. It is only certain that members of all political parties (including the Independent Socialist Party) belong to the association, excluding members of those parties which stand for revolutionary force or the dictatorship of any one class.

There is no connection between the Einwohnerwehren and the so-called 'Orgesch'. The head association of the Einwohnerwehr is purely Bavarian and does not belong to the Reich association of the Orgesch. Its regulations are not adopted by the Einwohnerwehr. In the Bavarian Landtag also the sharp division which exists has recently been emphatically expressed. Only in the person of the first president these two associations, differing in aims, were united in one man.

The Bavarian Government and the head administration of the Einwohnerwehr have both repeatedly emphasised the fact that the *disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr is only a question of time*. When the disorderly elements are in the main disarmed and when, further, the state organisations for ensuring order are materially and morally so strengthened that they are equal to the weapons and moral means of enticement of the revolutionaries, then the exceptional measure *of defence*,—i.e. the Einwohnerwehr—rendered necessary by the overwhelming conditions, becomes untenable and the abnormal condition in which citizens are armed in self-defence will cease.



The execution of the *Spa provisions* is therefore not refused but only temporarily postponed.

It is at present difficult to see how the *disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr* will take place. Presumably it will be the reverse proceeding of its arming: it will begin in the quieter places and neighbourhoods and end by the centres of unrest.

#### No. 348

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) and Sir C. Eliot<sup>1</sup> (Tokyo)*

*No. 550<sup>2</sup> Telegraphic [C 14811/113/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 31, 1920, 3.28 p.m.*

A serious crisis in political relations of allies with Germany has arisen in consequence of notes addressed to German government by allied Military Commission of Control at Berlin without previous consultation with respective allied governments. In order to prevent recurrence of such danger we are proposing to French govt. that ambassadors' conference at Paris should address an instruction to the Control Commission not in future to make communications raising grave political issues to the German government without previously submitting text of proposed note to the ambassadors' conference, and obtaining their explicit approval.

Please urge Govt. to which you are accredited to instruct their Rep<sup>re</sup> at Paris to support this proposal when it comes before the Conference.

Repeated to Berlin, No. 388, and Brussels, No. 226.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Ambassador at Tokyo.

<sup>2</sup> No. 550 to Rome and No. 396 to Tokyo.

#### No. 349

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received January 1, 1921, 12 p.m.)*

*No. 640 Telegraphic [C 15/13/18]*

*Very confidential*

BERLIN, *December 31, 1920, 5.50 p.m.*

With reference to conversation reported in my telegram No. 637,<sup>1</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent me a personal letter in which after enumerating the causes of apprehension felt by German Government as to intention of Allies to find pretext for measures of coercion (see my telegram No. 638<sup>2</sup>) he states that he wishes to declare to me in writing that German Government do not dream of giving up programme on which they took office, most important of which was to 'to [*sic*] demonstrate by conscientious effort at the execution of Treaty of Versailles in whatever degree such execution is possible.' This specifically refers to disarmament clause[s] of Treaty and contents of first protocol of Spa.

<sup>1</sup> No. 343.

<sup>2</sup> No. 344.

German Government had expected that Allies would recognise results of their efforts instead of answering them with a fresh threat. . . .<sup>3</sup>

None of parties to Spa Conference has expected that (? efforts at) disarmament of Civil Population would be anything like so successful as they have been shown to be. If disarmament in Bavaria and East Prussia cannot for the present be carried out this does not result from resistance on the part of Governments of Reich, of Bavaria and of Prussia but from material obstacles which have been exhaustively explained in notes to Allies.

Dr. Simons considers difference with Aerial Commission could be removed by general discussion between diplomats and experts of both parties. He declares in the question of Artillery armament of fortresses on Eastern and Southern frontiers German Government have yielded to combined Military Commission in far greater degree than was necessary according to clear conditions of Treaty.

Finally he expressed conviction that above facts will prove to me that any impression that German Government are deliberately adopting a stiffer attitude with regard to fulfilment of Treaty rests on total misapprehension of contentions of German Government. He wishes he could convince himself that the intention of Military Directors of International Commissions is not to render impossible an understanding on financial and economic grounds of (which) Brussels Conference offered prospect. I think that above assurances show that German Government are genuinely apprehensive as to situation. It is probable that Ministers are kept in ignorance of much that is done by subordinate officials and were really surprised by demands made respecting 'security Police'. They have now published note from Control Commission and their reply.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> These notes appeared in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of December 31.

## No. 350

*Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on a conversation with M. de Fleuriau*

[C 406/13/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 31, 1920*

M. de Fleuriau spoke to me today on the attitude of the German government in the matter of disarmament and generally in their dealings with the allied governments. He communicated to me a note,<sup>1</sup> which is being placed on record in the Files.

He added some observations on two points:

1. Dr. Simons had clearly intimated to the French Ambassador at Berlin that if the French govt. saw their way to be more accommodating as regards the reparation questions dealt with at the Brussels conference, the German government on their part would show more energy and produce better

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

results as regards the disarmament.—This had made the worst possible impression on the French government because it seemed to prove clearly that the German government are not sincere in declaring that they are quite unable to do more as regards disarmament than they have done.

2. The interview in the course of which the German Minister for Foreign Affairs made the above intimation, took place at the French embassy. Dr. Simons arrived there, accompanied by the interpreter who had served at the Brussels conference. Dr. Simons, who speaks French fluently, on this occasion insisted on speaking in German and on having his remarks translated into French and the French ambassador's words translated into German. According to the ambassador, the whole scene was a gross and deliberate impertinence.

M. de Fleuriau added that M. Leygues had addressed a note to the German ambassador at Paris formally reciting all the instances in which the German government had failed to fulfil its obligations under the treaty of Versailles and the Spa protocol, and reserving the right to take such action as may be concerted with the allied governments. M. de Fleuriau promised to let me have the text of this note<sup>2</sup> tomorrow. He went on to express Mons. Leygues' conviction that the time had come for a further meeting between the Heads of the allied governments in order to settle on a definite line of action to be taken jointly by the allies.

E. A. C.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note recited the undertakings of the German Government and its failure to fulfil them, and ended with the sentence: 'Le Gouvernement Français prend acte, dès maintenant, en ce qui le concerne, de ces manquements aux engagements solennellement contractés par l'Allemagne, manquements sur lesquels les Gouvernements alliés auront à délibérer.'

## No. 351

*Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)*

*No. 4190 [C 14811/113/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 31, 1920*

My Lord,

On the receipt of Y. L.'s telegram No. 1420 (section 12) of the 27th instant,<sup>1</sup> H.M.G. have given their anxious consideration to the situation created by the notes exchanged between General Nollet representing the inter-allied Military Commission of Control at Berlin and the German government. Before coming to a decision as to the attitude to be adopted towards the German government in the matter of the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr, H.M.G. will await the report of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles and the Naval Advisers, foreshadowed in your tel. on the progress made up to date in the execution of the military, naval and air clauses of the treaty of Versailles and of the Spa protocol.

<sup>1</sup> No. 342.

Meanwhile however I request Y. L. to call the attention of the French government to the grave inconvenience inherent in the arrangement whereby an acute crisis in the general relations between the allied Powers and Germany is liable to be produced by notes, raising political issues of great magnitude, being addressed to the German government by the inter-allied Military Mission of Control, without any previous consultation with the allied governments. In the present instance this procedure has resulted in placing the allied governments quite unexpectedly in face of a *fait accompli* of a nature calculated to cause them extreme embarrassment and to increase their difficulties in dealing with the already sufficiently complicated situation in Germany.

The French government will, I feel convinced, agree that a system which permits of such a situation being suddenly produced without any opportunity being afforded for the proper consideration of the political issues involved, is faulty. The obvious remedy is not to allow the Commission of Control to act in matters raising such issues, without obtaining the specific authority of the allied governments, which should be conveyed to them through the ambassadors' conference at Paris.

I would accordingly suggest that this question be brought before the conference at a very early date, with the view of their giving instructions to the Commission not in future to address to the German govt. any communication which raises political issues of importance, without previously submitting the text of the proposed communication to the ambassadors' conference and so giving them the opportunity should they think it desirable of consulting the respective governments before definitely expressing approval.

I leave to Y. L.'s discretion the manner of bringing the question before the conference. The most suitable arrangement might be for the French Representative to take the initiative in doing so. If not you will doubtless arrange another procedure. I shall be glad if you will communicate at the proper moment with your Italian and Japanese colleague[s] with a view to secure their support. I have telegraphed to H.M. ambassadors at Rome and Tokio<sup>2</sup> requesting them to solicit instructions to your Italian and Japanese colleagues in the same sense.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

<sup>2</sup> No. 348.

**No. 352**

*Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received January 3, 1921)*

*No. 3897 [C 90/13/18]*

PARIS, December 31, 1920

My Lord,

In my telegram No. 1420, section 12 of the 27th December,<sup>1</sup> I reported that the Conference of Ambassadors had instructed the Allied Military Committee of Versailles and the Naval Advisers to draw up for transmission

<sup>1</sup> No. 342.

to the Allied Governments a general report on the extent to which the military, aeronautical and naval clauses of the Treaty and the Spa Protocol had been carried out up till the end of the year. I have the honour now to enclose these reports for the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

The Allied Military Committee of Versailles naturally attach most importance to that part of their report which deals with the failure of the German Government to disarm and dissolve the *Einwohnerwehr*, and in this connection I would call Your Lordship's attention to the correspondence on this subject which is enclosed in my despatches Nos. 3854<sup>2</sup> and 3865.<sup>3</sup>

You will observe that in this respect the Versailles Committee have dealt not only with the failure of the German Government to comply with the Treaty and the Spa Protocol, but also with their attitude to the three Notes addressed by the Supreme Council from Boulogne on the 22nd June. Two of these Boulogne Notes deal with military questions and their stipulations are merely demands to execute the provisions of the Treaty, or in the nature of concessions accorded by the Allied Governments. The Military Committee of Versailles, in preparing their report found it necessary to refer to these Notes in addition to the Spa Protocol inasmuch as they contain the terms of the concession made with regard to the German Police Force and also because they demand the dissolution of the *Einwohnerwehr*, whereas the Spa Protocol only stipulates for its disarmament. As far as I am aware, the German Government have never disputed these two Boulogne Notes dealing with military questions, and as they have always taken the fullest advantage of them, they may be presumed to have accepted them.

There remains, however, a third Boulogne Note of June 22nd dealing with the resumption by Germany of the manufacture of civil aircraft. This Note contains a demand which may be interpreted as a modification of the Treaty and as such has never been accepted by the German Government. The latest aspect of this question is dealt with in my telegram No. 1420, section 6 of the 27th instant.<sup>1</sup> As this refusal by the German Government is included in the present report of the execution of the aeronautical clauses of the Treaty, I think it desirable to call your attention to the fact that it falls within a somewhat different category from direct violations of or failures to execute the Treaty.

Similarly [*sic*], the present report contains references to the refusal of the German Government to recognise their obligation to pay compensation for the illegal destruction of certain zeppelins. This refusal, as Your Lordship is aware, is the result of a demand made by the Conference of Ambassadors, as reported in Lord Derby's telegram No. 1154 section 9 of October 2nd.<sup>4</sup> The history and present position of this claim is [*sic*] dealt with further in my despatch No. 3898.<sup>5</sup> It also appears to fall into a separate category by itself.

I have, &c.,

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

<sup>2</sup> Paris despatch 3854 of December 28 contained the correspondence between the Allied Military Commission of Control and the German Government concerning the dissolution of the *Sicherheitspolizei*; see No. 343, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> No. 295.

<sup>3</sup> No. 347.

<sup>5</sup> Of December 31, not printed.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 352

*Marshal Foch, President of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors*

2069/1

PARIS, December 28, 1920

I have the honour to forward to you herewith the reports called for by the note of the Conference of Ambassadors of December 27th as to the execution of the Military and Air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

In forwarding these documents, the Allied Military Committee of Versailles feels called upon to draw attention to the fact that according to reports received from General Nollet and General Masterman, the German Government has, since the beginning of December, adopted an attitude of definite resistance to the execution of certain of the essential Military and Air clauses of the Treaty and the demands of the Allied Governments and the Conference of Ambassadors.

The Allied Military Committee of Versailles considers that it is necessary that this attitude which has been clearly demonstrated should be brought to the knowledge of the Allied Governments.

FOCH

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 352

*Report by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles dated December 30, 1920, on the State of Execution by Germany of the Military and Aeronautical Clauses of the Peace Treaty, of the Spa Protocol and of the Boulogne Note, up to December 25, 1920*

By a note dated December 27th 1920, the Conference of Ambassadors call upon the Allied Military Committee of Versailles to draw up a general report on the state of execution by Germany of the military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace and of the Spa Protocol.

The meeting of the Supreme Council at Spa (July 5th 1920), preceded by that at Boulogne (June 20th 1920) had as its object among others, the fixing in a definite manner of the state of execution by Germany of the military and air clauses at that date, that is to say six months after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. It was also intended to specify those clauses which had either not been executed or been only partially executed; and to fix limiting dates for the execution of such clauses.

It is sufficient therefore to review, whilst merely mentioning them, those clauses which were regarded as executed at the time of the Spa Conference. Those are:—

Delivery of information regarding the manufacture of explosives (Art. 172).  
Suppression of military schools (Art. 176).

Disarmament of fortifications within a zone 50 km. wide east of the Rhine (Art. 180).

To these might be added the question of dismantling German fortifications, the execution of which is proceeding satisfactorily and upon which it is not necessary to lay stress.

On the other hand—and in view of their importance—it is necessary to examine one by one the clauses which remain still unexecuted at the time of the Spa Conference. These clauses bear on the following subjects:—

German military legislation and the reduction of the German army;

The surrender and destruction of German war material;

The suppression of all organisations created in Germany under pretence of assuring the maintenance of order (*Sicherheitspolizei, Einwohnerwehren &c. . .*).<sup>6</sup>

These clauses and the state of their execution, as established by the information furnished by the Presidents of the Military and Aeronautical Commissions of Control, are examined below.

## MILITARY CLAUSES

### I. *German Military Legislation and German Military Forces*

The Boulogne Note and the Spa Protocol had imposed on Germany the following obligations:—

*At once* to make its legislation conform to the military clauses of the Peace Treaty.

To complete the reduction of the strength of the German army to 100,000 men *by January 1st 1921*.

#### (a) *German Legislation*

As regards the legislation referring to military service and the organisation of the army, the German Government passed on August 20th [*sic*]<sup>7</sup> a law providing for: the abolition of compulsory military service and the organisation of the German army according to the stipulations of the Peace Treaty.

This law contained serious omissions and resulted in many protests from the Military Commission of Control.

To remedy it, the German Government brought forward a fresh draft military law. In its turn this draft law also gave rise to certain observations on the part of the Commission of Control:

In particular:

it is not specified that apart from service in the Reich, military service is abolished as regards the German States:

effectives of certain services (service in Artillery depôts, service in fortifications, administrative personnel, paymasters, &c.) are not included in the total effectives of 100,000 men and seem to be intended as additional to that figure:

<sup>6</sup> Punctuation as in original.

<sup>7</sup> For this law of August 21, see *Reichs Gesetzblatt* of August 26, 1920, pp. 1608–9.

an article in the Law even contemplates including in the army a series of nameless military organisations of 'complementary troops' ('Ergänzungstruppen') as to which no definite explanation is given.

Observations on this point were addressed to the German Government. To these no answer has as yet been received. It follows, therefore, that at the moment, the German legislation with regard to military laws is not yet established in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty.

*(b) Reduction of the German Army to 100,000 men*

A draft organisation with regard to the reduction of the German army to 100,000 men has been drawn up by the German Government.

The Commission of Control has shown that the executive measures for this reduction had already been taken, but the detailed examination of the draft organisation has resulted in the Commission making certain observations to which the German Government has not yet answered.

Under this reserve, it seems that the reduction of the German army can be completed by January 1st 1921. The checking of this reduction by the Commission of Control will begin from that date.

*(c) Organisations for liquidating the former German Army*

To effect the dissolution of the former German Army there had been organised in the several General Staffs and units of the old army, certain liquidation organisations ('Abwi[c]kelungsämter' and 'Abwicklung[s]-stellen'). The Interallied Military Commission of Control had long since asked for the suppression of these organisations and had finally fixed January 1st 1921 as the time limit for their suppression.

The German Government having been called upon to comply has indeed suppressed the liquidation organisations of units ('Abwickelungs[s]tellen') by October 1st, but as regards the staffs of Army Corps, it has simply substituted for these organisations what they called 'Zweigstelle' and 'Record Offices' comprising for each Army Corps region several former Officers, N.C.Os and certain civilian officials.

The total strength of these new organisations is certainly less by one third than the total strengths of the former liquidation organisations or Army Corps Staffs. It is none the less true that Germany is thus maintaining organisations forbidden by the Peace Treaty.

The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control has protested against the maintenance of these organisations and is suppressing them.

## *II. Surrender and Destruction of War Material*

The Spa Protocol had repeated the clauses of the Peace Treaty imposing upon Germany the obligation to 'surrender to the Allies with a view to destruction, and to assist in the destruction of, all arms and military material in excess of the quantities authorised by the Treaty.'

The surrender and destruction of the material are proceeding normally, but are not yet completed.



Up to December 11th 1920 there had been surrendered:—

Guns	30,500 of which	28,100 destroyed.
<i>Minenwerfer</i>	10,120 of which	7,600 destroyed.
Machine Guns	65,360 of which	50,270 destroyed.
Small Arms	2,785,220 of which	2,304,820 destroyed.

It is however necessary to draw special attention to the objection made by Germany to the surrender of heavy artillery material at Cüstrin and Königsberg (in excess of the armaments authorised for the latter fortress) in spite of the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors refusing to allow any armament for the fortress of Cüstrin and fixing an authorised armament for Königsberg as proposed by the Interallied Military Commission of Control.

Further, there exists:—

- (a) Excess material derived from the reduction of the German Army from 200,000 to 100,000 men.
- (b) Material collected in the Reichswehr Depôts, which the German Government has asked for authority to keep as training material or for renewals.

The Interallied Military Commission of Control rejects the exaggerated proposals<sup>8</sup> of the German Government and will insist upon the surrender of the material of these two different categories.

To sum up, although the surrender and destruction of German war material has already attained very considerable figures, it is none the less true that the disarmament of Germany is still far from complete.

### III. *Disarming the Civil Population, Einwohnerwehren and Sicherheitspolizei*

The Spa Protocol had imposed upon Germany the obligation 'to issue a proclamation demanding the immediate surrender of all arms in the hands of the civil population . . . to proceed immediately with the withdrawal of the arms of the Einwohnerwehren and Sicherheitspolizei.'

#### (a) *Disarming the Civil Population*<sup>9</sup>

The legislative measures for assuring the disarming of the civil population

<sup>8</sup> *Note in original:* 'As an example, the Peace Treaty allows two Machine Guns for the armament of a Co[mpan]y of Pioneers; the German Govt. has demanded: 6 Machine Guns for training, 80 Breaches and 500 barrels for renewals.'

<sup>9</sup> *Note in original:* 'Up to December 1st the material delivered to the Commission of Control and derived from the Einwohnerwehren and from the disarming of the civil population was—

Guns	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	41
Mortars	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	47
Machine Guns	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	3,733
Small Arms	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	377,043

On the other hand, the German Government furnished the following information which it has not been possible for the Commission of Control to check—

Arms declared as surrendered to the German authorities by the population up to October 21st 1920—

were taken in August (the law of August 7th and the Regulations of August 22nd)<sup>10</sup> and the surrender of arms began on September 15th.

Up to now there has been delivered to the Commission of Control only an insignificant part of the arms reported by the Reichs Commissioner for Disarmament as having been surrendered by the civil population to the German authorities. Therefore from the point of view of the Interallied Military Commission of Control execution of this clause has been only begun.

(b) *Disarming of the Einwohnerwehren and Self-Protection Organisations*

A certain number of arms have, it is true, been surrendered, particularly in Prussia, but the Reichs Commissioner, whose duty it is to fix the date by which all the arms of the Einwohnerwehren should be delivered, has not yet officially communicated this date to the Commission of Control. Not only this, but the German Government by its Note of December 9th<sup>11</sup> informed the Commission of Control that the arms of the Einwohnerwehren in North and Central Germany could not be withdrawn before March 1st 1921, while it has on two occasions formally refused to carry out the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehren and Self-Protection Organisations in East Prussia and Bavaria, pretending that the situation does not allow of this measure being taken at present.

It can thus be seen that the disarmament of the Einwohnerwehren is not only hardly begun in the general area of the Reich, but the German Government actually refuses to carry out the disarming in Bavaria and East Prussia.

(c) *Disarming the Sicherheitspolizei*

The disarming of the Sicherheitspolizei is in progress, and about two-thirds of their arms have been surrendered.<sup>12</sup>

To sum up, if the disarming of the Sicherheitspolizei is relatively well advanced, on the contrary that of the civil population is only begun, while that of the Einwohnerwehren is not only hardly started, but is even refused by the German Government in so far as Bavaria and East Prussia are concerned.

#### IV. *Dissolution of the Sicherheitspolizei*

The Boulogne Note of June 22nd 1920 imposed upon Germany the obligation to dissolve the Sicherheitspolizei within three months, that is to say, by September 22nd, 1920 at the latest.

Small arms . . . . .	1,301,788
Machine Guns . . . . .	9,133
Depôts of arms declared by organisations up till November 30th 1920—	
Small arms . . . . .	801,653
Machine Guns . . . . .	8,404

These figures have not been accepted by the Commission of Control and are subject to verification.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>10</sup> For these Regulations see *Reichs Gesetzblatt* of August 23, 1920, p. 1595.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. No. 330, n. 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Note in original*: 'Up to December 1st, the Sicherheitspolizei had surrendered 500 guns, 530 mortars, 1,530 machine guns, 54,860 small arms out of about 75,000.'

Sixteen States out of 18 which form the Reich have published decrees ordering the dissolution of their Sicherheitspolizei but up to now the result[s] of the control operations do not allow us to record this dissolution as having been effectively realised anywhere. The President of the Interallied Military Commission of Control formally notified the German Government of this and has called upon the latter to proceed with the dissolution.

The German answer dated December 26th<sup>13</sup> merely contains a protest without indicating any date for the dissolution of this Police.

#### V. *Dissolution of the Einwohnerwehren and Selbst-Schutzorganisationen*

The Boulogne Note of June 22nd 1920 called upon the German Government effectively to suppress the Einwohnerwehren formations.

This demand has remained a dead letter up to now.

If in North Germany and in Saxony these organisations have been officially dissolved, they have been reconstituted under other titles. In East Prussia and Bavaria, not only do they still exist, but contrary to Art. 177 they are connected with the Reichswehr. By two successive Notes<sup>14</sup> the German Government has informed the Commission of Control that it is unable at present to order this suppression, and has informed the Commission that it (i.e. the German Government) would submit the question to the Conference of Ambassadors.

Thus no effective dissolution of the formations of Einwohnerwehren and 'Self-Protection' has been realised, although their maintenance constitutes—in spite of the denials of the German Government—a flagrant violation of Articles 177 and 178 of the Peace Treaty as also of the Boulogne Note.

To sum up, and ignoring the clauses of the Treaty the execution of which are in progress and those which the Commission of Control seems able to have executed at an early date, it should be stated that the German Government claims to maintain the so-called 'Self-Protective' organisations and also the armament of a portion of them, while it has taken no effective measures for the dissolution of the Sicherheitspolizei.

Thus, the German Government is opposing an essential clause of the Peace Treaty to which its attention was imperatively drawn by the Boulogne Note and the Spa Protocol.

To explain such an attitude one cannot admit the pretext invoked by the German Government: the necessity of the maintenance of order.

It is sufficient indeed to recall that the maintenance of order is assured in Germany:

- (a) by the Reichswehr which, by virtue of Art. 160 of the Treaty of Versailles 'shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory, and to the control of the frontiers.'
- (b) by the Police and Gendarmerie, the authorised strength[s] of which were raised by the Boulogne Note of June 22nd from 92,000 to 150,000 for the Police and from 12,000 to 17,000 for the Gendarmerie, with a view to ensuring very liberally the maintenance of order.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. No. 343, n. 2.

<sup>14</sup> See No. 330, n. 1 and No. 341, n. 1.

The German Government no longer makes any allusion to this very important concession and its claims would lead one to suppose that the concessions are non-existent.

It is necessary moreover to observe that, if at the time of their creation, some of these organisations seemed to answer to the needs of internal security, it cannot be maintained on the other hand that the number and importance of these organisations should be constantly developed now that order has been re-established in Germany.

Nor can one explain why these different organisations, if they are only intended for local needs, seem to be co-ordinated for the whole of Germany by a central organisation,<sup>15</sup> or why they should be linked with the Reichswehr as has been definitely established.

On the other hand all these dispositions, by the facilities which they afford to the preparation of a general mobilisation of the German people, explain the obstinacy with which the German Government is trying to maintain them in opposition to the Treaty.

The German Government moreover does not deny, in its Note of December 22nd,<sup>16</sup> that the measures which it took, and which it attempts to maintain, do in fact facilitate such a mobilisation.

It confines itself to urging that if such is their effect, such was not their object, and that it follows that they do not fall under Art. 178 of the Treaty which, according to the German Government, only forbids measures *appertaining* to mobilisation.

In this connection it is sufficient to note that Art. 178 of the Treaty states that:

‘All measures of mobilisation or appertaining to mobilisation are forbidden’ and that in consequence any measure which has the effect of preparing for mobilisation is in opposition alike to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty.

Consequently, the Allied Military Committee of Versailles is unanimously of the opinion that the German Government:—

- (a) in not taking any effective measures for the dissolution of the Sicherheitspolizei,
- (b) in refusing to dissolve ‘Selbstschutz’ organisations and in trying to justify their maintenance,
- (c) in refusing likewise to proceed with disarming a portion of these organisations,

has put itself in opposition both to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty and to the explicit decisions taken several times by the Allied Governments.

The Allied Military Committee of Versailles further reports that:—

*As regards the dissolution of the Sicherheitspolizei*

General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of

<sup>15</sup> *Note in original*: ‘This Central Organisation has as its head *Escherich* who is at the same time chief of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehren.’

<sup>16</sup> Cf. No. 341, n. 1.

Control, has on December 23rd<sup>17</sup> by his Note 1266 to the German Government formally recorded 'the violation of the stipulations of the Peace Treaty and of the Boulogne Note' involved by the non-execution of this dissolution.

*As regards the dissolution of the Selbstschutz organisations and the disarming of part of these*

The German Government, by its letter of December 9th addressed to General Nollet, notified *the Allied Governments* that it did not consider itself legally bound to the dissolution of the Selbstschutz organisations, also that it could not proceed to disarm these organisations existing in East Prussia and Bavaria; that in addressing this communication *to the Allied Governments*, the German Government was 'fully conscious of the gravity of the resolution it had adopted.'

By his letter of December 11th,<sup>18</sup> General Nollet replied to the German Government demanding that he should be informed without delay of the measures taken for the dissolution and the immediate disarming of the Selbstschutz organisations.

To this demand ('mise en demeure') the German Government replied on December 22nd referring to its letter of December 9th which it again asked General Nollet to bring to the notice of the *Allied Governments*.

Thus the German Government has, by its repeated refusals, formally intimated its desire not to conform to Articles 177 and 178 of the Treaty.

The Allied Military Committee of Versailles places this on record, and reports accordingly to the Allied Governments, while calling their attention to the character of these violations.

<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>Italy.</i>	<i>Belgium.</i>	<i>Japan.</i>
For the Military	The Military	The Military	The Military
Representative:	Representative:	Representative:	Representative:
F. H. KISCH.	MARIETTI.	JOOSTENS.	WATANABE.
<i>France.</i>			
The Marshal-President:			
FOCH.			

<sup>17</sup> Cf. No. 343, n. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. No. 334, n. 1.

#### ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 352

*Rapport général par la Commission interalliée de l'Aéronautique sur l'état d'Exécution des Clauses aériennes du Traité de Paix, du Protocole de Spa et de la Décision de Boulogne*

#### I. Résultats obtenus

CHALAIS MEUDON, le 28 Décembre 1920

(a) *Matériel mobile.* — À la date de ce jour, le matériel aéronautique suivant a été mis hors d'usage ou expédié aux différentes Puissances de l'Entente:

25,823 moteurs d'avions, soit environ 90 %  
13,079 avions et hydravions, soit environ 92 %  
6 dirigeables.

Il faut ajouter à ce matériel une quantité considérable d'instruments divers, d'appareils photographiques, de T.S.F., de pièces détachées et accessoires d'avions et de moteurs.

Tout le matériel indiqué ci-dessus n'a pas été déclaré par le Gouvernement allemand et la Commission a retrouvé par ses propres moyens :

7,930 moteurs d'avions,  
281 avions et hydravions,

plus une grande quantité d'instruments divers, d'appareils photographiques, de pièces détachées et accessoires d'avions et de moteurs.

Par conséquent, il existait en Allemagne du matériel dissimulé qui aurait pu subsister dans ce pays après le départ de la Commission si celle-ci n'avait pu le retrouver.

Il existe du matériel aéronautique allemand qui n'a pas été livré.

Ce matériel comprend celui exporté et celui encore dissimulé en Allemagne.

Il est impossible de déterminer avec précision les quantités de ce matériel, car tous les essais d'évaluation faits à ce jour renferment forcément des données de provenance allemande et par conséquent douteuses.

Dans une lettre en date du 14 Décembre, le Gouvernement Allemand admet l'existence de matériel encore dissimulé chez des particuliers et déclare préparer une nouvelle loi qui, d'après lui, devra faire retrouver ce matériel.

Tant que les effets de cette loi n'auront pas été constatés la Commission ne peut déclarer que les Clauses Aériennes du Traité de Paix concernant la livraison du matériel aéronautique allemand ont été satisfaites.

Elle fera cette déclaration lorsque le vide relatif qu'elle aura obtenu sera tel qu'elle ne puisse plus pratiquement retrouver que des quantités de matériel insignifiantes.

(b) *Hangars.* — Dès maintenant, 20 pour cent des hangars d'avions ont été démontés. Un seul hangar de dirigeable est en voie de démontage. Le délai d'exécution est fixé au 15 mai 1921.

(c) *Usines à hydrogène.* — Le travail de démolition des usines à hydrogène se poursuit normalement.

Des résistances se manifestent pour la livraison des bouteilles à gaz et des wagons réservoirs.

(d) *Armement.* — On a livré environ 5,000 mitrailleuses d'avions. Ce chiffre est insuffisant.

## II. Difficultés rencontrées dans l'exécution

(a) *Décision de Boulogne concernant l'interdiction des fabrications aéronautiques en Allemagne.* — Les infractions suivantes à la Décision de Boulogne ont été constatées :

Usines Junker .	. 50 Avions civils construits.
Usines Fokker .	. 3 Avions civils construits, un en construction.
Usine L.F.G. .	. 1 hydravion d'un type nouveau construit, un en construction.
Usine Sablating	. 3 avions civils construits.

A la suite des rappels à l'ordre faits par la Commission, le Gouvernement allemand a adressé, pour être transmise à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, une lettre en date du 14 Décembre 1920.

Cette lettre de protestation contre la décision de Boulogne a été transmise au Conseil des Ambassadeurs.

Onze avions civils Junker trouvés à Hambourg par la Commission avaient été mis sous séquestre. Le Gouvernement Allemand vient de lever l'interdiction d'exportation en Amérique de ce matériel, malgré les ordres donnés par la Commission.

(b) *Vol dans la zone neutre.* — Des vols dans la zone neutre ont été constatés.

La Conférence des Ambassadeurs vient de prendre une décision récente à ce sujet,<sup>19</sup> et dont les effets n'ont pas encore pu se faire sentir.

(c) *Réparations pour les dirigeables détruits en 1919.* — Le Gouvernement allemand a adressé directement à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs une lettre de protestation contre la décision prise au sujet des réparations demandées pour les dirigeables détruits en 1919.

Des ordres ont été donnés par la Commission pour l'exécution de cette décision.

Aucune mesure n'a été prise à ce jour par le Gouvernement Allemand.

(d) Le Gouvernement Allemand a refusé de livrer des pièces de rechange pour dirigeables sous prétexte que ce matériel a été construit en 1919 pour les aéronefs civils.

(e) Une certaine quantité de matériel recensé et indiqué pour être soit détruit, soit livré, a disparu des lieux où il était entreposé.

(f) La Commission a demandé au Gouvernement Allemand un supplément de 25 millions de marks pour remboursement de matériel exporté.

Le Gouvernement allemand n'accepte pas cette évaluation.

#### *Observations générales*

On a constaté que, à partir des premiers jours de Décembre, les Allemands ont opposé une résistance systématique pour exécuter les ordres donnés par la Commission de Contrôle.

Les Allemands ont, en outre, inauguré une tactique d'atermoiement qui consiste à adresser à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs de longues lettres de protestation contre ces décisions ou les ordres d'exécution donnés par la Commission.

E. A. MASTERMAN,  
*Air Commodore, R.A.F.*

<sup>19</sup> See No. 342, n. 10.

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 352

*Memorandum dated December 31, 1920, by the Naval Advisers for the Conference of Ambassadors in accordance with their decision of 27th December, 1920*

*General Report of the State of Execution of the Naval Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the Protocol of Spa*

*Articles 168 and 169.* Out of a total of 345 factories (with which the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control (N.I.A.C.C.) is concerned) 167 remain uncompleted.

*Article 181.* Last paragraph remains uncompleted as regards Disarmament by the Germans of warships in Reserve.

*Article 182.* Vessels and their war material still require to be controlled during the process of their reduction in numbers.

*Article 183.* Active service personnel is stated by the Germans to have been reduced, but supervision of this reduction has not yet been completed by the Commission of Control.

(NOTE. There has been no obstruction in regard to Articles 181, 182 and 183.)

*Article 184.* Executed.

*Article 185.* Delivery of vessels is complete except as regards: (a) certain missing Guns and Torpedo Tubes to Great Britain; (b) armament and equipment of vessels surrendered to France and Italy for incorporation in their Fleets, which is not proceeding satisfactorily.

Many protests are being raised by Germans who decline delivery of a great proportion of the material demanded and who fail to appreciate that they are required to fit out these vessels in accordance with Allied demands. In a letter dated 20th December 1920 (Annex A),<sup>20</sup> the German Naval Peace Commission has categorically refused to deliver over certain articles of equipment as directed by N.I.A.C.C.

*Article 186.* Incomplete, but progress is being accelerated.

*Article 191.* Has been violated as shown in the following extract of a report from N.I.A.C.C., Berlin dated 18th December 1920.

The firm of C. and J. Jaeger of Elberfeld have been discovered to be engaged in manufacturing conning towers for submarine boats. The firm allege that these submarine conning towers are being manufactured for a Dutch firm, viz., *Koninklijke Maatschappij de Schelde*, in Vligsingén [Vlissingen]. The Director of the firm refused to allow the drawings to be examined. The German Government state that they do not see that they are compelled, either by the Articles of the Treaty of Versailles, or the list of naval war material in the Blue Book, to acknowledge the conning towers as being war material, and refuse to order the cessation of the work. The action of the German Government in this matter is in direct contravention of Article 191 of the Treaty of Versailles.

<sup>20</sup> Not printed.



*Article 192.* (Paragraph 1.) Uncompleted and cannot be completed until the delivery of the material mentioned under Article 185 above is satisfied.

(Paragraph 2.) Obstructions and concealment have practically created general suspension under this article; vast quantities of war material remain to be dealt with. The surrender of all essential fittings for submarine boats has been refused. The inspection of the commercial installations of submarine Diesel engines has not yet been commenced.

In his letter dated 18th December 1920 [P.] N.I.A.C.C. reports the following violations and obstructions under Article 192:—

1. The Reichstreuhandgesellschaft (which is the Disposal Board for dealing with German war material) has, on many occasions, removed and disposed of War Material without the permission of N.I.A.C.C. (in spite of having been continually warned that this action is illegal), thereby preventing a large amount of Naval War Material from passing through the hands of the Reparation Commission for sale. Continual remonstrances from N.I.A.C.C. to the German Naval Peace Commission have failed to stop this illegal procedure. Moreover the German Naval Peace Commission have invariably endeavoured to defend the actions of the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft.
2. The War Material from certain Mine-Sweeping vessels paid off at Pillau has been disposed of without the permission of N.I.A.C.C.
3. The German Government have refused to destroy large numbers of couplings for submarine main propelling shafts at Dessau.
4. Naval War Material is being secretly distributed and concealed throughout Germany, palpably with the consent and active participation of the Naval Representatives of the German Government. Some of the more serious instances are as follows:—
  - (a) At *Siemens and Halske, Berlin*, the representatives of the German Government deliberately countenanced the concealment of vast quantities of fire control, U boat and other Naval War Material. When the authorities became aware of the suspicions of N.I.A.C.C. as shown by their continual inspections of this firm, material was removed elsewhere. 30 to 40 tons of this material were subsequently discovered by N.I.A.C.C. in a private house in Berlin.
  - (b) At *Messrs. Hirsch, Ilsenburg*, about 800 tons of undeclared Naval War Material were located by N.I.A.C.C. After the surrender of this material was demanded at Ilsenburg, four truck loads were found to have been removed secretly. The demands of N.I.A.C.C. to have this War Material returned to Ilsenburg have not yet been complied with.
  - (c) *Stores at Teltow*. Large quantities of undeclared war material have been located by N.I.A.C.C. (searchlights, fire control, ammunition hoist motors, &c.).
  - (d) At five separate stores in the vicinity of Berlin large quantities of undeclared War Material have been located (Naval Wireless Apparatus).

5. A Swedish subject was discovered to be negotiating for the sale of German Naval War Material (U boat gun sights). This man was staying at one of the leading hotels in Berlin and when the matter was reported to the German Government, they did not co-operate with the N.I.A.C.C. in obtaining this War Material.

*Article 193.* Proceeding slowly.

*Article 194.* The necessary legislation to comply with this Article has not yet been passed by the Reichstag.

*Articles 195 and 196.* Are being dealt with by the Military Commission of Control. Not yet completed.

*Article 197.* Completed.

*Articles 204, 205 and 206.* Much obstruction encountered. German Liaison Officers frequently obstruct systematically instead of assisting. Documents and information in a number of cases withheld.

In his letter dated 18th December 1920 [P.]N.I.A.C.C. instances the following violations and obstructions:—

1. The German Government refuses to accept the additions which N.I.A.C.C., under the authority of the Conference of Ambassadors, has found necessary to make to the Schedules of Naval War Material in the Blue Book, in particular to Schedules Nos. 73, 77 and 89 and have refused to allow the work of N.I.A.C.C. to proceed in connection with any war material under these Schedules.
2. The German Government have refused to allow the surplus Naval Gun Shrinking Pits and Turret Erecting Pits at Messrs. Krupp, Essen, to be filled in.
3. The 16 No. 60 cm. Torpedo Air Vessels at Bremen required for the ships surrendered to France and Italy were deliberately destroyed immediately after orders had been given by N.I.A.C.C. that no destruction of these Air Vessels was to take place.
4. The officers of N.I.A.C.C. employed in inspecting Factories and classifying and destroying Naval War Material have been frequently obstructed in their duties by the German Naval Liaison Officers. The attitude of the German Liaison Officers, instead of being a help to the work of the Commission, has been more frequently a hindrance. This obstructive attitude has lately become more acute.

*Article 209.* Delivery of documents is unsatisfactory; much information being withheld by the German authorities.

*Protocol of the 10th January 1920.* The delivery of the first instalment of Dock Material is proceeding satisfactorily with the exception of dredgers.

The delivery of the second instalment of this Material has been commenced.

Generally, in regard to the foregoing, great and increasing opposition is being experienced by N.I.A.C.C. in carrying out their work, due to the present obstructive attitude of the German Naval Peace Commission, repre-

senting the German Government. In consequence of this obstructive attitude, much useful work, especially in the destruction of War Material, is now at a standstill. Many of the infringements referred to above were the subject of paragraph (V) of the Protocol of Spa (dated 9th July 1920) and in his report of the 18th December 1920 addressed to the Conference of Ambassadors, P.N.I.A.C.C. observes that the Naval Commission of Control views the attitude at present adopted by the German Government with reference to submarines and their essential parts *with the greatest apprehension*.

.....<sup>21</sup> for France.

..... for Great Britain.

..... for Italy.

..... for Japan.

<sup>21</sup> No names were appended to the copy of this document in the Foreign Office files.

## CHAPTER V

# Reparation by Germany July 6–December 31, 1920

No. 353

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 24)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Confidential/General/363/16]*

*Very urgent. Private and personal*

PARIS, July 24, 1920

I have had a long and very intimate talk with Marsal<sup>1</sup> to-day. He tells me a proposition should have been made to you by M. Cambon either on Monday<sup>2</sup> evening or Tuesday morning with regard to question of coal, and which briefly I understand to be as follows:

Instead of French Treasury having to find the difference between internal and external price of German coal,<sup>3</sup> will British Government consent to principle either of a general loan, or a loan launched by Germany and guaranteed by Allies in same proportion as has been arranged for reparation, or a loan issued under similar conditions by Reparations Commission?

You will of course have through M. Cambon all particulars. The answer is very urgently required as Marsal has to make a statement on Tuesday at latest, and, if assent of British Government can be given, to have proper effect it should be announced then.

It would lose, in Marsal's opinion, half of its effect if it had to be announced after that date.

*Very Secret*

Giving you my personal opinion for what it is worth, I cannot help being rather frightened as to position of Millerand's Government. I am writing to you full letter to-night<sup>4</sup>, but as matter is so urgent I would beg that immediate answer be given to proposition. I am, of course, unaware of arguments against proposal, but I am certain that everything that can be done should be done at present moment in the interests of both countries to make any concessions not detrimental to ourselves which would be of use to Millerand's Government.

<sup>1</sup> M. François-Marsal was French Minister of Finance.

<sup>2</sup> July 19.

<sup>3</sup> See Mr. Lloyd George's proposal at Spa, Volume VIII, No. 76, appendix 3.

<sup>4</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 354

*Note by Sir E. Crowe on a conversation with the Portuguese Minister in London*

[C 1921/8/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 26, 1920*

The Portuguese Minister called to day to express the thanks of his government for the effective way in which H.M.G. had supported the claims of Portugal in the matter of reparation at the Brussels and Spa conferences.<sup>1</sup> He said the support he and Senhor Costa had received from Sir Laming Worthington-Evans<sup>2</sup> and Sir J. Bradbury was most warmly appreciated.

E. A. C.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 156.

<sup>2</sup> Minister without Portfolio.

No. 355

*Lord D'Abernon (Warsaw)<sup>1</sup> to Earl Curzon (Received August 4)*

*Unnumbered [C 2971/8/18]*

WARSAW, *July 30, 1920*

My Lord,

In reply to Your Lordship's telegram No. 244 of the 23rd instant,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to submit a Report on the financial situation of Germany, with a view to the discussions which are to take place at Geneva.

This Report has been drawn up under circumstances of some pressure here, and individual figures may require corrections, which I shall be able to supply after a short stay in Berlin.

The general tendency of my views, however, will not, I think, be changed by any alteration of individual figures which I am likely to find necessary on a further examination of the position.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

<sup>1</sup> Lord D'Abernon was in Warsaw as a member of the special Anglo-French Mission to Poland.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram, sent at the instance of the Treasury, asked Lord D'Abernon to furnish the Cabinet, for the purpose of the Geneva Conference (see Volume VIII, p. 641), 'such verification and criticism of the documents furnished by the German Government to the Spa Conference in regard to Germany's capacity to pay and her Reparation proposals as it may be possible to complete within say fifteen days'.

*Note on the Financial Situation of Germany*

WARSAW, July 30, 1920

The governing fact to be remembered in economic and financial discussions respecting Germany is that she is uncommonly near bankruptcy. Recovery is only possible through great skill on the part of her financial authorities, aided by careful nursing of economic factors on the part of all interested. The only chance of obtaining from Germany any large annuity towards reparation is intelligent assistance, enabling her to revive her agriculture and her industry. Blind demands for payment either in kind or in cash without reference to the practical possibilities of the moment, without intelligent consideration of the psychology of the tax-payer, and without reference to the effect of an excessive immediate burden on the economic recovery of the country, are certain to mean a breakdown. The first consideration for the pilot is to avoid the shoal of bankruptcy; it matters much less if he takes a course a little wide of the shortest.

It should be recognised from the beginning, as a basic fact, that, without a radical change in Germany's present financial situation, there is not the faintest chance of Germany being able to pay the full amount of reparation for which she is responsible under the Treaty, which may be estimated at from 11 to 12 thousand millions sterling. An improvement so radical as to enable her to raise this amount may or may not be ultimately possible: but it is certainly impossible without the most careful administration, and without time.

It follows that it is useless to press a hard or precise interpretation of any individual claim, since the result will be not to increase the total sum obtained from Germany, but merely to transfer payments from Germany from one heading to another; thus an increased contribution under heading (a) would merely diminish the amount available under heading (b).

It may therefore be said, and this is an important point, that nothing is to be gained by riding any individual claim too hard. The real desiderata at Geneva appear therefore to be:—

1. A minimum annuity at once.
2. A postponement of the discussion to fix the total amount of the final indemnity until the situation has developed.

I should even doubt whether an endeavour to fix a sliding scale or *barème*, under which the minimum annuity would increase in proportion with either German production or German exports or German revenue, is now desirable. My chief reasons for this view are:—

The extreme confusion of German currency. Until this is stabilised no serious forecast can be made of the financial future of Germany. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this factor.

A second reason why any serious forecast is impossible now is the fact that during the war no increase of taxation was imposed in Germany. A very

stringent scheme of taxation has been elaborated during the last six months and is now being applied. We must see how this increased taxation is paid before forming an opinion as to the possibility of its maintenance or its increase. It is, therefore, impossible for anyone, even with the fullest information, to estimate now the payment Germany could bear in future years. Any excessive demands or even undue precision in demands will gain nothing and will injure, if they do not kill, the prospects of the future. Apart from this, as a matter of tactics, it may be observed that the Germans themselves have greater interest in fixing a definite sum than the Allies have in imposing it. They must, in their own interest, come forward with a proposal. Is not a proposal from their side a better basis for negotiation than a demand from ours?

There is another reason against a premature attempt to fix the final figure of indemnity. The views of the French and German Governments are, for the moment, too far apart for any compromise to be possible or for any broker, however ingenious, to bring them together. I can imagine no figure which, adopted to-day, would not so shock public opinion in one country or the other, as to break down negotiations.

The Boulogne scheme<sup>3</sup> represented a great advance, in that it constituted a considerable reduction of the previous French estimates. On the other hand, it did good in Germany, where its chief outlines were known, in that it showed the German Ministers how far their ideas went short of those of the Entente. But, as a matter of fact, the Boulogne figures represented a level of demand which is quite unattainable at present, unless the reparation in kind represented by coal and other deliveries is calculated at a very high figure. The minimum annual payment agreed to at Boulogne was three milliards of marks gold per annum. This represents, at the present exchange, approximately 24 milliards of marks paper. The total estimated revenue of the German State on the basis of the new taxation is approximately 31 milliards (ordinary budget), and her minimum internal expenditure necessary to her existence as a State at [*sic*] approximately the same amount. As the German Budget barely balances, without leaving anything for indemnity, the payment of this annual sum in cash would mean nearly doubling all German taxation. Now it is quite doubtful whether the new scheme of taxation (calculated to produce 31 milliards) can be smoothly worked. It is altogether impossible to conceive that twice the new rate of taxation could be imposed without producing a revolution.

There is a further question, the advisability of a loan based on a minimum annuity, which was discussed at Spa, in the belief that a loan was urgently required by France and would be cordially welcomed by Germany. The French financial authorities, however, appeared less keen than we anticipated about a loan, while the German unofficial financial authorities said that as far as they were concerned they were indifferent whether a loan was issued or not. The only real point of vital interest to them was the possibility of balancing expenditure with revenue, and thus ceasing to depend upon the

<sup>3</sup> See Volume VIII, appendix to No. 31.

printing press. Whether this view was sincere or not I cannot say. It seems rather to conflict with other statements which have been made regarding the necessity of more food and more raw material. But even if a loan is not urgent I should still advocate an endeavour to obtain at Geneva a promise of an annual minimum payment, as a payment on account of future indemnity and as a basis on which further financial arrangements could be made.

In conclusion, the view which the Entente should, in my opinion, keep constantly before them, is that Germany's present financial position is very precarious; but that, on a long view, the economic position shows signs of the possibility of future improvement.

The above statement represents my considered opinion on the negotiation as a whole.

I append a series of notes, or *obiter dicta*, on sectional aspects of the problem. These may afford arguments in one direction or the other: they are independent of one another and are not tuned to fit in with one general conclusion.

D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 355

*Notes (obiter dicta) on German Finance appended to Lord D'Abernon's Memorandum of July 30, 1920*

(All figures approximate only, and subject to revision)

1. *Rates of Income Tax in Germany and England (1920 Budgets)*

—	Englishman pays	German pays
Low-skilled labour, say, £3 a week in England; 10,000 M. a year in Germany*	Say, £3, or 2 per cent. of his income	1,170 M., or 11·7 per cent. of his income.
Skilled labour and (in England) lower middle-class incomes, say, £350 a year England; 25,000 M. Germany	Say, £35, or 10 per cent. of his income	5,000 M., or 20 per cent. of his income.
£1,000 a-year man or 75,000 M. in Germany	Say, £130, or 13 per cent. of his income	25,000 M. (about), or 33 per cent. of his income.

\* It is to be noted that in Germany incomes down to 25s. a week are taxed, whereas in England incomes under 45s. are tax-free.

German income-tax rates are thus very high indeed.

Indirect taxation also is apparently on a correspondingly high scale. For of the 1920 tax revenues of the two countries—

England raises—

By direct taxation . 40 per cent.  
By indirect taxation . 30 „  
By excess profits duty 30 „

Germany raises—

By direct taxation of  
income . 42 per cent.  
By indirect taxation 50 „  
By capital levy (in-  
terest) . 8 „



In Germany the yield of *indirect* taxation (both absolutely and per cent.) *exceeds* the yield of income tax; in England it is the other way round.

## 2. Tax revenues (*pre-war and present*) compared

—	England	France	Germany
A.-1913	£250,000,000	3,500,000,000 fr. = £175,000,000	4,500,000,000 M. = £225,000,000.
B.-1920	Paper-£1,000,000,000 which equals— Pre-war-£500,000,000 approximately	Paper { 26,000,000,000 fr. = £540,000,000 which equals— Pre-war { 6,500,000,000 fr. = £325,000,000 approximately	Paper { 31,000,000,000 M. = £207,000,000. which equals— Pre-war { 2,000,000,000 M. = £100,000,000. approximately.

Isolating the 'Pre-war' values, and adding index figures (England in 1913 = 100), we have:—

—	England	France	Germany
1913	£250,000,000, or 100	£175,000,000, or 70	£225,000,000, or 90.
1920	£500,000,000, or 200	£325,000,000, or 130	£100,000,000, or 40.

In the above Tables, the 'pre-war' value of *English* revenue is based on English *price-level[s]* (1920 prices being twice those of 1913); for *France and Germany* the 'pre-war' value is based on the present rates of exchange for the franc and the mark against the paper pound of 1920. The franc and the mark may have a somewhat different value in purchasing goods in France and Germany from their value in exchange against the paper pound, so that some variation in the figures given for the 'pre-war' values would be quite admissible. But it remains broadly true that, whereas both France and England have substantially *increased* the *real* (as well as the nominal) value of their tax revenues, the *real* value of the German revenue has *substantially declined*.

Germany might be asked to explain why, in spite of the enormous increase in her *rates* of taxation, she is getting less real value out of her taxes.

Partial explanations of this are:—

1. German production has declined. This is probably temporary: most of the contributory factors mentioned on page 4 of the memorandum on 'Germany's solvency for purposes of reparation'<sup>4</sup> are common to the whole world, and are beginning to disappear as the world recovers from the reaction after the hard work of war. Travelling through agricultural Germany, at any rate, one does not get an impression of a hopelessly sullen or listless people. In so far, however, as decline of production is a cause of the discrepancy between the high rates and the low yield of German production, the moral is to avoid discouragement of German production.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 172.

2. The disappearance of large German fortunes, due to (a) the capital levies, and (b) the revolution and disappearance of capitalists abroad. This is a factor, but its importance can easily be exaggerated. The German Budget was never so dependent on a few very rich individuals as, for example, the English.
3. The newness to German life of intensive taxation. A citizen requires training before he can become a good taxpayer on a high scale.
4. Probable inefficiency of the tax machinery. Note that—
  - (1) Germany had no income tax machine before the war.
  - (2) The higher the rates of taxation, the greater the incentive to evasion and the difficulty of collection.
  - (3) The notorious growth in the 'illicit imports' trade.

### 3. *German national expenditure*

Germany estimates 32,000,000,000 M. (nominal) as the minimum expenditure necessary to her internal administration.

Compare *England and France*—

—	Nominal value	Pre-war value
England . . .	£1,300,000,000	£650,000,000.
France . . .	26,000,000,000 fr.	6,500,000,000 fr. or £325,000,000.
Germany . . .	32,000,000,000 M.	2,100,000,000 M. or £105,000,000.

Note also that whereas England's debt obligations amount to only 25 per cent. of the total expenditure, Germany's amount to over 35 per cent. of the total of hers.

*Conclusion*—Germany appears to be economical in her administration.

### 4. *Comparative taxation per head in Germany and England*

—	Nominal	Pre-war value
England . . .	£22 per head	£11.
Germany . . .	533 M. or £3 17s. 6d. per head	35·5 M. or £1 15s. 6d.

NOTE—1. German national income is more evenly distributed than English.

2. Marks are possibly slightly more valuable if used for buying goods in Germany than if used for buying English sovereigns.

For the first of these reasons, it is impossible to expect from Germany the same rate of tax per head as is attained in England. But the discrepancy in the above figures is very large and might well be brought to Germany's attention.

### 5. *The Currency Position*

German currency (notes and coin) before the war was probably from 4,000,000,000 to 5,000,000,000 M. It is now estimated at about 64,000,000,000 M.: but a large proportion (variously estimated at from 20,000,000,000 to

34,000,000,000 M.) is held abroad, leaving the probable internal circulation at from 40,000,000,000 to 50,000,000,000 M., or approximately ten times the pre-war circulation. The present level of German prices is likewise estimated by the German experts at about ten times the pre-war price level.

*Question.* What is Germany's liability in the event of the sudden presentation of the large number of marks held abroad? And what cover has she against such liability?

#### 6. *The German Debt*

This is estimated at 197,000,000,000 M., of which 105,000,000,000 M. is floating. How can she keep such a floating debt afloat?

Her 1920 Budget appropriates only 12,000,000,000 M. a year for debt services: this represents only a fraction over 6 per cent. interest on her debt. How has she contrived to borrow so largely at such a low average rate?

#### 7. *Military Expenditure and Foreign Investments*

Before the war, in addition to her large military and naval expenditure, Germany invested about £100,000,000 annually abroad. Why are these amounts not now available for reparation?

#### *Main Conclusions*

1. The mark is heavily depreciated, and liable still to violent fluctuation. There is no possibility of estimating the amount which Germany can finally pay, until a definite and stable value can be assigned to the mark.

2. Stabilisation of the currency of other large European countries with which Germany trades is likewise necessary before any final estimate of Germany's true financial position can be made. This rather points to the advisability of conducting the internal [? international] conference regarding currency and finance at the same time as the Geneva Conference, and in relation to it. So long as the European currency position remains unstable and unregularised, nobody knows what is meant in speaking of francs, marks, lire and kronen.

3. There is a wide discrepancy between the high rates and low yield of German taxation. This is due mainly to (a) decrease of production, and (b) newness of the fiscal machine, both to those who pay taxes and those who collect. With time and careful handling, there should be substantial improvement both in production and in the yield of taxation. A cardinal point of taxation is to avoid synchronisation of increased taxation with increased indemnity payments: the former should always precede the latter—just as in England, in drink taxation, the retail price of drink was allowed to go up one year, and corresponding taxation only imposed in the year following.

The rate of tax levied this year is nominally much higher than last year or ever before. There will, therefore, be initial difficulties of collection, which will be got over in time. On the other hand, the estimated revenue represents in gold less than the pre-war tax revenue, and is, therefore, probably a smaller proportion of the total national income than before the war. This leads to

the hope that it may be possible to realise greatly improved returns as the initial difficulties of collection are overcome.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> In an unnumbered despatch from Warsaw on July 31 Lord D'Abernon suggested that it would be of great value if a detailed comparison of taxation in France, England, Germany, and America could be prepared with a view to discussions at the Geneva Conference.

No. 356

*Note from Earl Curzon<sup>1</sup> to the Belgian Ambassador*

[C 3111/8/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 10, 1920

Your Excellency,

With reference to Your Excellency's note No. 3712 of July 27th,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government consider the date of August 23rd proposed for the Geneva Conference by the Belgian Government would not allow sufficient time for the proper consideration of the result of the Spa Conference. His Majesty's Government therefore suggest September 20th as a more suitable date.

2. His Majesty's Government have nominated the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Laming Worthington-Evans as their representatives. Should the Belgian Government desire to maintain the nomination of the Belgian member of the Reparation Commission as one of the Belgian representatives, His Majesty's Government would feel bound to add the name of the British member of the Reparation Commission to the list of the British representatives, and there is little doubt that in such event the other governments concerned would desire to adopt a similar course. It is however to be feared that some inconvenience would be involved in thus making the principal members of the Reparation Commission national representatives on the Geneva Conference. The Reparation Commission is invested with an independent and semi-judicial character, which His Majesty's Government think it important in the interest of the treaty to maintain unimpaired.

3. I therefore suggest that instead of letting members of the Reparation Commission form part of the allied delegations at Geneva, the Commission might be represented at Geneva by subordinates, who would not be members of the Conference, but would be available to give advice and information.<sup>3</sup>

[I have, etc.,]<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The terms of this note were suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note informed Lord Curzon that M. Delacroix proposed fixing August 23 as the date of the Geneva Conference and that the Belgian Government had appointed as its representatives the Minister of the Interior (M. Jaspar) and M. Theunis, its delegate on the Reparation Commission.

<sup>3</sup> A note in similar terms was addressed by Lord Curzon to the Italian Ambassador on August 27.

<sup>4</sup> Signature lacking on filed copy.

No. 357

*Mr. Robertson (Coblenz) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)*

*No. 432 [C 4404/23/18]*

COBLENZ, August 18, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward to Your Lordship herewith Captain Georgi's Report on the Coal Situation in Occupied Territory for the fortnight ending August 15th, 1920.

I would venture to draw Your Lordship's special attention to the serious situation which is likely to be created in the Occupied Territory during the winter months as a result of Germany's efforts to carry out the Spa Agreement.<sup>1</sup> The inadequate supplies of coal, notably in the French occupied area, last winter were already a matter of serious concern to the High Commission. Should those supplies be still further decreased during the coming winter, as appears practically certain, widespread distress and discontent may result which will seriously affect the safety, maintenance and requirements of the Armies of Occupation.

I have, &c.,

ARNOLD ROBERTSON

<sup>1</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 194.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 357

*Report on the Coal Situation in Occupied Territory, August 15, 1920*

Supplies of fuel to Occupied Territory during the first half of the month of August have been on a considerably reduced scale as compared with last month. Complaints of coal shortage are reaching the High Commission daily from important gas works and other public utility concerns which have already used up their stocks and are living from hand to mouth. The town of Coblenz reports that they have two days' supply on hand and very little in sight. The town of Ems has no supply at all.

The present position is said to be the outcome of the Spa decisions. The Germans state that since the 1st of August they have been delivering to the Entente the amounts specified regardless of any consequences which such deliveries might have on their own home supplies, and Occupied Territory must take its chance with the rest of the country.

In Coal Report of the 30th July<sup>2</sup> the fact was mentioned that the German Authorities had met at Godesberg on July 24th in order to discuss the position of coal supplies to Occupied Territory as affected by the Spa decisions, and to endeavour to formulate some scheme of distribution to lay before the High Commission for its approval. The meeting in question was void of any result and another meeting was held in Berlin on the 12th of August at which it was finally decided that it was impossible at present to

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

formulate any scheme: the position being that the amount of coal which is left over after the demands made by the Entente have been satisfied will be distributed on a certain basis between consumers in Occupied and Unoccupied Germany exactly on the same basis. At the end of the month it is proposed to hold a further Conference at which the situation will be examined afresh on [*sic*] the light of the experience gained during the first few weeks of the new régime. The German Authorities say that they are quite unable to formulate any definite proposals as to coal distribution, as they do not know what amounts they can dispose of, neither do they know how much of the different classes and qualities of coal and fuel will be left over after the demands of the Entente have been duly met. The only matter which seems to have reached a solution is that of the apportioning of the deficiency between the different classes of consumers. The matter will be dealt with on the following basis:

*Railways.* The latter will be supplied as hitherto, but no additional quantities over and above their actual requirements will be delivered for putting into stock. Railway stocks at the present moment are approximately at a 25 or 30 days' standard.

*Gas, Water, Electricity.* It is laid down that gas, water and electricity works will be supplied as far as possible on the same scale as hitherto. So far as gas works are concerned the position is not bright as very little gas coal is now available for distribution on account of the exceptionally large demands made by the Reparation Commission for this class of coal. One may anticipate a very large number of complaints from gas works in the near future. The supply to water works should cause no trouble as most of the pumping is done electrically and little coal is actually used. In so far as electricity works are concerned it should also be noted that a large proportion of the current used in Occupied Territory (Cologne, Bonn, &c.) is supplied by stations erected in the vicinity of brown coal fields. How localities which are not so favourably situated will fare is a matter which will receive very careful consideration.

Domestic requirements will be curtailed still further, and it is proposed to issue brown coal briquettes instead of coal wherever possible; for the month of August it is anticipated that 100,000 tons of briquettes will be issued to householders in the place of coal, thus liberating 100,000 tons of coal for general purposes. Exports to neutrals are to be reduced by 96,000 tons per month, and supplies for general industrial purposes by 691,000 tons. These three items represent a figure of 887,000 tons available for meeting the extra demands for Reparations Coal. In addition it may be reckoned that about 120,000 tons, representing the quantities supplied to railways and other public utility concerns in July and in previous months over and above their requirements for the purpose of forming reserve stocks, will become available, as these surplus issues will now cease. We arrive in this way at a total of 1,007,000 tons which, added to the 1,000,000 tons or thereabouts delivered to Reparations account in July, brings up the amount of coal delivered to the Entente in August to 2,000,000 tons, the amount laid down at Spa. The

German policy at present is to satisfy all Entente requirements and with what is left meet their own. It seems that the opinion is gaining ground in responsible quarters that it will be impossible to maintain in the long run deliveries of Reparations Coal at the present rate. What the Germans appear to hold out for is that something or other will occur in the next two or three months which will enable them to press for a revision of the Spa Terms, and pending this they are carrying out the latter as an experiment in order to gauge exactly what the effect thereof will be in practice on their own economic situation.

As to how Occupied Germany will fare under the new conditions it is impossible to say. A letter dated 11th August was sent by the High Commission to the German Authorities pressing for the formation of stocks of fuel for the armies, railways, and public utility concerns, and in addition large permanent stocks in the Southern French Area. Only a comparatively small portion of this programme has actually been carried out and it is now too late to expect that the remainder will be completed, unless new terms in regard to the general supply of coal to Occupied Territory are imposed on the Germans. At the present moment it is impossible to discover with any degree of accuracy what supplies have arrived in Occupied Territory since the beginning of July, but there is no doubt that things have taken a turn for the worse during the last fortnight. The German authorities, *viz.*, the Verteilung[s]stelle and the representative of the Reichskommissar in Coblenz, claim that they have no figures available to enable them to compile accurate returns. As regards the probable quantities of coal and other fuel to be expected in Occupied Territory for August, one may assume that, provided everything goes well and no hitch of any description occurs, the following amounts will be supplied:—

*Essen Coal Syndicate*—430,000 tons as against approximately 700,000 tons, the average for the last four months.

*Aachen Coalfield*—50,000 tons—No change.

*Cologne Brown Coal Syndicate*—290,000 tons—No change.

A total of 770,000 tons or thereabouts as compared with over 1,000,000 tons in the past. The Germans state quite frankly that the figure of 770,000 tons will not be exceeded but may be reduced should unforeseen circumstances such as strikes, a further decrease in output or other incidents occur.

These figures show how deeply the position of Occupied Territory has been affected by the Spa decisions. The Germans, of course, intend to keep to the provisions of the Versailles Coal Agreement of August, 1919, and to treat Occupied Territory similarly to Unoccupied Territory in the matter of coal. As such an attitude, however justified it may be from a legal point of view, may have serious consequences on the safety, maintenance and requirements of the Armies of Occupation I addressed the following note to the Coal Committee, which note will be discussed on the 17th of August:—

‘I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the position of coal supplies to Occupied Territory. Reports from German sources are to the

effect that deliveries this month have been on a very reduced scale as compared even with last month. As a matter of fact stocks held by public utility and other concerns in Occupied Territory, instead of being built up to a 30 day figure, are being drawn upon in nearly every instance. Herr Jordan<sup>3</sup> informed me himself that stocks held by public utility concerns covered from 7 to 10 days' requirements at present. This may be true in some cases, but it should not be forgotten that what they were aiming at was to constitute stocks equivalent to 30 days' mid-winter requirements; whereas Herr Jordan refers to stocks covering mid-summer requirements, which are from 1/2 to 1/3 of the former. I would point out to the Committee that the Germans will hold that the supply of coal to Occupied Territory is governed by the Versailles Agreement of the 29th August, 1919, which stipulates that Occupied Territory shall receive the same treatment as Unoccupied Territory in the matter of coal. In other words the factor of satisfaction, to use an expression adopted by the Reparation Commission, is not to be worse in Occupied Territory than in Unoccupied. I would also remind the Coal Committee that the Reparation Commission undertook to supply the High Commission with figures and other statistics to enable the High Commission to ascertain whether the Germans were supplying Occupied Territory in an adequate and satisfactory manner. So far no information of any description has been received from the Reparation Commission. The High Commission cannot, therefore, express a definite opinion as to the relative treatment of Occupied Territory, as such an opinion can only be based on assurances and figures given by the Germans themselves.

'In my opinion the Spa Coal Agreement was drawn up without any regard to the requirements of Occupied Territory, and without considering for a moment how the said decision would affect supplies to Occupied Territory and incidentally the safety, maintenance and requirements of the Armies of Occupation. There is no doubt that it would have been advisable if the High Commission had been represented at these discussions.

'It is clear to my mind that some modification of the Versailles Protocol of the 29th August, 1919 is necessary at present. The High Commission should lay down that a certain minimum quantity of fuel is required for use in Occupied Territory to ensure the safety, maintenance and requirements of the Armies of Occupation. What this amount of fuel should be cannot be stated offhand as its determination will require a certain amount of consideration, but it strikes me as illogical that the Germans should be in a position to cut down our supplies of fuel by 30% without any consideration having to be given to the safety, requirements and maintenance of the Armies of Occupation, simply because they are governed by an Agreement which was drawn up when conditions were totally different to [*sic*] what they are to-day. I may say that the amount of fuel to be allotted to Occupied Territory is still under consideration by the Germans, but from information derived from very reliable sources, a

<sup>3</sup> Delegate of the German Coal Commission in Occupied Territory.



reduction of 30% on the June or July figures is to be expected. Considering that we have been none too well supplied with fuel in the past such a reduction may have very serious consequences. In particular the Germans are delivering no gas coal alleging that deliveries to the Entente of gas coal are so large that very little is left over for home consumption.

'I should also like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the German Verteilungs[s]telle in Cologne supplies little useful information to the Commission, and what little information it does supply is generally several weeks old. I refer in particular to returns of deliveries actually made to points in Occupied Territory. I suggest that in view of the fact that the Germans are curtailing their deliveries drastically at present, and, furthermore, pretend that they cannot give particulars of deliveries for some 6 or 8 weeks after they have been carried out, that [*sic*] the Coal Committee should send a representative to be stationed at the Verteilung[s]-stelle at Cologne, at any rate for the next month or so, whose duty it would be to forward each day to the Commission a return of deliveries made to Occupied Territory, and supply the Commission with all information it may require.

'If a measure of this description is not adopted I am afraid that we shall lay ourselves open to unpleasant surprises.'

The British Department will press for an immediate settlement of this question, as with the Autumn and winter approaching it is dangerous to take risks especially in view of the fact that a very large proportion of the coal which, in the ordinary course of events, would have gone to build up winter stocks, is now being despatched as Reparation Coal. . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The remainder of the Report discussed specific aspects of the coal situation such as the position in the Aachen and Ruhr coalfields, the problem of nationalization, and questions of transport.

## No. 358

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 3, 8.30 a.m.)*

*No. 1057 Telegraphic [C 5472/8/18]*

PARIS, September 2, 1920, 8.36 p.m.

Paris telegram No. 1050.<sup>1</sup>

Note just received from Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

'It does not appear to President of the Council possible now to contemplate meeting Geneva Conference on the date suggested (September 20th). Brussels Conference<sup>2</sup> is to begin work on September 24th: it has already

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The International Financial Conference convened by the League of Nations met at Brussels from September 24 to October 8. For this Conference see *International Financial Conference Brussels 1920* (League of Nations, Brussels, 1920).

been adjourned twice and it would be most inconvenient to postpone it again. Moreover many representatives whose presence at Brussels is indispensable would be retained at Geneva. On the other hand now that all problems regarding Germany have been eliminated from Brussels programme, there is no longer any reason why Geneva meeting should precede that of Brussels.<sup>1</sup>

In view of above I await Your Lordship's instructions regarding both Conferences before pressing for Geneva Conference to meet on September 24th (see your telegram No. 968<sup>1</sup> and Mr. Henderson's No. 1058).<sup>2</sup>

Copy of note by bag to-night.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In the Foreign Office the number was corrected to 1056.

### No. 359

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 976 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 5472/8/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 3, 1920, 4.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 1057 (of September 2nd:<sup>1</sup> Geneva Conference).

Please inform French Government that Belgian, German and Italian Governments have now consented to Geneva Conference being held on September 24th: and that we understand French Government's sole reason for desiring postponement to be that French personnel for Brussels and Geneva Conferences will be in part identical.

Reparation Commission in return for deposit by German Government of German Treasury bills maturing 1st May 1921 in exchange for Spa coal advances due 1st September 1920, promised German Government on August 29th<sup>2</sup> that whole subject of these advances would be discussed at Geneva together with general subject of reparation and that Geneva Conference would be expedited so that matter might be regulated before 1st October 1920 when next advances fall due.

His Majesty's Government feel it incumbent on them therefore to press for date proposed—September 24th and they trust that French Government will be able to arrange for different persons to represent them at Brussels and at Geneva. In the last resort Brussels Agenda could perhaps be arranged in such a way that subjects in which French experts engaged at Geneva were interested, would be dealt with towards close of Brussels Conference.

Please urge French Government most strongly to agree and endeavour to telephone reply this evening.

<sup>1</sup> No. 358.

<sup>2</sup> See Nos. 362, § 2, and 366 below.

No. 360

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 7, 10.40 a.m.,  
No. 1068 Telegraphic [C 5705/8/18])*

*Very secret*

PARIS, September 6, 1920, 8.40 p.m.

My telegram No. 1066 of September 5th.<sup>1</sup>

Monsieur Paléologue<sup>2</sup> presided over Ambassadors' Conference today and before the meeting I pressed him to give me an answer with regard to date for German [*sic*] Conference. He informed me I should get official answer tonight or tomorrow morning but privately he told me that French Government would not agree to date and that moreover they had received energetic protest from United States Government against Geneva Meeting and also that Belgian Government had made important reservations. I will telegraph you text of answer as soon as received but I think you can take it as definite that Geneva Conference cannot be held on September 24th if French participation is essential.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

No. 361

*Sir John Bradbury (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain<sup>1</sup>*

[C 6533/8/18]

PARIS, September 8, 1920

My dear Chancellor,

You will no doubt by this time have received through diplomatic channels a joint representation from the Belgian and French Prime Ministers for the postponement of the Geneva Conference and the reference of the examination of the German indemnity question to the Reparation Commission.

Colonel Theunis has been vigorously canvassing the members of the Commission to give strong support to this proposal in advising their own Governments. Signor Bertolini tells me that he has cabled to Rome that, while he would not himself have felt justified in initiating such a proposal, he is inclined to give it his personal support, having regard to the difficulties which the French Government experience in taking part in a Geneva Conference, unless his own Government, for reasons of their own or by reason of objections which may be entertained by the British Government, see political reasons to the contrary.

I have told Theunis that I regard the matter as one to be settled directly by the Governments, and that I doubt very much whether my advice, if I were to give it, would carry any very great weight; further, that I am by no means satisfied on merits that the proposal would have any practical results,

<sup>1</sup> This letter, communicated by the Treasury, was received in the Foreign Office on September 17.

except further delay, and destruction of whatever prestige may still remain to the Commission.

It seems to me that the suggestion, if adopted, will be stamped on its face as a mere temporising expedient, with the result that the Germans and the Commission are hardly likely to get to serious grips in any discussions which may take place between them. If the discussion is to be confined to an examination by the Commission of any proposals which the Germans may put forward and to reporting thereon to the Governments (or perhaps not even directly to the Governments, but to a future Geneva Conference, which, in its turn, will have to report to the Governments) it is very unlikely that the Germans will put forward any proposals which the Commission would not have to reject summarily as quite inadequate. If, on the other hand, the Commission attempted to confine the discussion to 'principles' I doubt very much whether we should be able to add anything to Article 3 of 'The Monster'.<sup>2</sup>

The gossip here is that Deschanel is almost on the point of resigning the presidency of the Republic, and that Millerand expects to be his successor, always supposing that, in the meantime, he does not quarrel any further with French public opinion in regard to the indemnity question. On this basis, it would obviously be very convenient to Millerand to find an expedient for shelving the Geneva Conference for the moment, and leaving his successor, as Prime Minister, to liquidate his commitments of Spa—but whether that would suit *us* equally well is quite a different question.

I had a long talk with Boyden this morning. He is inclined at the moment to support the Franco-Belgian proposal, though not so much, I think, on its merits as on the strength of the general instructions he has had from the American Government to work for having reparation matters left as far as possible to the Reparation Commission.

He quite agrees with my view that anything like a fruitful discussion of figures with the Germans by the Commission at this stage is out of the question, but he hopes that, if the matter is referred to the Commission now, that reference would result in a definite recommendation to the Allied Governments to fix the indemnity on the basis of German capacity to pay, instead of on the basis of a valuation of damages in accordance with the Treaty, and he seems to think that the formal recognition of this principle by a body like the Reparation Commission would represent substantial progress.

This does not impress me very much, as we have already all got as far as this, even in M. Millerand's published declarations, and the principle seems to me to be clearly established in the spirit, if not in the actual wording, of Article 3 of 'The Monster' itself.

Another reason in favour of an immediate conference between the Germans and Representatives of the Allied Governments with full powers is to be

<sup>2</sup> This is possibly a reference to the *Agreement between the Allies for the settlement of certain questions as to the Application of the Treaties of Peace and Complementary Agreements with Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, signed at Spa, July 16, 1920* (Cmd. 1615 of 1922).

found in the position in which the German food and clothing advances under the Spa Protocol has [*sic*] been left. The Germans at Spa proposed that these advances should be merged in the total of the German Reparation obligation. The Allies would not have this in the Agreement, but M. Delacroix said that the modality of repayment would be settled in connection with reparation discussions.

In accordance with the Inter-Allied Agreement at Spa, we have asked the Germans for bonds repayable on 1st May, 1921. They have given us these under protest for the September advances on the understanding that the whole question will be discussed at the Geneva Conference before the end of September, and if such discussion does not take place the Allies will be put in a very difficult position unless they are prepared to agree to add the total of the advances to the reparation obligation as the Germans originally proposed—a course to which, I think, strong objection would be taken by the French, and possibly also by ourselves.

Whether of course you are in a position to press for the holding of the Geneva Conference in spite of the French opposition I do not know, and if it should prove to be necessary to accept the Franco-Belgian proposal I shall of course do what I can to make the best of the situation.

I gather that Theunis' own view is that not very much is to be expected from the reference to the Reparation Commission, but that it is impossible for the French Government now to take part in a Geneva Conference, while it may be possible for them to do so when the Reparation Commission has tried and failed. As against this, I am disposed to think that, apart from any change in French sentiment which might result from the League of Nations Conference at Brussels—in my opinion a very remote contingency—it would be much more difficult to hold a possible successor of Millerand to Millerand's pledges at a future date than it is to hold Millerand himself now, more particularly since, after the discussion with the Reparation Commission, the Poincaré-Tardieu school will almost certainly be in a position to point to the proposals which the Germans have made to the Reparation Commission as evidence of their unwillingness to put forward any reasonable proposals at all.

In writing the above, I am quite conscious of the fact that I have probably got hold of only half the story, but it may be useful to you to know how the position strikes me from this side, and, in any case, I am bound to let you know that some of my colleagues are anxious to support the Franco-Belgian proposal.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BRADBURY

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 10, 4.10 p.m.)*

*No. 1078 Telegraphic [C 6081/8/18]*

*Most urgent*

PARIS, September 10, 1920, 1.30 p.m.

My telegram 1068.<sup>1</sup>

Note just received from Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated yesterday as follows:—

Conferences of Brussels and Geneva cannot be simultaneous, for nature of agenda for both, and necessity for avoiding slightest divergence of policy or interpretation between French representatives, render it imperative for French Government to be represented by the same delegates at the two meetings. There can be no question of postponing Brussels Conference again and there is not sufficient time for Geneva Conference to meet before September 24th. Proposal at Spa on July 16th was for a Conference to meet at Geneva within two or three weeks; six weeks have passed and so it was to be presumed proposal had been dropped.

This is not the only, or even the chief reason which French Government invoke to justify views expressed in their Note of September 2nd,<sup>2</sup> for:—

(1) It is very doubtful whether in present disposition of German Government, a favourable result could be expected from discussion with their delegates at Geneva. Tendencies revealed in Germany by recent incidents and by statements of members of Government indicate intention to seek all possible opportunities of evading Treaty of Versailles and escaping from a burden which is alleged to be intolerable. The summoning of a Conference at which Allied and German delegates would meet to settle a question arising out of Treaty would afford just such an opportunity as it is important, in the general interest, *not* to give to Germany.

(2) Meeting of a Conference such as that proposed at Geneva does not appear consonant with views of some of the Governments concerned. On August 27th United States delegate on Reparation Commission communicated to his colleagues [in] formal protest against Inter-Allied Agreement of Spa, which his Government considered incompatible with provisions of Versailles Treaty.<sup>3</sup> Belgian President of the Council has informed Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he agrees with Belgian delegate on Reparation Commission in thinking it desirable to re-establish that Commission in its true role and to avoid or postpone Geneva Conference, thus: let Reparation Commission summon German Delegation to Paris and ask it for proposals prepared by German Government for Geneva Conference, and study these proposals at its Headquarters more profitably than could be done in the hurry and agitation of a special meeting held far off, and let members of the Commission then refer to their respective Governments. Rôle and prerogatives assigned to Reparation Commission by Treaty would thus be preserved; Commission is already engaged in work of this kind (direct relations with German Government for the purpose of executing Spa Protocol respecting coal).

<sup>1</sup> No. 360.

<sup>2</sup> No. 358.

<sup>3</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii, pp. 421-2.

French Government wish to take account of opinion of United States Government, and concur in views of Belgian Government.

According to precise information from a good source, moreover, Reparation Commission did not on August 29th give German Government any such promise as that mentioned in your telegram No. 976;<sup>4</sup> nor was it in a position to give such promise in return for deposit by German Government of Treasury Bills maturing May 1st 1921, and in exchange for coal advances due September 1st next. Germans receive advances in exchange for coal, and in return for advances deposit Bills. This operation is self-sufficient and 'the circuit is closed'; Reparation Commission has only to settle with Germans details of execution and has nothing to add. In point of fact there is no such provision in Convention (text of which was agreed to between Reparation Commission and German Government) on the subject of first monthly advance for deliveries of coal.<sup>5</sup>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs feel sure that above considerations will cause His Majesty's Government to recognise that French Government have good reasons for maintaining conclusions stated in their Note of September 2nd, and they hope His Majesty's Government will be convinced, after re-examination of the matter, that procedure suggested above is entirely advantageous.

Copy of Note<sup>6</sup> by bag to-night.

<sup>4</sup> No. 359.

<sup>5</sup> See enclosure in No. 366 below.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

### No. 363

*Mr. Parr (Brussels) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)*

*No. 650 [C 6367/8/18]*

BRUSSELS, September 10, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that on his return from France, Monsieur Delacroix gave an interview to one of the Brussels papers on the subject of his negotiations with Monsieur Millerand.<sup>1</sup>

He stated that both he and Monsieur Millerand had been able to arrive at an agreement on the questions of the hour and that he hoped that Great Britain and Italy would adhere to their point of view.

As regards the Russo-Polish question their views were in complete harmony. Neither France nor Belgium would ever recognize the Government of the Soviets. France would use her preponderating influence in Poland with a view to hastening the conclusion of peace.

Monsieur Delacroix then proceeded to give certain explanations in regard to the question of reparations. He stated that there were two points of view. France, on the one hand, holding to the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, considered that it was the business of the Reparations Commission sitting at

<sup>1</sup> M. Delacroix had met M. Millerand in Paris on September 4.

Paris to discuss the question of reparations with the Germans. The formula suggested at Spa of discussing the matter at Geneva, at a Conference at which Germany would be represented, did not smile either on Monsieur Millerand or on the French Senate which had given an unfavourable opinion thereon. England, on the other hand, considered that the Conference proposed at Spa was the best means of reaching a solution. Monsieur Delacroix himself had, however, suggested a compromise (*une proposition transactionnelle*) to which Monsieur Millerand had agreed, and which was as follows:—

The Reparations Commission would sit at Paris and would hear the German delegates. The heads of the Allied countries would meet at Geneva towards the 15th of October to examine the proposals of the Reparations Commission. They would eventually decide whether the Germans should be invited to take part in this Conference.

Monsieur Delacroix stated that Monsieur Millerand would submit the above proposal to Mr. Lloyd George and Monsieur Giolitti and it was hoped that they would agree to this procedure.

It is announced today that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate has been summoned to meet in the middle of next week to hear from the Prime Minister the results of his interview with Monsieur Millerand.

I have, &c.,

R. C. PARR

#### No. 364

*Earl Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington)*

*No. 732 Telegraphic [C 6081/8/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 11, 1920, 7 p.m.*

Paris telegram No. 1078 (of September 10th:<sup>1</sup> Geneva Conference).

In accordance with the decision of the Spa Conference to refer the reparation question to a special commission at Geneva composed of 'two delegates from each delegation' we proposed to French, Italian, Belgian and German Governments on August 31st that Geneva Conference should be held on September 24th. Italian, Belgian and German Governments consented: but French Government, whilst agreeing to be represented at this Conference in manner similar to His Majesty's Government, replied that the date proposed was impossible for them as it was identical with that chosen for the financial conference of Brussels, which many of their Geneva delegates would have to attend.

When we pressed them to reconsider this decision, urging the necessity of arriving at Geneva at a settlement of the Allied monetary advances to Germany under the Spa Coal Agreement, they replied by note substance of which is contained in Paris telegram No. 1078.

The policy, which they now propose, runs entirely contrary to the policy which the Allies have been endeavouring to carry out since the San Remo

<sup>1</sup> No. 362.



Conference and which consists, as you know, in trying as far as possible to obtain German co-operation in the execution of the Treaty by means of direct exchange of views between the Allied Governments and the German Government.

We had always believed that the United States Government were in complete sympathy with this policy and we are therefore at a loss to understand the reasons for the conduct of the American delegate to the Reparation Commission reported in Lord Derby's telegram No. 1078.

We should accordingly be grateful if you would make enquiries at the State Department explaining the position as above.<sup>2</sup> Please telegraph result of these enquiries as soon as possible.

Repeated to Paris No. 996, by bag.

Repeated to Rome No. 420 Berlin No. 305 and Brussels No. 150.

<sup>2</sup> For the resulting British memorandum to the State Department see . . . *Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii, pp. 435-7.

### No. 365

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 995 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6081/8/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 11, 1920*

Your telegram No. 1078 (of September 10th:<sup>1</sup> Geneva Conference) was considered by the Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law<sup>2</sup> and Lord Hardinge this morning.

It was felt that the policy defined by the French Government is in complete contradiction to that which was accepted by the Conference at Spa at its final meeting on July 16th: and it was thought that it will probably be necessary to address a protest to the French Government and to inform them that their proposal that the Reparation Commission should summon a German delegate to Paris cannot be accepted.

The whole question will however be first considered by Lord Curzon and Sir L. Worthington-Evans on September 13th at 12 o'clock,<sup>3</sup> before instructions as to any communication which Your Excellency should make to the French Government are sent to you.

Repeated to Berlin, Rome, Brussels and Washington [as No. 734].

<sup>1</sup> No. 362.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Privy Seal.

<sup>3</sup> This meeting appears to have taken place on September 14; see No. 373 below.

### No. 366

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)*

*No. 2899 [C 6213/8/18]*

PARIS, *September 11, 1920*

My Lord,

Your Lordship will have observed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the penultimate paragraph of their note of September 9 enclosed in my

despatch No. 2886 of September 10<sup>1</sup> respecting the projected Conference at Geneva on reparation by Germany, contest the accuracy of the statement in the second paragraph of Your Lordship's telegram No. 976 of September 3,<sup>2</sup> regarding the promise made by the Reparation Commission to the German Government on August 29.

With a view of obtaining for Your Lordship with the least possible delay a full statement of the facts, I have consulted the British Delegate on the Reparation Commission on the subject; and I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum furnished to me by Sir J. Bradbury, giving a detailed account of what actually passed between the Reparation Commission and the President of the German Kriegslastenkommission, and commenting on the arguments used in the above-mentioned note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.,  
DERBY

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see No. 362.

<sup>2</sup> No. 359.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 366

*Memorandum by Sir J. Bradbury concerning arrangements for coal advances*

In the discussion between the representatives of the Reparation Commission and Herr Bergmann, President of the Kriegslastenkommission, on the subject of the coal advances to be made on September 1st, objection was taken by Herr Bergmann to the request that the bonds should be made repayable on the 1st May 1921, on the ground that it had been definitely stated by Monsieur Delacroix at Spa that the question of repayment would be regulated at the discussions which were shortly to take place in regard to the Reparation problem generally at Geneva.

The representatives of the Reparation Commission pointed out that as such discussions must necessarily take place before the date of maturity proposed for the bonds, the interests of the German Government were amply safeguarded. Herr Bergmann, however, said that he understood that some of the Allied Governments desired to negotiate the bonds upon the market, and it would obviously place the German Government in a very difficult position if bonds maturing at a definite early date could get into the hands of persons whose direct interest in the maintenance of German credit was less than that of the Allied Governments. After considerable discussion Herr Bergmann consented to give bonds for the September advance only maturing on 1st May 1921, upon the lending governments agreeing not to put these bonds in circulation before an agreement was concluded for the subsequent monthly advances, provided that if such an agreement had not been concluded before the 30th September 1920 the lending governments should have the power to call for repayment of the bonds on the 1st December 1920.

The wording of this clause in the agreement would, of course, be satisfied either by a general settlement of the reparation problem at a Conference such as that proposed to be held at Geneva, or by a specific agreement between

the Allied Powers and Germany in relation to the coal advances alone, and if a decision is taken to postpone the Geneva Conference, the Germans will have no ground for complaint if the Allied Governments consent to an arrangement in regard to the bonds not less favourable to Germany than the German Government could expect from the general discussion, e.g. that the bonds should be made repayable out of the proceeds of deliveries in kind to the Reparation Commission under the Peace Treaty, which would have to be made to the Reparation Commission in any case and would otherwise be applied to the cost of Armies of Occupation and general reparation purposes.

The representatives of the Reparation Commission did not, of course, give to Herr Bergmann any pledge that the Geneva Conference would be held before the 30th September, or at all. They merely assumed that, as it had been promised that the Conference should be held about three weeks after the end of the Spa meeting, any considerable further delay was out of the question, recognising at the same time that the difficulties which had arisen in connection with the coal advances made an early meeting with the Germans either at Geneva or elsewhere imperative.

The argument in the penultimate paragraph of Monsieur Paléologue's note of the 9th September, that the functions of the Commission in regard to the coal advances were merely executive, *viz*: obtaining bonds due 1st May 1921 from the Germans in exchange for the advances, ignores the fact that not only did the Germans at Spa not give any undertaking to give such bonds in exchange for the advances, but had actually received a promise from Monsieur Delacroix that the method of repayment of the advances should be settled by agreement with the Allies as a part of the regulation of the Reparation question generally. In view of this, it was clearly impossible, without a breach of faith, to ask the Germans to give bonds constituting a separate obligation payable on a specific date, independent of, and in addition to, the general reparation liability, without at the same time consenting to arrangements which would safeguard their legitimate expectations under Monsieur Delecroix' [*sic*] promise.

This was secured (1) by making the bonds non-negotiable until the general agreement had been arrived at, and (2) by limiting the arrangement to the first advance and enabling the Germans to raise the question anew when the time comes for the second advance, at the end of this month.

No. 367

*Sir J. Bradbury (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain<sup>1</sup>*

[C 6534/8/18]

*Secret*

REPARATION COMMISSION, PARIS, September 11, 1920

My dear Chancellor,

The Embassy has sent me the correspondence between the British and French Governments in regard to the proposed postponement of the Geneva

<sup>1</sup> Communicated by the Treasury, and received in the Foreign Office on September 17.

Conference, and I am writing to Blackett by this mail on the subject of the relation between the arrangements for the coal advances and the date of the Conference with regard to which some misunderstanding seems to have arisen.

As regards the general question, I think it is pretty clear that Millerand has resolved to shelve the Conference for the moment at all costs. The Delacroix proposal seems to have been put forward at Millerand's instigation, probably in consideration for concessions made by France to Belgium in regard to some of the other matters recently discussed between the two Prime Ministers. From what one sees in the French and Belgian press, I do not gather that they have gone so far as to agree to tell quite the same story. Theunis tells me, and the extracts from the Brussels papers bear him out, that Delacroix's idea is to hold the Geneva Conference on very much the bases originally agreed immediately after Brussels, and the preliminary examination by the Reparation Commission is introduced merely as a device for saving the French face from which no practical results are expected. Millerand's press satellites, on the other hand, are saying that it is quite impossible for the Allied Ministers to meet the Germans at all, while the latter are in the present temper, and the time has come for revising the mistaken policy begun at San Remo, etc., etc.

The French official note to our Embassy of 9th instant<sup>2</sup> and the French press both make a most unfair controversial use of Boyden's 'protest' to the Reparation Commission against the Spa Agreement. The reason of that protest was the idea which the United States Government and Boyden had in their minds that the Allied Governments were attempting to vary their Treaty agreement with Germany by agreements between themselves to which Germany was not a party and to impose on the Reparation Commission, by instructions given to their Delegates on the Commission, methods of valuation prejudicial to German interests in cases in which the Treaty required the valuations to be made by the Commission acting in a judicial capacity. The United States, so far from at any time raising objection to direct discussion between the Allied Governments and the German Government for the purposes of fixing the Reparation liability, have always done everything in their power to encourage such procedure. In point of fact, Boyden's protest was based on a misapprehension—plausible enough in view of the unfortunate drafting of parts of the document—of the real purpose and effect of the Spa Inter-Allied Agreement. The explanations which I was able to give to the Commission from the notes sent me by Blackett and Worthington-Evans entirely disposed of his scruples, and yesterday he expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with the resolution, accepting the agreement, which I moved in the Commission, and gave his unofficial vote in favour of it.

I do not, of course, know how hard you are going to press the French for an early Geneva Conference, but I imagine that a certain amount of postponement at any rate is now inevitable. Assuming that you postpone it until the date suggested in Brussels (15 October), the question arises whether you

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see No. 362.

should also agree to the preliminary enquiry and hearing of the Germans by the Reparation Commission, or make it a postponement pure and simple. Personally, I am still disposed to think that postponement pure and simple, and as short as possible, is the better policy. I would certainly not recommend you to agree to a reference to the Reparation Commission emphasising 'the whole Treaty and nothing but the Treaty' idea, but if an open reference could be obtained it is just possible that the preliminary examination might have some utility. All the members of the Reparation Commission, except the French, are very much nearer to the British than the French point of view in regard to the reparation problem, and the French representatives on the Commission are probably at least more liberal as [? than] Millerand himself,—which means a good deal more liberal than the doctrines which Millerand is forced to preach in the Chamber; and assuming that Millerand has come to the conclusion that abatements must be made from the extreme French nationalist point of view it would probably suit him very well that the odium for the initiative should be incurred by the Commission. Also, for reasons to which I referred in my last letter, the political motives against any appearance of weakening at the present moment may not be so operative in four or five weeks' time.

If, therefore, the matter went to the Reparation Commission with an open reference, it is not inconceivable that we should find our French colleagues less intractable than one would have been inclined to expect. On the other hand, however hopeful such a procedure might have been before San Remo when our Government proposed it and it was blocked by Poincaré, the Commission has now lost so much prestige as the result of subsequent events that I am doubtful whether we should get proposals from the Germans of a kind on which we could base useful recommendations. All the same, the choice being between evils, it is possible that this may be the least.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BRADBURY

No. 368

*Sir A. Geddes (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13, 9.50 a.m.)*

*No. 628 Telegraphic [C 6183/8/18]*

*Very urgent*

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1920<sup>1</sup>

Your telegrams Nos. 732<sup>2</sup> and 734<sup>3</sup> and 735.<sup>4</sup>

For meeting between Secretary of State<sup>5</sup> and Sir L. Worthington-Evans at 12 noon on September 13th.

I discussed the position disclosed with Secretary of State to-day.

He asks me to say that he regards the talk we had which took place at

<sup>1</sup> The time of despatch is not recorded.

<sup>2</sup> No. 364.

<sup>3</sup> No. 365.

<sup>4</sup> No. 362, which was repeated by the Foreign Office to Washington as No. 735.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. Lord Curzon. See also No. 365, n. 3.

Embassy as preliminary but he himself suggested that I should not delay to inform you by cable that he personally (and he believes President also) is fully in sympathy with British desire to obtain German co-operation in execution of Treaty by means of direct exchange of views between Allied and Associated Governments on one hand and German Government on the other hand.

Mr. Colby says he does not understand what authority American Delegates could believe themselves to have had to take action reported in Paris telegram No. 1078.<sup>4</sup>

He has definitely undertaken to consult President to-morrow and if President agrees, as he has no doubt he will, to send clear instructions to American Representatives at Paris to the effect that they are to co-operate with British Representatives in carrying out the policy designed to bring Germany back to comity of Nations with a view to securing her co-operation in execution of Treaty.

I personally believe him to be sincere and have no doubt that we are here dealing, as in Teschen case, with department instructions issued without knowledge of Political Heads of State Department on authority of Mr. Hugh Gibson.<sup>6</sup> (See my telegram No. 563.)<sup>7</sup>

As a general observation applicable to the whole of the field of European affairs Mr. Colby said that America has no desire to be lined up with France or to *appear* to be lined up with France in her Policy with regard to Europe or Asia Minor.

He stated definitely that his Polish note<sup>8</sup> had been mis-interpreted and that he regarded France as militaristic and imperialistic and at the same time absurdly full of fear and that he would do everything in his power to secure hearty co-operation with us in any broad and sane policy designed to secure Peace and renewed commercial prosperity in Europe.

Now that Mr. Hugh Gibson has been got out of State Department and despatched to Poland it is more likely that Secretary of State will be able to secure practical results in conformity with his intentions and aspirations.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Gibson had been temporarily on the staff of the State Department.

<sup>7</sup> No. 526 below.

<sup>8</sup> This note of August 21, 1920, is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. iii, pp. 391-2.

## No. 369

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 14)*

*No. 1089 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6257/8/18]*

PARIS, September 13, 1920

Geneva Conference. Your telegram No. 995 of September 11.<sup>1</sup> President of Council is reported in press today as having made following statement to journalists at Aix yesterday after conversation with Monsieur Giolitti:—

<sup>1</sup> No. 365.

'Geneva Conference was decided on at Spa on July 16 last but has not yet been held. Today it is impossible, even from a practical point of view only, to hold it before the Brussels financial conference of September 24. On the other hand, Belgium and France have displayed their interest in the Reparation Commission resuming its rôle of examining these questions; the Governments will subsequently have to see what they have to do. Monsieur Giolitti has made no objection to this view.'

The above statement is favourably commented on by the press as indicating that Monsieur Millerand has succeeded in bringing Monsieur Giolitti as well as Monsieur Delacroix round to the French as against the British point of view in regard to execution of Treaty of Versailles by means of direct discussion between Allies and Germans.

### No. 370

*Earl Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington)*

*No. 743 Telegraphic [C 6409/8/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 14, 1920, 10.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 628 (of September 12th.<sup>1</sup> Geneva Conference).

Please report as soon as possible whether instructions have in fact been sent to American representative on Reparation Commission to dispel misunderstanding and to make it clear that policy of French Government as regards postponement of Geneva Conference can expect no support from the United States Government.

Repeated to Paris, No. 1007.

<sup>1</sup> No. 368.

### No. 371

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard (Rome)*

*No. 430 Telegraphic [C 6409/8/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 14, 1920, 10.30 p.m.*

Paris telegram No. 1089 (of September 13th.<sup>1</sup> Geneva Conference).

You should inform Italian Government that we have seen this report with surprise. We feel sure that it does not accurately express considered view of Italian Government, but we should be glad to be reassured as soon as possible. Please communicate to Italian Government the substance of Paris telegram No. 1078 of September 10th<sup>2</sup> and say that we are considering a protest to the French Government. We agree, however, that Geneva Conference must now be postponed for practical reasons until termination of financial conference at Brussels.

Repeated to Paris No. 1008.

<sup>1</sup> No. 369.

<sup>2</sup> No. 362.

No. 372

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Parr (Brussels)*

*No. 153 Telegraphic [C 6409/8/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 14, 1920, 10.30 p.m.*

Paris telegram No. 1078 (of September 10th.<sup>1</sup> Geneva Conference).

Please enquire whether views of Belgian Government are in fact as stated, and, if so, what are the reasons for this surprising change of front. You should say that we have received the above information with much astonishment, since it appears to indicate that, without giving us any warning, they have abandoned the policy which was agreed to by Allied Governments at Spa, and to which Belgian Government are peculiarly pledged since M. Delacroix presided over the meeting at which the compromise with the Germans embodied in the arrangement for a Conference at Geneva was accepted. It does not seem likely that the mere desire to show complacency to the French can have been responsible for a change of attitude which, if welcome to one Ally, must certainly be equally distasteful to another.

If there is any misunderstanding, we are anxious that it should be cleared up without delay, since we are about to address protest to French Government on the subject. We have reason also to think that attitude of American Government has been misrepresented, and that her delegates at Paris acted without authority.

You should say to Belgian Government that, while we accept postponement of Geneva Conference until after the Brussels financial conference as inevitable for practical reasons, we cannot agree to abandonment of policy which all accepted at Spa.

Repeated to Paris No. 1006 and to Washington No. 742.

<sup>1</sup> No. 362.

No. 373

*Memorandum on the Geneva Conference by Mr. Waterlow*

*[C 6409/8/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 14, 1920*

The situation created by the communication from the French Government, reported in Lord Derby's telegram, No. 1078 of September 10,<sup>1</sup> was considered at a meeting held in the Secretary of State's room this morning at which Sir L. Worthington-Evans was present.

It was decided that an attempt should be made, by means of a vigorous protest, to hold the French Government to the policy agreed upon at Spa; but that, in the first instance, the Belgian Government should be asked to explain their conduct in going back on a policy for which they were pecu-

<sup>1</sup> No. 362.



liarily responsible at Spa. When the reply of the Belgian Government has been received, and when further particulars have reached us of the action taken by the United States Government, as foreshadowed in Sir A. Geddes' telegram No. 628,<sup>2</sup> representations should be made to the French Government. As regards the form which those representations should take, it was agreed that a postponement of the Geneva conference until after the international financial conference at Brussels should be accepted as inevitable for practical reasons, that it should be pointed out that there is no evidence for the contention of the French Government that Germany is showing a disposition to evade the treaty and that the claim of the French Government that they are supported by the United States Government is untenable. On this latter point Sir L. Worthington-Evans reported that, as appeared from an explanation contained in a private letter from Sir John Bradbury to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,<sup>3</sup> there had in fact been an unofficial American protest, but that it was based upon the mistaken notion that the allied Governments had at Spa imposed fresh liabilities on Germany without consulting the United States Government.

S. P. WATERLOW

<sup>2</sup> No. 368.

<sup>3</sup> No. 367.

#### No. 374

*Mr. Parr (Brussels) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16, 10.30 a.m.)*

*No. 107 Telegraphic [C 6519/8/18]*

BRUSSELS, September 15, 1920, 8.45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 153.<sup>1</sup>

I have made desired representation to Belgian Prime Minister who explained to me attitude of Belgian Government at some length.

Main reason for proposal which he made at Paris was his firm conviction that present French Government would never hold to Geneva Conference—'Ils n'iraient jamais à Genève'. He stated that French public opinion was so much against it that it would mean fall of Monsieur Millerand's Government and accession to power of Monsieur Poincaré. He felt sure that if Mr. Lloyd George had been in Paris he would have arrived at the same conclusion. It was on account of this conviction that he had proposed to Monsieur Millerand idea of discussion of proposal of German Delegates before Reparation Commission in Paris as an alternative or at any rate a preliminary to Geneva Conference. He added that Commission could if necessary be strengthened by presence of Cabinet Ministers for each of countries represented thereupon, and that findings of Commission could if necessary be referred to a Conference later on.

He had offered to make proposal himself to other Allied Governments but

<sup>1</sup> No. 372.

Monsieur Millerand had said that he himself would suggest it to British and Italian Governments.

Prime Minister then proceeded to point out that he had been solely guided by desire to prevent rupture between British and French Governments which he considered would be a catastrophe. He said that French Government would act alone rather than go to Geneva and that they would certainly occupy Ruhr basin. England would naturally protest and 'La Belgique se trouverai(t) dans un(e) position très embarrassant(e).'

He stated that question of reparation was a matter of great import both to Belgium and France and that attitude of French Government was due to the fact that they knew that they would have to accept a much lower figure than had so far been promised them and that if this were announced as a result of Geneva Conference there would be an outcry in France, whereas a decision taken by Reparation Commission would not have same effect. He considered that Reparation Commission were empowered to deal with matter adding 'We rather sat upon the Reparation Commission at Spa.'<sup>2</sup>

I took first opportunity to point out to Prime Minister that his change of attitude though possibly agreeable to French Government could not but be distasteful to His Majesty's Government.

After some reflection he stated that he personally was in no way averse to the idea of Geneva Conference.

It was only on account of French intransigence [*sic*] that he had considered it necessary to find some solution. If however this solution was not agreeable to His Majesty's Government he said he was quite prepared to revert to Spa decisions and would support Great Britain. 'La Belgique marcherait avec elle et dernière [*sic*] elle'; were his exact words which he authorised me to convey to Your Lordship. *But* he added, was it expedient in the circumstances to do so and to risk French occupation of Ruhr with its possible consequences?

Prime Minister informed me that he had already instructed Belgian Ambassador, London, to explain his point of view.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Note in original: 'Translate into French.'

<sup>3</sup> The explanation was made by Baron Moncheur in a conversation with Sir M. Hankey on the morning of September 14.

### No. 375

*Sir A. Geddes (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16, 9 a.m.)*

*No. 638 Telegraphic [C 6453/8/18]*

*Urgent*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1920<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 743.<sup>2</sup>

Geneva Conference.

I have had to-day prolonged conference with Secretary of State and Assistant-Secretary of State from which it is clear that United States Govern-

<sup>1</sup> The time of despatch of this telegram is not recorded.

<sup>2</sup> No. 370.

ment are in complete agreement with what they understand to be aim of His Majesty's Government, namely (1) Establishment of a specified capital sum to constitute Germany's entire financial obligation for reparation and (2) direct discussion at Geneva between Allied Prime Ministers and German delegates to obtain German co-operation in execution of treaty. Attitude of American Delegate on reparations commission is explained as follows:—

Certain decisions of Spa Conference appeared to State Department to violate terms of Versailles Treaty and to invade prerogatives that are specifically delegated to Commission.

Accordingly American representative proposed reserve 'rights and interests of other Powers of [*sic*] signatory of Treaty of Versailles but not parties to Spa agreement'.

A resolution in this sense was eventually presented by British Delegates and was regarded by American Delegate as covering points which he wished to safeguard. This was regarded as (? purely) formal reservation and as a hint that certain technical questions were best left within province of Reparation Commission but Secretary of State claims that it could not reasonably be construed into a disapproval of principle of direct negotiations with Germans on questions of policy. This Mr. Colby will make quite clear to American representative on Reparation Commission and to French Government. He will also furnish me with memorandum in above sense.<sup>3</sup>

While fully supporting idea of Geneva Conference Secretary of State is inclined to think that difficulties of time and space may make it desirable to postpone Geneva meeting for a few days.

<sup>3</sup> See *Papers relating to Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii, pp. 437-9.

## No. 376

*Sir A. Geddes (Washington) (Received September 15, 10.30 p.m.)*

*No. 639 Telegraphic [C 6408/8/18]*

*Urgent*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1920<sup>1</sup>

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>2</sup>

Main difficulty with Americans appears to reside in fact that their principal representative in (? Europe) for these questions sits on Reparations Commission whereas his . . .<sup>3</sup> are of course directly (? subordinate) to Prime Ministers who meet from time to time in Conference. (? This) (? no doubt) leads State Department to attach exaggerated importance to maintaining quasi-autocratic character of Reparations Commission within its own sphere. Secretary of State is therefore disposed to recommend President to appoint American representative to attend Geneva Conference. His influence if appointed would be all on the side of British (? policy) in these matters. United States Government however appreciate difficulties of present French Government.

<sup>1</sup> The time of despatch is not recorded.

<sup>2</sup> No. 375.

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain.

No. 377

*Mr. Kennard (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18, 9.15 a.m.)*

*No. 426 Telegraphic [C 6643/8/18]*

ROME, September 17, 1920, 10.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 430.<sup>1</sup>

Political director of Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Italian Ambassador, London, has been instructed to inform you that Giolitti expressed no views to French President of Council as to suppression of Geneva Conference but merely adhered to proposed postponement it being necessary for Italian delegates to be same at both conferences.

He says that Italian Government have had no note from French Government in the sense of that quoted in Paris telegram 1078<sup>2</sup> doubtless because question was discussed at Aix meeting.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 371.

<sup>2</sup> No. 362.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 369.

No. 378

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1022 Telegraphic: by bag [C 6519/8/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 18, 1920

Your Excellency is aware of the surprise with which His Majesty's Government have received the communication reported in your telegram No. 1078 of September 10th,<sup>1</sup> in which the French Government urge that the Geneva Conference should be abandoned and that the Reparation Commission should instead summon the German Delegation to Paris to discuss the German proposals with them.

The arguments put forward by the French Government in favour of this proposal, which involves reversal of the policy agreed upon at Spa, are as follows:—

(1) That the delay which has occurred since Spa has raised the presumption that the project of a conference at Geneva has lapsed.

(2) That the 'present disposition' of the German Government to evade their treaty obligations renders impolitic a meeting 'to settle questions arising out of the Treaty'.

(3) That the United States and Belgian Governments are opposed to the Geneva meeting.

None of these contentions are sound. The answers to them are *seriatim* as follows:—

(1) This argument can hardly be taken seriously. Negotiations as to the Geneva Conference have been in continuous progress between the Allied Governments since July 27th.

<sup>1</sup> No. 362.

(2) His Majesty's Government do not know what instances the French Government have in mind of any tendency on the part of the German Government to seek opportunities to escape from the burdens imposed upon them by the Treaty. Such facts as the passage of the disarmament law of August 7th and the law of August 21st providing for the abolition of military service, the steady reduction of the German Army and the delivery (despite the disturbances in Silesia) of more than the stipulated quantity of coal for August, may be cited as evidence to the contrary. These facts are, of course, not conclusive, but they make it impossible to base on the ground alleged by the French Government the withdrawal of a concession to which the German Government and the German people are entitled to look forward. In any case, it is a complete misrepresentation of the policy agreed at Spa to suggest that the Geneva meeting is intended to 'settle questions arising out of the Treaty'. The decision taken at Spa on July 16th was that the question of reparations was, in the first instance, to be considered by a special commission composed of two delegates from each delegation, who should meet at Geneva to explore the whole position and report to the Allied Governments. On July 12th the Prime Minister had already made it clear that what was required from this commission was not a decision but a report, and Monsieur Millerand had accepted the proposal on this understanding.

(3) The Belgian Government have now approached us in the same sense as the French Government. We are in communication with them on the subject, and have good hopes of modifying their views. As regards the United States Government, it now appears that the interpretation given by the French Government to the statement recently made by the United States delegate on the Reparation Commission is based upon a misunderstanding, and that the United States Government are in fact in full sympathy with the point of view of His Majesty's Government. See Washington telegram No. 638<sup>2</sup> repeated to Your Excellency.

Please make immediate communication to French Government rebutting their arguments on above lines.

Your Excellency should, at the same time, make it clear that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to substitute any proposal which would involve abandonment of the policy of discussing with German delegates in a neutral country the problem of the fixation and liquidation of the total German liability. To summon German delegates to Paris to discuss that problem with the Reparation Commission would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be no adequate substitute for the policy which has been formally agreed upon between the Allied Governments. The question whether the Allied Governments are definitely pledged to the German Government to carry out that policy is immaterial. The fact remains that the German Government were able to return from Spa without serious impairment of their position in Parliament and in the country, largely because they were able to point to the forthcoming conference at Geneva as a hopeful step on the road towards solution of the problems with which Germany is confronted.

<sup>2</sup> No. 375.

To withdraw that hope will be to intensify that state of unrest and discontent in Germany which, both from the political and the economic point of view, is a constant menace to the interests of the Allied Governments.

We therefore trust that the French Government will re-consider their decision to abandon a policy to which they are pledged in common with ourselves and the Belgian Government, and to agree to the examination of the German plans for reparation at Geneva immediately after the close of the Brussels Conference, which may be expected about October 10th. We do not wish to contest the view of the French Government that it is impossible, for practical reasons, that the Geneva meeting should take place while the Brussels Conference is sitting, but we are anxious that the Geneva Conference should not be postponed beyond the middle of next month.

*Confidential.* Should Your Excellency judge that Monsieur Millerand's difficulties in Parliament and in the country are such as to make inevitable some concession on our part, which would save the face of the French Government, you are authorised to intimate that we should be prepared to agree to a preliminary meeting between the Germans and the Reparation Commission. But it should be made plain that this concession would be strictly on the understanding that the meeting with the Reparation Commission would be quickly followed by a meeting at Geneva on the lines originally agreed upon. If, on the other hand, the French Government prove entirely obdurate, you will realise and bear in mind that we shall be obliged seriously to consider withdrawing from co-operation with them on the reparation question. If they are unable or unwilling to carry out agreements reached at conferences between the heads of Governments, no other course will be open to us.

Repeated to Rome No. 436, Brussels No. 157, Washington No. 752 and Berlin No. 311.

### No. 379

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20, 9 a.m.)*

*No. 1107 Telegraphic [C 6689/8/18]*

*Urgent. Confidential*

PARIS, September 19, 1920, 9.30 p.m.

Your telegrams Nos. 1022,<sup>1</sup> 1023, 1024, and 1025<sup>2</sup> with reference to Upper Silesia and Geneva Conference. . . .<sup>3</sup>

With regard to Geneva Conference position is very difficult owing to crisis created by Presidential election. In my own mind I have little doubt but that M. Millerand will become President of the Republic and M. Briand President of the Council but that will not be known with any certainty until Wednesday.<sup>4</sup> I feel that it might be better to approach new President of the Council if M. Millerand goes to the Élysée rather than to commence discussion with him. This is a matter which I feel can only be dealt with directly

<sup>1</sup> No. 378.

<sup>2</sup> Volume XI, Nos. 49, 50, and 51.

<sup>3</sup> The omitted paragraph referred to Upper Silesia.

<sup>4</sup> September 22.

with head of Government. In addition I do not think that M. Millerand will be able to see me within the next 3 days as his time is very fully occupied with this election. I should prefer therefore waiting to see how events turn. If M. Millerand remains in office I may have lost 3 days, though as a matter of fact I do not think much, if anything, would be done in those 3 days. On the other hand if he is succeeded by M. Briand I shall be able to start discussion with him *ab initio*. You can have no idea of what a complete dislocation of business at Ministry of Foreign Affairs is caused by this election.

Please telegraph me immediately your views. In the event of your agreeing to postponement I would cross Tuesday night or Wednesday morning to London, see you if possible Thursday and return early Friday. I should like however to have your (? instruction)s and shall not leave here until I know exactly what you wish.

**No. 380**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1030 Telegraphic [C 6689/8/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 20, 1920, 6.50 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 1107 (of September 19th:<sup>1</sup> Upper Silesia and Geneva Conference).

We concur.

<sup>1</sup> No. 379.

**No. 381**

*Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received September 21, 9.40 a.m.)*

*No. 550 Telegraphic [C 6839/8/18]*

BERLIN, *September 20, 1920, 8.40 p.m.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me today about Geneva Conference and said he was much concerned at attitude of French Press. Idea that German Delegates should merely be summoned to Paris to lay proposals before Reparation Commission was not acceptable to German Government and was not in consonance with terms of invitation to Spa. He was going to propose this afternoon to Commission of Foreign Affairs that Allied Governments should be invited to send experts to Berlin to discuss financial question preparatory to Conference at Geneva which he earnestly hoped would not be allowed to fall to the ground. He would be glad if Allied experts were the same persons as formed Reparation Commission but he saw grave objections to German experts going to Paris and appearing before said Commission sitting as a body as this would make discussion impossible.

No. 382

*Letter from the Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon*

[Confidential/General/363/16]

*Confidential and personal*

PARIS, September 20, 1920

My dear George,

I went down this morning to see if I could see Millerand on the two questions of urgent importance, Upper Silesia and the Geneva Conference. He sent me word that he would see me this afternoon with regard to the former but that he hoped any consideration of the latter might be postponed till after the Presidential crisis was over. However I had luncheon with him today—a farewell one given by him to Matsui the retiring Japanese Ambassador and he took me aside afterwards and we had a short conversation of which roughly the following is the gist. . . .<sup>1</sup>

Geneva Conference. It was obvious from the outset of our conversation that he felt *he* was in honour bound to have the Conference and the only thing that has impeded it is that undoubtedly public opinion, headed and voiced by Poincaré is against it, and I do not think that Millerand or his successor (and I am sure there will be a successor) could agree straight away to the Conference. I therefore without making any definite proposal rather hinted at what you had proposed as being a possible method of saving his face, namely that the Reparations Commission should first of all consult with the Germans but that it should be on the distinct understanding that say within a month after they had commenced their conversation there should be a Geneva Conference. While not actually agreeing he gave me clearly to understand that he would try and come into such arrangement. Indeed I think I might go further and say that he would welcome such a solution. We were then interrupted by Matsui and I could not go on with the conversation. I feel however greatly relieved by my talk with him and my only fear at not arriving at a satisfactory solution is that his successor may not endorse his views. At the same time the fact that I have got this assurance from him makes me hope that there will be no change in the policy. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Yours ever,  
D.

<sup>1</sup> The omitted paragraph related to Upper Silesia.

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of the letter related a conversation with Madame Millerand and made brief reference to Turkish affairs.

No. 383

*Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Earl Curzon (Received September 21, 9.45 p.m.)*

*No. 108 Telegraphic [C 6916/8/18]*

*Very confidential*

BRUSSELS, September 21, 1920, 5.45 p.m.

President of the Council spoke to me at length this morning on the subject of his action with regard to Geneva Conference. While in Paris he saw perfectly clearly French Government could not go to Geneva as arranged



and that they would be certain to fall if they did for a variety of reasons. He learnt among other things that Monsieur Dubois, President of Reparation Commission, had told Monsieur Millerand that if he persisted in the idea of Geneva he would resign and state his reason before Parliament.

Monsieur Delacroix was genuinely alarmed at prospect thus opened of a serious conflict between France and England. He believed that it would entail onesided action on the part of France and that she would occupy Ruhr Basin. He declared with greatest emphasis and, for reasons which I am reporting by despatch,<sup>1</sup> that occupation of Ruhr would be a cataclysm. Moreover there would be a strong movement in Belgium to follow suit. Nothing would induce him to do so and he would rather resign. Apprehending prospect of position of Belgium [*sic*]—between France on the one side and England on the other in conflict—he had put forward proposal known to you. Nothing is further from his mind than to detach himself from England. His wishes are all the other way.

I said that beside reasons which French Government had hitherto given there was possibly the hidden one that if Monsieur Millerand went to Geneva something would happen there which would prevent his candidature for President of the Republic from being successful. If, as now appeared probable, he were to be elected we should have a new situation and a new President of the Council with whom co-operation might be more easy. I believed that His Majesty's Government were still firmly attached to their policy of discussing with German delegates in a Neutral Country the fixation of and liquidation of German liability and that they desired the meeting at Geneva to take place after close of Brussels conference next month.

Monsieur Delacroix said that strong impression he received in Paris of Parliamentary situation led him to believe that no French President of the Council would or could carry out proposal as made at Spa for Geneva Conference. He remains as anxious as before about this matter. He considers that only way out of the difficulty would be for Reparation Commission to be present at Geneva together with Ministers or special delegates. If Reparation Commission is left out, he is sure that conflict imminent at time of his visit to Paris will recur with all the dangerous possibilities which he foresaw and still foresees.

<sup>1</sup> No. 214.

#### No. 384

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*

*No. 318 Telegraphic [C 7050/58/18]*

*Confidential*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 25, 1920, 6 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Question of waiving any right to seize enemy bank balances which we may have under Paragraph 18 of Annex 2 to Section VIII of the Treaty is being considered.

<sup>1</sup> No. 217.

No. 385

*Mr. Seeds (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)*

*No. 1012 [C 8778/58/18]*

BERLIN, *October 11, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 562 of October 7<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copy of the English text of the announcement, published through Wolff's Bureau, concerning German credits and property in the United Kingdom.<sup>2</sup> The publication coincided unfortunately with the newspaper lock-out in Berlin as a result of which no newspapers have since appeared with the exception of organs of the Left. As the latter's interest in such questions is but slight, press comments on the subject are not available to throw light on the manner in which the announcement has been received.

Mr. Thelwall was, however, interviewed by the Syndicus of the Deutsche Bank who remarked that the announcement, though satisfactory in itself, did not go very far, and that the real difficulty as regards the opening of credits in the United Kingdom was paragraph 18 of Annex II to Section 8 of the Treaty of Peace.

The possible seizure of bank balances under that paragraph is undoubtedly the subject of much apprehension in German official, financial, and commercial circles, and I therefore have the honour to express the hope that the consideration at present being given to this question, as stated in Your Lordship's telegram No. 318 of the 25th ultimo,<sup>3</sup> may if possible result in my being authorised to issue some reassuring announcement.

I have, &c.,

WILLIAM SEEDS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Cf., however, No. 217.

<sup>3</sup> No. 384.

No. 386

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Seeds (Berlin)*

*No. 327 Telegraphic [C 8401/58/18]*

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 15, 1920, 3.30 p.m.*

His Majesty's Government do not intend to exercise their rights under paragraph 18 of annex 2 to part 8 of the Treaty of Versailles, to seize the property of German nationals in this country in the case of voluntary default by Germany. This applies to German property in the United Kingdom or under United Kingdom control whether in the form of bank balances, or in that of goods in British bottoms, or of goods sent here for sale.

Please inform German Government as soon as possible and intimate that there is no objection to a public statement of this decision being made in Germany.

No. 387

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 3394 [C 8401/58/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 16, 1920

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith copy of a telegram<sup>1</sup> which has been sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin announcing the decision of His Majesty's Government that they do not intend to exercise their rights under paragraph 18 of annex 2 to part 8 of the Treaty of Versailles.

2. I shall be glad if Your Excellency will inform the Conference of Ambassadors of the action of His Majesty's Government in this matter. The reason why this step has been taken is that experience has shown that grave prejudice is being caused to British financial and commercial interests by the apprehensions aroused by the paragraph in question.

I have, &c.

(For the Secretary of State)

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> No. 386.

No. 388

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23, 3.15 p.m.)*

No. 570 Telegraphic [C 9404/8/18]

BERLIN, October 22, 1920, 8.40 p.m.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs today<sup>1</sup> and gave him general outline of the present position of Anglo-French discussions respecting Geneva. He agrees with the view that immediate Conference between German and French plenipotentiaries would be dangerous unless opinion in both countries could previously be brought more into harmony with each other and with the facts. On his expressing some fear lest very soon Conference at Brussels should become substitute for Geneva, instead of a preliminary, I assured him that this would not be the case. I added that if German Government made a point of immediate Conference at Geneva His Majesty's Government would not draw back from any engagement taken by them at Spa. His Excellency seemed gratified and completely satisfied with my

<sup>1</sup> A fuller report of Lord D'Abernon's 'long conversation' with Dr. Simons was given in his despatch No. 1069 of October 22 (not printed). Apart from the Geneva Conference the conversation covered the topics of coal deliveries, Germany's financial situation, and disarmament. The gist of the views exchanged on disarmament is given in Lord D'Abernon's *An Ambassador of Peace*, vol. i, p. 78.

assurances but said he was quite content to allow matters to proceed as now being negotiated between London and Paris provided, as stated above, that Brussels shall be only preparatory and shall not take place of Geneva. He agrees that impartial and (? just) examination of financial facts is the main thing required.

No. 389

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23, 8.40 p.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [C 9470/8/18]*

*Very secret. Personal*

PARIS, October 23, 6.40 p.m.

I had a long interview with President of the Council<sup>1</sup> this morning. He is very anxious for answer as soon as possible to French Note of October 20th about reparation (my despatch No. 3191)<sup>2</sup> as he is being very much pressed for settlement of question and wishes to be able to confront Parliament when it reassembles in a few days time with a *fait accompli*. As I have written to you, I am convinced that it is last (? word of) French Government and I sincerely hope you will be able to agree to it.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. M. Leygues who had succeeded M. Millerand as French President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs after M. Millerand's election as President of the Republic.

<sup>2</sup> Of October 20, not printed. For the French note see No. 390 below.

No. 390

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1140 Telegraphic [C 9246/8/18]*

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 26, 1920, 4 p.m.

Your despatch No. 3191 (of October 20th).<sup>1</sup> Negotiations for settlement of reparation).

The note from the French Government of October 20th cannot be regarded as satisfactory. It proposes that the Reparation Commission experts should make a preliminary examination (Brussels), that there should then be a Ministers' meeting assisted by technical experts (Geneva), that the report of this meeting should be drawn up, in the form of suggestions without decisions, and that this report shall then be submitted to the Reparation Commission for its decision.

It seems to us absurd to go through the farce of a conference of responsible Ministers, if the Governments to which that conference will report, are to be bound by the decision of the Reparation Commission and are not able to come to their own decision.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The last paragraph of the note<sup>2</sup> is also open to serious objection. Although it represents the specifically French view, if it remains in the note unchallenged, it might subsequently be held to have been acquiesced in by us.

Please inform the French Government that we are prepared to accept the proposal for the appointment of the technical experts, and their examination, as proposed in the section marked (1) of their note and in the first part of the section marked (2).

The second part of the section marked (2) coincides with our views as to the meeting of Ministers at Geneva, but it is necessary that an addition should be made to it to the effect that the Ministers should report to their Governments and further action upon their report should then be considered and agreed upon by the respective Governments.

The sections of the note marked (3) and (4) should then be omitted.<sup>3</sup>

We also wish to make it quite clear that the labours of the experts at Brussels should not be too prolonged and that the Geneva conference should take place not later than the middle of December.

The Reparations Commission will meanwhile pursue its labours in accordance with the Treaty.

Repeated to Brussels No. 182, Rome No. 480 and Berlin No. 332.

<sup>2</sup> The last paragraph read as follows: 'Le Gouvernement français pourrait d'autant moins s'écarter du Traité que, les Allemands n'ayant pas fait leurs propositions dans les quatre mois de la signature, le 28 octobre 1919, (comme ils y étaient tenus par le Protocole du Traité et aux termes de la lettre du 16 juin 1919), le Traité de Versailles est devenu pour la France loi de l'État. Le Gouvernement français ne saurait donc, sans l'assentiment du Parlement, modifier sa position.'

<sup>3</sup> Section III of the French note proposed that the technical report (étude) of the experts at Brussels and the general report (étude) of the Geneva Conference should be communicated to the Reparation Commission which would then have in hand all the elements necessary for making a decision. Section IV prescribed that the decisions of the Reparation Commission before being put into execution should be referred to the Supreme Council 'qui doit les examiner au point de vue des gages et des sanctions à prendre.'

## No. 391

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28, 11.30 a.m.)*

*No. 1247 Telegraphic [C 9802/58/18]*

PARIS, October 27, 1920, 11 p.m.

I feel that I ought to let you know that there is a storm of indignation here to-day against His Majesty's Government in connection with announcement by Board of Trade respecting treatment of German property in England in the event of voluntary default by Germany. Special bitterness is aroused by report that His Majesty's Government informed German Government of decision without previous consultation with Allies, which is denounced as direct violation of treaty engagements. Public opinion is in highly nervous and irritable condition for fear lest 'sanctions' necessary for enforcement of

reparation on Germany may be weakened. Would it be possible to issue some reassuring statement?

I fear that this incident may develop into serious cause of difference between the two countries unless immediate steps are taken to remedy it. Press is clearly writing under *mot d'ordre* from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and there is likely to be an outburst on reassembling of Chamber next week.

**No. 392**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [C 9964/8/18]*

*Private*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 28, 1920, 9 p.m.

Your private letter of October 27th.<sup>1</sup>

Geneva Conference.

I telegraph my comments at once, after consultation with Chamberlain and Worthington-Evans.

2nd. paragraph. Delay was, I believe, due to despatch, though dated Saturday, not being sent till Monday.<sup>2</sup>

4th. paragraph. No attempt is made or contemplated to take assessment of damages out of hands of Reparation Commission. That is their business. It is for Governments subsequently to decide how far they shall be enforced.

5th. paragraph.<sup>3</sup> Date of Conference. Your argument is sound, and we would agree to postponement for reason stated.

6th. paragraph. We should be quite willing, if you think it will help matters, to accept the Delacroix proposal.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives. A note of October 29, however, on the file by Mr. R. H. Campbell, Private Secretary to Lord Curzon, explains that this telegram was drafted by the Secretary of State and that Lord Derby's letter had foreshadowed a refusal by the French Government to modify their latest proposals in spite of the views of the British Government conveyed to Lord Derby in No. 390.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 397, p. 542.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Campbell's note said that Lord Derby's fifth paragraph urged that it would be useless to attempt to fix a figure for reparation until the result of the Upper Silesian plebiscite was known.

<sup>4</sup> This was, in Mr. Campbell's words, 'that the members of the Reparation Commission, sitting not as a corporate body, but as individuals, should meet the Germans at Brussels; that they should report to their respective Governments, leaving the subsequent procedure undecided, but stipulating that after consideration of the report by the various Governments a meeting of the Supreme Council should be held to decide the ensuing procedure'.

**No. 393**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29)*

*No. 3261 [C 9919/58/18]*

PARIS, October 28, 1920

My Lord,

In my telegram No. 1247<sup>1</sup> of October 27, I informed Your Lordship of the storm of indignation with which the French Press greeted the news that His

<sup>1</sup> No. 391.

Majesty's Government had exempted certain categories of private German property from the possibility of confiscation in the event of reprisals for a voluntary default by Germany. Yesterday's newspapers of every shade of opinion took part in this chorus of disapprobation. Both the act itself and the procedure followed are blamed. As for the action taken, it is regarded as a severe blow to the Treaty. 'Pertinax'<sup>2</sup> argued that if England refuses to avail herself of such minor sanctions as the one now abandoned, how will she take the more serious steps which may have to be contemplated. Several journals see in it an added proof that British policy under the influence of pure commercialism is rapidly diverging from the French national policy, even though the immediate advantage gained is more than counterbalanced by the disadvantages which will inevitably arise from the resultant growth of Pan-Germanism. The 'Journal' thinks that the action of His Majesty's Government is all the more blameworthy for not having been due to German pressure, and is especially to be regretted at a moment when France was hoping to get all questions of sanctions cleared up. Other journals point out that Powers other than England are now under the painful dilemma of having either to carry on trade with Germany under a severe handicap as compared with their English rivals, or to follow suit and put their hands to an agreement which they may well have strongly disapproved of. The 'Éclair' considers that His Majesty's Government's action is a single-handed modification of the Treaty, and as such questions its legality.

As to the procedure followed by His Majesty's Government, there is only one opinion. Apart from the intrinsic damage to the Treaty, to the cordiality of Anglo-French relations, and the chances of securing proper reparations from Germany, there is not a paper that does not consider it a serious affront to France that His Majesty's Government should have acted alone, and should have first notified the German Government of their decision, allowing their Allies to hear of it later, and almost in the newspapers.

The papers [*sic*] of today's date are equally occupied in this discussion, but though the substance of their remarks is much what I have reported above, the tone is not so bitter. The 'Temps' and the 'Débats' both consider that the decision of His Majesty's Government will encourage Germany to demand further revisions of the Treaty and that it tends to mark the change of relationship between the British and French Governments from one of collaboration to one of mere commercial rivalry. It is this selfish pre-occupation of England's that 'Bonsoir' finds most reprehensible; the 'Liberti' [? Liberté] and other papers feel that France is now marked out as alone in desiring an integral execution of the Treaty; and that as for reparations, it will be left to France and Belgium to get them as best they can.

I cannot help regretting that the decision of His Majesty's Government, once reached, to abandon any right to exercise this particular form of reprisal, should have been promulgated in this particular manner. Opinions expressed by commercial men of Paris are reported to me to the effect that the real bearing of the decision and its essential reasonableness are perfectly

<sup>2</sup> *Nom de plume* of M. André Géraud, a prominent French political journalist.

realized in business circles, who hope that the French Government will now take similar action. I cannot help thinking that if a different procedure had been followed; if the French Government had been informed beforehand of the contemplated action and given a chance to object, acquiesce, or follow suit, the whole affair would at the very worst have assumed small proportions and might have been disposed of in a very few days without arousing any serious adverse comment. As it is the incident has had a most unfortunate effect, and one out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance. The 'Éclair' states that the French Government will make an official protest against His Majesty's Government's action, and I am informed the matter may be raised at the Conference of Ambassadors on Saturday next.<sup>3</sup> It is almost sure to give rise to embittered speeches when Parliament meets next week; and with or without justification it may furnish French writers with arguments in favour of isolated action by France on the matter of sanctions.

I have, &c.,

DERBY

<sup>3</sup> October 30.

**No. 394**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29, 4.15 p.m.)*

*No. 1258 Telegraphic [C 9955/58/18]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, October 29, 1920, 1 p.m.

My telegram No. 1247.<sup>1</sup>

Press announce that renunciation by His Majesty's Government of rights under paragraph 18 of Annexe 2 of Part 8 of Treaty of Versailles will be discussed at Conference of Ambassadors at their next meeting on October 30th. But as a matter of fact I gather that French Government do not intend to raise question at Conference until they have obtained further information from London as to reasons which have prompted His Majesty's Government to take this course. In case however it is raised here I should be glad to learn what explanations I should give.

I would remind you that French Government have always held that penalties provided for in annexe 2, part 8, can be applied in the case of violation or non-execution of any part of Treaty and not merely reparation clauses and that these penalties can be interpreted so as to extend even to occupation of German territory. This view was maintained by Monsieur Millerand at time of discussions in March regarding proposed occupation of Ruhr as reported in my telegram No. 333 March 20th<sup>2</sup> (see also Minutes of Conference of Ambassadors March 20th).<sup>3</sup> This explained in part why French attach so much importance to this stipulation in Treaty being maintained unimpaired by all the Allied Governments.

<sup>1</sup> No. 391.

<sup>2</sup> Volume IX, No. 174.

<sup>3</sup> Volume IX, No. 170.



No. 395

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29, 7.15 p.m.)*

*No. 1260 Telegraphic [C 9954/8/18]*

*Very urgent. Secret*

PARIS, October 29, 1920, 3.20 p.m.

Reparations and Geneva.

I am to see President of the Council to-morrow morning. Meanwhile I have seen Berthelot<sup>1</sup> and again discussed the whole question with him.

His private opinion is that the best thing to do would be to allow Conference[s] at Brussels and Geneva to stand as arranged, the reports of Delegates to latter Conference being sent to Governments as well as to Commission of Reparations and whole question including further procedure should then be discussed and decided by a meeting of Supreme Council.

May I make this suggestion? Would it be of any use for Berthelot to go over and see you and Prime Minister? If so I think I could arrange for him to be sent with probably very full powers to arrive at a settlement.

Meanwhile, unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall present note at my interview with the President of the Council to-morrow morning.

I am writing to you by to-night's bag.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. Philippe Berthelot had succeeded M. Paléologue as Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> This private letter of October 29 to Lord Curzon has not been traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 396

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 30, 9.20 a.m.)*

*No. 1262 Telegraphic [C 9985/8/18]*

PARIS, October 29, 1920, 9.35 p.m.

I have seen Monsieur Millerand and had another interview with Berthelot and I am convinced that there is no real difference of opinion between you and them.

The only thing that is required is some formula which will have appearance of giving Reparations Commission more authority than they really possess. I find that to put forward Delacroix' proposal might lead to misunderstanding as he spoke in a very different way when he was here to what he did in London.<sup>1</sup>

Yet one more suggestion. May I make following proposals to French Government?

1. Experts from Reparations Commission to meet German experts at Brussels. Reports to be made to Reparations Commission and by representatives of Allied Powers on that Commission to their respective Governments.

<sup>1</sup> For the minutes of his conversation in London see Volume VIII, No. 91.

2. Conference of delegates from Governments of Allied Powers to meet with delegates from Germany at Geneva as at Spa. Their report, or reports in the case of non-agreement to unanimous report, to be made to Allied Governments represented and to Reparations Commission.

3. Reparations Commission shall arrive at figure to be demanded from German Government and shall make a unanimous report to Supreme Council.

4. The Supreme Council to meet to approve of amount and to consider best way of enforcing decision arrived at.

I would point out that number three which requires unanimous decision of Reparations Commission gives British Government full power to have its views considered and accepted by Reparations Commission. If no unanimous report can be arrived at it is obvious that Governments must decide question.

In number four the Supreme Council which again would have to be unanimous has to approve of this amount. It follows of course that it could equally have power not to approve. By this arrangement whilst shadow would belong to Reparations Commission the bone would belong to Governments either in their individual capacity acting through their representatives on Reparations Commission or on Supreme Council.

Pending an answer to this telegram I am deferring my communication to French Government in the sense of your telegram No. 1140.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> No. 390.

## No. 397

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 3557 [C 10073/58/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 29, 1920*

My Lord,

In the absence of M. Cambon, M. de Fleuriau asked to see me this afternoon, in order to make a special representation on the part of his Government with regard to the action taken by the British Government in respect of the release of private German property in this country.<sup>1</sup>

He read to me a copy of this representation—which I append—and he added that his Government viewed with especial concern independent action of this nature on the part of the British Government, taken without notice to our Allies, and with results that would weaken the latter in dealing with the reparation question when a final settlement of that question with the Germans took place. I need not recapitulate here the particular points that he made, because they are contained in the statement.

<sup>1</sup> M. de Fleuriau had already spoken to Sir E. Crowe about this matter on October 27, but according to a note by Mr. Waterlow he was not then understood to be 'under any instructions to express displeasure on the part of the French Government'.

In reply, I said that I deeply regretted that this incident should have occurred to ruffle the surface of harmonious relations between our two countries, but that I could not help thinking that a mountain had been made out of a relatively small matter, which the explanations which I was able to give would reduce to its proper dimensions. Two questions were in fact raised: the one of procedure, the other of policy.

As regards procedure, I was glad to see that the French Government had not taken the line, which had been freely adopted in the French Press, of assuming that the action of H.M. Government had been due to representations from Germany, or was indeed the result of some communication with the Germans. There was no truth whatever in such a suspicion. On the other hand, the French Government did complain that the decision had been taken without any notice to the Allies. This, I said, was not the case. As soon as the decision had been reached here, we proposed immediately to communicate it to the other Powers through the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, as well as to the Reparation Commission through the British Delegate, who was instructed for the purpose. Unfortunately, our despatch to Your Excellency, which had been drawn up on Saturday October 16th, did not, owing to that day being Saturday, leave the Foreign Office until the following Monday. It therefore reached you too late for the session of the Conference to which you were expected to communicate it, and the erroneous impression was produced that the information had been deliberately withheld.

Next, as regards the procedure adopted in this country when the decision was reached. The matter having been dealt with by the Exchequer and the Board of Trade in combination, their decision was communicated to the Foreign Office. It was regarded in this Office as being of so technical and departmental a character, and as so little involving any broad political issue, that it had not even been referred to Lord Hardinge or to myself, and the first that I had heard of it was when I saw the outcry in the newspapers.

So much for the procedure adopted: which was, I thought, sufficient to demonstrate to M. de Fleuriau that there had been no deliberate intention in London to act with any discourtesy either to the French Government or to our other Allies.

As regards policy, I asked M. de Fleuriau whether he had read the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons last night. Inasmuch as it contains our reply, and as what I said to the French Minister on this point was little more than a repetition of it, I give it here:—<sup>2</sup>

‘I am glad to have an opportunity of making a statement on this matter which has given rise to a good deal of misconception. The paragraph in question reads as follows: “The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general

<sup>2</sup> This statement is also printed in *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 133, cols. 1921–2.

such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances." H.M. Government have not renounced their right to take measures such as are contemplated in this paragraph. They have merely declared that, among the measures which they might take in given circumstances there will not be included a seizure of the property of German nationals in this country, whether such property is in the United Kingdom or under United Kingdom control, and whether it is in the form of bank balances or of goods in British bottoms or of goods sent to this country for sale.

'This decision was not taken in consequence of any representations from Germany, nor was it dictated by regard for German interests. The matter has been under consideration for a long time, and it was hoped that it might be decided in connection with the general discussion of reparation questions at the Spa Conference or at the Conference proposed to be held at Geneva. In view however of the postponement of the latter, H.M. Government felt it to be impossible to continue to maintain a threat which injuriously affected British interests without offering any real security for the execution of the Treaty, since so long as private German property in this country and in particular private bank balances belonging to Germans were exposed to seizure, it was fairly certain that, if the moment ever arrived when we desired to put Paragraph 18 into operation, there would be no appreciable property to seize. The paragraph thus operated merely to keep business away from London and to make Germans keep their balances in neutral currencies, a course which was inconvenient to all parties and involved clear loss to this country without any countervailing advantage.

'I may add, by way of further commentary, that there has actually been a campaign in certain of the German newspapers in favour of the handing over of these particular German assets by the German Government to the Reparation Commission, in order to punish the individual German owners for sending money abroad.

'With regard to the criticism that this action was taken by H.M. Government on their own responsibility without obtaining the concurrence of the Allied Governments, I would say that the words of the paragraph clearly leave it *'to the respective Governments'* to determine what action may be necessary under the paragraph. In the opinion of H.M. Government it would have been both unnecessary and undesirable to seek to share the responsibility of the decision they have taken with the other Allies, thus both limiting their own freedom of action under the Treaty and giving the appearance of desiring to dictate to other Governments as to their action under the paragraph. As a matter of courtesy the decision reached was immediately communicated to the other Powers through the Ambassadors' Council and also to the Reparation Commission through the British Delegate.'

I added that this statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer had at once been telegraphed to Your Excellency in Paris,<sup>3</sup> with the request that

<sup>3</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 1165 of October 28, not printed.

you would point out to the French Government that, as explained at the end of the statement, H.M. Government regarded it as both unnecessary and undesirable to create a precedent which might have seemed to limit the unfettered responsibility of each Allied Government under the paragraph, or to involve an attempt to dictate to other Governments.<sup>4</sup>

I had a further shot in my locker for M. de Fleuriau. With reference to the extreme sensitiveness that had been shown by his Government as to isolated action on our part, I was able to acquaint him with a fact of which he was not at all aware, namely that his Government had anticipated us in a very similar case by announcing their intention of releasing Bulgarian balances in French banks, and they had done this without any previous consultation with us. Their reason for this decision was simply that the Bulgarian balances in their banks were so small that they were not worth seizing. Bulgarian balances in British banks, on the other hand, were sufficiently large to make the Treasury decline to release them. This was not a retort of which I desired to make any public use, but I asked M. de Fleuriau to pay me the compliment of reminding his Government of it.

He was, I think, relieved at the explanation which I had given, and he did not show any inclination to pursue the matter.

I deemed it right, however, to seize the occasion to make a few remarks to him—as he had always shown himself a warm friend of this country—on the position of affairs that was being created by the increasingly bitter and hostile tone of the French Press towards this country and its leading statesmen.

In the present instance, before the facts were known or any explanation could be given, there had been a veritable tornado of invective and abuse in the Paris newspapers, and every attempt had been made to exacerbate the relations between the two countries. Nor did this case stand alone. It followed upon attacks of a most violent nature recently directed by leading French organs against the Prime Minister. It was part of a campaign which had been going on unchecked in France for many months past, and which must in the long run, if it were pursued, have permanently mischievous results.

I asked M. de Fleuriau to take the converse case of which indeed I supplied him with two recent illustrations. The first was when, in the early part of this year, France decided on her own account, and without consultation with her Allies, to cross the Rhine, and occupy three German cities. The second occasion was when, equally without notice to the Allies, M. Millerand's Government announced their recognition of General Wrangel. I did not propose to enter into the question of the rights or wrongs of either of these

<sup>4</sup> In Paris telegram No. 1259 of October 29, not printed, Lord Derby said that he was communicating the statement to the French Government as instructed, but that he must 'point out again that instructions to notify German Government of decisions taken were sent by telegram on October 15th to His Majesty's Representative at Berlin. These instructions were repeated to me on October 16th by despatch which only reached me on October 20th late in the evening so that notification to Secretariat of Ambassadors' Conference could only be made on morning of October 21st. I have therefore felt compelled to omit last sentence of your telegram under reply from my note to French Government.'

cases. I was now discussing only the attitude taken towards them by our Press. On both occasions, and more especially on the second, great feeling was aroused in this country by the manner in which we had been treated. Could the French Minister however point to a single instance in a single newspaper in which the remarks or criticisms of the British Press had exceeded the bounds of friendly comment? As a matter of fact, all the newspapers had declared that these incidents must not be allowed to disturb the union between the two countries, and the co-ordination of their policy, these being the only sound foundations of European peace. Excuses, indeed, had been found for the French action, particularly in the case of the Rhenish occupation, and nothing had been said to render a settlement more difficult. Could the French Minister say the same of the attitude of the French Press? Granting the differences between the psychologies of the two peoples, admitting the phlegmatic temperament of the Englishman, and allowing for the more emotional nature of the Frenchman, was there anything to justify this sharp difference of tone between the newspaper Press of the two countries? It was almost heartrending, I said, when we were still labouring in a troubled ocean, and were by no means in sight of port, to find the atmosphere still further disturbed by these gratuitous cyclones.

M. de Fleuriau did not attempt to deny the justice of my complaint. On the contrary, he said that the attitude of the French Press was a source of the utmost anxiety to himself, and that he had made it the subject of frequent representations in Paris. He had hoped very much that, when the change in the French Government took place some time ago, there would be a marked change in the tone of the Press. Had M. Briand become Prime Minister, as had been expected, M. de Fleuriau thought that his hopes would have been more quickly realised. The matter was, however, just as much a cause of concern to M. Berthelot as it was to M. de Fleuriau. M. Berthelot now had great influence in the French Foreign Office, and he was exerting himself in every respect to produce a better tone.

I answered that we were aware that it was to the influence of M. Berthelot that we owed the reply in the 'Temps' to the scandalous attacks that had been made on the Prime Minister by M. Sauerwein in the 'Matin.' But there was, I added, a point concerning which I thought that the French Foreign Office had a direct responsibility which it could not disown. The source of much of this trouble was the able but dangerous writer who used the *nom de plume* of 'Pertinax'. It could not be denied that this journalist was abundantly supplied with official inspiration, and that in many cases he went direct from the Quai d'Orsay to the desk at which he dipped his pen. We even knew of cases in which official Notes, addressed by us to the French Government, had been communicated to 'Pertinax' in Paris, and had been telegraphed by him to London papers, not too favourably disposed towards the Government, suggesting the suspicion that they had been improperly divulged in London. A great deal of the mischief between our two peoples arose from the unrestrained activities of this gentleman, against the licence accorded to whom I could not too vehemently protest.

In reply, M. de Fleuriau admitted that 'Pertinax', by long practice, had developed to an undue degree the characteristics of the pamphleteer, but said that his exceptional gifts as a journalist placed him in a position which it was not always easy to ignore.

I concluded by saying that these attacks upon British honour, British good faith, and British policy were all the more annoying at a time when every British statesman or official who had met the new President of the French Republic regarded M. Millerand not only with admiration but with affectionate esteem, and when there was in the French Foreign Office, in the person of M. Berthelot, a man not only of quite exceptional ability but of acknowledged friendliness to the common Entente. Was it not deplorable at such a moment that the excellent feelings on this side should meet with no reciprocity on the other, and that instead the rancour of the French Press should increase from day to day? Phlegmatic as were the British people, a time might come when they would say that, though they were convinced of the immense importance of friendship between France and this country, they were being asked to pay almost too high a price for it, if they were to continue to be subjected to incessant abuse.

M. de Fleuriau cordially agreed with my remarks, with which he was in complete sympathy. He said that the whole of his efforts had for some time been directed to produce a better atmosphere; that he would report to Paris what I had said; and that any influence he might exercise there would be energetically devoted to the promotion of a better state of feeling.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 397<sup>5</sup>

*Résumé d'une Dépêche de M. Leygues à M. de Fleuriau*

Le Gouvernement britannique a pris la décision de ne pas exercer en ce qui le concerne le droit de saisir les biens des ressortissants allemands qu'il tient comme tous les Alliés du paragraphe 18, Annexe 2, Partie VIII, du Traité de Versailles. Cette décision a été communiquée à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs et à la Commission des Réparations plusieurs jours après avoir été portée à la connaissance du Gouvernement allemand, qui a eu toute latitude d'en faire l'objet d'une déclaration publique. Elle a été motivée par le grave préjudice que cause aux intérêts commerciaux et financiers britanniques l'appréhension liée à l'application dudit paragraphe du Traité de Versailles.

Le Gouvernement français est désireux d'éclaircir directement cette question avec le Cabinet de Londres.

Cette préoccupation s'inspire du désir d'éviter une discussion contradictoire devant la Conférence des Ambassadeurs et de prévenir par un

<sup>5</sup> The file copy of this enclosure is missing and the present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

échange de vues entre Paris et Londres des malentendus que les deux Gouvernements et les deux pays ont un égal intérêt à écarter.

Le Gouvernement français estime qu'un des signataires du traité ne saurait s'autoriser d'une action individuelle vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne pour renoncer au détriment de ses Alliés aux droits qu'il tient du traité.

Dans l'espèce, le Gouvernement français se croit en droit d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur les conséquences de son action tant au point de vue de la politique générale que sur le terrain même du droit.

Les Alliés, et tout spécialement la France et l'Angleterre, ont le plus grand intérêt à toujours se concerter avant de prendre une attitude politique vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne. D'autre part, le Gouvernement français estime que le Traité de Versailles place tous les Alliés dans un intérêt conjoint, et qu'une action isolée risque de compromettre la situation de tous les autres au bénéfice d'un seul. Il semble dans le cas présent que la Grande-Bretagne ait accompli un acte isolé à son bénéfice sans se rendre compte du détriment direct qu'elle cause aux autres Alliés et particulièrement à la France. La note du Gouvernement britannique autorise en effet les Allemands à faire une déclaration publique de la concession qui leur a été consentie et qui revêt ainsi un effet favorable à la Grande-Bretagne et nuisible aux autres Alliés et à la France. En second lieu, la note britannique reconnaît que la mesure a été prise dans l'intérêt financier et commercial de la Grande-Bretagne. En effet, la décision en question va attirer sur le Royaume-Uni et à l'exclusion des autres places alliées les capitaux allemands. Les biens et avoirs allemands afflueront dans les banques anglaises.

Le Gouvernement français rappelle que dans les pourparlers qui ont précédé la signature du traité, les Allemands avaient fait des objections à l'Article 297 qui prévoit la liquidation des biens allemands. Ils prétendaient que leur commerce, leur industrie ne pourraient reprendre sous cette menace. Il leur fut répondu que la liquidation ne s'appliquait pas aux biens à venir, mais aux biens actuellement existants dans les pays alliés. Ce régime ne fut pas étendu à la menace prévue par le paragraphe 18, en vertu du droit général de représailles économiques.

Or la décision du Gouvernement britannique prive dorénavant les Alliés de la possibilité que leur donnait le traité d'exercer *en commun* des représailles économiques en cas de manquement volontaire de la part de l'Allemagne. Les Allemands savent désormais qu'ils n'ont plus à craindre à cet égard une action commune des Alliés, puisque la Grande-Bretagne leur a notifié qu'elle y renonçait d'avance.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,*

*le 29 octobre 1920*



*Letter from Sir E. Crowe to M. de Fleuriau*

[C 9803/58/18]

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 29, 1920

My Dear Minister,

I have looked into the question of our action in waiving our rights under paragraph 18, annex 2, part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, and I do not think that there is anything of substantial importance that requires to be added to what I said to you when you touched on the matter in our conversation last Wednesday.<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, one point which it may be useful to make clear. It has been generally assumed that our action was a result of German pressure, and that this pressure indicates an intention on the part of Germany voluntarily to default, and to safeguard herself in advance against some of the unpleasant consequences of that course. In point of fact, no representations of any kind, whether official or unofficial, have been made to us on the matter by the German Government, nor have we been approached by any German interests. So far as we are aware, there has been no perceptible agitation or movement bearing on the subject in Germany. On the other hand, for some time past various British commercial and financial interests had been making strong representations to us to the effect that the apprehensions aroused in Germany by the paragraph in question were causing German banks to transfer to other countries, notably to Holland and the United States, banking deposits which they would otherwise have kept in London, and were preventing German traders from shipping goods, especially to the Far East, in British ships. This was having serious results for British shipping lines in competition with their Japanese, American and German rivals; and the displacement of banking deposits was having a perceptible effect on our exchange. It was solely in consequence of the serious complaints which we had been receiving under these heads from the British interests affected that we took the decision which has aroused so much ill-judged indignation in the press. It is obvious that, had we not made it, there would, in all probability, have been no German goods or bank deposits for us to confiscate in the event of Germany's voluntary default; so that the object of the paragraph would, in any case, have been self-defeated, so far as we were concerned.

Finally, it should be remembered that the sole effect of our action, as regards the Treaty of Versailles, is *pro tanto* to weaken our hands in one single respect, if and when it should become necessary to bring economic pressure to bear on Germany short of war. The hands of our allies remain entirely free, and, in our own case, all the other economic weapons involved in the modern conceptions of blockade remain available.

I trust that this explanation will be of some use to you in removing from the mind of your Government, any suspicion of disloyalty on our part. I

<sup>1</sup> See No. 397, n. 1.

may add that, when this decision was reached, we were careful to instruct Lord Derby to inform the Conference of Ambassadors, and that similar instructions were sent to the British Delegate on the Reparation Commission, who was in full agreement with the course which we took. The real state of the case being as I have explained, we did not think it necessary to consult our allies in advance on what we deemed to be purely a domestic matter in no way affecting our attitude towards the execution of the treaty.

Believe me, my dear Minister,

Yours sincerely

EYRE A. CROWE

### No. 399

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 30, 10.45 p.m.)  
No. 1266 Telegraphic [C 9995/58/18]*

PARIS, October 30, 1920, 6 p.m.

My telegram No. 1247.<sup>1</sup>

Great emphasis is laid in Press here (clearly under inspiration of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) on understanding reached between French and British Governments last April at the time of controversy over French occupation of Frankfurt . . .<sup>2</sup> and recorded in notes exchanged, that Allied Governments have no intention of acting in any inter-allied questions raised by execution of German Treaty save in agreement with their Allies (see my despatch No. 1116<sup>3</sup> etc). Line taken is that complete agreement between Allies is indispensable 'in every sphere' and no Allied Government should take any action whatever arising out of Treaty without previous agreement with the others.

Some of Press is more moderate than on last two days.

<sup>1</sup> No. 391.

<sup>2</sup> The text is here uncertain.

<sup>3</sup> This despatch of April 11 transmitted a note by M. Millerand, an English translation of which is printed in Volume IX, No. 357.

### No. 400

*Memorandum by Mr. Blackett on further proposals regarding the Brussels and Geneva Conferences to be laid before the French Government<sup>1</sup>*

[C 10406/8/18]

At a meeting in Lord Curzon's room at the Foreign Office on Wednesday November 3rd at 2.45 p.m., present, Lord Curzon, Lord Derby,<sup>2</sup> the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir L. Worthington-Evans, and Mr. B. F. [sic] Blackett—it was arranged that in place of the formal communication to the

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum was sent to Paris under cover of Foreign Office despatch No. 3620 of November 4.

<sup>2</sup> In Foreign Office telegram No. 1152 of November 2 Lord Derby had been asked to come to London to discuss the Geneva Conference question.

French Government of the contents of telegram No. 1140 of the 26th October,<sup>3</sup> Lord Derby should put forward the following suggestions for a solution:—

(1) A Conference to be held at Brussels between Allied experts, who would be the National delegates to the Reparation Commission sitting as representatives of their respective Governments, sitting with German experts—as proposed in the French Note of October 20th. The experts would make their report to their Governments and the *procès-verbal* of their meetings would be communicated to the Reparation Commission.

(2) After this Conference has reported, but not before the question of Upper Silesia has been determined by the plebiscite, a Conference to be held at Geneva between Ministers of the Allied Governments to discuss the question of reparations in its entirety, German Ministers being called in in a consultative capacity as at Spa.

The members of this Conference would report to their respective Governments, and each Government would then inform its representative on the Reparation Commission of the opinions at which it has arrived on the report of its representatives at the Geneva Conference.

(3) The Reparation Commission will then proceed, in accordance with the Treaty, to declare the total amount of Germany's liabilities under the Treaty, and to report upon the capacity of Germany to pay.

(4) The Supreme Council will then meet to consider what further steps require to be taken.

*Notes.* As regards (1), the Reparation Commission will of course be fully informed of all that transpires. But it is well that the reports should not be made officially to that Commission, since (a) if the report were unanimous it would technically involve a body of experts which is not formally the Commission dictating to the Commission and (b) if not unanimous the national experts must necessarily express their own views to their respective Governments.

As regards (2), no Government could agree to allow the report of its responsible Ministers to be made to their own subordinates, *viz.* the Reparation Commission Delegates, nor is it possible to contemplate laying before the Reparation Commission, as such, confidential reports e.g. by the Belgian Ministers to the Belgian Government criticising e.g. the Italian Ministers. In practice, no doubt, the National Delegates to the Reparation Commission will be kept fully informed not only of the actual opinions of their respective Governments (as under (3)) but also of the detailed course of the discussions.

As regards (3) and (4) the Treaty itself reserves for the Governments the duty of deciding on any reduction of the total Treaty liability of Germany. The function of the Reparation Commission is to fix the total liability and to permit payment to be postponed within certain limits but not to reduce the total. Though it is of course not desirable from the French standpoint to speak openly of a reduction of the total, the object of the British Government (and the clear implication of all the negotiations leading up to Spa and especially of the Boulogne Agreement of June) is to take a short cut to the final fixation of a 'forfait'.

<sup>3</sup> No. 390.

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)**No. 1131 [C 10671/1118/18]*

BERLIN, November 4, 1920

My Lord,

On October 27<sup>1</sup> I informed Your Lordship that I hoped in the course of a fortnight to send a despatch dealing fully with the present financial situation in Germany. Since then, however, I have dealt somewhat fully with certain aspects of this subject in my despatches Nos. 1101 of the 29th ultimo<sup>2</sup> dealing with my conversation with Dr. Wirth, 1103 of the 30th ultimo<sup>2</sup> giving a long review of the position as seen through the medium of the Bankers' Conference, 1125 of yesterday's date<sup>2</sup> transmitting a brief summary of the statement submitted by Dr. Wirth to the Reichstag on the assessment and collection of new taxes, 1130 of yesterday's date,<sup>2</sup> transmitting a memorandum on certain aspects and results of the recent depreciation of the Mark.

I will not, therefore, trouble Your Lordship with any long recapitulation in the present despatch. My general opinion remains unchanged, namely, that Germany is either on the verge of bankruptcy or already bankrupt but that there is no advantage from any point of view in an official declaration of bankruptcy, such a course being fraught with many dangers to public order and to the future prosperity of the country. The main cause of financial peril is a quite simple one—that Government revenue does not nearly come up to Government expenditure. At the same time it appears extremely difficult for the moment to increase taxation. It is not so difficult but still far from easy for a Government constituted like the present one to reduce expenditure.

The consequence of this lack of equilibrium between revenue and expenditure is that the Government has constant recourse to the printing press, the note issue of the Reich increasing approximately at the rate of a milliard of Marks a month. German financiers with whom I have been in contact appear somewhat blind to the grave dangers which this policy obviously portends and they appear unwilling or unable to make the supreme effort necessary in order to stop the increase in the note issue and thus give some chance of a stable exchange. They argue that the unpopularity of large reductions of expenditure and of large increases of taxation would be such that severe social disorder might ensue and this social disorder the Government is not at present strong enough to cope with. They are inclined to hang on and to live from hand to mouth in the hope of some favourable turn in the course of political or financial events. For my own part I do not see that a favourable turn of sufficient importance to modify the problem is at all likely to occur and I regard national bankruptcy—declared or veiled—as almost inevitable. I agree, however, with the German financiers in the view that there is no advantage in making a parade of insolvency.

<sup>1</sup> In his despatch No. 1087, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Dr. Wirth was German Minister of Finance.

Those who talk of the restoration of the Mark to something like its pre-war value are apt to forget that any such restoration would enormously increase the burden of the State debt. A striking demonstration of this is afforded by the fact that the present German debt (funded and floating) of 280 milliards of Marks is equivalent in goods and services to about 1,000 millions Sterling if taken at the present rate of exchange, while it would be equal to 14,000 millions Sterling at the pre-war rate. This aspect of indebtedness appears to merit very mature consideration not only in Germany but in all countries.

With regard to reparation, my own view is as follows:—

The experts when they meet in Brussels will be merely wasting their time if they devote their attention solely or mainly to the question of what Germany owes or what she should pay. The only practical question is to ascertain what she can pay and no scheme purporting to establish this will be worth the paper on which it is written unless it provides, as a basic condition, for the stabilisation of German exchange and the cessation of further note issues. This brings us at once to the problem of the German Budget and there appears to be no alternative but for the financial experts at Brussels to go through the Budget in detail and assure themselves by discussion and by cross-examination regarding the possibilities there may be either of increasing revenue or diminishing expenditure—the review extending not only to the immediate but also to the less immediate future, when conditions may be better.

It is in my judgment important to keep the discussion at Brussels off the more or less Byzantine question of Germany's duty and to confine it to the practical question of Germany's ability.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

**No. 402**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7, 8.50 p.m.)*

*No. 1303<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [C 10568/8/18]*

PARIS, November 7, 1920, 4.45 p.m.

Reparations.

Your despatch No. 3620.<sup>2</sup>

I communicated your proposals verbatim to Monsieur Berthelot on evening of November 5th. I saw President of the Council yesterday and I have this morning received official reply from him.

After expressing appreciation of spirit of conciliation which has actuated His Majesty's Government, note recites and, with two modifications, accepts procedure proposed by you.

These amendments are:—

1. In paragraph two 'after Silesian plebiscite but not later than first half of February'.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was despatched in reverse order with No. 403.

<sup>2</sup> This despatch enclosed a copy of No. 400.

I am confidentially assured that object of this is to put pressure on General Le Rond's commission, which French Government very rightly regard as dilatory, to bring about the plebiscite without delay.

2. At end of paragraph four are inserted words 'including pledges and sanctions'.

I earnestly hope Your Lordship will be able to accept these proposals and instruct me to-morrow by telephone as it is most important to confront Chamber with a *fait accompli*.

Text of note in my immediately succeeding telegram.

### No. 403

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7, 7.30 p.m.)*

*No. 1304 Telegraphic [C 10569/8/18]*

PARIS, November 7, 1920, 3.50 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Following is French Note dated yesterday.

Son Excellence Lord Derby a bien voulu remettre, le 5 novembre, 1920, la réponse du Gouvernement anglais à la Note française du 20 octobre.

Le Président du Conseil apprécie hautement l'esprit d'entente dans lequel le gouvernement brittan[n]ique se rallie, d'une manière générale, à la procédure proposée par le gouvernement français. Les différents stades d'examen de la question des réparations seront dès lors les suivants:

Decerné [? Alinéa] premier. Réunion à Bruxelles d'experts techniques alliés désignés par la Commission des Réparations et Siégeant, comme représentants de leurs gouvernements respectives [*sic*], avec des experts Allemands.

Les experts feront leur rapport à leurs gouvernements respectives [*sic*] et le procès-verbal de leur réunion sera communiqué à la Commission des Réparations.

Deuxième. La Conférence de Genève se réunira après le plébiscite d'Haute Silésie, mais au plus tard dans la première quinzaine de février, pour discuter dans son ensemble la question des réparations (montant total de la dette et examen de la capacité de paiement de l'Allemagne). Les représentants du gouvernement allemand ne participeront à cette Conférence qu'à titre consultatif, comme . . .<sup>2</sup> feront leur rapport à leurs gouvernements respectives [*sic*] et chacun de ces gouvernements informera son représentant à la Commission des Réparations des conclusions auxquelles il sera arrivé, quant au rapport de ses représentants à la Conférence de Genève.

Troisième. La Commission des Réparations procédera, alors, conformément aux termes du Traité (de ? Versailles) à la fixation du montant total et des modalités de paiements des sommes dues par l'Allemagne, et fera aux puissances trimestre [*sic*] rapport sur la capacité de paiement de l'Allemagne.

Quatrième. Réunion du conseil suprême pour examiner toutes mesures ultérieures à prendre, gages et sanctions exclusivement [inclusivement].

<sup>1</sup> No. 402.

<sup>2</sup> The text is here uncertain.

*Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the German Ambassador*

[C 10917/8/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 8, 1920

The German Ambassador asked me to-day whether I could confirm the statement which had appeared in this morning's *Times*<sup>1</sup> as to the terms of the arrangement arrived at between us and the French Government in respect to the proposed Conference at Geneva.

I told him that whilst an understanding with France on the lines of the published announcement was imminent, nothing definite has as a matter of fact yet been settled. Herr Sthamer was very much perturbed at the statement that the German delegates at Geneva were to be admitted only in a consultative capacity.<sup>2</sup> He said his Government had distinctly understood that the German representatives would meet their British and French colleagues round the same table and deal with them on a footing of equality as members of one conference. This is what had been done at Spa, and the German Government had expected the same procedure to be followed at Geneva.

I said I was under the impression that it was certainly intended to follow at Geneva the same procedure as at Spa, and that it was this procedure which the French communication referred to as the presence of German delegates in a consultative capacity. So far as I understood it this merely meant that the Conference as a whole, that is to say, German, French and British members acting together, would not pass resolutions as representing the decisions of the Conference itself, but that any decisions at which the Allied representatives arrived would be based on the discussions in which the German members took part. This had in fact been the actual procedure at Spa.

The Ambassador seemed quite ready to accept such an arrangement as satisfactory.

He said he was going to Germany on short leave in a week's time and he hoped I should be able to inform him before then of the exact arrangement arrived at.<sup>3</sup>

E. A. C.

<sup>1</sup> This summarized the gist of the French note the text of which was transmitted in No. 403 above.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Curzon underlined the last five words and noted in the margin: 'These were not our words & I have not accepted them. C.'

<sup>3</sup> Lord Curzon minuted: 'Sir E. Crowe is right. But the French have tried to emphasize the subordinate position of Germany by a slight manipulation of the text of our proposal. C. 8/11.'

*Report by Mr. Prentice for the British Embassy, Berlin, on the work of the  
Reparation Commission<sup>1</sup>*

*British/130 [C 12071/59/18]*

BERLIN, November 8, 1920

The Council of Ambassadors have entrusted the Reparation Commission with the duty of liquidating the arisings of destroyed military, naval, and aeronautical material referred to in Articles 169, 192 and 202 of the Treaty of Peace.

The Reparation Commission have set up a Bureau in Berlin known as the Bureau de Liquidation du Matériel de Guerre for the purpose of carrying out the instructions referred to above.

In April 1920, the French, Belgian, Italian, American and British Delegations of the Reparation Commission appointed their respective Delegates of the Bureau de Liquidation du Matériel de Guerre, Berlin. After considerable investigation, reporting, etc., on the conclusion of the Spa Conference in June, the Bureau de Liquidation du Matériel de Guerre was definitely established and work commenced, after having notified the Commissions of Control concerned and the German Government.

This Bureau has now become a comparatively large one and consists of a staff of approximately 70 of all grades, and is located in the Prinz Albrecht Hotel, Prinz Albrecht Strasse, Berlin.

Since last July, District Officials of the B.L.M.G., Berlin have been appointed with small staffs attached to the Headquarters of the Armament and Naval District Committees with whom they work in close contact.

The sale of the arisings of the war material (destroyed under the order of the Commissions of Control) has been carried out since the Armistice for the account of the German Government, and it has been found expedient to negotiate with a German Company known as the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft to act as Special Agents and Warehousemen for the safe keeping, etc., of the arisings resulting from the destruction of war material.

A Contract was signed on the 5th November between the B.L.M.G. and the R.T.H.G.

The Reparation Commission will pay the R.T.H.G. a commission calculated on the monies received from the sale of material as from 5th November 1920. The sale of arisings of war material concerned under Articles 169, 192 and 202 has been contrary to the Treaty, and the R.T.H.G. will supply the B.L.M.G. with full particulars of contracts, agreements, etc., of all sales made by official and unofficial organisations. A commission will be paid on the monies received from the German Government on account of the

<sup>1</sup> This report was submitted at a meeting in the British Embassy at Berlin on November 8, and a copy was sent on the same day under cover of despatch No. 1145 (not printed) to the Foreign Office where it was received on November 17.



sales which have been effected as from the 11th July 1920 up to the date of the signature of the above contract.

It is not known the actual amounts which will be obtained from these two sources, but it is estimated that it will run into several milliards of Marks. The monies received will be allocated amongst the Allies in definite proportions as laid down at the Spa Conference, according to whether the arisings are of naval, military, or aeronautical origin, etc.

It was considered necessary to employ the R.T.H.G. in view of the fact that the armaments and arisings which are yet to be sold are generally under the control of this Company on behalf of the German Government, and located in hundreds of depôts and thousands of factories throughout the German Empire. If this Company had not been employed it would have necessitated setting up a very large staff to act in a similar capacity; probably 4,000 would have been required, which would have taken about 6 months to organise, and it is hoped that this Company will carry out the work in a satisfactory manner. As a precaution heavy penalties are provided for against non-fulfilment of the terms of the contract.

For economic reasons it has been decided in Paris that in principle the arisings will be sold to German nationals in order that it cannot be said at any later date that the economic life of the country had been seriously hampered owing to the export of enormous quantities of scrap materials, etc.

W. F. PRENTICE

*British Delegate, Reparation Commission, (B.L.M.G.)*

#### No. 406

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1213 Telegraphic [C 10569/8/18]*

*Very Urgent.*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 9, 1920, 7 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 1303<sup>1</sup> led us to think that French Government accepted our proposals subject to two modifications to which we should have been prepared to agree. But French note as communicated by you in your telegram No. 1304<sup>2</sup> and as telegraphed in substance from Paris to the 'Times'<sup>3</sup>—a proceeding for which an explanation seems to us to be required—contains a number of variations which we are unwilling to adopt.

1. The experts at Brussels were to be designated not by the Reparation Commission but by their respective Governments. We cannot cede this point.

2. The French note qualifies the reference to reparation in paragraph 2 by adding the words 'montant total de la dette et examen de la capacité de paiement de l'Allemagne'. Are these words intended to limit the scope of the enquiry at the Geneva Conference and if so in what way?

<sup>1</sup> No. 402.

<sup>2</sup> No. 403.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 404, n. 1.

3. It was agreed that the representatives at Geneva should be Ministers. The French text only speaks of representatives. We assume that Ministers will be sent but should be glad of a definite assurance to that effect.

4. The French have given a rather unkind turn to the reference to capacity in which German Ministers are to appear. There seems to be no need to state this in conditional rather than positive form.

For these reasons we hope that French Government will revert to position reported by you in your telegram No. 1303 in which case the incident may be regarded as closed.

#### No. 407

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11, 11.30 a.m.)*

*No. 1319 Telegraphic [C 10972/8/18]*

*Urgent*

*PARIS, November 10, 1920, 10.20 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 1213.<sup>1</sup>

I have seen Monsieur Berthelot who assures me that French Government agree with substance of your proposals and that only matters of wording have been separating two Governments.

As regards paragraph 1 of French note of November 6th,<sup>2</sup> they had thought it would meet your wishes, as it was obvious that, as members of Brussels Conference were to be representatives of their Governments, National delegates to Reparations Commission would of course have to take their Government's orders as to their selection. However, as you cannot accept French text French Government would find another. They cannot accept text you furnished me with because it would tie them to sending Monsieur Dubois to Brussels and they do not want to be so tied. They suggest following as simplest formula (translate following into French) meeting at Brussels of Allied technical experts sitting with German experts. (End of French.) This gives Government right to appoint delegates to Brussels and to choose them where they please.

As regards paragraph 2 about Geneva they are quite willing that point about Minister shall be made clear and propose paragraph in this note shall begin with following words in French.

(A) 'Conference of Allied Ministers shall meet at Geneva after plebiscite etc.'

(B) They had no intention of limiting scope of Geneva Conference by words in brackets and to remove any misapprehension propose to insert word 'etc' after word 'Germany'.

(C) They agree to strike out word 'only' as requested by you.

Please let me know whether these alterations meet your views.

<sup>1</sup> No. 406.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 403.

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11, 11.15 p.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [C 11243/8/18]*

*Very Urgent. Private*

PARIS, November 11, 1920, 9.15 p.m.

Monsieur Leygues sent for me today and handed me Note<sup>1</sup> which corresponds absolutely with information sent you last night in my telegram No. 1319.<sup>2</sup> He asks for an early reply and he also asks for something which I think will amuse you—permission to publish the Note as soon as you have approved.

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the note as finally agreed see *Documents relatifs aux réparations*, vol. i, p. 69. Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. ii, p. 441.

<sup>2</sup> No. 407.

*Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 3)*

*No. 3587 [C 12847/8/18]*

PARIS, December 2, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who left for London last night,<sup>1</sup> called upon me yesterday afternoon to return my visit of the day before.

He told me that he intended to raise the question of reparation by Germany on his return to London, and showed considerable excitement when I observed that I thought the question was in a fair way of being settled. He denied that this was the case and declared that it was absolutely necessary for an agreement to be arrived at amongst the Allies to compel Germany to carry out her obligations. I pointed out to him that it was generally realised in England that it would be absolutely impossible to carry out the intention, at one time proclaimed by both the French and British Governments, to extract from Germany payment of the whole cost of the war. I felt, however, doubtful whether the French Government had as yet succeeded in persuading the French people that such a demand would be impossible to fulfil.

M. Leygues replied that the views of the French Government were most reasonable. France had suffered greater losses, both in men and in material prosperity, than any other country, and she was therefore entitled to a first claim on German resources. She would be obliged to provide, in the next budget, 16 milliards for the devastated regions. According to the Treaty, the Germans should provide the whole of this sum, but they professed to be unable to contribute more than two or three milliards. The French Government, could not, he said, accept this as sufficient. The French public were

<sup>1</sup> M. Leygues had come to London to take part in the Second Conference of London (Nov. 26–Dec. 4, 1920): see Volume VIII, Chap. XIV.

already heavily taxed and would object to continuing this contribution towards German finances; indeed, any Government which persisted in such a policy would undoubtedly forfeit the support of the Chamber.

M. Leygues said that the French Government would be perfectly satisfied if the German Government would, as a proof of their sincerity, pay in the forthcoming year six to eight milliards instead of two to three. The French Government are absolutely convinced that such a payment is within the power of the German Government; and they are equally convinced that it will be made if the French Government receive the support which they now ask from their Allies in their demand from the German Government. It was not, M. Leygues assured me, the desire of the French Government to make any unreasonable or excessive demand, but it was vital that France should obtain the support of her Allies in this matter in order to prove to the world that no disagreement existed between them.

M. Leygues added that the persons who accused the French Government of militarism did not realise that France was obliged to maintain a sufficient force to enable her to demand territorial guarantees in the event of her not receiving what was legally due to her from Germany. Such a course would however be very distasteful to the present French Government and he trusted that events would so shape themselves as to prevent any danger of himself and his colleagues being forced into such action by the pressure of public opinion.

I have, &c.,

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

#### No. 410

*Letter from Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Earl Curzon*

[Confidential/General/363/15]

*Private and confidential*

BRUSSELS, December 5, 1920

Dear Lord Curzon,

As I told you in my private and confidential letter of the 26th ultimo, Delacroix promised to let me know the result of any conversations which he might have on the subject of the Reparation question when he next went to Paris.

I dined with him last night. Jaspar,<sup>1</sup> Theunis (the new Minister of Finance), and Franqui (the well-known financier, who is supposed to be a great political wire-puller), were present. After dinner, Delacroix told me that he had been unable to see François-Marsal, but he had had a long conversation with Poincaré. The latter informed him that he had not been in favour of the occupation of Frankfort, nor of the recognition of Wrangel. He said, as regards the Frankfort occupation, that it had been a mistake on

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government formed by M. Carton de Wiart on November 20 following the resignation of M. Delacroix on November 3.

the part of the French Government to act without their other Allies. Delacroix asked him whether he accepted the decisions of the Boulogne Conference as regards the reparation sums to be demanded from Germany. Apparently, Poincaré answered in the affirmative, but talked round the subject in a way which—so it seems to me—left the door open for future reserves. He said, amongst other things, that, supposing the figures in question were accepted, the Reparation Commission should nevertheless continue their task of estimating the total damage inflicted by Germany. Having assessed the amount which Germany could, by the Treaty of Versailles, be called upon to pay, negotiations might be initiated with Germany in the course of which she would be told the full sums which could rightly be demanded from her, and informed that if a lesser sum were accepted (presumably that of the Boulogne Conference) she must in return give the Allies guarantees that this latter sum would be paid. These guarantees would consist in giving the Allies the right of control of her Customs, or the takings of her railways. Poincaré criticized the policy of fixing what Germany *could* pay because her capacity to pay was at present zero; therefore there would be no 'point de départ' at all. It must be laid down what she *ought* to pay.

Delacroix had a conversation with Dubois, the French Reparation Commissioner, and put to him the same question, namely whether he accepted the figures settled at the Boulogne Conference. Again the answer was in the affirmative, but with qualifying circumlocutions. Delacroix hopes to see Marsal this week.

Delacroix talked to Poincaré also about the question of the possible occupation of the Ruhr Basin. Poincaré spoke in a very re-assuring way about this matter saying it was only a Sword of Damocles held over Germany's head. I observed to Delacroix that this Sword of Damocles had been on the point of descending on Germany's head already, as he would remember, having been at Spa! I added that I should be interested to hear what Ministers, such as François-Marsal, said about all these questions, for neither Millerand nor Poincaré were really responsible for the conduct of French policy; and, even when Ministers said something, one could not be sure, such was the uncertainty and variable nature of French policy, that what they said or thought at one moment, would represent what they would say or think a month later.

I asked Delacroix whether he had had the impression that Poincaré had in his mind the idea of coming back into Power. He replied that he thought so. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Yours very truly,

GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of the letter recorded Sir G. Grahame's comments on a tentative idea of M. Delacroix that France might consent to the withdrawal from Germany of the Allied armies of occupation 'if England would make some kind of defensive alliance with France against a German attack'.

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received December 10, 11.45 a.m.)*

*No. 622 Telegraphic [C 13512/8/18]*

BERLIN, December 9, 1920, 9.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 387.<sup>1</sup>

My general impression from conversations here is that German Government do not propose at Brussels to put forward any definite offer of lump sum or annual payment but to invite delegates to examine whole financial and economic position of Germany together with German delegates in order to arrive at workable and elastic scheme which will consolidate German finance, avoid danger of bankruptcy and provide best result for creditors available in the circumstances. German delegates will be instructed to discuss all questions openly and sincerely on businesslike lines.

To make quite sure that I have not misrepresented views of German Government I have read substance of the above to Minister for Foreign Affairs who endorses them as correctly representing German view.

In my judgment above programme gives, on the whole, best chance of enduring result and of avoiding a crisis later which might easily occur if any cut and dried solution was offered or imposed prematurely.

Germany is in the position of a business which has got to be reconstructed after full examination and with a broad view of the future.

German Government will circulate further documents and material as soon as these can be printed. Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes to have a considerable portion ready by Saturday<sup>2</sup> and will communicate them to Embassy here.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added that he now hears Herr Bergmann may be able to come to Berlin sooner than he expected.

Germans have convoked all their experts for meeting here on December 13th and it is possible that they may be able to start for Brussels on December 13th night thus rendering possible a first meeting at Brussels on December 15th.<sup>3</sup>

I propose to start myself on December 11th evening unless there is some fresh development.

Repeated to Paris and Brussels.

<sup>1</sup> On the file the number has been corrected to 371. Of December 8, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> December 11.

<sup>3</sup> For the meeting of financial experts at Brussels see *Documents relatifs aux réparations*, vol. i, pp. 69 ff., and *Sammlung von Aktenstücken über die Verhandlungen auf der Sachverständigenkonferenz zu Brüssel vom 16 bis 22 Dezember 1920* (Berlin, 1921).

No. 412

*Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)*

*No. 4094 [C 14230/2018/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 21, 1920*

My Lord,

The question whether it is desirable that His Majesty's Government should exercise their rights under paragraph five of Annex III to part VIII of the treaty of Versailles, whereby Germany is compelled to build merchant ships in German yards for the account of the Allied and Associated Governments in the five years following the entry into force of the treaty, has recently been under the consideration of the Cabinet. It was suggested that the question is one which might conveniently be discussed at the forthcoming conference at Geneva.

2. In communicating this suggestion to the French Government I should be glad if Your Excellency would ascertain their views on the desirability or otherwise of the exercise of the rights of the Allied Governments under this portion of the treaty.<sup>1</sup>

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State)  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

<sup>1</sup> In a subsequent telegram No. 1318 of December 24 (not printed) Lord Curzon suggested on the advice of the Ministry of Shipping that the discussion should be initiated by Sir J. Bradbury. In his despatch No. 1 of January 1 (not printed) Lord Hardinge replied that in Sir J. Bradbury's view, since the matter was necessarily bound up with the shipping questions being considered by the Brussels Conference, the best course would be to hold the matter in suspense until that Conference was concluded.

PART II  
PLEBISCITES

CHAPTER VI

The Plebiscite in Schleswig  
January 10—July 10, 1920

No. 413

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received January 11, 10.30 a.m.)*  
*No. 18 Telegraphic [169527/548/30]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, January 10, 1920, 6.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 1788 of January 5th.<sup>1</sup>

Following from Colonel Trew<sup>2</sup> to Foreign Office for Admiralty and to Sir (? C. Marling)<sup>3</sup> and Admiral Shepherd [*sic*].<sup>4</sup>

Begins.

Cancel my telegram of yesterday as regards early despatch of French battalion to Flensburg. French representative considers it inadvisable that single French battalion should take over whole plebiscite area except for two or three days.

For the purposes of evacuation whole plebiscite zone of Schleswig is divided into (? six) areas by line running East and West.

Northernmost area will be first area; 1 [*sic*] to South of it second area and so on.

Area wherein Flensburg lies will be sixth area.

Evacuation by German troops of first area will take place on 9th day after Treaty comes into force. Evacuation of second area on 10th day after Treaty comes into force and so on, allowing one day per area.

Allied troops are not to arrive in areas until dates fixed for evacuation.

Detachments of French troops will arrive at Haderfleben, Apenrade and Sonderburg as areas in which these towns are situated are evacuated, that is on 9th, 11th and 12th days after Treaty comes into force.

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (see Volume V, No. 345, n. 1) Sir E. Crowe, then head of the British Peace Delegation in Paris, said that he had learnt from telegram No. 4 of January 4 from Sir C. Marling that the Plebiscite Commission had made no arrangements for the German military evacuation of the Schleswig area.

<sup>2</sup> A member of the staff of the Allied Forces in Schleswig temporarily in Paris; cf. Volume V, No. 345, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> H.M. Minister at Copenhagen and President of and British representative on the International Commission for Schleswig.

<sup>4</sup> Rear-Admiral T. D. L. Sheppard, Chief of the Allied Force of occupation in the Schleswig area.



German officers would like to meet officers of Admiral Shepherd's staff at Flensburg Hof at Flensburg on 9th day after Treaty comes into force.

Unless any further alterations are made, details of which above is a rough summary, will form (? part of) Protocol which is to be signed today.

A further meeting to discuss a minor matter will take place today.

An initial delay of 8 days has been accorded to Germany in order to give time for Delegates to return to Berlin and to enable necessary orders to be issued by Germans for evacuation of their troops. Evacuation will therefore commence on 9th day. Delays of even greater length have been accorded to other plebiscite areas.

Repeated to Copenhagen.

**No. 414**

*Sir C. Marling (Copenhagen) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*

*Unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [170145/548/30]*

*Most Urgent*

*COPENHAGEN, January 13, 1920*

Following for Supreme Council.

I now learn through Admiral from Flensburg that German evacuation will not be completed till 14th or 15th day. As this is not in accordance with Treaty, am I to understand, as a local paper has suggested, that a special arrangement prolonging period allowed for evacuation from 10 to 15 days has been made between Supreme Council and Germany? I have received no information whatever beyond bare fact of exchange of ratifications, and ignorance in which Commission has been left, has thrown all arrangements out and is producing great confusion.

Please reply immediately to this and to my enquiry re military arrangements<sup>2</sup> and please repeat to Admiral.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 40 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on January 14 at 8.25 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 413, n. 1.

**No. 415**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Mr. Grant Watson<sup>1</sup> (Copenhagen)*

*(Received January 15, 10.45 a.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [Confidential/General/140]<sup>2</sup>*

*PARIS, January 14, 1920, 11.40 p.m.*

Your tel. of Jan. 12th.<sup>3</sup>

Please see Colonel Trew's tel. to you of Jan. 10th.<sup>4</sup> Colonel Trew will give you fuller information on arrival.

Plebiscite in Northern Zone should take place three weeks from complete evacuation from about Jan. 24th. In view of this delay in evacuation I presume interval will be adequate for you to complete arrangements.

<sup>1</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Copenhagen and acting Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of Sir C. Marling.

<sup>2</sup> This is the file number of the archives of the International Commission for Schleswig deposited in the Foreign Office.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> No. 413.

**No. 416**

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received January 28, 2.25 p.m.)*

*No. 1 Telegraphic [174191/548/30]*

FLENSBURG, January 27, 1920, 3.10 p.m.

International Commission arrived Flensburg yesterday without incident.

**No. 417**

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received February 12, 10.5 p.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [178078/548/30]*

FLENSBURG, February 11, 1920, 11.30 p.m.

Following sent today Paris No. 5.

Following for Council Ambassadors. Plebiscite in Northern zone gives 75% votes for Denmark out of total votes cast 100,400. This is preliminary count only.

Repeated to Foreign Office and Copenhagen.

**No. 418**

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received February 26)*

*No. 1 [181210/548/30]*

FLENSBURG, February 12,<sup>1</sup> 1920

My Lord,

1. Although no official intimation was vouchsafed by the Supreme Council in Paris to the Slesvig Commission as to the day fixed for the exchange of Ratifications it was abundantly made clear before the close of the year, that that date was not far distant and the International Commission accordingly set to work to complete its dispositions. Three questions of importance were still outstanding:

- (1) the agreement with Germany relative to the exchange of coal &c. for cattle and dairy produce from the plebiscite area
- (2) the provision of corn for the towns and
- (3) Danish occupation of the first zone.

2. The first of these was easily terminated. A draft agreement had been drawn up as long ago as October 6th but never completed as Landrath Boehme<sup>2</sup> had never been able to furnish the figures of the weekly delivery of coal which Germany was to undertake in return for a weekly delivery of 390 head of cattle and 35,000 kilos. of butter &c. from Slesvig to Germany. An examination of the agreement by Professor Mölgaard<sup>3</sup> on behalf of the Com-

<sup>1</sup> Drafted on February 9.

<sup>2</sup> Former German representative on the Schleswig Commission.

<sup>3</sup> Danish member of the Comité de Ravitaillement instituted by the Schleswig Commission.

mission resulted in the disclosure that while the cattle were easily obtained owing to the fact that so large numbers have been imported from South Slesvig and Holstein that the stock in North Slesvig is now proportionally greater than in Denmark, it was quite impossible, owing to the lack of food-stuffs for these cattle, for the plebiscite area to produce anything like 35,000 kilos. of butter weekly. Similarly Landrath Boehme admitted that Germany would not be able to supply coal to anything like an amount equal to the deliveries of cattle and butter from Slesvig. The agreement was accordingly modified so as to make it as elastic as possible, the quantities of the various commodities specified therein being regarded as maximum quantities, while a schedule of relative prices was attached which would enable the Commission to ascertain at any moment whether the bargain was being observed, and, if not which party was the defaulter. The agreement was signed on January 12th.

(2) The victualling question was more complicated. We had been constantly warned that we should encounter great opposition if we endeavoured to requisition grain of all sorts from the producers at the maximum prices fixed according to German Law. The unwillingness of the peasant to part with his produce on those terms was natural enough seeing that he could employ it much more profitably for feeding his cattle, or could smuggle it out of the country, or, if obliged to keep it, would be able to sell it after the plebiscite for good Danish Kroner instead of at a very low fixed rate payable in depreciated marks. The question also assumed a political complexion from the fact that there is practically no grain in the southern zone, so that in the eyes of the farmers in the northern zone the requisition was to be made in the first zone for the benefit of Flensburg—'German' Flensburg—which on account of its size would profit more than all the other urban areas put together; so strong was this feeling that the Danes of the first zone were said to be working against Danish interests in the second. As none of us are [*sic*] familiar with Slesvig we were unable to form an independent judgment dependent on knowledge of the character of the people; but certainly the peasantry and farming class were represented to us in the most unamiable light, and perfectly ready to sacrifice their traditional national aspirations for the sake of their pockets. It was said that they would forcibly oppose requisitioning, and if Danish troops once appeared we could not hope to get a single ounce of grain in the first zone. In the circumstances, Professor Mølgaard proposed that the difference between the German fixed price and the current Danish price for all requisition[s] should be made good to the producers by the Danish Government by means of a deferred payment in Kroner. The postponement of payment was an innocent device to veil what might clearly be represented as an inducement held out by Denmark to the voter, and the Danish offer—for such it was—could not be accepted except with the expressed consent of Germany. For the moment there seemed to be a fair prospect that this would be accorded, for although Landrath Boehme received the scheme with cautious reserve, Staats Kommissar Köster<sup>4</sup> was

<sup>4</sup> See § 4 below, and Volume IX, No. 380.

confident that it was acceptable. Eventually it was put forward in what seemed to be a much more harmless form, *viz.*, that the Danish Government would be charged with the supplementary payments incurred in those districts which became Danish and Germany with the payments incurred in those which remained German. This arrangement could not possibly affect the vote, but at the same time the financial obligation would in practice fall wholly on Denmark for, as remarked above, there is little or no grain left in the second zone where alone is there a prospect of any territory remaining to Germany. The scheme in the form of an agreement between Germany and Denmark was however rejected by Germany on the ground that it would form a precedent which if followed in other plebiscite areas might not improbably lead the populations all over Germany to refuse requisitions. It is not quite clear to me how this would occur, but such was the gist of Landrath Boehme's verbal explanations. As Germany had refused all co-operation, the Commission considered the three alternatives left to it, *viz.*: (i) to accept the Danish offer *tel quel*, (ii) to adopt the system of supplementary payments and add the cost to the expenses of the Commission payable by the Danish and German Governments, (iii) to requisition, if necessary by force, without any supplementary payments at all. Proposals (ii) and (iii) were discarded, the former as being too complicated and the latter impracticable, and the Commission adopted a modification of (i) under which the Danish Government is to sell grain to the Commission at German maximum prices in force in Slesvig—the cost being recovered by the sale of the grain to the bakers in Flensburg. The advantage of the scheme was its great simplicity, and its disadvantage lay in the fact that as it involved a considerable loss to the Danish Government the Commission would be open to a charge of affording Denmark an opportunity to influence the voting. Against this however it was argued that Germany had refused to co-operate in a perfectly unobjectionable and to her costless scheme, and it was decided that when the proposal was communicated to the German Government it should be accompanied by an offer to include the resulting loss in the general expenses of the Commission. The decision seems a weak one and as a matter of fact the Commission would have preferred to take the strong line and impose requisitions. This however is impracticable, as the grain has not been threshed out, and the Commission could neither have found the means to transport the stacks to Flensburg, nor, if they could, is there any threshing machinery available. To force the farmers to thresh would have been exceedingly difficult; they had insufficient fuel for their threshing machinery, and if it had been forthcoming they would probably have *saboté* their own machines.

(3) The more the question of a Danish occupation of the first zone immediately after the declaration of the result of the first plebiscite was studied, the more undesirable and the more impossible did it appear; all the Commissioners were frankly opposed to it, not only on account of the practical difficulties it would engender, but also because of the political effect it seemed likely to have on the voting in the second zone. This view

was also shared by the Danish Government, whose chief preoccupation seemed to be to discover some means by which the responsibility for deciding against occupation should not fall on their shoulders, and lay them open to attack in Parliament. The Government apparently would have liked to leave the question open, and trust to the Commission insisting, when the moment came, on conditions which could not be carried out without considerable preparation for which there would be no time; but an enquiry from the German delegate to the Commission whether the occupation would take place or not debarred evasion, and the Commission in order to be able to reply to Landrath Boehme addressed an official communication to the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on January 11th pointing out the various difficulties involved and inviting the Danish Government to concur in the view that occupation was on the whole impracticable. The Danish reply, after concurring in the Commission's view, expressed the hope that instead of occupation the Commission would agree to the despatch of officials to prepare the ground for the eventual definitive transfer of sovereignty over Slesvig to Denmark. To this of course the Commission assented, and the arrangement was verbally communicated to Staats Kommissar Dr. Köster.

3. With these three questions settled or in fair way of settlement, the Commission's sole anxiety in view of the impending exchange of Ratifications was to obtain from the Supreme Council in Paris reasonable notice of the date decided on. A carefully thought out time-table working from a zero date and showing the exact number of days counting from that zero date which could be allowed for the formation of the plebiscite registration and supervising committees, for the hearing of appeals in registration cases, publication of registration lists &c., was quite ready to be printed and only awaited the filling-in of dates. This may sound unnecessarily meticulous, but it must be remembered that the Commission had but three weeks to prepare and check a practically new register of voters out of a scattered rustic population of some 200,000 souls. When we were in Paris at the end of November, both Admiral Sheppard and I were assured that five days' notice would certainly be given us, but the insistence of the statements of a semi-official character in the press that the 10th January was fixed for the exchange of Ratifications inspired the Commission with no little anxiety that no notice at all or insufficient notice would be given. Repeated telegrams elicited no reply from the Supreme Council, and the only warning received arrived actually after the exchange had taken place. Colonel Trew, who had been called to Paris to arrange for the evacuation of German troops, sent off a telegram on the 9th<sup>5</sup> which arrived in a very mutilated condition especially as regards dates and was delivered on the 12th. His message however was enough to show that some elaborate arrangement involving a prolongation of the period allowed for evacuation—on which the whole of our time-table depended—had been made, but exactly what we did not learn in time to be of any use. Indeed up to the moment of writing this report (9th February) the Commission has not received a copy of the Paris Protocol<sup>6</sup> of the 10th

<sup>5</sup> Presumably No. 413, i.e. Col. Trew's telegram of the 10th.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 413.

January relating to the evacuation of Slesvig. The neutral members of the Commission were not a little annoyed by the lack of consideration shown to them by the Supreme Council, which has entailed a large amount of unnecessary work and some little confusion, which would have been avoided by the despatch of a short telegram. A further unlucky accident for the Commission was that the 10th of January fell on a Saturday, so that as the printers do not work on Sunday a valuable day was lost in getting out the necessary notices.

4. Mr. Brudenell-Bruce, Assistant Commissioner and Secretary-General, went down to Flensburg on the 14th, to organise the office &c. and took with him various officers of the Commission whose duty it was to get the plebiscite committees and control commissions formed and working, and arrange for the distribution of voting registers to them, open the passport office, [and] arrange for issue of frontier circulation cards. He had also to see that the officials appointed by the Commission to replace the evacuated German officials, Landräthe, Amtsvorsteher, &c., were ready to take up their duties, that the reorganisation of the gendarmerie and taking over of police was [*sic*] carried out, and finally make arrangements to secure that the Germans carried out punctually the provisions of the still unknown protocol of 10th January. Thanks to his tact, energy and capacity for command Mr. Brudenell-Bruce managed to get his heterogeneous team in hand, and by the time the Commissioners themselves arrived on the 26th, its machinery was in some kind of working order. Mr. Bruce had no serious difficulties with the German authorities and Staats Kommissar Dr. Köster, who has replaced Landrath Boehme as the accredited delegate of the German Government, has done his best to avoid friction. Meantime Rear-Admiral Sheppard C.B. in H.M.S. 'Carysfort' and the French cruiser 'Marseillaise' had already arrived in Flensburg Fiord on the 11th, and the French troops, a battalion of 22nd Chasseurs, had been arriving in successive detachments according to the plan prepared by the French General Staff in Paris for the gradual evacuation by the German troops of the plebiscite area by zones beginning in the north. The German evacuation was duly completed by the 24th without any incident whatever, and from that day the plebiscite period commenced. The Commissioners came from Copenhagen by special train reaching Flensburg at midday, and were received with a suitable guard of honour at the station by Admiral Sheppard. They are lodged at the Flensborger Hof which has been hired for the purpose, and their offices have been installed at the Officers' Casino. Except for the Passport Office, which for the first few days was quite snowed under by applications, especially for frontier circulation cards for which a new arrangement has been made, the Commission arrangements have on the whole worked surprisingly well. Only one incident has occurred, *viz.*, in connection with the evacuation of Dr. Todsen, the late Oberbürgermeister. This official is one of those who under the Treaty has to be evacuated, but in the earlier days of its work at Copenhagen, the Commission yielding to a certain extent to the representations of Landrath Boehme as to the hardship of causing an official whom he described as

worthy and inoffensive to leave his home for two months or more, deemed that the terms of the Treaty would be sufficiently satisfied if Dr. Todsén evacuated his office, but of course with the proviso that his presence or conduct would not affect the impartiality of the plebiscite. On arrival however we came to the conclusion that Dr. Todsén's influence among the minor officials, and especially with the police whose chief he has been for some twenty years, would continue, and it was decided that he must leave, forty-eight hours being given him for the purpose. As Dr. Todsén himself expected to be expelled and had even asked Mr. Bruce that 'he should not be suddenly removed by soldiers in the middle of the night' there was really nothing to complain of. However, it came to our ears that a demonstration was to be made before his house on the day of his departure and as this was obviously an impertinence to the Commission, the demonstration was forbidden. It then transpired that the police were about to hold a private meeting when they would decide whether they would continue service under the Commission. This meeting was likewise prohibited, and the police were informed that any member of the force who declined to obey orders would be *ipso facto* dismissed. This measure was necessitated by the belief that if called on to prevent the demonstration in favour of their old chief, the police might refuse to do so. It had also been noticed that civilians, obviously officers, had been constantly talking to the men when on duty, and altogether it seemed on the cards that some action might be attempted merely to try the temper of the Commission. The Commission was only too pleased to have an opportunity of showing they meant to be masters, and accordingly two companies of Sherwood Foresters—who had arrived on the 28th—were brought into the town from Mürwik and dispositions were made by Admiral Sheppard in case any demonstration were attempted. Nothing occurred however. The police meeting also was abandoned and the general belief is that we shall have no more attempts of the kind, and that the police will prove perfectly trustworthy. There is singularly little agitation in the town. The local press on the whole is moderate in tone; it finds very little to say by way of criticism of the Commission, and its remarks are usually harmless. Nor can it be said that the newspaper polemic on either side is specially bitter. The appearance of foreign troops excites little or no remark and even the presence of the Sherwood Foresters' band on the occasion of the British taking over the guard from the French marines for the first time attracted only children.

5. A variety of questions have of course come up for decision since our arrival, but only a few are worth citing here. The point which has given rise to most discussion is whether officials who have to be evacuated under the Treaty but who possess the voting qualifications may exercise the vote. The question was first examined at Copenhagen in August in connection with the case of Dr. Todsén (the Oberbürgermeister already mentioned in this despatch), and the Commission then came to the conclusion that evacuation under the Treaty could not annul the right to vote, and, in consequence of another individual case that cropped up, further placed on record the opinion that functionaries liable to evacuation might remain in

the plebiscite area *provided they owned the house they inhabited*, and of course on condition of irreproachable conduct. Further consideration brought about another modification; the property qualification of owning his house was abandoned and the privilege of remaining was to be accorded to *elected* but not to nominated officials. The final decision was only reached after the arrival of the Commission in Flensburg, and after reference to Paris had produced no ruling on the point. It was laid down that evacuated officials might exercise their right to vote by proxy. There are only four officials concerned. The ordinance of the Commission prohibiting officials from taking part in the political campaign has been looked upon as a severe blow to the German party. Of its justice and of its necessity if the two parties are to have equal opportunity there can be no question. As is well known, Government officials and particularly the clergy and the teaching profession have been the great instrument of political education in Germany for years past, and during the present campaign have naturally been made great use of in the German interest, for of course the very great majority of the pastors and teaching staff are German. Danes there are, of course, but they are few in number and would not until after the arrival of the Commission have been permitted to agitate in favour of union with Denmark. Undoubtedly the measure has hit the Germans hard and Dr. Köster has complained of it as unneutral, but he has been assured that it will be enforced as rigorously against the Danes as against the Germans. It is a kind of neutrality at which the Germans, who had been previously pleasantly surprised at the impartiality of the Commission, are disposed to kick.

6. The Germans have another grievance against the Commission in the alteration of the date of the plebiscite in the southern zone. Shortly after our arrival we called together a meeting of Landraths, Technical Advisers, and others, nineteen in all, to discuss that date and under a certain amount of pressure from the Swedish and Norwegian Commissioners who attended to represent the Commission and who urged the advisability on general grounds of shortening the period as much as possible, the 7th March was agreed on unanimously in spite of the opinion expressed by some of the Danes that that date would put them at a disadvantage. A few days later, however, a numerous signed petition from the Danish side asking for a prolongation was received, and we accordingly asked four representatives of the two parties to meet the Commission and discuss the question again. The Danes represented that although they could quite well manage their registration business in the time available if the plebiscite took place on 7th March it did not give them time to examine and challenge German claims to registration: the Germans had had five or six months to prepare their claims and had had the zealous assistance of the local officials, archivists, registrars, clergy, &c., whereas the Danes had only been able to start that work a fortnight ago, and even now do not find the same willing spirit among the German officials; moreover whereas in Flensburg town, the centre of interest, the Germans expected to poll 8,000 outvoters, the Danes did not expect more than 2,000; this meant that the Danes had four times as many enemy votes to examine



with a view to challenging as the Germans, and they therefore claimed an extension. The German representatives had no reply to these arguments and the Commission decided at once to postpone the plebiscite to the 14th March, i.e. to within two days of the latest possible date allowed by the Treaty. Our action will no doubt be represented as another instance of the anti-German tendencies of the Commission.

7. So far the period of the Commission's administration has been without serious incident, though the newspapers have of course endeavoured to magnify trifles. The French troops have in small ways shown their animus against the Hun by such incidents as the removal of a statue of Blücher at their barracks at Mürwik and it is said that they have torn down German political placards; and there have of course been mutual accusations between the two parties of disturbing each other's meetings, while windows displaying party appeals have been smashed. The German customs have tried to hold up paper for the pro-Danish newspapers and Danish flags, but this was of course at once dealt with by the Commission. It would be difficult to imagine a less spirited contest.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

#### No. 419

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received February 27)*

*No. 214 Telegraphic: by bag [181377/7067/39]*

PARIS, February 25, 1920

Following for Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (4) Sir Charles Marling recently suggested that the Conference of Ambassadors should notify the German Government that during the period elapsing between the plebiscite in the Second Schleswig zone and the definite delimitation of the new Danish-German boundary, it should be understood that the present Schleswig Commission should continue to administer the whole of the territories submitted to the plebiscite. The Conference held that Article 110 of the Treaty clearly implies that the Plebiscite Commission should continue to exercise its functions until the new frontier has been actually [de]limited. Sir Charles Marling is to be informed accordingly. At the same time the Conference decided that it would be undesirable to make any notification to the German Government lest they should attempt to attach conditions to their agreement. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received March 19)**No. 2 [186556/548/18]**Confidential*

FLENSBURG, March 1, 1920

My Lord,

In continuation of my despatch of February 9th,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that the Plebiscite in the First Zone of the Slesvig Area took place on the 10th February in perfect order. Although the Plebiscite officials at each voting station were instructed to send in the returns by telephone and telegraph, the last return was not received until the afternoon of the following day, while the final and definite results, which cannot be established until all the ballot boxes have been delivered, are not yet known.

The preliminary count however which is most unlikely to be modified materially by the later official returns showed an immense majority in favour of Denmark, viz. 74,887, as against 25,223 votes for Germany.<sup>2</sup> The poll was a very heavy one, over 90 per cent. of the voters having taken part. An analysis of the voting is being prepared in the Commission of which I propose to send Your Lordship a copy in a subsequent despatch.<sup>3</sup>

An incident which appears to most sober-minded people as absolutely devoid of importance occurred on the 11th February and has caused quite a flutter in Flensburg. Just before 5 o'clock in the afternoon the British and French flags, which with those of Norway and Sweden are flown over the Hotel where the Commissioners are lodged, were hauled down and the German and Slesvig-Holstein flags substituted for them. The fact was noticed in a very few minutes and the proper flags restored. A crowd collected in front of the Hotel and there was some little cheering of the German flag, but there was no kind of disturbance and the whole incident did not occupy a quarter of an hour. To my mind the thing was an amusing schoolboy trick obviously the work of one or two individuals and of no political importance; but unfortunately the French Commissioner has taken it tragically. At a meeting called at his request the next day he worked himself up to using absurd language and threats. He began by demanding the punishment of the officer (British) commanding the guard that furnishes the sentries at the front door of the Hotel, and then proposed that a fine should be levied on the Town! If it was impossible for the military guard to protect his flag, he would have it removed, and if his flag were removed, he would have to follow it. He would bring in his own troops who would know how to deal with Germans and would give them orders to use their arms. The transition from this to a vehement attack on the troops (British) in the town for not giving adequate support to the police was easy and M. Claudel having thus blown off steam, we got down to business. The Hotel was put under military protection and a sentry was placed over the four flags; Dr. Köster's apology has been published

<sup>1</sup> No. 418.<sup>2</sup> The final figures reported by Sir C. Marling in his despatch No. 4 of March 16 (not printed) were 75,431 for Denmark, 25,329 for Germany, and 882 spoilt cards.<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in despatch No. 4 of March 18, not printed.

in the papers; the police have been instructed to endeavour to find the offender, and the orders as regards cooperation between police and military, though they were already quite adequate in substance, have been made somewhat more explicit.

By the next morning M. Claudel's attitude had quite changed. He was obviously a good deal ashamed of his outburst of the preceding day and moreover, amusingly enough, it had meantime come to his knowledge that on the morning of the 10th the French Chasseurs Alpains, the crack regiment of which he is so proud, had woken up to find a German flag flying over the barracks they occupy. In the face of such an incident he could scarcely complain of the slackness of the British guard of eight men at a Hotel full of German servants. His explosion which was taken very quietly by all his colleagues has however had one good result, i.e. in calling attention to the necessity of which we were all aware, of getting rid of his protégé, Captain Daniel Bruun, the Commission's Chief of Police. This Danish officer who has been in French service and has had four years' experience in the Danish gendarmerie was appointed by M. Claudel as a member of the French Delegation and recommended by him as well qualified by training and experience to act as Chief of Police and Gendarmerie. Neither I nor the Swedish and Norwegian Commissioners had any previous personal acquaintance with him and we therefore accepted him, on my own part with no very great confidence, more especially as there was no one else available, and at the time the selection was made, i.e. in August, there seemed to be no time to look outside for a more suitable candidate. Long before the Commission came to Flensburg it was clear to me that Captain Bruun had not the requisite qualifications, but it was difficult to insist on his removal till his unfitness was proved. Since his arrival here his incapacity has been only too patent. With the possible exception of the Todsén affair, which I suspect was grossly exaggerated, there has not been one single incident since the Commission took over the administration which could possibly justify military intervention yet the police have four times sent in requests for it; it is true that the police is largely German, and that as the great majority of incidents are connected with tearing down Danish placards, or breaking windows where they are exhibited, it is to be expected that the police would rather sympathise with the offenders; but in no single instance has Captain Bruun ever been on the spot nor has he taken any special measures to prevent such incidents. He has merely given instructions that in any assemblage of a demonstrative nature, the military are to be called in. The call has always been answered but the military have found nothing to do. On this Captain Bruun has been complaining to M. Claudel that he does not get proper support. It appears that Captain Bruun is bitterly Anglophobe, and I am inclined to surmise that conscious of his own incapacity but being anxious to play a big part on our own little stage he has hoped by repeated complaints against the British troops to get M. Claudel to insist on French troops being brought in, confident that with their ineradicable propensity to treat Slesvig as a conquered enemy country they will dragoon the town under his instiga-

tion. Be this as it may M. Claudel the next morning sought Mr. Brudenell-Bruce who had been unable to attend the previous day's meeting and expatiated on the necessity of getting the police in hand and, as a first and essential step, of displacing Captain Bruun. An endeavour was made to do this with due regard for Captain Bruun's feelings, by inducing Mr. Hanssen-Nørremøller, Minister for Slesvig Affairs, to ask us to place at his disposal a high police official to study the future organisation of gendarmerie and police in the first zone, but after a great deal of hesitation Captain Bruun declined this solution and sent in his resignation, which was forthwith accepted.

The gendarmerie has been scarcely more satisfactory under Captain Bruun's direction than the police. This force, which is exclusively rural, is a creation of the Commission; the German gendarmerie which was composed almost entirely of ex-non-commissioned officers and privates of the old German army has been dissolved under the terms of the Treaty. Its ordinary work as a rural police has been quite creditable, but as in the case of the Flensburg town police it has proved useless when it has been called on to preserve order or protect the rights of a minority party in the matter of holding political meet[ing]s, while the supervision of the southern frontier which was entrusted to it has been very defective. To remedy this state of affairs in the gendarmerie it is now our intention to establish a gendarmerie post under Captain Tretow Loof at Laek in that part of the district of Tondern which falls within the second zone. All our information goes to show that Laek is the chief centre of illicit German propaganda activities in the western part of that zone, and it is also sufficiently near the southern boundary to make constant supervision of the frontier easy.

As regards replacing Captain Bruun, M. Hallgren, a high official of the Swedish police, will take over his duties but without receiving the title of Prefect of Police. He will also take over in large measure the work of Mr. Valdemar Sørensen, who as Bürgermeister holds the office of Polizeimeister. Mr. Sørensen was selected by the Commission for this important post because he had filled it before, shortly after the fall of the Empire, and because he might be expected as leader of the advanced socialists to exercise influence over the workmen who it was believed were likely under Spartacist instigation to prove unruly. Whether this is so or not has not yet been put to the proof, for there has so far been no sign of unrest in the shipping yards nor do the workmen appear to take any special interest in the plebiscite in which indeed only a minority is qualified to vote. Generally speaking, the population of Flensburg appears to be exceptionally peaceable and the only 'incidents' that have occurred, all very trivial, have been directly connected with the Plebiscite and have obviously been incited by professional politicians, particularly teachers and pastors. It is precisely with such matters that M. Sørensen has proved his incompetence to deal in a firm and impartial spirit, and he is moreover accused of being influenced by personal likes and dislikes. By transferring the work of Polizeimeister to M. Hallgren it is hoped to bring the police much more directly under the control of the Commission, as he is to work in very close touch with the Secretary General.

It has been found necessary to constitute a special tribunal to deal with cases of contravention of the Commission's ordinances dealing with interferences with the freedom of the vote, &c. In certain classes of cases, such as tearing down of proclamations, the ordinary German courts could take action, but in the majority of instances the offenders are Germans, and the punishments inflicted by the German magistrates have been totally inadequate. In others, such as the abuse of their official position by teachers and pastors to break up meetings, there is no offence under German law, and a special tribunal was necessary. It is composed of three judges, *viz.* the Secretary General of the Commission and the German and Danish Technical Advisers in legal questions, and though the accused are to be allowed the use of counsel, the proceedings will be as summary as possible. It is confidently expected that when a few examples have been made, these pestilent agitators will behave themselves.

The disposition of troops has been left practically undisturbed since their arrival, except that the small British detachment at Aabenraa, the town in the first zone where the Danish officials sent to study the problem of the eventual taking over of the administration have their office, has been recalled to Mürwik. But Rear-Admiral Sheppard is now making arrangements to send British detachments to the island of Sylt and to Laek, while the French detachments in Haderslev and Sønderborg are to be considerably reduced so as to strengthen the forces in this city.<sup>4</sup>

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

<sup>4</sup> In Foreign Office despatch No. 2 of March 27 (not printed) Lord Curzon expressed his approval of Sir C. Marling's 'attitude throughout these proceedings'.

## No. 421

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 6, 10.45 p.m.)*

*No. 256 Telegraphic [183498/548/18]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, March 6, 1920, 8.40 p.m.

Following from Bradbury for Chancellor of the Exchequer.

It was decided at Commission<sup>1</sup> today to allow Danish Government to put out a notice for electioneering purpose in connection with second Schleswig Plebiscite that Reparation Commission has consented to suspend delivery of Schleswig tonnage pending taking of Plebiscite, that in the event of vote being in favour of Germany immediate delivery will then be insisted on, but in the event of the vote being in favour of Denmark Danish Government will be allowed to hold the ships as trustee for Reparation Commission provided they undertake that they shall be disposed of in accordance with decisions of Commission taken after consideration of any claims which may be made by Danish Government on behalf of themselves or of Danish

<sup>1</sup> i.e. at the 21st meeting of the Reparation Commission.

Nationals under paragraph 20 of Annexe two of part 8 of Treaty. This notice is only to be published if the Danish Government agree to give undertaking above referred to. If and when such agreement is received the Reparation Commission will notify German Government that their requirements in regard to delivery of ships in question are suspended until further notice. I felt very great doubt about concurring in this decision but, in view of political importance attached by Council of Ambassadors to issue of such a statement without delay seeing that Plebiscite is to be taken on March 14th, I finally agreed, stipulating only that notice should be in above form which leaves Reparation Commission in a position, if it sees fit, ultimately to claim its full rights whatever they might be in respect to tonnage in question.

Please inform Ministry of Shipping.

**No. 422**

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received March 19)*

*No. 3 [186557/548/18]*

*Confidential*

FLensburg, March 7, 1920

My Lord,

The good results anticipated in my despatch No. 2 of the 1st instant<sup>1</sup> from the change in the command of the Police in this town have so far been justified by events. The special tribunal, the institution of which was mentioned in that despatch, finds nothing to do and during a big Danish meeting held on the 1st, perfect order was maintained by the civil force which has been strengthened by the addition of 25 mounted police. M. Hallgren indeed has now such confidence in his men, that he professes to be able to ensure complete order even on the day of the plebiscite without any assistance from the military. My colleagues and I are not however disposed to run any risks and at our request Vice-Admiral Sheppard<sup>2</sup> will make the necessary dispositions to have suitable bodies of troops ready, if called on, to come to the assistance of the police at any place where disturbance seems possible.

Among other precautionary measures we have prohibited the sale of spirits from the 12th to the 15th inclusive and also the display of national flags from private houses and shops and the carrying of banners in procession in the streets. The latter prohibition has aroused a good deal of resentment among the Germans but the reasons for making it are I think convincing. In the first place it is evident that such displays are quite likely to provoke attempts to tear down or seize the flags, which is sure to result in brawling which might easily get beyond the power of our small police force to quell, and in the second I am by no means sure that some of the French troops, who are quite incapable of curbing their hatred of everything German, would not them-

<sup>1</sup> No. 420.

<sup>2</sup> Rear-Admiral Sheppard had been promoted Vice-Admiral as from February 19, 1920.

selves attack the German flag. Although we have hushed them up as far as possible, there have unquestionably been several incidents of this kind and only a few days ago a party of French soldiers and sailors led by some of their officers attempted to rescue one of their number who had been arrested by the Commission's police for brawling in a café and brandishing a revolver, and taken to the Rathaus. Fortunately the officer on duty there was a Dane in the French Army and was wearing French uniform, so that there was no violence and I only quote the circumstance to show that the presence of French troops is not an unmixed blessing, and that their employment is quite as likely to lead to trouble as to prevent it. There is also some reason to think that the display of bunting might have some slight effect on the voting. The 'Deutsche[r] Ausschuss für Slesvig' at all events has informed us that they consider our prohibition as likely to hurt their cause, though they find it hard to give a plausible explanation. From the Danish side however we learn that German landlords, employers and shopkeepers are preparing to force their tenants and workpeople to display German colours, and it is believed that an overwhelming show of German flags will induce considerable numbers of weak-kneed Danes to vote German in the hope of escaping the after-resentment of the Germans, if as the show of German colours indicates, Flensburg remains German. After fifty years of German rule, Danes know only too well what to expect and most of those who like Advokat Ravn have been prominent in the Danish cause say openly that if Flensburg remains German they will be obliged to leave the town.

As the date of the Plebiscite approaches a little more activity is apparent in the campaign and the Danes have been distributing pamphlets in the streets in considerable quantities, but on the whole they have shown very little enterprise and no capacity for making use of their trump cards. So supine and timid have they been as to suggest the reflection that their leaders do not really wish to acquire Flensburg or any part of the Second Zone for Denmark, which would be quite in accord with the aims and wishes of Mr. H. P. Hanssen, the Danish Minister for Slesvig Affairs, and with the very prudent policy of the Zahle Cabinet. The Germans have not been much better. The 'Unser Slesvig,' a newspaper started for the express purpose of their cause, announced with a flourish of trumpets that the Allies had decided that territories separated from Germany would have to bear their share of the war debt. A moment's reflection shows that if this were true Slesvig and Flensburg would nevertheless gain enormously by becoming Danish, as they would not bear the burden alone but would share it with the whole of Denmark. I have not been able to discover that this simple reply was made by any Danish paper, and the Danish committees seem to have been content to let the lie do its work until it was contradicted by a Reuter's telegram. The Germans have also tried to make capital by raising the cry of autonomy for Slesvig Holstein. The movement was started avowedly in the German interest by a meeting at Rendsburg, a town in the Second Zone whence much of the German propaganda is directed, and three principal speakers went off to Berlin to lay before the Central Government the aspira-

tions of the two Duchies.<sup>3</sup> The German Government seems to have been a little taken by surprise and the deputation was received with vague sympathy, though it was of course expressed in the warmest terms compatible with a non-committal attitude. The feeling in favour of local autonomy is as a matter of fact a real factor though how it will affect the present issue it is difficult to say. It is a curious circumstance that the colours most worn by the population are the blue, white, red of Slesvig Holstein, while German colours are in a very small minority and the Dannebrog is totally absent. Various explanations are current, the most plausible being that the wearers are really pro-Danish but seek to cloak it under an ambiguous emblem, which at any rate is not Danish. Whatever significance this symptom may possess, most competent observers affirm that if the question at issue were the reconstruction of the Two Duchies, there is no doubt that the great majority of the population of Slesvig Holstein would vote in favour of it, and that the present method of dealing with the question by lopping off a part of Slesvig and attaching it to Denmark will not produce a final solution, but is only an additional complication. At the present juncture I doubt whether the attempt to resuscitate the two Duchies will have much influence on the plebiscite next week. The same cannot however be said of the question of the fate of the shipping registered in the port of Flensburg. Under Part VIII Annexe III of the Treaty of Peace Germany has to deliver by way of reparation to the Allies a very large part of her shipping, and this within two months of the coming into force of the Treaty, and the German Government has accordingly issued orders that all shipping that would be affected by these provisions are [*sic*] to be delivered to it by the 10th March, i.e. four days before the Plebiscite. The Danish Government has presented a closely reasoned memorandum to the Council of Ambassadors in Paris urging that the above-mentioned Annexe is not applicable in the case of territory that may be separated from Germany. The International Commission has also asked for a ruling on the point and for instructions whether the German Government's order for the delivery of the tonnage in question is to be executed in Flensburg or not. But in spite of repeated telegrams the Council has remained dumb till now though it is clear that in a town where staple industries are shipping and shipbuilding a great many voters will be influenced by a reply which may save or temporarily destroy those industries.

It would be idle to make forecasts in a despatch which may not reach Your Lordship's hands until the issue of the plebiscite is known, but I cannot refrain from quoting the opinion of a Danish friend that Denmark has no chance whatever of acquiring Flensburg, and this because the Danish Government and in particular Mr. Hanssen, whose personal interest is wholly bound up with the First Zone, do not want it.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

<sup>3</sup> The text of the resolution adopted at this meeting is printed (in French translation) by Franz de Jessen in his *Manuel historique de la question du Slesvig 1906-1938* (Copenhagen and Paris, 1939), pp. 401-2.



*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received March 19)*

*No. 68 [186481/548/18]*

COPENHAGEN, *March 13, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward to Your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch addressed to me by Captain the Hon. B. Freeman Mitford, R.N., Naval Attaché to this Legation, concerning some strategical aspects of the Slesvig frontier.

I have, &c.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 423

*Captain Mitford to Mr. Grant Watson*

*March 9, 1920*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that on the 5th of March my French Colleague, Capitaine de Vaisseau Lagrenée, asked me to meet Colonel With, of the Danish Army.

Capitaine de Vaisseau Lagrenée had been led to believe that Colonel With had been charged by the Danish General Staff to explain unofficially their view of the military importance of Denmark obtaining Flensburg and the 2nd Zone in the Slesvig Plebiscite.

As you will see from the Memorandum drawn up by my French Colleague on the subjects discussed<sup>1</sup> Colonel With expressly denies that he was charged with this mission, but I am in agreement with Captain Lagrenée that his views military and probably political do represent those of the Chiefs of the Army.

From the Naval and Military point of view there are two subjects mentioned which are of interest as representing (I believe) the views of the General Staff.

1. The importance of a tenable and suitable frontier to the South of Flensburg in case this port is returned to Denmark.
2. The question of pressure on the part of the Entente Powers being brought to bear on Denmark to make her bear her proper share of Armament as a member of the League of Nations.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. According to this memorandum Colonel With made five other main points concerning the plebiscite and the Danish frontier, namely: (1) that from the military point of view the Dannevirke was the only strategic line of defence possible for Denmark's limited forces; (2) that from the historical, ethnic, and economic points of view Schleswig formed an indivisible whole with Flensburg as its centre; (3) that the majority of the population of the third zone was Danophil; (4) that the non-evacuation of the third zone was unfortunate and would prejudice the election results in the second zone; and (5) that it was of the greatest importance for the Entente that Flensburg should be allotted to Denmark whatever the results of the voting on March 14.

As regards 1. In a war in which Denmark were opposed to Germany, unless the hills commanding that harbour and the approaches to the harbour were in Danish hands this port would be useless. Were Denmark a neutral, the harbour would be useless unless the approaches were in Danish hands and proof against Submarines.

As regards 2. I have already written to you on this subject, but as far as I was aware at that time this same view was only held by the Chief of Staff at the Admiralty. It is interesting to note that the probable future Prime Minister is said to be anxious to avail himself of this pressure to obtain money for the Crown forces, money which would not otherwise be forthcoming.

I have, &c.,

BERTRAM MITFORD,  
*Captain and Naval Attaché*

**No. 424**

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received March 15, 8.30 p.m.)*

*No. 5 Telegraphic [185505/548/18]*

FLensburg, March 15, 1920, 1.45 p.m.

Returns are not all in but it is clear that Danes will scarcely poll more than 25% in this town and 17% in country districts.

Repeated to Copenhagen and Paris.

**No. 425**

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received March 23)*

*No. 76 [187279/548/18]*

COPENHAGEN, March 19, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit the following observations showing the attitude of the Danes towards the result of the plebiscite in the 2nd Zone of Slesvig.

Whilst the Liberals and Social Democrats expected a German majority the Conservative party composed largely of the older generation who remembered the campaigns of the 'sixties earnestly hoped for a more favourable result especially in the country districts and appear unable to reconcile themselves to the loss of the 2nd Zone. Meetings, demonstrations and processions in favour of the annexation of Flensburg have been more numerous since the 14th than ever before. The nationalists have brought forward numerous arguments attributing the German majority to various causes such as lack of secrecy in the ballot boxes and consequent fear of Danes to be seen

voting Danish; general intimidation by the Germans, including threats of ejection from German landlords and the suppression of all news of the revolution in Germany.<sup>1</sup> They also state that the rumour that the 2nd Zone would become a British protectorate for some years had gained such ground that many Slesvigiers considered it immaterial which way they voted. The Conservatives are further organising protest meetings all over the country which has caused the Radicals and Social Democratic parliamentary groups to hold a meeting at which it was resolved that it was necessary to oppose the agitation in order that the Interallied Commission should not get a wrong impression of the general opinion of the Danish people.

The Radical Members of Parliament made the following announcement on March 18th:—

‘We consider that all dissensions regarding the Slesvig question since the plebiscite should be avoided. A movement has just commenced to express the desire that the result arrived at by the voting and the Clauses in the Peace Treaty should be set aside. In order to avoid giving such an incorrect idea of the opinion of the Danish people it will be necessary to hold meetings to show that the Danish people adhere to the decisions of the Peace Treaty and do not wish the result of the plebiscite to be put aside.’

The Social Democratic Members of Parliament stated ‘We have discussed the situation which has arisen through the agitation to obtain Flensburg in spite of the desire of the people as shown by the plebiscite. More consideration would have been shown the Interallied Commission had it been allowed to arrive at a decision without outside influence but as an agitation has been commenced Social Democrats must give the Commission and the public the necessary elucidation. It was resolved to invite the Party’s leaders and the Cooperative Trades Unions Business Committee in order to eventually make a public statement. It was further resolved to hold public meetings at which the Social Democrats’ point of view would be stated.’ The programme put forward at Socialist meetings is as follows:—

‘Comrades are asked to demonstrate against

- 1) Nationalism and chauvinism.
- 2) Violation of peoples’ right of self determination.
- 3) Annexation of Flensburg.’

The Conservatives do not appear to be entirely unanimous in their opinion. At a debate held at the Student[er]foreningen which was attended by many leading personages from Flensburg, Professor Birk, an eminent Conservative leader of the Flensburg movement, called attention to the fact that Denmark was not in a position to fight Germany, having only the arms of the Allies to rely upon, and that it would be dangerous and impudent to create an irredenta and ended with a warning against an annex[at]ionist campaign. His speech aroused much opposition, the next speaker remarking that his ideas

<sup>1</sup> i.e. the Kapp ‘Putsch’, for which see Vol. IX, Chap. II.

of justice were in direct opposition to what Slesviggers awaited from Denmark. From previous speeches at the meeting it is obvious that many Conservatives expect an offer of part of the 2nd Zone from the Interallied Commission or that some kind of conciliatory measure will be made, presumably because they feel that the German majority is due to German intimidation.

The editor of the 'Flensburg Avis' also spoke at the meeting and was very well received. He has been responsible for some controversy in the Press owing to a procession led by him which made its way to the King's Palace. The King spoke in order to calm the crowd and the Liberals accuse the Conservative press of deliberately distorting the meaning of His Majesty's speech in order to suit their own purposes.

The Danes generally expect that the Interallied Commission will quickly arrive at its decision and it is hoped that Allied troops will be stationed in the 2nd Zone for some time to come as there is much uneasiness on account of the Danes there who have reason to expect a reign of German tyranny.

On the whole in spite of much political effervescence engineered by professional politicians it seems probable that the majority of the Danish people have accepted the result of the vote of March 14th and, with it, the definite loss of Flensburg. This will weaken the Conservative opposition and will undoubtedly give a new lease of life to the present radical Government whose attitude towards the Slesvig question seems to have been justified by the result of the Plebiscite.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir Charles Marling.

I have, &c.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

**No. 426**

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received March 30)*

*No. 5 [188911/548/18]*

FLensburg, March 20, 1920

My Lord,

The few days elapsing between the date of my despatch No. 3 of March 7th<sup>1</sup> and the taking of the Plebiscite were marked by only one incident worth noting, *viz.*, the resignation of all the German Technical Advisers (Article 109 of the Treaty) as a protest against the prohibition to fly flags on the polling day and the two preceding and succeeding days. These gentlemen admitted that they themselves resigned unwillingly and under pressure from public opinion, but they could nevertheless not be induced to withdraw their resignations. Their action placed the Commission in a difficult position, as it practically paralysed several services, one of them, the rationing bureau, being of essential importance. There was nothing for us to do but to make a graceful concession, and we therefore announced that the prohibition would

<sup>1</sup> No. 422.

be enforced only as regards flags or national emblems and colours etc. displayed on the ground floor of shops and houses or carried in procession, when it might be apprehended that such display might give rise to disturbances. Although the police was confident that the full prohibition would have been generally obeyed—such is the respect in which the Chasseurs Alpains are held—I was personally glad to make the concession, the only one the Commission has yet made to German protests, partly because the measure appeared to me to be unnecessarily harsh and partly because I did not think that with the small number of police at our disposal we could have enforced it generally, except by calling in the assistance of the military, which for such a purpose would, in my opinion, have been unjustifiable. In the issue, however, it would seem that I underestimated the astonishing docility of the inhabitants, for although our concession was by no means well received, on Friday morning when the prohibition came into force the lavish show of flags and colours in the shop-windows in Grosse Strasse and Holm Strasse and the other chief streets had disappeared, though the town remained quite gay with bunting hung up high out of reach.

The out-voters from the south, about 7,700 in number, began to arrive as early as the 11th, coming in special trains at the rate of three or four a day, and were lodged in the town according to arrangements made for them by the local German Committees. A small party of troops was present as each train arrived. The 1,300 voters from the north came by sea and slept on board the Danish vessels that conveyed them. Although no one anticipated any disorders it was thought prudent to bring practically all the available forces into the town from the 11th to the 16th, but they were kept to barracks as much as possible. On the actual polling day, small parties were as a precaution stationed in the immediate vicinity of each voting station, but their services were never required as the crowds were perfectly orderly and the police under the command of Mr. Hallgren and Captain Hjelmfeldt always had complete control. The Germans organised a monster procession through the streets, but those who took part in it seemed singularly apathetic, though here and there groups of women provided with little books of words tried to arouse enthusiasm by singing patriotic songs, in which, so far as I could make out, Slesvig Holstein hymns were quite as numerous as German. The Danes were very little *en évidence*. Voting closed at 8 o'clock and the returns received from the country districts up to midnight foretold a complete disaster for the Danes, and what was known of the count in the town of Flensburg gave no hope of anything better. The results of the preliminary count are shown in the enclosed table and map.<sup>2</sup> The official results will not be ready for a few days and though complaints from the Danish side of intimidation, irregularities and trickery on the part of the Germans are pouring in, most of them not very serious, the result is not likely to be modified appreciably.

A German victory is no surprise, but the completeness of a 75% was anticipated by few, though one or two Danes have since told me that in the

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

innermost Danish circles this figure was usually mentioned as a fair estimate of the enemy strength. The military *coup d'état* in Berlin appears to have had none of the effect which was anticipated;<sup>3</sup> but it is more than likely that had it taken place a week or so earlier, and had the Danish party made proper use of it, the German majority would have been largely reduced, though it may be doubted whether the Danish vote would have gained.

It is remarkable that the percentage of votes in Germany in the second zone should be practically identical with that of the Danish majority in the first, and it shows with what intimate and accurate knowledge the boundary dividing the two areas was drawn.

The decisiveness of the German victory at least has one advantage in that it removes all difficulty in tracing the future Dano-German frontier, which *must* be the southern boundary of the First Zone, with such modifications as local conditions demand. These modifications will, however, be few and unimportant.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

<sup>3</sup> See Volume IX, No. 102.

No. 427

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received April 13)*

No. 6 [191454/548/18]

FLENSBURG, March 23, 1920

My Lord,

In my despatch No. 3, Confidential, of March 7th<sup>1</sup> I referred to the apprehensions entertained by those who have taken a prominent part in the Danish agitation of the persecution they may be exposed to at the hands of the Germans in the event of the plebiscite resulting in the second zone remaining German, and now that this has occurred those fears are naturally redoubled and find expression in requests to the Commission to take some steps to protect them from Teutonic vindictiveness. Outside Germany it may seem incredible that a man should be deliberately persecuted by official authority merely because he has exercised the right conferred upon him by a public Treaty to take part in a political agitation, but that such persecution is not only possible but probable cannot be doubted for a moment by anyone who has had the opportunity during the last few weeks of becoming acquainted with local conditions and the local character. At this moment the resentment of the official class, whether Prussian or local, is particularly bitter. For years they have been the Government's most effective organ of political education and influence, and have been accustomed to take an authoritative lead in all matters of public or political interest. Scores of individual cases

<sup>1</sup> No. 422.

of interference could be cited to show how ingrained in the official mind is the belief that it is the right and duty of public functionaries to exercise such influence and pressure as they can to forward what they believe to be the Government policy, but it is sufficient for me here to indicate a few of the commonest methods. Such are the refusal of postmen to deliver Danish newspapers, obstacles placed by the German authorities in the way of the local Danish press obtaining paper for their journals, delivery of Danish flags delayed by the German Customs, to say nothing of the activities of German schoolmasters and pastors.

During the period preceding the plebiscites, active participation in political propaganda and public meetings was rigidly prohibited by the Commission to officials, and, after one or two heavy fines had been inflicted the order was pretty generally obeyed. But the official mind was incapable of comprehending that the measure was taken merely to secure fair play, and in one letter of protest the prohibition was described as a curtailment of civic rights. Indeed, fifty years of Prussianism had so successfully accustomed the public mind to the idea of intervention by officials in political questions that the local Danes of the northern zone are looking forward to the day when they will be able to pay off old scores on the Germans who come under Danish rule. It will be thus readily understood that the Prussian official world is only awaiting the departure of the Commission to punish the temerarious Dane who dared to flaunt his sympathies under the protection of the Commission, and it must be remembered that as a consequence of the plebiscite the Germans are now in possession of lists of Danish sympathisers, for which, as was said to me, von Koehler<sup>2</sup> would have cheerfully paid 100,000 M. In these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the Danes are filled with the gloomiest forebodings of the fate that awaits them when the Commission leaves Flensburg. Open-minded Germans, such as Staats Kommissar Köster, admit that there is only too good ground for their apprehensions. An instance indeed has already occurred, i.e., the threat by the local Director of Posts to dismiss a couple of letter-carriers for having Danish sympathies. Generally speaking, Germans and Danes are on excellent terms in private life; and the persecution of the latter is entirely political and is carried out by officials, especially the minor ones who love to have opportunities of exhibiting their authority.

Before the German revolution, an order from the Government at Berlin with an intimation that it was to be carried out in spirit and letter would have gone far to prevent such persecution, but in existing circumstances, when Dr. von Kapp's reactionary *coup d'état* has further weakened the already enfeebled authority of the central Government, orders from Berlin would be treated as so much waste paper by the local politician flushed with victory and by the local official burning to resume the power to bully, of which the Commission has temporarily deprived him. Thus even assuming that the

<sup>2</sup> Presumably Ernst Matthias von Köller, Oberpräsident of Schleswig-Holstein from 1897 to 1901, during whose administration the Germanizing policy of the Prussian Government was intensified.

new order of things in Germany has brought with it such an effective change of spirit that Berlin would be ready sincerely to discountenance official pressure of the kind in question, it is extremely improbable that any practical protection for the Danish minority would be achieved.

The Commissioners have been much impressed by the numerous representations made to them to secure protection for these unfortunate people. All sorts of suggestions were mooted for the purpose. One remedy is the appointment of consuls with special powers, and another the creation of a Free Town of Flensburg! while a third is an agreement between Germany and Denmark guaranteeing the interests of the minorities of their respective races in the two zones, such agreement to be imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers. This last idea is the least impractical of the three, but the Danish Government is strongly opposed to it as giving Germany too many opportunities for German interference in the internal affairs of Denmark. But these suggestions and, indeed, all that I have yet seen suffer from the same defect, *viz.*, that they require months to carry into effect, and it is in the first few months after the definitive laying down of the frontier that German vindictiveness is most to be feared.

The only solution that presents itself to me is the erection of middle and southern Slesvig and Holstein into an autonomous state, which, indeed, in the opinion of many of those most competent to judge is moreover the only permanent solution of the Slesvig Holstein question. It appears to me that by thus giving the two elements of the population common interests and ambitions, the animosity between the two races would be eliminated. It is worth recalling that vehement as are the politicians in proclaiming their affection for Denmark or Germany as the case may be, historically there are no very strong grounds for their professions. It is true indeed that for centuries the Duchies were Danish, but as a matter of fact they were not part of the Danish Kingdom but were united to it by the circumstance of their having a common sovereign, and it was the Danish attempt to extend the Danish constitution to them in partial derogation of their autonomous status that furnished Germany with a pretext for the war of 1864. In many towns, indeed, the feeling against Denmark on this account at that time was so strong that on their entry the German troops were hailed as saviours. Germany can, of course, make no serious appeal to history, seeing that there are plenty of persons still living who remember Flensburg under the Dannebrog. There is, however, beyond question a strong pro-German feeling, but it is in great part founded on a preference for citizenship in a great rather than in a small country, and it is certainly not a desire to see perpetuated the existing state of affairs, *i.e.*, Prussian rule. The cry of 'Los von Preussen' was raised in the last few weeks by the Danes, but it found an echo in many a pro-German heart. The Slesvig Holsteiners are after all a mixed border race in which the tradition of century-long existence as a recognised political unit still lives strongly, and which has no desire to lose its identity by absorption into or subjection to another people whether Danish or German. There are even Slesvigiers who have preached complete independence under the



protection, for a few years, of Great Britain—a score of letters praying for it have reached the Commission's office—or of the League of Nations, but the wiser heads recognise that economically Slesvig Holstein must come within the German Customs union, and that autonomy not independence must be their aim. If as I am convinced this is a generally true picture of the real sentiments of the Slesvig Holstein population, it is not I submit optimistic to believe that the best, if not the only, means to secure the protection of the Danish minority will be found in an autonomous régime, and that when the Prussianising policy of Berlin is eliminated and the Berlin appointed officials are replaced by local men, the race hostility between Dane and German would die a natural death.

It cannot of course be pretended that autonomy for Slesvig Holstein can, any more than the other proposals mentioned earlier in this despatch for the protection of the Danish minority in the second zone, be brought into immediate effect, but it would seem to have this advantage; that with the creation of common hopes and common ambitions the rival parties will be the readier to sink past differences, and that the Berlin official, finding himself in opposition to the supporters, both German and Danish, of the separatist movement, will have less power and will be less apt to indulge in persecution.

As to whether autonomy for Slesvig Holstein comes within the range of practical politics just now I can only speak from a local point of view. As I reported in my despatch No. 3 of March 7th, as a result of an important meeting held at Rendsburg in the early part of this month, a deputation was sent to Berlin to ascertain how the German Government would view a demand on the part of Slesvig Holstein to exercise the right conferred by article 18 of the German Constitution of holding a plebiscite on the question of an autonomous state in the Duchies. The chief immediate motive of those who called the meeting was no doubt the intention to discourage by playing on the 'Los von Preussen!' chord the undecided voter from polling for Denmark, and if this stood alone it would be unwise to attach too much weight to it. But since then the failure of the Republic[an] Government of Germany to make a stand in Berlin against v. Kapp's militarist *coup d'état* has greatly lowered the prestige of the central government and has strengthened the local feeling that Slesvig Holstein's well-being will be much better assured if it is cut free from the political storm-centre of Berlin. Indeed the chaos reigning in so many parts of Germany seems to have revived the spirit of particularism that showed itself in the first half of 1918, and Slesvig Holstein, with its traditions, its geographical situation, and its peculiar population is naturally specially susceptible to its influences. Be this as it may, the feeling at the present moment is showing itself in a very marked degree. The hope, inspired partly, no doubt, by the sense of security which the presence of the Allied troops affords against Soviet outbreak or attack, has been frequently expressed that the International Commission's existence may be prolonged until Slesvig Holstein has had time to present its case for autonomy without interference and undisturbed by the anarchy existing in Germany, and there is an intention I am given to understand to send to

Berlin a further deputation, one of whose chief duties will be to endeavour to elicit from the allied representatives there how their governments would view the matter. There is also talk of sending a delegation to the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, and it would depend largely on the reception and encouragement with which its representations are received whether the project of autonomy is pursued; for it is felt that without the countenance and moral support of the Allied and Associated Powers it has little chance of success.

The leaders of the Slesvig Holstein movement count with confidence on support and encouragement, as they believe that it is the conviction of Europe that in the redisintegration of the German Empire into its component states lies the best guarantee against possible German aggressiveness. It is thought, too, that the weak Government now reinstated in Berlin may find it politic to grant concessions, which would be refused later, and they are anxious to seize the opportunity before it passes, perhaps for ever.

From Denmark a mild opposition is to be anticipated, as she would be apt to see in the autonomy of Slesvig Holstein the possible loss of those regions of North Slesvig which she is about to acquire under the plebiscite of the 14th instant, or at least a readjustment of the new frontier. That frontier, which will practically be that laid down in the Treaty of Peace as the southern boundary for the first zone, as the terms of the Treaty seem to my colleagues and myself to preclude us from making any material alterations in it,—is far from ideal, and I think that a rectification on sounder lines even though it would involve some loss of territory would not be very seriously resented, except by the extremists in the Dano-Slesvig question. In any case we may be sure that with her habitual prudence in foreign affairs, Denmark will acquiesce eventually, even though no doubt with the *arrière-pensée* that a little mild opposition on her part will be applauded in Berlin, she may make a good deal of protest.

Many efforts have been made indirectly to induce the International Commission to interest itself actively in this question, but my colleagues and I feel that while we might possibly in our final report to the Council of Ambassadors express the opinion that the question of the protection of the Danish minority in Middle Slesvig is one of those matters requiring further treatment as contemplated in paragraph 2 of Article 114, it would be quite outside our province to make suggestions as to the measures to be taken. But it appears to me that the question of an autonomous Slesvig Holstein is one that is worth examining, not only as providing a means of protection to the Danish minority in this zone, which, deserving as it is, is after all a matter of trifling importance, but also because it seems to carry with it the promise of considerable advantage to our own and allied interests without necessarily involving us in fresh obligations or responsibilities.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

P.S. Since writing the foregoing a few days ago, I have learnt very confidentially that the idea of addressing Berlin and Paris has been for the

present abandoned, and that it was intended to proclaim Slesvig Holstein (excluding the Northern Zone of the Plebiscite Area) as an autonomous German state. The announcement was to be made at Rendsburg, but the difficulty which I mentioned in my telegram No. 12 of March 22nd<sup>3</sup> of finding a candidate for the Presidency of the new state has probably only been among many obvious reasons to defer precipitate action. It is probable that this prudence is in a measure due to the return to Flensburg of Dr. Todsén, the former Bürgermeister.

C. M. M.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

No. 428

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received April 13)*

*No. 8 [191456/548/18]*

*Confidential*

FLensburg, April 2, 1920

My Lord,

At the first sitting of the Commission after the plebiscite in the Second Zone, it was unanimously assumed that in view of the crushing German majority the Commission had no option but to adopt for recommendation to the Allied and Associated Powers the line laid down in the Treaty as the limit of the First Zone (generally known as the 'Clausen' line), with only such minor modifications as quite local economic and geographical considerations demanded, and further that as the obvious intention of the Treaty was to restore territory to Denmark, such modifications should on the whole favour that Power.

There are five sections at which such variations from the Clausen line had to be examined, namely: (1) in the Fjord, (2) Kupfermühle, (3) Krusaa, (4) Patborg, (5) the lower part of the Scheidebaek and Wied Au.

(1) The deviation from the 'median line' of the Fjord was quickly agreed on and adopted at the meeting of 29th March. It consists of a deflection North-West from the median line at a point about a mile east of the mouth of the Krusaa, and then following the trend of the north shore of the Fjord and at a distance of 400 metres from it, to the mouth of the Krusaa. It is intended to give a reasonable anchorage in German waters to the Port of Flensburg.

(2) *Kupfermühle*. The Clausen line here follows the Krusaa, which at Kupfermühle runs right through the factory which gives its name to the village—an obviously impossible frontier. We decided that the line should be shifted westwards so as to leave the whole of the works and its reservoir to Germany. So far as I am aware there are no inhabitants on the area affected.

3. *Krusaa*. The same situation exists here as at Kupfermühle; the stream which forms the Clausen line runs through a flour mill and electric installation belonging to Commerzienrat Hubsch, and further traverses his property in such a manner that while his house and principal farm buildings are in

the second zone, his garden and estates are in the first. Here we decided on a line which will bring all the essential part of M. Hubsch's property within the Danish frontier. M. Hubsch himself, though once an ardent German patriot, now professes Danish sympathies. Of the rest of the small resident population, only one family is German.

(4) *Patborg*. A slight adjustment of the line may be necessitated by railway considerations, but the Commission found them to be of too technical a character for their decision, and the matter has been left to the mixed Commission of Delimitation.

(5) *Lower Sections of Scheidebaek and Wied Au*. The question involved here is of more importance, and, though technical, the Commission finds that it can and should lay down a line to which the Delimitation Commission would work.

The main watershed of Slesvig runs north and south quite close to its eastern shore, so that nine-tenths of its drainage is into the North Sea. This drainage again takes place through two distinct basins, divided from each other by a slight ridge starting from the main watershed about the level of Froslee and running roughly parallel, first to the Clausen line and afterwards consequently to the course of the Scheidebaek, to disappear near Sonder Logum on the edge of the 'Marskland' extending along the coast of the North Sea from Hojer to Dageböl. The pasture on this 'Marskland' is of remarkable richness and to it cattle are sent to be fattened not only from the rest of Slesvig and from Holstein, but even from Pomerania, but its prosperity and indeed its existence depend on the proper control of an elaborate system of canals and sluices. This system is directed by a 'Deichgraf', residing at Tondern in the First Zone, who exercises supervisory and co-ordinating control over the three or four drainage associations of the Marskland. Hydrographically it is divided into two parts, the Northern being almost wholly in the First Zone and the Southern entirely in the Second Zone; indeed the two, though connected by the sluices on the South shore of the Rotteböl See near Merlinghuset, are almost independent. These sluices are, however, of little or no real use except when, owing to an exceptional flood in the Southern basin which the small canal of Sydvesthjørne is unable to carry off, the surplus waters have to be diverted to the sea at Hojer through the canalised channel of the Wied Au; and of so little importance are they that Herr Sonningsen, the Deichgraf, and Count Schack, the Landrath of Tondern, are of opinion that they could be completely closed, and both informed us that if they were closed and if the frontier line were drawn roughly parallel to the course of the Wied Au and at a distance not exceeding 400 metres from it from the west of Rotteböl See to a point a little east of Aventoft, the drainage of the Northern basin would be perfectly assured.

At the meeting of the Commission on the 26th March at which this question was discussed, this solution was generally accepted, and it seemed as if nothing was left but to record our recommendations as to a frontier. But at the very end of the sitting the Norwegian Commissioner said that before taking a final decision he wished to have the expert opinion of Colonel

Ramsing, a Danish Engineer Officer, whom with the assent of the French Commissioner he had summoned to Flensburg. To call in an expert without consulting all his colleagues was perhaps slightly irregular, but scarcely sufficiently so to warrant a refusal to hear his opinion, and accordingly a definite decision was deferred till Colonel Ramsing should have presented his report. Colonel Ramsing came to see me the next day and the first two minutes' conversation betrayed the fact that he was a violent 'maximalist' in the matter of Danish claims. His report, presented in the short space of two days, proved to be nothing but a piece of ingenious special pleading intended to prove Danish rights over about one-fifth of the second zone. At the meeting on the 28th March I was careful to point out that the strong bias of the report largely destroyed its value. Unluckily his arguments appealed to the French Commissioner who, though in Copenhagen he never wearies of branding the Danes as pro-German, has on this Commission made no secret of his desire to favour Denmark in fixing the new frontier. The particular points of Colonel Ramsing's argument which attracted Monsieur Claudel's attention were: (1) that as Tondern is the financial centre and market of the pasturage business of the 'Marskland,' that town would be ruined if the greater part of the 'Marskland,' which is south of the Clausen line, were cut off from it by the new frontier: and (2) that to make it possible for Denmark to drain and develop the boggy basin traversed by the Süder Au, Grön Au, &c., it is essential that she should be in possession of the whole basin draining into the Scheidebaek and Wied Au.

I pointed out that the suggested line would hand over to Denmark a considerable area in which the voting had been overwhelmingly in favour of Germany and it seemed to me that if, as we were advised by Count Schack and the Deichgraf, the essential requirements in the drainage system of the first zone could be assured by a small deflection of the Clausen line, involving little or no infringement of the principle of self-determination, there was no case for adopting Colonel Ramsing's suggestion for assigning to Denmark the much more considerable district comprising Jarlund, Ladelund, Karlum, Sondern Logum and Aventoft with their strongly German population. The economic grounds for giving Tondern more elbow room to the south and west seemed to me to be no more solid. To my mind the main principle to guide us in our choice of a frontier line was the result of the voting, and the stipulations allowing economic and geographical considerations to be taken into account could only justify us in overriding it if they were of very much greater importance than was shown in Colonel Ramsing's report. The Swedish Commissioner strongly supported my view and added that the economic and geographic factors had in his view been introduced into the Treaty mainly with an eye to the second zone, where a strict adherence to the result of the voting as taken by communes might have involved a totally impracticable frontier. In his view the suggested alteration was not within the powers of the Commission. Monsieur Claudel, however, entirely dissented from this view and advanced the opinion that economic and geographic considerations were of practically equal weight with the result of the voting.

Dropping for the moment at least the case on economic grounds for more territory to the south-west of Tondern, he concentrated his efforts on proving the need for moving the line southwards so as to include in Danish territory that part of the northern system which lies in the second zone comprising considerable portions of the communes of Søndern Logum, Karlum and Ladelund with their preponderating German population. I have since learnt that although from the map it would appear that the water from the south must drain into the Scheidebaek, a very large part of it is as a matter of fact drawn off for some months each year to irrigate lands still further south. It will be interesting to see how Monsieur Claudel gets over this weak point in his economic argument. Monsieur Claudel made no secret of the fact that his underlying motive is the desire to 'get some satisfaction' and to 'teach the Germans that they will have to pay for the persecution they are preparing for the Danish minority', and in this thoroughly characteristic outburst he was silently applauded by Monsieur Hefte.<sup>1</sup> Monsieur von Sydow<sup>2</sup> pointed out that considerations of this kind might be taken into account by the Allied and Associated Powers but were quite outside the scope of the Commission's mandate, and I then remarked that after all the difference of opinion that divided the Commission depended on a question of fact, *viz.*, were the economic and geographical factors of sufficient importance to override the results of the plebiscite? Monsieur Claudel at once responded to the suggestion and it was decided that he and Monsieur von Sydow should examine the whole question together. Subsequently I had two very friendly talks with Monsieur Claudel about this matter, but, while he was most anxious that the Commission should send in an unanimous report, he was no less anxious to get his recommendation before the Council of Ambassadors. At the second of these conversations on March 29th, he confessed that he was largely actuated by what at the moment appeared to be the critical political situation at Copenhagen. The King, as Your Lordship will recall, was on the point of dismissing the Zahle Cabinet<sup>3</sup> in a manner which would be denounced by the Radicals as unconstitutional, and he was doing this on account of the popular discontent with the Cabinet's Slesvig policy. What, Monsieur Claudel asked, would His Majesty's position be if the *coup d'état*, as His Majesty's action was absurdly called, after all failed to get anything more for Denmark. I pointed out that in theory the Commission ought not to let itself be influenced by a political situation in Denmark, but apart from that the final decision did not rest with the Commission which could only make recommendations on which the Allied and Associated Powers would found their final award. Our recommendations would presumably not be known till after the award was made, and so I failed to see how, by any action of ours, we could assist the King, much as I should wish to do so. It seemed to me that in Copenhagen the wrongest notions of the position and powers of the Commission prevailed. I then urged Monsieur Claudel to expedite his

<sup>1</sup> The Norwegian Commissioner on the Schleswig Commission.

<sup>2</sup> The Swedish Commissioner.

<sup>3</sup> He did so on March 30.

investigations as much as he could. The expenses of the Commission, or rather of the occupation, were enormous and it was not fair to Denmark or Germany to prolong them unduly. I was moved to do this by the feeling I have had for some time that Monsieur Claudel for some reason was trying to protract the mission as long as possible. He said that he hoped that he would have his written report ready by April 8th, and then said that in his opinion it was to the interests of everyone that the occupation should continue for two or three months. The presence of our troops had prevented the storm of spartacism reaching Flensburg and stood as a breakwater between it and Denmark, and was even now having a steadying influence on the wilder politicians of Copenhagen. I admitted that it was very likely that but for the occupation it was more than probable that there would have been trouble in this town just as there was at Slesvig and Kiel, though, as the avowed Spartacists among the workmen are barely 100, the population is not excitable, but I pointed out that there was the question of expense to be considered and, moreover, the troops and ships might be required more urgently elsewhere.

For some days past I have been conscious that Monsieur Claudel and the Norwegian delegate have been seeking to delay the conclusion of the Commission's work, the former, as he confesses, on account of the political situation at Copenhagen, although as it seems to me the month which must inevitably elapse before the frontier question is finally decided by the Powers, should see a normal political situation restored again, and the latter because he wishes to put off the fateful day when the Danish Minority will be delivered to Prussian vengeance. To talk of 'pogroms' as Monsieur Heftye does, is of course, nonsense, but, though there is an evident appreciation on the part of the more far-seeing Germans, born of course of the fear that the cry raised in Denmark for the erection of the second zone into a free state may bear fruit, that it would be prudent to preach a policy of conciliation at all events until the Commission has finally departed, still I fear that it cannot be doubted that a good deal of quiet persecution will take place. I can, however, see nothing arising out of the mandate of the Commission to justify delay, and I propose, as soon as Monsieur Claudel's report has been considered, to bring its work to as speedy conclusion as possible. If for any reason His Majesty's Government and the Allied Powers consider that the occupation of north and middle Slesvig should be prolonged it will always be within their power to defer their final decision.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received April 13)*

*No. 9 [191457/548/18]*

FLensburg, April 2, 1920

My Lord,

In this despatch I propose to put on record some observations on the recent plebiscites, and though the event is still too near to give relative importance to the various causes influencing the voting with any degree of accuracy, I hope that these remarks made while facts and impressions are still fresh may not be without interest.

The voting in the Northern Zone can be dismissed with very little comment. It was, I believe, as good a gauge of popular feeling as could be expected, and as Mr. Chater points out in the memorandum attached to my despatch No. 4 of March 18th,<sup>1</sup> the Danish contention that the German non-resident vote would materially alter the figures of the result is scarcely borne out by an analysis of the poll. Nor do I think that the Danish vote was sensibly diminished by anything in the way of German intimidation or by an improper exercise of their influence by German officials, for in the first place it is probable that the German party, knowing that they were fighting a battle already lost, made no special efforts to influence the doubtful voters, and in the second, for similar reasons the weak-kneed among the Danes were always sure that they could vote according to their wishes without any fear of subsequent vengeance on the part of the Germans. The most remarkable circumstance about the first zone is the accuracy with which the southern boundary was fixed, for it is so drawn as to include in the first zone, where the results of the plebiscite were to be regarded as a whole, every single commune where the proportion of Danish voters is sufficient to justify its incorporation in Denmark and to leave in the second zone every single commune the inclusion of which in the first could have been cavilled at by the Germans, on account of the paucity of its Danish inhabitants, as obviously inconsistent with the principle of self-determination. The zone is of course really Danish and in the few communes where the Germans claimed a majority the circumstance is easily explained. Such communes were generally towns, more particularly the garrison towns of Haderslev and Sonderborg, where the German trader and German official chiefly established themselves, or railway junctions such as Tinglev where the requirements of the service naturally resulted in a German colony. An exception must be made in the case of Tondern town, which, though the language mostly employed is Danish, has always been strongly German in sympathy. It is very remarkable also that the ratio between the two races has scarcely altered in fifty years.

In the second zone, although I have been told that the best informed Danes never expected to poll a larger number of votes than they actually did, I believe that the Germans were genuinely surprised at the completeness of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



their own victory. The Danish extremist press, however, which has clamoured so shrilly for the restoration of 'Danish' Middle Slesvig has now, to justify its clamour, been obliged to allege all sorts of malpractices on the part of the Germans and negligence on the part of the Commission in protecting the Danes. It is, of course, true that the Danes started with a disadvantage, but it is not true to say that direct intimidation or malpractice were practised by the Germans after the arrival of the Commission to an extent that could have altered the results by 1 per cent. Direct intimidation of a mild kind, such as suggestions by school teachers and pastors to break up Danish meetings did take place in not a few instances soon after our arrival, but that was seven weeks before the vote took place: Danish placards were torn down in Flensburg, and the windows of Danish political offices were broken, but to these practices we were able to put an almost complete stop. The indirect intimidation, by which I mean the fear of later Prussian vengeance, was, however, a real factor, and one for which there was no remedy. It certainly, however, did not affect the vote to the extent of 5 per cent. Apart from influences such as this, which are the result of fifty-five years of German rule, and are therefore inherent in the situation, the plebiscite was taken in circumstances peculiarly favourable to the Danish cause. Reunion with Denmark meant abundant food, an immensely lightened war debt, escape from the throes of political reconstruction, hope of retaining the shipping of Flensburg, rise of values by the change of currency from the depreciated mark to the sound Kroner, yet with all these weapons to her hand Denmark fought a very feeble campaign. Their press was feeble and inept, their speakers few and timid, their organisation ineffective and their representatives on the joint boards for supervising and carrying out the voting often incompetent and weak. It is true that a good deal of money was spent, but it was usually employed to little advantage. The German campaign was scarcely better. They had, of course, certain advantages over the Danes: thus the provision in the Treaty giving the vote to persons born before 1900 in the Plebiscite area, but not resident in it, operated in their favour though no doubt the opposite was intended. One reason, though probably overlooked, is now clear, *viz.*, that the German military and official classes, from which these non-resident voters spring, were constantly being renewed from outside, in other words a 'generation,' so to speak, for these classes might be only four or five years, while for the Danes it was the period fixed by nature. Further, the Germans had been able to work up their lists of non-resident voters with all the assistance that the Government could give and plenty of time, whereas the Danes had only eight weeks for the same work, and, if they met with no actual obstruction, they at least obtained no zealous assistance from the officials; the Germans of course had in officials the most valuable weapon, especially in the country districts being the teachers and pastors—a zealous and influential body of workers. The Commission did what it could to neutralise this official influence and was successful in preventing its exercise publicly; but there is no question that the fact of the great majority of the officials being German was a real handicap to the Danes. The Danes have,

as Your Lordship is aware, made a great outcry over the non-evacuation of German forces and officials from the 3rd Zone, and I am aware that some of my Colleagues think their plaint is justifiable. I think it quite probable that, had this zone been included in the Plebiscite Area, the fact that there is in it a slightly stronger Danish element than further north might have encouraged a few timid abstainers to record their votes, but I am persuaded that the non-evacuation did not affect the result by one per cent.

Danish complaints of irregularities at the polling and of intimidations have been numerous, over 300 written petitions having reached the Commission within the fortnight allowed for protests after the day of the Plebiscite. The vast majority were concerned with matters against which the Danish members on the various Plebiscite Committees and Control Commissions should have provided safeguards, such, for instance, as inadequate measures to ensure secrecy, plural voting, etc. Typical cases of each category of complaint were selected for investigation, and in only one instance was it shown, and this on not very conclusive evidence, that there was plausible ground for complaint. As to secrecy, I may mention that in the principal polling station I saw a woman openly put her voting card—Danish—into the envelope with half-a-dozen persons wearing German colours looking on, and I am inclined to believe that it was chiefly in cases of ‘ratting’ that secrecy was prized. Of the remaining cases, the most important were charges of intimidation. It was, for instance, alleged that the directors of two or three large German industrial concerns had announced that any employee who voted Danish would be dismissed. The names of these concerns were given but no other evidence whatever, nor would any witness come forward for examination. Under the heading of intimidation may be classed cases of prevention from voting. The instances cited were absurdly frivolous. One complaint concerned a Danish chauffeur who had been unable to vote as he had been driving all day for the German Committee. But the greatest discouragement to the Danish party in the Second Zone was the consciousness that Denmark did not want to acquire Middle-Slesvig. It has never been any secret that Mr. H. P. Hans[s]en Nørremølle, the Minister for Slesvig Affairs, was strongly opposed to the Second Zone. The Zahle Cabinet also was against it and the recent course of events would seem to show that the vehement attacks made on his Slesvig policy were as much the expression of party rancour as of patriotism.

Taking all things into consideration the result of the vote was pretty true. Whatever it was in 1864, Flensburg is to-day a German town built up by German money, brains and energy, where German is spoken almost exclusively, and all of whose interests are bound up with Germany. In the rural districts the sentiment is also overwhelmingly German. As a frontier town Flensburg is almost sure to suffer economically, to whichever Power it belonged [*sic*], but as a Danish town it could have had no future at all. It has no industries except shipbuilding, and with cheap German iron and coal, and cheap heavy forgings from Essen, its shipyards flourished. But it would

have been a very different matter when all these advantages were absent, and it had to fight with a jealous Copenhagen.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

No. 430

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received April 28)*

No. 15 [194605/548/18]

*Very confidential*

FLENSBURG, April 17, 1920

My Lord,

The investigation of the modification of the 'Clausen' line proposed by the French commissioner, which, as I reported in my Despatch No. 8 of the 2nd April,<sup>1</sup> was to be carried out by him and Monsieur von Sydow, was pursued by them for four or five days, at the end of which time the Swedish delegate tacitly withdrew, having, as he informed me confidentially, satisfied himself that the geographical and economic considerations invoked by Monsieur Claudel were far too slender to warrant the Commission's adopting for recommendation to the Conference of Ambassadors a line involving so large a disregard of the result of the vote of the 14th March. He told me further that Monsieur Claudel was ready to accept any statement made by Colonel Ramsing who accompanied him as 'expert', and that the latter was so carried away by his partizanship for Danish interests that he had on two or three occasions made quite inaccurate statements. Monsieur Claudel seemed to Monsieur von Sydow to have some ulterior object in view, one of which was to gain or, as it seems to me, to waste time.

On the 1st April I asked Monsieur Claudel if his report, which he had promised to produce in time for us to come to a final decision before Easter, 4th April, was ready, and learnt that it would not be finished before the 8th, and on my urging more expedition he promised that it should be ready by the 6th, in time for us to discuss it in the evening. He professed to make no secret of his motive in allowing this delay, i.e., to allow the political situation in Copenhagen to clear up. In his view it was quite clear that the King had dismissed the Zahle Cabinet in the belief that he was giving effect to the national discontent with its indifference to Danish interests in the Slesvig question and it was necessary to justify His Majesty's *coup d'état* by results. Hollow as this reason is, for the Commission only makes recommendations for final approval by the Allied and Associated Powers, there can be no doubt some such considerations were weighing at this moment in Copenhagen, for several messages from Copenhagen were received by persons connected with the Commission, Monsieur Claudel, Mr. Bruce and myself among them, urging delay until Easter on these grounds. As there was nothing to detain me here, I decided to go myself to Copenhagen for Easter to

<sup>1</sup> No. 428.

learn what the political situation really was. I arrived on the evening of the 3rd, and by next morning it was known that a compromise had been reached according to which the Liebe Cabinet was to resign and to be replaced by another 'Ministère d'Affaires' under Mr. Friis whose task would be to carry through the Elect[or]al Law Amendment Bill, in return for which the general strike on the 6th instant, threatened by M. Stauning in support of the Radicals and Socialists, would be called off. It was at once clear to me that not Slesvig but the Electoral Bill was the real bone of contention, and that the Left and the Conservatives, knowing that the King could never be induced to take so decided a step as the dismissal of his Ministers over a constitutional point, had dragged the red herring of Slesvig across the trail. I suspected also that M. Zahle, knowing that the days of his Cabinet were numbered, deliberately irritated the King during his audience with His Majesty into pronouncing his summary dismissal, which the Radicals describe as a *coup d'état*. As stories were being circulated that the *coup d'état* had been instigated by His Majesty's Government working through the channel of Queen Alexandra and the Empress Marie Feodorowna, I thought it better to postpone any attempts to get direct information respecting the King's attitude until the following day when the settlement had become generally known and accepted, but on Monday, the 5th April, I saw the King's Secretary, Kammerherre Rothe and Mr. Andersen. Both confirmed the view I had formed of the real import of the recent crisis, and both agreed with my view that the Slesvig question should be cleared out of the way as soon as possible, as it provided, quite unwarrantably, a too easy means of rousing public excitement. Mr. Andersen called on me late in the evening to say that he was commissioned by the King to inform me that His Majesty hoped the Commission would continue its work in a normal way without any reference to his position.

From a conversation I had with M. Otto de Scavenius, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, I gather that the Prime Minister adopted exactly the same attitude as the King, but that he himself strongly held my view. Armed with this information I returned here on the 6th in the hope of convincing Monsieur Claudel that Danish interests demanded expedition rather than delay, but while professing agreement, he coolly informed me that his report could not be ready until the 14th; but under pressure he agreed to produce it by the morning of the 8th, and a meeting of the Commission to discuss it was fixed for the afternoon of that day. As a matter of fact he sent me a copy on the evening of the 7th, and it proved to be a deplorable production, unsound both in reasoning and in facts. The next morning I told him that, much as I wished to send in a unanimous report, I could never consent to put my name to a suggestion so palpably partizan, even as merely an alternative, and I suggested that as he felt so strongly about it, he might with equal effect bring his proposals before the Conference of Ambassadors by sending it to his Government, by whom it could be used when the recommendations of the Commission came to be examined. Monsieur Claudel urged that there could be no objection to an alternative line, even if signed by only two of the Com-

missioners, being included in our report, to which I assented reluctantly, and as he manifested great unwillingness to discuss his report, the conversation ended, with a tacit understanding that the line which had practically been unanimously agreed on a week before would be definitely adopted as the official recommendation of the Commission, and that a suggestion for an alternative line, signed only by the French and Norwegian Commissioners, would be attached. I certainly understood also that no more time was to be lost.

At the sitting that afternoon the Norwegian Delegate presented a list of Danish protests against various alleged irregularities in the taking of the Plebiscite and of cases of improper influences employed by the Germans. Most of them had been already examined by the Swedish Commissioner and myself, in the light of the reports of our technical advisers on such matters, and found to be trivial or unproved, but three on their face seemed to deserve investigation. This was admitted on all sides, but it was also admitted that even if malpractices were proved up to the hilt, it would not alter the result of the voting materially, nor could another plebiscite be taken. I therefore proposed that we should at all events go on with the examination of the line. Monsieur Claudel at once protested that this would not be logical, and as I received no support, the consideration of the line was deferred. Monsieur Claudel then proposed that as the examination of these complaints would take two or three days, we could agree to Monsieur Heftye going to Norway to celebrate his birthday, a proposition which he had turned down that very morning under pressure from me. It was difficult to refuse and accordingly Monsieur Heftye departed for five days. Three days sufficed to clear up the Danish complaints, which as might have been anticipated proved to be of no great importance, Monsieur Claudel himself drawing up the final reports recording the results of the investigation. During these few days the Swedish Commissioner expressed to me more than once his earnest hope that Monsieur Claudel would drop his alternative proposal, so as to permit a unanimous report, and again gave vent to his conviction that Monsieur Claudel was merely seeking to gain time, though he could not find any plausible reason, unless it were to be sought in the political situation in Copenhagen. He also made an attempt to induce Monsieur Claudel to discuss his memorandum, but as he encountered the same unwillingness as myself, he drew up a memorandum stating the reasons of his opposition to the proposed alternative line.

On the 13th Monsieur Heftye returned and a meeting was held the same afternoon. I invited discussion of the draft which I had prepared and circulated to my colleagues giving a formal account of the proceedings of the Commission and describing the line which a fortnight before had been accepted in principle by all the Commissioners. Monsieur Claudel at once said that he and the Norwegian Commissioner were quite ready to sign it on the understanding that the alternative line proposed by them was also sent in as, so to speak, a minority report, and he read out the draft of the paragraph introducing his proposal, but not the description of the line. In reply

to the Swedish Commissioner, he said he did not propose to attach his above-mentioned report in support of the proposal, and consequently Monsieur von Sydow's objections will likewise not appear. One or two quite inconsiderable changes as regards form and wording were made in my draft, and it was agreed that the final draft should be prepared at once and finally examined on the 15th. The actual signature took place on the 16th.<sup>2</sup>

In marked contrast to his former procrastination, Monsieur Claudel has since the meeting on the 14th shown every desire to complete and despatch our report as soon as possible. He would not, however, appear to have abandoned his hope of getting his proposed line adopted by the Powers as he has announced that he is about to 'transfer his office' to Paris.

I do not profess to understand clearly Monsieur Claudel's motives in all this matter, but on the whole I am inclined to think that the mainspring has been the desire in accordance with general French policy to establish a permanent source of bad relations between Germany and her neighbours, and he hopes to accomplish this by laying down a frontier against which Germany is sure to protest as not being in accordance with the principles of the Treaty. In addition to this I fancy he hopes to make political capital at our expense in Denmark by posing as the Champion of Danish interests, while allowing it to be inferred that the British Commissioner siding with the Swedish Commissioner, who is assumed to be Germanophil, cares nothing for them. His unblushing and successful efforts to delay the Commission's work are, I think, sufficiently explained by the belief that he would thereby assist the Moderate Left (Venstre) and Conservatives in their efforts to smash the Radical and Social Democrats who are responsible for what he denounces as the pro-German policy of the late Cabinet through the war. This explanation seems to gain confirmation from the fact that he dropped his dilatory tactics as soon as it became pretty evident that the Friis Cabinet would not take any overt step whatever either at Flensburg or at Paris in the Slesvig question.

I do not believe that in Denmark Monsieur Claudel will gain anything by his manœuvres. If there is one thing that all Danes are agreed on, it is that the only policy for their weak country is one of the utmost prudence and nothing will dismay them more than the acquisition of a strip of valueless territory to which, on the principle of the wish of the population, Germany has the better claim. If he thinks otherwise it is because he listens to the passionate outpourings of the Conservative and Venstre press and forgets that the solid sentiment of the country really finds expression not there but in the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs in which all parties are represented.

As matters now stand Monsieur Claudel is apparently going to Paris to urge the Powers to adopt his line, and on my arrival there—it has always been understood that as President of the Commission I should go to Paris to furnish any explanations that might be required by the Conference of Ambassadors—I shall again find myself in stark opposition to my French Colleague over a question in which, as he has candidly stated more than once, he has

<sup>2</sup> The text of the report is printed by de Jessen, *op. cit.*, pp. 435-42.

been guided by sentiment and interest, instead of by the strict spirit of impartiality that should be observed by a member of an International Commission charged with quasi-arbitral functions.<sup>3</sup>

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

<sup>3</sup> In his despatch No. 5 of May 4 (not printed) Lord Curzon asked Mr. Brudenell-Bruce to inform Sir C. Marling upon his return that he had read his report with the greatest interest and that he approved his attitude.

### No. 431

*Mr. Brudenell-Bruce (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received April 29, 9.30 a.m.)*

*No. 2 [sic] Telegraphic [194892/548/18]*

FLensburg, April 28, 1920, 7.30 p.m.

Following for Sir Charles Marling.

Danish Government will almost certainly occupy zone 1 on May 5th and I expect that agreement to that effect will be signed tomorrow.<sup>1</sup>

I have informed Doctor Metzger [sic]<sup>2</sup> and he raises objection to German judges being replaced by Danes on the ground that judicial branch is not part of (? administration) but a separate body. He also states that Danish judges could not apply German law in any case. The argument appears to me to be merely one of principle as for some time after the cession Denmark will be obliged to use German legal procedure in Schleswig.

Danish Government attach great importance to this question and I propose, in the event of German Government continuing their opposition, the International Commission should take the matter into their own hands and inform judges that they must make way. Personally I think that German Government would not object to this course as they are indifferent and only want to justify themselves in the eyes of German public as question of interpretation of word 'administrative' in Article 109 section 3 and action proposed above might evoke usual protest from Berlin to Paris.

I should be glad if in absence of all the Commissioners you would let me know by telegraph whether this step would meet with your approval.

As regards introduction of crowns (sic)<sup>3</sup> I understand that International Commission is to do so by ordinance without asking German Government's approval. Danish Government are anxious that this should be done as soon

<sup>1</sup> An unnumbered telegram of April 29 from Mr. Brudenell-Bruce (not printed) confirmed that the agreement was signed on April 29. See No. 441 below, paragraph 5.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Metzger was Herr Köster's successor as German delegate to the International Commission for Schleswig.

<sup>3</sup> i.e. kroner.

as possible. They propose May 15th and I see no reason to put it off now that we have agreed to do so.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Sir C. Marling telegraphed his approval of Mr. Brudenell-Bruce's proposal relating to the judges in Foreign Office telegram No. 5 of April 30 (not printed). He added that he thought the correct procedure for introducing Danish currency 'should be that the measure should be promulgated by an ordinance of Danish Administrators countersigned by yourself as Secretary-General to signify approval of Commission. This was the procedure agreed on by Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself for ordinances in general, and I see no reason for making exception in the currency question.' He also reminded Mr. Brudenell-Bruce that it had been agreed that Danish currency 'could be introduced ten days after occupation'.

## No. 432

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 7)*

*No. 540 Telegraphic: by bag [196499/548/18]*

PARIS, May 5, 1920

Following for Cabinet:—

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning, M. Jules Cambon being in the Chair.

The only item on the Agenda was Sir C. Marling's report on the result of the Slesvig plebiscite.<sup>1</sup>

Sir C. Marling explained the divergence of opinion between his French and Norwegian colleagues on one side and his Swedish colleague and himself on the other, which was primarily based on a different interpretation of the terms of the Treaty. In his view, and that of his Swedish colleague, the result of the vote was the preponderating factor and geographical and economic conditions were of quite secondary consideration. He pointed out that the first paragraph of Article 109 stated explicitly that the frontier should be fixed in conformity with the wishes of the population, and that it was only in Article 110 that reference was made to geographical and economic conditions. This had been necessary in order to prevent an impossible frontier with enclaves, but was not intended to modify the results of the vote except in such special conditions. Sir C. Marling also referred to the covering letter to the German Delegation sent with the draft treaty which contained the statement that no transfer of territory would take place which would not be in accordance with the wishes of the population.<sup>2</sup>

Sir C. Marling then described in detail the new frontier proposed.

I explained that Sir C. Marling, as President of the Commission, had had the right to a casting vote, but that he had preferred not to use it until the other members of the Commission had had the opportunity of presenting

<sup>1</sup> In his telegram No. 502 of April 28 (not printed) Lord Curzon had instructed Lord Derby to arrange for the report to be considered by the Conference of Ambassadors as soon as possible.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. . . . *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. v, pp. 915-7.



their case to the Conference of Ambassadors. M. Claudel, the French Commissioner, who should have been present had not arrived in Paris and the question was therefore adjourned until such time as he should arrive to state his case.

In the event of the Conference deciding to adopt Sir C. Marling's point of view, I presume that I am to request the Conference to notify Denmark and Germany accordingly, and to take such steps as will give effect to the decision.

### No. 433

*Notes of a meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors held at Quai D'Orsay, Paris  
Saturday, May 8, 1920, 10.30 a.m.*

C. A. 39 [Confidential/General/166/4]

#### *Secret*

PRESENT: *America, United States of*: Hon. Hugh C. Wallace; SECRETARIES: Mr. Harrison, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Gordon.

*Great Britain*: Lord Derby; SECRETARY: Mr. Sargent.

*France*: Mr. Cambon; SECRETARY: Mr. Massigli.

*Italy*: Count Bonin Longare; SECRETARY: Mr. Vannutelli Rey.

*Japan*: Mr. Matsui; SECRETARY: Mr. Sawada.

INTERPRETER: Mr. Camerlynck.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: *America, United States of*: Mr. Winthrop.

*Great Britain*: Mr. Lothian Small.

*France*: Mr. Bressy.

*Italy*: Lieut. Bosio.

There were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*Great Britain*: Sir Charles Marling, Ct. Lucas, Mr. Leeper.

*France*: General Weygand, Capt. Roper, [Mr. Laroche].

*Italy*: General Cavallero, Mr. Dell'Abbadessa.

4. . . .<sup>1</sup> MR. CAMBON: Mr. Claudel, whom we were to hear on the question of Schleswig, has not yet arrived.

*Question of Schleswig* MR. LAROCHE: He is expected to-day or to-morrow.

MR. CAMBON: I am aware moreover, that the inhabitants of Schleswig,—Danes and Germans, are asking to be heard before we make a decision; I should not like to compel Sir Charles Marling to prolong his stay in Paris. Could not the question be postponed until this day week?

LORD DERBY: No, I most emphatically oppose our hearing either the Danes or the Germans. We have appointed a Commission which has submitted its report; and before which each side has been able to state its own views; I refuse absolutely to take part in a meeting at which either Danes or Germans are present.

COUNT BONIN LONGARE: I share Lord Derby's opinion.

MR. CAMBON: I am very glad of this decision by the Conference which frees us from a very tiresome affair. We heard Sir Charles Marling's observa-

<sup>1</sup> The first three minutes related to other matters.

tions at the last meeting; I will ask Mr. Laroche kindly to give us the reasons for the proposals submitted by Mr. Claudel and the Norwegian Delegate.

MR. LAROCHE: Article 110 of the Treaty reads as follows:—

‘Pending a delimitation on the spot, a frontier line will be fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers according to a line based on the result of the voting, and proposed by the International Commission, and taking into account the particular geographical and economic conditions of the localities in question.’

The International Commission has submitted its line of delimitation; it is based on the result of the voting, but only to a very slight extent does it take into account the particular local geographical conditions referred to in the Treaty. It is this omission that two out of four of the Delegates of the Commission wished to make good by the following proposal:—

I will first call your attention to the fact that the Commission, which was originally to have been formed of five members, has been reduced to four and divided exactly into two: I do not think that the division is very marked, but there is, nevertheless, a slight difference of opinion and it is interesting to note that, of the two Scandinavian members, one has adhered to the view of the French Delegate, whilst the other has adopted the British point of view.

I shall not deal with the portion of the draft relating to the region of Flensburg. As to this region, I for my part am entirely disposed to admit the unanimous point of view of the Commission and to recognize that the extension of the port of Flensburg deserves not merely to be considered, but also to be received with the greatest favour. Further, I have noted with great satisfaction that compensation in some manner has been granted in the west to the Danes, by assigning to them the Port of Hoyer, with regard to which the Commission recommends that the line should pass between two islands, in order to give them access to the port. It is, indeed, absolutely just that what has been done for one of the parties should be done for the other. There are a few small corrections which have been effected by the Commission, on which everyone agrees and on which I shall not dwell. I now come, however, to the great difficulty: while signing the report in a spirit of conciliation, the French and Scandinavian [? Norwegian] Delegates have, however, proposed a somewhat different settlement and are asking that the frontier line shall pass to the south of the one indicated in the report of the Commission. The motives for this request are based on local geographical conditions, and that is entirely in keeping with the terms of Article 110 which I read just now. In that part of Schleswig we are completely in an orographic centre. So much so, that you are perfectly aware that if the Danes, for motives admitted by our two Delegates, demand the portion south of the line, the Germans on their part, claim the portion which lies to the north; this proves clearly that the line proposed by the Chairman of the Commission is one of those diplomatic compromises which one is in the habit of accepting, but which we have accepted only too often, since the results in these cases are always bad frontiers. In the present case the proof that the frontier is not good,

is that it cuts the orographic system in two. You will therefore have difficulties and unceasing claims from both sides, with this difference, that the Germans in Danish territory will, in view of their strength, be able to obtain satisfaction, while the Danes who have remained in German territory will never gain their cause. In reality, you will give Germany control over the entire southern section demanded by her. That is what we want to avoid. On the other hand, the results of the plebiscite are certainly incontestable, but we must not forget that this has taken place after 56 years of German domination; it is possible that this district, entirely Danish before 1866, has been Germanized, both by force and in view of conditions on which I will not dwell. Clearly, it is impossible to contest in a general manner the results of the plebiscite, but we are however, justified in not taking them too much as gospel truth. I will not enlarge any more on this point, but I wish, in this connection to mention a condition which is unanimously accepted by the Commission, relating to minorities and to conditions which it would be necessary to impose on Germany in order that minorities may be respected. I am glad that the Commission is unanimous on this point, for this is in some way connected with what I have just said: there is no doubt but that the results of the plebiscite have been distorted by the fact that the third zone, the evacuation of which had been requested by the Commission on Danish affairs, was not evacuated, but purely and simply handed over to Germany. This enabled the latter Power to exercise very great pressure,—and particularly moral pressure,—on populations who were saying: ‘we are going to become German tomorrow; let us vote for Germany in order not to be persecuted.’ Those who have had the courage to vote differently know,—for the German police is very well organized,—that they are given over to inevitable persecutions. It is therefore the duty of the Powers to impose on Germany guarantees of a very serious nature in favour of the Danes who are in danger of becoming victims in the near future.

LORD DERBY: I shall not discuss the points on which agreement has been reached. Mr. Laroche has told us that we were confronted with a diplomatic line, to the north of which the Germans were raising claims, and to the south of which the Danes were protesting. Whatever the accepted line might be, the same consequences would inevitably arise. In view of my experience regarding questions of arbitration, I can say that when one is confronted with a decision of which both sides complain, it means that one has reached a just solution. If therefore, the line is traced according to the results of the plebiscite, I cannot help thinking that the Conference will act wisely in ratifying these results. As to the geographical considerations which have been urged, I do not think that these apply to as large an extent of territory. The proposal submitted to us comes in reality from the minority, for Sir Charles Marling could always make use of his casting vote. Mr. Laroche accepts as decisive the result of the plebiscite, but he asks that the fact should be taken into account that this country has been submitted to the German regime for a great many years, that it is to be feared that the Danish spirit has been broken, the Germans having brutally imposed their will. To this I can reply

that I have extremely vivid recollections of a visit which I paid to Alsace-Lorraine, a country which had been oppressed by the Germans during long years, and I did not perceive that the French spirit there had been broken. It seems to me that the Danes have been in the same position, and I therefore think that the results of the plebiscite express clearly the state of mind of the inhabitants.

Mr. Laroche has mentioned the necessity of safeguarding the rights of minorities; this is a point which seems to me to come within the province of the Conference of Ambassadors, and I am entirely prepared to adhere to any suggestion submitted here and calculated to safeguard minorities. In any event, I still think that the possible geographical alterations contemplated by the Treaty cannot apply to vast expanses of territory, but solely to particular cases, like that of a town whose water and drainage system might, for instance, be in another country. It would have been ridiculous to separate the town from its supply of drinking water; and it is precisely this sort of thing that the Treaty intended to avoid by means of Article 110; but it has not as a matter of fact been necessary to apply this stipulation to the second zone; when the Treaty was drawn up, this zone was delimited, and it cannot be said that the question of geographical modifications arises in this case. To sum up, I adhere completely to the report, and consider that the line has been traced in accordance with the general principles of the Treaty, in a manner as just and fair as possible. We should be entirely wrong in not accepting this line proposed by Sir Charles Marling and his colleague.

COUNT BONIN LONGARE: I am prepared to agree with Mr. Laroche that a plebiscite does not always give absolutely truthful and practical results; nevertheless, when we undertook the principle of a plebiscite, we bound ourselves to accept the results thereof. The only point of view which can be urged against this principle is to be found in the first paragraph of Article 110, which states that we should take into account the particular geographical and economic conditions of the localities in question. The word 'localities' is used, and not 'regions', that is to say, limited expanses of territory are referred to and not vast expanses. The Treaty intended that if the frontier line passed half way down the slope of a hill, it would be more natural to make it pass over the summit; if it cut a village in two, it would be preferable to move it to the north or to the south of that village, in order to obtain a line compatible with practical requirements. But such modifications do not go so far as to assign several communes to a State, when the inhabitants have definitely shown that this is against their will. I therefore think that if we did not adopt the line drawn by the Commission we should very clearly act in opposition to the plebiscite results.

As regards the second point considered by Mr. Laroche, i.e. the advisability of granting guarantees to minorities, I am, as is Lord Derby, quite prepared to agree with any suggestion to this effect made by the Conference of Ambassadors.

MR. MATSUI: I entirely agree with the views expressed by my colleagues, the Ambassadors of Great Britain and Italy.

MR. CAMBON: Has Mr. Laroche any other remarks to make?

MR. LAROCHE: First of all I want to reply to the remarks made by Count Bonin Longare.

According to the Italian Ambassador, the powers of the Commission, as defined in Article 110 of the Treaty, would be extremely limited. If I remember what took place when I was a member of the Commission on Danish Affairs—and as I drew up the report of that Commission I feel I have some right to make the remark—I think I can state that this interpretation is too narrow, although everybody has a right to express an opinion on a text once it is drafted. At the time of the work of the Commission, everybody agreed that the voting might give rather unexpected results and that consequently the powers of the Commissioners must be interpreted rather widely: it was, naturally, intended to respect the voting, but it was understood that the line drawn by the Danish Government itself was purely arbitrary. Indeed, that line was drawn solely according to the wishes of the population, who pronounced an opinion on electoral committees or during similar meetings. A frontier line is not drawn in that way. Consequently the Commission did not wish to touch the line proposed by the Danish Government, because it was favorable to the Danes and thought that if the latter had themselves drawn that line it was because they hoped for a vote in their favor; but it did not imagine that it was in any way suitable from the geographical point of view. If a real frontier line had been desired, it would have to have gone much farther north or much farther south than Flensburg. In short, that frontier was only decided in accordance with electoral considerations and that is why it was decided that the powers of the Commission must be widely interpreted.

Having made this clear, I wish now to reply to Lord Derby on a single point.

He acknowledged with much good faith—and he is quite right—that our Alsace-Lorraine was able to resist German domination; but that conclusion should not be applied elsewhere; I do not wish to weaken any idea which may be held as to the moral resistance of the Danes, but it must be understood that it is not only Schleswig, but the whole country (and a very small country), the whole of Denmark, which was subjected to German domination. For 54 years, since 1866, Denmark has trembled before Germany and everybody is aware that quite recently her Government was still pro-German; but that Government was so little in agreement with the general opinion of the nation that it was swept away by a popular vote immediately after the plebiscite and the King of Denmark had the huge majority of the people behind him when he interpreted the constitution as he did. It is therefore not astonishing that the Danes, who were directly under the German heel, were able to resist the Germans and the German spirit much less than the population of Alsace-Lorraine who, for their part, felt themselves supported by a large country of 38 million inhabitants.

MR. CAMBON: Gentlemen, I think that the discussion is at an end. Two questions have been raised:—(1) the question of the frontier resulting from

the work of the Commission and concerning which you have heard the various opinions; (2) the question of the steps to be taken to guarantee the rights of minorities.

I am therefore going to ask you whether you adopt the red line or the green line (on the map submitted to you)<sup>2</sup> as the frontier; the red line is proposed by two members of the Commission including the Chairman; the green line is proposed by the French and Norwegian members.

COUNT BONIN LONGARE: I should first like to ask Sir Charles Marling whether a medium line could not be traced which would satisfy both parties.

SIR CHARLES MARLING: It would be quite impossible. No boundary between the two lines would be satisfactory. The green line is not properly speaking geographical; it does not follow mountain tops nor water courses.

MR. LAROCHE: There is also the question of pastures.

LORD DERBY: There is no need for us to discuss these questions of detail: we must adhere to general principles.

MR. CAMBON: Although I vote for the green line, the red line is adopted by the majority.

MR. LAROCHE: Since the red line is adopted, would it not be necessary to provide for a Convention for the control of the water-system?

SIR CHARLES MARLING: It is recommended by the Commission.

MR. LAROCHE: I should like this Commission for the Control of the water system to draw up a very detailed draft to protect the Danes as much as possible from German domination, so that the working of the Commission may not be turned against the Danes. That is a point to be examined.

I do not wish to enter into details. Perhaps it would be necessary to provide for arbitration between the parties if there was disagreement, as is the case between the Belgians and the Dutch as regards the Scheldt. Thus the Danes might feel free and not be in the power of the Germans.

Questions arise concerning the change of pasture land for cattle. I should like an agreement by which the inhabitants on the other side of the frontier may be ensured the means of feeding their cattle.

Such conventions are made between all countries where there are pasture lands; especially between France and Italy.

MR. CAMBON: They also exist between France and Spain.

MR. LAROCHE: These questions of pastures give rise to frequent incidents even between countries which are friendly, like France and Italy.

When it is a matter of two countries as hostile as Denmark and Germany, one of them a small State and the other a great Power, it is advisable for us to take precautions to prevent the Danes from being bullied.

The Commission has carried out the work of a guardian. The Great Powers are responsible in this matter. I ask them not to be indifferent to the final settlement, in order that there may be no further incidents between the Germans and the Danes.

LORD DERBY: Is the Commission authorized to prepare these agreements?

MR. LAROCHE: I should like the Commission to examine means for

<sup>2</sup> Not attached to filed copy; see n. 5 below.

preparing the agreements which will be signed at the time of the cession of territory. When we give our final assent to the boundary, we could have agreements signed by both parties for the control of the locks, pastures, and the protection of minorities. At the same time the parties would undertake not to alter this regime without the consent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

If we do not act in this way, I am afraid that in the near future the Germans may abuse their position to impose an agreement on Denmark altering the cession of territory and in reality indirectly violating the Treaty of Versailles.

It should be impossible to alter the regime established by us, without our consent.

Moreover, according to Article 110, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are to fix the frontier line. The Boundary Commission will merely place landmarks on the spot.

LORD DERBY: I am entirely opposed to this point of view. Our sole duty is to accept the frontier line.

The other arrangements in question must be decided by the two countries concerned. If we deal with them, we shall never finish our work.

I am ready to accept a Convention for minorities, since it is a matter of the transfer of individuals.

I am not in favor of inserting annexes to the present Treaty: that is not our duty.

MR. LAROCHE: How did the Commission provide for the settlement of these questions? They are pointed out in paragraph XIII of the Commission's report.

LORD DERBY: That is a matter to be settled between the two countries concerned.

MR. LAROCHE: And if Germany refuses to conclude these arrangements I think it would be better at the same time to submit a draft to the two parties.

SIR CHARLES MARLING: The Treaty does not bestow this power on the Commission.

MR. LAROCHE: The least I can require is that the document to be signed concerning the boundary delimitation shall contain a list of the arrangements to be concluded. The two parties would undertake to negotiate.

That is, moreover, provided by an Article of the Treaty.

MR. MATSUI: That is so according to the last paragraph of Article 110. An agreement is necessary for the transfer of territories to Denmark by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. LAROCHE: There is no doubt that an agreement is necessary.

LORD DERBY: I have proposals to make on this subject.

MR. CAMBON: Since the Powers have to transfer these territories to Denmark, I do not see that they cannot attach conditions [*sic*] to such a transfer. I do not understand why the Powers which take precautions for minorities cannot reach decisions concerning the regime of the water-system and the change of pasture for herds of cattle, for these questions are less important than those of minorities.

Personally, I have had rather more experience of Germany than Lord Derby. I know how she treats minorities in her own country.

While I was at Berlin,<sup>3</sup> there was one day, a first communion in a Polish church at which the officiating priest was unfortunate enough to preach in Polish. The church, which was a few yards away from the French Embassy, was invaded by police armed with swords. Women and children were wounded. The priest was torn from his pulpit. That is how the German police treated a minority even in Berlin.

I am extremely sceptical as to the protection which will be granted the Danish minorities if you leave the matter to the Germans.

Indeed, after a war in which we have all been attacked by the Germans, I think it is our duty to take precautions for the Danes. We must fulfil this duty not only where minorities are concerned, but also in other matters liable to lead to disputes between Denmark, which is still a very small Power, and Germany, which, whether republican, imperial, or militarist, will always be the same.

LORD DERBY: I acknowledge that I have been reproved by the President; I receive this reproof in all humility.

With the Germans we can never take too many precautions. We might therefore ask Sir Charles Marling and Mr. Laroche to discuss the three questions concerning the safeguard of minorities, the regime of the water-system and the change of pasture for cattle. They could enter into details better than we can.

COUNT BONIN LONGARE: I express my satisfaction at this understanding. Any arrangement guaranteeing minorities and the special interests mentioned by Mr. Laroche would have my sympathy. I have often witnessed the difficulties between Austria and Italy as regards these questions of pasturage. We used to meet with great difficulties in this matter.

It will be the proud claim of the Conference to have succeeded in establishing a state of things which will avoid future disputes.

MR. CAMBON: I thank Lord Derby very sincerely for what he has just said and the proposal which he has just made.

To sum up, we ask Sir Charles Marling and Mr. Laroche to come to an understanding and to submit proposals to us at our next meeting.

LORD DERBY read a memorandum on the method to be followed after the new German-Danish frontier has been fixed by the Conference of Ambassadors. (Appendix 'B').<sup>4</sup>

MR. LAROCHE: It is clearly understood that we cannot give notice of the frontier line and publish it until the two parties have signed the agreements in question. That is an absolute condition; otherwise, if we do not take this precaution, if we let the Germans enter into occupation first, they will refuse to sign anything at all.

SIR CHARLES MARLING: It is entirely in the interest of the Germans to sign; this agreement is indispensable.

MR. LAROCHE: It should all be done at the same time. It is evidently a matter of agreeing as to principle; we should not enter into details.

<sup>3</sup> M. Jules Cambon had been French Ambassador at Berlin 1907-14.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.



SIR CHARLES MARLING: The Germans are already bound *in fine* by Article 114.

MR. LAROCHE: That is true, as regards the question of pastures; but as regards minorities it is more open to doubt. If we do not make the signature of the agreement a condition of the transfer of territory, we shall get nothing afterwards.

LORD DERBY: Will not that take months?

MR. LAROCHE: I do not think so. In any case, we can make Germany sign an undertaking to accept the conditions to be imposed as regards the protection of minorities.

COUNT BONIN LONGARE: That will be difficult. Look at the difficulties we are meeting with in connection with the clauses of the Treaty with Roumania.

MR. LAROCHE: It must not be thought that we are going to impose a Treaty for minorities as in the case of other countries. I do not even think that we can defend Danish culture in that district. In my opinion it is merely a matter of protecting inhabitants from persecution for the part they took in the voting. If we wished to impose the protection of minorities on Germany, that would take much time, although in theory I do not see why we should not do for the Danes what has been done for others, by trying to insert a clause for the protection of schools.

It is absolutely necessary to prevent the persecution of persons who have taken part in the voting. This clause would concern both Denmark and Germany. The Treaty must be alike for both countries.

SIR CHARLES MARLING: The Germans will never agree.

MR. LAROCHE: In the third zone Mr. Wolf was imprisoned and treated with great severity. Others were subjected to considerable annoyance.

I do not think that we can reject the addition of a clause stipulating that no persons who took part in the vote may be subjected to any vexatious measures whatever on account of the opinion which they have expressed.

The same clause would be signed by Denmark and by Germany, although in reality the Germans have much less need of protection than the Danes.

SIR CHARLES MARLING: The Governments will not openly persecute people for having voted; they will persecute them indirectly: for instance a lawyer will lose his clientele at Flensburg, for he will systematically be made to lose all his cases.

MR. LAROCHE: In that case the Allied and Associated Powers have the right to make representations.

We always refused to interfere officially in favor of Mr. Wolf, for we could not prevent the German Government from exacting reprisals from its own national.

If, on the other hand, the German Government recognizes that it may not persecute any person similarly situated, we are always entitled to remonstrate with it if there are complaints.

LORD DERBY: I disagree entirely with Mr. Laroche. Once the line is fixed, we have nothing more to do with it. It is no longer our business.

MR. CAMBON: I do not share your opinion. We apply Article 114 of the Treaty.

LORD DERBY: That is a Treaty with Germany; Denmark has nothing to do with it.

MR. LAROCHE: I do not insist in the case of Denmark; I confine my demand to Germany.

MR. CAMBON: We have instructed Sir Charles Marling and Mr. Laroche to examine the question.

We simply adopt the general principles of the British Memorandum and change the dates.

It was decided:

(1) to adopt the frontier line between Denmark and Germany proposed by the International Commission of Schleswig (red line on the maps appended to the report of the Commission C. A. 37.)<sup>5</sup>

(2) to adopt the conclusions of the British memorandum relative to the instruments to be drawn up after the establishment of the new German-Danish frontier.

(3) to refer to Sir Charles Marling and Mr. Laroche, for examination and report, the question of the regulation in detail of all questions dealing with minorities, water-system and pastures. . . .<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. Copies of the maps are attached to file 194411/548/18.

<sup>6</sup> The remaining minute concerned the auditing of the accounts of the Schleswig Commission.

#### No. 434

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received May 9,  
12.35 p.m.)*

*No. 499 Telegraphic [196805/548/18]*

COPENHAGEN, May 8, 1920, 8.25 p.m.

My telegram No. 485 of May 5th.<sup>1</sup>

Unofficial Flensburg Delegation composed of five members leave for Paris via United Kingdom May 9th.

Professor Winding Kruse, a Conservative writer, who advocates internationalization of second zone, is proceeding to Paris to act as intermediary between delegation and Danish Minister. Though Government officially proclaim that they favour a conclusion on basis of self-determination they are practically giving their support to 'internationalist' group. Thus Professor Kruse should be considered as a Quasi-official delegate.<sup>2</sup>

In an interview with a correspondent of 'Chicago Daily News' Herr Neergaard stated 'we will try by all means to save Danish minority in second zone. We could support idea of "internationalization"'.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This reported the resignation of the Friis government on May 5 and the formation of a new ministry headed by Hr. Niels Neergaard.

<sup>2</sup> For a protest addressed to M. Millerand by Dr. Göppert against proposals for internationalization of the second zone, see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 128.

For the rest question has been placed in the hands of Schleswig Commission.'

Mr. H. N. Anderson [*sic*]<sup>3</sup> will shortly pay a visit to London but I understand this will be solely in connection with question of Danish exports.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. H. N. Andersen, director of the Danish East Asiatic Company.

#### No. 435

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 542 Telegraphic: by bag [196499/548/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 10, 1920*

Your telegram No. 540 (of May 5th.<sup>1</sup> Slesvig report).

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government no other interpretation of the Treaty than that held by Sir C. Marling is possible. His Majesty's Government consider that the frontier line must be drawn generally according to the voting in the communes.

You should draw the attention of the Conference to the necessity of taking steps for constituting without further delay the Frontier Delimitation Commission. The British representative, Colonel Winter, is in London and is holding himself in readiness to proceed immediately on receipt of instructions.

<sup>1</sup> No. 432.

#### No. 436

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 12, 11 a.m.)*

*No. 573 Telegraphic [197373/548/18]*

*Secret*

PARIS, *May 11, 1920, 10 p.m.*

The Danish Minister called on me to ask whether the Ambassadors' Conference would reconsider the decision they arrived at at their last meeting with regard to Danish frontier. I pointed out to him that decision had been arrived at in strict accordance with the terms of the Treaty, and that to include area in Danish territory which M. Claudel advocates would be to go diametrically contrary to the wish of the inhabitants as shown by plebiscite. He admitted that this was absolutely accurate but said decision of Conference would be a disappointment to the Danish King<sup>1</sup> and Government. He quite

<sup>1</sup> The King of Denmark had telegraphed on May 7 to H.M. King George V asking him, if possible, to help postpone the decision in Paris with regard to the Schleswig question until the French Minister at Copenhagen and the delegation being sent from Denmark had been heard. The reason for his telegraphic appeal was, he said, the receipt of a wire from Paris stating that the decision would be taken on the 8th. No reply to his telegram has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

understood my position and acknowledged that no other course could be taken under the terms of the Treaty. In conclusion I informed him that I shall resolutely oppose the question being reopened at the Conference unless I received instructions from Your Lordship to do so, and this I hope sincerely will not be given.

The Ambassadors' Conference will consider within the next day or two provisions for protection of minority and safeguarding of pasturage and waterways which Germans will be asked to accept, and this I feel convinced is as far as we should go.

No. 437

*Record by Lord Hardinge of a conversation with the Danish Minister  
in London*

[198154/548/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 12, 1920

The Danish Minister called this afternoon and gave me the accompanying paper.<sup>1</sup> I understood from him that the Delegation mentioned in the paper has no official character but that they are on their way to place their views before the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris. Their proposals consist of:—

- (a) the inclusion of Flensburg in the first zone,
- (b) the internationalisation of the second zone,
- (c) the procedure to be adopted in demarcating the second zone.

I told Count Castenskiöld that I would submit the matter to you,<sup>2</sup> but that personally the desirability of the Delegation being received at the Foreign Office seemed to me very doubtful, as it would have the appearance of going behind the back of Sir C. Marling, who is our representative on the Commission and who has been in Paris to express his view of the situation. Moreover, I did not see that an interview here could possibly be of any practical utility to the Delegation since obviously the Foreign Office could give no reply to any statement that the Delegation might be pleased to make.

Count Castenskiöld then asked me whether it would be possible to suggest to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris that no definite decision should be taken on the points raised until after the arrival of the Delegation in Paris, it being the intention of the Delegation to leave immediately after the question of their reception in the Foreign Office has been decided.

I replied that it might be possible to inform Lord Derby that the Delegation is actually on its way to Paris and to suggest that it might be desirable

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This was a formal enquiry whether Lord Curzon would allow a delegation from the 2nd zone in Sleswig to be received at the Foreign Office on its way through London to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. Lord Curzon to whom this record was addressed.

to allow them to put their views before the Ambassadors before the latter had taken a definite decision. I do not think that this would commit us in any way.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In reply to a minute by Lord Hardinge asking whether the Delegation should be received Lord Curzon wrote: 'I am under the impression that the Ambassadors' Conference decided to await the arrival of the Danish representative—who wd. doubtless be accompanied by the Danish Delegation—in Paris before resuming the discussions, and I so informed the King some days ago. It is all to be found in telegrams from Lord Derby. Most certainly we could not receive them here and they ought to go direct—as they had originally intended—to Paris. C 12/5.'

No. 438

*Letter from Sir C. Marling (Paris) to Mr. E. Phipps (Received May 14)*

[197865/548/18]

PARIS, May 12, 1920

My dear Eric,

There is an immense amount to be said for and against an autonomous Slesvig Holstein, and when I wrote my desp. of 23 March<sup>1</sup> I think I was looking at the matter principally from the standpoint of the protection of the Danish minority for which it would no doubt prove an excellent solution. There was at that moment quite a strong local feeling in favour of it, the result partly no doubt of the Kapp 'Putsch' and of the reflection how pleasant it would be to be for ever guaranteed ag[ain]st Prussianism and attempts to revive it by the protection of Gt. Britain or the League of Nations, but though that feeling undoubtedly still exists, the present attempt to raise the question is wholly Danish, supported and encouraged by my French Colleague, Claudel, and for that reason I think we ought to have nothing to do with it. It wd. be different if the impetus came from Middle and Southern Slesvig and Holstein, but at present it does not, and personally I very much doubt whether the reflecting people in Denmark support the idea, for it is pretty certain that once the question came on the *tapis* as a matter of practical politics, Middle Slesvig (i.e. Flensburg) would at once clamour for the 'Tiedje' line, which wd. rob Denmark of 2/5th of N. Slesvig. That the present Govt. in Copenhagen appears to be supporting the project means very little more than that they are obliged to do it to please the Conservative party (which has always been v. Chauvinist in the Slesvig question) in order to have a majority in Parliament.

Claudel has had a long talk with the Ambassador on the subject, which H. E. will no doubt report.<sup>2</sup> C.'s object is of course to encourage separatism in Germany and he wd. like to see us appointed legal guardian of his bastard, and so keep us in hot water with Germany.

Yours,

C. M. MARLING

<sup>1</sup> No. 427.    <sup>2</sup> No report of this conversation has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 439

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon*

*(Received May 14, 9.30 a.m.)*

*No. 519 Telegraphic [197787/548/18]*

COPENHAGEN, May 13, 1920, 8.5 p.m.

My telegram No. 499 of May 8th.<sup>1</sup>

German Minister enquired on behalf of his Government whether Denmark would be willing to conclude an agreement with Germany for reciprocal protection of minorities in Schleswig.

Danish Government replied that at present moment they could not negotiate on this.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Danish Minister at Paris has been instructed to inform the Allies, should they consult him, that Danish Government consider that Article 113 of German constitution<sup>2</sup> supplemented by guarantees analogous to those contained in Article 23 of the Treaty of Vienna between Denmark and Prussia and Austria of October 30th, 1864 (State papers volume 54 page 530) would offer adequate protection for Danes in second zone. Danish Government would however require that agreement should be drawn up in such a manner that Germany could not abolish or alter Article 113 of constitution.

Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to contemplate that Allies would be a party to such an agreement but he did not expressly say so nor did he explain how these instructions to Danish Minister would affect position of Doctor Winding Kruse.

He is anxious that it should be stipulated that Danes should have the right to leave Germany with all their belongings.

If these arrangements were made he thought that position of Danes in second zone would be tolerable.

Repeated to Paris for Sir C. Marling.

<sup>1</sup> No. 434.

<sup>2</sup> This article read: 'Sections of the population of the Federation speaking a foreign language may not be restricted, by means of legislation and administration, in their free national development; this applies especially to the use of their mother tongue in education, as well as in questions of internal administration and courts of law;' see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxii, pp. 1082-3.

No. 440

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 15)*

*No. 1458 [198001/548/18]*

PARIS, May 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that at the request of the Danish Minister I have this morning seen Dr. Kruse, to whom reference is made in Your Lord-

ship's despatch No. 1553 of the 11th instant.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Kruse is I understand the leading lawyer in Denmark, and thoroughly conversant not only with the laws of that country, but also with those of Germany and England. He is a personal friend of Sir E. Pollock, Solicitor General, who would doubtless give you full information on this point.

Dr. Kruse had been specially sent as an envoy from Denmark to see the members forming the Ambassadors' Conference on the subject of the new Schleswig frontier. After a long discussion with him I ascertained that he agreed it would be impossible in view of the Plebiscite to alter the frontier line as laid down by Sir Charles Marling's Commission, and he confined his remarks to urging measures which he considers essential for the protection of the Danish minority in Flensburg and the second zone.

In his opinion no Treaty would be of any value for their protection, and he considers it imperative that a neutral zone that would include the town of Flensburg should be constituted.

He has handed me a paper<sup>2</sup> on the subject which I attach to this despatch. According to his figures the population of the area which would form the neutral zone is some 108,000, out of which 35,000 are Danes.

He is anxious to lay his views before Your Lordship and he is proceeding to England immediately for that purpose. I told him I felt sure Your Lordship would either see him yourself or depute somebody to do so on your behalf, but at the same time I told him I could hold out but slight hopes that his pleading would be of any avail.

I pointed out that there was no provision in the Treaty with Germany which would allow of the creation of such neutral zone, and that to attempt such would be a contravention of the terms of the Treaty with Germany, to which Germany could with great right on her side offer strong objection.

I am, &c.,

DERBY

<sup>1</sup> This transmitted a copy of No. 434 to Paris for Sir C. Marling.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. A French translation of this paper is printed by de Jessen, op. cit., pp. 449-55.

#### No. 441

*Mr. Brudenell-Bruce (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received May 20)*

*Unnumbered [199028/548/18]*

COPENHAGEN, May 13, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit the following report of events at Flensburg since Sir Charles Marling's departure on April 22nd.

2. Sir Charles Marling, on his departure, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen and approached the Danish Government with a view to renewing the negotiations for the occupation of the 1st Zone which had

been broken off on account of Dr. Køster's opposition to the introduction of the Kroner currency.<sup>1</sup> I learnt from Sir Charles Marling that it had been decided between himself and the French Commissioner that in the event of the Danish Government wishing to introduce the Kroner into the 1st Zone the Commission should do so by an ordinance of their own, but that as a preliminary step Denmark should occupy the 1st Zone keeping for the present the Mark currency. The Danish Government sent Mr. Lundbye on April 26th to Flensburg to negotiate a new agreement with the International Commission, and as Mr. Heftye, the Norwegian Commissioner, left the same day, the negotiations for the occupation of the 1st Zone were carried on between M. Lundbye and myself.

3. A meeting took place on April 27th between Dr. Mezger, the German Delegate, Mr. Lundbye and myself in which Dr. Mezger was informed that the Danish Government had decided to occupy the 1st Zone in accordance with Article 109, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Versailles. Dr. Mezger raised no objection to this occupation, with the exception of the question of replacing the German judges by Danish ones. He argued that judges were not 'administrative' but 'civil' authorities, and as such could not be replaced until the sovereignty was ceded to Denmark.

4. The Danish Government attach great importance to the introduction as early as possible of Danish legal officials, and after protracted negotiations I proposed to the German Government that the present German judges should continue to handle current cases and that new cases should be given over to the Danish judges. To this proposal I have, as yet, received no reply. I have no doubt, however, that the matter, being an extremely intricate one, will eventually be made the matter of an agreement between the Danish and German Governments, as Denmark, although anxious to introduce her own legal officials into Northern Slesvig, is at the same time unwilling to take over alone cases at present under consideration.

5. An agreement was signed on April 29th between Mr. Lundbye and myself for the occupation of the 1st Zone. The chief points of this agreement were that Denmark should occupy with her Military and administrative forces the 1st Zone on May 5th, that a Danish official should be appointed as administrator of the 1st Zone and issue all ordinances jointly with the Commission thus avoiding the possibility of the Commission dealing direct with individual officials, that the revenue should remain the property of the German Government until the sovereignty is ceded to Denmark, and that Danish officials receive the salaries of those German officials as they replace them. The expenses of the Military occupation are to be considered as part of the Commission's expenses, and are to be borne half by Germany and half by Denmark. Denmark further guarantees to make an effective frontier control between the 1st and 2nd Zones should the International Commission require it. This latter point was put into the agreement in order to prevent smuggling between the 1st and 2nd Zones in the event of Danish

<sup>1</sup> For Dr. Göppert's protest of May 11 to M. Millerand on this subject see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 127.



currency being introduced at a later date. Customs and currency were to remain for the present as before.

6. I communicated a copy of this agreement privately to the German Delegate who replied with a somewhat lengthy note in which he contended that although Germany continued to receive the revenue Denmark should pay her own officials. He also reiterated Germany's opposition to the introduction of Danish judges.

7. Dr. Mezger brought this protest personally, and as a result of a further conversation between him and myself he decided to leave for Berlin the next day in order to, if possible, get the German Government to agree in principle to the terms of the Memorandum signed between the Danish Government and the Commission.

8. Dr. Mezger returned on the 2nd of May having obtained very little from his Government, beyond a threat that in the event of the Danish Government insisting on the points in question, the German Government would immediately withdraw all their officials from the 1st Zone.

9. The Danish Government became somewhat nervous at Germany's attitude and replied in conciliatory terms, with the result that the German Government agreed to continue negotiations and allow their officials to remain. Denmark accordingly occupied the 1st Zone in accordance with the agreement, and on May 5th Danish troops arrived in Sønderborg, Haderslev, Aabenraa and Tønder. A certain number of higher Danish officials arrived at the same time and are at present working in nominal harmony with the Germans.

10. I strongly advised the Danish Government not to allow themselves to be intimidated by Germany as I am certain that an attempt by Germany to withdraw her officials at short notice would result in failure, the officials in question not being anxious to leave the Plebiscite area where housing and food conditions are considerably better than in any other part of Germany. The Friis Cabinet was, however, extremely nervous, and in view of their approaching fall (it will be remembered that they only accepted office for a fortnight until the new elections had taken place) anxious to retire without taking any step which might lay them open to criticism from their successors. The new Danish Government was in fact formed on May 4th, the day before the actual occupation.

11. I would add that the negotiations were marked by extreme indecision on the part of the Danish Government and by a distinct spirit of antagonism on the part of Germany who, far from acknowledging the 1st Zone as lost, have insisted on maintaining their sovereign rights to the utmost letter of the law, showing a rather marked desire to hamper Denmark in her somewhat difficult task.

12. Mr. Hefstye, the Norwegian delegate, returned to Flensburg on the 5th of May, and on his suggestion I left for Copenhagen on the 6th in order to discuss on the spot the various questions involved with the eventual introduction of Kroner currency.

13. Although the Danish Government originally were extremely anxious

that Danish currency should be introduced within ten days of the occupation I found them practically unprepared for the step. It was, however, arranged that the Commission, in view of the present unsettled state of the Plebiscite area, should approach them on the subject of introducing Kroner currency and ask them for their cooperation. This would give the appearance that the step came from the Commission and not from the Danish Government.

14. I telegraphed this arrangement, which was made at a meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself on May 8th, to Mr. Heftye, and received a reply to the effect that he approved of this step. I handed in a Note to the Danish Government in this sense on May 10th, Mr. Heftye at the same time informing the German Delegate in Flensburg of this fact.

15. The Danish Government replied on May 12th that they were willing to cooperate and enclosed a series of draft ordinances for the introduction of Danish currency, based on the original laws prepared by them in October last. These drafts I have accepted on behalf of the International Commission, and I return to-night to Flensburg. The ordinances will be published<sup>2</sup> on May 15th. The Danish Government proposed May 17th as a suitable date for the introduction of the new currency but in view of the short notice to the public the date has been delayed at my request to May 20th.

16. The occupation of the 1st Zone and the introduction of Danish currency should render much easier the eventual incorporation into the Danish Kingdom of such territory as may fall to Denmark under the Treaty of Peace. Danish officials will have been able to take over gradually the administration during the International Commission's occupation of the Plebiscite area and the difficulties involved in change of currency should be already practically overcome before the final act of cession: the currency ordinances which are being issued by the International Commission being practically identical to those Denmark has intended eventually to introduce.

I am communicating copy of this despatch to Sir Charles Marling and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Copenhagen.

I have, &c.,

C. BRUDENELL-BRUCE

<sup>2</sup> A French version of the text is printed by de Jessen, op. cit., p. 456.

#### No. 442

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)*

*Unnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [197920/548/18]*

PARIS, May 14, 1920

Following from Sir C. Marling.

Your telegram No. 519 to Foreign Office.<sup>2</sup>

I gather that Conference will not agree to any provision which would

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 578 to the Foreign Office, where it was received at 9.30 p.m. on the same day.

<sup>2</sup> No. 439.

require them to demand of Germany that this or that article of German constitution shall not be amended or abolished.

It is proposed to introduce into Treaty a clause permitting Danes of second zone to option [*sic*] of nationality in same conditions as apply to Germans in first zone.

### No. 443

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 17)*

*No. 583 Telegraphic: by bag [198213/7067/39]*

PARIS, May 14, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> 5) M. Cambon called the attention of the Conference to the notes from the Danish Minister (see my despatch No. 1478)<sup>2</sup> and from the German Peace Delegation<sup>3</sup> (which are being sent in a subsequent despatch) asking the Conference of Ambassadors to reconsider various points in connection with the new Slesvig frontier. M. Cambon explained he had informed the Danish Minister that his note had arrived too late, and that in any case, if this Danish case were heard by the Conference, they would equally have to hear the German. This reply was approved.<sup>4</sup> I informed the Conference of my conversation with Dr. Kruse as reported in my despatch No. 1458.<sup>5</sup>

The Conference had before it the draft convention which had been drawn up for regulating the transfer of Slesvig territory in accordance with the decision of the Conference reported in my telegram No. 556.<sup>6</sup> This draft has been prepared by Sir Charles Marling and M. Laroche with the help of Mr. Fromageot and Mr. Malkin.<sup>7</sup> Sir C. Marling, who returns to London to-morrow, will take with him a copy and I will be able to explain its stipulations, and also the various small amendments which we considered it desirable to introduce. I submitted these amendments to the Conference this morning but it was not possible to arrive at any decision as the members of the Conference had not had time to study the text either of the Convention itself, or of the amendments. It is hoped, however, to obtain complete agreement at the next meeting.

In order that the winding up of the Commission, and the transfer of the territory at present administered by the Commission to Germany and Denmark respectively, may not be unduly delayed on account of the signature

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note of May 12 protested that the 'déviation de la frontière maritime dans le fjord de Flensburg proposée par la Commission' was prejudicial to Denmark.

<sup>3</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 130.

<sup>4</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 132.

<sup>5</sup> No. 440.

<sup>6</sup> Of May 8, not printed.

<sup>7</sup> Respectively Legal Adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Assistant Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office.

and ratification of this Convention, I proposed to the Conference that as soon as its terms had been agreed upon the Conference should formally announce the line which has been fixed as a future frontier between Denmark and Germany, and withdraw the Interallied troops from the plebiscite areas so as to allow Germany and Denmark to take over at once the territories assigned to them, without waiting for the coming into force of the Convention now under consideration. This proposal will be further considered at the next meeting of the Conference. . . .<sup>1</sup>

**No. 444**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 562 Telegraphic: by bag [197373/548/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 15, 1920*

Your telegram No. 573 (of May 11th<sup>1</sup>, Schleswig question).

Your action approved.

You should refuse absolutely to allow this question to be reopened.

<sup>1</sup> No. 436.

**No. 445**

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)*

*No. 217 [198593/548/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 17, 1920*

Sir,

Professor Vinding Kruse, who had been sent by the Danish Government as a Delegate to see me with regard to the Slesvig Question, called on me this afternoon in the Foreign Office and, with great earnestness, pleaded his case.

It was to this effect: that the Middle Zone, including the town of Flensburg, which, at the recent plebiscite, had by an overwhelming majority voted for incorporation in Germany, should be constituted a neutral belt or zone under international protection, either of the League of Nations or otherwise, and in this way be saved from union with Germany. The Professor dilated, with much feeling, both upon the methods which the Germans were alleged to have employed to cajole or terrorise the voters at the recent election, and upon the persecution which the Danish element who were left in German territory would suffer in the future. He described the plans, with regard to education, to business, and other matters, which the Germans would be certain to adopt; and he urged that his fellow-countrymen should be saved, by the kindly intervention of the Powers, from the dire fate which otherwise awaited them.

It was my duty to point out to him, sympathetically, I hope, but firmly, that what he was asking the British Government to do was that we should

ourselves propose an infraction of the Treaty of Peace with Germany; that we should ignore the result of the plebiscite which had just taken place, under conditions as fair and equitable as could in the circumstances be devised; and that we should intervene in the special interests of that which was, unhappily but indubitably, a small minority of the population. Had the plebiscite gone the other way, no one, I argued, would be more angry than the Danes had the German Government made a similar proposal. I could not hold out the smallest hope that the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, by whom the matter was about to be dealt with, would be able to take any step in the direction that he desired. On the contrary, I had reason to believe that, within a couple of days, they would approve of the draft Convention which had been drawn up upon the report of the Commission, and that the Danish and German Governments would then be invited to sign it.

I gave the Professor a summary of the contents of this Convention, and pointed out to him that it contained a provision under which any Dane in the Zone in question would have the right to claim Danish nationality, and to leave the territory if he so desired. Further, I said, there was to be a clause providing for the non-molestation of persons who had taken part in the plebiscite, and this, I hoped, would provide a becoming protection for those who might otherwise suffer. I could not hold out any hope that the Allied Powers would be prepared, at this date, to consider any other solution.

Professor Kruse can, I am convinced, have expected no other answer, although he expressed extreme chagrin at the disappointment of his hopes. He wished, however, to know whether it would be possible to insert in the Convention any provision for the adequate protection of minorities—that is, of the Danes—in the Zone in question, and he begged me to give him an introduction to the British Ambassador in Paris, with a special request to the latter to give him an opportunity of making this suggestion.

I declined to take this step, because, as I remarked, having seen Lord Derby a few days before, he had already had the opportunity, if he chose, of making the suggestion. I did not think that it was for me to give any hint to the Ambassadors' Conference in the matter. If, when the Danish Government received the Convention, they desired to make any representation or suggestion about it, I supposed that nothing could prevent them from doing so.

The Professor then left me, without having, I fear, derived much consolation from our interview.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

**No. 446**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 579 Telegraphic [198705/548/18]*

*Very urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 18, 1920, 5.45 p.m.*

His Majesty's Government are most anxious to expedite withdrawal of British troops and dissolution of international commission, continuance of which after completion of its task merely causes useless expenditure.

You should therefore urge that formal notification of new frontier lines should be made to Danish and German Governments at earliest possible moment without waiting for conclusion and ratification of convention for transfer of territory. This notification will permit those Powers to occupy their respective territories up to new frontier at once, and will involve withdrawal of allied forces.

Text of convention drafted at Paris has been considered here in consultation with Sir C. Marling. Please insist on its acceptance without substantial changes.

**No. 447**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 580 Telegraphic [198705/548/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 18, 1920, 5.45 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Sir C. Marling understands that about a fortnight would be enough to allow for our withdrawal. During that time the eight days' visit of the French troops to Copenhagen could take place and arrangements could be concluded with the German staff for their transport by land. Admiralty could send transport for our own troops, whose two days' visit to Copenhagen could take place on way home.

You are therefore authorised to suggest, unless you see objection, that Danish and German Governments should be privately informed at once that formal notification of new frontier will be made to them on or about June 3rd. Our troops might evacuate same day and Germany re-occupy day after. Denmark is already in occupation of first zone.

<sup>1</sup> No. 446.

**No. 448**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 19, 12 noon)*

*No. 597 Telegraphic [198728/548/18]*

PARIS, *May 18, 1920, 6.20 p.m.*

Am I authorised to agree to the draft Convention as modified by Sir C. Marling and Laroche on 15th instant? Or do you wish to consider Danish

proposal for an international belt? I am telegraphing you on that subject report of my meeting with Danish deputation this afternoon.<sup>1</sup> French are submitting to Conference a draft note<sup>2</sup> to be addressed to German and Danish Governments communicating text of Convention, and announcing that Allied Governments have decided to withdraw troops as soon as German and Danish Governments have expressed their intention of accepting Convention.

The draft note goes as far as to fix fifteen days as time limit, within which two Governments must notify their acceptance of Convention. I demur addressing this sort of ultimatum to the two Governments, unless we are prepared to enforce it by maintaining Allied troops of occupation indefinitely in plebiscite area as a means of pressure. As His Majesty's Government would probably object to keeping British troops in Sleswig [*sic*] for this purpose, the alternative would be for Allies to evacuate all their troops, and for Commission to hand over administration of territory to Germans and Danes as soon as new frontier line is officially communicated by Conference of Ambassadors to Governments concerned. Germans and Danes would be invited simultaneously to sign draft Convention, but without any time limit being fixed. They might, of course, refuse, but I think that it would be better to run this risk than to drift into position of having to maintain Allied troops in Sleswig after work of Commission is finished. Besides in unlikely event of refusal, means of pressure other than continued military occupation could doubtless be devised for enforcing wishes of Allies. I propose to take this line when matter is discussed at Conference. I gather that Sir C. Marling, whom you will doubtless consult, agrees with me in this matter.

<sup>1</sup> No. 449 below.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

#### No. 449

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 19, 11.20 a.m.)*

*No. 595 Telegraphic [198726/548/18]*

PARIS, May 18, 1920, 8.45 p.m.

I to-day received a deputation of Danish gentlemen who were introduced by M. Tessen. The members mostly came from Flensburg and district in order to represent to me the dangers that would arise for all those who, having advocated annexation to Denmark now found by result of plebiscite that they would still remain in German territory.

I pointed out to the deputation that I could not discuss with them the question (? of frontier) line. That had already been definitely decided. They agreed that was so, although they protested that a great deal of illegal pressure had been exercised by Germans over voting.

They had been shown by M. Cambon and M. Laroche the draft treaty which will be submitted to Ambassadors' Conference tomorrow morning

and which it is proposed should be signed by both Denmark and Germany, and object of which is to secure protection to minorities in each country. Deputation assured me that Treaty would be of little value in protection of lives and property of Danes left in German hands, and they begged me to lay before Your Lordship the imperative necessity of instituting an international belt. Among many reasons they brought forward was that such a belt would include island of Sylt on west coast, which, having deep water and being free from ice all the year round, had been used as a submarine and zeppelin station by the Germans during the war, whilst on east coast the international belt would include Flensburg, which equally had been a German submarine base. I pointed out to deputation that however desirable such a belt might be, it was impossible to realise their wishes under present treaty. That there was no clause which could possibly be construed into giving plebiscite commission the right of instituting such a belt, and in order to do so it would require a supplementary treaty to be agreed upon by Germany and Allies.

I informed the deputation that I would lay their views before Your Lordship, and that you would have opportunity of considering them at the same time as treaty above mentioned, which I believe will be approved by Ambassadors' Conference.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In his telegram No. 601 of May 26 (not printed) Lord Curzon 'entirely approved' Lord Derby's language. In the meantime a telegram (not printed) from the Central Schleswig deputation to Lord Curzon urging him to support their proposal for internationalization had been received in the Foreign Office on May 20.

#### No. 450

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 19, 10.25 a.m.)*

*No. 596 Telegraphic [198727/548/18]*

*Very secret*

PARIS, May 18, 1920, 8.45 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.

The deputation assured me Monsieur Cambon and Monsieur Laroche said that France would be prepared to agree (? but that) England objected. I have no knowledge as to whether this is true or not.

#### No. 451

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 21)*

*No. 598 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, May 19, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> 5. I informed the Conference of the visit of the Danish Mission re-

<sup>1</sup> The first four sections related to other matters.



ferred to in my telegram No. 573.<sup>2</sup> My French and Italian colleagues had received similar visits of which they gave an account. In each case the Mission made much the same statements.

The Conference examined in detail the draft convention for transferring the Schleswig territory to Denmark, as finally agreed upon between Sir C. Marling and Monsieur Laroche on the 15th instant. Since then, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs have shown a copy of the convention to the Danish Legation, and the latter have suggested various amendments which were brought before the Conference at today's meeting.

The Danish Legation request (*a*) that further stipulations should be inserted in article 3 of the draft convention so as to extend the right of opting for Danish or German nationality, as the case may be, to a category of persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty, who are not covered by the present stipulations governing the matter; (*b*) they also ask that inhabitants of the second zone who opt for Danish nationality should be exempted from payment of German taxes which have not been levied during the administration of the Commission. As these points involve redrafting of article 3, it was decided to refer them to the Drafting Committee. As His Majesty's Government are now unrepresented on that Committee, I propose to accept any draft which Monsieur Fromageot, in whom I have great faith, may suggest to meet the difficulty as regards (*a*) where there is obvious need for amending the present text; as regards (*b*) since the question of principle involved goes beyond the competence of the Drafting Committee, I shall be glad in the absence of a financial adviser, to be furnished with an expert opinion on the point at issue. It is all the more important, as a decision in this case will probably form the precedent for the other plebiscites. A copy of the Danish note setting forth these two points is enclosed in my despatch No. 1517.<sup>3</sup>

The French further proposed the addition of an article setting up an arbitral Commission to decide disputes arising out of the Convention. The Commission is to be composed of representatives of the German and Danish Governments, and of a member appointed by the two Governments, or, should they fail to agree, by the League of Nations; its expenses being borne equally by Germany and Denmark. I agreed to this addition.

The other provisions of the Convention were accepted by the Conference, subject to some verbal alterations in articles 2 and 5. The convention will come before the Conference for final decision on the 22nd, together with the proposals of the Drafting Committee with regard to the redrafting of article 3. I shall be glad to have, by that time, an expert opinion as regards the payment of German taxes by the inhabitants of the 2nd zone who opt for Denmark.

The United States Ambassador called attention to the question of the participation of the United States Government in this convention. He presumed that the United States would not sign it, in as much as they have not ratified the German treaty of which it is an outcome. On his suggestion,

<sup>2</sup> Presumably an error for '583', i.e. No. 443.

<sup>3</sup> Of May 19, not printed.

however, the drafting Committee is to be asked to express an opinion as to whether the abstention of the United States would affect the validity of the Convention.

6. The French Delegation submitted a draft of a note communicating the text of the above Convention to the German and Danish Governments (See my despatch No. 1508,<sup>4</sup> my telegram No. 597<sup>5</sup> and your telegram No. 579<sup>6</sup>). I induced the Conference to alter the draft note by omitting all reference to the evacuation of the plebiscite area, and as approved it will merely communicate the draft convention to the two Governments and invite them to notify the Allies as soon as possible whether they are prepared to accept it. The question, therefore, of the date on which the troops are to be evacuated and the Commission is to hand over the administration of the zone is still left undecided. I proposed in accordance with your telegram No. 580<sup>7</sup> that the Governments concerned should be informed that June 3rd should be fixed as the date on which the plebiscite commission should terminate its administration, and that from that date, the withdrawal of troops should begin. My colleagues pointed out that to make any such statement would be an incentive to the German Government not to sign the Convention, and they urged that no such statement should be made even unofficially to the Governments concerned. They quite realise, however, that as from that or some approximate date, His Majesty's Government will be compelled to start withdrawing British troops. It is possible, however, in that case that French troops would remain until the German and Danish Governments have accepted the Convention. This question will again be considered on the 22nd and I trust a decision arrived at.

<sup>4</sup> Of May 18, not printed.

<sup>5</sup> No. 448.

<sup>6</sup> No. 446.

<sup>7</sup> No. 447.

## No. 452

*Mr. Brudenell-Bruce (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received June 3)*

*Unnumbered [201474/548/18]*

FLensburg, May 20, 1920

My Lord,

In continuation of my despatch unnumbered of May 13<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to state that on my return to Flensburg on May 14th the ordinances necessary for the introduction of Kroner in the First Zone were signed by the Danish Administrator and myself and issued the same evening. The new currency will be introduced to-day. As the regulations in question may have a certain general interest I have the honour to enclose them herewith in the original German and Danish text.<sup>2</sup>

The publication of these ordinances, as was to be expected, raised a storm of indignation in the local German press<sup>3</sup> and Dr. Mezger came to see the

<sup>1</sup> No. 441.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 441, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> For a protest by Herr Woermann to M. Millerand see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 136.

Norwegian Commissioner and myself on May 15th. He was extremely agitated and appeared to be taken quite unprepared; although he had been warned that Kroner would be introduced he had evidently expected that the International Commission would at the last moment hesitate to bring the law into force. He drew lurid pictures of the riots, strikes, &c., which would ensue and his attitude in general could be described as just within the limits of the usually accepted forms of politeness. Mr. Hefte and I succeeded in quieting him and he went away apparently only passively dissatisfied. The same day I received a deputation of workmen who also came with a protest. On learning, however, that an effective economic frontier would be made between the Zones and on the promise that their request for the abolition of the present restrictions in trade &c. with Germany would be considered sympathetically by the competent Authorities they pronounced themselves satisfied. The result of this interview was apparently a disappointment to the political organisations for I learnt a few hours afterwards that a meeting would be held the next day in order to discuss the question of a general strike. As the persons leading this meeting were well-known professional agitators from the south and the usual formalities (namely twenty-four hours' notice to the police) had not been fulfilled the Commission decided to forbid the meeting which was accordingly done.

The next morning (May 16) I was rung up on the telephone at 8 a.m. by Dr. Mezger who made an energetic appeal for the meeting to be allowed. As he was very excited I promised, in order to oblige him, to confer with the police. I found, however, that the police had already taken all necessary measures and had closed the meeting house. I therefore rang up Dr. Mezger and informed him that it was too late to alter the decision now and that I did not feel justified in weakening public authority by allowing the meeting in spite of the prohibition. Dr. Mezger then completely lost his head. He stated that he had promised the people they should be allowed to meet, on whose authority other than his own he did not state, and then proceeded with a flow of abusive remarks more against the Allies than the International Commission. I informed him that this tone would not be tolerated by the Commission and that until he apologised I could have no further communication with him. I reported the matter to Mr. Hefte who approved of my attitude. Dr. Mezger came to the Commission about half an hour afterwards. He was received by Mr. Hefte who states that he was both arrogant and unrepentent [*sic*] and the result of their interview was that Dr. Mezger was informed that he must either apologise or, as he himself suggested, ask his Government to recall him.

As, after forty-eight hours, he apparently had decided on no course of action I wrote on Mr. Hefte's suggestion a private letter to Dr. Köster asking him to recall Dr. Mezger in order to avoid further scandals.

Before Dr. Köster's reply came another incident occurred. Dr. Mezger placed a German flag on his motor-car which, being against the police regulations, these permitting only cars of the International Commission to fly flags, he was ordered by a policeman to remove. This he did but I believe

hoisted it again as soon as the policeman was out of sight. He called on Mr. Hefte to protest and Mr. Hefte promised to look into the matter. A private letter was then addressed to him by Mr. Hefte stating that though there was no objection in his particular case he (Mr. Hefte) would be glad if he would not do it as once an exception was made to the rule other unauthorised people might follow suit. Dr. Mezger thereupon wrote an official despatch couched in the most arrogant terms and as a result of this Mr. Hefte requested me to telephone to Dr. Köster and ask him to recall Dr. Mezger without further delay.

Dr. Köster informed me on the telephone that Dr. Mezger had been informed by telegram that he was suspended from his office and was to have no further intercourse with the International Commission. Dr. Köster also expressed his own regret at the incident and added that he hoped the matter was now closed and that the International Commission would have no further troubles of the kind. Dr. Mezger's recall was all the more desirable as the Commission have reason to believe that he is actively intriguing against them. To give an instance. He specially asked for a permit to enter the plebiscite area for Dr. Adler, the Socialist leader, and now a temporary German official. He stated that Adler was coming on purely official business and the permit was granted. Dr. Adler came to Flensburg and immediately started propaganda for a general strike against the International Commission. The facts are proved beyond doubt and the International Commission have informed Dr. Adler, who in the meanwhile had returned to Germany, that his permit was cancelled and he was not to return to the Plebiscite Area during the remainder of the International Commission's administration.

Though Dr. Mezger's behaviour has been quite outrageous I do not think he should be judged too harshly. He was totally unsuited to a post requiring tact and judgment, especially in view of the fact that his predecessor Dr. Köster (now Minister for Foreign Affairs) carried out his task with great ability. He (Dr. Mezger) was formerly German Consul at Kolding and came here knowing nothing of the local conditions. I think he was at first sincerely desirous of working in harmony with the International Commission but that he was subsequently talked over by the numerous political agitators who must always be found in a territory under the temporary administration of a foreign Commission. I understand he is to return to his post at Kolding after his brief and stormy career of about four weeks in Flensburg.

The various organisations have had several secret meetings where I believe threatening language was used and violent resolutions passed. Threats of a general strike have been made but the campaign appears to be chiefly political and from the latest reports today it would seem that the movement has failed completely. The International Commission has not been approached again except by a small mixed deputation who came intending to present a bellicose resolution but at the last moment their courage appears to have failed them and the resolution (of which I obtained privately a copy) was never presented.

On the 17th of May (Monday) the frontier was closed for all traffic in goods

&c. Ordinary travellers can at present circulate between the Zones without restriction, the police are however entitled to search suspicious persons. The German Government having asked for the strictest possible control, orders were given to this effect to the Danish and Commission gendarmes with the result that an already considerable amount of goods have been collected on both sides of the frontier. The effective closing of the frontier, though possibly agreeable to the German Government, has not met with general popularity among the commercial classes in Flensburg. Most of the merchants' retail trade is in the First Zone, all the richer inhabitants own summer residences there. Though the eventual adoption of the First Zone frontier as a national frontier was expected no one seemed to realise the economic difficulties this frontier would make for Flensburg until they were faced with the *fait accompli*. In order to render Flensburg and the Second Zone's position easier the Commission are contemplating the possibility of opening the frontier to the south within the next few days and the possibility of abolishing passport control between the Second Zone and Germany is under discussion. The German Government informed me last night that they desired the abolition and would agree to the establishing of a passport control between the First and Second Zones, which would be the natural result.

The Danish Government will, in the first instance, import Kroner very sparingly. They have as a preliminary measure brought seven million into the First Zone and the fact that the German Mark is still legal currency should have the effect of preventing a rapid change. The present frontier guard is practically as effective as a national frontier and I do not think that prices in Flensburg will be more affected than they would have been if the sovereignty had been handed over to Denmark officially.

In fact, the sovereignty is Danish except in name. Danish officials have taken over all the more important post[s] and the remainder will be taken over in a few days; the introduction of the Kroner renders it impossible for the German official receiving his salary in Marks to remain.

There only remains Germany's right to the local revenues and the German Customs which is still on the old frontier. This latter institution can possibly be kept working for another few weeks, but in the event of a delay in the final settlement I have no doubt that Germany will agree to their being removed south as well. I am transmitting a copy of this despatch to Sir Charles Marling and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen.<sup>4</sup>

I have, &c.,

C. BRUDENELL-BRUCE

<sup>4</sup> The action taken by Mr. Brudenell-Bruce was approved by Lord Curzon in his despatch No. 6 (not printed) of June 7.

No. 453

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 593 Telegraphic [199169/548/18]*

*Very urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 21, 1920, 7 p.m.*

Your Excellency's telegram No. 598 (of May 19th)<sup>1</sup> paragraph 5.

Question of granting freedom from certain German war taxes to persons in plebiscite zone who on opting for Danish nationality have to leave Germany for Denmark may present some legal difficulties; but at first sight the Danish claim seems equitable, and Your Excellency should support it unless report of drafting committee raises serious doubts as to propriety of doing so.

<sup>1</sup> No. 451.

No. 454

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 25)*

*No. 613 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, *May 22, 1920*

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> (9) The Conference considered again the draft convention regulating the transfer of Slesvig territory to Denmark. The report of the Drafting Committee—or rather M. Fromageot—on the various amendments set forth in my telegram No. 598 paragraph 5,<sup>2</sup> were [*sic*] considered and were adopted, except that dealing with the remission of taxation during the administration of the Commission (see my telegram No. 598 S[ection] 5.) which was reserved in view of the fact that Sir Charles Marling expressed doubt as to whether the Commission ever had remitted taxation as alleged by the Danish Legation.<sup>3</sup> In the Convention as now drafted, the United States do not appear as signatories, but provision is made for their adhering if and when they ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

My Italian and Japanese colleagues reserved their definite approval of the Convention pending authorisation from their Governments, which it is hoped they will receive by the 26th, when the draft will come before the Conference for final approval.

The question was again raised of when the Allied troops should be withdrawn and the Commission terminate its administration. It was recognised that in virtue of Article 110 of the Treaty of Versailles the Commission hands over its functions to the German and Danish authorities from the moment when the new frontier line is published, and I made it quite clear that the Allied troops should not remain on after that date, inasmuch as they were

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 451.

<sup>3</sup> In the Foreign Office it was suggested that this word should read 'Delegation'.

only there for the purpose of keeping order during the plebiscite and could not be kept on for the purpose of protecting the Danish minorities, pending the acceptance by the German Government of the draft convention now under consideration. The Conference finally accepted this point of view and recognised that from the moment when the new line is notified, Allied troops will have no longer any legal status in the second zone, although it may be claimed that they require a certain time in which to move out. It was urged however, and I agreed, that it was very desirable that notification of the frontier line and the termination of the administration of the Commission should not take place before the Draft Convention had been communicated to the two Governments. In order to allow therefore a margin for any possible delay I agreed that the withdrawal of British troops should be postponed until the 15th June. This was accepted and this date can therefore be considered as definite. For the time being however it should not be made publicly known. I am informing His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen and the Secretary General of the Commission at Flensburg confidentially, of this decision.<sup>4</sup>

The notification of the new frontier line will be made simultaneously with the presentation of the draft convention, the date of which cannot yet be fixed. It is possible however, that the draft convention omitting the new frontier line will be communicated unofficially beforehand to the German and Danish Governments so as to give them an opportunity to formulate their observations and possibly sign the Convention before the official notification, and consequent withdrawal of the troops. . . .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The Danish Minister in London, who in a letter (not printed) of May 22 had enquired whether His Majesty's Government 'would be prepared to leave the Allied troops of occupation in the 2nd plebiscite zone until the treaty has been ratified by Germany', was also informed of the decision in a letter from Lord Hardinge (not printed) of May 27.

<sup>5</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

## No. 455

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 603 Telegraphic [198728/548/18]*

*Secret*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 26, 1920, 3.20 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 596 (of May 18th.<sup>1</sup> Schleswig).

It is desirable that Your Excellency should seek an explanation from M. Cambon. If he admits having spoken to the Danes in the sense reported you should make a protest against this method of sowing dissension between the allies, instead of loyally standing by policy approved by the allies in common, however divergent their predilections may have been.

<sup>1</sup> No. 450.

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 28)*

*No. 630 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, May 26, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (9) The Conference approved in its final form the draft Convention regulating the transfer of Slesvig territory to Denmark, a few further modifications being introduced at M. Fromageot's suggestion. The text as finally approved is enclosed in my despatch No. 1617.<sup>2</sup> The Conference also approved with certain modifications the covering letter which is to be addressed to German and Danish Governments, communicating to them the text of the Convention. Copy of this letter as approved is also enclosed in my despatch No. 1618.<sup>3</sup> I am sending copies of Convention and covering letter to His Majesty's Representatives at Berlin and Copenhagen for their information.

As the Italian Ambassador had not yet received the authorisation of his Government to agree to the text of the Convention, it was decided that as soon as he received it he should inform the Secretariat General with a view to their despatching the Convention and covering Note to the German and Danish Governments, without it being necessary to bring the matter again before the Conference of Ambassadors. I trust therefore that the Convention (omitting the description of frontier line) will be formally communicated to the two Governments concerned within the next few days.

It was felt that if the two Governments were called upon to consider the Convention without knowing the new frontier line fixed by the Allies they might use this as a pretext for delaying their reply. It was accordingly decided that the frontier line should be communicated unofficially to the two Governments at the same time as the draft Convention.

The covering letter asks that a reply may be received within ten days so that if possible the Convention can be signed at the same time as the Allied Governments notify officially the new frontier line. If therefore the German and Danish Governments accept the Convention promptly it is possible that the official notification of the new frontier line will be made before the 15th June. It is more probable however that the acceptance of the German and Danish Governments will be delayed, in which case the official notification of the frontier line will be made at the latest on the 15th June and the British troops withdrawn as from that date in accordance with a decision taken at the last meeting.

<sup>1</sup> The first eight sections reported discussion on other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Of May 26. For the English text see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, enclosure in No. 148.

<sup>3</sup> Of May 26, not printed. A further copy was sent under cover of Lord Derby's despatch No. 1787 of June 9.



*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received June 19)*

*Unnumbered [204744/548/18]*

FLensburg, May 26, 1920

My Lord,

Towards the end of March the Danish Government again brought up the question of the occupation of the Northern Zone by its military and administrative Authorities and in an official note dated March 22 drew the attention of the Commission to the urgent importance of the measure on economic grounds and invited its formal concurrence. The Danish Government added that it undertook to continue if necessary the requisite supplies of flour, grain, cattle, etc., for the use of Flensburg and Middle Slesvig, on the same scale as under existing agreements, even should the German Government decline to carry out its engagements under them. In its reply the Commission agreed on the expediency of immediate occupation and took note of these assurances but the fall of the Zahle Cabinet and the establishment of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [*sic*] under the Presidency of Monsieur Friis prevented the question being then pressed. Meantime, however, the information which reached the Commission, from Danish sources of course, of the industrial and economic situation in North Slesvig became increasingly disquieting, and on the 16th of April the Commission reverted to the question and invited the Danish Government to send some one down to Flensburg to discuss it. To our surprise, instead of a single official, the Danish Government despatched a party of nine or ten gentlemen, headed by Mr. H. P. Hanssen Nørremølle, lately Minister for Slesvig Affairs in the Zahle Cabinet, who, at a meeting with the Commission on the 18th of April, unfolded proposals which comprised among other matters the taking over of the Customs and the introduction of Danish currency, the establishment of a very strict police cordon along the southern boundary, prohibition of exports from middle to north Slesvig, and of course military occupation. I pointed out to the Delegation that all these measures implied possession rather than occupation, and that as German sovereignty was expressly maintained until the Allied Powers had laid down the definitive frontier, the German Government must be expected to raise strong objections to such flagrant disregard of those rights as were implied, for example, by taking over the Customs and displacing the Mark by the Kroner. In inviting the Danish Government to proceed to military and administrative occupation, the Commission had contemplated the taking over by Danish officials of all the administrative services such as Police and Gendarmerie, Railways, Posts, Telegraphs, Roads, Education and Religion, and even of Justice so far as that was possible, the whole to be under the control of a special Administrator: the Delegation's proposals, however, went far beyond this and appeared to contemplate direct administration from Copenhagen, just as though North Slesvig was already incorporated in Denmark. This, I said, was, in the opinion of the Com-

missioners not the intention of the Treaty and it was therefore beyond the powers of the Commission to agree to it. The Danish Delegates appeared to be very crestfallen and said that they had been completely misled by the Slesvig Committee as to the role they were to play. I went on to say that the Commission wished to assist the Danish Government as far as it possibly could consistently with its own powers under the Treaty, and that the Commission considered that its proper course was to inform Doctor Köster that it had invited the Danish Government to proceed to the occupation of North Slesvig, as provided by the Treaty, and then see how far His Excellency could be brought to meet Danish wishes. A general basis having thus been reached between the Commission and Dr. Köster, *but not before*, the Danish Delegates could then enter into discussions with Dr. Köster or his successor as to details. The necessity of the first step being taken by the Commission was very strongly impressed by Mr. Bruce on Mr. H. P. Hanssen Nørremölle before the meeting broke up, but, in spite of it, one of the latter's secretaries waylaid Dr. Köster at the station the following day and conducted him to Mr. Hanssen Nørremölle's hotel where an interview took place which ended by a flat refusal on the part of Dr. Köster to listen to the proposals as regards the Customs and currency. This, of course, came to my knowledge at once, and consequently when subsequently I saw Dr. Köster I felt it was useless to do more than state the fact that Danish occupation was impending and allude to some of the difficulties involved. The Danish Delegation returned to Copenhagen the same evening, but two days later Count Reventlow of the Danish Foreign Office returned alone. He was the bearer of a more moderate scheme in which the proposal to take over the Customs was dropped but the introduction of Danish currency was insisted on as indispensable. I told Count Reventlow that one great obstacle to our agreeing to this step was that the Commission had announced in its Proclamation that the Mark would be retained as the monetary unit. Moreover, I very much doubted whether the introduction of Kroner was so necessary as the Danish officials—from whom the Commission gets its information—made out.

It would be an abuse of Your Lordship's time for me to enter into the somewhat complicated circumstances explained to me by Count Reventlow which convinced me that the view of the Danish Authorities that the measure is one of great expediency is not without good foundation, it is enough to say that I agreed to put the case again before my French and Norwegian colleagues—the Swedish Commissioner had left immediately after the adoption of the Commission's Report—and induce them to alter their view. Mr. Heftye, whose anti-German sentiments have been his only guide throughout the Commission's administration, of course made no difficulty, and when I went to Copenhagen I easily prevailed on M. Claudel, who had already preceded me thither, to agree by pointing out that the undertaking in our Proclamation was to maintain the Mark as the monetary unit *for the period of the Plebiscite*, not for the period of our administration, and that with the actual transfer of North Slesvig to Denmark so imminent it would be stretching regard for Germany's sovereignty too far to insist on maintaining a régime that would

entail serious economic results on the population. I then called on the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and it was agreed between us that the occupation should commence on the 5th of May at earliest, that the Danish Government would appoint a special Administrator for North Slesvig, and that if, after a short period, which we might put at ten days, experience showed that the introduction of the Danish currency was a matter of necessity the Commission would raise no objection.

I informed Mr. Heftye, who remained at Flensburg to carry on the administration of the Commission, of the arrangement and left for London and Paris by destroyer the next day, April 25th. M. Claudel remained on at Copenhagen as he wished to await the result of the General Election in Denmark on the 25th before proceeding to Paris. On the 6th of May, however, he had not arrived at Paris and in the light of the request made to Your Lordship by the Danish Minister in London<sup>1</sup> that the final decision of the Powers as to the frontier line may be deferred until after the formation of the new Danish Cabinet, I conclude that he is endeavouring to ensure that delay. For what motives delay is desired I am unable to guess nor does Mr. Castenskiöld's note throw any light on the subject.<sup>2</sup>

I have, &c.,

CHARLES M. MARLING

<sup>1</sup> See No. 454, n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Grant Watson in his telegram No. 557 of May 25 (not printed) said that such a request was likely and commented: 'Danish Government evidently fear Allies will have no means of bringing pressure to bear on Germany when troops have been withdrawn should Germany refuse to concede eventual rights due to Danes in second zone under proposed Treaty.'

## No. 458

*Record by Mr. Malkin of a conversation with Dr. Kruse*

[201002/548/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 31, 1920

I have just had a visit from Dr. Kruse, who is apparently a member of the Danish Delegation dealing with the question of Slesvig. He apparently came to see me because he had seen M. Fromageot in Paris, who had given him my name.

The object of his call was to argue in favour of internationalisation of the whole or part of the second zone—a scheme which I thought had been finally dropped. It would seem, however, that some support has recently been manifested to the idea in French official circles, and Dr. Kruse said that there had been an article in the 'Temps' a day or two ago,<sup>1</sup> which he assumed to represent French official opinion, saying that France was quite prepared to agree to internationalisation if England would do the same, so that

<sup>1</sup> In fact of May 29. An article, partly based on that in *Le Temps*, appeared in *The Times* of June 1.

'the future of the second zone was in the hands of Mr. Lloyd-George'. In these circumstances Dr. Kruse wanted to convince me that there was nothing in the Treaty which prevented internationalisation or required German consent to it. His argument appeared to be as follows. The treaty says that the frontier line is to be based on the result of the voting (*basé sur le résultat des votes*), and if you add the votes in the first zone to those in the second, you get a Danish majority; consequently the Powers are entitled to fix the frontier line so as to take in the whole or part of the second zone. As, when they have fixed the line, they are entitled to hand everything to the north of it over to Denmark, they are entitled to take the lesser step of internationalising part of these territories. He went into considerable detail to show that such action would be equitable, but it does not seem necessary to go into this. I pointed out the obvious objections to this interpretation of the Treaty; if the result of the voting was to be taken as a whole, the provision for a plebiscite [*sic*] in two parts and a vote by communes in the second zone became meaningless, and in order to internationalise part of the second zone it is necessary either to fix two frontier lines, whereas the Treaty only contemplates one, or to fix a frontier line which would not be in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 110. The main objection however is of course that the Treaty certainly contemplated a frontier line between Germany and Denmark which was to be based on the result of the plebiscite, and nobody who signed the Treaty had any idea of an international zone in between. Finally, Dr. Kruse said that he did not put his case otherwise than that the interpretation he pleaded for was a possible one, and that in the circumstances it would be right to give Denmark the benefit of the doubt. I told him that I did not think this was the right way for the Powers to interpret the Treaty. He wanted to know whether the Draft Treaty had yet been communicated to the German and Danish Governments, but I told him that I did not know whether this had actually been done, though I had understood that such communication was imminent. I tried to find out whether any steps were being taken at Paris by the Danes to bring the proposal for internationalisation again before the Council, but he seemed rather vague on this point. Finally, I told him that I would report what he had said, but that if I were asked to advise as to whether internationalisation was possible under the terms of the Treaty, which was the only point with which I was competent to deal, I should have to advise against his contention.

He gave me the annexed document,<sup>2</sup> which is an address prepared by the inhabitants of the second zone and supported, he said, by the Danish Government. He said he had given a copy to Lord Derby, who has presumably sent it home,<sup>3</sup> in which case it has no doubt already been considered.

H. W. MALKIN

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 440, n. 2.

No. 459

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received June 3, 11 a.m.)*

*No. 574 Telegraphic [201523/548/18]*

COPENHAGEN, *June 2, 1920, 8 p.m.*

My telegram No. 573.<sup>1</sup>

Nationalist Danish papers have extensively reproduced leading article in Paris 'Temps' of 28th [sic] ultimo<sup>2</sup> which declares in favour of internationalisation of the second zone and puts the odium of non-acceptance on England. Several Danish journalists in Paris have telegraphed in a similar sense. Danish Minister in Paris has informed his Government however that Quay [sic] d'Orsay are opposed to this scheme and that officials there have expressed irritation at publication of this article.

Prime Minister has also informed me that he understood that France would not accept such a proposal.

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Of June 2. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 458, n. 1.

No. 460

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received June 5, 2.30 p.m.)*

*No. 579 Telegraphic [201903/548/18]*

*Confidential*

COPENHAGEN, *June 4, 1920, 8.45 p.m.*

My telegram No. 573 of June 2nd.<sup>1</sup>

Danish Government have despatched to-day full power to Danish Minister in Paris to sign Schleswig convention without alteration.

Even should German Government propose modifications Danish Government have decided not to press for any further alterations. They intend to carry through ratification by Danish Rigsdag as soon as possible after signature. When Danish Rigsdag have ratified convention it is present intention of King of Denmark to pay five days' visit to Schleswig

In these circumstances it would seem advisable [sic] that two days visit of Admiral Sheppard and British Troops to Copenhagen should take place if possible before King's visit to Schleswig.

This latter is likely to be a purely Danish festivity.

Repeated to Paris. Mr. Bruce, Flensburg, informed.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received June 14)*

*No. 201 [203603/548/18]*

*Confidential*

COPENHAGEN, June 8, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that 'Berlingske Tidende' in its evening edition of the 27th ultimo contained a telegram from its Paris correspondent, Franz von Jessen, announcing the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference in the Slesvig question, whereby the future frontier between Denmark and Germany would coincide in all essentials with the 'Clausen' line dividing the First and Second Zones. The correspondent added that the internationalisation scheme was not under consideration and that the Treaty to be concluded between the Allied Powers and Denmark and Germany would contain certain provisions for the moral and material protection of the Danish minority in the Second Zone, and that these provisions had been in a special degree supported by France.

Commenting on this telegram in its leading article the paper remarks that from the Prime Minister's statement in the Folketing<sup>1</sup> it was reasonable to conclude that there was still some hope of the internationalisation of the Second Zone, and endeavours to defend the Government against the charge of having prepared a disappointment for the Danish people. Turning to the Conservative papers which have taken the extreme nationalist point of view, 'Berlingske Tidende' expresses the hope that they will now see the realities of the situation and will contribute to the solution of its problems. The new frontier is not regarded as one likely to lead to peaceful conditions in Slesvig. Continued German agitation for the Tietje line is to be looked for, and the paper appeals to the Danes of the Second Zone not to abandon their homes but to form a breakwater, protecting the new Danish frontier against the waves of aggressive Germanism.

'Politiken', alluding to Hr. Neergaard's statement in the Folketing regarding internationalisation considers that the Prime Minister's attitude cannot be called altogether innocuous, as it is liable to create the impression abroad that the new Ministry began its career by supporting a policy manifestly at variance with the Peace Treaty. The paper opposes 'Berlingske Tidende's' advice that the Danes of the Second Zone should remain at home, and expresses the view that the clearer and sharper the new frontier becomes from a national point of view, the better will be the prospects of peace.

'Social Demokraten' sums up the results of the 'chauvinist' campaign of the last few months as follows:—

- (1) Reunion has been postponed involving great suffering to the population both of the First and Second Zones and enormous cost to the Danish Treasury;

<sup>1</sup> This statement was made on May 20.

- (2) the feeling between Danes and Germans has been embittered and the German chauvinists have been given an excuse for continued agitation for the Tietje line;
- (3) A unique campaign of lies has brought the Left and the Conservatives into power in Denmark.

'Berlingske Tidende' in its leading article of the 29th instant appeals to the nation not to allow 'the bitterness, the humiliation, the feeling of shame with which we received the decision determined by the Peace Treaty' to lead to an irresolution which would leave the future of Slesvig to Germany, and maintains once more that a strong Danish element in the Second Zone is of vital importance to Danish policy, since without it the tide of Germanism will flow unchecked towards the North.

It may be added that a telegram from Paris to 'Flensburg Avis', dated May 26th, announcing the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference, proceeds as follows: 'That this was the solution is due in the last resort to England's policy. France has given (us) her support in full measure, although she has not been willing to push matters to extremes and thereby suffer another defeat at the hands of England. But all the leading men with whom the Slesvig delegation have spoken insist that it was the policy of the Zahle Ministry that prepared and compelled this situation. The change of Government in Copenhagen came too late.' This telegram is quoted prominently in 'National Tidende' which gives it the head-line: 'The Danish Flensborgers and Central Slesvigiers are sent back into exile', but does not otherwise comment.

The leading article in 'Le Temps' of the 28th instant<sup>1</sup> [*sic*], which declares in favour of internationalisation of the Second Zone and puts the odium for the non-acceptance of this scheme on England, has been extensively quoted in 'Berlingske Tidende' and 'National Tidende'.

Apart from the extreme nationalist group, there is in moderate Danish circles a feeling of disappointment and depression over the fate of the Second Zone which will no doubt to some extent mar the festival of reunion. In a recent conversation the Prime Minister informed me that thoughtful Danes, though realising that the new frontier was the result of the expressed wish of the local population, nevertheless felt that it was a bad frontier and they feared that a large town like Flensburg lying immediately to the south of the Danish boundary would be a centre for German Iridentist agitation and for intrigues in favour of the 'Tietje' line. During the last fifty years Germanism has gained ground in Flensburg at the expense of the Danish elements and they feared that Flensburg, owing to the new situation, would become the centre for the continuation of German development towards the North. The Danes had ardently hoped that the present time would bring about the final settlement of the Slesvig question and they were disappointed at realising that this would not be the case. Personally the Prime Minister understood that the present decision was the inevitable result of the Plebiscite and he regretted that certain Danish delegates and journalists in Paris had been

<sup>1</sup> See No. 458, n. 1.

misled by the polite phrases of French officials into believing that the French Government supported the idea of 'internationalisation' when such was not the case.

Nevertheless there is a certain illogical feeling in many circles that the Allies might have done more for Denmark and it is made to appear that France would have been willing to go further but that England stood in the way.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Sir Charles Marling, and to Mr. Bruce at Flensburg.

I have, &c.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

No. 462

*Mr. Brudenell-Bruce (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received June 22)*

*Unnumbered [205230/548/18]*

FLENSBURG, June 9, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that Kroner currency, the introduction of which was foreshadowed in my despatch of May 20th, has now been in force in the First Zone since that date, and that the change of currency has taken place without any serious difficulties, proving to be less complicated than either the Germans or Danes expected. The administration of the First Zone has been practically turned over to Denmark entirely and Danish officials are gradually replacing all the German ones. The much-disputed question of the judicial administration has proved less troublesome than Dr. Mezger predicted. I saw Dr. Köster, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Rendsburg on May 25th, and he agreed to take all possible steps to bring about the evacuation of the German Judges as soon as Denmark required it. A convention is now being drawn up on this point between Germany and Denmark by which Denmark will, in the event of the sovereignty not being handed over before that date, take over the judicial administration on June 15th retaining and paying a certain number of German Judges who will act more as advisers.

Dr. Köster also promised to take steps to secure the removal of the Customs barrier between Denmark and the First Zone. This is a step to which the Danish Government attach great importance but in view of the fact that Germany still considers the sovereignty of the First Zone as German, the Commission decided that they could not bring pressure to bear on the German Government. I telephoned to Dr. Köster on June 5th on this subject and he hoped, after the Elections which would take place on June 6th, to begin arrangements for removing the Customs frontier. He was of opinion that this could be done without the consent of the German Reichstag. Should this be done the last step in the occupation of the First Zone will have



been made and Denmark will be in possession of the sovereignty in all but name. Dr. Köster, I would add, has been extremely obliging all through these rather difficult negotiations and I feel that it is a great deal due to his efforts that the evil influences of Prussian bureaucracy and of Dr. Mezger, the late Delegate, have been rendered null and void. It is evidently his intention to bring about a friendly settlement of all details with Denmark, and, should he remain Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have no doubt he will make every effort to bring about friendly and peaceable relations between the two countries. It is, of course, impossible to say whether he will be returned to power after the Elections and I gathered from our conversation by telephone to-day that he is not very hopeful of the result.

Dr. Köster also mentioned amongst other things that the draft Treaty between Germany, Denmark and certain Allied Powers had arrived in Berlin and had already been submitted to a special Committee. He seemed on the whole satisfied with the terms of this Treaty but informed me that there were certain points which he thought the German Government would not be prepared to accept. What these points were he did not mention but I understood they were only of minor importance. From information I have received from Germans who are well acquainted with Dr. Köster it would appear that the German Government are not satisfied with the optant proposals contained in the Treaty and fear that numbers of voters who are not resident in the Plebiscite Area (it will be remembered that in Flensburg alone 8,000 Germans living outside the area came here to vote) may opt for Denmark in order to avoid German war taxation and from what I learn the Danish Government is also equally alarmed at this possibility. It would appear that both Germany and Denmark are interested in certain conditions being placed on the right to opt—Germany not being anxious to lose her surplus taxation and Denmark being particularly averse to receiving into her midst this type of German.

The appointment of a new German representative on the Commission has not been made but an unofficial representative has been nominated to carry on what little work there is between the Commission and the German Government. The representative in question is Mr. W. Iversen, member for the Prussian Parliament, who has administered the International Commission's Rationing Committee during the period of the plebiscite. Mr. Iversen is therefore at the same time the German Government's Representative and a paid official of the International Commission. The position is rather an anomalous one, but I do not anticipate that it will work badly. M. Iversen is a reasonable person and I have dealt with him for many months. He is by profession a small farmer, who by industry and ability has raised himself to rather a prominent position in Slesvig. He is a practical man and I should say rather more homest [*sic*] than the average German politician.

Mr. Heftye, the Swedish [*sic*] Commissioner, left Flensburg for Copenhagen on June 4th, and Mr. von Sydow, the Swedish Commissioner, left on June 5th.

There have been threats of a General Strike in the First Zone for some considerable time. The original cause of this was the non-introduction of Kroner but no sooner was Kroner introduced than a movement was set on foot to strike against its introduction. Although it looked at first as if the trouble would blow over I regret to say that on June 4 the strike was actually proclaimed in the four chief towns: Sonderborg, Haderslev, Aabenraa and Tönder[n]. Although the nominal reason for this strike is a demand for higher wages due to the rise in prices occasioned by the introduction of the Kroner currency I am quite convinced that it is merely a political move engineered by paid German agitators, mostly former members of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, and German Spartacists, the majority of whom have been in the Plebiscite Area for only one or two years. Further, I have reason to believe that the Danish Socialists are also implicated and are encouraging the Slesvig workmen in order to make difficulties for the present Danish Government. There have been similar threats of strikes ever since the Commission's arrival in the Plebiscite Area but none of these strikes have ever materialised in view of the attitude of the Commission towards members of the former Workmen's Councils who, under Paragraph [Article] 109 of the Treaty of Versailles, should have been evacuated from the Plebiscite Area but on the Commission's arrival were allowed to remain provided they took no part in political propaganda. As they were fully aware that the International Commission would not hesitate to utilise their right to evacuate them under the Treaty of Versailles these persons have been extremely careful to keep within the letter of the law. Now, however, that the Danish Government have practically taken over the entire administration of the First Zone they have become considerably bolder and have taken a leading part in these strike movements. The almost incredible weakness of the Danish administration has certainly contributed to bring about the present state of affairs and, strange as it may sound, the Danish Administrator for the First Zone has gone so far as to negotiate with these Spartacists. The matter is one of little interest to the Commission in view of the fact that the Danish Government will shortly receive the sovereignty of the territories. The Commission, however, are of the opinion that as long as they have the highest administrative authority this attitude of the workmen is extremely undesirable and likely to have a deleterious effect on social conditions in Flensburg. I therefore rang up Mr. Haarlov, the Danish Administrator, on the telephone and called his attention to the irregularity of this step, and I trust he will be more careful in future, at any rate as long as the Commission is still here. At the same time I learnt that as the negotiations had led to no definite result Mr. Haarlov had called together a further meeting for Tuesday, June 8th, to which the International Commission was requested to send a representative. In view of the fact that the leaders had gone straight from their meeting with the Administrator to their homes in the various towns in the First Zone and openly advocated demonstrations against the Authorities I ordered thirteen of these persons to be arrested on June 6 and brought to Flensburg. The Danish Administrator arrived the next day and I informed

him that I had taken this step pointing out that though Denmark administered the First Zone the Commission had made the stipulation, at the instance of the Danish Ministry of Justice, that the police should continue to be under the Commission's administration and receive their orders from it direct. In view of this fact I considered that the Commission had still a real, as well as a moral, obligation for the maintenance of public order and that such order could not be maintained if responsible Danish officials consorted with Spartacists and former members of Workmen's Councils. I had therefore as a preliminary measure arrested these persons and would arrest any others who attempted further disorders. Mr. Haarlov was very confused and apologetic stating that he had acted in good faith and that he had been unaware as to the status of these agitators. It would also appear from statements he made that he had not been properly informed by the local authorities. In the meanwhile news was received that the meeting convened for June 8 had been postponed. I, nevertheless, went to the First Zone on June 8 and visited the four chief towns. The arrest of these agitators has had the effect of calming public opinion, the more responsible members of the community having heard of this act with considerable relief. It would appear that now these persons have been removed the strike itself will collapse. Yesterday, when in Töndern, I received a deputation of workmen who asked for the liberation of their agitators but I pointed out to them that these persons had broken the terms of the Commission's ordinance and were evacuable under the Treat[y] of Peace, therefore the Commission had no intention of releasing them. I also received to-day a further deputation from Aabenraa and informed them in the same sense. The Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Justice arrives to-morrow and has called together all the higher police officials in the First Zone with a view to impressing upon them the necessity for keeping public order and not allowing demonstrations, which under Danish administration are generally of a harmless nature, to take place in view of the fact that the people of Slesvig, who have been for many years under Prussian administration and during the last three months have been engaged in an acute national struggle, are not of the same temperament as the Danish workmen and cannot be handled in the same way. I have no doubt that this interview will bear fruit as Mr. Schröder, the Under-Secretary, is a man of strong will and sees entirely eye to eye with the Commission on the subject of this strike.

The Swedish Commissioner returned on the 8th and the Norwegian returned to-day. I have reported my action as afore-mentioned to them and have received their full approval.

The Vice-Admiral commanding the Forces is making all arrangements for the British Naval and Military Force to leave Flensburg on June 15th. The Forces will be transported by sea to Copenhagen, where they will be entertained by the Danish Government on the 16th and 17th, sailing from there direct to England. The French Forces are still without instructions as to the date of evacuation and I am still unaware as to whether the Commission is to leave with the troops or continue to function until the Ratification of the

Treaty which has been submitted to the Danish and German Governments. Should it be the intention that the Commission remain until the final formalities are gone through I am of opinion that a certain number of troops should be left in order that the Commission may have sufficient power to continue to govern the country. I am strongly of opinion that it is quite impossible for the Commission to remain in Flensburg without the troops and in this view both the Swedish and Norwegian commissioners and the Admiral concur. For want of further information I have begun to wind up the affairs of the Commission in Flensburg and in the event of the troops being withdrawn I propose to remove the civil members of the Commission to the First Zone where the final arrangements for clearing up can take place. I do not feel justified in keeping any members of the Commission in Flensburg after the departure of the troops and I am quite sure that neither the Norwegian nor the Swedish Commission[er] would stay even if they are asked to do so.

I have, &c.,

C. BRUDENELL-BRUCE

P.S. Copies of this despatch have been forwarded to Sir Charles Marling and to His Majesty's Legation at Copenhagen.

C. B.-B.

No. 463

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 14)*

*No. 695 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 11, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon (the Belgian Ambassador being present for item No. 9), and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (5) M. Cambon announced that the Danish Minister had informed him that his Government were prepared to sign the Slesvig Convention,<sup>2</sup> but that the President of the German Delegation had asked for an extension of time in which to reply on account of the political situation in Germany. He had intimated, moreover, that he thought it probable that the German Government would object to the option clauses in the Convention and also to the special stipulations with regard to the Slesvig-Holstein family.<sup>3</sup> It was decided that in agreeing to German Government's request for an extension no further time limit should be fixed, but that the matter should be brought up again in about ten days' time, when the political situation in Germany had cleared.

The French tried again to raise the question of how pressure could be brought to bear on Germany in the event of her refusing to sign, but I declined to enter into this discussion, pointing out that the Treaty of Versailles

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, enclosure in No. 148.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., articles 3 and 5.

gives the Allies no power to insist upon Germany signing the particular Convention which the Conference had communicated to her. M. Cambon argued that under Article 111 the Allied Governments had full right to insist upon Germany signing, but he recognised that if she refused, the question as to what further measures should be taken would be one of high policy, which the Allied Governments alone could decide.

In the meantime, the Conference agreed to my proposal that the new frontier line should be formally notified by the President of the Conference to the German and Danish Delegations in Paris on the 15th instant.<sup>4</sup>

The note to the German Delegation will contain an intimation that the Allied Powers hope to be informed shortly that the German Government are prepared to accept the Convention which has been communicated to them. The Plebiscite Commission is also to be instructed to publish the new line in their official gazette on the same date. The French Government have decided to remove their troops on the 15th, simultaneously with the British troops. I am informing Sir Charles Marling of the decisions.

The Danish Minister has pointed out that there is reason to suppose that the German authorities are already making arrangements to arrest Danish leaders in the 2nd zone on the charge of high treason. He, therefore, asks that even if it is necessary to withdraw the Allied troops, at least the Secretary General of the Plebiscite Commission should remain at Flensburg for the present so as to give his moral support to the Danish minorities. I expressed doubt whether this would really be of much use, but undertook to refer the proposal to His Majesty's Government. I shall be glad, therefore, of your views. I am also informing Sir Charles Marling of this proposal. . . .<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 156.

<sup>5</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

#### No. 464

*Sir C. Marling (Flensburg) to Earl Curzon (Received June 13, 9.10 p.m.)*

*No. 19 Telegraphic [203438/548/18]*

FLensburg, June 13, 1920, 1.6 p.m.

Following sent to Paris No. 17.

Your telegram of June 11th to Mr. Bruce.<sup>1</sup>

It is difficult to take Danish representation seriously. I am fairly confident that alleged intention of prosecuting leading Danes in second zone for high treason is an invention of Extremists among Conservative party, that Cabinet does not credit it but that while it is afraid that by refusing to submit it to Powers it may forfeit Conservative support, which is necessary to its existence, it will gladly see suggestion rejected by Conference.

It is equally difficult to see what useful purpose would be served by retaining Secretary-General of Commission here. Prosecutions can only be undertaken on orders from Berlin and it is therefore in Berlin that representations would have to be made and not locally.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably the communication referred to at end of No. 463.

It is also worth pointing out that as Commission dissolve on June 15th Secretary-General has no official status after that date and would have to be specially accredited to German Government.

There is very little local feeling against genuine Danes but a good deal against recent converts and while there will be a certain amount of persecution it will not be overt but of more subtle kind which can never be entirely prevented. In any case I am convinced that present German Minister for Foreign Affairs who appears to have a free hand in local Schleswig affairs will not countenance persecutions in any form.

Repeated to Foreign Office and Berlin.

#### No. 465

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)*

*No. 698 Telegraphic: by bag [203515/548/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 15, 1920

Your telegram No. 695 of June 11th.<sup>1</sup> Slesvig Convention: Section V, last paragraph.

I share Sir C. Marling's view reported in his telegram to you No. 17 of June 13th<sup>2</sup> and do not consider that the continued presence of the Secretary-General will serve any useful purpose.

<sup>1</sup> No. 463.

<sup>2</sup> No. 464. In an unnumbered telegram of June 16 (not printed) Sir G. Grahame informed Mr. Grant Watson that the Conference of Ambassadors had agreed that the Secretary-General need not remain at Flensburg.

#### No. 466

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 21)*

*No. 742 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 19, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning, M. Jules Cambon being in the chair.

(1) The Conference again considered the Slesvig question, having before it the German observations on the draft convention,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which forms the enclosure in my despatch No. 1943 of to-day's date.<sup>2</sup> M. Cambon read two further letters which he had just received from the Danish Legation, urging immediate transfer of formal sovereignty of the territory to be ceded to Denmark. I had previously received a private telegram from Sir Charles Marling in a similar sense, and a copy of this and of my reply are enclosed

<sup>1</sup> No. 157 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

in my despatch No. 1944 of to-day's date.<sup>3</sup> The letters from the Danish Minister will follow when available.<sup>4</sup>

M. Cambon considered that the formal transfer of sovereignty was undesirable prior to the signing of the Convention, otherwise the Allies would have no *locus standi* for intervening in the Convention. I said that the two things ought in my opinion to be kept distinct. Transfer of sovereignty was a necessary corollary of Article 110. The Convention was quite a different matter, and I had always pointed out that we had no power under the Treaty to force Germany to sign, or to exercise on her any other than moral pressure. The Italian Ambassador was in favour of early transfer of sovereignty, but appealed to paragraph 2 of Article 114 as giving the Allies the right to intervene in the matter of the Convention. I pointed out that this was merely a stock paragraph inserted in several cases of ceded territory (e.g. Articles 86 and 92) and it was therefore doubtful what special significance [*sic*] could be attached to it in the present case.

M. Cambon made a very strong appeal against a repetition of what he described as the Pontius Pilate policy of 1866, when Great Britain and France had washed their hands of the Danish question. He then appealed on the legal point to M. Fromageot, who explained that the Allied Powers could transfer to Denamrk [*sic*] the complete exercise of sovereignty, without transferring the sovereignty itself. In the case of the Saar for instance, sovereignty technically rested with Germany, but the exercise of sovereignty was in the hands of an international Commission. This showed that the two did not necessarily go together. I replied that it seemed to me that exercising sovereignty on a power of attorney from the Conference was exactly what Denamrk [*sic*] objected to, and the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors again strongly supported me in urging the immediate transfer of sovereignty. It was pointed out by the former that if Germany got the idea that the transfer of sovereignty was being held up for the signature of the Convention, this might act as a further motive for her to delay her signature.

It was ultimately decided;

(a) That M. Cambon should write to the Danish Minister in Paris<sup>5</sup> to the effect that the Conference accepted their request for immediate transfer of sovereignty.

(b) M. Fromageot should be instructed, as soon as he could assemble his Allied colleagues, to draft the instrument of transfer.

(c) That Articles 1 and 2 as at present standing in the draft Convention<sup>6</sup> should be cut out and replaced by a clause binding Germany to accept the transfer of sovereignty as laid down in the above-mentioned instrument. (This appears to me somewhat meaningless and may be refused by the

<sup>3</sup> This despatch and its enclosures are not printed.

<sup>4</sup> These letters, forwarded under cover of Paris despatches No. 1986 of June 23 and No. 2000 of June 24, are not printed. The Danish Minister in London, in a memorandum of June 18, also made representations on this subject.

<sup>5</sup> A copy of this letter (not printed) of June 19 was enclosed in Lord Derby's despatch No. 1986.

<sup>6</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, enclosure in No. 148.

Germans, but I agreed to it in order to meet my French and Italian colleagues who both objected to the unconditional omission of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, on the ground that this was just what Germany had asked for in her Note.)

I ventured to point out that these decisions now render the presence of a British Member of the Drafting Committee in Paris imperative, and I am relying on the presence of Sir C. Hurst or Mr. Malkin on the 25th, when the Drafting Committee are to meet to deal with this Slesvig question.

**No. 467**

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)*

*No. 358 Telegraphic [204212/548/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 23, 1920, 6 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 210 (of June 10th:<sup>1</sup> visit of Schleswig force to Copenhagen.)

You are requested to convey following message from The King to the King of Denmark. Begins.

‘I have heard with much satisfaction of the generous reception which Your Majesty and the Danish nation have so spontaneously accorded to Admiral Sheppard and the officers and men of the Schleswig force on their recent visit to Copenhagen.’<sup>2</sup>

The warmth of this reception affords a new proof of the friendly feelings which unite our two countries and, in the name of the British people, I desire to thank Your Majesty and the Danish nation.’

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> This took place from June 15 to 18.

**No. 468**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 26, 5.30 p.m.)*

*No. 765 Telegraphic [206071/548/18]*

*Immediate*

PARIS, *June 26, 1920, 3.45 p.m.*

At request of Danish Government Schleswig Treaty (see my telegram No. 742 section one<sup>1</sup>) is to be signed July 2nd. Date cannot be delayed. Signature of Dominions will be necessary and unless I am to receive authority to sign for them, their representative should be here on that date.

I presume I am to sign for India.

<sup>1</sup> No. 466.



No. 469

*Sir C. Marling (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received June 28, 11 a.m.)*

*No. 610 Telegraphic [206206/548/18]*

COPENHAGEN, *June 27, 1920, 1.16 p.m.*

My telegram No. 573 of June 2nd.<sup>1</sup>

At Danish Parliament held on June 26th, their last sitting prior to general election, a bill was passed for the incorporation of Northern Schleswig in Denmark.

King of Denmark however will not sign bill until treaty under which the Allies hand over Sovereignty to Denmark has come into force. In this manner it is hoped that reunion will take place without further action on the part of Danish Legislature.

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

No. 470

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 750 Telegraphic [206071/548/18]*

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 29, 1920, 6 p.m.*

My telegram No. 747 (of June 28th):<sup>1</sup> Schleswig treaty).

Colonial Office have entered vehement protest against the system which has been followed in this case as it has given them no adequate opportunity to communicate with the Dominion Governments. They are asking Dominion Governments by telegraph whom they wish to appoint as their representatives to sign instruments, but in any case Dominion representatives cannot be certain of attending in Paris on July 2nd<sup>2</sup> and there must therefore be a provision inserted enabling the treaty to be signed by the named plenipotentiaries at any period within a month from the date borne by the treaty. Unless the names of the Dominion plenipotentiaries are received before the final draft for signature is prepared, names of High Commissioners who have signed recent treaties should be inserted in preamble and the formula employed in the Air Convention must be also inserted enabling other plenipotentiaries to sign the instrument.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. In it Lord Derby was informed that he was authorized to sign for India, but that it was most improbable that he would be authorized to sign for the Dominions.

<sup>2</sup> In his telegram No. 782 of July 1 (not printed) Lord Derby said that he had secured postponement of signature until the morning of July 5.

**No. 471**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 7)*

*No. 793 Telegraphic: by bag [C 586/36/18]*

PARIS, July 5, 1920

Your telegram No. 765 of 3rd July<sup>1</sup>—Slesvig Treaty.

The Slesvig Treaty was signed this morning together with a Protocol enabling the named plenipotentiaries for the Dominions or their substitutes to sign within one month from the date borne by the Treaty.<sup>2</sup>

For reasons already explained it is desirable that the signatures should be given as soon as possible and I shall be glad to hear when the Dominions' representatives will be able to be present. They should of course bring their seals.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For the English text of the Treaty and for the frontier between Denmark and Germany as defined by the Plebiscite Commission after the plebiscite see Cmd. 1585 of 1922 (Treaty Series No. 17, 1922).

**No. 472**

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon*  
*(Received July 11, 3.40 p.m.)*

*No. 629 Telegraphic [C 996/36/18]*

COPENHAGEN, July 10, 1920, 7.15 p.m.

My telegram No. 622.<sup>1</sup>

The union of North Schlesvig [*sic*] was celebrated with great enthusiasm at Copenhagen yesterday and King's ride across frontier and entry into Haderslev today have been followed with intense interest by whole nation.

<sup>1</sup> Of July 7, not printed.

## CHAPTER VII

### The Plebiscite Question in Teschen

February 4–August 10, 1920

No. 473

*Mr. Wilton<sup>1</sup> (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 14)*

*No. 1 [178752/178752/55]*

TESCHEN, February 4, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Supreme Council,<sup>2</sup> that the International Commission assumed its functions at Teschen yesterday, the 3rd instant, and that the provisional president of the Commission, Monsieur de Manneville, has sent a telegraphic intimation to the French Government for communication to the Allied and Associated Powers.

I have, &c.,

E. C. WILTON

<sup>1</sup> British Commissioner on the International Plebiscite Commission at Teschen.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume II, No. 22, minute 3, n. 3.

No. 474

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Sir H. Rumbold<sup>1</sup> (Warsaw)*

*Unnumbered.<sup>2</sup> Telegraphic [186660/186660/55]*

TESCHEN, March 17, 1920

Your telegram Unnumbered March 15th.<sup>3</sup>

Strike of miners began on March 8th and developed to such an extent that export of coal from plebiscite area was prohibited on March 10th. Prohibition had excellent effect on Czecho-Slovak Government and influence was brought to bear upon miners to resume work. Prohibition removed on March 12th when Czechs [*sic*] miners were nearly all returning to work. It was intimated to Poland that no coal could be sent to Poland on March 15th unless Karwin Mines which employed 95% of Poles resumed work. On March 15th practically all Czechs were at work as well as 40% of Poles,

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram, addressed to Warsaw, was repeated as No. 1 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on March 18 at 7 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; the only copy traced is in the Warsaw Embassy files.

increased to 70% today in Karwin Mines. Polish Railwaymen struck work on March 12th but have returned as strike sympathetic with Galician strike and had nothing to do with political or racial feeling in plebiscite area. Events of last year<sup>4</sup> have raised a strong feeling of racial antipathy between Poles and Czechs, and this feeling has been strongly kindled by secret political organisations and *agents provocateurs* on both sides. In mining area racial antipathy has been in some degree lessened by common Socialistic bond between Czecho-Slovaks and Polish Unions but this bond appears to have been broken last week.

Crux of situation lies in mining area, and political agitators on both sides are becoming alarmed lest miners get out of control altogether, of which signs are not wanting.

The International Commission is taking all steps possible to restore and maintain law and order but position is a difficult and complicated one, and all efforts are seriously handicapped by political machinations on both sides to influence Plebiscite. Since yesterday there is a temporary lull due to successful efforts of International Commission to bring both sides together.

Reports of violence have been grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless many Poles and Czechs have been maltreated in mining area and elsewhere, some driven from their houses and others have left fearing reprisals. Neither Czech nor Polish gendarmerie can be depended on to afford protection to sufferers. I have been in close touch with miners' leaders on both sides and they assure me that Polish state of unrest was secretly instructed and encouraged by local Plebiscite Committees, both Czechs and Poles, and was actively and strongly supported from Mährisch-Ostrau and Cracow.

Repeated Prague, Paris and London.

<sup>4</sup> Friction in the Freistadt area had led to fighting between Czechs and Poles in January 1919. See S. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War* (Washington, 1933), vol. i, pp. 145-50.

## No. 475

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received March 26)*

*No. 200 [188113/186660/55]*

WARSAW, March 21, 1920

My Lord,

I have already reported<sup>1</sup> to Your Lordship the excitement caused here by the accounts of what is happening in the Teschen plebiscite area. This excitement shows no signs of abating and the matter came up for discussion in the Diet on the 18th instant when some strong speeches were made, amongst others, by Messrs. Zamorski and Daszynski. Both speakers protested against the allegations contained in the speech of the Czech Minister and did not hesitate to accuse the Inter-Allied Commission of partiality for the Czechs.

<sup>1</sup> In Warsaw despatch No. 120 of February 23, not printed.

M. Patek took the opportunity of replying to the speech made by M. Benes, the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>2</sup> M. Patek refuted in energetic terms the accusations which M. Benes had made against the Polish nation. The Czechs had maintained that the Poles had falsified the statistics but he enquired whether it was not rather the Czechs who had falsified the statistics in recently expelling 1600 Poles from the Teschen district. M. Patek said that the Inter-Allied Commission was in charge of the situation at the present moment, but that as that Commission only disposed of 1400 men it had not sufficient force to control the action of the Czech Gendarmerie. The Polish Government were therefore asking that the troops at the disposal of the Inter-Allied Commission should be reinforced and they would expect the Polish representatives on the Commission to adopt a more energetic attitude. In conclusion, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the question of increasing the inter-allied contingents in the Teschen area would be submitted to the Council of Ambassadors.

From something which the former French Minister, M. Pralon, said to me before he left, I inferred that he was inclined to think that the French Commissioner, Monsieur de Manneville, had been somewhat unwise in the choice of some of his French subordinates, and in particular, of one M. Filipo [Flipo]. Monsieur Pralon added that he had, in fact, recommended Monsieur de Manneville to dispense with the services of that gentleman. On the other hand, Count Puslowski, who is one of the Polish functionaries attached to the Allied Commission, has confessed to me that his countrymen have shown a lamentable want of tact in their dealings in the Teschen area.

The press of all shades of opinion are up in arms against the Czechs in connection with the Teschen plebiscite, and it has been suggested to me that this manifestation of nationalist feeling on the part of the Socialists is as much dictated by a desire that the Government should transfer troops from the Eastern front and so weaken that front *vis à vis* the Bolsheviks, as by real concern for Polish interests in the plebiscite areas.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

<sup>2</sup> In a speech in the Czech National Assembly Dr. Benes had declared that Czecho-slovakia would never renounce her rights to Teschen though she would abide by the plebiscite which had been imposed on her by Poland. M. Patek was Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 476

*Note from the Polish Minister to Earl Curzon (Received March 25)*

[187784/73/55]

POLISH LEGATION, LONDON, March 24, 1920

My Lord,

I have been instructed by my Government to inform Your Lordship of the following facts, concerning the present situation in the plebiscite-zone of

Teschen Silesia. As Your Lordship is aware, serious troubles have arisen in that country, since March the 8th. They were called forth by non-resident Czech agitators, who instigated a strike among the Czech miners of Dąbrowa, Poręba and Orłowa, followed by acts of organised pillage, robbery and violence committed on the Polish population. Four cases of death are reported and many persons have been wounded. These outrages are committed by Czech bands armed with revolvers and hand grenades and consisting, for the greater part, of disguised Czech legionnaires [*sic*]. A large number of Poles have been forcibly ejected from their homes and are housed in sheds or have fled to Galicia. The country being under the nominal control of the Interallied Commission, the Polish Government has no means of protecting Polish Nationals and will take no responsibility for any acts which despair may dictate to the long-suffering population. The above stated facts make it clear that a clandestine action tends, by means of terror, to deprive the country of its Polish population, with a view of influencing the plebiscite.

The Polish Government are convinced that the sole means of restoring order in Teschen Silesia would be to dissolve the Czech gendarmerie and replace it by Interallied forces. The Polish Government are aware that this measure, if applied to the Czech gendarmerie alone, would create difficulties to the Allied Powers and is therefore willing that the Polish gendarmerie should also be dissolved and replaced by Interallied troops. I am confident that Your Lordship will agree that this proposal proves the desire of the Polish Government of assuring just and equitable treatment to all inhabitants of the Plebiscite territory, whether of Czech or Polish nationality. The Polish Government will welcome the dissolution of the Polish gendarmerie in this area as being a means of insuring a just plebiscite, and cannot doubt that the Czech Government, animated with a like desire, will take a similar view concerning the dissolution of the Czech gendarmerie.

The Polish Government are of the opinion that a re-establishment of peaceful conditions of life on the plebiscite area should take place without delay, in order that the Polish refugees from Teschen Silesia, as well as all forcibly ejected Poles, should be given the possibility of returning to their homes and of taking part in the plebiscite.

As any delay in the settlement of these questions, owing to the strained situation in Teschen Silesia, must inevitably have the most serious consequences, I have the honour to express the earnest hope that this matter will be favourably considered by Your Lordship and that I will be informed at an early date of the decision that His Majesty's Government will reach in conjunction with the Allied Powers.<sup>1</sup>

I have, &c.,

E. SAPIEHA

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this note was forwarded by the Foreign Office on March 25 to Lord Derby in Paris.

No. 477

*Sir G. Clerk<sup>1</sup> (Prague) to Earl Curzon (Received April 6)*

*No. 68 [190032/186660/55]*

PRAGUE, April 1, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith, a memorandum upon recent events in Teschen, which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with a request to forward it to Your Lordship.

I have received no intimation from the British member of the Teschen Commission of his arrival in this country and no information from him as to events in Teschen beyond a repetition of two telegrams addressed by him to Warsaw. I have accordingly assumed that the Teschen Commission have been keeping the Allied Governments fully informed of events in the Plebiscite area and I have felt that I should have been going outside my own province had I sent reports on the subject from Prague. Indeed, such reports would by the nature of the case have been entirely one-sided, as only the Czech version reaches me here.

It may however be of some slight interest to note that a personal friend whose family own a large part of the disputed area and who has just come from Teschen, told me that incidents have been considerably magnified on both sides. But my informant added that the local feeling was that, unless the Commission themselves laid down the line of demarcation and there was sufficient Allied force to ensure it being respected, war between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland was inevitable, whichever way the Plebiscite might go.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE R. CLERK

<sup>1</sup> H.M. Minister at Prague.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 477

*Note from Dr. Benes to Earl Curzon*

PRAGUE, le 23 Mars 1920

Monsieur le Ministre,

Vu les événements qui se passent en Silésie de Teschen, même après l'arrivée de la commission interalliée, le gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque considère comme son devoir d'attirer d'une façon toute particulière l'attention des gouvernements des puissances alliées et associées sur ces faits et de leur demander de prendre les mesures de protection qu'exige impérieusement la situation dans cette région.

Déjà avant l'arrivée de ladite commission, les menées polonaises, finissant par commettre des assassinats politiques, ont atteint un tel degré que non seulement la population tchécoslovaque, mais encore les Allemands et même une partie considérable de Polonais ont accueilli cette nouvelle commission avec un sentiment de soulagement, car la population espérait que le pouvoir

arbitraire de 'Rada Narodowa'<sup>2</sup> qui n'était responsable à personne de son activité et pour laquelle même le gouvernement de la République Polonaise ne voulait prendre la responsabilité, prendrait ainsi fin.

Le gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque donna immédiatement l'ordre à ses organes, d'exécuter sans conditions et sans retard les règlements et prescriptions de la commission interalliée à Těšín, bien que certains arrêtés de la dite commission eussent été en contradiction avec nos principes et eussent modifié l'état précédent à notre désavantage. Le gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque le fit, afin de faciliter autant que possible — fût-ce même au prix de sacrifices — la prompte exécution du plébiscite. Toutes les autorités et tous les organes tchécoslovaques se soumirent immédiatement à ces instructions. Du côté polonais, on n'a pu porter aucune plainte contre nous. Par contre, le délégué de la République Tchécoslovaque fut constamment obligé d'attirer l'attention de la commission interalliée à Těšín sur le fait que du côté polonais, les arrêtés de la commission ne sont pas exécutés aussi rapidement et avec une aussi bonne volonté que de notre côté.

Les cercles politiques polonais se servirent de quelques décisions de la commission interalliée, dans leur action contre certains de ses membres, et cela aussi bien dans des réunions publiques que dans la presse. Le ton de ces attaques était tout à fait inusité envers les représentants d'États étrangers. On se servait des injures et on changeait les noms des personnes de manière à les rendre ridicules et injurieux. Pour réprimer les manifestations en faveur de la République Tchécoslovaque, ils tâchent de terroriser la population par des menaces, par une brutale violence et par une répression sans égards [*sic*] du droit de réunion et de la presse qui est favorable à la République Tchécoslovaque. Les cas de terreur sont malheureusement beaucoup trop nombreux. On a signalé au ministère des affaires étrangères, entre le 3 et le 25 Février de cette année, au moins 34 actes de terreur qui ont eu lieu. (Voir la liste ci-jointe).<sup>3</sup>

La cause principale de cette situation est une poignée d'agitateurs polonais, immigrés pour la plupart de Galicie, qui ont à leur disposition les armes abandonnées en cachette dans la Silésie de Teschen par l'armée polonaise avant son départ.

L'armée alliée a déjà saisi en plusieurs endroits, une quantité d'armes. Ainsi, le 19 février de l'année courante, à Koňská, des fusils et des grenades à main, et des baïonnettes furent confisqués. Les représentants officiels polonais, non seulement ne font rien pour tranquil[l]iser les esprits et empêcher cette terreur, mais l'approuvent même par leurs agissements. Ainsi, Monsieur Zamorski, délégué de la République Polonaise à la commission interalliée à Těšín, déclara après son retour à Varsovie (d'après le 'Dzennik Cieszinski') que la Pologne entière se tient derrière la Silésie. Si jamais la guerre éclate contre les Tchécoslovaques, ce sera la plus populaire des guerres en Pologne.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the National Council constituted in 1919 by the three Teschen deputies to the Polish Diet of Warsaw. Cf. No. 478 below.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



Une telle déclaration de la part d'un représentant officiel, si elle a été vraiment faite, il faut sûrement qualifier de très irréfléchie et irresponsable.

Dès lors, il n'est pas étonnant que cette terreur ne s'arrête pas même devant l'autorité de la commission interalliée et de son armée, comme l'ont démontré les événements, survenus à Teschen le dimanche 22 février de cette année, où les foules fanatisées de la population polonaise, appelées exprès à Teschen des régions des plus éloignées ont tenu, malgré l'interdiction formelle de la commission, une réunion sur la place de Teschen qui était manifestement dirigée contre la commission interalliée. Ni le cordon de l'armée alliée n'a pu empêcher que cette réunion, suivant les ordres de la commission, n'eût lieu. Le cordon a été rompu et les soldats qui ont dû céder devant la foule furieuse, ont à peine empêché qu'elle n'envahît pas [*sic*] le bâtiment où siège la commission. On en est arrivé à un tel point, que plusieurs soldats et un officier français ont été blessés. Maintenant, les Polonais s'efforcent de rendre responsable notre population des crimes de violence qu'ils ont commencé eux-mêmes à commettre et dont la dernière victime était [*?* les dernières victimes étaient] un soldat français,<sup>4</sup> Monsieur Octave Delille, tué le 9 Mars de cette année, et le citoyen tchécoslovaque, Monsieur le Dr Ladislav Radimský, frère du chargé d'affaires de la République Tchécoslovaque à Varsovie, qui allant de Bohême en Pologne, a été à la gare de Teschen, le 12 Mars 1920, maltraité de telle façon, qu'il est resté sans connaissance pendant quelques heures et a été sérieusement blessé.

La situation à Teschen par suite de cette terreur polonaise, est tellement sérieuse que la population réclame catégoriquement qu'on y remédie promptement.

Comme auparavant, le gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque désire sincèrement une entente et une collaboration raisonnable avec la Pologne. Guidé par cette idée et décidé d'aider loyalement même à l'avenir à accomplir d'une façon juste le plébiscite à Teschen, le gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque peut demander de droit que ce plébiscite, imposé au gouvernement tchécoslovaque, soit exécuté aussi du côté polonais uniquement par les moyens convenables et loyaux.

Le gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque croit que c'est à la commission interalliée à Teschen de rétablir la tranquillité et l'ordre sur le territoire qui lui est subordonné, de maîtriser les éléments qui portent atteinte aux droits primordiaux de la population et de punir sans égards [*sic*] des coupables. Cependant, vu que la commission interalliée ne peut pas faire face à cette terreur polonaise par suite du petit nombre de l'armée de l'Entente, le ministère des affaires étrangères de la République Tchécoslovaque propose:

- 1) que la garnison de Teschen, mise à la disposition de la commission interalliée soit augmentée dans l'intérêt du rétablissement de la tranquillité et de l'ordre.
- 2) que le gouvernement de la République Polonaise soit averti qu'il est

<sup>4</sup> In the original there is a full stop here and the following word, 'Monsieur', is printed on the next line as the first of a new paragraph.

de son devoir d'empêcher toutes les violences de l'élément polonais dans la Silésie de Teschen et de ne pas admettre que les organes officiels, par ses propos, irritent encore plus les esprits qu'ils ne le sont.

Le gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque formulant ces propositions, tendant à rétablir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans la Silésie de Teschen si gravement compromis par les Polonais, ne doute pas que le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande Bratagne et d'Irlande [*sic*] ne les prenne en bienveillante considération; il tient à faire remarquer qu'il ne pourrait prendre aucune responsabilité de l'évolution ultérieure des événements, si la terreur de l'élément polonais ne cessait pas le plus tôt possible.

Veuillez agréer, etc.,

DR. EDUARD BENESZ

No. 478

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received April 26)*

*No. 22 [194146/182090/55]*

TESCHEN, April 17, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 19 of the 12th instant,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to submit for Your Lordship's information a report of events leading up to the recent political agitation and disturbances in the mining districts of the Plebiscite Area.

The International Committee arrived at Teschen on 30th January last. At that time the Plebiscite Area was divided into two parts by the line of demarcation of 3rd February, 1919.<sup>2</sup> The Western part of the Line was held by Czech and the Eastern by Polish forces, and the line itself presented a formidable barrier of military posts and customs stations, which gave the appearance of a frontier between two hostile countries. The closest scrutiny of persons and of goods was combined on both sides with the strictest censorship, and the Demarcation Line had become a solid dam against the intercourse of the rival parties.

In obedience to the instructions of the Supreme Council, the Commission conceived their first duty to be the replacing of all Czech and Polish troops within the Plebiscite Area by the Allied forces at their disposal. These forces consisted of the 15th battalion of the Chasseurs Alpins who were subsequently reinforced on 17th February by a battalion of Monte Baldo Alpinis.

Decision No. 1 (enclosure in No. 4 of February 19th)<sup>3</sup> was issued on February 2nd, and at the same time the Customs line was set back to the respective frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland; permission was also granted for the unrestricted circulation of all correspondence, newspapers,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For the agreement making this division see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iii, pp. 836-7.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

and printed matter, as well as the free use of telegraph and telephone systems throughout the Plebiscite Area. The parts of the Area east and west of the Demarcation Line were each of them placed under the supervision of a Prefect, nominated by the delegates of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, respectively, and it was laid down that the Prefects should derive their authority and receive direct orders from the International Commission. Moreover, it was decided to exclude portions of the Freistadt District from the competence of the Western Prefect and to incorporate these communes into a separate administration directly controlled by a sub-commission consisting of four members, one delegated by each section of the Commission (Decision No. 4, enclosure in No. 4 of February 19th).

After the completion of these arrangements and the due nomination of the Czech and Polish prefects by the respective delegates, a protest was made by Mr Zamorski, the Polish delegate, demanding that the part of the Western area lying between the Demarcation line of 3rd February, 1919, and the line fixed by local arrangement between the Czechs and Poles on November 5th, 1918, should also be assigned to the authority of the Eastern Prefect.

In regard to Mr Zamorski's protest, it will not be out of place to refer here to the 'Notes on various projects for the carrying out of the Plebiscite in the Teschen Duchy,' submitted to the Supreme Council of Paris on September 20th, 1919, by the Interallied Commission which functioned at Teschen previous to the arrival of the present International Commission. In Article 1 of their Proposals, marked 'A,' the Interallied Commission stated:—

'La Silésie orientale restera divisée en deux parties, soumises respectivement aux autorités tchéco-slovaques et polonaises. La limite entre ces deux parties — suivant d'une façon générale la ligne actuelle de démarcation militaire — sera marquée à la limite orientale des communes ci-après. . . . Les sièges des deux administrations tchéco-slovaque et polonaise seront à Teschen. Elles auront à la tête un Préfet tchéco-slovaque pour la partie tchéco-slovaque, un Préfet polonais pour la partie polonaise.'

Col. Pakenham-Walsh, the British representative, in his remarks prefacing the Notes declared that 'the pretensions of the Poles to the right of administration up to the line of 5th November, 1918, has been from the beginning a political war-cry. Whatever their strict rights may be according to the Military Convention of February 25th, there is no doubt that in practice it would have been impossible for the Poles to administer a country occupied by the Czechs; and now it would only stir up bitter feeling to upset the existing *status quo*. I do not think that anybody but the officials and politicians are likely to be concerned if the present line as amended in Report "A" is retained for administrative purposes.'

The question of the division of the Plebiscite Area into two prefectures received the fullest attention from the International Commission, and it was only after close and continual consultation with the outgoing members (British, French and Italian) of the Interallied Commission that it was decided to adopt their recommendations, with the modification that a sub-

commission should administer that part of the country of Freistadt which lay to the West of the Line of Demarcation, and was included in the area which formed the subject of Mr Zamorski's protest.

From the date of his protest, Mr Zamorski's attitude towards the Commission underwent a change for the worse, and he came completely under the influence of the three Teschen deputies of the Polish Diet of Warsaw, who had constituted a National Council (*Rada Narodowa*) in 1919 and had governed the eastern part of the Plebiscite Area. Their régime at Teschen during the past year has probably contributed the most valuable of all propaganda work in favour of the Czechs, and their amateur and jejune methods would have resulted in financial disaster had not the Central Government come to their relief with substantial subsidies. The three deputies represent respectively the Socialists, the Clericals and the Silesian Party; they are men of little or no practical experience outside the narrow sphere of Galicia, the Plebiscite Area, and the borderlands of Czecho-Slovakia; they have no practical knowledge of administration, and their whole attention was absorbed in Chauvinistic politics, to the disregard of the important economic questions of this small but highly industrialised area.

The Polish delegate and the three members of the *Rada Narodowa* united in thwarting and obstructing the Commission and bent their efforts towards instigating their countrymen to defy the Commission's authority, quite regardless alike of the evil consequences which the inhabitants of Eastern Silesia subsequently suffered and of the embarrassment which their misbehaviour created for the Government of Warsaw. The Commission was virulently attacked in the newspapers of Poland, and the Czech press was not slow to take advantage of this error in tactics. My Italian colleague alone was hailed as a Polish sympathiser, while the French President of the Commission was singled out for attack as pro-Czech, an accusation which, as far as he personally is concerned, is entirely unjustifiable. Illegal meetings were convened in the Market Square at Teschen and under the windows of the Hotel which was the Headquarters of the Commission. On February 22nd an organised mass meeting of many thousands, conveyed in special trains from all parts, was held at Teschen in flagrant disobedience of the Commission's published orders. The crowd speedily got out of the control of their self-constituted leaders—the Teschen Deputies of the Warsaw Diet—nor were the Polish Delegation in any position to restrain that which they had made no attempt to prevent. Fortunately, the Allied guards were admirably handled by Major Mellier, and it cannot be doubted that their extraordinary patience and self-restraint alone prevented the occurrence of what would have been a bloody and lamentable scene in the Square that day. The Polish newspapers spoke openly of the Polish 'victory' over the Commission, and boasted that the will of the people had forced the ranks of the military. Ridiculous and unworthy of serious attention as these statements may appear to be, it is nevertheless to be feared that they have helped to fan into flame the smouldering bitterness of the Polish elements against the Czechs.

It cannot be denied that during the month of February the Polish political

leaders of Teschen, aided and abetted by their sympathetic countrymen at Cracow, behaved in a spirit at once foolish and childish, and it was disheartening to an impartial observer to note how completely they played into the hands of their more astute and hard-working rivals, the Czech delegation.

The Czech party had systematically utilised the breathing space of 1919 to consolidate their prestige in the country between the two lines of November 1918 and February 1919 by means of judicious propaganda and victualling. If the Plebiscite had taken place in January 1920 I venture to think that it would not have been unduly rash to have predicted that this region claimed by the Poles as overwhelmingly Polish would, with the notable exception of the Karwin mining district, have voted for union with Czecho-Slovakia rather than with Poland. Outside the mining district, this area is largely inhabited by Silesians of Polish origin, and their constant wish has been for an autonomous Silesia rather than for union with either Czecho-Slovakia or Poland.

In order to counteract the Czech successes in the above area, the Polish political leaders of Teschen endeavoured to carry out a programme of political propaganda, but their methods were crude, ill-considered, and conducted with feverish haste. The mayors of the agricultural communes were induced to protest against the authority of the Western Prefect, in spite of the notable fact that these communes had no grievances to redress, and they were instigated to refuse the payment of taxes. In the mining districts within the Western Prefecture and, especially where the numbers of the Czech miners predominated, Polish miners of influence among their fellows were bribed to distribute political literature and provoke acrimonious debates during working hours.

The Czech Plebiscite Committee which has its headquarters at Mährisch-Ostrau, within the Czecho-Slovak border, became alarmed at the activity of the Poles, and endeavoured to meet the new situation by encouraging the Czech miners to remove the Polish agitators from the mines.

The miners' leaders themselves, both Polish and Czech, were against political propaganda and disturbances at the mines, and were united by the common bond of Socialism. Their aims at the time were concentrated towards an amalgamation of the Polish and Czech mining unions as a means to secure combined effort for the furtherance of the interests of the miners. They took no part in the agitation and, confident in their own authority over the men, underrated the sinister influence which the machinations of the Czech and Polish Plebiscite Committees were exercising in the mining areas.

In my next despatch I propose to deal more particularly with the disturbances that have occurred in the mining area and at the various industrial centres as a consequence of the propaganda methods described above.<sup>4</sup>

The Allied troops at date consist of about 1,400 infantry with machine-guns. In addition, the French squadron (110) of the 12th Hussars arrived here from Upper Silesia on March 15th. The above force barely suffices to maintain law and order at present and is thus unable to provide any

<sup>4</sup> Teschen No. 24 of April 24, not printed.

reserve for an emergency. The number of troops originally assigned by the Supreme Council for service in the Plebiscite Area was 3 battalions (1 French, 1 Italian and 1 American); each, presumably, with a nominal strength of 1,000, or about 3,000 men in all. An additional battalion, or even half a battalion, would be of invaluable assistance and would ease the strain on the Allied forces.

I have the honour to enclose a map<sup>5</sup> of that part of the Plebiscite Area comprising the Duchy of Teschen illustrating the Demarcation Line of February 1919 and the line of November 1918.

I have, &c.,

E. C. WILTON

<sup>5</sup> Not reproduced. For a map of Teschen and Orava see Volume I, facing p. 618.

No. 479

*Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Earl Curzon (Received May 3)*

*No. 88 [195412/186660/55]*

PRAGUE, April 26, 1920

My Lord,

I received a visit yesterday from Mr. Wilton, the British representative on the Teschen Plebiscite Commission, who has come to Prague for two days at the request of the Czecho-Slovak Government. I gather that while Mr. Wilton considers that a line could be drawn which would be fair both to Czecho-Slovakia and to Poland, he has little hope that the voting of the Plebiscite will at all coincide with such a line, or that the result of the plebiscite itself stands much chance of peaceable acceptance. In this he confirms the impression of Colonel Coulson, the Military Attaché of H.M. Legation, who was a member of the original Teschen Commission and who was in the district lately on a private visit.

Dr. Beneš is confident that the plebiscite will show an overwhelming majority in favour of Czecho-Slovakia. Mr. Wilton thinks that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is over sanguine but is, I gather, of opinion that the result will certainly not satisfy the Poles, who are quite likely in such an event to maintain their position by force of arms. The Czecho-Slovak Government are fully alive to this danger and they are very anxious to arrive at a compromise which would be laid down by the Commission and which both countries would be forced to accept.

I agree with Mr. Wilton that it would be difficult for the Commission to prescribe such a compromise and dictate it to the two Governments, more especially as it would be almost impossible to arrive unanimously at a satisfactory arrangement as the Italian member of the Commission would work entirely in favour of the Poles.

The only possible alternative to a plebiscite would seem to be for the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments themselves to come to some direct

arrangement and ask the Commission to submit it to the Allied Powers, but Dr. Beneš has made overtures in this direction to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the reception he has so far met with does not encourage much hope of a satisfactory solution.

Dr. Beneš hopes however, that during his forthcoming visit to Paris, where he expects to meet M. Patek, it may be possible to find some solution. It is certainly to the general interest of Central Europe that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should come to an amicable agreement on this matter and I venture to hope that the Council of Ambassadors may be prepared to take into consideration any proposal which is put forward by the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Ministers for Foreign Affairs jointly.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE R. CLERK

No. 480

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received May 17)*

*No. 27 [198136/186660/55]*

*Confidential*

TESCHEN, April 29, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that, at the invitation of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Public Works, I visited Prague on the 20th and 21st instant.

On the 20th, in a private interview, Mr. Beneš narrated to me at some length his views on the question of the Teschen Plebiscite. He began by asking for my opinion as to the result of the plebiscite—to which I gave a non-committal reply—and continued by assuring me that the task assigned to the International Commission was impossible. The elections indeed might be held although he was aware of the serious difficulties in the way, not the least of which was the inadequacy of the strength of the Allied forces in the Plebiscite Area. I assured Mr. Beneš that it was the firm resolve of the Commission to carry out their orders to hold the Plebiscite at a date as early as possible. Mr. Beneš thereupon stated that the result of the plebiscite would make it impossible for the Commission to fix a line of division, and he illustrated his statement by permitting me to glance at a map prepared by the Czech Plebiscite Committee, from which it appeared that the whole of the mining districts, with the possible exception of Karwin, would vote for union with Czecho-Slovakia. In addition, the region to the east of the Kaschau-Oderberg railway, with the omission of ten or twelve communes in the south, were [*sic*] for the Czechs as well as large areas to the west of the line. Practically speaking, he claimed that the plebiscite would go in favour of the Czechs except in the southern rural communes, the Karwin mining district, and the communes, to the east of and including Freistadt, along the northern border. The Minister seemed confident that the Germans would vote with the Czechs.

Mr. Beneš proceeded to outline the geographical and economic position of Czecho-Slovakia surrounded by Hungary, Austria, Jugo-Slavia, Germany and Poland. He was of opinion that a Zollverein of these States would be impracticable, and he advocated strongly mutual political treaties and commercial agreements.

Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, he said, had common enemies, *viz.* the Bolsheviks and the Germans, and harmony between them was essential to the well-being of both as well as to the peace of Central Europe. He had made advances a week before to Mr. Patek on the subject of a common understanding upon the Teschen Plebiscite, and they had been received not unfavourably. He hoped to meet Mr. Patek at Paris in a fortnight, and he would then endeavour to lead up to a compromise on the basis of an equitable division without a plebiscite.

M. Beneš was convinced that the inevitable result of a plebiscite would be a war between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia as soon as the Allied Forces had left the country. In reply to a question which he pressed with some insistence, I could not deny the probability that his conviction was well-founded, but I remarked that neither State appeared to be in a position to carry on a successful war the one against the other, and the outcome would be disastrous for both sides. Mr. Beneš expressed his entire agreement with my remark but informed me that his colleagues in the Cabinet were of a different mind, and he characterised them as narrow-minded in their political views and impatient of diplomacy when armed force seemed the easier solution.

I took the opportunity to acquaint Mr. Beneš that the Poles of all parties at Teschen vehemently condemned the Czech invasion of January 1919; they declared that a gulf has arisen between the two countries which neither a plebiscite nor diplomacy could bridge. I asked him if he would explain to me the reasons for the action of his State, which appeared contrary to the spirit of the Provisional Agreement of November, 1918. Mr. Beneš readily agreed and said that the Agreement of 1918 was provisional only, but the Poles on December 10th had announced the election of deputies to the Warsaw Diet from the Teschen area, of which they were only in temporary occupation. This act had the appearance of a claim of sovereignty and was followed a week later by Polish mobilisation along the provisional frontier. These acts were construed as a menace to Czecho-Slovakia. Moreover, the mining area was in a state of unrest and disturbance, and the establishment of law and order in this region was imperative. He had himself on five occasions begged the Supreme Council to intervene but no action had been taken. These were the reasons, he said, which had prompted the Czech advance. Mr. Beneš put forward his arguments ably, but it seemed to me that his remarks were tinged with some regret for the past events. It may be that the Polish ill-feeling weighed more with him than the advantages gained by Czecho-Slovakia as a result of the policy of expediency, and it occurred to me that he himself had not been an advocate of the forward policy which has had such an unhappy influence upon the relations between Czechs and Poles.

Mr. Beneš concluded his interesting conversation with the earnest hope that



the Allied Powers would invite the two States to settle the Teschen question without recourse to the plebiscite. I ventured to remind the Minister that negotiations had been initiated at the instance of the Allied Powers in July last but, unfortunately, these had borne no fruit, and I asked him what he would consider to be a fair share for Czecho-Slovakia. He declared that he would be content with the whole of the Ostrau-Karwin mining area and the Kaschau-Oderberg railway, with the addition of the communes to the west of the Demarcation Line of February, 1919. He held the opinion, moreover, that both Czecho-Slovakia and Poland would respond to an invitation from Great Britain and France to negotiate for a compromise, and he suggested that I might pave the way at Teschen.

The following day I had an interview with Mr. Hampl, the Minister of Public Works, who is a Labour member and has, I believe, the reputation of being a man of strength and ability. I will submit later a separate report on the subject of my interview with him,<sup>1</sup> but it may not be out of place to record here a remark which the Minister dropped in the course of conversation. He stated his opinion that Czecho-Slovakia had committed a grave diplomatic blunder in having arrested the forward policy of January, 1919; he was aware, he said, that Poland was now threatening to fight for Eastern Silesia but, in that event, Czecho-Slovakia was ready and willing to return blow for blow. It would appear, therefore, that he had been a strong partisan of the aggressive action adopted towards Poland at that time.

I have the honour to state that, while I am not prepared to share wholly the sanguine views expressed by Mr. Beneš as to the favourable result of the plebiscite for Czecho-Slovakia, it is indisputable that the Czechs have profited by their predominant position during 1919 as well as by the mistakes of their rivals. It is probable, I think, that they may gain a considerable number of the communes, including those claimed by the Poles as overwhelmingly Polish. The Polish claim in this respect is to my mind misleading and based on erroneous premises, nor would it bear an impartial examination. It is evident that they are realising at this late hour that they have lost ground woefully and, if they cannot gain a breathing space within which to prosecute vigorous propaganda, it is likely they will be ready to resort to desperate remedies. Mr. Beneš apparently recognises this point very clearly and wishes to avoid armed conflict with Poland.

It will be observed that, in his conversation with me, Mr. Beneš claimed the two valuable assets of the Plebiscite Area, *viz.* the Ostrau-Karwin mines and the Kaschau-Oderberg railway, for Czecho-Slovakia, on the ground that these are both vital needs of the industrial life of his State. Mr. Beneš, I do not doubt, would be able to make out a good case to support his claim, and it may be that a compromise along such lines would, on the whole, be acceptable to Czecho-Slovakia. On the other hand, I venture to think that a compromise of this nature would be received with an outburst of fury from the Poles, nor would this be lessened by a reflection that the part of the area assigned to them, lying between Karwin and Dombrowa (Poland) mining

<sup>1</sup> No despatch on this subject has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

districts, has potential possibilities of development into a vast and valuable coal-field.

I have had opportunities of conversation regarding the Plebiscite with Poles of moderate views. Their number at Teschen is not large, but they are men whose opinions in this matter are entitled to be heard with some attention. They would prefer Autonomy as a solution of the present difficult position, and there are good grounds for believing that a large majority of the inhabitants of the Plebiscite Area, including the entire German vote, would vote for autonomy rather than for union either with Poland or Czechoslovakia. As an alternative to autonomy, it is suggested that the line of division between the two countries should follow generally that laid down in the November agreement of 1918.

Poles of all classes at Teschen are convinced that they can overcome the Czechs by force of arms and they appear to place an exaggerated value upon the hostility of the Slovaks towards the Czechs in the event of a war with Poland. My information on this point is meagre, but it leads me to suppose that the Slovaks as a whole are not enamoured of their union with the Czechs.

I have the honour to enclose a sketch map<sup>2</sup> showing roughly the Czech forecast of the Plebiscite. It will be observed that the map does not give them certain areas within which lie portions of the Kaschau-Oderberg railway.

I have the honour to report that no steps have been taken by me as regards Mr. Beneš' suggestion. The arrangements for the Plebiscite are proceeding but are encountering persistent opposition from the Polish side. The Czechs, on the other hand, appear anxious to expedite matters for an early election. The date for the publication of the voting lists was fixed originally for April 30th, but it has now been found necessary to postpone it until May 15th.

I have, &c.,

E. C. WILTON

<sup>2</sup> Not reproduced.

#### No. 481

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 6)*

*No. 536 Telegraphic: by bag [196172/7067/39]*

PARIS, May 4, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> 10. The Conference decided, in accordance with the request received from the Teschen Plebiscite Commission, to authorise the latter body to postpone holding the Plebiscite for another two months. It was understood, however, that this delay is to be considered as the maximum, and that if pos-

<sup>1</sup> The preceding sections related to other matters.

sible the Plebiscite should be held before then. Copy of the telegram from the Plebiscite [Commission] is being forwarded in my Despatch No. 1372.<sup>2</sup> . . .<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Of May 5, not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The following section related to technical details concerning the right to vote in the Teschen plebiscite area.

**No. 482**

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received May 25)*

*No. 32 [199597/182090/55]*

*Secret*

TESCHEN, May 15, 1920

My Lord,

In continuation of my despatch No. 24 of April 24th,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report on the state of affairs in the Plebiscite Area with special reference to the mining districts. Difficulties have also arisen in the areas of Spisz and Orawa in connection with the Plebiscite, but I will report on these matters in a later despatch.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the end of April last a dead body was accidentally discovered in the precincts of a group of dwellings at Teschen. These dwellings were constructed during the War, and served the purpose of barrack huts; they were occupied by Polish soldiers last year and, on the arrival of the International Commission at Teschen, permission was granted for the maintenance of a small Polish guard, under a Polish military officer, to look after the military stores which had been left behind. An inquest was ordered by the Commission, and the body was identified as that of a workman, resident within the Western Prefecture, who had disappeared in March last while on his way to Teschen; he was a native of Silesia, and Czechophil. The Czech Press at once seized hold of the incident and distorted it in a series of violent articles; prominent agitators, also, made use of the material to inflame the minds of the Czech miners and other workmen within the Plebiscite Area, who were led to believe that the unfortunate victim was only one of many others done to death by the Poles and that organised parties were going about the country committing similar murders in secret.

A few days later the house of the Czech stationmaster at Hnoinik within the Western Prefecture was destroyed during the night by a powerful bomb. No lives were lost, but the force of the explosion showed that the bomb differed very materially from the hand grenades occasionally thrown during the disorders in March, a number of which had failed to explode. M. de Manneville has paid a visit to the scene of the outrage, and he ridicules the idea advanced by General Latinik, the Polish Delegate, that the stationmaster had himself blown up his own house in order to conceal defalcations of his accounts. General Latinik complained at the same time that the man was a violent Czech propagandist; it would appear from the available evidence that the bomb was thrown by a Polish hand with the intention of killing the stationmaster.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> This despatch has not been traced in Foreign Office archives.

Hnoinik is not within the mining area, but the outrage profoundly disturbed the miners, already agitated by the exaggerated stories current of the 'barracks' incident. To make matters worse, a train arrived at Oderberg, bringing over 100 Czech men, women and children, who, it was alleged, had been evicted from Cracow by order of the authorities.

On the night of May 6th, the house of the Czech mayor of Poremba, within the mining area, and an inn in the adjoining commune of Polish-Leuthen were wrecked by powerful bombs, and two or three of the inmates seriously hurt. The next morning several thousand of the Czech miners left their work and held a mass meeting at Orlau to protest against these outrages, which appear to have been deliberately planned. Mr. Flowers (British) and Colonel di Bernezzo (Italian) members of the Karwin Sub-Commission, within whose sphere of administration these crimes had been committed, proceeded in the afternoon to Orlau and were joined later by Captain Flipo, the French member of the same Sub-Commission. Mr. Flowers, copy of whose report on his experiences on this occasion I have the honour to enclose herewith,<sup>3</sup> has stated to me that the Czechs were wildly excited against Colonel di Bernezzo, who was assailed with insulting epithets and menaced with a revolver. Animosity was not displayed against either Mr. Flowers or Captain Flipo, but apparently for very different reasons. The former was regarded as belonging to the British Delegation, which enjoys a reputation for strict impartiality, and the latter as a Czechophil; in justice to Captain Flipo, it should be stated that at no time has he appeared to have favoured the Czech side in the discharge of his official duties. There is little doubt that the presence of Mr. Flowers and Captain Flipo contributed materially to the eventual restoration of quiet in the minds of these thousands of infuriated Czechs. Deputies from Mährisch-Ostrau addressed the meeting and urged the miners to return to their work or else, they declared, the result would be disastrous for the industries of Czecho-Slovakia, which were already suffering from lack of coal. The Czech Government are evidently uneasy lest the prohibition of export of coal to Czecho-Slovakia, which was found advisable in March last, should be again repeated. The Czech miners resumed work the next day.

A large number of the Polish miners from the Karwin district had also struck work on May 7th for no apparent reason, and their conduct may be ascribed to uneasiness induced by an alarmed anticipation of events. Two of the pits recommenced working the same afternoon. Attempts were made by Polish political agitators to induce the others to remain on strike, but without success, and a large number of them voluntarily worked on Sunday, and also on the following Thursday, in spite of that day being a national holiday. It is very probable that the 'compensation' system, recently agreed to by the Commission as a temporary and tentative measure, tended to steady the Polish miners at this crisis. Under this system, of which only the Polish miners have availed themselves, the Sunday and holiday workers are enabled to obtain necessary articles which are urgently needed for themselves

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

and their families, such as boots and clothing, in lieu of extra wages. The output of coal for the past week may be considered as satisfactory, and there is every indication that work has been generally resumed throughout the mining area.

In my despatch Confidential No. 27 of April 29th,<sup>4</sup> I stated that, if the Poles were unable to gain a breathing space within which to prosecute vigorous propaganda, it was likely they would be ready to resort to desperate remedies. The Czechs profess to believe that a branch of the secret organisation P.O.W. ('Polska obrona wojskowa'), or 'Polish Military Defence,' has been formed to create disturbances in Eastern Silesia and that demobilised soldiers and soldiers on temporary leave from the Polish army, who are living in the Plebiscite Area, have been enlisted to act as agents for the acts of violence against Czechs and Czechophiles. They assert that the recent bomb outrages at Hnoinik, Poremba and Polish-Leuthen were the direct acts of these men, and that arms and explosives are being brought into the Plebiscite Area across the frontier from Biala. My informant, a leading member of the Czech Delegation, stated also that they believe General Latinik is cognisant of the activities of the P.O.W. in the Teschen area.

I hesitate to believe in the direct complicity of General Latinik in a movement of this nature. It cannot be denied, however, that he is an ardent hater of the Czechs, and I venture the opinion that he is ill-suited for the delicate and difficult post of Polish Delegate. He is greatly perturbed at the situation, and informed me in conversation three days ago that Czech bands armed with rifles were marching towards Karwin. Civil war, he said, would arise in the mining districts within two or three days, unless the Commission would immediately throw all their available forces, together with their Polish gendarmerie, between Freistadt, Karwin, Teschen, on the one side, and the Czech area of the West on the other. He offered to police the eastern portion of the Plebiscite area with Galician gendarmerie and to place at our disposal the services of 500 Polish soldiers, who were ready to move at a moment's notice from Biala across the frontier. The General's agitation did not appear to be assumed; on enquiry, however, it was found that the Czech rioters in the west were none of them armed with rifles, nor were any bands marching eastwards. The Commission have no intention of accepting his offer of military assistance. General Latinik also declared that there was a conspiracy between the Czech Government and the Bolsheviks to create disorder in Eastern Silesia, and to attack Poland on her western side. The Polish Government, he said, could not remain passive under this menace, and would have to move troops to meet the danger. He offered no evidence in support of his alarming statement, but he gave me the impression that some military movement from Poland in the direction of the Plebiscite Area might be imminent. I am not prepared to accept his unsupported asseverations as to joint designs by Bolsheviks and Czechs against Poland, but I have grounds for believing that Bolshevik emissaries are actually present in Teschen, Freistadt and Polnisch-Ostrau, close to the Czech frontier. Their activities

<sup>4</sup> No. 480.

are barely noticeable at the moment, but from the information I have received, they are well supplied with money. They are being watched, and I hope shortly to be in a position to furnish a report of their movements.<sup>5</sup>

It would be idle to deny the seriousness of the present situation which has developed with rapidity since the bomb outrages reported above. Left to itself, however, I believe that it would settle down if only the Polish political parties would permit it to do so. I regret to have to report, however, that I cannot at present see any desire on their part to refrain from dangerous propaganda, and I am reluctantly driven to the belief that they are determined to postpone the Plebiscite and to gain time at all costs, however desperate the expedients employed. It may be that there are hopes that the Polish successes against the Bolsheviks will gain sympathy for them abroad and, also, that time may be gained to prosecute a vigorous propaganda before the actual Plebiscite. It is not within my province to know what practical form foreign sympathy may take, but I venture to state with some confidence that they have been losing ground politically within the Plebiscite Area. The President of the Polish Miners' Union informed me confidentially a week ago that his union had lost more than 6,000 members, who had gone over to the Czech Union since February last, and he hinted that it might happen that even Karwin, the Polish stronghold in the mining districts, would prove a disappointment on the day of the Plebiscite. Mutual recriminations are rife in the Polish political camps at Teschen. A split has occurred between the Miners' and the Ironworkers' Unions; the former is inclined against the political leaders and is disposed towards a demand for Autonomy for Eastern Silesia. The educated Poles, who keep apart from professional politics, appear disgusted with the local politicians, and they maintain that the latter are fast losing their hold over all classes of the inhabitants, and one or two of the most prominent among them have in conversation with me compared very unfavourably the civil administration of the Polish Prefecture with that of the Czech Prefecture of the Plebiscite Area.

General Latinik informed me yesterday that the three principal political leaders at Teschen, Messrs. Reger, Londzin, and Bobek, had asked the Warsaw Government for his withdrawal, and that he intended to proceed to Warsaw on the 17th instant to explain that his position here was impossible and to offer his resignation. Speaking generally, the feeling among the Poles and their sympathisers at the present appears to be one of acute depression as regards the issue of the Plebiscite.

There is a marked difference between the disorders in March last and those of the present month. The former were marked by no serious casualties on either side, and the disturbances were local, spontaneous and in large measure due to the ill-feeling excited by political propaganda; on both sides, however, so far as miners and industrial workers were concerned, there appeared to be a desire to work and there was no real wish to allow as the introduction of plebiscite politics within the sphere of socialism. On

<sup>5</sup> Teschen despatch No. 50 of July 7, not printed.

the other hand, the present acts of violence indicate, I venture to think, the existence of an organised system of reprisals on the part of the Poles, partly, in revenge for the expulsion of Polish miners from their work and homes and, partly, from the feeling that the Plebiscite will result disastrously for Poland, and must be postponed at all costs.

In connection with the above, I have the honour to report that I have received information that in March last a branch of the P.O.W. was established at Welicka (Galicia) in order to deal with the question of the Teschen Plebiscite. The principal members are said to be military officers and the base of operations at Biala, on the Galician-Eastern Silesian frontier. Twelve bands have so far been organised, each consisting of six men under a chief who belongs to the branch of the P.O.W. The rank and file of each party is recruited from local Poles who have seen military service. Money and arms are supplied from Biala and their movements within the Plebiscite Area are being directed by the Polish Plebiscite Committee at Teschen. The leaders of this Committee are the Eastern Silesian deputies to the Warsaw Diet, *viz.*: Messrs. Reger, Lon[d]zin, and Bobek. The name of the chief of the twelve bands has been given to me as Herzog *alias* Bruneck, who is said to be a Russian Pole. The source of my information leads me to believe that it is probably not without foundation. I am endeavouring to pursue my enquiries with the necessary circumspection.

I have, &c.,

E. C. WILTON

**No. 483**

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received May 22, 9.35 a.m.)*

*No. 10 Telegraphic [199334/182090/55]*

TESCHEN, May 20, 1920, 9.5 p.m.

Following is a summary of telegram from International Commission to Council of Ambassadors in French to-day. Begins:—'Final date fixed by International Commission for return of voting lists was May 15th. Of 214 Communes of Duchy only 93 have sent in lists. Over hundred—and these the most pro-Polish—refuse to submit them. They are acting on instructions of Polish Committees which are openly trying to retard plebiscite.

'Lists for these insubordinate Communes will be prepared by representatives of Commission. This will cause great delay if vote be taken at the same time throughout (the) Duchy and in this event Commissioners consider forces at their disposal too weak to ensure public order during voting. International Commission therefore requests sanction to take plebiscite separately in each of following districts: (I) Friedek, (II) Teschen, (III) Mineral area under Karwin Sub-Commission, (IV) Bielitz with that part of Freistadt not administered by Karwin Sub-Commission.

'Period for objections to the voters will commence for each district as soon

as lists for all its Communes are ready and vote will take place either for one district or for two together. All lists have been received from Friedek district and plebiscite can be held there very shortly. Areas of Spisz and Orawa should also be authorised to vote separately. Commission could thus accelerate work and perhaps overcome Polish obstruction.' Ends.

French text follows by bag.<sup>1</sup>

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Under cover of Teschen despatch No. 35 of May 24, not printed.

#### No. 484

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received May 28)*

*No. 354 [200397/186660/55]*

WARSAW, May 22, 1920

My Lord,

Monsieur Patek referred yesterday in conversation with me to the state of affairs in the Teschen plebiscite area. He took a gloomy view of the possible outcome of matters there and evidently foresaw that there might be a conflict.

Two days ago he had been telephoned for to go to the Diet where events in the Teschen plebiscite area were being discussed by the Commission for Foreign Affairs. He had found on arrival that the Commission had prepared a resolution which contained two objectionable references to Monsieur de Manneville, President of the Teschen Plebiscite Commission. He had at once said that he would leave the Commission unless these objectionable passages were deleted from the resolution but undertook that if this were done he would make a statement about Teschen. The Commission then agreed to expunge the objectionable passages and Monsieur Patek made the statement of which I have the honour to enclose a translation.<sup>1</sup>

He then informed me that he was addressing a note to the representatives of the Powers represented on the Teschen Commission with regard to the state of affairs in the Teschen area. He read the draft of the note to me and I expressed the opinion that it would produce an unfortunate impression. I said that I had had the advantage two days ago of having a long conversation with Mr. Wilton, the British representative on the Teschen Commission. I gave Monsieur Patek a summary of this conversation, the main points of which were that the Czechs had, from the beginning, conducted their propaganda much more skilfully than the Poles. I pointed out to him that the recent destruction by Poles of a station with bombs containing a powerful explosive, and other incidents in which the Poles had used bombs had produced and were calculated to produce a most deplorable effect. I pointed out to Monsieur Patek that voters in all the plebiscite areas consisted of three categories, i.e., those who would anyhow vote for Poland, for Germany or for Czecho-Slovakia as the case might be, and a third most important

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



category, namely, the doubtful voters. The latter were the voters to win over but they would not be won over by bomb throwing and other violent methods. No doubt there were faults on both sides but violence did not pay. There was, indeed, evidence that the Poles were losing ground. I then said that the Poles had refused to take part in the Commissions of Control. The result would be that the Plebiscite Commission would be obliged themselves to prepare lists of voters.

Monsieur Patek observed that the Poles could never recognise these lists. Monsieur Patek said that the following demands must be fulfilled before the Polish authorities could take their proper part in the plebiscite proceedings:

(a) That 3,000 Polish voters who had been forcibly ejected by the Czechs and had left the Duchy should be allowed to return to their communes.

(b) That the Czech and Polish gendarmerie should be dissolved and their place taken by municipal guards under allied officers.

No doubt it might be necessary to put off the date of the plebiscite so as to allow of the formation of this latter force. Monsieur Patek added that what caused him most concern was a report he had received that there was a Bolshevik agitation in the Karwin mining district.

I said that I had heard that Monsieur Benes had at one time proposed to Monsieur Patek the settlement of the Teschen question out of court and without recourse to a plebiscite. He replied that this report was not quite accurate. He had been sounded on the subject by a person whose name he mentioned but which I have forgotten, but not directly by Monsieur Benes himself, nor was the proposal put forward in such a form as to constitute a proper basis for discussion. He had not met Monsieur Benes in Paris as the latter had only arrived there the day after Monsieur Patek's departure, but if Monsieur Benes thought fit to propose to Monsieur Pilz<sup>2</sup> in Paris a line across the Duchy as a basis for discussion he would give the matter his earnest consideration.

Whilst it will be seen that, in conversation with Monsieur Patek, I have emphasised the foolish proceedings of the Poles in the Teschen plebiscite area I imagine that the Czechs likewise create difficulties.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Prague and to Mr. Wilton at Teschen.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

<sup>2</sup> Polish representative in Paris.

#### No. 485

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received May 26, 5 p.m.)*

*No. 352 Telegraphic [200016/186660/55]*

WARSAW, May 25, 1920, 8 p.m.

Sir G. Clerk's Despatch (?100 ?88) of April 26th to Your Lordship<sup>1</sup> and my Despatch No. 354 of May 22nd.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is a reference to No. 479.

<sup>2</sup> No. 484.

I am impressed with desirability that Teschen question should if possible be settled direct between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia (? without) recourse to a plebiscite. Feeling here is running very high. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me recently that suggestion for a plebiscite in Teschen area had emanated from himself.

It would therefore seem rather difficult for him to propose an (? amicable) agreement but I think he would seriously consider any firm proposal made to him by Czecho-Slovak Government always provided that Council of Ambassadors would have no objection in principle to a settlement out of (? court) and it is not too late for such a procedure.

Repeated to Prague and Teschen.

### No. 486

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received May 30, 12.45 p.m.)*

*No. 15 Telegraphic [200661/186660/55]*

TESCHEN, May 29, 1920, 10 a.m.

Following is a summary of telegram from International Commission at Teschen to Council of Ambassadors sent in French and today.<sup>1</sup>

Begins.

In view of threat of Polish miners of Karwin on strike since May 21st to stop work of pumps and thereby render mines useless for several months International Commission requested reinforcement from President of Upper Silesia Commission.

One Italian battalion arrived at Karwin yesterday, occupied mines, and there is reason to hope that strike may end before long.

In the event of departure of extra battalion situation in Teschen area would again become extremely dangerous and it is indispensable that this battalion or an equivalent force be placed at disposal of Commission. International Commission consider that it would even be necessary to have four battalions at Teschen, two French and two Italian. With forces hitherto at their disposal Commission would be powerless to maintain order or to prevent civil war between Czechs and Poles, which would almost certainly lead to war between two countries.

Recent events have also shown necessity for re-organisation of Polish and Czech gendarmerie and for this purpose it is essential that International Commission should have services of

(1) An experienced major or lieutenant-colonel to take over command of whole of Polish gendarmerie.

(2) Ten or twelve French or Italian officers to be used solely for service with gendarmerie in various districts.

Commission would be grateful for early reply to their requests.

Ends.

French text<sup>2</sup> follows by bag.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was drafted on May 28; cf. No. 503 below.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

*Confidential*

Polish Delegate has proposed formally to International Commission that about 200 gendarmes from Poland should be employed in plebiscite area and that General [*sic*] Macready<sup>3</sup> from Warsaw should be seconded to secure law and order here. General Latinik spoke to me privately on the subject but I did not encourage his proposals. I would deprecate nomination of General Macready firstly because his rank is too high *vis-à-vis* of the commandant of Allied forces and secondly because it would be impolitic to appoint an officer in service of either Poland or Czecho-Slovakia.<sup>4</sup>

Repeated Paris, Prague, Warsaw.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Macready, Chief of the British Police Mission to Poland.

<sup>4</sup> In his telegram No. 10 of June 2 (not printed) Lord Curzon agreed that for the reasons given by Mr. Wilton it would be undesirable to send Colonel Macready to Teschen.

**No. 487**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 31)*

*No. 642 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, May 29, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:

. . .<sup>1</sup> 6. The Conference approved the proposal of the Teschen Plebiscite Commission that they should be authorised, in view of the obstructive attitude adopted by the Poles in the territory, to hold the plebiscite separately in the various districts (see Mr. Wilton's telegram to you of May 20th).<sup>2</sup> It was at the same time decided that the Notes which had been received from the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian Governments respectively complaining of the conditions under which the Plebiscite was being held and asking for various reforms, should, in the first instance, be referred to the Plebiscite Commission.

I took the opportunity of informing the Conference of the conversation I recently had with M. Benes in which the latter has suggested that as it was becoming increasingly evident that the plebiscite would not be recognised by either party, the Czecho-Slovak Government should attempt to arrive at a direct agreement with the Polish Government as to the division of the territory and that, if they failed to do so, they should refer the decision to the Conference of Ambassadors and accept whatever frontier line the Conference might lay down.<sup>3</sup> M. Benes had made very much the same com-

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections reported discussion on other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 483.

<sup>3</sup> Sir E. Crowe minuted on June 2 that M. Benes' proposal was: 'not correctly described in the telegram as one in favour of direct negotiations between the Czechs and the Poles.

'On the contrary he is very emphatic that a solution must be imposed by the Powers, although the consent of the parties will have to be ensured in some way.'

munication to the Italian Ambassador and has addressed a memorandum to M. Millerand which probably deals with the same proposal. It was decided to adjourn further discussion of this matter until the members of the Conference had obtained the views of their respective Governments. I shall be glad therefore to receive instructions as to how to act. . . .<sup>1</sup>

No. 488

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received June 7)*

No. 369 [201978/186660/55]

*Confidential*

WARSAW, May 29, 1920

My Lord,

Mr. Lindley<sup>1</sup> has been so good as to forward me a copy of his despatch No. 303 Confidential, of the 21st instant,<sup>2</sup> recording conversations which he has had with Count Goluchowski<sup>3</sup> and Count Larisch<sup>4</sup> with regard to the Teschen plebiscite as affecting the relations between Poland and Czecho-Slovak[ia].

Your Lordship has been kept fully informed by Mr. Wilton about the progress of events in the Teschen plebiscite area where matters seem to be going from bad to worse. The last accounts would seem to point to the impossibility of holding a plebiscite.

I had a long conversation with the French Minister yesterday and find that he has been acting on the same lines as I have in discussing the Teschen plebiscite question with the Polish Government. We have both pointed out that the Poles have been losing ground, that methods of violence were to be deprecated and that it would be in the interest of the Poles to meet the recent request of the Commission to send flour to the mining area. The French Minister has also, I gather, in his recent reports to his Government, referred unofficially to the proposal for settling the plebiscite by direct agreement between the Czecho-Slovakian and Polish Governments. But he has not gone so far as to recommend a direct settlement. It is clear that if an armed conflict took place between the Poles and the Czechs in the Duchy of Teschen there is no saying where it would stop.

I do not, however, agree with Count Goluchowski's view that the Poles could ward off a Bolshevik attack with one hand and deal with the Czechs with the other. The latest events on the northern section of the Polish line indeed show that the Poles will have all their work cut out to re-establish the situation and to hold their front. I do not believe that they have troops to spare for other adventures even assuming that they have the desire for other adventures which I am not prepared to admit. In this connection I would refer to my despatch No. 336 of the 15th instant<sup>2</sup> pointing out the considerations which must be present to the mind of the Polish Government if the war with the Bolsheviks is unduly prolonged.

<sup>1</sup> H.M. High Commissioner in Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Formerly Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> The owner of extensive coal mines near Teschen.

Speaking generally, the Polish Government have not handled the plebiscite questions skilfully. In some ways they are the victims of circumstances. Their representatives on the plebiscite commissions have shown want of tact, have been clumsy and impetuous. Their propaganda committees have contributed to stir up a great deal of ill-feeling whilst the terrorist methods sometimes employed by Polish agents are deplorable.

I think it can be truthfully said that both the French and this Legation have done their best to exercise a restraining influence on the Polish authorities, but the latter seem to be very much at the mercy of their representatives and committees in the various plebiscite areas. It is only fair to add that the regrettable incidents which have occurred in all the plebiscite areas are not solely caused by the Poles.

Mr. Lindley discusses the gradual grouping of the new states and the remnants of the old states in two combinations. He comes to the conclusion that the Italian Government will be found to stand behind the Polish-Hungarian combination, whilst the French Government will support the rival group consisting of Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia. He foresees that as soon as a national Government in Russia replaces the present Soviet Government, the Polish-Hungarian combination, plus the addition of Austria, will rely upon Italy and Germany on the one hand, whilst the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs will rely on France and Russia on the other.

Whilst I entirely agree that, judging at all events by the attitude of my Italian colleague at Warsaw, his Government are openly favouring the Poles, I am inclined to doubt whether the French would support a Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav combination to the detriment of their relations with Poland. In fact in a previous despatch<sup>5</sup> I have already expressed the opinion, which I see no reason to change, that the French tend to consider Poland as within their orbit and as a French preserve. Everything points that way and indeed it has been part of French policy to create as strong a Poland as possible with the view to keeping Germany in order from the east. It is, therefore, in my opinion more probable that whenever a constitutional government replaces the present Soviet Government in Russia, France will have every interest in encouraging good relations between Poland and a reconstituted Russia.

The Poles have a lively recollection of history and they know that Frederick the Great and Frederick William III were the main instigators of the first two partitions of Poland. They also realise that the Germans can never forget or forgive the loss of Posen and parts of West Prussia and they may well fear that the Germans will seize the first opportunity of recovering these territories. Bismarck said 'The resurrection of Poland could not come about without the loss of a part of our territory. We should have to relinquish Thorn and Danzig. The German Empire would remain exposed on the Russian frontier and we should lose our outlet on the Baltic.'<sup>6</sup> These words are prophetic.

<sup>5</sup> Volume XI, No. 242.

<sup>6</sup> This appears to be a paraphrase of remarks made by Bismarck in a speech of September 16, 1894. See *Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck*, ed. H. Kohl, vol. xiii, 1890-1897 (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1905), pp. 279 ff.

Again in his 'Memoirs' Bismarck wrote 'Any arrangement likely to satisfy Poland in the provinces of West Prussia and Posen and even in Silesia is impossible without the breaking-up and decomposing of Prussia.'<sup>7</sup>

The Poles have a profound mistrust and considerable fear of Germany as they recognise the superior efficiency and power of the Germans. On the other hand the Poles claim to be on a higher level of culture than the Russians and to be the people best fitted to be the middlemen in the future trade with Russia and the best instrument for the gradual reconstruction of that country. Russia has in the past been the great market for Polish manufactures and Poland has every reason to seek close relations with Russia in the future. She will in my judgment certainly rely on Russia rather than on Germany.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Mr. Lindley and to His Majesty's Minister at Prague.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

<sup>7</sup> *Bismarck the Man and the Statesman* . . . trans. cura A. J. Butler (London, 1898), vol. i, p. 121.

No. 489

*Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Benes*

[201597/186660/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 31, 1920

M. Benes, the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me today about the very serious situation in Teschen. The Poles were now officially declaring that they could not accept the plebiscite provided for under the treaty. According to M. Benes, the real reason for this is that the result of the local investigation has shown a large majority of Czechs in the district of Teschen as a whole. He computes that majority at about 70% of the inhabitants. He gave me the attached map<sup>1</sup> in which the estimated Czech element is shown in red, the Polish element in yellow, and doubtful districts in green.

M. Benes said that unless further allied troops were brought into the district, he felt convinced that the disturbances which had already begun to assume an ugly shape, would spread and lead to massacres on a large scale. He was most anxious to arrive at a settlement. There were people in Czecho-Slovakia who were content to let matters drift, in the confident expectation that before very long, Poland would find herself in a very difficult position owing to the Bolshevik attack, and that Czecho-Slovakia would then have an easy task in asserting her rights, which would by then be definitely established by the plebiscite.

<sup>1</sup> It has not been possible to trace this map which is not attached in the file. It was presumably similar to, though not perhaps identical with, the map referred to by Mr. Wilton in No. 480 above.

M. Benes however considers the possible difficulties of Poland's future situation to be an additional reason for seeking a solution now, as he would be opposed to any policy which would have the appearance of squeezing the Poles just when they were in distress.

M. Benes has been talking to the Polish representative in Paris, who appears more reasonable than his Warsaw superiors. They agreed that if some direct settlement could be arrived at on a compromise (i.e. partition) basis even at this 11th hour, between the parties, it would be a desirable solution.

I asked in what direction he looked for a solution. Did he expect the peace conference once more to intervene and dictate a line of partition? He would remember the several previous failures of this procedure. Or did he suggest some kind of arbitration, and if so by whom?

M. Benes at once admitted that whilst he could not, after all that had happened, himself propose an arbitration, he would accept such a solution if proposed or imposed by the conference. He thought Poland would probably also accept it. He had in fact sounded the Polish Representative at Paris as to leaving the decision to the joint arbitration of France and England, but the Pole would not accept this. On the other hand neither Italy, nor America, nor a neutral, would be acceptable to himself. He suggested the King of the Belgians.

I then asked what line of division M. Benes would be prepared even at this moment to accept, if imposed by the allies. He referred to the several lines which had been successively discussed at Paris. (I have drawn these—very roughly—on the attached map.)

The Teschen Commission had at first prepared a line as shown approximately in red (marked A). Subsequently owing to American pressure the line as shown in blue (marked B) had been proposed. Poland had rejected the first, and Czecho-Slovakia the second. Then M. Benes himself had proposed an intermediary line (C shown in black). This he would be even now prepared to accept. He would prefer that in the southern half of the country, the existing administrative district-boundary should be followed (Black line—D). This would add to Czecho-Slovakia a district marked yellow on the map because the majority of the inhabitants were Polish; but, as a matter of fact, the total number of those inhabitants were few, the district being very sparsely populated. This would be the most convenient line, administratively. He was however prepared to accept the C line if the Poles made difficulties. He would also in the last resort make a further concession by letting Poland have the capital Teschen (Tešín on the map), which is indeed neither Czech nor Polish, but German. He thought the Poles might wish to have the satisfaction of raising their flag at the capital which gave its name to the country in dispute.

I told M. Benes that I could not at present say what view H.M.G. would take of his suggestions. Moreover H.M.G. would probably wish first to consult the French government.

I think we ought to inform Lord Derby fully of the proposals now made

and suggest his discussing with the French delegates the whole situation created by the Polish refusal to stand by the plebiscite.—One solution is to maintain the plebiscite.—Should however the French share the view that an alternative to the plebiscite should be tried, it might be possible for the Ambassadors' Conference to propose to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak delegations the adoption of the compromise line (C) originally proposed by M. Benes or, failing that, reference to the arbitration of the King of the Belgians.

I would suggest that Mr. Harold Nicolson, who is familiar with all the details of the former negotiations on this complicated subject,<sup>2</sup> might be instructed to proceed to Paris and assist Lord Derby in dealing with the matter.<sup>3</sup>

E. A. C.

<sup>2</sup> He had been British expert on the Central Territorial Committee and on the Commission on Czechoslovak affairs at the Peace Conference.

<sup>3</sup> In a note on the file, dated June 3, Lord Curzon added that he had seen M. Benes who had spoken to him in a sense similar to that of his conversation with Sir E. Crowe.

#### No. 490

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 638 Telegraphic [201599/186660/55]*

*Private*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 3, 1920, 6 p.m.

You are authorised to have private conversation with French Foreign Office before bringing the question of Teschen and the new suggestions before Ambassadors' Conference. At present we only know attitude of Poles from what Benes told us, and it will require verification.

The French Ambassador has handed in a note today<sup>1</sup> in which his Government rule out the idea of direct agreement or of imposing a line and advocate arbitration as the only possible solution. We would agree to arbitration by the King of the Belgians as suggested by the French Government, but it would be necessary to find some form by which the decision of the Supreme Council in favour of a plebiscite could be superseded by the adoption of arbitration.

The French proposal is that arbitration should be suggested by their representative and supported by ours both at Prague and Warsaw and that if it be accepted by the Czech and Polish Governments, it should be submitted by them to King Albert, with the support of the three Great Powers.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

#### No. 491

*Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe on the proposed arbitration of the King of the Belgians in the case of Teschen.*

*[202702/186660/55]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 5, 1920

The suggestion that the proposal to refer the Teschen question to the arbitration of the King of the Belgians constitutes a severe blow to the



league of nations,<sup>1</sup> rests on a misapprehension of the nature of the covenant. So far from its being the case that 'if there is one job which the league of nations is expected to do, it is to arbitrate on an agreed reference', there is nothing in the covenant to suggest that the league should act as arbitrator in any circumstances.

Where arbitration is mentioned in the covenant, as in articles 12, 13, and article 15, it is as an *alternative* to action by the league:

*Article 12:* 'The Members of the League agree that . . . they will submit the matter *either* to arbitration, *or* to enquiry by the Council. . . .'<sup>2</sup>

*Article 13:* 'The members . . . agree that . . . they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration. . . . For the consideration of any such dispute the *court of arbitration* to which the case is referred *shall be the court agreed on by the parties* to the dispute. . . .'

*Article 15.* 'If there should arise . . . any dispute . . . *which is not* submitted to arbitration in accordance with article 13, the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council.'

It might perhaps be contended that although the covenant in no way contemplated arbitration as a function of the league, yet it would not be contrary to its provisions if the council of the league assumed the role of arbitrator in a particular case.

That may be so, but the procedure is not desirable in itself, and in this particular instance it would be doubly objectionable since the appeal to the arbitrators would lie against a solemn decision of the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council can agree to suspend its decision and to invite an impartial arbitrator to make a fresh one. But the council of [the] league is for all practical purposes undistinguishable from the Supreme Council except for the dropping out of the United States, and the accession of the four minor Powers at present seated in the Council of the League. The Council of the League would have to be unanimous in making a decision. The considered views of the four Principal Allied Powers are already on formal record. It was because those views (representing a compromise arrived at after much debate and with great difficulty) found favour with neither Poles nor Czechs, that the solution of the plebiscite was adopted. If the plebiscite is dropped, what chance is there of the 4 Powers arriving at any other conclusion than that already put forward by them and rejected?

It is for this reason, no doubt, that M. Benes quite frankly objected to any arbitration on the part of France, Italy, Great Britain, & America (He did not mention Japan) and proposed the arbitration of the King of the Belgians.

Moreover, I gather from a remark made by M. Benes to Mr. Nicolson that he has actually approached the league and informed them that he has

<sup>1</sup> This suggestion was made in a letter of June 4 (not printed) from Mr. Philip Kerr to Mr. R. H. Campbell.

<sup>2</sup> Sir E. Crowe here inserted the following marginal note: 'N.B. The French text is perhaps still more clear, in saying: "soit à la procédure de l'arbitrage, soit à l'examen du conseil".'

expressed his willingness to go to arbitration under article 13 of the covenant.<sup>3</sup> (We have no official information of this, as we are never informed of what goes on in the league, until 'post festum'.)

If in these circumstances, serious criticism is made in the House of Commons, as Mr. Philip Kerr suggests, H.M.G. should have no difficulty in answering it.

E. A. C.

<sup>3</sup> M. Benes's note of May 31 to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, is printed in the *Procès-Verbal of the Sixth Session of the Council of the League of Nations held in London on June 14 and 16, 1920*, pp. 58-62.

## No. 492

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 6, 9.50 p.m.)*

*No. 671 Telegraphic [201998/186660/55]*

PARIS, June 6, 1920, 5.30 p.m.

My telegram No. 665.<sup>1</sup>

At to-day's<sup>2</sup> meeting of Conference of Ambassadors, Monsieur Cambon raised question of Teschen Plebiscite and suggested that in view of circumstances which had arisen the Conference should formally propose to Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments that question, instead of being settled by Plebiscite, should be referred to arbitration of King of the Belgians. This course was unanimously approved by Conference with the exception of my United States colleague who reserved his decision pending further instructions from his Government.

It was decided that recent notes received by Conference from Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations in Paris protesting against Plebiscite would serve as a suitable opportunity for making a formal proposal in the above sense to two Delegations concerned. In doing so, stress will be laid on fact that, unlike other Plebiscites which are at present in progress, Teschen Plebiscite is not based on any treaty, and can therefore, unlike other Plebiscites, be cancelled by mutual agreement between parties concerned.

The formal proposal for arbitration will make no mention of King of the Belgians as arbitrator in as much as he has not given his consent to act in this capacity, but two (. . .)<sup>3</sup> will be informed privately by Conference that His Majesty is arbitrator they have in view.

It was agreed that French Ambassador Brussels, being Doyen of Allied representatives in that capital, should be instructed to approach King of the Belgians unofficially in order to ascertain whether he would be prepared to act in the event of Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments agreeing to proposal to arbitrate this question.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was presumably drafted on June 5, the date of this meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors.

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain. 'Delegations' was suggested in the Foreign Office.

Instructions will be sent forthwith to French Ambassador in this sense, and in the meantime the notes to be addressed to Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations will be drafted so as to be ready to be despatched as soon as United States Ambassador has received authority to approve them.

**No. 493**

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received June 7, 11.10 a.m.)*

*No. 376 Telegraphic [202256/186660/55]*

WARSAW, June 6, 1920, 6.20 p.m.

Under instructions from his Government French Minister yesterday submitted to Minister for Foreign Affairs suggestion which I understand French Government has made to His Majesty's Government and to Italian Government namely that Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments should agree to ask King of Belgians to arbitrate on Teschen question.

(? Minister for Foreign Affairs) told my French colleague that he would submit suggestion to Cabinet and seemed personally (? favourable) to idea though he suggested that a modification in following sense *viz*: that Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments should come to a direct (? preliminary) agreement with regard to districts in Duchy of Teschen which Government is prepared to recognize as indisputably Czech or Polish and that King of the Belgians should arbitrate with regard to remaining area which would be much more limited in extent. He also hoped that King of the Belgians would hear Polish and Czecho-Slovak Minister[s] for Foreign Affairs on 'their respective claims.

My Italian colleague has also received instructions to submit above-mentioned proposal to Polish Government and is doing so today.

Repeated to Paris, Prague and to Mr. Wilton.

**No. 494**

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 650 Telegraphic [201830/186660/55]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 7, 1920, 2.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 665 (Very Secret of June 4th.<sup>1</sup> Teschen Plebiscite) last sentence.

You have free authority to use your discretion as to form in which proposal for arbitration is to be put forward.

Monsieur Beres [*sic*] in his recent communications with this office threw out the suggestion that possibly the Poles would now accept solution of a line of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Lord Derby had asked for a free hand to do what he thought right.

partition which he is prepared to trace and by which he would make certain fresh concessions. You might consider, after consulting him, whether proposed communication to Czech and Polish Governments should not offer alternation<sup>2</sup> of either definite acceptance of that line or arbitration by the King of the Belgians. For so long as there is a chance of a line laid down by the Supreme Council or by French, British, and Italian Governments being accepted, it would be an obvious advantage if only from the point of view of time, to avoid the inevitable delay of arbitration. Presumably the allied occupation would have to continue until King of the Belgians had made his award.

<sup>2</sup> This word was corrected in the Foreign Office to 'alternative'.

#### No. 495

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received June 8, 11.35 a.m.)*

*No. 19 Telegraphic [202387/186660/55]*

TESCHEN, June 7, 1920, 9.20 p.m.

Teschen arbitration.

Warsaw telegram of June 3rd.<sup>1</sup>

In the event of arbitration being accepted by Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments I would respectfully enquire whether British Commissioner should not be withdrawn. I would be glad of your instructions as staff is entitled under agreement to a month's notice and arrangements as to termination of present duties in connection with local administration would take about two weeks.

Repeated to Paris, Warsaw and Prague.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably this refers to No. 493 above.

#### No. 496

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received June 11)*

*No. 41 [203058/186660/55]*

*Confidential*

TESCHEN, June 7, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch Secret No. 32 of the 15th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that on May 18th I took the opportunity of the presence of Sir Horace Rumbold at Cracow to proceed thither in order to explain to him the general situation here and to obtain the benefit of his counsel and experience in regard to the political attitude of Warsaw towards the Teschen question.

On that day a serious and unexpected riot broke out in Teschen itself and

<sup>1</sup> No. 482.

for some hours the town appears to have been terrorised by bands of workmen from the Polish iron-works at Trzyniec and local rowdies. In the morning the workmen invaded the premises of the Czechophil Slonzak newspaper office, but the damage done was not material beyond the destruction of newspapers and a few broken windows. An Italian patrol was sent to occupy the premises but, for some reason which it appears inadvisable to explain, withdrew in the early afternoon. Meantime, numbers of the workmen, accompanied by their wives, had entered German shops and satisfied their demands in an orderly manner by removing sundry necessities in the shape of cloth and clothing and leaving a small sum of money on the counter. These proceedings were conducted so quietly and methodically that the military patrols in the streets outside had no idea of the occurrences, nor did they receive the slightest assistance or information from the Polish gendarmerie on duty, which made no attempt at interference. The explanation given was that the proceedings were in the nature of a protest against the exorbitant prices demanded for necessities by the shopkeepers, whose prices are certainly excessive. After the withdrawal of the Italian patrol, a large crowd attacked and completely wrecked the newspaper offices invaded in the morning. Two motor cars belonging to the Czech Delegation were stolen, as well as half a dozen riding horses; the motor cars have been traced by the Czech Delegation into Galicia and have not yet been recovered. The French Commandant ordered a section of *chasseurs* to charge, and the crowd was promptly and effectively dispersed by the men using only the butts of their rifles. Another crowd had proceeded to the magistrate's office and by menaces obtained the order for the release from confinement of a Polish officer and two men arrested on suspicion of complicity in the Hnojnik bomb outrages. This Polish officer had previously been protected from arrest by the military member of the Polish Delegation; another prisoner was also released, who was charged with the murder of the man whose body was found in the barracks at Teschen (Secret No. 32 of May 15th).<sup>2</sup> The disorderly elements of the town had also proceeded to plunder German and Polish shops indiscriminately, but were speedily scattered by the soldiers. Military patrols restored general order and turned back at the railway station numbers of men and women, arriving from Trzyniec and elsewhere, who were carrying bags in which to take away enforced purchases from the shops.

On May 21st the Polish miners—to the number of about 11,000—struck work at seven mines and two coke-ovens within the Karwin area. Representatives of the men visited me the following day and explained that they had struck work as a protest against the failure to supply them with flour and against the presence of Czech gendarmes at Karwin. At their request I obtained a hearing for them from the full Commission. Their principal complaints were, as already stated, the presence of Czech gendarmes, and the failure to provide them with the full ration of flour during the previous fortnight. They demanded the immediate substitution of a purely Polish gendarmerie and the establishment of a Polish victualling centre at Karwin.

<sup>2</sup> No. 482.

One or two of the representatives frankly declared that a deputation had waited upon the Rada Narodowa, which controls the Polish food supplies at Teschen and, in response to an appeal for flour, had been told that the flour was available but would only be issued provided they obtained certain political concessions from the International Commission.

It may not be out of place at this point to state that, according to information furnished by the allied members of the Karwin sub-commission, the number of gendarmes in their area, with a population of about 120,000 including the mining districts (see map attached to No. 22 of April 17th),<sup>3</sup> was under 260, of whom ten were Poles and the remainder equally divided between Czechs and Austrian Germans. The region to the east of the area is policed entirely by Polish gendarmes.

In reply to the men's complaints, the Commission reminded them of the promise made in March last, agreeing to the formation of a communal police for Karwin and the gradual reduction in the number of gendarmes who are under Allied military command, as soon as the communal police were efficiently established. It was pointed out to them that the Czech and Polish sub-prefects attached to the Karwin Sub-Commission had nullified the list of communal police finally approved by the Mayor of Karwin: the former had objected to 19 of the 30 names on the list whereupon the latter promptly objected to the remainder. The Commission were ready to sanction at any time the list of the communal police as approved by the Mayor. The Polish sub-prefect, Mr. Adamecki, was present with the representatives at the sitting of the Commission and declared that he had known nothing of the preparation of the list and denied the statement of the Mayor that he had been present when it was finally drawn up and presented. Mr. Flowers (British) and Colonel di Bernezzo (Italian) confirmed the Mayor's statement and declared both they and Mr. Adamecki were present on the occasion referred to, whereupon Mr. Adamecki, in the presence of the Commission and the representatives of the miners, called upon God to witness that he was not present. There can be no doubt in my mind that Mr. Adamecki deliberately perjured himself. He has since resigned, and I hear from a trustworthy source that he has acted in his official capacity of sub-prefect as a spy and a tool of the Rada Narodowa, in complete disregard of his oath of allegiance to the Commission. In regard to the question of Victualling, the Commission agreed that the men had a grievance as supplies of flour had not arrived in sufficient quantity to give them their full ration, although the deficiency was met with large supplies of potatoes and an issue of pulse. The Victualling Department was established at Mährisch-Ostrau in January last, before the arrival of the Commission, with the full approval of all the miners, both Czech and Polish, and the mine-owners. It was not possible in a few days to change so complex a system, which had taken six months to arrange, but the Commission had urged the Czech Government to send supplies of flour at once, which were stated to have been delayed by shipping strikes in Germany. The Commission were willing to confer with representatives as to the best measures to be

<sup>3</sup> No. 478.

taken for the improvement of the present system but they were unable, in the interests of the men themselves, to commit themselves to a novel and experimental system which had neither been presented in a formal manner nor discussed in any practical form.

The majority of the miners' deputation appeared to be not ill-satisfied with the results of their conference with the Commission, but a violent minority of them had come entirely under the influence of the three Teschen deputies and their political entourage, known as the Rada Narodowa, and the next day it was decided to continue the strike and, moreover, to call out the engineers and men absolutely essential for the maintenance of the mines in connection with the upkeep of the machinery, the drainage and ventilation. A further demand was made that the districts lying between the November line of 1918 and the Demarcation Line of February 1919, referred to in my despatch No. 22 of April 17th,<sup>4</sup> should be included within the administration of the Eastern (Polish) Prefect. On May 26 the miners requested that the Commission should ask the Czech and Polish Governments to settle their differences without a plebiscite, and their request was verbally communicated to the Polish and Czech Delegates.

The mine-owners were in great alarm at the threat to call out the remaining staff at the mines, the execution of which, they declared, would ruin the coke-ovens and render the mines unfit for working for six months. They begged the Commission to take all measures for upkeep of the mines and their protection from sabotage. Immediate steps were taken in this direction, and the engineering staff in charge of the pumps, machinery and ventilation were induced to remain by promises of military protection. The forces at the disposal of the Commission were too weak to permit of any display of force at the mines and, in this connection, it may not be out of place to observe that, owing to military exigencies in France, the number of rifles available for patrol duty in the French battalion was but 186. Fortunately, the Upper Silesian Commission responded readily to the Commission's appeal for assistance, and the services of an Italian battalion, which arrived most opportunely on May 26th, were lent for a few days. The reinforcement produced at once an instant sense of relief, not only at Karwin but also in the adjacent commune of Orlau, the majority of whose inhabitants are Czech.

The following instance of the state of tension prevailing in the Orlau-Karwin district may perhaps serve as an illustration of the unsettled feeling prevailing generally at this time throughout the mining area. On the night after the strike at Karwin, a gendarme patrol on duty in the vicinity of one of the mines was fired upon by a band of Poles. The fire was immediately returned, and a brisk interchange of shots took place in the darkness without casualties on either side. The sound of the fusillade was heard at the towns of Karwin and Orlau, and the panic-stricken inhabitants streamed out, the former eastwards to Freistadt and the latter westwards in the direction of Mährisch-Ostrau. The news was immediately telegraphed to Teschen from Freistadt that the Czechs had occupied Karwin in force and that soldiers

<sup>4</sup> No. 478.

were advancing from the Czech frontier. In reality, Orlau and Karwin were comparatively deserted and in the occupation of Czechs and Poles respectively, neither of whom had the slightest intention to make any aggressive move against the other.

A small military post has been established to command the roads in the neighbourhood of Orlau and Karwin, and both sides seem to be contented and reassured by this step. This indication confirms my impression—if indeed it required confirmation—that the mass of the workers on both sides desire nothing better than to work in peace and security, and that it is the professional politician and the *agent provocateur* who are continually busy in fomenting unrest and discord.

The strike at the Karwin group of mines continues, and endeavours to localise the strike and prevent the Czech and other Polish mines from joining in have so far met with success. The actual result is a decrease in the output of about 7,000 tons of the best gas-coal in Central Europe, of which the Poles were allotted about 5,000 tons daily. This amount they have now temporarily lost, but the loss appears to concern the Polish Government but little, and the attitude of the Polish Delegation indicates that they are encouraging instead of endeavouring to stop the strike. The Polish miners were working very well in the beginning of May, in spite of the insidious machinations of the Teschen and Galician mischief-makers, but unfortunately the flour supplies, for which the Czech[o]-Slovak Government had undertaken the responsibility, gave out. In March last I urged the Czech Government, through their Delegation, to maintain a reserve of flour and offered, in my capacity as Coal Controller, to release coal as compensation for Roumanian or other grain. The assurance was given then and subsequently on several other occasions that all was well and [? that there were] no dangers of shortage. While making every allowance for the difficulties of the Czecho-Slovak Government, I cannot refrain from calling attention to the dire consequences which have resulted from bureaucratic self-complacency. At the present time, the Polish Government refuse to lend or sell the Commission flour supplies for even the Polish miners alone, unless instant compliance is made with ill-advised conditions which would render the situation hopeless beyond remedy. The Czech Government, on the other hand, appear to be doing their utmost to send necessary supplies into the mining area, not only for Czechs but also for Polish miners, and, although the arrivals are at present inadequate, there is reason to hope for a substantial improvement in the near future. It should be remarked that the Czech miners were equally affected by the shortage of flour, but have remained at work. The belief is gaining ground at Teschen that the Polish miners will not now resume work until the word to do so comes from Warsaw.

I regret to have to record my belief that the strike has been deliberately fostered and maintained by Polish politicians, and the leading conspirator at Teschen is one Reger, the Socialist deputy for Teschen in the Warsaw Diet, who is not even a native of Silesia, but of Galicia. Efforts are being made to proclaim a general strike of workers but so far without success except at Oderberg, where the Polish workers are on partial strike. In the neighbour-



hood of this town, bands of pickets paid from Teschen funds have been preventing peaceful workers from proceeding to their work, but steps are now being taken to prevent further interference and it may be hoped that the strike in those parts will not gain ground.

The Polish union leaders are anxious for the men to resume work, but they dare not voice their views publicly as they are in constant dread of denunciation as renegades.

I have been unsparing in my efforts to bring both sides together and put an end not only to the present strike, but also to the expulsions from home and work on both sides. A little, a very little, has been achieved in the way of an exchange of 'prisoners' kidnapped and interned either in Czechoslovakia or Poland, and the blows of expulsion have perhaps fallen with less frequency and violence than they might otherwise. Regarded as a whole, however, the attempts at conciliation, conducted as they have been with the greatest patience and earnestness, have met with little or no success. In many parts of the Area several armed bands are still at large and these are recruited from homeless workers, demobilised soldiers, demoralised lads and local rowdies.

The forces at the disposal of the Commission have hitherto been all too small to permit of effective patrol work and important tasks connected with the reduction and readjustment of the Czech and Polish gendarmerie. Inadequate as the force has proved to be, it would have sufficed, however, had the Czech and Polish Governments acted honourably towards the Commission, which had been called into being at their desire to settle a dispute which they either dared not or could not settle themselves. The unbridled license of the Press, and the Polish press is the worst offender, the Plebiscite Committees and unofficial political agents on both sides have apparently suffered no restraint at the hands of these two Governments. The result has been that the distrust between the Czechs and Poles living in the Plebiscite Area has been fomented into a feeling of frenzied hatred. It may be that the Czech Government has appeared less active in their direct encouragement of illegal propaganda methods and acts of violence, but their passive attitude towards the offenders has been none the less blameworthy than that of the Polish Government. The Czech Delegation have undoubtedly on the whole maintained a more correct attitude than the Polish Delegation, partly, because the political position of the former is less difficult but, principally, I venture to think, because the Polish Government have been less fortunate in the original selection of their Delegate.<sup>5</sup>

I have, &c.,

E. C. WILTON

<sup>5</sup> Sir E. Crowe minuted: 'The position is indeed most discouraging. In the last instance, of course, the Allied governments are to blame who first insisted on placing these districts under inter-allied control and then refused to furnish the military forces which they had themselves declared to be necessary. E. A. C. June 11.' The minute was initialled by Lord Hardinge.

No. 497

*Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Earl Curzon (Received June 9, 11 a.m.)*

*No. 103 Telegraphic [202632/186660/55]*

*Very urgent*

PRAGUE, June 8, 1920, 3.15 p.m.

My French colleague has telegram from his Government from which he gathers that he is to make, in conjunction with Italian Minister and myself, formal proposal to Czecho-Slovak Government to accept arbitration of King of the Belgians in question of Teschen. He has now received further details of telegraphic enquiry if he has already made proposal [*sic*].

My Italian colleague has telegram from his Government that he *may* associate himself with his French and British colleagues in such a step.

I venture to ask for Your Lordship's instructions.

No. 498

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 659 Telegraphic [202256/186660/55]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 8, 1920, 9 p.m.

Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No. 376 (of June 6th.<sup>1</sup> Teschen).

I had understood from Your Lordship's telegram No. 671 (of June 6th)<sup>2</sup> that the intention was not to approach the Poles or the Czechs until the King of the Belgians had been sounded, and until the United States Ambassador had received a reply from his Government. I am not therefore instructing His Majesty's Ministers at Prague or Warsaw to join in any communication, although I am of course quite prepared to do so if French Government so desire.<sup>3</sup>

As regards Polish suggestion that area under discussion should previously be limited by direct discussion between the two Governments chiefly interested, I cannot but feel that this will lead to delay and increased friction. Moreover it might place Czechs in a difficult position since the Bielitz district, which will apparently vote for Czecho-Slovakia, constitutes their best card in a bargain over the two central districts, and they will be unwilling to abandon this district at this stage in return only for the Frydek district which they regard as theirs anyhow.

Repeated to Prague No. 93 and Warsaw No. 253.

<sup>1</sup> No. 493.

<sup>2</sup> No. 492.

<sup>3</sup> In his telegram No. 688 of June 9 (not printed) Lord Derby replied that the French Government's instructions to their Minister at Warsaw were evidently given before the matter was discussed at the Conference of Ambassadors. He was asking the French and Italian representatives at the Conference not to take independent action in view of the fact that the Ambassadors' Conference had the matter in hand.

No. 499

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 9, 3 p.m.)*

*No. 685 Telegraphic [202711/186660/55]*

PARIS, June 9, 1920, 1 p.m.

Your telegram No. 650.<sup>1</sup>

I have already sounded Polish Peace Delegation on Teschen question and have come to the conclusion that Polish Government would certainly not accept Benes line and that it will be difficult even to get them to agree to arbitration. In the circumstances I do not think Conference of Ambassadors would be well advised to put forward Benes scheme as an alternative to arbitration in official note they are going to address to Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations. The former would probably take offence if they thought Conference were furthering a scheme which Benes has, I have little doubt, already communicated to them and which they have probably already rejected.

If, however, Benes really thinks Poles would now be ready to accept his scheme, there is no reason why he should not negotiate direct with them at the same time as Conference are putting forward proposal for arbitration.

<sup>1</sup> No. 494.

No. 500

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Clerk (Prague) and Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*

*No. 95<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic [202632/186660/55]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 9, 1920, 9 p.m.

My telegram to Lord Derby No. 659 (of June 8th.<sup>2</sup> Teschen Arbitration).

If your French colleague has received explicit instructions to present jointly with you proposal to Czech/Polish Governments, you are authorised to do so.

Repeated to Paris by bag.

<sup>1</sup> No. 95 to Prague, No. 259 to Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> No. 498.

No. 501

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 681 Telegraphic: by bag [202387/186660/55]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 11, 1920, 9 p.m.

Mr. Wilton's telegram No. 19 (of June 7th:<sup>1</sup> International Commission at Teschen).

<sup>1</sup> No. 495.

It is evident that Commission cannot be withdrawn until a settlement has been arrived at. At present sovereignty over Duchy is vested in the Allied Governments and exercised through the Commission. Commission would thus, in any case, have to remain until arbitral reward had been given and accepted and sovereignty transferred accordingly.

Repeated to Teschen No. 12.

### No. 502

*Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Earl Curzon (Received June 13, 11.20 a.m.)*

*No. 109 Telegraphic [203405/186660/55]*

PRAGUE, June 12, 1920, 8.15 p.m.

My telegram No. 106<sup>1</sup> and your telegram No. 95.<sup>2</sup> Teschen Arbitration. In view of fact that French and Italian Ministers had already made proposal to Czecho-Slovak Government and that Press published rumours that two Entente representatives had done so while the third had not, it was considered advisable to communicate suggestion to Czecho-Slovak Government and this was done verbally yesterday.

Reply was to be considered at Cabinet meeting yesterday evening but has not yet reached me.

Repeated to Paris and Warsaw.

<sup>1</sup> Of June 10. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> No. 500.

### No. 503

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 14)*

*No. 696 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 12, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (5) The Conference considered a telegram from the Teschen Commission asking for approval of the appointment of a special Military Court to deal with certain civil cases, against which the Poles had protested but which was rendered necessary by the partiality of the Polish and Czech local judges. It was decided to approve the proposal of the Commission.

The Conference also had before it the Commission's telegram of May 28th regarding the policing of the district (See Mr. Wilton's telegram No. 7 of that date),<sup>2</sup> but in view of the fact that an additional French battalion had since been sent, it was decided that no action was necessary. The proposed arbitration in the Teschen question was also referred to. It was stated that the French Ambassador had broached the matter at Brussels, and the Belgian Ambassador here had asked to be furnished with all relevant documents. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections reported discussion on other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 486.

No. 504

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 14, 3.35 p.m.)*

*No. 704 Telegraphic [203702/186660/55]*

PARIS, June 14, 1920, 12 noon

Sir George Clerk's telegram No. 109.<sup>1</sup>

I regret that there was a misunderstanding as to conclusion arrived at by Ambassadors' Conference with regard to plans of communicating with Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments on question of Teschen arbitration. I had distinctly understood all communications on subject were to be made to Polish and Czecho-Slovak Legations here and not through Allied representatives at Prague and Warsaw. My French and Italian Colleagues interpreted decision as implying that a preliminary communication was in addition to be made at Warsaw and Prague, and acted accordingly.

As French and Italian representatives have been instructed in this sense, it is evidently desirable that British representatives should associate themselves with their action. I regret however that this procedure has been adopted, as I consider communication premature in as much as we do not yet know whether United States Government and King of the Belgians approve of proposal.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 502.

<sup>2</sup> In his telegram No. 742 of June 19 Lord Derby reported the U.S. Government's approval. For the attitude of the U.S. Government to the Teschen problem see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. i, pp. 36-73.

No. 505

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 18)*

*No. 1857 [204466/196412/39]*

PARIS, June 15, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to H.M. Ambassador's telegram No. 544 of the 6th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to transmit herewith some notes on the situation in Danzig and the plebiscite areas written by Mr. Carr.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Carr went from Danzig to Warsaw in order to gather the views of officials of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Danzig question, and returned to Paris via Upper Silesia and Teschen.

Sir R. Tower's<sup>3</sup> report on the Danzig question<sup>1</sup> is already in the hands of the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE GRAHAME

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> A British representative at the Conference of Ambassadors. For the notes on Upper Silesia, see Volume XI, No. 18.

<sup>3</sup> League of Nations High Commissioner and Temporary Administrator of the Free City of Danzig.

*Extract from notes by Mr. E. H. Carr on a tour to Danzig, Warsaw and the Eastern Plebiscite Areas*

*June 12, 1920*

*Teschen (June 5-8)*

Of the far more difficult and interesting question of Teschen, however, where a plebiscite is being held between Czechs and Poles, it is worth while to say something.

Feeling between Czechs and Poles over Teschen has been growing progressively stronger since the Czech attack on the Poles there in January 1919. That attack, though Polish provocation can be alleged, was an act which cannot be defended, but since that date there has been little to choose between the conduct of the two sides. Probably only the presence throughout last year of an allied mission, and now of the plebiscite commission, have [*sic*] averted open hostilities. The approaching plebiscite, which has brought in from outside professional agitators, has aggravated rather than appeased the passions of the rival parties. The expulsion of Polish miners and workmen from Czech mines and factories, and the converse process, are so much a regular rule that only the rare exceptions excite comment. Many of the expelled find work among their kinsmen, the remainder form themselves into armed bands to act as highwaymen and prey on the community in general and the opposite side in particular. They are a nuisance rather than a serious menace, but they are a nuisance which in outlying districts the Commission with the limited forces at its disposal is powerless to dispel. The kidnapping of opponents by each party has been developed into a system; the victims of the Poles are placed in an internment camp near Cracow where some of the remnants of Denikin's armies are also interned: a similar institution for kidnapped Poles has been established by the Czechs on their side of the frontier. Exchanges of these prisoners take place from time to time under the auspices of the Commission. Occasionally one side or the other kidnaps an opponent of importance in whom they see a possible convert and whom they think it worth while to attempt to secure. The fortunate man is then feasted royally, treated during his internment as an honoured guest and ultimately released. One Polish mayor who had been subjected to this treatment was asked on his return whether he had any complaint to make against the Czechs, and replied with an emphatic negative. This naturally did not please the Polish party, who represented to him that, on patriotic grounds, he must make some protest. He thought it over for a week, and then came forward with a complaint that the Czechs had profited by his absence to seduce his wife. The allegation was however indignantly repudiated by the lady, and this particular atrocity has never been cleared up. The latest exploit of the Poles has been to kidnap two of the official motor-cars of the Czech Delegation which have been removed to a safe distance at Lemberg. The Czechs have apparently not yet thought of an appropriate counter-stroke. Indeed, in all the forms of propaganda now most favoured by the

two combatants in Teschen—from the placing of bombs in the houses of leading opponents, to the introduction into the rival delegations of lady secretaries whose function it is to appeal to the susceptibilities of the commissioners and their staffs—the Poles have in general taken the initiative, while the Czechs have been content with the rôle of apt, if tardy, imitators. In spite of occasional tragic incidents and a possible tragic conclusion, the situation in Teschen is pure farce and a salutary warning to any who may still be tempted to take the new nations of central and eastern Europe too seriously.

While the actual disorder prevailing in Teschen is probably in excess of that in Upper Silesia, the situation is far less disquieting. The inflammable passions of the former are in the long run of less moment than the deeper-seated hate of the latter. There is another point of even greater importance. The situation in Upper Silesia has been described. In Teschen the impartiality of the Commission, with the exception of one of the commissioners, who fortunately is of no account, and of certain subordinate members, cannot be called in question though it has been violently assailed from both camps. The French troops do their duty with complete correctness and efficiency, and if the Italian troops have occasionally shown undue tenderness or timidity in dealing with Poles, their partiality has not been too glaring. The result is that there is no hostility against either the troops or the commission on the part of the population as a whole, and though their impotence to repress disorders is only too often demonstrated,<sup>4</sup> there seems little danger of an organised attack on the authority of the Commission. Though therefore the conditions are not ideal there is no reason to doubt that the plebiscite can be carried out.

Everything points to a result more favourable to the Czechs than anything they can have dared to hope for at the outset. One of the commissioners told me that whereas three months ago he would confidently have prophesied that 85% of the population of Karwin, the principal mining centre, would vote Polish, he was now quite uncertain which side would have the majority there. It is the same throughout the Polish part of the district. Rightly or wrongly the Poles are generally regarded as the original instigators of most of the trouble which occurs, and as usual Polish propaganda methods have assisted no one so much as their opponents. The result is that all the neutrals and some of the Poles, including practically all the adherents of the 'independance' [*sic*] movement which has made some way here as in Upper Silesia, will probably vote Czech.

Whether the Poles will accept the issue which seems likely to be given to the plebiscite depends on the general position in Poland. They are at present by various devices making frantic and partially successful efforts to retard the vote, not so much because they think delay will improve their chances, as

<sup>4</sup> *Note in original*: 'A local wit, punning on the name of the president, M. de Manneville, has declared that the motto of the Commission is "Man will aber kann nicht". A third battalion (French) has just arrived; the Commission want a fourth but seem unlikely to get it.'

because they wish to be free from their eastern entanglements [*sic*] and ready for military action as soon as the result is declared. In the meantime war is freely discussed and preparations made on both sides. The French commissioner and I, driving a short distance across the frontier into Slovakia, discovered a system of trenches and barbed wire entanglements in course of construction, while Mr. Wilton a few weeks ago saw the Poles installing field telegraphs just across their border. Arbitration and compromise are in the air at the moment; but after the experiences of Paris last year it appears highly unlikely that they will succeed. The Allied powers having assumed responsibility for the settlement must carry through the plebiscite and fix the frontier on the result of it. Having done so they can only retire (not being prepared for an indefinite occupation) and 'après moi le déluge'. It would be absurd to take too tragically the formal or informal hostilities which, unless Poland has in the meantime received a crushing blow elsewhere, will almost certainly follow, or to pretend that it is a calamity of European importance. The western powers do not become involved in troubles of this kind unless they have other motives for becoming so, and at present they have none, or none that are adequate. Nor need the Allies blame themselves too seriously for the 'balkanisation' of this part of Europe. Though it is the indirect result of their victory and though for reasons both political and sentimental it has been fostered by them, it has sprung from causes far beyond their control and is a step, though for the moment it seems a retrograde one, in the progress towards a higher civilisation. But for this progress to become apparent we shall have to wait till one of the great powers<sup>5</sup> has recovered sufficient strength to put the central European house in order.

E. H. CARR

<sup>5</sup> A note here by Mr. Waterlow read: 'i.e. Germany. S. P. W.'

## No. 506

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [204291/186660/55]*

WARSAW, June 16, 1920

Your Excellency's telegram of June 14th<sup>2</sup> and Sir G. Clerk's telegram No. 110 to Foreign Office.<sup>3</sup>

As my French and Italian colleagues had already made a preliminary communication to Polish Government some time ago, I have informed Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs that I (? associate) myself with proposal that Teschen question should be settled by arbitration.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was addressed to Paris and was repeated to Prague, and as No. 409 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on June 17 at 11.50 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> No. 504.

<sup>3</sup> No. 110 has not been traced in Foreign Office archives. The reference may be to No. 502 above.



No. 507

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 25)*

*No. 751 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 23, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning at the Quai d'Orsay, Monsieur Cambon being in the Chair, and Count Vannutelli Rey replacing the Italian Ambassador, who was absent:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (2) M. Cambon reported that the King of the Belgians had received favourably the semi-official advances made to him in connection with the Teschen arbitration proposal. M. Cambon suggested that a formal proposal for arbitration should now be addressed to the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments. M. Laroche said that semi-official representations had already been made, but that it was now necessary that the Conference of Ambassadors should make a formal proposal in order that neither Government should appear in the eyes of its people responsible for making the advance. It was decided that M. Laroche should prepare a draft, to take the form of a reply to the protests against the plebiscite recently received from the two Delegations, and that this should be considered at the next meeting of the Conference to be held on the 25th instant. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted section(s) reported discussion on other matters.

No. 508

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 27)*

*No. 763 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 25, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning, M. Jules Cambon being in the Chair, and Count Vannutelli Rey again representing Italy:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (5) The Conference examined the draft note<sup>2</sup> prepared by M. Laroche on the subject of Teschen (See my telegram No. 751 of the 23rd instant, Section 2).<sup>3</sup> Several amendments were proposed by the United States Ambassador and myself. It was agreed that if either or both sides failed to accept arbitration it would be desirable to hold the plebiscite as soon as possible. The first section of the plebiscite is at present fixed for July 18th. It was contemplated that the date might be postponed to July 25th but the Italian representative felt it necessary to obtain the consent of his Government before definitely agreeing even to this limited postponement. A final text of the Note to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations was ultimately agreed on,

<sup>1</sup> The preceding four sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> No. 507.

copy of which will be forwarded by bag as soon as possible.<sup>4</sup> In the last paragraph of this Note the Conference informs the two Governments that if they have not received from both sides formal and unconditional acceptance of the arbitration proposal by July 15th, they will have no option but to proceed with the plebiscite as arranged within the following ten days. I have informed Mr. Wilton, Sir Geroge [*sic*] Clerk and Sir H. Rumbold.

<sup>4</sup> The copy was forwarded under cover of Lord Derby's formal despatch No. 2151 of July 6, not printed.

## No. 509

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge<sup>1</sup> (Received July 3)*

*No. 785 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, July 1, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning, M. Jules Cambon being in the Chair:—

. . .<sup>2</sup> 2. The Conference considered a Note received from the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, a copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 2070 of to-day's date, stating that the Czech Parliament had definitely rejected the proposal for arbitration in the Teschen question.<sup>3</sup> There was some talk of referring the matter to Brussels or Spa, as it was known that Messieurs Patek and Benes were both likely to be present, but the United States Ambassador pointed out that this question was governed by the decision of September 27th 1919 to which the United States were a party and that the United States would not be represented at Brussels or Spa. I pointed out that the decision of the Supreme Council of September 27th on which the Conference of Ambassadors were acting was to conduct a plebiscite, and that they had only suggested to the two parties arbitration by mutual consent on the understanding that if it fell through the plebiscite was the only alternative. It was now the duty of the Ambassadors' Conference to carry out that decision unless they were overruled.

It was decided to inform the Plebiscite Commission and the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments that the arbitration proposal had fallen through and that the plebiscite must therefore take its course, and at the same time to refer this resolution to the Supreme Council in case they might have any suggestions to make, it being understood that such suggestions could only become effective on receiving the concurrence of the United States Government. I have informed Mr. Wilton, Sir George Clerk and Sir H. Rumbold accordingly.

<sup>1</sup> Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> The first section reported discussion on another matter.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The Czecho-Slovak note stated that the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate had unanimously declared in favour of the carrying out of the plebiscite.

No. 510

*Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon (Spa)*

*No. 8 Telegraphic [207112/186660/55]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 3, 1920, 4 p.m.*

Lord Derby's telegram No. 785 (of July 1st.)<sup>1</sup> Section 2. Teschen.

I cannot but feel that in view of Czech and Polish opinion being out of hand Ambassadors' Conference would have done well either to impose a line or arbitration and thus to remove responsibility from the two Governments, since to proceed with plebiscite will probably have fatal results. We are now back where we were at the end of May. As however you may wish to raise matter again with Dr. Benes at Spa I shall take no action pending your return or instructions.

<sup>1</sup> No. 509.

No. 511

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received July 8)*

*No. 2184 [207929/186660/55]*

PARIS, *July 8, 1920*

My Lord,

I have received Your Lordship's despatch No. 2282 of the 5th instant enclosing a copy of a telegram to Lord Curzon at Spa on the question of Teschen.<sup>1</sup>

The decision of the Conference of Ambassadors to revert to the Plebiscite was foreshadowed in their letter of June 25th to the two parties (see my telegram No. 763 Section 5 of June 25th).<sup>2</sup> The United States Ambassador, whose views cannot on this occasion be ignored since his Government are parties to the decision of September 27th and have now sent a commissioner to Teschen,<sup>3</sup> was particularly insistent that the plebiscite should only be waived with the free consent of both parties, and the other Ambassadors also considered that the latter was the sole condition on which they were justified in departing from the decision of the Supreme Council. Monsieur de Manneville, President of the Commission, is now on his way to Paris. I do not know whether any decision will be taken at Spa, but if, as seems likely, none is reached, there will evidently be a further discussion of the question by the Conference of Ambassadors. In a matter of this importance, and particularly as whatever decision is taken is almost certain in the long run to lead to

<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office despatch No. 2282 to Paris enclosed a copy of No. 510.

<sup>2</sup> No. 508.

<sup>3</sup> On June 4 the U.S. Ambassador in Paris informed the President of the Peace Conference of the appointment of Mr. F. Dolbeare as U.S. representative on the Teschen International Commission.

war, I should be glad to have explicit instructions as to the views of His Majesty's Government. Otherwise I must endeavour as far as possible to fall in with those of my colleagues.

In soliciting instructions I venture however to lay before Your Lordship the following considerations:—

(a) The suggestion that the present tension and disorder in the district is the result of the plebiscite seems quite unfounded. Even a Pole or a Czech does not seriously believe that kidnapping and assassination of opponents wins votes for his side. Such acts are merely evidence of his standard of morality in general and his feelings towards his neighbour in particular and neither of these can be fairly attributed to the plebiscite. It will be within Your Lordship's recollection that from February to September last year, desultory fighting in Teschen between the parties was almost continuous and was only prevented from developing into regular warfare by the presence of an inter-allied Mission. In essentials, the position was much the same as it would be to-day if, as then, the allied mission were unsupported by troops.

(b) the solution of 'imposing' a line (whether drawn by the Supreme Council or by an independent arbitrator—the difference is not material) in favour of which it is now proposed to abandon the plebiscite, was itself abandoned by the Supreme Council in September last in favour of the plebiscite, and for exactly the same reason as is now alleged i.e. that one of the parties refused to accept it and would probably resist it by force of arms. There is some possibility that a resolution at the present moment to abandon the plebiscite in favour of another solution would produce a temporary lull, just as in September the decision to hold a plebiscite had a tranquillising effect for several months. But there is, I think, the certainty that as the moment for the ultimate fixing of the line approaches, the identical phenomena in evidence at the present moment will re-appear, perhaps in an aggravated form. In that case, is the Supreme Council again to bow down before the storm of threats and disorder? Is it to abandon the 'imposed line' solution to take refuge in another, only to see the same process repeated once more?

(c) It seems quite clear that no Czech Statesman would dare to put his signature to a settlement of the Teschen question acceptable to Poland, and *vice versa*, or that if he were rash enough to do so his signature would certainly not be honoured by his Government. This fact alone renders any real solution virtually impossible, and the conviction grows that, given the political mentality of the two parties, tranquillity will not be restored in Teschen till one side has evicted the other from the Duchy by force of arms. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers would however naturally refuse to put their signature to a settlement arrived at in this manner and, even if effective, it would therefore remain incomplete.

I have raised these points as illustrative of a few of the difficulties involved and in the hope that the Allied Governments will not rush into any new decision in the matter without some thought. If I have, in the Conference of Ambassadors, supported the view that the plebiscite should take its course, it has been from a conviction, not that it is a good solution, but that any

other is at least equally bad, and, above all, from a desire to spare the Allied Governments the humiliation of arriving at a fresh decision which they will be less able to carry out.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Lord Curzon at Spa and Mr. Wilton.

I am, &c.,

DERBY

## No. 512

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received July 17)*

*No. 814 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, July 15, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning, Monsieur Jules Cambon being in the Chair:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> 3. I brought up the decision which had been taken by the Supreme Council at Spa on July 11th on the subject of Teschen.<sup>2</sup> I proposed that—

(i) the matter should be referred to a special Committee who, in consultation with the Geographical Committee, should draw in detail the frontier outlined in the decision of the Supreme Council;

(ii) the Conference should summon the Polish and Czecho-Slovak delegates before them to state their case on the 19th instant and then give a decision as soon after that date as possible.

The United States Ambassador said that he had not yet received instructions from his Government, and that in provisionally accepting the above proposals he entirely reserved his future attitude. Both the proposals were then accepted. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Council had decided to suspend the plebiscite and itself to assume responsibility for the delimitation of the Czecho-Polish frontier in the disputed regions. It therefore instructed the Conference of Ambassadors to examine the question with full powers to reach a decision and to define the frontier. For the discussion at Spa see Volume VIII, No. 62, minute 3.

## No. 513

*Sir E. Crowe (Spa) to Lord Hardinge (Received July 17, 11.20 a.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [208513/186660/55]*

SPA, July 17, 1920, 12.7 a.m.

Following received today<sup>1</sup> from Paris.

Following for Sir E. Crowe from Nicolson.

I am experiencing difficulty in persuading French and Italians to interpret Spa resolution in the sense of Benes Line. I hope to secure adoption of that

<sup>1</sup> i.e. July 16.

line from Prstna to the south of Teschen town but cannot induce my colleagues to accept remainder of Benes line from south of Teschen to Slovakian frontier, since they interpret Spa resolution as indicating a frontier running parallel to, and a few kilometres from, railway. I do not propose to give way in committee but to present a minority report in which I shall support adoption of Benes line in this sector with such arguments as I can muster. It is possible however that Ambassadors will support French and Italian point of view and in that event Lord Derby proposes to suggest compromise by which line will follow Eastern Cadastral boundary of all townships through which railway passes. Effect of this will be to give Poles three townships within Benes line but not traversed by railway. Before suggesting this compromise, however, Lord Derby would wish to receive your views.

My own view is that Lord Derby's compromise will sufficiently cover the railway and that it is the northern and not the southern sector which is important.

Reply required by Monday morning<sup>2</sup> when final decision will be taken.

<sup>2</sup> July 19.

#### No. 514

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 18, 1.10 p.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [208514/186660/55]*

*Very urgent*

PARIS, July 17, 1920, 11.30 a.m.

Following for Sir Eyre Crowe from Nicholson [*sic*].

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup> At this evening's<sup>2</sup> meeting of Teschen Commission difficulties with French and Italians arose along whole line, not only on southern sector as I had anticipated. Dispute culminated in question of Teschen town, when examination of large maps showed impossibility of giving Czechs whole of railway without at the same time detaching from Teschen the suburb on west bank of Olsa. Benes' coloured map is quite inaccurate as regards railway junction and line actually runs through centre of suburb. French and Italians contended that this would be violating Spa stipulation that Teschen town should go to Poland and proposed that whole town including western suburb should be given to Poland, and Czechs merely given proprietary rights over this sector of railway.

Attitude of French and Italians was so uncompromising that I refused to continue the discussion and suggested that we should merely ask Ambassadors to allow us to adjourn till Tuesday when necessary information will have arrived from Spa. My real reason for this was that I am not sure whether Berthelot and Laroche actually accepted Benes line at Spa. If they did it will obviously be better to await their return. If they did not then perhaps you could speak to them and secure that they take our point of view if only about Teschen town.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably No. 513.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was drafted on July 16.

No. 515

*Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 800 Telegraphic [208511/186660/55]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 17, 1920, 7 p.m.

Nicolson's telegram to Sir E. Crowe repeated July 17th from Spa.<sup>1</sup>

Suggested compromise can be adopted, if unavoidable; but adoption of line originally proposed is preferable, as line following existing boundary is far more convenient than one dividing district arbitrarily.

<sup>1</sup> No. 513.

No. 516

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 801 Telegraphic [208514/186660/55]*

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 18, 1920, 4.35 p.m.

Following from Sir Eyre Crowe.

Your telegram No. 825<sup>1</sup> and your unnumbered telegram of July 17th<sup>2</sup> conveying message from Nicolson.

The map enclosed in our despatch of July 12th<sup>3</sup> is the one referred to in the resolution of the Supreme Council. It shows the concessions to Poland in Spitz and Orava which Czechs agreed to offer.

As regards town of Teschen, it was understood that there are two railway stations, of which the western one together with the main line running north and south would go to Czecho-Slovakia, whilst eastern station would become Polish. It was believed, and seemed clear from the only map available that if frontier passed between the two stations, cutting the line which runs from the town eastwards, it would leave the north and south line together with western station in hands of Czecho-Slovaks. If this be not so, guiding consideration should be that the through line should fall to Czechs. This is essential part of the resolution. It was not intended that the line as laid down in the resolution should be departed from. A more detailed description of it was contained in the note from M. Benes which we sent to you.<sup>4</sup> It was only because that description was too long that a shorter and therefore more general indication of the line was annexed to the resolution. It should be borne in mind that the handing over of town of Teschen to Poles was the special and principal concession offered by Benes as price of settlement. It is therefore only just that his view of what is involved in the concession should be taken. I certainly understood that Laroche and Berthelot agreed definitely to adoption of Benes line. If therefore there is any doubt as to what was intended on a particular point, it would be well to consult Benes or his representative.

We are telegraphing to Washington.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Of July 17, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> No. 514.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> As enclosure in Foreign Office despatch No. 2451 of July 12, not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. No. 520, n. 2.

No. 517

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 21)*

*No. 831 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, July 19, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning, M. J. Cambon being in the Chair.

1. The object of the meeting was to hear M. Benes and M. Patek on the Teschen question. The latter however had asked for an adjournment until Wednesday<sup>1</sup> in order to have the assistance of Polish experts on the Teschen question who were to arrive to-night. It was decided to hear M. Benes today and the Polish case tomorrow. M. Patek stated that M. Paderewski<sup>2</sup> might be present to present the Polish case. The Conference then heard M. Benes who formally asked for the line accepted by the joint Polish-Czecho-Slovak Commission in April 1919<sup>3</sup> for Teschen, the whole of Spisz, while he indicated the possibility of small concessions in Orava. He also presented various proposals relating to coal, option, amnesty, etc. It was decided to request the jurists to begin at once to prepare a Treaty to embody the main principles of the settlement, in the hope that it may thus even be possible to sign this week.

I have had semi-official assurances from M. Laroche and the Italian delegation that they will support the Benes line as decided by the Supreme Council at Spa and M. Benes' demand for the April 1919 line is of course not to be taken seriously. The U.S. Ambassador still awaits instructions. . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> July 21.    <sup>2</sup> Former Polish Prime Minister.    <sup>3</sup> See map in Volume I facing p. 618.

<sup>4</sup> The remaining section related to another matter.

No. 518

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 21)*

*No. 833<sup>1</sup> Telegraphic: by bag [208967/186660/55]*

PARIS, July 20, 1920

3. The Conference then heard Monsieur Paderewski on the question of Teschen. He claimed for Poland the whole of Orava and in the Spisz region the line of the Poprad, i.e. the whole of the area which was to be submitted to plebiscite and considerable extension towards the south and east. He claimed that the Duchy of Teschen is fundamentally Polish, and proposed a line which would give to Poland Oderberg and Karwin and the whole of the railway except a small section of the line between Oderberg and Karwin where the existing line would be left to the Czechs, and the Poles would have

<sup>1</sup> This telegram does not appear on the General file 199. The extract here printed from Lord Derby's report of the proceedings of the Ambassador's Conference on July 20 therefore bears the number of its particular file.



to build another for themselves. In return for this Poland would be willing to cede to Czecho-Slovakia a certain proportion of the coal of the district. This was the maximum concession which Poland was prepared to offer.

Monsieur Cambon in closing, emphasised, as he had done yesterday to Monsieur Benes, the necessity of acceptance by both parties of whatever decision might be come to by the Conference. In reply to a question, Monsieur Paderewski said that he agreed with this understanding.

The Conference is to meet again to-morrow to reach a final decision on the question and may then have a draft Treaty before it.

## No. 519

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 23)*

*No. 837 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, July 21, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning, Monsieur J. Cambon being in the Chair:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (2) The Conference then examined the frontier lines for Teschen, Spisz and Orava prepared by the special Committee. Copies of the geographical description of these lines are being forwarded in my despatch No. 2322 of to-day's date.<sup>2</sup> It will be observed that they are exactly in accordance with the frontiers drawn up by Sir E. Crowe with Dr. Benes at Spa.

The Italian Ambassador thought that the proposed frontier deviated too far from the railway in the southern part to the advantage of the Czechs, but M. Laroche explained that the line had been drawn where it was in order to meet geographical conditions, and the Italian Ambassador ultimately gave way. The lines were then adopted.

It was proposed to embody these lines in a declaration to be signed by the members of the Conference of Ambassadors and by the Czechs and the Poles, in which provisions should also be included to regulate:

(a) the supply of coal to Poland:

(b) the supply of coal to Powers, who received coal from this district in 1913:

(c) railway facilities for the Poles:

(d) the protection of mining property.

The Italian Ambassador reserved his opinion on the proposal put forward on point (d) but promised to communicate his decision this evening. Subject to this, the proposals were accepted.

It was decided to inform the Commission at Teschen confidentially of these decisions and to ask them to make the necessary arrangements to facilitate the handing over to the Poles and the Czechs respectively of the

<sup>1</sup> The first section reported discussion on another matter.  
<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Except for minor verbal differences the description is the same as that in the Teschen Declaration; see No. 528, n. 2.

territories allotted to them and for the evacuation of the Allied troops and the Commission as soon as possible.

The United States Ambassador was still without instructions and therefore gave no opinion on any of the above questions. He asked what the position would be, and my colleagues and I all came to the conclusion that in the last resort it would be necessary, in order to avoid very grave risks of bloodshed, to carry out our decisions even if the United States do not give their concurrence. It was agreed however, that the terms of the declaration should not be communicated to the Czech and Polish Delegates until Friday night,<sup>3</sup> for signature on Saturday morning, in order to give the longest possible time for a telegram to be received from Washington.

<sup>3</sup> i.e. July 23.

### No. 520

*Sir A. Geddes (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received July 23, 7 p.m.)*

*No. 544 Telegraphic [209242/186660/55]*

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1920<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 601.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of two interviews with Secretary of State on this matter I have been unable to persuade United States Government to issue instructions through their Ambassador in Paris to agree unreservedly to proposals of the Allies at Spa. Instructions which Mr. Wallace has received are to agree to them only provisionally unless both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia express themselves as unreservedly accepting them.

Mr. Colby informed me privately that the President was adamant on this point as he regarded any departure from self-determination as violating the principles by which peace of Europe was to be re-established.

<sup>1</sup> The time of despatch is not recorded.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This telegram of July 18 urged Sir A. Geddes to do his utmost to secure the despatch of instructions to the U.S. Ambassador in Paris regarding the settlement of Teschen.

### No. 521

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 23, 2 p.m.)*

*No. 850 Telegraphic [209185/186660/55]*

PARIS, July 23, 1920, 11.30 a.m.

United States Ambassador has now received his instructions with regard to Teschen.

Substance was privately communicated to me yesterday and is briefly as follows:

American reply while not disapproving of our line considers that to impose it upon both parties in this rapid way is an unjust form of procedure. They propose therefore that a Mixed Commission should examine in detail and report by September 15th.<sup>1</sup>

I had a private conversation with United States Ambassador last night and he added following detail that Commission shall consist of three Commissioners, British, French and American.

The Italian and Japanese to be excluded.

He begged me to keep an open mind on proposal which comes up this morning but I told him I could not possibly accept it and must adhere to decision arrived at being communicated immediately, to immediately interested countries.

The only doubt I have in mind is that D'Abernon<sup>2</sup> yesterday was anxious if possible result should not be made public sooner than necessary as he feared that decision which certainly cannot be called favourable to Poland might precipitate revolution in that country. I shall today oppose American proposal but suggest Boundary Commission shall be appointed to deal with question, it being clearly understood that general line is not to be deviated from, but that in respect to two or three communes east of railway in extreme south about which there was a difference of opinion in Ambassadors' Conference they shall have liberty to express their opinion as to whether for geographical or economic reasons they should be given to Poland or Czecho-Slovakia. That may meet American objection and at the same time offer some hope to Poles—though very unlikely to be realized—of slight alteration.

Please wire me immediately any instructions you may have.

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the U.S. note of July 23 proposing the appointment of a Mixed Commission see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. i, pp. 53-54.

<sup>2</sup> Lord D'Abernon, H.M. Ambassador at Berlin, was in Paris on his way to Warsaw (see Volume XI, No. 338).

## No. 522

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 818 Telegraphic [209185/186660/55]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 23, 1920, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 850 of to-day<sup>1</sup>—Teschén.

American reply shows complete failure to understand the actual situation. The essence of the agreement arrived at between Czechs and Poles at Spa was that in the interest of both countries a decision as to the frontier must be made with the least possible delay. It is the continuance of the present uncertainty to which both parties attributed the growing danger of local unrest. For this reason the Supreme Council was implored to cut the gordian knot and 'impose' a final decision.

I shall really despair if the Americans, by again reverting to their former tactics of delays and hesitation, once more succeed in frustrating a settlement,

<sup>1</sup> No. 521.

as they have done on former occasion. Nor can I understand by what right or reason United States can justify a demand that Italy shall be excluded from voice in final decision. Italy has taken her full share in burden of controlling plebiscitary areas, whilst United States have refused all co-operation.

Lord D'Abernon's fear of Teschen decision producing a revolution in Poland does not appear to have sufficient weight to stand against overwhelming advantage of getting this controversy settled once and for all now.

I gather from your telegram that United States Government do not disapprove of the proposed line on its merits. I beg you to use all your powers of persuasion to obtain their definite assent to immediate settlement.

### No. 523

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 24)*

*No. 855 Telegraphic: by bag [209333/186660/55]*

PARIS, July 23, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning, M. Jules Cambon being in the Chair:—

The meeting was entirely devoted to the Teschen question. The United States Ambassador read the telegram of which I have already sent the substance in my telegram No. 850 of today's date.<sup>1</sup> The Italian Ambassador protested against the exclusion of Italy from the proposed Commission to study the frontier and the Japanese Ambassador against that of Japan. The United States Ambassador stated that he thought they would both be welcome if they wanted to come in. I pointed out that the United States Government appeared to have based their telegram on the quite mistaken supposition that the decision had been imposed on the two interested parties and accepted by them with reluctance.

The discussion which followed led to the discovery of a remarkable discrepancy between the English and French text[s] of the telegram sent from Spa to Washington. The English text<sup>2</sup> states that 'the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian delegates have intimated to the representatives of the four Governments that the only means . . .'.<sup>3</sup> The French text reverses this sentence and makes it appear that 'the representatives of the principal Allied Governments have intimated to the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian delegates that . . .'.<sup>3</sup> The result is that in the French text, which was probably the one communicated to the State Department, the four Governments appear as having taken the initiative. Somewhat the same impression is given by the declaration of July 10th itself.<sup>4</sup>

A very long and complicated discussion followed as the result of which it was resolved that a letter should be written by Monsieur Cambon<sup>5</sup> to the United States Ambassador explaining that the initiative at Spa had come from

<sup>1</sup> No. 521. See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. i, pp. 51-52.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Punctuation as in the original.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume VIII, appendix 3 to No. 62.

<sup>5</sup> See *Papers relating to the*

*Foreign Relations of the United States 1920*, vol. cit., pp. 57-59.

the Czecho-Slovakian and Polish representatives and that it was they who desired the imposed solution which they had agreed to accept, both by signed declaration and by their verbal assurances before the Conference of Ambassadors. The United States Ambassador would communicate the text of this letter to his Government and press them to modify their decision and to bring it into accord with that of the Ambassadors' Conference. Mr. Wallace was to ask for a reply by Tuesday the 27th at the latest, failing which the Conference would be compelled to take a decision by a majority without awaiting the concurrence of the United States Government.

No. 524

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 30)*

*No. 878 Telegraphic: by bag [209989/186660/55]*

PARIS, July 27, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon met this afternoon to resume discussion of the Teschen question (see my telegram No. 875 of today's date).<sup>1</sup>

On instructions from his Government, the United States Ambassador presented several observations:—

*Article 2.*<sup>2</sup> He asked that four weeks instead of fifteen days should be allowed for the constitution of the Delimitation Commission in order that time might be allowed for an American representative to arrive. This was agreed to, as was also a proposal that the Delimitation Commission should have powers to suggest modifications in the frontier laid down where these were rendered desirable by local considerations in the interests of either individuals or communities.

*Article 7.* On the proposal of the United States Ambassador it was decided to add a clause to the effect that the provisions regarding coal would be liable to modification after the status of Upper Silesia was determined, when the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would re-examine the matter in the light of new conditions. The United States Ambassador objected to the proposal that Poland should be bound to furnish naphtha in exchange, maintaining that as this did not come from Teschen it had nothing to do with the present agreement. After some discussion the words 'in payment' were substituted for 'in exchange' and the words 'as far as possible' added, as it was pointed out that if Poland lost Eastern Galicia she might in fact not be in a position to supply the naphtha, however anxious she might be to do so.

In the same article it was decided to substitute the Reparations Commission for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as the body authorised to demand, for a period of five years, the supply of coal to countries which had drawn coal from the area in 1913. Monsieur Laroche stated that Monsieur Benes objected to this whole proposal at least in its present form, but this objection was overruled.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. of the draft Teschen Declaration.

*Article 9.* The United States Ambassador proposed that the League of Nations should be substituted for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This was rejected.

In conclusion the United States Ambassador read a statement on behalf of his Government, protesting against the hurried way in which this question had been dealt with. He said that he would be unable to sign the declaration tomorrow without formal instructions from his Government, but that he had little doubt he would be authorised to do so in the course of the next few days. It was therefore decided to leave the declaration open for signature. The remaining signatures will be appended tomorrow.

#### No. 525

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29, 10.10 p.m.)*

*No. 601 Telegraphic [209970/186660/55]*

WARSAW, July 28, 1920, 6.48 p.m.

Your telegram 818 to Paris.<sup>1</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs has received information pointing to fact that Czechs have been awarded all the coal districts in Teschen plebiscite area. He has been trying to keep this information quiet in order that resentment which will be aroused here may not prejudicially affect special Anglo-French Mission. But news is leaking out and although I do not agree that decision will produce a revolution in Poland, it will greatly increase already prevailing depression and demoralization here.

<sup>1</sup> No. 522.

#### No. 526

*Sir A. Geddes (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received August 1, 5.15 p.m.)*

*No. 563 Telegraphic [210199/186660/55]*

*Very secret*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1920<sup>1</sup>

Your telegrams 627, 631 and 632.<sup>2</sup>

On the subject of Teschen I have been in close touch with Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State and have discovered a state of affairs which is surprising.

State Department, without, I am sure, Mr. Colby's knowledge, sent instructions to United States Ambassador at Paris which were in effect that difficulties were to be raised because America had not been consulted and that he was not to agree to anything sent in a 'take it or leave it' way (? to) Council of Ambassadors.

<sup>1</sup> The time of despatch is not recorded.

<sup>2</sup> These telegrams were copies to Washington from the Foreign Office of Nos. 523, 522, and 521 above.

It appears probable that these instructions emanated in fact from Mr. Hugh Gibson, United States Ambassador to Poland, who is temporarily on the Staff of State Department. I have no doubt they were designed to annoy French.

There is no question of their authenticity.

I protested most vigorously and have reason to know immediate results have been obtained.

Mr. Colby was dumbfounded when he read in my presence what had been sent and I had not left State Department as much as half an hour before Mr. Norman Davis<sup>3</sup> was on the telephone explaining away instructions which had been issued.

Mr. Davis at that time asked me to send a message immediately to you and ventured to suggest its terms. For text see my telegram immediately following.<sup>4</sup> It is obviously designed to save the face of State Department but I think fairly represents position which now exists.

<sup>3</sup> Under-Secretary of State.

<sup>4</sup> No. 527.

### No. 527

*Sir A. Geddes (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received July 30, 9.30 a.m.)*

*No. 564 Telegraphic [209969/186660/55]*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1920<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 632.<sup>2</sup>

Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State assured me that United States Ambassador in Paris completely misunderstood his instructions of 22nd. Further instructions were sent to Mr. Wallace on 26th. A further telegram goes to him to-day.

United States Government now agree to proposed boundary and are prepared to (. . .)<sup>3</sup> its imposition on Poland and Czecho-Slovakia provided that details of line are fixed by a Commission.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The time of despatch is not recorded.

<sup>2</sup> No. 521: see No. 526, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> In Paris telegram No. 926 of August 5 Lord Derby reported that M. Cambon had approved a unanimous resolution of the Geographical Committee for the constitution of the Boundary Commission. This was to consist of the members of the Commission which was engaged in delimiting the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Upper Silesia. The Commission duly set to work, but, as Lord Derby reported in Paris telegram No. 1267 of October 30, 1920, experienced obstruction from the Polish delegate. The Conference of Ambassadors therefore decided to authorize the Commission to proceed with the delimitation of the Teschen boundary, as far as the frontier laid down followed administrative boundaries, if necessary without the co-operation of the Polish delegate. On January 7, 1921, Lord Hardinge, in Paris telegram No. 12, reported that the Commission had asked for authority to negotiate a new line as a compromise between the Polish and Czecho-Slovak proposals. The Conference of Ambassadors felt, however, that this would risk reopening the whole question and they therefore decided 'to instruct the Boundary Commission to adhere to the line as laid down in the Agreement of the 28th July'.

Mr. Norman Davis assures me that his conception of Commission is to place frontier posts and to see frontier does not unnecessarily cut through a house or a farm. Further both Mr. Colby and Mr. Norman Davis express themselves [*sic*] as believing that their instructions to Mr. Wallace now clear away all difficulties. They say that they have no objection either to Italian or Japanese representation on Commission.

**No. 528**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 30)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 881 Telegraphic: by bag [209923/186660/55]*

PARIS, July 28, 1920

The Teschen Declaration<sup>2</sup> was signed to-day by Czecho-Slovakia and Four Powers. It has been left open for United States Ambassador who hopes to receive instructions authorizing him to sign within next few days.<sup>3</sup> M. Paderewski will sign for Poland on Friday.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This telegram appears also to have been sent by telephone to the Foreign Office on July 29.

<sup>2</sup> For the text see *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series C, Acts and Documents relating to Judgments and Advisory Opinions given by the Court*, No. 4, Fourth Session (Leyden, 1924), pp. 128-36.

<sup>3</sup> In his telegram No. 1154 of October 7 (not printed) Lord Derby reported that the American Ambassador had announced at that morning's meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors that his Government now approved the text of the Teschen Agreement and that 'although the time had not come for the United States to sign the Agreement', they wished to be represented unofficially on the commission appointed to delimit the boundary under the Agreement.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. July 30.

**No. 529**

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received August 17)*

*No. 513 [211888/186660/55]*

WARSAW, August 6, 1920

My Lord,

A Delegation of Polish miners from Teschen, Silesia, came to this Legation this morning and was received by Sir Percy Loraine. They left a Memorandum protesting against the incorporation in Czecho-Slovakia of the region of which they are natives, and their spokesman made an impassioned appeal for the assistance of Great Britain in remedying the grave injustice towards the Polish population cut off from their mother country in view of the recent territorial award of the Allied Powers in regard to the Duchy of Teschen, and in enabling them to return to their homes with proper guarantees against maltreatment and persecution by the Czech bands whose violence had compelled them to become refugees.



Sir Percy Loraine related briefly the history of the Teschen dispute with especial reference to the untiring patience with which the Allied Powers had sought by every kind of means to settle it to the satisfaction and in the best interests of the parties concerned, and reminded the Delegation that the Polish Government, no less than the Czecho-Slovak Government, had ultimately left the final decision in the Allies' hands. He also pointed out that this Legation had no *locus standi* in the matter which, internationally, was conducted by the Conference in Paris, and by its instrument, the Plebiscite Commission at Teschen; whereas the proper recourse for anyone claiming Polish nationality and desirous of belonging to the Polish State was to the Polish Government. In conclusion Sir Percy Loraine undertook to submit the Memorandum to me in order that it might, if I thought fit, be brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government.

I am forwarding a copy of this Despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Prague and to Mr. Wilton.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

No. 530

*Mr. Wilton (Teschen) to Earl Curzon (Received August 19)*

No. 58 [212108/186660/55]

*Confidential*

TESCHEN, August 10, 1920

My Lord,

The decision of the Council of Ambassadors as to the division of the Duchy of Teschen and Spisz and Orawa on July 28th was received with very mixed feelings by the inhabitants.

The Czechs were gratified with the decision, although the Czechophil Slonzak party, led by Mr Koždon, was bitterly disappointed at having been thrown to the Poles. Reference was made to this party in my despatches No. 24 of April 24th<sup>1</sup> and No. 44 of June 14th.<sup>2</sup>

The Poles were greatly depressed but received the news on the whole with passive bitterness. The notorious Rada Narodowa has addressed a protest to President Wilson, but its members and other of the political agitators are at present entirely discredited with the Polish population, and none of them dare appear within the precincts of Karwin or Freistadt. If they do venture there later, it will be under the protection of the hated Czechs. The agricultural classes received the news with indifference. It was expected, however, that the Polish miners would actively resent the cession of Karwin to Czecho-Slovakia; on the contrary, they have remained quietly at work and have not yet recovered from their depression at the complete failure of the political strike organised in May and June, to which reference was made in my despatch Confidential No. 51 of July 10th.<sup>2</sup> There exists indeed a set

<sup>1</sup> See No. 478, n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

of irreconcilable Poles, including priests and professional agitators, who would foment agitation against the decision if they dared. Generally speaking, however, the whole of the Polish-speaking population handed over to Czecho-Slovakia has shewn little if any feeling of resentment and appears indeed to be relieved at having been severed from connection with distressful Poland and annexed to a country which, whatever its drawbacks may be, has at least a stronger Government and a more stable currency: the enhanced value of the Czech crown, as compared with the Polish mark, has played a most important part in reconciling the Silesian Poles to Czech rule.

The German population, realising the futility of their demands for autonomy, had turned their eyes towards the West, where so important a proportion of the inhabitants is of their race and blood, and there has been a feeling of keen disappointment among those in the Eastern part of the Duchy that they have now come under Polish rule: not a few of the latter have already made arrangements to migrate westwards. At Teschen itself, the German population did not conceal its dismay at being divided, and in this they are entitled to a measure of sympathy. The town and its industries have been built up and sustained by German enterprise alone, but the dividing line necessarily separates the reservoir from the waterworks, and the schools and hospitals from the gasworks. The Germans too have within the past three months openly manifested their preference for union with Czecho-Slovakia, and those of them still residing in the Polish quarter of the town are uneasy lest they should be called to account for their former partisanship.

The division of Spisz and Orawa was duly carried out on August 7th.

As regards the Duchy of Teschen, the operations were conducted in two stages, the first on the 6th and the final today, and everything has passed off quietly. The misfortunes of Poland have contributed very largely to this result and have prevented the troublesome local Polish element from receiving support and encouragement, while at the same time they have tended to alienate the Silesian Poles, whose patriotic attachment to Poland is by no means universally deep-rooted.

There is a marked disposition on the part of the principal Czech officials within the newly-annexed area to meet the Poles half way and to wipe out old scores, and I have little doubt this is an inspiration from the Foreign Office at Prague. A few, a very few, of the Polish functionaries appear to be animated by the same desire but, generally speaking, the Poles from across the Silesian border are maintaining a sullen appearance of reserve, beneath which is smouldering a feeling of bitter hatred and a hope for better times and revenge for a decision which they believe is unjust to them and has been obtained unfairly.

An incident which happened yesterday affords an indication of the intense feeling of rancour entertained by the more chauvinistic element among the Poles. The mayor of the town of Shibitz on the outskirts of Teschen was suddenly arrested by Polish gendarmes on a trumped-up charge and placed in a train for Poland. Shibitz is in the area handed over to the Czechs today and the mayor is a Czechophil Silesian. Fortunately information was given

in good time to the International Commission and the mayor was at once set free. There is little doubt that if he had been carried off, the outrage would have provoked the Czechs to a demonstration which might have had serious results as there are five Czech regiments in the area and a similar number of Polish troops.

It is current among these Poles that the decision was largely influenced by the fact that the Creusot company had taken over the Trzynietz iron-works and acquired the valuable group of mines belonging to the Austrian Berg und Hütte Company of Vienna. It is also pretended that the Council was guided by the advice of Count Larisch, a well-known mining magnate of Karwin, who, it is said, gave evidence during the recent consultations at Paris. Count Larisch was not at Paris, and the confusion as to his participation in the deliberations of the Council appears to be attributable to a recent utterance of Mr Beneš referring to the 'Laroche line' submitted to the Supreme Council in April of last year and at that time acceptable to the Czechs.

The causes of the ill-feeling between Czechs and Poles over the Silesian question have been referred to in my previous despatches and there is no need to recapitulate them here. Unfortunately the Plebiscite, compounded as it is no doubt of ideal ingredients, did not prove to be a salve but rather an irritant for the smarts on both sides, and it cannot be denied that a feeling of relief was experienced, not only in Eastern Silesia but also in responsible circles in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland once the idea of a Plebiscite had been definitely abandoned.

The behaviour of the Polish and Czech Delegations has played an important role in the conduct of affairs at Teschen during the past six months. In my despatch No. 34 of May 17th<sup>3</sup> I reported my opinion of the Czech Delegate, Dr Matouš, and I have had no occasion since to alter it. The Polish Government have been unfortunate in the choice of their three successive delegates. Mr Zamorski's attitude was defined by his public declarations on his return from a visit to Warsaw in February last that no war would be more popular in Poland than one with Czecho-Slovakia. This declaration has dwelt in the memories of the Czechs and has undoubtedly done a great deal of harm in inflaming the feelings of both Poles and Czechs towards one another. His successor, General Latinik, pursued a totally irrational line of action. In my despatch No. 32 of May 15th<sup>4</sup> reference was made to the secret organisation P. O. W., and I expressed my hesitation to believe in General Latinik's complicity. Yesterday I learned from a Polish source which, in my opinion and in that of my French colleague, is unimpeachable that General Latinik was not only cognisant of the workings of this organisation within the Plebiscite Area, but was also secretly engaged in promoting its activities. The appointment of Dr Bochenski was also singularly maladroit. He is known as a fanatical hater of the Czechs and in his legal capacity as Polish judge at Teschen he has thwarted the International Commission in the administration of justice against Polish agitators, and the repression of acts of violence against Polish terrorists.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> No. 482.

It would appear that the evident desire of the Czech Government is to endeavour to make friends with Poland, but the present attitude of the latter in these parts is unfriendly. There may very likely be no serious friction between the two parties yet awhile, as the one has weighty problems demanding immediate attention and the other is fighting for her existence. I fear, however, that the Eastern Silesian question will remain a constant source of irritation between the two neighbours, nor is this likely to be lessened if both continue their present selfish policy of building up walls to shut out one another's merchandise and impede free intercourse on either side.<sup>5</sup>

I have, &c.,

E. C. WILTON

<sup>5</sup> A letter was sent on September 29 to Mr. Wilton expressing the Secretary of State's high appreciation of the judgment and impartiality manifested by him while serving on the Plebiscite Commission in Teschen.

## CHAPTER VIII

# The Plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder January 21–September 29, 1920

No. 531

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 22, 1.30 p.m.)*

*No. 78 Telegraphic [172673/133744/39]*

PARIS, January 21, 1920, 8.35 p.m.

It has been decided by His Majesty's Government that apart from the battalion sent to Schleswig only two British battalions could be received for plebiscite and other areas in Germany to be occupied as result of coming into force of treaty, one of which should be sent to Dantzig and one to Allenstein but that no British troops should go to other plebiscite areas or to Memel. British ships will however furnish such support as may be possible at Dantzig and Memel. French military authorities are examining how far they may be able to make up deficiency caused by our failure to send promised numbers of troops but definite information as to their intentions has not yet been received. They anticipate being able to send at least two extra battalions.<sup>1</sup>

Italian Government were appealed to to assist in making up deficiency. M. Nitti stated however that he was doubtful not merely whether any additional troops could be furnished by Italy but even whether Italy could supply as many battalions as she had originally promised. Railway strike in Italy was quoted as a reason why it might be necessary to retain these troops in Italy for the present. They were unable to promise a definite statement before Friday<sup>2</sup> and number of Italian troops which will be sent remains therefore quite uncertain.

War Office will be able to furnish further particulars.

Please inform Colonel Percival<sup>3</sup> and any other commissioners affected who may be in London.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Volume II, No. 79 for the discussions of the Allied Representatives in Paris on this subject of troops for the plebiscite areas; also Cmd. No. 1325 of 1921, Nos. 11, 13, 15, 18, and 28 for correspondence on the same subject between M. Clemenceau and Baron von Lersner.

<sup>2</sup> January 23.

<sup>3</sup> Col. H. F. P. Percival was British representative on the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission in Upper Silesia.

*Mr. Rennie<sup>1</sup> (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received February 27)*

*No. 1 [181546/100450/39]*

*Confidential*

ALLENSTEIN, February 18, 1920

My Lord,

I have already forwarded to your Lordship copies of the reports<sup>2</sup> I have addressed to the President of the Peace Conference in Paris announcing the departure of the Inter-Allied Commission of administration and plebescite [*sic*] for Allenstein, and the taking over of the administration. A full list of the Members of the Commission and their staffs is enclosed herewith.<sup>3</sup>

M. Couget, the French Commissioner, is a diplomatist *de carrière*. His last post was that of Minister in Mexico. I had known him previously in Teheran and Vienna, and we had always been on friendly terms. Marquis Fracassi, the Italian Minister was for a short time in the diplomatic service, and is now a Member of the Italian Senate. Mr. Marumo, the Japanese Minister was at Petrograd at the outbreak of the Revolution, and afterwards with the Allied Missions to Vologda and Archangel. He speaks French fluently, but has no other knowledge of European languages. I am glad to say that the relations between the Commissioners, both during our meetings in Paris, and subsequently have been of a very friendly description. A certain amount of discussion naturally took place over the distribution of the Staff in the various offices, but with the assistance of my French colleague, I eventually managed to persuade the other two Commissioners that our Administrative service should be comprised in three departments: Interior, Communications and Finance, and I secured the appointment of British 1st class officials to the two former Departments, which are those which will probably have the most frequent dealings with the German officials.

A certain amount of preliminary work was carried out in Paris during the week previous to our departure. The chiefs of the various Departments proposed to the Commission the lines on which they intended to run their branches, and the distribution of the junior officials under them.

The journey, arrival and reception of the Commission here has already been reported.<sup>2</sup> We are now settling down to work in the large and commodious Government Buildings which were completed only a couple of years before the War, and consist of four storeys. The German officials cleared the first floor of this building for our use, the remaining three floors being occupied by the various branches which form the local administration. These offices were placed at our disposal the day of our arrival.

The following day the Regierungspräsident, who had already signified his readiness to leave immediately, offered to give us a short account of the

<sup>1</sup> President of and British Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Administrative and Plebiscite Commission for Allenstein.

<sup>2</sup> Allenstein Commission Nos. 1 and 2 of February 2 and 12 to the President of the Peace Conference, not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

functions of the administration of the District. To this we agreed, and Herr von Oppen described, at considerable length, its general working. It was understood at the time, and was formally published in the Proclamation,<sup>4</sup> that the Commission intended to allow that the Administration should work on the same lines as heretofore, and continue to employ the present functionaries, with the exception only of Herr von Oppen himself, and their task should be, for the present, limited to the control and supervision of the various Departments. Herr von Oppen had already given us the assurance that the present officials would continue to serve the Commission faithfully, and a form to this effect is being signed by the responsible Heads of Departments and by the local Landräthe.

The German Government have appointed as delegate, to be attached to the Commission under the terms of the Protocol,<sup>5</sup> Baron von Gayl, formerly in the Service of the Interior, and lately of the Colonization Committee. He, as well as Dr. Höhnen, who now acts as head of the administration under the Commission, report each morning to the Commissioners regarding current affairs. This system, together with the presence of the officials of the Commission in the various Departments, seems to be the one best calculated to ensure the desired control, together with the uninterrupted working of the administrative machine. The attitude of both of these German Officials has, so far, been satisfactory. It would seem that the German functionaries realize that it is in the interests of the District and themselves that existing conditions should be disturbed as little as possible.

According to the terms of the Protocol of January 9th,<sup>5</sup> it has been established that all orders for payment of salaries for German Officials must bear the visa of the Commission, and also that executive communications of a financial character, as laid down under Heading D, must for purposes of control bear a similar visa.

The various District Commissioners have proceeded to their posts with general instructions that their functions are to control and supervise the local Landrat.

The local police in the shape of Sicherheitspolizei and the Grenzschantz [*sic*] are being, for the present, retained. They are under the control and supervision of Lieut. Col. Bennett and Major David-Deevis. The former force numbering some three thousand men are well armed and equipped, and are stationed in the various towns of the District. They were organised last year during the Revolution, when serious trouble of a Spartacist nature was threatened. They appear to be a well-controlled body of men; Colonel Bennett considers them reliable. As the force of occupation consists of only one weak newly-formed British Battalion their continuance appears to be necessary, as there is no other body of men capable of effectively maintaining order.

<sup>4</sup> i.e. the proclamation of the Inter-Allied Administrative and Plebiscite Commission of February 14 on taking over the administration of the area. For the text see S. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War* (Washington, 1933), vol. ii, pp. 57-58.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. the so-called Le Rond-von Simson agreement, the text of which is printed *ibid.*, pp. 50-57.

The Grenzschantz number about twelve hundred, and form a cordon along the Southern frontier of the District. In my opinion they must remain as, at present, posted.

I asked the Regierungspräsident whether Poles were also enrolled in these two bodies of police. He replied that they would not be refused, but that in both bodies there was hardly anyone but Germans [? who] had been enlisted.

I have no doubt that the Commission will receive complaints from the Poles that these police cannot be trusted, and show partiality to their own race and hostility to the Poles. Their activities will of course be carefully controlled.

A system of passports is being organized, and will come into force on the 25th inst. This measure was laid down in the Protocol, and is intended to control persons wishing to enter or leave the Plebiscite Territory. Although the measure affects the traffic with East Prussia, it has not been opposed by the German Authorities, who materially assisted Colonel Bennett in drawing up his scheme.

At the present moment the District of Allenstein, together with the rest of East Prussia, finds itself in great straits owing to the lack of communication with the West, which has been caused by the occupation by the Poles of the corridor to the Baltic. The Railway, telegraphic and telephonic system has been entirely disorganised, and the greatest difficulty is being experienced. The unfortunate effects of these conditions are obvious. Colonel Lomas, the Head of the Communications Department, has left for Warsaw in order to negotiate with the Polish Authorities and to endeavour to remedy matters.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

### No. 533

*Mr. Beaumont<sup>1</sup> (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received March 3)*

*No. 6 [182611/100450/39]*

*'MARIENWERDER, February 25, 1920*

My Lord,

According to figures furnished to the Commission from a German source the total population of this Plebiscite Area is approximately 158,300 of whom 134,500 are claimed to be of German race and 23,800 Poles, or 15%. With the exception of the Circle of Stuhm where Poles admittedly number 15,500 out of a population of 36,500 (42%) the German sympathies of the inhabitants are clearly indicated, but their attitude since our arrival has been passive and correct.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Beaumont, British representative on the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission, and the other members of the Commission had reached Marienwerder on February 17. The account of their journey across Germany and of their arrival in Marienwerder has been printed in Volume IX (No. 56).



Immense sums have been spent in the past on railways, roads, bridges and public buildings. Local revenue can never have sufficed to meet public expenditure of the district, and it is obvious that under Polish administration these benefits must more certainly cease than if it continues to remain under German rule.

The attitude of the Poles in their newly occupied territory is not likely to change these sympathies. It has, I believe, been deliberately adopted in order to show the difficulties to which the inhabitants will be exposed if they elect to remain German and consists of putting every possible obstacle in the way of communication between this area and the neighbouring Polish territory and of transit across the latter. The frontier is strictly guarded; persons having business on the other side are prevented from passing without having to go through vexatious formalities. Trains are held up for hours on entering and leaving Polish territory or the service is suspended altogether. Postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication is constantly interrupted. To pass into the territory of the Free City of Danzig it is necessary to cross through a narrow strip of Polish territory by the great bridge over the Vistula at Dirschau. Here the way is barred by sentries (in French uniforms) who refuse to understand any language but Polish, and a similar barrier has been established at the little village of Mühlhaus before again entering Danzig territory. The result is that this area is cut off from its shopping centre and chief port almost completely, and at best a journey which formerly took a little over two hours is prolonged to half a day. Communication with Berlin is still more difficult and irregular.

Although it is scarcely likely to change the result of the Plebiscite it would in my opinion be desirable to convey a hint to the Warsaw Government that their present policy is scarcely calculated to gain them votes.

It is possible that an international Railway Conference which is now sitting at Warsaw may result in the modification or removal of some of the restrictions complained of.

The political and strategical considerations which led at Paris to the attribution of the important railway junction at Dirschau with the great bridge over the Vistula to Poland instead of to the Free City of Danzig can hardly fail to be the cause of serious trouble and conflicts in the future. The only road and railway access to Danzig from the East and South East is across this bridge. Whether therefore the Marienwerder Area votes Polish or German there must be six closely situated frontier stations to pass before anyone travelling from this district or from East Prussia can reach Danzig, *viz.*, one on either side of the Nogat at Marienburg where Danzig Free City territory is entered, two on the right bank of the Vistula opposite Dirschau for exit from Danzig territory into Polish territory again, and two on the other side of the small Polish wedge of Dirschau for exit from Polish territory and entry into the territory of the Free City. Whatever the racial position may be Dirschau cannot be claimed as a characteristically or historically Polish town.

It is as if Clapham Junction—as well as a bridge over the Thames—were,

in a redistribution of territory in England, assigned to a new independant [*sic*] State created in Kent and another wedge of Kent were interposed through which all persons going to London must first pass before arriving at Clapham.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

**No. 534**

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received March 12)*

*No. 152 [184845/100450/39]*

WARSAW, March 5, 1920

My Lord,

Mr. Beaumont has been so good as to send me a copy of his despatch to Your Lordship No. 6 of the 25th ultimo<sup>1</sup> drawing attention, amongst other things, to the difficulties placed by the Poles in the way of communicating with the Marienwerder plebiscite area.

I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on this subject to-day. I told His Excellency that I had heard not only from Marienwerder but also from one of the British officers attached to the Plebiscite Commission at Allenstein that those Commissions felt that they were isolated both from Poland and from Germany. The French Minister had also told me that he had on the instructions of his Government, acting on behalf of the Council of Ambassadors, made representations to the Polish Government to the effect that coal and petrol should be allowed to be exported to the plebiscite areas. I said that it was in the interests of the Poles themselves that the inhabitants of the plebiscite areas in Eastern Prussia should be in a contented frame of mind and should not be irritated by short-sighted measures and unnecessary formalities.

Monsieur Patek quite grasped this point and made a note of what I had said. He observed that it was an unfortunate fact that the Poles could not succeed in making themselves liked. The Polish Government had selected Poles for service in the plebiscite areas who they had hoped could be counted on to show tact in their dealings with the Commissions. But they were disappointed in this hope. He also spoke strongly about the tactlessness and rigidity of the Polish Military authorities.

I listened to these remarks in silence. It is evident that the Minister appreciates the position.

At the Railway Conference which is now sitting at Warsaw the German delegates proposed that they should have the use of the line passing through Dirschau as being the best line for communications between Western Germany and East Prussia. The Polish delegates declined this proposal on the ground that it would over-load the railway junction at Dirschau. They

<sup>1</sup> No. 533.

offered two alternative lines. I am informed by two of the British officers who have been present at the sittings of the Railway Conference that the Poles claim that the Germans have not handed over to them the number of railway waggons which they should have done, presumably under Article 371 of the Peace Treaty. The Poles are therefore using the line through Dirschau as a lever with which to obtain the railway waggons in question, and the British officers are of opinion that if and when the Germans hand over the waggons still due to the Poles, the latter will make no difficulty about allowing the Germans to use the line through Dirschau.

I understand that the Germans wish to despatch fourteen pairs of trains a day to and from East Prussia, so that they can hardly put forward the excuse that they are short of trucks.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

No. 535

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received March 22)*

*No. 8 [187090/100450/39]<sup>1</sup>*

MARIENWERDER, *March 10, 1920*

My Lord,

Our stay in this area has already been sufficiently long to convince all the members of the commission that the result of the voting is a foregone conclusion and that an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants will vote for Germany. Apart from race feeling, the provocation, repression and intolerance of the Polish authorities, in the territory newly occupied by them, have produced a deplorable effect on opinion not only of Germans, but of all impartial observers.

In my despatch No. 6 of the [2] 5th instant,<sup>2</sup> I referred in general terms to the interruption of through traffic, and telegraphic and telephonic communication between East Prussia and the rest of Germany, in clear violation of article 89 of the Treaty of Versailles. Concrete instances of this interference with the freedom of communication have now been repeatedly brought to our notice.

The interests of this side of the temporary boundary are so clearly bound up with those of districts now included in Poland that constant and free intercourse is indispensable. This has been denied, and it is only with the greatest difficulty that persons are allowed to cross a bayonet-guarded frontier.

The station which supplies electric light and power to this side of the Vistula is on the west bank. Since the Poles have been in occupation, no coal has been allowed to pass through, and at any moment the current may be cut off either from lack of fuel, or by caprice of a Polish official. The question

<sup>1</sup> The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> No. 533 above.

has also arisen as to the payment for current and coal in German or Polish currency, affecting both the cost of production and the cost to the consumer. This is only one of the many sources of inconvenience and friction caused by a redistribution of territory regardless of local economic conditions. I have already in my despatch No. 6 referred to the effects of the important railway junction of Dir[s]chau having been assigned by the Peace Treaty to Poland instead of Danzig. As a result, the ill-will between the Polish and German nationalities and the irritation due to Polish intolerance towards the German inhabitants of the corridor, far worse than former German intolerance of the Poles, are growing to such an extent that it is impossible to believe the present settlement can have any chance of being permanent.

Unless a change of policy be inaugurated in Poland, nothing in my opinion can avert an armed conflict even before Germany has had time to recover from the overwhelming humiliation of the Peace Treaty.

A German resident with whom I had occasion to speak lately, a typical representative of the middle class, assured me that, although he might wish to remain German, he would have had nothing to say against the incorporation of this area with Danzig and would infinitely prefer annexation by Great Britain to subjection to Poland. It can confidently be asserted that not even the most attractive economic advantages would induce any German to vote Polish, and when one sees the fine public buildings, the monumental bridges over the Vistula, the great high roads running in every direction, the wealth almost squandered by the German Government on this remote country district, and the order and discipline which everywhere prevail (to say nothing of the imposing castles and churches of the Knights of the Teutonic Order), the point of view of the German population can readily be understood. There is little enough to induce them to throw in their lot with a State inexperienced, unpractical, chaotic, starving, armed to the teeth and already on the verge of financial ruin.<sup>3</sup>

It is perhaps premature to raise difficulties before they arise, but eventually this commission must find itself greatly embarrassed to recommend a frontier on this side of the Vistula in accordance with article 97 of the treaty which, whatever the result of the plebiscite, allots to Poland so much of the east bank of the river 'as may be necessary for its regulation and improvement.'

If the frontier is unsatisfactory now it will be far more so when it has to be drawn on this side with no natural line to follow, cutting off Germany from the river bank and within a mile or so of Marienwerder, which is certain to vote German. I know of no similar frontier created by any treaty. Some eventual modification of this formula or limitation of its application seems to be inevitable.

Interesting light has been thrown upon the readiness of Germany for another war by our experience in disarming the local police, the so-called

<sup>3</sup> With reference to Mr. Beaumont's strictures upon the attitude and conduct of the Polish authorities, Lord Hardinge minuted upon this despatch as follows: 'It is a very great pity that Mr. Beaumont always seems to be actuated by bias which impairs the value of his opinions. H.'

'Sicherheitswehr' and 'Einwohnerwehr.' The former is a uniformed force in constant service, subject to military discipline, commanded by an ex-colonel of the regular army—resident in Marienwerder—and differing but little from a purely military organisation. In this district, with a population of 160,000, it numbered about 1,400 men. The 'Einwohnerwehr' does not wear uniform, and is, nominally at least, a voluntary organisation. The men are only called up in case of emergency, according to the terms of enrolment, for local service in the area where they reside. Their exact numbers are not easily ascertainable, but the force is probably larger rather than smaller than the 'Sicherheitswehr.'

It appeared that such forces, considerably outnumbering the Italian troops of occupation and armed with bombs and machine guns, could not possibly be required only for police purposes, might become a menace, and were, moreover, regarded by the Polish inhabitants as an instrument of intimidation likely to interfere with the free exercise of the right of vote.

The commander of the Italian battalion, after a consultation with the commission, decided therefore to disarm them. This was done without incident of any kind in the course of last week. Arms were collected at seventeen different points in the district, deposited, and registered in the presence of Italian officers and some members of the staff of the commission. A few verbal protests were raised, but delivery was effected with the disciplined submission which has hitherto been shown towards all the measures imposed by the commission. The figures of the arms handed in or notified are:—

Rifles, including some of obsolete pattern	.	.	6,924
Swords and bayonets	.	.	4,511
Revolvers and pistols	.	.	478
Machine guns	.	.	49
Cannon	.	.	2
Mortars	.	.	4
Hand grenades	.	.	4,442 <sup>4</sup>

If throughout Germany the population were armed in the same proportion, this would give approximately 180,000 machine guns and 2,500,000 rifles for the whole of Germany.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

<sup>4</sup> For later figures of arms collected see Mr. Beaumont's despatch of May 3 (Volume IX, No. 445).

No. 536

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*<sup>1</sup>

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [185338/100450/39]*

PARIS, March 11, 1920, 3.30 p.m.

Council of Ambassadors decided<sup>2</sup> to-day to support representations already made by Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission to Polish Government regarding violation of the frontiers of the Marienwerder district by Polish soldiers.

You should associate yourself with your Allied colleagues in any representation to Polish Government in this sense.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this telegram was sent under cover of despatch No. 772 of March 13 from Paris to the Foreign Office, where it was received on March 15.

<sup>2</sup> In response to a telegraphic request of March 10 from the President of the Marienwerder Commission.

No. 537

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 317 Telegraphic: by bag [183227/100450/39]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 11, 1920

German Chargé d'Affaires has drawn my attention<sup>1</sup> to the obstacles placed by the Polish Government in the way of the proper execution of Article 89 of the Treaty of Versailles, which assures free passage without hindrance for Germans and German trade through the Danzig corridor.

Information received from His Majesty's Representatives on the Allenstein and Marienwerder Commissions fully bears out Herr Sthamer's statements. His Majesty's Representative at Marienwerder even states that Poles are deliberately rendering communications difficult in order to influence plebiscite in their favour.

Negotiations have been in progress for some time between German and Polish Governments with a view to settlement of these difficulties, but without result.

You should therefore take an early opportunity of raising matter at Ambassadors' Conference and of suggesting that a collective instruction should be sent to the Allied Ministers at Warsaw to make joint representations to the Polish Government on the subject.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> i.e. in a conversation with Lord Hardinge on March 4, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> The decision of the Conference of Ambassadors on March 20 to draw the attention of the Polish Government to the measures complained of and to request that they should immediately be remedied was communicated to the German Peace Delegation on March 26. Cf. Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 83.

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received March 22)**No. 9 [187085/100450/39]<sup>1</sup>**ALLENSTEIN, March 11, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 4 [*sic*] of February 18th,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to report that the assumption of the administration of the district by this Commission is now concluded.

The officers of the Commission placed to control the various Departments of the Government here are working well with the German officials, and, on the whole, matters are proceeding smoothly and without undue friction.

The various district officers send a weekly report to this Commission, besides reporting when necessary regarding special matters. The reports of the British officers are to the effect that they are working well with the local Landräte and are given all necessary assistance, and are also able to exercise satisfactory control. The French and Italian district commissioners, who are posted in districts near Allenstein, appear to have had rather more difficulty with some of the German officials, and have been obliged to refer local matters to this Commission.

The Polish consul-general, Dr. Lewandowski, arrived here on the 16th February, and his exequatur was granted by the Commission on the 3rd March. Dr. Lewandowski had already presented himself to the Commission in Paris, where he was attached to the Polish Mission. He formerly kept, I believe, a chemist's shop at Posen, and is now a deputy. He is some 60 years of age, and apparently has a little experience of official life. Immediately after his arrival he began sending to the Commission complaints, frequently couched in extravagant language, recounting minor incidents of alleged unfair or bad treatment of persons of Polish descent and declaring that the entire Polish population of this district have been terrorised for years, and are, in consequence, unable to or incapable of expressing their sentiments. His complaints are all being investigated, and the Commission is doing what it can to show that the promises of equal treatment and liberty of both races are being put into effect.

I feel, however, that I should state that Dr. Lewandowski's attitude is not always judicious, as may be instanced by the incident which occurred on Sunday last, the 7th March, in connection with the hoisting of the Polish flag over the consular office. Dr. Lewandowski had been recognised only four days previously, and, without giving notice of his intention to the Commission, proceeded to hoist his flag from his office window, which is situated in the same building and alongside the office of the Polish Propaganda Department. On seeing the Polish flag hoisted for the first time in Allenstein, the population, perhaps not unnaturally, showed its resentment. The police

<sup>1</sup> The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> No. 532.

were summoned, and entered the building and removed the flag, being, as they declared, under the impression that the building whence it was flown was a private one. Colonel Bennett, of this Commission, proceeded as soon as possible to the consulate, where already several 'Sicherheitspolizei' had arrived. He instructed them to guard the consulate while he went to obtain further instructions from the Commission. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the flag was again flown, and a force of eight 'Sicherheitspolizei' were posted outside the consulate to prevent trouble, with orders to remain there until the flag was hauled down at 5 o'clock. These orders appear to have been carried out, but unfortunately later in the evening a crowd assembled and two boys climbed up, pulled down and carried off the consular shield. Immediate steps were taken to investigate the incident, and the following day Dr. Lewandowski laid his complaint before the Commission. He was still in a somewhat agitated condition, but admitted that he had given no warning either to the Commission or to the police of his intention to fly a flag, and intimated that he did not think that such a course was necessary in a 'civilised country.'

I pointed out to Dr. Lewandowski that he ought to realise that his position here was a delicate one and that, in the heated state of national feeling, trouble was to be expected if the Polish flag was suddenly hoisted on a building which was not yet known to be that of the consulate-general.

I also told him that it was highly desirable that his office should not be situated in a building which was closely connected with the Bureau of Polish Propaganda.

In a written communication from the Commission the consul-general has been informed that next Sunday a member of the Commission, a representative of the local authorities and a proper force of police will be present at the hoisting of his flag and that the consulate will be guarded during the day. The Polish consul-general has not yet replied, but I am told privately to-day that he wishes to accept this reparation. The local German National Society have, I hear, distributed handbills enjoining order on the population, so that it is to be hoped there will be no further incidents.

I have, I fear, given an extremely lengthy account of the incident, but this is in order to show that popular feeling here has already become roused at the idea of the coming plebiscite, and that troubles are to be expected, unless both sides—Germans and Poles—can be induced to exercise restraint and prudence.

The position of the 'Sicherheitspolizei' and of the Bürgerwehr is pre-occupying the attention of the Commission.

As Your Lordship is aware, the troops of occupation consist of one weak battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment, only about 500 strong. I have therefore felt that we must proceed with caution and that time must be allowed to gauge the situation and to see how far the local forces can be utilised and made to act as the police force of the district, or to what extent it should be disarmed or disbanded.

The 'Sicherheitspolizei' in this district numbers 3,800 men, including



1,200 Grenzschutz, and is armed with rifles and possesses twenty-four machine guns and eight howitzers.

It was raised in November last, and previously to this, about March last year, the Bürgerwehr had been formed in order to prevent Spartacist troubles, which were then to be feared in certain parts of the district, as well as to give means of defence to the farmers and villagers in the outlying parts against robbery and violence, which since the cessation of hostilities had become extremely rife.

The 'Sicherheitspolizei' was then formed later on in the year, in November, with the avowed object of maintaining order in the event of Spartacist troubles after the withdrawal of the regular troops from the district, which was then in view.

As I have already stated in a previous despatch,<sup>3</sup> these two forces now exist side by side, the 'Sicherheitspolizei' being a well-armed mobile gendarmerie, while the Bürgerwehr forms a body of special constables who retain their arms in their houses and are liable to be called out in the event of serious disorders. The latter can hardly be termed a military body.

A decree has now been published for the disarmament of the Bürgerwehr in the larger towns. Their arms are to be collected and stored under guard of the British battalion here and of the recently-arrived Italian battalion at Lyck. Steps are also being taken to sequester arms which may be in possession of unauthorised persons.

The present idea of the Commission is to gradually disarm the remaining Bürgerwehr and to call in the guns belonging to the 'Sicherheitspolizei,' and make greater use of this latter force for police purposes all over the district, and thus remove the major part of them from the town.

My French colleague and the French district officers are very insistent on this being done immediately, but the remaining members of the Commission have felt that these steps should be taken more gradually in view of the small numbers of troops hitherto at our disposal.

In general, the attitude of the population towards the Commission and the troops of occupation has not altered. There has been an absence of untoward incidents of any importance, and the inhabitants on Sundays flock to see the British troops march to Church parade and to listen to the concert in front of the Government buildings that is subsequently given by the regimental band.

This, however, does not mean that our presence is welcome. It is merely tolerated as one of the consequences of the treaty.

The reports of the district officers regarding the feeling in the country to the west and south of the town of Allenstein are very satisfactory. In the parts that touch the Polish frontier a vigorous German propaganda is in progress, and, according to information received, the feeling against the occupation of the country is a good deal stronger. A military excursion will be undertaken this week by two companies of British troops in order to make the inhabitants realise more fully the presence of the occupying troops. If that

<sup>3</sup> Apparently No. 532 above, although it does not specifically mention the Bürgerwehr.

does not have the desired effect, it may be necessary later on, after the British regiment has been reinforced, permanently to station a company at one of the more important centres, say Osteröde, which is the seat of the local Landrat and which lies about 20 miles west of Allenstein on the main railway line. I am reluctant to take any steps which will tend to scatter the already scanty occupying force, but, as already said, it may become indispensable to do something to prove that the Commission can make itself felt. I fully realise the objections there are to the course, and nothing will be done without duly weighing the advantages and disadvantages.

At present one feels, and my colleagues agree with me, that, were the plebiscite immediately taken, the Polish race would not be allowed to give free expression to their wishes as to the future of this area.

I would only add that the conditions of general security of property cannot be compared with those of pre-war days. Robbery in lonely districts still takes place, and there are said to be a certain number of demobilised troops who have not yet returned to their homes and who, in small numbers, hold up travellers on lonely country roads.

I have, &c.,  
E. RENNIE

#### No. 539

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received March 20, 4.5 p.m.)*

*No. 181 Telegraphic [186861/100450/39]*

WARSAW, March 19, 1920, 9.58 p.m.

Your telegram No. 317 of March 11th to Paris.<sup>1</sup>

Position is that German Delegates to railway conference at Warsaw broke off negotiations on (? March 12th) and (? returned to Berlin) on (? March 16th). (? In Poland it is) (? suggested that) their action was determined by (? report) of news of impending counter-revolution in Germany.

Coal trains are running between Upper Silesia and East Prussia and there is some sort of passenger connection between East Prussia and rest of Germany. British officers who have been attending Conference are of opinion that Poles are withholding full facilities for passenger and other traffic through Dantzig Corridor in order to force German Government to carry out stipulations contained in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of supplementary Protocol signed in Paris on January 9th last regarding execution of Article 10 of Polish-German Agreement of November 25th, 1919.<sup>2</sup> This originally refers to handing over of rolling stock in (? Polish) areas and Poles claim that Germans have not handed over proper number of waggons in this connection.

Impression given by Poles is that once rolling stock question is settled the other arrangements will be facilitated.

<sup>1</sup> No. 537.

<sup>2</sup> For this agreement see G. F. de Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3rd series, vol. xvi (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 346 ff.

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received March 26)**No. 203 [188115/100450/39]*WARSAW, *March 22, 1920*

My Lord,

I have the honour, with reference to Mr. Rennie's telegram No. 15 of March 15th,<sup>1</sup> which, he tells me, was repeated to the Foreign Office and to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, to transmit to Your Lordship the accompanying copy of a note from the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup> referring to the flag incident at the Polish Consulate General at Allenstein on March 7th, renewing the demand for the dissolution of the Sicherheitspolizei in that plebiscite area, and requesting the despatch of additional allied troops to uphold the authority of the Inter-Allied Commission. Monsieur Patek further asks for the exercise of my good offices with His Majesty's Government in order that these desiderata may be brought to the notice of the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris.

A copy of the reply which I have returned to His Excellency's communication is likewise enclosed herein.<sup>1</sup> I should explain, however, that before sending in this note, I requested Sir Percy Loraine<sup>2</sup> to point out privately to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs what an unfortunate impression the concluding paragraph<sup>3</sup> of Monsieur Patek's note was likely to create and see whether it could not be dropped or modified. Sir Percy Loraine spoke to Count Przezdziecki<sup>4</sup> and pointed out that the natural interpretation of this statement was that the Polish Government questioned the impartiality of the Inter-Allied Commission, and threatened not to accept the result of a plebiscite provided for in a Treaty which they had signed: that if the paragraph were retained it would be impossible to let it pass unnoticed and that it was to be feared that a very disagreeable impression would be caused at Paris. Count Przezdziecki, who quite understood the friendly spirit in which this representation was made, informed Sir Percy Loraine, after consulting with the head of the Political Department, that it seemed impossible to withdraw or modify the paragraph in question as it had been sent likewise to the French and Italian Legations in connection with the Marienwerder and Upper Silesia plebiscite areas. He added that the matter referred solely to the question of the Sicherheitswehr, and the Polish contention was [that] the continued existence of this force, which was merely the old German army under a new name, was in itself an evasion and therefore an infraction of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> First Secretary in H.M. Legation at Warsaw.

<sup>3</sup> This ran as follows: 'Dans le cas où se prolongerait ne fut-ce que quelque temps l'état des choses actuel dans le[s] territoires plébiscitaires de la Prusse, le Gouvernement Polonais ne pourrait considérer l'issue du plébiscite comme conforme à la volonté véritable de la population des territoires en question.'

<sup>4</sup> An official of the Polish Foreign Office, and subsequently Head of its Political Department.

Article 95 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides for the withdrawal of German troops and authorities from the plebiscite area. He also drew a distinction between not considering a plebiscite as a true indication of the popular will and a refusal to recognise its result: the Danes he said, for example, had accepted the plebiscite result in the Second zone in Schleswig, but did not believe it accurately reflected the will of the community. Sir Percy Loraine had the impression that the paragraph in question would have been withdrawn except for the fact that its text was already in the hands of the French and Italian Ministers.

I may add that I had previously brought to the notice of the Polish Government the reasons, as stated by Mr. Rennie, for which the Allenstein plebiscite Commission found it expedient to maintain the *Sicherheitswehr*. It is, however, only fair to state, that since that force was formed, the Polish Government have consistently pointed to the probability of its being used as an improper lever in plebiscite areas, and the fact that the Marienwerder plebiscite Commission, as reported in Mr. Beaumont's despatch to Your Lordship No. 8 of March 10th,<sup>5</sup> found it necessary to disarm the *Sicherheitswehr* in that area because such a force 'considerably outnumbering the Italian troops of occupation, and armed with bombs and machine guns, could not possibly be required only for police purposes and might become a menace' lends, it must be admitted, considerable force to the Polish contention.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

<sup>5</sup> No. 535.

### No. 541

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder)*

*No. 4 Telegraphic [187148/100450/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 24, 1920, 10 p.m.*

German Chargé d'Affaires here states that Marienwerder Commission intend to issue a regulation (a) repealing Customs Dues and all other dues on import of goods into Plebiscite Area (b) waiving all claim to proceeds of such dues and all such monetary fines pending at moment.

You should telegraph your observations immediately and refuse assent of His Majesty's Government should any such proposal be made.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On March 20 Sir E. Crowe had noted on the file: 'I promised Mr. Sthamer to look into this at once. It looks at first sight like a repetition of the "Hole-in-the-West" blunder we made on the Rhine. E. A. C. Mch 20.' For representations on this subject see the letters of March 10 and 26 from the German Peace Delegation to the Conference of Ambassadors printed as Nos. 63 and 82 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921. For the 'Hole-in-the-West' see Volumes VI, No. 186, and IX, Nos. 23, 29, and 479.

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received March 31)*

*No. 12 [189176/100450/39]*

*Confidential*

MARIENWERDER, March 25, 1920

My Lord,

The secret service reports of the Italian Commander of the Troops of occupation show that preparations were made here to cooperate with the reactionary forces which for a short time controlled Berlin. Whether the wireless installation sent to the corps of Military Police (Sicherheitswehr) as reported in my despatch No. 10 of the 19th instant<sup>1</sup> had anything to do with the conspiracy is still not clear. But it is not open to doubt that the monarchical party, which contains strong adherents among the great<sup>2</sup> landowners such as Count Zu Dohna of Finckenstein, (25,000 acres) Count Finkenstein of Schloss Schonberg, (22,000 acres) and Baron von Oldenburg of Januschau (15,000 acres), who live within a short radius of Rosenberg, has been engaged in recruiting followers to help on the movement if it showed any signs of strength or permanence. These individuals and their friends make no concealment of their sympathies, or of their detestation of the democratic rule of Herr Ebert. Although the views of the large body of Prussian officials in the province are probably the same, they have been more cautious in expressing them. A return to the old order would be welcomed by most. They clearly regret the failure of Herr Kapp to establish himself in power and criticise him only for having ill chosen his time.<sup>3</sup>

With regard to the Commission the German element is so confident of its success in the Plebiscite that they feel they can afford to be friendly, and our position would, probably, hardly have been affected by a successful counter-revolution.

The danger of Bolshevism has been the constant argument of the official and upper classes for the maintenance of the Sicherheitswehr and the excuse of the landowners for recruiting forces to be collected outside the Plebiscite area in East Prussia. It is a danger which of course cannot be altogether ignored but in this orderly and peaceful agricultural district there is less ground for apprehension than in most parts of Germany. Since our arrival, at least, there have been no disorders and scarcely any signs of unrest. The persistence with which the argument was used to dissuade the Commission

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. An apparatus with a radius of about 50 miles for sending and 300 miles for receiving was discovered on March 18 and sequestered by the Commission since it could not be required 'solely for police purposes'.

<sup>2</sup> *Note in original:* 'It may be noted that the large estates are all farmed directly by the owners who have almost sovereign rights, the peasantry being little more than serfs. In the whole area there is only one great Polish landowner—Count Sierakowski—with about 25,000 acres, in the circle of Stuhm. All the others are German.'

<sup>3</sup> For the Kapp 'putsch' in Germany see Volume IX, Chap. II, which includes (No. 116) a telegram reporting reactions to it in Marienwerder; also, in connexion with Herr von Oldenburg, *ibid.*, No. 445.

from proceeding to the disarmament of the police force has only made us suspicious of its sincerity. So far we have had no occasion to regret our decision.

No change has been made in the methods of Polish propaganda. Occasional meetings are held, but they are attended only by Poles in small numbers. German counter demonstrations are limited to hustling and jeers, as at Marienburg the other day when one of the persons attending the meeting was raised on the shoulders of the crowd and hailed as 'King of the Poles' until he finally took refuge in a police station from the mob. The incident was exaggerated by the excitable Polish Vice Consul here into a veritable St. Bartholomew's Massacre of Poles, with insistent telephonic appeals for the despatch of Bersaglieri and machine guns to restore order.

In spite of all our protests the vexatious restrictions on persons crossing into Poland are still maintained. Cases of bare-faced brigandage by Polish frontier guards are of almost daily occurrence. A short time ago we had occasion to protest against the seizure at Neustadt by Polish officials of three trucks of oats on their way through the corridor from Marienburg consigned to a German firm in Stettin.<sup>4</sup> I was in Graudenz, 10 miles south of the Plebiscite area, two days ago. In spite of many Polish soldiers and crowded barracks, the town has a deserted, poverty-stricken and depressed appearance. The German population is clearing out as fast as it can, and even the Polish inhabitants have no good to say of Polish administration.

As 'retaliation' for an alleged tearing up of a Polish passport by a frontier guard in the Plebiscite area the Vice Consul here has now refused to visa any Passports of Germans wishing to go to Poland, whether on his own authority or on instructions from Warsaw is not at present known. Article 89 of the Treaty of Versailles is constantly and completely disregarded.

These acts, and articles violently abusive of everything German in the newly founded Polish newspaper appear to be the only methods adopted to persuade the inhabitants of the Plebiscite areas to vote for Poland.

Since our arrival the conviction has been forced upon us that the settlement of the Polish question in Paris is not due to an over-estimate of Polish capacities and superficial knowledge of local conditions must have been deliberately designed for the purpose of leaving an open sore between Poland and Germany which time is more likely to envenom than to heal.<sup>5</sup>

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

<sup>4</sup> In an *aide-mémoire* (not printed) of April 8 Sir H. Rumbold drew the attention of the Polish Foreign Minister to these abuses and urged that Polish officials should be enjoined strictly to observe the obligations contracted by Poland under Article 89 of the Treaty of Versailles.

<sup>5</sup> In a private letter (not printed) of April 8 Sir E. Crowe reproved Mr. Beaumont for these 'disrespectful remarks concerning the action and policy of the Supreme Council and peace conference'.

No. 543

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1045 [187434/100450/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 27, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to the concluding paragraph<sup>1</sup> of your telegram No. 277 of March 11th. in regard to the troops of occupation in the Marienwerder plebiscite area, I have to inform Your Lordship that His Majesty's Government are unable to supply a British detachment for the purpose of increasing the Allied forces in this area.

2. If the matter is again raised at the Conference of Ambassadors, I request that Your Lordship will make a communication in this sense.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State),

ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. At the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors on March 11 the Italian Ambassador had reported that the President of the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission had complained that the troops at his disposal were inadequate to keep order.

No. 544

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received March 31)*

*No. 383 Telegraphic: by bag [189120/7067/39]*

PARIS, *March 29, 1920*

Following for Cabinet.

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon, and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (10) It was decided to inform the Allenstein Commission, in answer to an enquiry made by Mr. Rennie, that the German Government had no right to hold elections in the Plebiscite area. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

No. 545

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received April 6)*

*No. 222 [190055/107890/39]*

WARSAW, *March 30, 1920*

My Lord,

I observe from the Despatch No. 8 which Colonel Percival addressed to Your Lordship on the 4th instant from Oppeln,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which has reached

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

me in the Confidential Print Sections, that the Upper Silesia Plebiscite Commission has likewise found itself in a difficult situation as regards the Sicherheitspolizei, described by the British Commissioner as forming 'a semi-military organization . . .<sup>2</sup> which possesses arms on a scale sufficient to enable it to undertake operations in the field as a military body', and has thought it necessary to deprive that body of all arms, such as machine guns, grenades, *flammenwerfer* etc., which are not required for the conduct of purely police duties.

I have the honour, with reference to my Despatch No. 203 of the 22nd instant<sup>3</sup> and especially to its concluding paragraph, to point out that the Poles may perhaps find it strange that whereas in the Marienwerder and Upper Silesia Plebiscite Areas the Interallied Commissions have taken steps respectively to disarm totally and partially the Sicherheitswehr, no such analogous steps have commended themselves to the Commission which is administering the Allenstein Plebiscite area.

If, as I understand to be likely, the result of the plebiscite in Allenstein shows a considerable majority in favour of the German connection, that would seem to be only an additional reason for giving the Poles every guarantee that any possible instruments of unfair pressure on the population have at least been neutralized.

I have forwarded copies of this Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and to Mr. Rennie at Allenstein.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

<sup>2</sup> Omission in the original.

<sup>3</sup> No. 540.

#### No. 546

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 3. Telegraphic [189556/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, April 1, 1920

Following for Council of Ambassadors.

Commission have practically concluded draft of their plebiscite *règlement* and it only needs further comparison with that of Marienwerder Commission to complete.

Vote would take place eighty-five days after publication.

Draft without dates has been brought to notice of Polish Consul-General and Polish representative. These insist that taking of vote ought to be delayed until complete equality of both nationalities has been established. They ask that number of Allied troops should be greatly increased, that present police force be dissolved, that Commission should be in position both here and in

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Warsaw and to the Foreign Office, where it was received on April 2 at 5 p.m. For a letter from Sir E. Crowe to Sir M. Hankey concerning it see Volume IX, No. 342.



districts if necessary to replace part of existing employees so as to fully control administration and plebiscite, and that plebiscite may be postponed until Polish population have had time to realize new conditions. They urge that otherwise freedom or justice of vote is illusory.

This attitude of Poles (? not) unexpected (see my despatches 5 and 6 to President of the Council of Ambassadors<sup>2</sup> which should by now have arrived), but if their wishes are conceded, taking of vote will have to be postponed until some quite indefinite period.

Commission does not see its way to fall in with views of Poles unless Council of Ambassadors inform (Commission?) that they think fit to take into consideration protest of Polish Government which it is believed will have already reached Paris.

<sup>2</sup> These two despatches have not been traced in Foreign Office archives.

### No. 547

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received April 10, 11.30 a.m.)*

*No. 231 Telegraphic [191044/100450/39]*

WARSAW, April 8, 1920, 9 p.m.

My despatch No. 203 of March 22nd.<sup>1</sup>

Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs replying to my note of March 22nd, says that the concluding paragraph of his note of March 15th implied no intention whatever of disputing the validity of plebiscite, and that good will and impartiality of the Inter-Allied Commission, recently emphasized by the satisfaction given in respect of the flag incident at the Polish Consulate, is absolutely unquestioned. His Excellency's purpose was to draw attention to the fact, on which he again insists, that presence of Sicherheitspolizei and other German organizations, as well as inadequate numbers of Allied troops in Allenstein plebiscite area, render it impossible for Polish population to exercise the rights guaranteed to it by the treaty of Versailles.

Text of note by bag to-day.<sup>2</sup>

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to Paris and Mr. Rennie.

<sup>1</sup> No. 540.

<sup>2</sup> Under cover of Warsaw despatch No. 234, not printed.

### No. 548

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 14)*

*No. 17 [191754/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 9, 1920

My Lord,

The Commission has been actively engaged during the last few days in drawing up regulations for holding the Plebiscite. These have been com-

pleted and should be published on the 14th. instant.<sup>1</sup> They have been prepared in consultation with the Allenstein Commission and such differences as exist are due to the greater size of the Allenstein area and the distribution, in the eleven circles (Kreise) into which it is subdivided, of Control-Officers. In the Allenstein area these officers become Presidents of the Commissions of Control established for supervision of all the voting arrangements. As the Marienwerder Commission has no such control officers we have decided to appoint a judge, including at least one Pole, as President of each of the Commissions of Control to be created in the four Circles included in the area. The Commissions are to be composed of six members including the President, nominated in equal numbers from lists presented by the German and Polish Propaganda Associations respectively. No Landrat (the Chief Executive German Official in each Circle) will be appointed. The Commissions of Control will appoint Plebiscite Committees of four members, two chosen from the German, and two from the Polish lists in each of the voting areas ('Gemeinde' and 'Gutsbezirke') throughout the district. These number approximately 320 in the four Circles. The Commissions of Control are to be formed within five days of the publication of the Regulations and the Plebiscite Committees within a period of fifteen days from the presentation of the lists of candidates. Twenty days are then to be allowed for preparing the Registers of voters, eight days for claims, and fifteen days for the examination of claims and publication of the definitive Register which should, it is calculated, be ready on June 20th. The precise date of voting has not yet been fixed but may be on June 27th. It will in any case coincide with that fixed by the Allenstein Commission. The date of voting must be definitely announced at least thirty days beforehand.

The Germans and even Poles who have been consulted appear to be satisfied with the periods allowed for each operation, but the Polish delegation are making strenuous efforts to have the date of the Plebiscite postponed at least until September. There is nothing to be gained by acceding to their wishes. While it is true that their propaganda campaign is backward, unless a complete change be made in its methods, now that complete liberty has been guaranteed by the presence of the Commission, a longer period will scarcely affect a single doubtful vote. The new Polish newspaper published at Marienwerder confines itself chiefly to offensive criticism of the impotence of the Commission. Polish meetings are attended by none save Poles and the only practical methods employed are the imposition of the severest restrictions aimed at severing all communications between this area and Poland. The avowed object of this policy is to show the inhabitants the disadvantage of a frontier barrier between districts which up to now have lived in the closest economic relations. The Polish Consulate has lately adopted a system of withholding all visas for passports of Germans having business in Poland, and Germans wishing to leave the Corridor are constantly refused permission to take with them their household effects and domestic animals, being consequently obliged to sell them at a heavy loss in depreciated Polish

<sup>1</sup> For the text see S. Wambaugh, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 88-99.

currency. Nothing less than the dismissal of all the German officials in the Plebiscite area and substitution by Poles, who could not be found even if we agreed to this, would satisfy the agitators who are conducting the Plebiscite campaign.

*Confidential.* The French delegates both here and in Allenstein are inclined to yield to the insistence of the Poles on the postponement of the voting as long as possible. This is however contrary to the opinion held by the majority of both Commissions and we hope that the French view will not be supported in this respect by the Council of Ambassadors. It might help matters if the Council were to express a wish that the Plebiscite should not take place later than June 27th.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

No. 549

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received April 26)*

*No. 14 [194141/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, April 13, 1920

My Lord,

I shall have the honour to send by separate despatch the Plebiscite *Règlement*,<sup>1</sup> which has now been completed. This has been elaborated by this Commission who have consulted German Government officials regarding technical details, and the project was also communicated verbally to the Polish Consul-General in [? and] the local Polish Committee. The necessity that the rules should correspond as nearly as possible with those of the Marienwerder Commission has somewhat delayed its completion in its present form.

The *Règlement* was generally accepted by the Polish Committee, except on points which were mainly of detail, and upon which the Commission has tried, as far as possible, to meet them. The Polish Consul-General was, however, somewhat violent in his disapproval, and had one or two sharp passages with the French Commissioner, which necessitated his being called to order. The French Commissioner has throughout displayed great interest in the Polish side of the case, so that this attitude on the part of the Polish Consul-General was altogether uncalled for. It is regretted that the Polish Government have not seen their way to depute a representative who is able to express his case in more conciliatory terms, or in less exaggerated language. Even admitting that M. Lewandowski's position is not an easy one, it is unfortunate, to say the least, that he should be a person so ignorant of diplomatic proceedings and behaviour, and that he should endeavour to introduce in his conversations with the Commission the language of a village 'tribune of the people'. Soon after the project was submitted, about a fortnight ago, he proceeded on leave of absence, and he has been temporarily replaced by

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. For the text see S. Wambaugh, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 63-69.

a Mr. Titus Zbyszewski, whose methods of procedure are entirely different. Both the Consulate-General and the Polish Committee here, however, agree in insisting that the number of Allied troops in this Plebiscite Area is far too small, and also insist on the need of making a clean sweep of German functionaries in the District, and have asked that a greater number of troops and Allied officials should be sent. They have been told that this is a matter outside the powers of the Commission, who were sent here by the Supreme Council, who had knowledge of the conditions, and that, if they are not satisfied, the remedy lies with the Polish Government, who can raise the question at Paris.

The Commission is doing all it can to prevent the German officials in the District from taking part in national propaganda in connection with the Plebiscite, in addition to the undertaking given by them on the taking over of the administration by the Commission, whereby they promised to abstain from exercising pressure on the population. Ordinances and instructions in this sense have been issued.

Continual representations are received from the Polish Consulate-General of schoolmasters abusing their position, and bullying the Polish school-children. These complaints are frequently of the most trivial nature, and on investigation often turn out to be invented, or, at all events, greatly exaggerated. It is also stated that the parish priests similarly exercise undue influence on their parishioners. It is, of course, very difficult, indeed practically impossible to prevent these two classes from making their opinions felt, and all that can be done is to prohibit them from doing so in the course of their official business or ministrations. The Poles also complain of the maintenance in office by the Commission of the local Landrats. Speaking generally these officials appear to be working well with the Allied district officers but naturally the supervision by the latter over the details of business cannot be of a complete nature, especially as some of them (I refer especially to the French and Italian Officers) have but a very slight knowledge of German. They have, therefore, obviously to rely a great deal on the local Landrat.

In the matter of the Burgermaster [*sic*] of Allenstein and the chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, it was found necessary to suspend these officials during the Plebiscite period, and they have now left the Area. The suspension of the former caused a great deal of local feeling, and at one time a general strike was contemplated by the citizens of Allenstein as a protest. The excitement appears now to have passed off, and the proposed strike did not take place. According to rumour, one of the reasons for not doing so being that the Commission had issued an order forbidding strikes in general. A protest was also registered against the suspension of these two officials by the German delegate, but a successor to the Chief of Police has now been proposed to the Commission.

In general the propagandist activities on both sides are increasing, and it is fairly certain that before long many breaches of the peace will occur. This, however, is only to be expected, and the Commission will take all possible police precautions to ensure that meetings may be held by both sides under as near as possible normal conditions.

The Sicherheitspolizei are employed on such occasions for the purpose of protection. It is of course obvious that if this force is disbanded, as the Poles have suggested, the means of protection for holding meetings will equally disappear. The disarmament of this force has now been arranged for; a separate despatch on the subject follows.<sup>2</sup>

The disarmament of the Einwohnerwehr in the larger towns has been carried out without incident. Their arms are now in process of being stored under the care of the Allied troops. Disarmament of the country Einwohnerwehr is not yet being undertaken. In view of the number of bad characters roaming about the country it seems hardly fair on persons living in isolated parts to deprive them of the means of self-defence. The matter is being kept in view, and arms will probably be withdrawn from them as the time for voting approaches.

As regards the troops of occupation, the British battalion here is receiving drafts and should soon attain a strength of 700. When this has been reached, probably next week, it is intended to despatch at least half a company to Osterode, which is situated about 25 miles on the main railway line between here and Deutsch-Eylau. Osterode has always been a somewhat disturbed point, owing to the presence there of a considerable number of workmen who are employed in the railway repair works.

My colleagues, notably the French Commissioner, urge on a distribution of the troops of occupation in the various towns, but on general principles, I am opposed to the dissemination of troops in small bodies over the country where they would be useless in the event of serious disturbances.

In order to show the Allied troops, it is proposed that military promenades should be arranged, and one of these has already taken place, but we are still somewhat doubtful as to whether these movements have the desired result. The relations between the British troops and the native population are on the whole satisfactory, and the British soldier has again shown his capacity for behaving well in foreign surroundings.

The Italian company here has been rather less fortunate in its experiences. Several local incidents have occurred. I am told that in one or two cases individual British soldiers have intervened on their own initiative, between the German crowd and the Italians, and prevented further trouble occurring.

When I last wrote I reported that the events that were occurring in Germany had so far not spread to this District.<sup>3</sup> This fortunately continues to be the case.

The Independent Socialists have talked over matters with myself and the Commission, and certain concessions to their wishes have been made in the way of granting greater facilities for meetings. For the time being they appear to be fairly satisfied, and are said to have expressed themselves pleased with the way they have been received by the Commission, and contrast its methods with those of the Prussian officials.

It should be mentioned that there are indications that the Poles seem to be

<sup>2</sup> No. 553 below.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Volume IX, No. 155.

trying to coquet with this party, and to win them over to their side with promises of greater liberty should the elections go in favour of Poland.

The talk, however, among the more well-to-do classes is to the effect that anything would be better than that this country should be handed over to Poland, and that, in order to postpone that evil day, they would prefer a prolonged Allied occupation, and even agree to the Area becoming a 'British colony.'

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

**No. 550**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 14, 10 p.m.)*

*No. 13 Telegraphic [191839/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 14, 1920, 11.45 a.m.

Polish Committee here have protested at Paris against immediate publication of voting regulations fixed for today. Only object is to gain time in execution of policy of obstruction evidently decided on. I hope protest will be turned down.

Committee has so little confidence in result that they are contemplating total abstention from voting.

Repeated to Warsaw.

**No. 551**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 23)*

*No. 19 [193569/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 14, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's telegram to the Earl of Derby No. 317 of the 11th. ult.,<sup>1</sup> respecting the non-compliance of the Polish authorities with the terms of Article 89 of the Treaty of Peace in regard to the free transit of persons and goods between parts of Germany separated by the Polish corridor, the following particularly flagrant cases of violation of the Article have been brought to the notice of this Commission.

1. Three trucks containing 40,000 kilos of oats consigned by Gustav SCHARMITZY of Marienburg to Emil AVON of Stettin, at the station of LAUENBURG, were sequestered by the Polish authorities at NEUSTADT about the middle of March.

2. Two trucks of coal consigned to the Marienwerder narrow gauge Railway from Upper Silesia were held up at the station of MUNSTERWALDE on the

<sup>1</sup> No. 537.

other side of the Vistula near here, and diverted to ALTJAHN in the corridor in the early part of this month. The tramway in question, which serves villages on this side of the Vistula, would have been compelled to stop working, had not the Prussian State Railways come to the rescue and furnished the necessary supplies.

These two cases have been referred to the Polish representative here, and a protest was also addressed by the Commission direct to the President of the Council of Ministers in Warsaw, in respect of complaint No. 1, with what result is not yet known. Count Sierakowski, the Polish representative, is doing his utmost to secure redress but his task is not an easy one. These abuses are only quoted as examples. The list could be added to indefinitely, and I understand that the High Commissioner at Danzig is constantly receiving similar complaints. It is clear that the Polish authorities disregarding all protests are acting in this way systematically, as well as countenancing innumerable acts of brigandage, of which peasants and farmers attempting to trade with the other side of the frontier are the victims, under the erroneous impression that they will thereby persuade the inhabitants of the Plebiscite area and of the Free City territory of the advantages of being under Polish rule. The effect of course is just the contrary and is almost as exasperating to disinterested spectators (who are however also exposed to the invariable rudeness of brutal and ignorant frontier guards) as to the victims themselves.

The unforeseen difficulties arising out of the Polish settlement may be exemplified by the case of Hela. It is a fishing village and important lighthouse station at the end of the long narrow stretch of sand dunes which form the northern arm of the Gulf of Danzig. The village is entirely German and Protestant. It is now occupied by a small detachment of Polish soldiers and sailors who not only keep out all persons not provided with special passports, and terrorise the natives, but, evidently as part of the same deliberate policy referred to above, even prevent the fishermen from selling in Danzig, their only market, or drawing provisions from there, compelling them to go to the nearest Polish town of Putzig, a tramp of twenty miles across the sand dunes. If this be persisted in the place must soon become a desert. The only salvation is for Danzig to become Polish. This is clearly the aim of the military party, apparently now supreme in Warsaw. Their ag[g]ression is hardly kept within bounds by the presence of Commissioners and Allied troops in the Free City and Plebiscite areas. If the Poles could they would also try to starve out villages in the Plebiscite area. This being impossible they content themselves by stopping practically all intercourse across the frontier.

With insufficient territory to make it self-supporting, with free access to it cut off by the Polish occupation of the Dirschau wedge, which bars the way from all sides except the sea, and hemmed in in every direction by Polish bayonets the future of Danzig is gloomy. There seem to be two or perhaps three alternative methods of dealing with the problem.

1. The acquisition by Danzig of Dirschau with free communications and an extended hinterland, as well as removal of some of the strangling restric-

tions imposed by Article 104 of the Treaty when the city might become free in reality as well as in name.

But Poland is clearly in no mood for renouncing any of the privileges or territory with which the Treaty has so liberally rewarded her. Nor can Germany be expected to surrender, even to the Free City, a rich agricultural district which, whatever the percentage of persons of Polish race, is typically German in sentiment and character.

2. The second alternative is to disregard all wishes of the inhabitants and complete the half measure decided upon by the Conference at Paris by acquiescing in Polish annexation pure and simple. In either case the outlook is threatening. It is almost inevitable that the first favourable opportunity will be taken to cut through the artificial barrier between East Prussia and the Rest of Germany.

It would however at least be some relief for the present almost intolerable state of things were Germany to be assured free intercourse both with East Prussia and the Free City accorded by the Treaty but systematically denied by Poland. The latter has little to hope for from the Plebiscite either in this area or in Allenstein. In return for complete freedom of transit by the railway Dirschau, Marienburg, Riesenburger, Rosenberg, Deutsch-Eylau, all of which places will certainly vote German, and which lie in the most direct line between Danzig and Warsaw, Poland might perhaps consent to some kind of internationalisation of the line Elbing–Marienburg, Dirschau–Konitz–Schneidemühl which seems vital to the interests of East Prussia, Germany and the Free City. Unless these two lines can be internationalised or at least controlled by impartial and disinterested authorities, the freedom of intercourse aimed at in the Treaty can hardly be realised.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

## No. 552

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received April 17)*

*No. 472 Telegraphic: by bag [192444/7067/39]*

PARIS, April 15, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon. In view of Your Lordship's telegram No. <sup>1</sup> I had agreed to replace on the Agenda the various questions concerning the German Treaty which had been adjourned during the last week.

. . . <sup>2</sup> 5. The Council considered two telegrams and a Despatch from the President of the Marienwerder Commission, copies of which are being sent by bag,<sup>3</sup> and Mr. Rennie's telegram No. 3 of April 1st, which was repeated to you,<sup>4</sup> regarding the date of the Plebiscites in the Marienwerder and Allen-

<sup>1</sup> This is left blank in the original, but presumably the reference should be to No. 385 in Volume IX.

<sup>2</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> Under cover of Paris despatch No. 1156 of April 15, not printed.

<sup>4</sup> No. 546.



stein districts. The French Delegation were disposed to support the Polish request for a lengthy postponement of these Plebiscites and proposed that the matter should be referred to the Polish Commission. I pointed out:—

(a) that the Treaty gives no indication of date in either case, a fact which implies that the Plebiscites should be held as soon as the arrangements are complete;

(b) that His Majesty's Government, and no doubt other Allied Governments, are very anxious to release their troops and the personnel of the Commissions as soon as possible;

(c) that neither of the Commissions had recommended postponement and both had in fact clearly expressed themselves in the opposite sense.

I suggested that two months from the present date would be a reasonable period, but subsequently agreed to this being extended to three months.

The Italian Ambassador supported this view and proposed that a telegram should be sent to the Presidents of the two Commissions (a) informing them that the Council of Ambassadors was of opinion that the holding of the Plebiscites was to be hastened as much as possible: (b) stating that a proposal had been made by the Council that the date for the Plebiscites should be fixed as within three months from the present date, and enquiring whether they approved of this course.

After some discussion this proposal was accepted. I have sent a telegram to Mr. Rennie in this sense on behalf of the Council<sup>5</sup> and have also informed Mr. Beaumont. . . .<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> On April 15, unnumbered. Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

## No. 553

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received April 26)*

*No. 15 [194142/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, April 15, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 222 of March 30th<sup>1</sup> regarding the Sicherheitspolizei in this District, as well as to the remarks contained in my despatches on the same subject, I have the honour to state that the Commission have decided to disarm that body. A copy, with translation, of the decree on the subject is enclosed herewith.<sup>2</sup>

As Your Lordship is aware, this measure has for some time been under consideration, but in view of the outbreak of the Revolution a month ago in Germany, it was considered wiser to postpone taking action so as to allow time to see whether the revolutionary movement would make itself felt here. It is estimated that there exist in this Area advanced or Spartacist [*sic*] elements to the number of eight thousand, and there is reason for supposing that they possess hidden stores of arms. It would therefore have been a risky

<sup>1</sup> No. 545.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

proceeding to disarm a police force on which the Commission have largely to depend for dealing with local disturbances until the situation here became clearer. Fortunately the likelihood of armed disturbances of a Spartacist nature seems now to have passed away, and accordingly the Commission have proceeded to put into execution a measure which will have the effect of reducing the Sicherheitspolizei to the level of an ordinary police force. In addition reductions in their strength are under contemplation. The result of the measures now intended to be taken will be to break up the bodies of Sicherheitspolizei which have hitherto been centred in the large towns, and to disseminate them more in the country districts, where they will perform ordinary police duties.

It should be remembered [*sic*] that conditions in the Allenstein Area are somewhat different from those in Marienwerder, this District being some three times larger both as regards area and population, and that the elements likely to cause trouble are to be found in places where there are no occupying troops.

It is hoped that the steps which are now being taken will satisfy the Polish Government, and will reassure the Polish-speaking population of this District.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

**No. 554**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 23)*

*No. 20 [193570/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, *April 15, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 9th. instant,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to transmit copies, in French translation, of the Regulations for taking the Plebiscite in this area<sup>2</sup> which in spite of formal protests from the Polish Propaganda Committee and from the Polish Consul General, in the name of his Government, to await the result of examination of the question by the Council of Ambassadors at Paris, were published yesterday.

Except an extension of time for preparing the Register from 20 to 25 days, for claims from 8 to 10 days in order to bring these terms more closely into line with those fixed by the Allenstein Commission, no important change has been made in the draft as briefly outlined in my despatch above referred to. All preliminary work should be completed on the same date as in the Allenstein area, namely June 28th., and the voting will therefore be possible on the first Sunday after that date in both areas on the same day.

We had intended to fix the residence qualification for voting in the same way as the Allenstein Commission *viz.*, as from January 1st., 1905, a date

<sup>1</sup> No. 548.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The German text is printed in S. Wambaugh, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 88-99.

which would have excluded nearly all the very numerous Prussian officials in the area, but at the special request of the Polish National Committee, based on reasons which have not been explained, we changed the date at the last moment to the 1st. of January 1914. Apparently since the war there has been an influx of Polish settlers, and in particular the President and Vice President of the Polish National Committee would not have been qualified to vote had the earlier date been taken, having bought property in the area since 1905.

The Poles are disappointed that their attempts to have the publication of the Regulations postponed have been unsuccessful, and further obstruction may be expected from them with the object of putting off the Plebiscite as long as possible even if the threat of total abstention from voting be not carried out. It is evident that they have abandoned all hope of winning any important towns, and are discouraged at the small response made to their appeals even from the country districts where the Polish element is stronger.

It is believed that many outvoters of Polish descent, if they can be brought in from the Ruhr valley and other parts of Germany, will not vote for Poland.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

#### No. 555

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 18, 5.30 p.m.)*

*No. 14 Telegraphic [192508/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 16, 1920, 11.20 a.m.

Polish Government has closed frontier for all telegraph, telephone and railway communication for ten days beginning April 17th. Reason given, namely, re-issue of Austrian paper currency with Polish overcharge, is not sufficient to explain measure affecting also all transit between East Prussia and Dantzig, and East Prussia and the rest of Germany. Real object seems to be to show dependence of Dantzig and plebiscite areas on Polish goodwill, former being now cut off from all supplies except by sea.

Commission is protesting formally to Council of Ambassadors against measure which seems to be intolerable abuse of power and violation of Treaty of Versailles.<sup>1</sup>

Local German authorities report that Polish troops are being concentrated in neighbourhood of railway at Deutscheylau [*sic*] and armed raid into plebiscite (? area) is not impossible.

Repeated to Warsaw.

<sup>1</sup> For a protest by Dr. Göppert to M. Millerand on the same subject see No. 104 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

**No. 556**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 17, 11 p.m.)*

*No. 15 Telegraphic [192509/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 17, 1920, 10.45 a.m.

Following telegram sent to Paris No. 1 April 17th.

Your telegram of April 15th<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Rennie.

Date of Plebiscite.

Commission hopes to have all preliminaries completed by June 28th and could if necessary take vote on July 4th. Poles' desire to postpone is unreasonable.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 552, n. 5.

**No. 557**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 17, 11 p.m.)*

*No. 16 Telegraphic [192510/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 17, 1920, 11.10 a.m.

Your telegram No. 5.<sup>1</sup>

Observations were telegraphed in my telegram No. 9 March 26th<sup>2</sup> of which following is repetition.

Your telegram No. 4.<sup>3</sup>

(? Proposal) (to suspend custom duties on goods imported into area) was considered in order to facilitate trade and to put Dantzig and Poland on same footing as Germany but has been abandoned in view of opposition raised. Cost of collecting duties is greater than revenue produced. German objections were therefore based on political rather than on economic grounds and on necessity involved of transferring German Customs barrier from this area to present East Prussian frontier.

<sup>1</sup> Of April 16, not printed. This asked for Mr. Beaumont's observations as soon as possible on the alleged interference of the Plebiscite Commission with customs duties.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram seems never to have reached the Foreign Office.

<sup>3</sup> No. 541.

**No. 558**

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 6. Telegraphic [192506/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, April 17, 1920

Following for Supreme Council.

Inter-Allied Commission protest against stoppage of railway traffic through Polish corridor in consequence of decree of Polish Government dated April 7th.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Warsaw and to the Foreign Office, where it was received at 11 p.m. on April 18.

Owing to this step railway communication is completely interrupted with (? Dantzig) Germany and (? rest of Europe).

Commission insists on facilities being granted for its members and correspondence.

#### No. 559

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received April 19, 12.30 p.m.)*

*No. 256 Telegraphic [192717/100450/39]*

WARSAW, April 18, 1920, 11.45 p.m.

Marienwerder telegram No. 13.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst Inter-Allied Commission must be the best judges of date for taking plebiscite, I think it important from our point of view here that Poles should have no excuse for a present or future grievance against the Allies, on the ground that plebiscite arrangements have been pushed through too rapidly.

Repeated to Marienwerder.

<sup>1</sup> No. 550.

#### No. 560

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received April 19, 6 p.m.)*

*No. 257 Telegraphic [192799/100450/39]*

WARSAW, April 18, 1920, 11.50 p.m.

Marienwerder telegram 14.<sup>1</sup>

It is not a fact that Polish Government has suspended all railway traffic with Dantzig and Plebiscite areas.

Official Gazette 32 of April 15th published Decree by which passenger traffic on line Konitz-Czersk-Marienwerder, and goods traffic on above line and on line Konitz-Czersk-Graudenz and Deutsch-Eylau are not to be suspended. Inter-Allied railway Mission confirms this and Sir R. Tower who has just been in Warsaw has satisfied himself that there has been no . . .<sup>2</sup> in supply trains to Dantzig. There will be no interruption of official telegrams.

Reason for closing frontiers is as stated by Polish Government, who are only following similar measure taken by Czecho-Slovak Government some time ago. There seems therefore to be no justification for suggestion that real object of measure is to show Dantzig and Plebiscite areas that they are dependent on goodwill of Poland. Protest of Commission would likewise seem to be unjustified or premature.

I will make enquiries as to reported concentration of Polish troops at Deutsch-Eylau, but I venture to think that information of this nature received from German sources should be accepted with reserve.

Repeated to Paris and Marienwerder.

<sup>1</sup> No. 555.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is uncertain.

**No. 561**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 20, 6 p.m.)*

*No. 19 Telegraphic [193023/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 19, 1920, 5.50 p.m.

Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 257.<sup>1</sup>

There is now no railway communication with Danzig except supply trucks for Allied troops and transit from East Prussia to Germany, by only direct main line *via* Dirschau, is completely suspended.

Concession offered *via* Schmentau and Graudenz is not yet effective, and as regards Königsberg, it is as if transit between York and London were only allowed over a single line passing through Wales.

Repeated to Warsaw.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 560.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Hardinge minuted as follows upon this telegram: 'General Carton de Wiart told me this morning that this reported obstruction by the Poles in the corridor is grossly exaggerated. H.' (This undated minute was written not earlier than April 21.)

**No. 562**

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received April 20, 6 p.m.)*

*No. 259 Telegraphic [193015/100450/39]*

WARSAW, April 19, 1920, 6.40 p.m.

My telegram 257<sup>1</sup> last paragraph.

Deputy Chief of Polish General Staff informs British Military Mission categorically that report of concentration at Deutsch-Eylau is totally untrue. He added that in any case there are not sufficient Polish troops available.

I do not anyhow believe Poles would make an armed raid into Dantzic and plebiscite areas.

<sup>1</sup> No. 560.

**No. 563**

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [192924/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, April 19, 1920

Following for Supreme Council.

Disturbances have occurred at two towns where Poles had arranged propaganda meetings. Commission in first case proclaimed martial law. They are investigating incidents and endeavouring to take all proper measures.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Warsaw and as No. 15 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on April 20 at 11.20 a.m.

It is understood that Polish Government has exposed general situation to Supreme Council. Commission would be glad to hear what reply has been made to these representations.

Excitement in area is increasing and forces at the disposal of Commission are inadequate to insure freedom and liberty of speech demanded.

**No. 564**

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received April 20, 9.30 p.m.)*

*No. 16 Telegraphic [193025/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, April 20, 1920, 1.55 p.m.

My telegram No. 7 to Paris.<sup>1</sup> Situation here is gradually becoming serious and will develop as Polish propaganda grows more active.

Proceedings of Polish agents who are foreign to this area are according to report regarded with disfavour by (? resident) Poles and are calculated to irritate German-speaking population without advancing Polish cause.

Attitude of Polish Consul-General makes co-operation with him very difficult. Although I am still reluctant to make formal complaint against him nevertheless it should be pointed out that he appears to consider his rôle here is to create trouble and there is reason to think he encourages more violent elements.

Polish agitators are trying to win over extreme Socialists by promises of improved conditions should territory vote for Poland.

Sent to British Ambassador Paris, and British Minister Warsaw.

<sup>1</sup> This is apparently a reference to No. 563 above.

**No. 565**

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 9 Telegraphic [193354/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, April 21, 1920

Following for Council of Ambassadors:—

Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 257 of April 20th.<sup>2</sup>

Railway communication with Danzig and Berlin now restored. Protest on the part of this Commission accordingly no longer necessary.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 14 to Warsaw and as No. 17 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on April 22 at 12 noon.

<sup>2</sup> No. 560.

No. 566

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 479 Telegraphic: by bag [192924/100450/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 22, 1920, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 472, Section 5 of April 15th:<sup>1</sup> Marienwerder and Allenstein Plebiscites.

Your action approved.

His Majesty's Government consider it highly desirable that these plebiscites should be held at latest by July 15th.

Repeated to Marienwerder No. 7, and to Allenstein No. 6.

<sup>1</sup> No. 552.

No. 567

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received May 4)*

*No. 17 [195721/100450/39]<sup>1</sup>*

ALLENSTEIN, *April 22, 1920*

My Lord,

In my despatch No. 14,<sup>2</sup> enclosing copy of my despatch No. 7 to the Supreme Council, I reported the publication of the 'plebiscite *règlements*.' A week has now elapsed, and I think it may be safely said that the rules themselves have met with very little adverse press criticism beyond the German papers expressing the hope that the vote may be taken as soon as possible, in order to terminate the present state of uncertainty.

The formation of the control committees has now begun, and, as was to be expected, the Germans had their lists of candidates fully prepared. On the other hand, the district officers have had difficulty in producing similar lists of Poles, and one officer at least has reported that he was unable to find suitable Polish names for his district. The Commission proceeded to make their selection of candidates, but the day before yesterday a letter was received from the Central Polish Committee that the lists as presented by the local committees must be withdrawn. It was unfortunate that last week two cases had occurred of Polish meetings being broken up. The Commission, however, took all possible measures, sent a detachment of British troops to the place where the more serious disturbance occurred, and are holding an enquiry in order to bring to justice the persons responsible for the disorders. Urgent instructions were at the same time sent to all the local administrative and police authorities to protect Polish meetings, pointing out that in the event of the Poles being unable to carry out the necessary preparatory propaganda work, the taking of the plebiscite might be postponed. Orders were

<sup>1</sup> The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> No. 549.



also issued by the German societies all over the area to refrain from molesting the Poles. These various steps were communicated to the Polish consul-general, who was invited yesterday to call upon the Commission. M. Lewandowski admitted that the Commission were doing all they could to safeguard the interests of his countrymen, but then went on to repeat, what he had declared on so many previous occasions, namely, that the means, both military and administrative, at the disposal of the Commission were quite inadequate for their task and for the purpose of securing to the Poles the guarantees which had been promised when the Commission arrived. He renewed all his old arguments to the effect that Polish population here was completely 'terrorised,' and would not admit that any improvement in their condition had been effected. He was told that the inadequacy of these means could not be discussed by the Commission with the Polish representatives here, but was one for the Polish Government to discuss with the Council of Ambassadors. If the Polish Government were not satisfied they should have drawn attention to the fact before the Commission left Paris, and should at least represent the situation to the higher authorities. He was urged to impress upon the Polish committees the necessity for their participating in the work which was being commenced for the drawing up of the lists of voters. He replied that the committees consider that the lives of their countrymen would be endangered if they took part in these proceedings. These outpourings of M. Lewandowski evoked a sharp reply from our French colleague, who said that, if the Poles refused to take a share in what was merely administrative work under the ægis of the Commission, the Polish Government would be placed in a difficult position, as they would have to admit to the Council of Ambassadors in Paris that no representatives of Poland had the courage to come forward when the national interests of their country were at stake. M. Lewandowski replied in his usual exaggerated language that he could not ask that the Polish representatives should expose themselves to the risk of working on the control committees, and, although he appeared to see the force of M. Couget's argument, that the Polish cause would suffer, and that the Government would be placed in a difficult situation, said that he could not again approach his committees. His position here, he asserted, was an impossible one, and he was immediately proceeding to Warsaw to explain the situation to his Government. I regret to have to say that M. Lewandowski's attitude produced a lamentable impression of pusillanimity.

As I have already indicated, M. Lewandowski's antecedents and personality are such as hardly to entitle him to control and direct his countrymen here. The Polish committees appear to be composed of persons of inferior capacity, and appear to be assisted by men of the paid agitator type who have been educated in the Polish propaganda school at Warsaw, and probably they are out of sympathy with the few better-class Poles resident in the area. On the other hand it is becoming evident that the means at the disposal of the Commission are insufficient effectively to protect the non-German against the German section of the population, if the latter resolve to carry out a systematic petty persecution.

The complaints of the Poles that they are unable to carry out their preparatory work and organisation for the plebiscite, have accordingly a certain amount of justification.

Both the Polish consul-general and the committees urge that the plebiscite cannot be carried out this summer, but when asked what their opinion is they declare that they can give no date, vaguely mentioning next year or the year after, and can only repeat that the Allied forces in their present strength cannot afford them the necessary guarantees or security or effective equality of rights.

The Commission however consider that, having published the *règlement*, they must proceed with it, and the district officers are being instructed to complete their committees by the temporary inclusion of Germans if no Poles are available. I feel, nevertheless, that I must point out the opinion of this Commission that the number of occupying troops is too small for the carrying out of, in the letter, that portion of article 95 of the treaty, *viz.*, 'to arrange for the vote and for the taking of such measures as it may deem necessary to ensure its freedom, fairness, and secrecy' for the Polish-speaking section of the population.

It must be remembered that since the revolution in 1918 the whole moral tone of Germany has declined and the population is no longer the former law-abiding one, and that, even if the German societies can control their members and induce them to refrain from molesting their adversaries, there still remains a large unruly element of rowdies and malcontents who are not under control, who would like a chance to threaten the Polish-speaking population.

I am not prepared at present to state what further guarantees would satisfy the Poles, for, in all probability whatever further steps were taken in their favour, they would still continue to ask for more.

The object of this despatch is to prepare Your Lordship for the further representations which are to be expected from the Polish Government. Without giving it as my personal opinion, I should add that there seems to be a general feeling that the vote in this area will go very largely in favour of Germany, and that realising this probability the tactics of the Poles are to decline to take part in what they anticipate will be a losing game.

I have, &c.,  
E. RENNIE

**No. 568**

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received May 4)*

*No. 18 [195720/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, *April 22, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to my immediately preceding Despatch No. 17<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to call to the attention of your Lordship the small number of effective

<sup>1</sup> No. 567.

troops at the disposal of the Commission. From a military point of view the position is extremely unsatisfactory, even when it is understood that the troops are merely for the purpose of assisting existing police organisations to maintain order.

The British battalion here consists of some 650 troops stationed at Allenstein, one company being detached at the regulating station at Deutsch-Eylau in the Marienwerder Area. It has been found necessary to send a detachment to Bischhofsburg [*sic*], where martial law has been declared on account of disturbances which took place last week, and a company has been sent this week to Osterode in consequence of the representations of the French District Officer, who insists that it is imperative to show there a force of Allied troops.

The Italian battalion which is stationed at Lyck near the Eastern frontier, more than 100 miles from Allenstein, has been similarly weakened by having to send two detachments away from its centre. I am well aware that from a military point of view this division of force is greatly to be deprecated. On the other hand it is necessary to show the population of the country districts that Allied troops are actually in occupation of this Area in order to meet the Polish complaint that in the rural districts the Commission depends exclusively on the former German police organisations.

I have written to the General Officer Commanding at Danzig requesting him to strengthen the British battalion here by returning to it the company of troops stationed at Deutsch-Eylau.

Although I understand the difficulties entailed by asking that the troops of occupation may be strengthened, yet I feel it my duty to point out to His Majesty's Government the situation which will arise when the Polish Government complain to the Council of Ambassadors that the steps taken by the Allies are inadequate, as not offering the guarantees promised to the Polish-speaking section of the population, and to indicate the eventuality of a refusal of Poland to accept the result of the Plebiscite, on the pretext that conditions laid down by Treaty having [*sic*] been unfulfilled.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

**No. 569**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received April 24, 10 p.m.)*

*No. 21 Telegraphic [193976/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, *April 23, 1920, 4.30 p.m.*

Question has been raised of sending more troops to this area.<sup>1</sup> I learn indirectly that while Italian Government will not accede to request, French

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 543.

Government may be prepared to accept recommendation made by their Representative here.

I wish to place on record my emphatic opinion that force here is adequate for all purposes for which it can properly be used.

Repeated to Paris.

No. 570

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received May 4)*

No. 288 [195727/100450/39]<sup>1</sup>

WARSAW, April 24, 1920

My Lord,

The President of the Allenstein Plebiscite Commission, in a recent communication to me, alluded to the difficulties which he experienced in co-operating with the Polish consul-general, and pointed out that M. Lewandowski was rather apt to encourage the violent national elements, and this was not very desirable in view of the present conditions in the plebiscite area.

Mr. Rennie disclaimed any desire to complain of M. Lewandowski, and, in those circumstances, I thought it better not to make any written representation to the Polish Government for fear lest such a step might only end by rendering the relations between Mr. Rennie and the Polish consul-general more difficult. However, Sir Percy Loraine, acting under my instructions, called to-day on the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, who deals with all questions connected with the northern plebiscite areas.

Sir Percy Loraine begun [*sic*] by saying that, now that the Allenstein Commission had decided to disarm the Sicherheitspolizei and reduce its numbers, and to take the other measures recorded in Mr. Rennie's despatches No. 14 of the 13th April<sup>2</sup> and No. 15 of the 15th April to you,<sup>3</sup> which are of a nature to give satisfaction to the desires expressed by the Polish Government in regard to these matters both to this legation and to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, it might perhaps be useful to explain the difficulties with which the commission had had to contend, and which had rendered it necessary to act very prudently in any matters concerning the forces on which it had to rely for the maintenance of order. For this purpose Sir Percy Loraine briefly summarised the contents in that connection of Mr. Rennie's despatches.

M. Dabrowski expressed his gratitude for this explanation, and said that the Polish Government had learnt with considerable satisfaction of the measures taken by the commission, and appreciated highly the impartial manner in which it strove to carry out its duties, as also the difficulties which beset its action.

There was, however, he added, a further and deeper question, namely, that of the date of the plebiscite. There was, he said, a very considerable

<sup>1</sup> The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> No. 549.

<sup>3</sup> No. 553.

population in this area of Polish extraction which had been so long under Prussian domination and under the influence of the most characteristically Prussian ideas and traditions that their Polish origin and instincts had become dormant.

It amounted to this, that the Poles had only the few weeks which were to elapse between now and the date of voting to reclaim these kinsmen from the stupor into which long years of Prussian administration had driven them, and to revive their national consciousness.

Sir Percy Loraine pointed out at this juncture that, although His Majesty's Legation had thought it to be its duty to support the Polish contentions as regards the conditions of impartiality and freedom from pressure in which the plebiscite was to be held, the question of the date of the plebiscite was outside its competence and was a matter for settlement between the Inter-Allied Commission and the Conference.

M. Dabrowski stated that he fully recognised this, and was grateful for the action which the legation had thought fit to take in regard to the matters referred to in the early portion of this despatch. There was, however, he said, an ulterior reason which considerably transcended the mere question of fixing the date of the plebiscite. Poland was a State in the process of formation, and although the war had wrought enormous changes in every country, Poland had not even a continuous pre-war history and tradition to resume; her frontiers were still undefined and she had everything to create. She must have peace to develop her energies and form her administration, and the greatest threat against that peace was the very spirit of militarism and monarchical intolerance which, as exemplified in Germany, had led to the outbreak of the European war.

In East Prussia Poland saw the focus of that danger. East Prussia was a nest of militarist instincts, and the cradle of the Prussian race and of the military caste which had brought such disaster to the world; its propinquity to Poland would always be a great danger, and if the Poles in its southern districts could be united to Poland, the danger would be *pro tanto* limited.

Moreover, East Prussia, from which the Kapp-Lüttwitz *coup d'État* had emanated and where other similar attempts or plots were more than likely to be hatched in the future, was close to the borders of Russia. Russia, under the Tsarist régime, had been crystallised into a political entity, and that régime had been copied by Peter the Great from the Prussian model.

It looked as if Russia was going to relapse once more into an amorphous state, and the present Soviet régime was probably only a stage in that direction. It was again the Germans who had given that régime its chance of existence even if they had not actually started it. If Russia became a mere formless expanse of territory, Germany's eyes would be turned towards her as an instrument for the resurrection of Germany, and East Prussia would be the fittest centre for the execution of German plans for securing domination in Russia. For Poland, he said, the centre of political gravity would always be in the West, but the danger of that centre being displaced to Poland's disadvantage would come from the East.

Sir Percy Loraine, explaining that he spoke unofficially but none the less quite frankly, then referred to the question of the Polish consul-general at Allenstein, and said that Mr. Rennie had not found his desire for cordial co-operation reciprocated to the extent which he had hoped and expected.

M. Dabrowski, who admitted that he himself had little enough experience of diplomatic intercourse, said that he had already dealt with this matter; he recognised that M. Lewandowski, who was a person of very vivid temperament, was quite unaccustomed to the usages of international relations. He had already spoken frankly the previous day on this very subject with M. Lewandowski, and had decided to appoint an official, who knew France and England well, and had a thorough experience of diplomatic methods and usages, to act as liaison officer between the Polish consul-general and the Inter-Allied Commission; he hoped that this would prove a satisfactory solution, especially as it did not alter anybody's position or ruffle anybody's susceptibilities.

Throughout the interview M. Dabrowski spoke with the utmost friendliness and with conspicuous moderation.<sup>4</sup>

I have, &c.,

H. RUMBOLD

<sup>4</sup> In his despatch No. 246 of May 8 (not printed) to Sir H. Rumbold, Lord Curzon approved Sir P. Loraine's action.

## No. 571

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 11 Telegraphic [194990/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, *April 27, 1920*

My telegram No. 7.<sup>2</sup>

Following for Council of Ambassadors.

In order to satisfy not altogether unreasonable demands of Poles who urge that existing police are a militant German force (? calculated) to prevent free taking of plebiscite and in view of steps that have been taken in other plebiscite areas as well as of decisions that have been taken by Inter-Allied Military Control Commission this Commission contemplates:

1. Dissolution of (? frontier) and Sicherheits Police.
2. Reinforcement of Municipal Police.
3. Formation of Mixed Police recruited from Poles and Germans to be used as a frontier guard.
4. Substitution of Sicherheits Police by a mixed plebiscite guard to be under orders of local officer commanding Allied Forces to support latter in case of necessity. This body to be without any staff or central organization.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Warsaw and as No. 19 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on April 29 at 9 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently this is a reference to No. 563; see also No. 564, n. 1.

In order to carry out these steps it is necessary that troops of occupation should be reinforced and that officers of experience with knowledge of German should be provided to organize new formations.

Unless these precautions are taken it is feared that measures thus outlined and which are intended to afford guarantees for Poles may at first at any rate (? overthrow) public order.

Moreover it must be remembered that frontiers of territory are of considerable extension and may be exposed to danger from outside especially as regards Eastern end.

No. 572

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 1388 [193537/100450/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 28, 1920*

My Lord,

I have received Your Excellency's despatch No. 1226 of April 21st.<sup>1</sup> transmitting a copy of a note addressed by the German peace delegation to the President of the Peace Conference,<sup>2</sup> in regard to the arrangements made for holding the plebiscites in the Allenstein and Marienwerder territories.

2. Your Lordship will no doubt have noticed the German Government's protest against any attempt to postpone these plebiscites beyond the month of June.

3. I feel that the opportunity should not be lost of pointing out to the German Government the complete inconsistency between a protest such as this and the observations contained in the speech made by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly on April 21st. and reported in Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 199 of April 21st.<sup>3</sup> a copy of which is enclosed.

4. Dr. Köster stated in his speech that voting in the plebiscite areas would take place at a time when Germany was economically and morally broken and that as a consequence Germany could never recognise decisions taken at such a moment.

5. I request that Your Lordship will draw the attention of the Conference of Ambassadors to this matter and suggest that some reference should be made to it in any reply which the Conference may decide to return to the German note of April 14th.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State),  
ERIC PHIPPS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, document No. 100.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

No. 573

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received May 4)*

*No. 20 [195722/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, *April 29, 1920*

My Lord,

In my despatch No. 18 of April 22nd.,<sup>1</sup> I stated that I had written to the General Officer Commanding Danzig, requesting him to strengthen the British battalion here by returning to it the Company belonging to it which is stationed at Deutsch-Eylau. A copy of my letter is enclosed herewith.<sup>2</sup> I now have the honour to report that General Sir R. Haking states that this cannot be done for the reasons contained in his letter, copy of which is also enclosed.<sup>3</sup> It is my duty to again refer to the position of this Commission as regards British troops and to that of the Colonel of the Regiment who is in command of the Allied contingents in this District.

I request that this situation may be duly considered, and that instructions may be sent to the General Officer Commanding at Danzig, in order that the detachment, now stationed at Deutsch-Eylau, and which properly belongs to the battalion sent to the Allenstein Area, may be placed at the disposal of the Commission and under the orders of the Officer Commanding this Area.<sup>4</sup>

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

<sup>1</sup> No. 568.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. Sir R. Haking explained that the troops were urgently needed at Deutsch-Eylau in order to provide guards for the supply trains in the plebiscite areas.

<sup>4</sup> In Foreign Office despatch No. 10 of May 7 to Mr. Rennie Lord Curzon pointed out that this matter was one for the Ambassadors' Conference.

No. 574

*Letter from Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Sir E. Crowe  
(Received May 10)*

*[197004/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, *April 29, 1920*

Dear Crowe,

Your letter of the 8th.<sup>1</sup> only reached me yesterday. I am sorry that I should have appeared to be wanting in respect towards the Supreme Council, and must admit that my criticisms were not very happily worded, particularly the suggestion that any decision could have been due to ignorance. My meaning was merely that the wish of France to create a strong State on

<sup>1</sup> See No. 542, n. 5



Germany's Eastern flank was likely to lead to trouble. Of course it may be my ignorance but I can hardly think that the creation of this Frankenstein monster could be otherwise explained. We all came here sympathizing with Poland but since we have seen things at close quarters we have without exception, and including the French, changed our views. Even Prussian militarism was gentle compared with what is going on all round our frontiers. Our impression is that aggression is more likely from the side of Poland than Germany. Germany is bound hand and foot and can hardly be ag[g]ressive for a long time to come. The Socialists are stronger than the Junkers, as was shown at the time of the Kapp 'Putsch'. Polish statements of German war preparations must be accepted with caution and, like the German announcements in Flanders of our having used asphixiating [*sic*] gas, may be the prelude and pretext for their own action.

Trouble may come soon, or it may come later, but that it must come some day is the conviction of every member of every Commission working in this part of the world.

Yours sincerely,

H. D. BEAUMONT

No. 575

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received May 10)*

*No. 24 [196900/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, April 30, 1920

My Lord,

In deference to constantly reiterated official and unofficial Polish representations this Commission, under authority provided in (F) 2° of the Protocol of January 9th, 1920, (for the disbanding, maintenance or transformation of the police forces in the Plebiscite area), has today issued a Decree dissolving the Sicherheitspolizei and Grenzpolizei. A French translation of the Decree is enclosed.<sup>1</sup> The main features are:—

Officers and men of the existing forces not born or domiciled in the area to be eliminated with certain exceptions.

Officers and men so eliminated to be replaced by carefully selected officers and men of Polish race, the latter recruited as far as possible from Poles resident in the Plebiscite area.

The new forces are to be placed under the direct orders of the officer commanding the Allied troops (Colonel Fernando Po) assisted by a Committee composed of one French and two Italian officers.

It is proposed to engage the services of not more than 14 Polish officers, very willingly offered by Poland, and between 300 and 400 Poles.

Some expense will be involved by the proposal to make a change in the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The German text is in S. Wambaugh, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 103-7.

uniform of the Sicherheitspolizei, so so [*sic*] hateful to the Polish element, by the addition of a badge or facings. The Germans are inclined to be obstructive but Colonel Po has received assurances that about 700 officers and men of the old Sicherheitspolizei out of a total of 1,300 will enlist in the new formation, and the Polish Committee here, which is of course very anxious for the scheme to be carried through, has already furnished long lists of candidates.

The danger of conflicts within the ranks of the police, and misuse of the opportunity given for the exercise of Polish influence, will, we hope, be avoided by severe discipline and by the provision inserted for the immediate disbandment of the two forces as soon as the Commission has completed its work, and left the territory. The success of the scheme will to a great extent depend upon the energy and tact of Colonel Po in which the Commission has entire confidence.

I have, &c.,  
H. D. BEAUMONT

#### No. 576

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*<sup>1</sup>

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [195631/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, May 3, 1920

My Despatch No. 21 April 29th to Foreign Office.<sup>2</sup>

Polish local committees continue to abstain from taking part in plebiscite control committees.

Suggest you might indicate to Polish Government that Commission cannot give way to this obstruction as it would practically mean that local committees can fix date of plebiscite.<sup>3</sup>

Would not Polish Government be willing to send instructions that local Poles should participate at least in preliminary work? In Marienwerder they are doing so.

*Confidential.*

It is said that there is much dissension here amongst Polish Committees, out of which Germans are making capital.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Paris and as No. 22 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on May 3 at 11.15 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> In his telegram No. 309 of May 4 to Lord Curzon Sir H. Rumbold reported that he had taken action in the sense suggested.

*The Polish Minister in London to Earl Curzon (Received May 8)*<sup>1</sup>

No. 2072 [196742/100450/39]

LONDON, May 5, 1920

My Lord,

I have been informed by my Government that the British Representative in Kwidzyn (Marienwerder) has received instructions to the effect that the plebiscite in that area must take place before July the 15th.

I have the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that, in view of the conditions prevailing in that country, this measure would be unjust and undoubtedly prove prejudicial to Polish interests.

At present, the conditions in the plebiscite area are as follows:

1. The Sicherheitspolizei [*sic*] is the only organ of public security in the districts of Olsztyn (Allenstein) Elk and Kwidzyn (Marienwerder).
2. The numerically insufficient Allied troops (one Italian Battalion [*sic*] for the district of Marienwerder, one British and one Italian battalion for the districts of Allenstein and Elk respectively) are not in a position to prevent the outrages of the Sicherheitspolizei, which render German propaganda, chiefly consisting of threats and menaces, employed with a view of terrorising the Polish population into voting for Germany, possible, and prevent any counteraction on our part.

The danger of German propaganda is sufficiently proved by the fact that in the district of Allenstein alone, which, as was stated above, is occupied by only one British battalion, the Sicherheitspolizei is 8000 men strong.

3. The result of these conditions is that, in spite of their conscientious [*sic*] efforts, the Plebiscite Commissions are unable to fulfil their task of ensuring an equitable Plebiscite for the following reasons:

- a) the Sicherheitspolizei is terrorising the population.
- b) the German population, in spite of the summons of the Plebiscite Commission, has not surrendered its arms, which are a menace to the Polish inhabitants.
- c) outrages in schools and Government offices continue and no schoolmasters or officials have been dismissed.
- d) acts of violence directed against the Poles are not hindered, as for instance on March the 7th in Allenstein, when the Polish flag was forcibly removed by a German Police officer from the Polish Consulate.
- e) members of the Polish Plebiscite Commission are unable to travel in the country, as they are constantly attacked and ill-treated by German bands, with whom the Sicherheitspolizei refuses to interfere.

My Government have instructed me to point out to your Lordship that they consider that it is impossible to hold a plebiscite in the above stated conditions and until both nationalities inhabiting these territories enjoy such equal rights as will allow them to vote according to conviction.

<sup>1</sup> Date of entry on Foreign Office file.

With a view to achieving this result the following measures appear imperative:

- a) That the Allied garrison should be substantially strengthened.
- b) That those members of the Sicherheitspolizei who are not inhabitants of the Plebiscite area should be repatriated.
- c) That the Sicherheitspolizei should be dissolved and replaced by a Militia, formed of both German and Polish inhabitants of the various districts, under command of Allied officers.

In view of the above stated facts and conclusions I have the honour to request your Lordship to be kind enough to take the necessary measures with a view to postponing the Plebiscite until a time when the local conditions will ensure the freedom of vote to the population. Were the Plebiscite to take place under different conditions the result would very probably be the forming of an Irredenta, which must be avoided in the interest of all parties concerned.<sup>2</sup>

I have, &c.,

JOHN CIECHANOWSKI,

for The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary

<sup>2</sup> In his reply on May 13 Lord Curzon reminded the Polish Minister that all questions relating to these plebiscites were inter-allied matters which could only be considered by the Ambassadors' Conference. A copy of his note had therefore been forwarded to H.M. Ambassador in Paris.

### No. 578

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Rennie (Allenstein)*

*No. 13 Telegraphic [196458/100450/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 10, 1920, 6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 19 (of April 27th:<sup>1</sup> dissolution of Sicherheitspolizei etc.)

We have been obliged to make it clear to Lord Derby<sup>2</sup> that no reinforcements will be available from British sources for the Allenstein plebiscite area.

<sup>1</sup> No. 571.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 543.

### No. 579

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 17)*

*No. 583 Telegraphic: by bag [198213/7067/39]*

PARIS, May 14, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the Chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> 2. The Italian Ambassador called attention to the resolution of the Conference of the 15th April (see my telegram No. 472 paragraph 5)<sup>2</sup> proposing that the plebiscite[s] of Allenstein and Marienwerder should be held within three months from that date. He asked that the two Commissions having replied that they agreed with this proposal, it should be definitely laid down that the two plebiscites should be held before the 15th July. M. Cambon demurred on the ground that Mr. Rennie, in his telegram of the 29th ultimo to the Conference of Ambassadors (repeated to the Foreign Office in his telegram No. 19)<sup>3</sup> had proposed the re-organisation of the Police Force in order to guarantee liberty of voting to the Poles. I replied that I could not agree to the date of the Plebiscite being made dependent on the possibility of the troops of occupation being increased, and added that I was convinced that no more British troops could be sent to these plebiscite areas (see your despatch No. 1560).<sup>4</sup> M. Cambon accordingly withdrew his objection and it was agreed to the plebiscite taking place before the 15th July.<sup>5</sup> . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 552.

<sup>3</sup> No. 571.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Lord Curzon conveyed this information to Mr. Rennie in his telegram No. 16 of May 20, not printed.

## No. 580

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received May 25)*

*No. 25 [199733/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, May 15, 1920

My Lord,

My despatches Nos. 10<sup>1</sup> and 11<sup>2</sup> addressed to the Council of Ambassadors which were forwarded under compliments forms Nos. O.L. 70 and O.L. 72 are intended to give some idea of the obstructive tactics that the Poles intend to pursue towards the Plebiscite of this Area.

When the Poles object that little has been done it is only fair to remind them that many steps have already been taken to meet their objections of disparity of position. For instance:—

The Sicherheitspolizei, in consequence of their disarmament, have now greatly lost their military character; measures have been taken to prevent the clergy and the schoolteachers from abusing their position; the District Commissioners supervise the Local Landrats, and are in a position to deal with Polish complaints; facilities are offered for the Poles to hold meetings; the German Committees have issued instructions, which I believe to be fulfilling their purpose, to abstain from molesting the Poles; steps have been taken to punish the authors of the disturbances which took place in two towns when Polish meetings were being held, and in the more important case, an exhaustive enquiry is being held by a mixed Court presided over by a British officer, and containing both a Polish and a German judge.

<sup>1</sup> Of May 11, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Of May 12, not printed.

This Commission, however, appear[s] to be not alone in these experiences, as I gather from the neighbouring Marienwerder Commission that they are being treated in much the same way, e.g., the latter's re-organisation of the local police, a step which we in this District have been unable to more than consider, has given little satisfaction, and has been the pretext for further pretensions.

I trust therefore, that it will be evident to the Council of Ambassadors, although it seems to be scarcely appreciated by the Poles, that this Commission, as far as their means allow, are doing all they can to meet Polish exigencies.

It is indeed becoming more difficult not to believe that their abstention from preparatory Plebiscite work, i.e., their non-participation in the local committees, is not the result of a premeditated scheme designed to retard the vote, and colour is lent to this supposition by the language used by the Polish Government in their notes to the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, and by the Consulate General and the local Committees in their communications to the Commission.

The Polish cause has indeed been badly served here. Dr. Lewandowski, the Polish Consul General, has, however, now been given a prolonged leave of absence, if not actually recalled. He was evidently at loggerheads with the Local Committees, who are both divided among themselves, as well as at variance with such influential and better-educated Poles as there may be in the District.

M. Andrycz, his successor, arrived two days ago, and has had his first talk with the Commission. He admits that mistakes have been made, and gave the impression that Warsaw had not been very well informed regarding the position. He had apparently heard much about 'terrorism' and 'Massacres', but it was pointed out to him that so far his countrymen had proved no definite charges that either the German administrative authorities or the police had abused their position, and that the chief justified complaint is that about four Polish meetings have been broken up. My French colleague remarked bluntly to M. Andrycz that up to now only some twenty Polish heads had been broken, and that this certainly did not imply over-keen political partisanship.

One of the factors that may account for the present Polish obstruction is that Polish propaganda, so far, has had apparently little result among the Mazurs, who are said to number some 200,000. The Polish Commission in Paris, last year, I believe, tried to claim these people, who are indeed of Slav descent, and who speak a Polish patois, but who inhabit territory which, it seems, never formed part of the ancient kingdom of Poland. They apparently, now refuse to be won over by Polish agents, and this refusal is no doubt a disappointment to their wooers.

Admitting that in the Allenstein Area the Poles under the former German rule, were in the position of a subject race, nevertheless, so far as one can gather, their position was far from being unendurable, and they used to live on comparatively friendly terms with their German neighbours. It was only

last year, when the Polish agitation began, that they began to be subjected to unequal treatment, and at the present they do not appear to be disposed to suffer much for national ideals. Both M. Couget, the French Commissioner, and Count Marchetti, who is acting as Chargé d'Affaires for Marquis Fracassi, seem lately to have quite changed their minds regarding the Polish community, which, when they first arrived, they were inclined to consider a downtrodden and oppressed race.

One can only conclude that the Poles have mistaken or misunderstood the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which relate to this Plebiscite Area, and, disappointed in their expectations that the Commission would effect a complete change in the administrative system and personnel of this Area, are now endeavouring to urge Paris that the vote cannot take place until every vestige of the former authority has been swept away. Accordingly, the surmise that Polish obstruction is really directed against the Treaty does not seem to be altogether harsh or unjustified.

As regards the general internal situation here, there is little to report except where in two or three Districts strikes have occurred, or have been threatened by the workmen. The most serious took place last week, where [*sic*] the local workmen and the agricultural labourers near the town proclaimed a strike nominally against the high local prices, but in reality against the Local Landrat and the German authorities. The townspeople replied by closing their shops, whereupon the workmen threatened to destroy the local gas and water works. Colonel Crichton, the local District Commissioner, who has won for himself the general respect of the community, acted with energy, and succeeded single-handed in dissuading the workmen from committing acts of sabotage, and he and Colonel Bennett, after various meetings with the malcontents, ended in persuading all parties to refer their complaints for the decision of the Commission. The municipality, I hear, intend to name a street after Colonel Crichton in recognition of his services on this occasion! I mention this to show the position which the British District Officers are making for themselves in their Districts.

One frequently hears that the Independent Socialists say that they now obtain a bearing and justice which they never experienced under the old regime.

A British detachment has now been sent to the District of Ortelsburg, about 40 miles to the S.E. of Allenstein, where there is said to be a considerable Polish population, and where unruly elements appear to be strong. This measure has caused a further diminution of the British troops, who are now posted at Osterode and Ortelsburg, with a further detachment at Bischhofsburg [*sic*], (where a riot occurred in the middle of April), as well as troops at the Control Station at Deutsch-Eylau in the Marienwerder Section, where a detachment was left by the orders of the G.O.C. Danzig. I am well aware that the sub-dividing of forces is undesirable from a military point of view, but at present there is no reason to fear that it would lead to untoward results, and from a political point of view, it is highly desirable that Allied forces should make an appearance in different parts of the country. At the

end of April the 1st Royal Irish Regiment made a two days' trip by train of the Eastern half of this Area, and have since done a smaller tour. Their Colonel informs me that they were everywhere exceedingly well received. In the town of Allenstein itself, it is scarcely too much to say that they are beginning to be looked on as forming a normal feature in the life of the town.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

No. 581

*Letter from Mr. Carr (Danzig) to Mr. Sargent (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

[200485/100450/39]

DANZIG, May 19, 1920

Dear Sargent,

I have just returned from a trip with Tower to Marienwerder and Allenstein and I thought you and possibly the Ambassador might be interested to know how things were going in these parts.

We went from here to Marienwerder via Dirschau, Marienburg and Stuhm, the next day on to Allenstein and the following day across East Prussia from Allenstein to Elbing, the[n] thence back to Danzig.

In motoring from one end of Marienwerder to the other we saw no indication anywhere of anything Polish, except occasional Polish names, which crop up everywhere in this part of the country and by no means prove that their owners are Polish. We were perhaps a little unfortunate inasmuch as when we were at Stuhm, which is recognised as the principal and indeed the only Polish centre in the area, a big German demonstration was in progress and the Poles who were presumably there were remaining indoors. It appears uncertain whether the Poles will get a majority in Stuhm, but everyone seems agreed that they have nothing whatever to hope for elsewhere.

Though there is a serious danger that things may take a tragic turn before the end, the activities of the Plebiscite Commission (minus its Japanese member, who has been in hospital almost from the first) have principally belonged to the sphere of farce. Having had special stamps printed in Italy, they sold so large a proportion of the first issue to dealers that they ran out altogether at the beginning of last month, and having since failed to get any more they have had to go back to the German Government and buy German stamps from them. These are surcharged by the local printer, who is thus of course in a position to produce as many as he likes on his own account.

Yielding to the clamour of the Poles against the Sicherheitspolizei, the Commission decided to reorganise the force, incorporating in it some 400 Poles (whence derived I do not know) and placing it under Italian command. The natural result is that the whole force is now more dangerous than useful, and as a Polish demonstration has [*sic*] been fixed for Sunday (the day we arrived) the Italian Commander in Chief of the force had gone away for the

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this letter was entered on the Foreign Office file on May 28.



week-end, leaving strict injunctions that the whole force was to be confined to barracks for the day and under no circumstances allowed out. The demonstration took place. There was the usual interchange of compliments between German and Poles, which in the absence of any police, developed into a scuffle and one of the Poles in a moment of excitement started firing at random and wounded a Polish woman. As he is a local Polish leader the Commission are afraid to punish him and though he has been arrested are now trying to find an excuse for letting him out as soon as possible.

The Commission sit morning, noon and night. The usual procedure seems to be as follows. The Italian President proposes some action, usually in the direction of keeping the Poles in order, which seems to be the principal need of the district. The Frenchman objects. Beaumont assures them both that he entirely agrees with them, but implores each not to insist on his point of view for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of the other. The net result is naturally that they do little and do that little wrong. Beaumont's tactics do not appear to have secured even the minor advantage of harmony within the Commission, as the President now talks of coming to Paris to explain to the Council of Ambassadors that he cannot carry on without more effective support from his colleagues. I do not know whether he will come before I return or what exactly he will say, but if he does the two principal needs are to strengthen his hands against the Poles (being a politician he is apparently somewhat intimidated by the attacks by the Polish press bureau put in the Italian press against him), and to hurry on the Plebiscite as soon as possible, ere worse things befall. Both Allenstein and Marienwerder have provisionally arranged for the second Sunday in July, but neither has so far had the courage to announce the date. This is the last possible date within the three months given them by the Council of Ambassadors.

In Allenstein the position is much better and there seems [*sic*] to be one or two quite good people on the staff of the Commission. Local strikes and occasional collisions between Poles and Germans are the only features. The Poles are at present refusing to participate in the work of the local committees in order to force a postponement of the Plebiscite, but these tactics are being wisely ignored by the Commission.

The only outstanding question is the Sicherheitspolizei. You will recollect the telegram which Rennie sent to Paris about it<sup>1</sup> shortly before my departure. Except that he has heard from London that under no circumstances would more troops be sent, he has had no answer and it is desirable that the answer should be postponed as long as possible. Definite refusal of the scheme proposed at the instigation of the Poles would unnecessarily irritate the latter. On the other hand reinforcement of the troops is both impossible and unnecessary and the Commission, with the example of Marienwerder in front of them, are not likely to attempt a reorganisation of the police force without. Here too it is most undesirable that there should be any unnecessary delay in the plebiscite, as the situation is certain to get worse rather than better. The Polish chances of winning certain districts on the southern border are

<sup>1</sup> Presumably No. 571.

variously estimated, but it seems agreed that that will be the utmost limit of their success.

In crossing East Prussia, both inside and outside the plebiscite area, the two chief impressions one got were the general prosperity of the country and the extreme friendliness of the people. Both these remarks apply specially to the country, but also in a slightly lesser degree to the towns. The Sicherheitspolizei who examined our passports at the frontier were both civil and efficient, thereby contrasting with the armed Polish guards who stopped us three times in crossing the narrow tongue of Polish territory less than 10 kilometres wide round Dirschau. On different occasions a Sicherheitsman and two German soldiers came with us on the car for a few miles to show us the way. Among people of this kind (of course we saw nothing of the Junkers) there is certainly no anti-British feeling, but entirely the reverse. The feeling against the Entente is alleged to be strong in Königsberg. If so, it is presumably due to the presence there of a branch of the Control Commission.

There is nothing to report here yet, but I may write you another letter as to developments here and my own movements before the bag goes.

Yours ever,

E. H. CARR

No. 582

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Mr. Rennie (Allenstein)*<sup>1</sup>

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [199232/100450/39]*

WARSAW, May 20, 1920

Following forwarded to-day to Allenstein unnumbered. Your telegram No. 17 to me<sup>2</sup> and your despatch No. 16 to Council of Ambassadors.<sup>3</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Polish Government cannot issue instructions directly to inhabitants of Plebiscite areas and that in view of the good reasons on which these based their refusal to take part in the Commissions of control, cannot exercise pressure on them as desired by Inter-Allied Commission.

Polish representatives also point out that police authority in Plebiscite area is exercised by Sicherheits Polizei which is two and a half times as great as pre-war police and by a local German gendarmerie five times pre-war strength; and that German armed forces disperse Polish meetings. In above circumstances any Polish member of the Commissions of control would risk losing his life and property if he took part in proceedings of Commissions.

Polish Government consider that inhabitants of Plebiscite area could only accede to wishes of Inter-Allied Mission when Sicherheits Polizei has been demobilized, General Commission of Germans and Poles are equally represented therein, and when Polish representatives have been accredited to German administrative authorities.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Paris and as No. 343 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on May 21 at 10 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Possibly No. 576.

<sup>3</sup> Not received in the Foreign Office.

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 25)**No. 610 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, May 22, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning<sup>1</sup> under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>2</sup> 3) The Conference considered Mr. Rennie's request for the reinforcement of the police in the Allenstein plebiscite area, (see telegram of April 27th.)<sup>3</sup> I stated at the outset that H.M. Government could not send reinforcements or even officers to organise the police, but that they would have no objections to reinforcements or officers being sent by the other Allies. My Italian colleague pointed out that as Italy had already done more than her share by sending a battalion to Allenstein in the place of a British battalion it was not to be hoped that Italy could help further in the matter. The question was therefore reduced to the sending of officers to organise the police. Marshal Foch pointed out that as the troops in Allenstein were British and Italian, the officers sent must be of this nationality. But it was generally agreed that as the plebiscite was to be held on July 11th, it was now too late to organise the police, and I suggested that officers might be sent to hold, as it were, a watching brief and superintend the action of the police. On my emphasizing the language difficulty, General Weygand pointed out that in Silesia, the French had detached from the troops already there experienced and specially qualified officers for this independent and responsible work, and had replaced them by troops with officers of ordinary qualification. It was decided that the Conference should send a communication to Mr. Rennie suggesting the detachment for this purpose of any officers that could be spared from the troops of occupation. I have also telegraphed to Mr. Rennie in this sense. Monsieur Cambon is anxious that the Allies should take this measure in order to be in a strong position to meet the possible protests of the Poles after the plebiscite, which will probably be unfavourable to them, and I would urge that the War Office should endeavour to send some officers as desired especially as we were unable last January to send to various plebiscite areas the number of battalions we had originally promised.

4) In spite of the quieter situation in Germany, Senator Pavia, President of the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission had maintained his request for an additional battalion to reinforce the troops of occupation in that area. It was proposed to transfer the French battalion, now near Danzig, to Marienwerder. In support of the proposal Monsieur Cambon read out a telegram of May 17th<sup>4</sup> from the French delegate on the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission reporting a riot caused by the Germans on the occasion of a procession organised by the Poles with due authorisation. I pointed out that

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was evidently drafted on May 21.

<sup>2</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>3</sup> No. 571.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

the City of Danzig had been maintaining this battalion for some considerable time at their own expense and for the purpose of their own security and that they might well refuse to pay for this maintenance up to the present if the battalion were now removed when its presence might be much required.

It was decided that my Italian colleague should consult Senator Pavia once more as to the present need for the reinforcement and that simultaneously I should consult Sir Reginald Tower as to the advisability of releasing the French battalion or part of it from Danzig.

5) The Secretariat General of the Conference urged that some reply must be sent to the notes<sup>5</sup> of the Polish delegation of April 16th and 20th, requesting that the plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder should be postponed until effective measures had been taken to secure a free vote, and until certain German officials had been removed and the German police force reduced. Monsieur Cambon pointed to a passage in the 2nd note to the effect that unless their request was complied with, the Polish Government would be obliged to declare that the plebiscite was held in a manner contrary to the spirit of the Treaty. I proposed that a reply should be sent maintaining the dates already fixed, and stating that the Conference could not accept the declaration of the Polish Government just alluded to. My Italian colleague proposed that, apart from this point, the tone should be more lenient, and that the Polish Government should be informed that their complaints would be referred to the President of the Plebiscite area for any action possible.

6) My attitude in regard to the Polish request just mentioned appeared justified by a contrary request of the German Government in their note No. 151 of April 14th,<sup>6</sup> asking that the dates of the plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder should not be postponed beyond the month of June, and in accordance with Your Lordship's despatch No. 1388 (193537/39) of April 28th,<sup>7</sup> I proposed that the Conference should point out to the German Government the complete inconsistency between this protest and the statements contained in a speech of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly on April 21st last, to the effect that voting in the plebiscite areas would take place at a time when Germany was economically and morally broken and that as a consequence Germany could never recognise decisions taken at such a moment. This proposal was readily agreed to.<sup>8</sup> . . .<sup>2</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 577.

<sup>6</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 100.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 572.

<sup>8</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 145, for M. Millerand's reply to Herr Woermann.

## No. 584

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 28)*

*No. 630 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, May 26, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon and considered the following questions:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (5) With reference to the question of increasing the troops in the Marienwerder Plebiscite Area (See my telegram No. 610 paragraph 4)<sup>2</sup> I informed the Conference that I had received a telegram from Sir R. Tower to the effect that General Haking was of the opinion that the French Battalion at Neufahrwasser could not be spared as it would weaken the Allied forces in Danzig unduly. At the same time the Italian Ambassador stated that Signor Pavia, President of the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission, had now acknowledged that no further increase in the troops of occupation was necessary. This appears to be in conformity with the views expressed in the telegram which I have received direct from Mr. Beaumont.<sup>3</sup> In these circumstances the Conference decided to take no further action in the matter. In answer to an enquiry received from the Marienwerder Commission it was decided to authorise them to announce the date of the plebiscite whenever they thought fit to do so.<sup>4</sup> . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 583.

<sup>3</sup> No. 569.

<sup>4</sup> In paragraph 4 (not printed) of his telegram No. 695 of June 11 Lord Derby reported that the Commission had fixed July 11 as the date.

## No. 585

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received June 15)*

*No. 32 [203829/100450/39]<sup>1</sup>*

ALLENSTEIN, June 10, 1920

My Lord,

The announcement of the 11th July as the date for taking the vote in this plebiscite area has given considerable satisfaction to the population, who have been anxious lest the present unsettled position might be indefinitely continued. Now that the date is fixed, there is reason to think that the people will settle down to the serious business before them, and that the present tranquillity will be maintained.

In my despatch No. 12 to the Council of Ambassadors<sup>2</sup> I reported that this commission had consented that Polish delegates should be attached to the Allied district officers in the different districts. The acting Polish consul-general here had tried to bargain and to make the participation of the Poles in the plebiscite control dependent upon this concession. M. Andrycz, the recently appointed Polish delegate, on his arrival, however, took up the matter in a different spirit, with the result that two or three days before the delegates were appointed the Central Committee in Warsaw decided that the Polish representatives on the Control Commission were to resume their work. The Polish obstruction has, therefore, for the moment ceased, and to all appearances they are moderately satisfied, though M. Andrycz continues to express the hope that the reforms in the Polish<sup>3</sup> force desired by his country-

<sup>1</sup> The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> This word should probably read 'police'.

men may yet be effected before the vote takes place. The commission is now awaiting the arrival of Colonel Hawker, who is to assume the duties of inspector-general,<sup>4</sup> when modifications may be introduced within a very brief period. Meanwhile, the Poles have reopened their propaganda campaign. Three meetings were held last Sunday in the neighbourhood of Allenstein, and passed off without incident, and the Polish press has even gone so far as to express satisfaction at the manner in which the police, who were told off to protect the meetings, performed their duties. Some dozen other Polish meetings are announced to take place during this week, and it would thus seem that the measures taken by this commission and the warnings issued through the German committees to the German population have borne fruit. My impression, however, is that the Poles have, for reasons alluded to in previous reports, now rather given up hopes of obtaining any great degree of success when the vote is taken in this area, and are devoting greater attention to the Marienwerder [? district] in order to obtain control of the direct railway line running through Deutsch-Eylau and Marienburg, which gives direct communication between Soldau and Danzig.

The exhaustive enquiries of the Bischoffsburg affair, which occurred on the 14th April, have now been concluded, and arrests of various people suspected of having been the chief offenders in the matter of breaking the Polish meeting have been effected. Their cases will be tried by the local court at Allenstein. The detachment of British troops at Bischoffsburg, which it was necessary to send to that town on account of the hostile state of feeling, has now been withdrawn.

In certain quarters here there was some anxiety lest the 6th June, the date of the German elections, might be a critical day, as rumours were current that a *coup* was to be attempted in East Prussia which might possibly extend to this area. The day, however, passed off quietly. It must be remembered that the Allenstein district, unlike the rest of East Prussia, is not a country of large landed proprietors. It is true that most of the Government officials that remain working under the commission in the district have reactionary tendencies, but they have little following in the rural districts, and the commission have frequently to intervene between those two classes. A short while back, when the Red armies were feared to be advancing rapidly towards Minsk and Wilna, there was a certain amount of unrest among the agricultural labourers, and a general strike, to take place at harvest time, was talked of. Now that the Red advance has stopped, this prospect for the moment appears to be less imminent, and in any case it may be postponed until the late summer.

General Nollet, of the Allied Control Commission in Germany, visited Allenstein last week in order to obtain information regarding the 'Sicherheitspolizei' and to make preparations for carrying out the destruction of

<sup>4</sup> In his telegram No. 28 of May 27 Mr. Rennie had suggested the appointment of Colonel Hawker of the Grenadier Guards as Inspector-General of the reorganized police force. Lord Curzon concurred and in his telegraphic reply of June 4 said that Col. Hawker would leave for Allenstein on June 8.

war material. The General expressed himself as satisfied with the steps that had been taken to disarm the police and the plan for its reorganisation, which will be taken up when Colonel Hawker arrives. As regards the destruction of cannon, warlike material, &c., the commission has signified that this will be undertaken as soon as the Allied Commission can do so.

The Royal Irish Regiment here have recently received various drafts, and will shortly have a strength of 800, excluding the detachments quartered at the Control Station at Deutsch-Eylau in Marienwerder territory. This reinforcement is very satisfactory, as it will enable detachments to be sent to the larger towns on the day of the vote. I am glad to be able again to report that there is practically no trouble between them and the population. The behaviour of the Italian troops is somewhat less satisfactory, and various incidents have occurred which, fortunately, have had no graver results, but which contrast unfavourably with the conduct of our men.

In my despatch No. 13<sup>5</sup> to the president of the Council of Ambassadors, I reported the departure of M. Couget, who has been appointed French Minister at Prague. Sincere regret is felt by the whole of this commission at the departure of M. Couget, who has won the regard of members of the British section, and acted as a good colleague to myself personally. M. Chevalley, his successor, who was recently French Minister at Christian[i]a, seems resolved to work on the same friendly lines. Unfortunately, he is somewhat handicapped by his lack of knowledge of German, which remark also applies to the Italian and Japanese representatives, a state of things which renders current business rather difficult.

I have, &c.,

E. RENNIE

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

No. 586

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

No. 1972 [201851/100450/39]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 11, 1920*

My Lord,

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith a copy of a memorandum from the German Chargé d'Affaires<sup>1</sup> in regard to certain statements said to have been made by the President of the Marienwerder plebiscite commission.

2. I should be glad if Your Excellency would bring this matter before the Conference of Ambassadors and ask that some explanation may be obtained from the President of this Commission as to the attitude and action ascribed to him.

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure below.

3. Your Excellency should also if necessary move the Conference to give definite instructions to the (Italian) President of the Commission as to the policy which the Conference desire him to pursue.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State),  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 586

*Memorandum from the German Chargé d'Affaires in London (Received June 2)*

*A. 816/20*

*Translation*

LONDON, June 1, 1920

Some time ago the President of the Inter-Allied Commission at Marienwerder expressed the opinion to the representative of the Foreign Office whether it was not expedient to abstain from taking a plebiscite at all in the Marienwerder area and solve otherwise the question of which State the West Prussian plebiscite district should belong to. He imagined that a court of arbitration or other commission would probably decide in regard to this district that Rosenberg Kreis, Marienwerder Kreis and the part of Marienburg Kreis belonging to the plebiscite zone should remain with Germany, while the greater part of Stuhm Kreis would be given to Poland. Recently the President of the Inter-Allied Commission suggested to two other German gentlemen that he was willing to give Stuhm Kreis to the Poles without a plebiscite and leave the three other Kreises, Marienburg, Marienwerder and Rosenberg to the Germans, or a strip along the Vistula could be given to the Poles and in addition the Mława-Deutsch-Eylau-Marienburg railway could be internationalised.

All the German gentlemen adopted a negative attitude towards the suggestions made to them, alleging as reason that the solutions proposed were a modification of the Peace Treaty which was devoid of all real justification. It was pointed out by the gentlemen to the representative of the Inter-Allied Commission that the Germans would not relinquish the plebiscite and abandon their comrades in Stuhm Kreis, which in spite of a relatively large number of Poles is overwhelmingly (more than 60%) German.

The German Government adopts the attitude that any proposal whereby the plebiscite prescribed in the Peace Treaty for the zone of Marienwerder would be avoided and parts of this district handed over to the Poles to the prejudice of Germany, is not really justified and cannot be discussed and therefore must be declined. The Imperial Government will under no circumstances renounce the plebiscite in the Marienwerder area prescribed in the Peace Treaty.



*Note from the German Chargé d'Affaires in London (Received June 14)*

*No. 823/20 [204076/100450/39]*

*Translation*

LONDON, *June 11, 1920*

In view of the polling expected shortly in the plebiscite areas in West and East Prussia the German Chargé d'Affaires has the honour to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, in the interests of Germans entitled to vote, the German Government, through its Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, has put before the Polish Government the following proposal[s]:

1) that the Polish Government will immediately undertake the definite duty of running, with German material and German locomotives, all special trains carrying persons entitled to Vote on the direct main lines through the Polish corridor, eastward before the polling and back again after the polling.

2) that the Polish Government will not insist that every one entitled to vote, who travels in these special trains, must be furnished with a passport bearing a Polish visa, but that it will recognise the voting card, on the strength of which electors are entitled to vote, as the only voucher valid for the passage through the corridor to the voting areas and back.

3) that the Polish Government will give all persons living in Poland entitled to vote, especially those in the ceded districts of East and West Prussia, the opportunity of proceeding in time for the polling to East and West Prussia and undertakes that their journey to the poll will result in no detriment whatever.

The German Government has undertaken to guarantee that the persons entitled to vote do not leave the trains while in Polish territory.

The regrettable experiences which the German Government had with the Polish authorities, the conduct of whom repeatedly ran counter to the provisions of the Peace Treaty, in the corridor surrendered to Poland in virtue of the Treaty of Versailles, cause Herr Sthamer, by order of his Government, to request the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

- 1) that genuine guarantees may be demanded from Poland on the part of the Allied Governments for the unhindered travelling of *all* persons entitled to vote, without any raising of passport difficulties, through the Polish corridor to the plebiscite areas in West and East Prussia.
- 2) that the Polish Government may be induced to permit persons in Poland entitled to vote, especially those living in the ceded districts of Posen and West Prussia, to proceed to East and West Prussia for the polling, and to give them guarantees that no prejudice whatever will result from the voting.
- 3) that the trains carrying the persons entitled to vote through the so-called Polish corridor may be under Allied supervision. On the other hand, Germany declares herself ready to allow these trains on German lines to be likewise accompanied by Allied Control Officers.

The German Chargé d'Affaires has the honour to point out that the President of the Inter-Allied Peace Delegation in Paris, M. Millerand, informed the German Government, in a note of March 6th, 1920,<sup>1</sup> that the Allied Governments would undertake the protection of the exercise of the right to vote by those so-entitled and that the inhabitants would be under the protection of the Allies in everything which concerned the exercise of the right of voting (en tout ce qui a trait à l'exercice [*sic*] de leur droit de suffrage). Herr Sthamer would be most grateful if he might be informed as soon as possible of the further progress of the matter.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 60.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of a similar German note, of June 7, to M. Millerand was forwarded by Lord Derby to Lord Curzon under cover of his despatch No. 1858 of June 14 (not printed). For other German notes to the President of the Peace Conference on this subject see Cmd. 1325 of 1921, Nos. 152 and 163.

### No. 588

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received June 22)*

*No. 43 [205227/100450/39]*

MARIENWERDER, *June 14, 1920*

My Lord,

A recent tour in the villages along the East bank of the Vistula to inspect registers of voters has convinced me that the assumption upon which the questions submitted in my despatch No. 40 of the 1st. instant<sup>1</sup> were based is almost a certainty. These villages contain only a few scattered Poles whose votes cannot affect the result. If all the outvoters from other parts of Germany be allowed to cross the corridor by special trains provided by the German railway administration the German victory can hardly fail to be overwhelming. Outvoters, i.e. persons born in the area, but domiciled elsewhere in Germany, duly registered, will in many places number nearly a third of the total.

It is therefore not surprising, as nearly all these outvoters are German, that the German authorities are as anxious as the Poles are reluctant to facilitate their transport to the Plebiscite areas. The German railway administration has drawn up an elaborate time table providing ten special trains a day for eight days before that fixed for voting (July 11th) and during a similar period for the return journey. All arrangements for lodging and feeding this large influx of population have also been completed. These facilities must of course be granted equally to Polish and German voters between whom it will be hardly possible to discriminate since it cannot be known with certainty which way every individual will vote.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This despatch raised questions of detail concerning the recommendations to be made by the Plebiscite Commission for giving to Poland full and complete control of the Vistula after the plebiscite.

The railway proposals have been submitted to the Polish representative here by the Commission, but up to now no definite reply has been received. Nor has an answer yet been returned to a further enquiry whether persons entitled to vote will be allowed to cross the corridor on presentation simply of a Certificate issued by the Plebiscite Committee of the commune in which they are entitled to poll without a special visa by an authority representing the Commission or the Polish Government. At present no one is allowed to cross the corridor without a Polish visa which can only be obtained with considerable difficulty and on payment of a high fee at a Polish Consulate.

As the provision in the Treaty of Versailles by which all persons born in the Plebiscite Zone are entitled to vote is believed to have been inserted in order to favour Poland, the Germans, who will certainly most benefit by it, are particularly anxious to have full opportunity of taking advantage of this provision. It is still uncertain which side will gain the point, but whether Poland gives way or not will probably make no difference in the actual result, except to increase a large to an overwhelming German majority.

These considerations are reported in order to show the importance of arriving at a decision beforehand of the recommendations to be made by the Commission to assure to Poland full and complete control of the East bank of the Vistula with or without sovereignty over an undoubtedly German population.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

No. 589

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 17 Telegraphic [203923/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, June 15, 1920

My telegram of June 14th to Sir H. Rumbold<sup>2</sup> repeated to you [No. 16].  
Following for Council of Ambassadors.

(It appears that) action of Polish Government in impeding present railway service with Germany across Polish territory gives rise to serious apprehensions.

It appears as if Polish Government were intending to prevent entry of German voters into Plebiscite area for July 11th and colour is given to this supposition by delay created at Warsaw in making of arrangements for special service to convey voters.

If confirmed it is difficult to foresee what consequences may be on local population which at present is maintaining tranquillity, and protest to Polish Government becomes necessary.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Warsaw as No. 26 and as No. 32 to the Foreign Office, where it was received at 5 p.m. on the same day.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. It gave details, supplied by 'German Authorities, of the interruptions to train services between Germany and the plebiscite areas.

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received June 22)*

No. 44 [205228/100450/39]

MARIENWERDER, June 15, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to the report from the Allied Railway Mission to Poland of the 27th of May,<sup>1</sup> copy of which has been forwarded to me by Sir H. Rumbold, in connexion with my despatch No. 31 of the 10th ultimo,<sup>2</sup> I have the honour to submit the following observations.

The article in the Treaty of Versailles to which I referred as being at present disregarded by Poland is No. 89 and not, as Colonel Graham<sup>3</sup> seems, from the 6th paragraph of his report, to have understood, Article 98. The latter provides for the conclusion of a convention 'with the object of securing full and adequate railroad, telegraphic and telephonic facilities for communication between the rest of Germany and East Prussia over the intervening Polish territory', and to Poland similar facilities for communication between Poland and the Free City of Danzig over any intervening German territory. This, as Colonel Graham observes, cannot of course be drawn up before the fate of the Plebiscite Areas is settled.

On the other hand Article 89 is categorical and unconditional. By it 'Poland undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany over Polish territory, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of Polish or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation, starting point or ownership, as regards facilities, restrictions and all other matters'. No reservation is made in this respect by Article 371 which provides for the delivery by Germany of rolling-stock, nor is anything said about waiting for the conclusion of a special agreement.

Since May 21st the main line Marienburg-Dirschau-Schneidemühle has been closed for all traffic between East Prussia and Germany. The reasons are no doubt mainly military and political, but the result has been, owing to the admitted inadequacy of a restricted use of alternate routes, to bring trade across the corridor by rail almost to a standstill.

If Poland, under whatever pretext, be allowed entirely to disregard an obligation imposed by a solemn International Treaty, what is likely to happen in the case of a Railway Convention signed only by Poland and Germany with the assistance indeed but not necessarily with the sanction of the Council of League of Nations to enforce it?

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This enclosed a report by Major E. W. Rostern, the railway expert attached to the Inter-Allied Commission at Marienwerder, suggesting that the two main lines communicating between East Prussia and Germany and between Danzig and Warsaw respectively should be internationalized.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel E. Graham, R.E., was head of the Allied Railway Mission to Poland.

It is these considerations which have led the Commission to suggest as a means of avoiding future disputes and difficulties the internationalization, if possible, of all the lines concerned, without however much hope that Poland will be prepared to make the necessary concessions, even with the certainty of thereby securing full rights of transit over the most direct line between Danzig and Warsaw.

The way in which Poland is now carrying out the provisions of Article 89 of the Treaty is shown by a new order operative from June 15th prohibiting any through passenger traffic between East Prussia and Germany *via* Danzig and Neustadt, the only route hitherto available, communications being therefore reduced to the single line Marienwerder-Schmentau-Czersk by which fast or heavy traffic cannot pass and transit is confined to the day-time. The elaborate passport and customs revision enforced in the corridor, applicable to all persons even provided with through tickets, seems also to be as unnecessary as it is vexatious and contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the Treaty of Versailles.

There may be an improvement after the Plebiscite has been taken, but unless there is a great change in the temper both of Poles and of Germans a good deal of optimism is required to hope for an amicable and permanent settlement of differences even under the aegis of the Council of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile it would not seem out of place to insist upon Poland carrying out an obligation imposed by the Peace Treaty as an act of justice of almost vital importance for Germany.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

#### No. 591

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 27 Telegraphic [204122/100450/39]*

ALLENSTEIN, *June 16, 1920*

My telegram of June 14th.<sup>2</sup>

German Authorities urge that negotiations for train service conveying plebiscite voters must be completed by June 23rd at the latest as at least a week is necessary to make arrangements for service which must begin on July 1st.

They declare emphatically there will be no differentiation between voters whether of German or Polish Nationality.

They further call attention to the restrictions difficulties experienced in traffic of goods trains between east Prussia including plebiscite areas and Germany which entails great reduction of this service.

They point out that this is contradictory [*sic*] to article 89 of Treaty of Versailles and protest energetically.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 18 to Paris and as No. 33 to the Foreign Office, where it was received at 10.50 p.m. on the same day.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 589, n 2.

No. 592

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Mr. Rennie (Allenstein)*<sup>1</sup>

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic [204628/100450/39]*

WARSAW, June 17, 1920

Your telegrams Nos. 25,<sup>2</sup> 26,<sup>3</sup> and 27.<sup>4</sup>

I am pressing Polish Government to settle by direct negotiations with German railway authorities at earliest possible date, detailed arrangements for trans-corridor trains conveying voters during plebiscite. Polish Government reiterated their intention of placing no obstacles in the way and have themselves received assurances from representatives here as regards equality of treatment for Poles and Germans. Polish Government disclaim intention of interfering with traffic on Marienwerder-Czersk-Konitz line and state that information given you on this subject was incorrect.

It seems to me however most important not to confuse this question of plebiscite traffic with that of trans-corridor traffic under Treaty of Versailles which must be subject to future general negotiations, those which began early in the year having been suspended and not yet resumed.

Please also to bear in mind that Cabinet crisis here<sup>5</sup> is still unsolved and that information and authoritative instructions are very difficult to secure.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Paris and as No. 413 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on June 18 at 2.45 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> No. 589.

<sup>4</sup> No. 591.

<sup>5</sup> M. Skulski's government had resigned on June 9 and a new Cabinet under M. Grabski was not formed until June 23.

No. 593

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received June 19, 8 p.m.)*

*No. 417 Telegraphic [204768/100450/39]*

WARSAW, June 18, 1920, 11 p.m.

Following sent to-day to Allenstein unnumbered.

My telegram of June 17th repeated to Foreign Office as 413.<sup>1</sup> Polish Government

1. Will satisfy all justifiable requests of German Government as regards trans-corridor traffic for (? Plebiscite):

2. Will however require a guarantee that number of persons returning to Germany will not be less than number which proceeded to vote:

3. Is unable to make pronouncement in regard to technical details and formality of acceptance of control until it has reached an understanding with competent Polish authorities and Plebiscite Commissions of Marienwerder and Allenstein:

<sup>1</sup> No. 592.

4. Deny truth of information published by Wolff Bureau in regard to suspension of railway traffic between June 15th and July 15th.

The note to foregoing effect is accompanied by a memorandum referring to German request for seven transitional trains daily for fourteen days to convey alleged voters to northern Plebiscite area, accommodation thus being demanded for 98,000 persons.

Memorandum adduces statistics from German works on population and emigration showing that number of persons born on Plebiscite territory and residing in Germany cannot exceed 150,000 and that of these not more than 93,000 can possibly be present in German territory to west of Poland; amongst these maximum number of voters would be 47,430 of which not more than fifty per cent are likely for various reasons to be in a position to vote.

Memorandum therefore concludes that maximum number of voters to be conveyed will be 24,000 whereas German Government requests accommodation for 98,000.

No. 594

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received June 28)*

No. 411 [206201/100450/39]

WARSAW, June 21, 1920

My Lord,

I took advantage of a visit which the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs paid to me yesterday to draw his attention to a resolution which had been unanimously voted by the Diet on the 15th June in regard to the northern plebiscites. This resolution was to the effect that in spite of the provisions of Art. 88 of the Treaty of Versailles the Polish population is continually threatened by German vengeance if the plebiscite goes in favour of Germany and is terrorised in every way. The resolution demanded that not only Germany and Poland but also the Allies themselves should be obliged to adhere to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty and that the Allies should strictly execute the provisions of the Treaty, for if the plebiscites were to be carried out in present conditions it would be a derogation of the high principles proclaimed by the Allies. Such plebiscites could not be recognised by Poland.

I told M. Dambrowski that this resolution was in contradiction with the assurances given to this Legation by the Polish Government as reported in my despatch No. 234 of April 8th.<sup>1</sup>

Monsieur Danbrowski [*sic*] then alluded to the figures showing the number of voters whom the Germans wished to send into the Allenstein plebiscite area to vote for the plebiscite. He maintained that these figures were grossly exaggerated. I replied that the Commissions of Control were there to verify the lists of those entitled to vote and I assumed that these lists would be

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 547, n. 2.

checked. He replied that the checking of the lists, which according to him had not yet been begun, would take a great deal of time and he suggested that the date of the plebiscite should be put off for several months, especially as effect had only just been given to certain requests made by the Poles for improving the conditions under which the plebiscite should be taken. I pointed out [that] the date of the Allenstein plebiscite had been definitely fixed and that there was no prospect of its being put off.

I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to Mr. Rennie.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

No. 595

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 25)*

*No. 751 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, June 23, 1920

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning at the Quai d'Orsay, Monsieur Cambon being in the Chair, and Count Vannutelli Rey replacing the Italian Ambassador, who was absent:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (5) The Conference then considered Mr. Rennie's telegram[s] Nos. 16<sup>2</sup> and 17<sup>3</sup> of the 14th and 15th instant respectively, which were repeated to Your Lordship, together with a telegram in similar terms from the president of the Marienwerder Commission,<sup>4</sup> and the two Notes of the German Delegation of the 7th and 18th June<sup>5</sup> (copies of which are being forwarded in my despatch No. 1990 of to-day's date),<sup>6</sup> all relating to the question of the transit of voters from Germany to the two plebiscite areas. I proposed:

(a) That the Polish Government should be informed that any interference with railway traffic between Germany and Plebiscite areas across the Polish corridor, or with persons crossing the corridor, or any attempt to hinder persons resident on Polish territory from proceeding to the plebiscite areas for the purpose of recording their votes, will be regarded by the principal Allied powers as an unfair attempt to influence the result of the plebiscite and will be taken into account as such when the votes have been counted and the time comes to determine the frontier line.

(b) That the German representatives in each of the plebiscite areas should have the right to arrange for a suitable number of special trains (the number to be determined in each case by the Commission) to bring from Germany

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 589, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> No. 589.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Nos. 152 and 159 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This enclosed only a copy of the German note of June 18; the note of June 7 had been forwarded under cover of Paris despatch No. 1858 of June 14 (see No. 587, n. 2).



persons entitled to vote in the plebiscites. These trains should each be accompanied by an Allied officer appointed by the Commission (either from their own staffs or from the Military Missions in Berlin), who would certify that they are only conveying voters, and these trains should then be permitted to cross the Polish corridor without any interference or passport or other examination.

In regard to the question of transport by sea I suggested that the two Commissions should be consulted. M. Cambon vigorously opposed the proposition that Allied officers should accompany the trains conveying voters across the Polish corridor, but the Italian representative and myself both thought this essential and M. Cambon finding himself in a minority of one, gave way. I have telegraphed in accordance with this decision to Mr. Rennie and Mr. Beaumont, and repeated my telegram to His Majesty's representatives in Warsaw and Berlin.

In the course of the discussion on this point it was mentioned that the Germans had complained that the Poles had stopped 67 trains of merchandise crossing the corridor, and that on the other hand the Poles claimed to have detained 62 trains loaded with munitions. It was decided to ask the Allied Commissions of Control in Berlin to investigate the latter assertion. . . .<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

## No. 596

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received June 27, 3 p.m.)*

*No. 439 Telegraphic [206102/100450/39]*

WARSAW, June 25, 1920, 8.35 p.m.

Lord Derby's telegram to Allenstein of June 23rd.<sup>1</sup>

I venture to point out that decision taken by Conference of Ambassadors apparently leaves out of account correspondence since Mr. Rennie's telegram to Paris No. 16 of June 14th,<sup>2</sup> specially my telegrams to Allenstein, repeated to Your Lordship under Nos. 413,<sup>3</sup> 417<sup>4</sup> and 420.<sup>5</sup> These will have shown that as regards (a) Poles have never intended to hinder passage across corridor of voters recognised by Inter-Allied Commission; that as regards (b) they were persuaded by this (Legation?) to settle technical traffic (? details) direct with German authorities. (These were satisfactorily settled on June 22nd in accordance with renewed request for their completion by June 23rd).

Anxiety of Poles to secure guarantees against Germans endeavouring to introduce persons to vote, who had no genuine title to vote, appears to me natural and legitimate.

It should be remembered that imminence of plebiscites has brought about a considerable state of nervous tension and excitement which I fear the communication which it has been decided to make to (? Polish Government)

<sup>1</sup> See No. 595.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 589, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> No. 592.

<sup>4</sup> No. 593.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

will serve to accentuate, whereas if time had been left to this Legation to use its influence to secure a settlement of difficulties, which I believe has now been completely done, Conference of Ambassadors might not have thought it necessary to address a warning of a minatory character to (? Polish Government). Difficulties here were of course enhanced by prolonged Cabinet crisis, unfortunately coincident with negotiations on this subject.

Addressed to Foreign Office and Allenstein. Repeated to Paris.

No. 597

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received July 14)*

No. 33 [C 1292/140/18]

ALLENSTEIN, June 25, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to the President of the Council of Ambassadors at Paris, enumerating some of the recent steps that have been taken by this Commission since May 31st. These steps should go some way towards meeting most of the complaints that have reached the Council of Ambassadors through the Polish Delegation. At the same time I feel that I should point out that the impression here seems to exist that the Polish Government intend, on every possible occasion, to lodge protests, and to assert that a Plebiscite is impossible under existing conditions, even where points at stake are of relatively small importance. Even M. Andrycz, the present Polish Delegate here, with whom the Commission maintains ever best relations, admitted, rather naively, that this was his role, while, accordingly to newspaper reports, Dr. Lewandowski, the late Consul General, continues, in his own country, to harangue audiences on the subject of the impotence of Plebiscite Commissions, and this one in particular.

Now that the Poles have failed to obtain a postponement of the Plebiscite, and the terrorism campaign no longer exists as a very valid excuse, in view of the comparative tranquil[1]ity that remains in the District, and the Police reforms that have been undertaken, they have now taken up another theme, viz., that of electoral lists.

As stated in my despatch to the President of the Council of Ambassadors, it will be remembered that in the first instance the Poles refused to participate in the preliminary election work; that subsequent changes [?] were made] in the election *règlements* to enable them to be re-admitted, and that the period for the verification of lists was extended, in order to give them fuller opportunity to take part in electoral work, which they had hitherto declined to perform. Nevertheless, at the end of the electoral preparations, and accordingly, very late in the day, the Polish Consul General alleges that names of non-resident voters have been illegally included; and that it would be impossible to identify such voters, and is trying to obtain the annulling of whole lists on the ground of small technical irregularities.

The Polish Government may then declare to the Council of Ambassadors that they are unable to agree to the result of a vote taken under such conditions.

These tactics appear to be rather obvious. At the same time I think it best to anticipate them by reporting what has already been done, and the grounds on which complaints are to be expected.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

ENCLOSURE IN No. 597

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors (Paris)*  
*No. 15*

ALLENSTEIN, June 24, 1920

Your Excellency,

I have had the honour to receive your despatches dated June 10th and 11th, enclosing notes that have been addressed to the Council of Ambassadors by the Polish and German Delegations in Paris.

I have on various occasions reported to Your Excellency on the various steps taken by the Commission in order to meet Polish demands, and to place the Polish on an equal footing with the German population. It will therefore be sufficient to enumerate some of the steps that have been taken on behalf of the Poles since May 31st.

(1) Attachment of a Polish representative to Allied District Officers for administrative purposes, and to represent Polish interests.

(2) Re-admission of Polish members to the Commissions of Control and Plebiscite [*sic*] Committees, subsequent to these various bodies, which were composed for the purpose of drawing up electoral lists, had [*sic*] been formed. As Your Excellency is aware, early in May the Poles declared they would not take part in Plebiscite preparations. They subsequently changed their mind, and this Commission decided to make a concession in their favour, and re-admit them in spite of the fact that the Commissions had had to be reformed on account of their previous abstention.

(3) The extension of the period for the exhibition and verification of lists, and the putting in of claims by six days, *viz.*, from June 14th to June 20th.

(4) Renewal of Plebiscite Committees, and nomination of new Presidents, an important concession thus being made to the Poles, involving a modification of the Plebiscite *Règlements*.

(5) The creation of special passport bureaux at Soldau, Graudenz and Posen, for facilitating entry into this territory of Poles during the Plebiscite period. His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw has also been requested to give all passport facilities.

(6) The Sicherheitspolizei has been placed under an Allied Inspector

General. A Polish officer has been specially attached to the staff. Steps have been taken to break up the former staff organisation of the Sicherheitspolizei, which is now re-named 'Plebiscite Police', and wear[s] special badges. For local purposes the police are under the orders of the District Officers. Dismissal of members of former force not entitled to vote; a consequent reduction of force, and admission of Polish recruits to force. The question as to number of officers to be employed is still under consideration. It should here be mentioned that Colonel Hawker, the Inspector General, has had very great experience of mixed police as regards their recruitment and the way in which they should be employed. The Commission is of opinion that it is best to trust to his judgement, giving him general instructions as to the lines on which reforms are to be carried out. It will thus be evident that effective measures have been taken to transform the character of the force formerly known as 'Sicherheitspolizei'.

(7) Special instructions have been issued to the Control Commissioners regarding the supervision of the voters' lists in so far as they include names of persons born in the District, but now resident outside.

In addition to these various measures, many minor steps are taken: for example; Police of all ranks have been removed when there proved cases that they have acted with partiality or negligence in their duties; Schoolmasters have been reprimanded, and in various cases suspended. Special attention is devoted to Polish meetings, and to the measures for their protection. Influence is used with the papers officially and unofficially, urging that breaches of the peace must be avoided, and the comparative quiet that has existed in the District, must, I think, be to some extent attributed to these efforts. Little more could have been done without a complete re-organisation of the existing system of administration, a step which, as Your Excellency is aware, is beyond the power of this Commission to effect.

Complaints reach the Commission, not only from Polish but from German sources, a fact that seems to indicate that the Commission is doing its best to act with impartiality.

It is to be hoped that the fore-going brief statement meets some of the objections contained in the Polish note of May 26th.<sup>1</sup> addressed to the Council of Ambassadors.

The Commission observes that Your Excellency on May 26th.<sup>2</sup> informed the Polish Delegation at Paris, that they had examined the observations of the Polish Government, and considered that every effort was being made in this direction.

I have, &c.,

E. RENNIE

<sup>1</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> M. Millerand's note of May 26 replied to a note from the Polish Foreign Minister dated April 12 and forwarded to the President of the Peace Conference on April 20. In it M. Patek had argued that for lack of adequate forces the Plebiscite Commissions in Allenstein and Marienwerder had been unable to guarantee equality of rights and that the date of the plebiscite ought to be postponed.

No. 598

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 2)*

*No. 778 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, *June 30, 1920*

A meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors was held this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> (4) The Italian Ambassador announced that M. Pavia had telegraphed to the effect that the Marienwerder Commission could spare no officers to supervise the passage of trains carrying voters across the Polish frontier (See also Mr. Rennie's telegram No. 19 of the 24th instant).<sup>2</sup> On the other hand there was no objection to sea transport.<sup>3</sup> I said that the War Office had been asked whether a certain number of officers could be spared from Danzig to assist in this work (See my telegram No. 766 of the 26th instant)<sup>4</sup>, but that I did not yet know the result. It was agreed by everyone that the various commissions in Berlin would not be able to furnish much assistance. After some discussion it was decided that the Plebiscite Commission should be told to exercise as much control as was possible over these trains with the personnel available.

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> Not traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>3</sup> In a letter of June 18 to M. Millerand (Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 159) Dr. Göppert had requested that two steamers lying at Flensburg and one at Hamburg should be released in order to carry voters from Stettin to Danzig.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

No. 599

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 2243 [205081/100450/39]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 1, 1920*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch, No. 2113 of June 22nd,<sup>1</sup> I transmit to Your Excellency herewith copies of three despatches, Nos. 44,<sup>2</sup> 45<sup>3</sup> and 46<sup>3</sup> of June 15th and 18th, from His Majesty's Representative on the Marienwerder Plebiscite Commission, as to railway traffic across the Polish corridor. Copy of a memorandum recently addressed by General Mance to Mr. Sargent is also enclosed.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This transmitted to Paris copy of a letter of June 11 from the Allied Railway Mission to Poland.

<sup>2</sup> No. 590.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. Brigadier-General Mance was President of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

2. I see no objection to the suggestion made by General Mance in the penultimate paragraph of his memorandum that the Conference of Ambassadors should intimate to the Polish Government that it would be desirable to allow the allied technical experts to be present at the negotiations between Poland and Germany for the conclusion of the agreement contemplated under article 98 of the Treaty of Versailles. But it should be clearly understood that the allied Governments do not propose to control that negotiation or to assume responsibility for it. It is not desirable that the allied Governments should make themselves sponsors for the execution of particular articles of the treaty by directly supervising their execution, except where the treaty explicitly provides for such supervision, as is the case with the disarmament clauses, etc. I should be glad if Your Excellency would act accordingly.

3. At the same time, I deprecate any action being taken on behalf of His Majesty's Government which would, at the present stage, suggest or encourage direct intervention in the present matter by any League of Nations Committee.

4. As regards Mr. Beaumont's observations on the non-execution by Poland of article 89 of the treaty, while it is probable that the Poles put greater restriction on traffic than is proper, it must be remembered that the conditions are abnormal. The fear that the Germans will abuse the opportunity of introducing masses of people into the plebiscite areas, who are not entitled to vote, would seem to be not altogether unreasonable. Nor have the Germans, on their part, shown scrupulous alacrity in meeting all their obligations under the treaty. It must be remembered that these Prussian provinces were only recently flooded with Baltic troops and other revolutionary and incendiary material. The Poles may well demand some indulgence if they show themselves over-suspicious and hang back from strictly fulfilling their obligations to Germany in these very regions.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State),  
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

#### No. 600

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 31 Telegraphic [C 235/118/18]*

*Urgent*

ALLENSTEIN, *July 2, 1920, 10.55 a.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 30 and Paris No. 21.

In spite of protests of joint Inter-Allied Control Commission at Konitz more than 700 persons in the first two trains of voters have been refused

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 30 to the Foreign Office, where it was received at 6.30 p.m. on the same day. Telegrams Nos. 30-36 from Allenstein to the Foreign Office were later renumbered Nos. 34-40. The original Allenstein numbering has been retained here and in Nos. 605, 606 and 608 below.

passage across Polish territory. Reason given for this action by Polish authorities is that identity was insufficiently established, which in the case of so large a proportion of passengers appears improbable.

This commission strongly protests against interpretation, which is evidently too severe, of Article 2 of Protocol, drawn up at Warsaw on June 18th.<sup>2</sup> Please bring above to knowledge of Polish Government together with request that necessary steps may be taken to control action of authorities at Konitz and not render illusory facilities which Polish Government have undertaken to grant.

Matter has been brought to the notice of Polish delegate who is immediately proceeding to Warsaw.

<sup>2</sup> The reference should no doubt be to article 3 of this agreement between the Polish authorities, representatives of the Allenstein Plebiscite Commission, and the Inter-Allied Railway Mission at Warsaw. This read as follows:

'Toute personne ayant le droit de vote et désirant passer par le territoire polonais doit prouver son identité au moyen:

- (1) d'un bulletin de vote délivré par une Commission compétente,
- (2) d'une carte d'identité personnelle accompagnée d'une photographie.

'Les bulletins de vote seront estampillés au cours du contrôle. Le passant ne peut pas transporter des armes avec soi.'

A copy of the agreement was forwarded by Lord Derby to Lord Curzon under cover of his despatch No. 2169 of July 17.

## No. 601

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received July 7)*

*No. 35 [C 648/140/18]*

ALLENSTEIN, July 2, 1920

My Lord,

With the approach of the Plebiscite date, the excitement in this Area is naturally rising. Every possible measure, is, however, being taken to prevent disturbances occurring during the next ten days.

The trains conveying Plebiscite voters are beginning to arrive, and there was naturally some feeling when the news was spread that many of the voters had been removed, and it was not unnaturally considered that the Poles were endeavouring to play a trick. I lost no time in seeing the Polish Delegate, and the Commission arranged with him that telephonic instructions should be sent to allow passengers who failed to satisfy the Polish Authorities as regards their passports, but who were not objected to by the Inter-Allied Control Commission, [should be allowed]<sup>1</sup> to proceed on their journey, the words 'under reserve' being noted on their passport. It was pointed out to the Polish Delegate that very serious effects would arise if the trains were not allowed to proceed when passengers had been examined by the Control Commission, which had been expressly sent to Konitz. M. Andrycz appeared to recognise this, and proceeded the same evening to Warsaw.

<sup>1</sup> These three words were bracketed by Mr. Waterlow.

Colonel Hawker has made considerable progress in the transformation of the force which is now termed the Plebiscite Police. He is doing all he can to meet the wishes and objections of the Poles, without impairing police efficiency. Polish recruits were asked for, but did not present themselves in very large numbers, and a great deal of weeding-out had to be done before the recruits were accepted. The question of the numbers of officers of Polish nationality who can be employed is occupying his attention. He has already appointed a Polish officer to deal, specially, with Polish complaints. The reduction and decentralisation of the former Sicherheitspolizei is thus being carried on, having due regard to the demands that may be made upon the force during the next few days.

As might be expected, complaints are coming into the Commission from both Polish and German quarters. At the present moment the principal grievance of the former seems to be that lists of non-resident voters are inaccurate, and that many names are included that have no right to be there. The Poles state that they are prepared to supply proof, alleging that the time has been too short to bring these cases before the Control Commissions. They have been reminded that if the time is short it is because the Polish Committees began by abstaining from the preliminary Plebiscite preparations, that concessions were made to them in the way of re-forming the Control Commissions and Plebiscite Committees, and that the period for examining the lists was extended by six days, in consequence of their representations. Attempts are also being made to bring pressure to obtain the postponement of the vote, on the ground that sufficient time has not been allowed for the Poles as well as the Masurian Poles in the District to obtain full consciousness of their national and racial aspirations. The old arguments are repeated that the personnel of this Commission and the Troops of Occupation are insufficient, and that the taking of the vote on the 11th July does not give the Poles a fair chance. One can only give them the same answer as before, *viz.* that these grievances should have been brought to the notice of the Supreme Council. It seems that their efforts in this direction having failed, they are now endeavouring to bring personal pressure to bear on the Commission.

Complaints are also being received from German quarters that numbers of young Poles have lately been brought into the District with a view to creating disturbances. I was to-day told by an author[itative] German source that the presence of at least 500 individuals was established, and that probably there were more than double in the District. Steps are being taken to verify this statement, and the matter has been brought to the notice of the Polish Consulate General. These incomers are said to be provided with proper passports, and if it is proved that they have come in at the instance and with the cognizance of the Polish Consulate General, it is difficult to believe that they are not collecting here with the object of creating trouble.

The Commission, the German Delegate and the German leaders here are losing no opportunity of impressing upon the German speaking population the absolute necessity of giving the Poles no excuse to say that they are being subjected to terrorism, and the need for tranquillity is fully realised by the



better classes. The rural population are, however, not unnaturally disturbed and nervous, and it is hoped that the Commission will be enabled by the Polish Authorities here to give an authoritative denial to these disturbing rumours.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

No. 602

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received July 9)*

No. 49 [C 914/140/18]

MARIENWERDER, *July 3, 1920*

My Lord,

The examination of claims for the establishment of the definitive registers of voters in this area was completed on the 30th ultimo, three extra days having been allowed for the purpose beyond the date (June 27th) fixed in the Plebiscite regulations.

The number of voters registered is approximately 120,000 of whom about 30,000 are non-residents. 11,664 claims were examined by the four Commissions of Control at Marienwerder, Marienburg, Stuhm and Rosenberg. The three Polish members of the Commission of Control at Rosenberg, at its final sitting on June 28th, voted against the closing of the lists for Deutsch-Eylau on the ground of discovery of a considerable number of irregularities in the registers drawn up by the local Plebiscite Committee of persons entitled to be registered without application. Names of persons who were dead, or who had left the town, as well as a few names of women entered both under their maiden and married names were discovered, and after examination of the register by a special Sub-Committee, some 130 names were eliminated out of a total of 1,900. Voting on the Commission of Control being equally divided, three Poles protesting and three Germans voting for declaring it definitive the question was referred to the Inter-Allied Commission in accordance with Article 7 of the Plebiscite Regulations. The Poles claimed that further time should be given for a complete revision of the lists, arguing that as so large a proportion of irregularities had been discovered after an incomplete examination of the list of voters drawn up by the local Committee, a more detailed examination would probably bring to light further errors, not only in this list, but also in that of voters registered after personal application which had not been examined by the Commission of Control at all.

The Inter-Allied Commission after hearing both sides unanimously decided that the Deutsch-Eylau lists should be declared definitive as well as that of Bischofswerder against which similar protests had been lodged by the Polish members of the Rosenberg Commission of Control.

The decision was based on the ground that only individual and specific claims could be taken into consideration, that during the periods allowed such claims had all been examined and settled, and that a general protest, unsupported by direct evidence of any kind presented on the last day for examination of claims, could not be upheld under any provision of the Plebiscite Regulations.

It is clear that the action of the Polish members of the Rosenberg Commission was an afterthought inspired by the Polish Propaganda Committee and is only a manœuvre designed for the purpose, if possible, of gaining time and of discrediting generally the *bona fide* of other registers of voters.

Ample opportunity, for the removal of names improperly included in the lists, has been given, and if Poles have not taken advantage of it they have only themselves to blame.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

No. 603

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Mr. Rennie (Allenstein)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 3 Telegraphic [C 430/140/18]*

WARSAW, July 4, 1920

Your telegram No. 31 July 2nd.<sup>2</sup>

An energetic memorandum has been left with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense desired and also pointing out unfortunate impression which incident may produce in view of warning to Polish Government decided on by Conference of Ambassadors on June 23rd as telegraphed by Lord Derby on that date.<sup>3</sup>

Vice-Minister explained that 700 persons had only been stopped because their voting tickets did not bear stamp of inter-allied commission. Orders had already been sent for them to be allowed through subject to their voting papers being marked by Mixed Commission of Control as being 'sous réserve'. These orders apply to future similar cases in order that passage of Voters may not be impeded.

Vice-Minister spoke to me at some length on Polish proposals which he says were submitted to you two days ago, and on demonstrable falsifications in list of voters said to have been born in plebiscite area but resident in Germany. He is confident of Polish ability to prove that Germans in this way have deliberately attempted to influence plebiscite unfairly and it is on these grounds that Polish Government has again requested postponement of date

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Paris and as No. 472 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 5 at 11.10 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> No. 600.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. No. 595.

of voting in order that Polish delegates may have time to check accuracy of 'Emigrant voters' lists' and establish fraudulent nature of their . . .<sup>4</sup> in many instances. They have also requested that separate urns should be used for 'Emigrant' voters on list which they describe as list No. 2.

<sup>4</sup> The text as received in the Foreign Office was here uncertain; the original Warsaw text reads: 'the fraudulent nature of their composition'.

#### No. 604

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Mr. Rennie (Allenstein)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 4 Telegraphic [C 367/140/18]*

WARSAW, July 4, 1920

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>2</sup>

Polish Government have information which they regard as quite reliable that Germans are organizing a violent demonstration for about the time when commission will have completed counting votes and be about to submit its recommendations to conference, in order to impress it with undesirability and even danger of assigning away the smallest portion of former German territory. They are so convinced that this demonstration will be accompanied by further acts of personal violence against Poles that they are seriously considering desirability of evacuating their plebiscite agents in order to preserve them from assassination.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Paris and as No. 473 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 5 at 10.20 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> No. 603.

#### No. 605

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 24 Telegraphic [C 467/140/18]*

*Urgent*

ALLENSTEIN, July 5, 1920

German delegate informs me today German Government are protesting at Spa Conference against an instruction that has been issued here introducing separate voting urns for non-resident voters.<sup>2</sup>

This was done on initiative of French Commissioner who was supported . . .<sup>3</sup> Italian colleague and issued in spite of my representations that it was contrary to spirit in which plebiscite *règlement* was framed.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 33 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 6 at 9.30 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> See Cmd. 1325 of 1921, No. 181. A letter including both a similar protest against this intimidation and one against the action of the Polish authorities at Konitz (see No. 600) was sent to Lord Curzon by Herr Sthamer on July 5.

<sup>3</sup> The text is here uncertain.

Above Commissioner's [*sic*] contention [*? is*] that it is merely extension of Article 2 of *règlement* which laid down that in communes of over 600 voters separate polling stations were to be arranged for non-resident voters.

They declare that instruction does not infringe on precedent and that no distinction will be made between votes of residents and non-residents in calculating plebiscite result and that measure is to be considered as a satisfaction to Poles who are protesting against numbers of non-resident voters.

I consider instruction not only attacks principle of secrecy of vote but is also calculated to give rise to confusion at voting stations and consequent trouble.

I have informed my colleague that I must disclaim all responsibility in the matter.

*Confidential.* I may mention that neither French Commissioner nor Italian took part in drafting *règlement*: former having arrived only early June while latter was absent for ten weeks, during whole time that *règlement* was being prepared.

Repeated Foreign Office No. 33.

#### No. 606

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received July 5, 7 p.m.)*

*No. 32 Telegraphic [C 463/140/18]*

ALLENSTEIN, July 5, 1920, 11 a.m.

My telegram of July 4th to Rome and Paris repeated to you.<sup>1</sup>

I am fully aware of great desirability of settling futures of Plebiscite areas and releasing troops of occupation as well as dangers attendant on delays.

I must however point out that Poles seem to be preparing to repeat their protest against what they term premature (taking) of votes and will specially attack question of non-residence of voters.

General situation in area is not unsatisfactory considering the nearness of date of vote and serious trouble seems more likely after rather than before July 11th. Polish attitude however is provocative, rumours for instance being spread that immediately after Plebiscite Polish troops will enter area, while interference with voters in Polish Corridor is calculated to accentuate bitter feeling.

Presence of troops of occupation is accordingly indispensable until Council of Ambassadors has given its decision.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 32 and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Allenstein No. 31 to the Foreign Office, not printed.

No. 607

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*

*No. 34 Telegraphic [C 652/118/18]*

ALLENSTEIN, July 6, 1920

Repeated to Foreign Office 34,<sup>1</sup> and Paris 25.

Control Commission Konitz reports that in spite of instructions that have been sent, Polish authorities continue to interfere and turn back passengers and that protests of Commission are unavailing.

I hear that Marienwerder . . .<sup>2</sup> consequently withdrawing their Chief Representative who is President of the Commission and are contemplating recall of other members in which case I shall be obliged to take same steps.

Please call attention of Polish Government to (? my) protest of July 1st and point out need that orders which Polish Consulate General here stated have been sent to local authorities are executed by latter.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Repetition of this telegram was received in the Foreign Office on July 6 at 11 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> The text is here uncertain. The Warsaw Embassy copy reads: 'I hear from Marienwerder? that they? are'.

<sup>3</sup> In his telegram No. 10 of July 7 (not printed) to Allenstein, repeated as No. 490 to the Foreign Office, Sir H. Rumbold said that he had made representations in the desired sense.

No. 608

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received July 7, 10.40 a.m.)*

*No. 36 Telegraphic [C 653/140/18]*

ALLENSTEIN, July 6, 1920, 6.30 p.m.

My telegram No. 35<sup>1</sup> yesterday and Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 473.<sup>2</sup>

I have repeated my telegram No. 35 to Sir H. Rumbold adding that Commission have no information to confirm statement that Germans are organizing violent demonstration after vote has been taken, that Poles are no doubt endeavouring to magnify minor incidents inseparable from election campaign and that all measures within our power are being taken to protect Polish population.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 36, Paris No. 27.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> No. 604.

No. 609

*Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received July 9, 3.55 p.m.)*

*No. 486 Telegraphic [C 946/140/18]*

WARSAW, July 7, 1920, 9.15 p.m.

At yesterday's sitting of Diet it was decided to send an appeal to Parliaments of Allies' countries requesting them to bring pressure on their respective Governments with a view to postponing date of Plebiscites until such time as Polish nation is at peace and in a position to make necessary preparations for Plebiscites.

Repeated to Paris, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Teschen and Oppeln.

No. 610

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 9)*

*No. 803 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/2]*

PARIS, July 7, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning, Monsieur Jules Cambon being in the Chair:—

. . .<sup>1</sup> 8. The Conference considered:—

(a) Mr. Rennie's telegram No. 21 of the 2nd instant<sup>2</sup> reporting stoppage by the Polish authorities of 700 voters in their passage across the Polish Corridor on the ground of the inadequacy of their papers;

(b) A protest from the German Delegation against the proposal to count separately the votes of outvoters (see also Mr. Rennie's telegram No. 24 of the 5th instant, repeated to you under No. 33);<sup>3</sup>

(c) A Note from the German Delegation (a copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 2167 of to-day's date),<sup>4</sup> protesting against the attempt to prevent persons qualified to vote in Allenstein and Marienwerder from voting, on the ground that they had already participated in the plebiscite at Slesvig (see also section 7 of the Note from the Polish Government, a copy of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 2169 of to-day's date).<sup>5</sup>

It was decided:—

(a) to inform the Polish Delegation that the decision as to validity of identification papers and other documents presented by voters was a matter which concerned the Commission and its representatives alone, and that the Polish authorities should be instructed to stop no one whose papers were passed as adequate by the officers of the Commission;

(b) that the Commission should be informed that no distinction should be made between the votes of outvoters and the rest of the votes;

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

<sup>2</sup> No. 600.

<sup>3</sup> No. 605.    <sup>4</sup> Not printed. Cf. No. 171 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

(c) that the Commission should determine as to the right to vote of persons who had previously voted at Slesvig. It was pointed out however, that under the Treaty there was nothing to disqualify from voting a person born in Allenstein or Marienwerder on the sole ground of his having previously voted in Slesvig. . . .<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.

**No. 611**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received July 10, 12 noon)*  
*No. 30 Telegraphic [C 981/140/18]*

MARIENWERDER, July 9, 1920, 11.20 a.m.

Frontier police have arrested 37 Poles who crossed into this area on night of July 7th. They were armed with bombs and knives. Passports, all issued on (? same) day at Graudenz, were viséd by French military mission charged with this duty by Commission. Men who are all soldiers of Polish army admit that they were in pay of Polish organization and form part of a force placed at the disposal of propaganda committees here and in Allenstein area.

Repeated to Warsaw and Allenstein.

**No. 612**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12, 9.15 p.m.)*  
*No. 31 Telegraphic [C 1156/140/18]*

MARIENWERDER, July 10, 1920, 1.20 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Seventy-six more arrests have been made of Poles entering plebiscite area under suspicious circumstances or without passports. All had received instructions at Graudenz to report to Headquarters of Polish Committee here. Amongst them are soldiers of 55th Infantry Regiment from Thoriv detached on 'special mission' precise object of which was to be explained here.

Depositions of some state that they were paid by Military Commandant at Graudenz.

Repeated Warsaw and Allenstein.

<sup>1</sup> No. 611.

**No. 613**

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12)<sup>1</sup>*  
*No. 45 Telegraphic [C 1158/140/18]*

*Urgent*

ALLENSTEIN, July 12, 1920<sup>1</sup>

Provisional figures for yesterday's vote are as follows:—

For East Prussia Communes 1694. For Poland Communes 9. Total number of votes cast for East Prussia 362,491. For Poland 7,852. Tranquil[l]ity prevailed in whole district.

<sup>1</sup> The times of despatch and receipt are not recorded.

**No. 614**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received July 13, 10 p.m.)*

*No. 32 Telegraphic [C 1235/140/18]*

MARIENWERDER, July 13, 12.10 p.m.

Figures of voting on July 11th so far as yet known are:

Germany ninety-one thousand, six hundred and twenty-four votes. Poland seven thousand, six hundred and eighty-two votes. There have been (? no) disorders of any kind either on Sunday<sup>1</sup> or yesterday.

Repeated to Berlin and Warsaw.

<sup>1</sup> July 11

**No. 615**

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 17 [C 2206/140/18]*

ALLENSTEIN, July 15, 1920

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to report that the Plebiscite vote took place on Sunday, 11th July.

The result, so far as can be ascertained, is as follows: For East Prussia Communes, 1,694; for Poland, 9. In one Commune which was not counted the vote was equal.

The number of votes was as follows: For East Prussia, 363,370. For Poland, 7,858. The total numbers of voters prescribed on the lists was 420,517.

It will thus be seen that a proportion of 88% voted. The number of non-residents who voted is estimated at a little over 100,000, out of about 150,000 who were inscribed.

Tranquil[li]ty prevailed over all the District, even in one or two places near the Polish frontier where trouble seemed likely. In the town of Allenstein there was a complete absence of disorder, although, as was only natural, considerable crowds assembled in the street near the hotel where the German pressmen were collected, and singing and cheering went on into the small hours of the morning. So far as it is possible to ascertain, there were no incidents or encounters between the two parties in other parts of the Area. Special precautions were of course taken on the day of the vote. Troops were posted in all Kreis towns, except at Marggrabowa where the District Officer stated that their presence was quite unnecessary. Detachments were also sent to three or four other points which might have been threatening. Here in Allenstein the Royal Irish Regiment, and a company of the Italian Regiment were confined to barracks in case of emergency. Fortunately there was

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this despatch was sent by Mr. Rennie to the Foreign Office, where it was received on July 26.



no necessity to call them out. Two days before the vote the Inter-Allied Commission addressed a proclamation to the population of the District, which was specially placarded here in the town, enjoining upon all a dignified and peaceful attitude, and notices were issued by the German Societies calling upon all Germans to abstain from interfering with the Poles. These various precautions and appeals seem to have had the desired effect. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Referring to the results of the vote, it may be said that the number of votes cast for East Prussia exceeded the expectations of the Germans. Among the reasons that have contributed to this have been no doubt the Bolshevik victory on the Eastern battle front, and the reports of Polish panic and demoralisation which have seriously spread in the Area. Full use too was made of the untimely call to register themselves that was made on the male inhabitants of the Soldau District, which until quite recently formed part of East Prussia. Other local factors in favour of Germany were the conditions as regards the railway and passenger traffic which have subsisted since the Polish Government took over the so-called Corridor, and the molestation to which the first trains conveying voters were subjected.

These events and incidents have certainly contributed towards German solidarity, even if they have not actually diminished the Polish vote. Three months ago it seemed quite possible that the Independent Socialists might throw in their lot with Poland; subsequent events, however, appear to have deterred them. Moreover, so far as can be judged, the propaganda carried on by the Polish Committees not only failed to appeal to the Masurian-speaking population, but the way it was conducted by what are called 'strangers from Warsaw', alienated not a few Poles of the district, and was actually damaging to the Polish cause.

In view of the Polish grievances against the Plebiscite proceedings, the Commission have thought it well to allow time up to the 30th July for the presentation of protests. This appears necessary in order to prevent the Poles declaring that their claims have been thrust aside. They are now busy trying to collect evidence, which will be duly sifted by the Commission. For the present it seems sufficient to say that even should the list of non-resident voters, to which the Poles have taken special exception, be left uncounted, the Poles' position as regards votes would be [? only] a little improved. So far as can be judged to-day, it would look as if the formal recommendations of the Commission would involve few, if any territorial changes. The draft of a railway protocol, to be signed by the Polish and German authorities, has, however, been prepared, in the event that the Supreme Council decide that any portion of railway is to be handed over to Poland.

In conclusion I would like to state on behalf of the Commission, that it is hoped that the decision of the Supreme Council may be given as soon as possible. Not only at the present moment, after the sweeping German victory, is the situation rather delicate, but it will naturally tend to become more so, as the situation becomes prolonged. As the Commission naturally

<sup>2</sup> The ensuing nine paragraphs were taken up by a general review of the work of the Plebiscite Commission since its arrival at Allenstein.

rely on moral force for the maintenance of order, it is obviously not being strengthened with the fact of the Plebiscite having now been taken and the vote obtained.

It must be understood that this Despatch is not to be taken as the full report<sup>3</sup> of the Commission, but rather as a preliminary review of the work of the Commission and the material results of the Plebiscite.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

<sup>3</sup> For this, dated August 14, 1920, see S. Wambaugh, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 75-84.

**No. 616**

*Lord Kilmařnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received July 22)*

*No. 591 [C 1964/140/18]*

BERLIN, July 18, 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith translation of extract from a speech made by Herr von Gayl, German Commissary attached to the plebiscite commission of East Prussia, on the 10th instant at Allenstein, at an official reception of Press representatives, in which he stated that Germany must at all costs regain the Vistula territory.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 616

Sunday, July 11, 1920

*'Dresdner Nachrichten'*

*Mr. v. Gayl on the Removal of the Polish Corridor*

The State Commissioner then stated that he regarded the Polish corridor merely as a temporary territorial condition:

'This senseless state of affairs imposed upon us by the hate of our enemies must be abolished. For us Germans the removal of the corridor is not only a question of honour but one which affects our very existence. If the isolation of East Prussia were to last much longer the position would be a sorry one for the province. Every possible attempt must therefore be made to regain the Vistula territory. If this can be accomplished by peaceful means, so much the better. If not, then we must consider by what other and more forcible means we can secure the recognition of our rights.'

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received July 26)*

*No. 52 [C 2261/140/18]*

*Very confidential*

MARIENWERDER, July 19, 1920

My Lord,

In spite of the obstructive tactics adopted by the Polish representative, in which the French Commissioner has co-operated, the President, M. Pavia, is leaving for Paris today in order to present a preliminary report on the result of the Plebiscite. A copy of this report is transmitted herewith.<sup>1</sup>

Briefly summarised the result of the voting was as follows:—

Out of 125,091 registered voters 104,941 votes recognised as valid were recorded. Of these 96,923 were for East Prussia and 8,018 for Poland. According to statistics controlled by the Commission 23,718 outvoters from other parts of Germany took part, proving that the result of the Plebiscite was not materially affected by extension of the right of voting to all persons born but not resident in the area.

In Stuhm town, which was believed to be the great Polish citadel, the Polish vote was only 751 against 2,079 for East Prussia.

In all other towns there was an overwhelming German majority:—

	<i>East Prussia</i>	<i>Poland</i>
Marienwerder . . .	7,811	362
Marienburg . . .	9,641	165
Rosenberg . . .	2,430	8
Riesenburg . . .	3,321	50
Freystadt . . .	1,875	36
Deutsch-Eylau . . .	4,746	235
Christburg . . .	2,571	13
Bischofswerder . . .	1,270	227

In twenty-eight communes there was a Polish majority or equality of votes, three on the bank of the Vistula and twenty-five in the Kreise of Marienwerder and Stuhm. The latter form a fairly compact group beginning at Tiefenau, a few miles north of Marienwerder, and running north-east as far as Altmark, completely cut off from Poland and surrounded on all sides by a German population, so that for geographical reasons it is impossible to recommend their inclusion in Poland. The total number of votes for Poland in these twenty-five communes was 2,717 against 1,619 for East Prussia.

The greatest difficulty in making our recommendations has been, for the Vistula frontier, in estimating the distance required to assure to Poland 'full and complete control' of the river. It is mainly a technical question, but Comte de Chérissey the French Commissioner, who had already had the advantage of consulting General Dupont, President of the Polish-German

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Signor Pavia presented this report to the Conference of Ambassadors on July 24.

Boundary Commission, professes not to have had enough time to study the matter, and reserves the right to present a minority recommendation, which, so far as he has yet divulged, will propose to assign to Poland a strip of territory along the whole bank including a number of purely German villages.

In all the twenty-four Vistula villages concerned 4,077 persons voted for Germany and 461 for Poland. More than half of the latter will be transferred to Poland if the Majority recommendation be accepted to create a small Polish group of five villages opposite Mewe. The objections to the French proposal are sufficiently stated in the report of which copy is enclosed.

I referred at the beginning of this despatch to the obstructive tactics of the French Commissioner. They began as far back as the publication of the Regulations for holding the Plebiscite. Comte de Chérissey did all he could to support the Polish demand for delay, and, when it came to fixing the date for voting, putting a different interpretation on the report received of the decision of the Council of Ambassadors from that which was clear to the rest of us, he voted to postpone it until after the 15th of July.

Since the Plebiscite is over he has urged that a prolonged term should be allowed for the presentation of claims and protests, while quite recognising the futility of such protestations in view of the decisive result of the voting.

Now he claims that he has not had time, during the five months we have been here, to prepare his recommendations for the Vistula line. At a meeting on the 17th he began reading a descriptive memorandum of the natural features of the Plebiscite Area, but stopped short before making any definite proposals, because 'so serious a question required further study'.

Throughout he has scarcely attempted to appear impartial, but openly poses as the Champion of Poland, justifying, and supporting, even if sometimes excusing, the most unreasonable demands put forward by the not very skilful Polish propaganda agents here. His guiding principle seems to be that the Treaty has not done enough for Poland and that by all means in his power it is his duty to endeavour to make good where it fell short of requirements of French policy or Polish aspirations.

In view of the overwhelming German majority in Marienwerder and Marienburg he is unable to recommend a line of frontier passing to the east of these towns, but failing this he now, apparently, wishes to propose a boundary, economically impossible, across the Vistula plain, cutting off villages from their natural markets on this side, barring access to the river from Germany and if adopted certain to give rise to endless conflicts and difficulties without satisfying any strategic conditions.

As a reason for the extension of Polish territory on this side of the Vistula and for further delay the Polish representative has mentioned a scheme which he states is under study at Warsaw for the construction of a Vistula canal. Whether the line which it should follow would be across the Marienwerder plain, where there is water everywhere at a depth of three or four feet, is a technical point upon which the Commission would be glad to have other than Polish expert advice, as well as an opinion as to how far such considerations should be taken into account in making or modifying their recom-

mendations. On the face of it, possibilities of traffic by water would not appear to justify the huge cost of so grandiose a scheme, or a change in the principle upon which these recommendations have been based.

I have, &c.,

H. D. BEAUMONT

*P.S.* I should add that Monsieur Pavia's report although read and approved by the Commission is a personal appreciation of the principal incidents of the Plebiscite. As originally drafted it contained a serious inaccuracy, namely, that I had opposed waiting for the proposals of my French colleague and any representations of the Polish Government. This was his own view, but not wishing it to appear he endeavoured to place the responsibility for such an obvious want of consideration both towards my French colleague and the Polish Government on myself and the Japanese Commissioner. The correction was made, but I report the incident as an indication of the President's mentality. He evidently wishes to avoid responsibility for an attitude which might be interpreted as hostility to the French or Polish point of view.

He approves my proposal for the delimitation of the Vistula frontier which was based on the expert advice of Colonel Boger,<sup>2</sup> but has endeavoured to avoid having it put formally to the vote, when he would have been compelled definitely to range himself on our side.

H. D. B.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 617

*Proposals for delimiting new frontier of Poland accepted by British, Italian and Japanese Commissioners pending receipt of French counter-proposal.*

Dans presque tous les villages sur le bord de la Vistule le Plébiscite a donné une prépondérance écrasante de votes en faveur de la Prusse Orientale. Les chiffres exacts sont marqués sur les cartes ci-annexées.<sup>3</sup> Seulement un tout petit groupe de Gemeinde en face de la ville de Mewe s'est prononcé pour la Pologne. Puisque ces villages dépendent économiquement plutôt de Mewe, à l'autre côté du fleuve que de villes situées à l'est, il y a toute raison pour les assigner à la Pologne. Ils sont:—

*Aussendeich* 99 voix pour la Pologne contre 26 Prusse Orientale.

*Neu Liebenau* 22 voix pour la Pologne et 16 pour la Prusse Orientale.

A ces deux communes il faut ajouter *Johannisdorf* qui a un caractère nettement polonais et le hameau étroitement relié de *Kramershof* qui ont donné, le premier 120 votes à la Prusse Orientale et 111 à la Pologne, et le deuxième 8 votes à la Prusse Orientale et le même chiffre à la Pologne, ainsi que

*Kleinfelde*, 15 votes pour la Prusse Orientale et 12 pour la Pologne.

<sup>2</sup> In response to a telegraphic request (Marienwerder No. 29 of June 18, not printed) by Mr. Beaumont for the services of an expert to examine the question of the east bank of the Vistula, Col. Boger, British representative on the Germany-Poland Boundary Commission, had been instructed to proceed to Marienwerder.

<sup>3</sup> Not annexed to filed copy.

Pour le reste la Commission se base sur le principe général que la plaine (Niederung) bordant la rive Est de la Vistule constitue un ensemble, lequel pour des raisons géographiques et économiques ne doit pas être divisé, et que la possession de la digue qui la protège des inondations, et qui a toujours été maintenue par les soins et aux frais des propriétaires des terrains y dépendant, est indispensable à ses habitants.

Tenant compte de ceci, la Commission recommande que pour assurer à la Pologne plein et entier contrôle du fleuve la nouvelle frontière sera tracée d'un point à choisir sur la ligne où la frontière méridionale du cercle de Marienwerder rencontre la rive Est de la Vistule, suivant en général la ligne des pierres qui marquent le bout extérieur des brisants (Wurzel Steine) ou, dans le cas où ces brisants ont été remplacés par une rive artificielle, une ligne à une distance d'à peu près 50 mètres du côté intérieur de cette rive artificielle, mais à l'exception de la partie de la digue où passe le chemin de fer de Münsterwalde, du port de Kurzebrack, et de l'endroit où les villages d'Aussendeich et de Johannisdorf bordent le fleuve, la ligne de frontière ne doit pas passer à l'est du pied de la digue la plus rapprochée de l'eau. Le port, mais pas le village, de Kurzebrack, et tout autre port se trouvant entre la digue et le cours d'eau ainsi que cette partie de la rive et de la digue qui se trouve dans les Gemeinde d'Aussendeich, de Johannisdorf et de Kleinfelde seront attribués à la Pologne.

L'attribution de l'écluse et du port de Weissenberg dans le Nogat sera décidée par la Commission nommée par l'Article 101 du Traité de Paix, en tenant compte du fait que la Gemeinde de Weissenberg a clairement indiqué son désir d'appartenir à la Prusse Orientale.

Le pont du chemin de fer sur la ligne Marienwerder, Münsterwalde et les culées aux deux bouts avec toute la digue intérieure, le remblai du chemin de fer, et le terrain réclamé jusqu'au pied de la deuxième digue plus éloignée du fleuve seront attribuées à la Pologne.

Cette attribution devrait dépendre de garanties données par la Pologne d'assurer à la population de la Prusse Orientale l'accès et l'usage de la Vistule, d'accord avec l'alinéa 5 de l'Article 97 du Traité.

Un brouillon de règlement rédigé dans ce but est annexé.<sup>4</sup>

La Commission tient en même temps d'exprimer sa conviction que, pour assurer à l'Allemagne les droits dont il s'agit, il ne suffit pas seulement d'obtenir des garanties qui pourraient rester inefficaces, et que le caractère international de la Vistule doit être reconnu selon l'Article 338 du Traité, la réglementation en étant soumise à une autorité internationale ou au moins à une Commission avec représentation de la Ville Libre de Danzig, de la Pologne et de l'Allemagne.

Quant aux villages situés dans les cercles de Marienwerder (3) et de Stuhm (22) où il y a eu une majorité en faveur de la Pologne de 2,717 contre 1,619 pour la Prusse Orientale; étant donné que tous ces villages sont entourés d'une population presque exclusivement allemande et, s'ils étaient attribués à la Pologne ils seraient coupés de leurs débouchés naturels, pour

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

des raisons économiques et géographiques, leur attribution à la Pologne devient impossible. Cela ne pourrait se faire qu'en créant un couloir traversant le territoire allemand, qu'en coupant le chemin de fer entre Marienwerder et Marienburg en deux, et qu'en englobant des villages allemands pour donner accès à la Vistule.

A la frontière sud, les habitants de tous les villages avoisinant la ligne actuelle, ont exprimé d'une manière si nette et concluante leur désir de rester allemands que la Commission se trouve dans l'impossibilité de recommander une modification quelconque de cette ligne. Les seuls changements qui pourraient y être introduits seraient en faveur de l'Allemagne, dans le but d'inclure quelques villages au sud de la ligne actuelle presque entièrement allemands; cette recommandation paraît être hors de la compétence de la Commission.

L'Allemagne réclame avec une certaine raison que la frontière naturelle et économique passerait au sud de Lessen actuellement en Pologne, ce qui empêcherait que la route entre Konradswalde et Garnsee, tous les deux dans la zone du Plébiscite, ne soit coupée à deux endroits par la ligne frontière et que les habitants de Lessen, terminus d'une ligne de chemin de fer secondaire qui la relie avec Garnsee et Marienwerder, mais avec aucune ville Polonaise, ne soient coupés de leur débouché naturel. La ligne de la petite rivière Ossa qui passe près de Bischofswerder pour déboucher dans la Vistule à Sakran, un peu au nord de Graudenz, formerait une frontière naturelle bien supérieure au tracé actuel. La population d'une partie au moins de cette zone est en majorité allemande.

#### No. 618

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 23, 4.45 p.m.)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic: by telephone [C 2101/1897/18]*

PARIS, July 23, 1920

I note your anxiety<sup>1</sup> which I share to get all troops out of East Prussia plebiscite areas. The Presidents of Commission[s] for Marienwerder and Allenstein are to make preliminary report tomorrow morning. In my opinion and that of my Italian colleague it is quite possible to definitely settle whole question on the draft report leaving certain minor details to be decided afterwards, such decision not requiring the retention of troops. My Italian colleague however informs me that French will take attitude that we must await full report and expiry of the time given to Poles in Allenstein namely July 31st in which to offer objections to voters.

Nothing that they can say will alter overwhelming German majority and I think French objections could perfectly be overridden. I propose to try and get my colleagues to agree. Meanwhile if you could send me a telegram giving a definite date on which to consider troops should have left the area it would enormously strengthen my hands but in order to be of any value such order must reach me tonight.

<sup>1</sup> The reference is presumably to No. 262.

No. 619

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*Unnumbered. Telegraphic: by telephone [C 2101/1897/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 23, 1920, 8.45 p.m.*

Your telephone message of to-day<sup>1</sup>

War Office wish evacuation of Plebiscite areas by British battalion to be complete by July 31st at the latest. Evacuation will probably be carried out *via* Danzig. British battalion is an Irish battalion: this being a special reason for early withdrawal.

Preliminary warning to prepare for evacuation has already been telegraphed to General Haking, and definite orders will be issued to proceed with evacuation immediately Your Excellency telegraphs agreement of Conference of Ambassadors.

It is important that we should hear that Conference agree by 26th instant at latest.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 618.

<sup>2</sup> In his telegram No. 858 of July 24 (not printed) Lord Derby reported that at a meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors that morning he had announced that orders would be sent to British troops in both plebiscite areas on Monday, July 26, to prepare for immediate evacuation and that such evacuation would be carried out by July 31. In his telegram No. 862 of July 24 (not printed) he added that his Italian colleague had declared that similar action would be taken with regard to the Italian troops.

No. 620

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 25, 10 a.m.)*

*No. 857 Telegraphic [C 2161/1897/18]*

*Very urgent*

PARIS, *July 24, 1920, 2.15 p.m.*

My telegram No. 851.<sup>1</sup>

Following is substance of note just received from President of the Council replying to proposal contained in your telegram No. 814<sup>2</sup> respecting movement of German troops begins:—

‘German Chargé d’Affaires discussed question with M. Millerand on July 22nd and asked authorisation to form “a guard of volunteers” on German frontier and to let German troops pass through Plebiscite areas. M. Mayer based this request on maintenance of German sovereignty over those areas pending result of Plebiscite, which would give Germany right of assuming defence of areas. M. Millerand replied that maintenance of a Sicherheitspolizei and a[n] Einwohnerwehr in violation of treaty of Versailles rendered it impossible to authorise formation of a new military force on frontier. He similarly declined to acquiesce in dangerous suggestion to allow German troops to

<sup>1</sup> Of July 23, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> No. 262.



penetrate into the various plebiscite territories on pretext of defending them. He also declined absolutely to enter on the path (into which German Government have already several times tried to lead Allies) of military co-operation of Allies against Bolsheviks, danger of which is too obvious.

'In present instance danger of Bolshevik troops attacking German frontier in East Prussia seems now remote especially after declaration of Germany's neutrality as between Poland and Russia. Bolshevik attack has developed in consequence of Polish offensive and aims only at Poland. Moreover a request for armistice has already been made. In the circumstances despatch of German troops to East Prussia frontier seems in any case premature. Withdrawal of Allied troops from Allenstein and Marienbad and Plebiscite<sup>3</sup> areas after vote has taken place, but before delicate task of fixing frontiers according to vote has been accomplished, would in fact amount to abandoning delimitation of frontiers to detriment of Poland of whom allocation has already required indispensable sacrifices.

'Allied decision would also involve risk of compromising possibly in near future free settlement of highly important question of Upper Silesia. If immediately after Disarmament Protocol of Spa Germany were authorised to increase her troops in East Prussia and to cross Polish Corridor, it would become very difficult to ensure that Protocol was being respected and executed, and "Executive Force" of treaty of Versailles itself might at the same time be diminished. Such a decision could only be taken in case of absolute necessity and should then be accompanied by such guarantees and counter-measures as may be desired.

'Franco-British Diplomatic and Military Mission now on the way to Warsaw will furnish Allied Governments with information necessary in order to judge usefulness of proposal. In any case reply of Soviet Government to Polish request for armistice should be awaited.' Ends.

I would add that Ambassadors' Council is to discuss results of Allenstein and Marienbad and Plebiscite<sup>3</sup> votes this morning and probable decision will be to assign whole of both areas to Germany.<sup>4</sup> This will change aspect of problem considerably.

<sup>3</sup> This passage was emended in the Foreign Office to read 'Marienwerder Plebiscite . . . '.

<sup>4</sup> In fact the decision was that three of the nine communes in the Allenstein area which had voted for that country should be assigned to Poland and that five communes in the Marienwerder area should be given to her. Recommendations concerning the frontiers were adopted by the Ambassadors' Conference on July 26 (see No. 629 below).

## No. 621

*Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)*

*No. 347 Telegraphic [C 2293/140/18]*

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 28, 1920, 6 p.m.

Following for Lord D'Abernon:—

Conference of Ambassadors have been engaged in determining frontiers between Germany and Poland in area of Allenstein and Marienwerder in

accordance with results of plebiscites.<sup>1</sup> It is hoped to arrive at definite decision forthwith, and as soon as this shall have been notified to German and Polish Governments, Allied Commissions who are now administering the two regions will under the Treaty have to be withdrawn after handing over to German and Polish authorities respectively. War Office is most anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the British troops now under orders of the plebiscite Commission, and press[es] for evacuation by July 31st.

Monsieur Millerand at Boulogne yesterday raised objection on ground that evacuation will in existing circumstances practically deprive Poland of all security that the free rail and river communication with Danzig guaranteed to her under Articles 97 and 98 of the Treaty will in effect be respected.

We agreed to defer definite decision pending receipt of your views as to whether Polish situation will in fact be seriously affected by early withdrawal of our troops from the plebiscite areas.<sup>2</sup>

Repeated to Paris No. 839.

<sup>1</sup> The proceedings of the Conference were reported to Lord Curzon in Lord Derby's telegrams Nos. 867 and 872 of July 26 (not printed).

<sup>2</sup> See Volume VIII, No. 79, minute 4.

## No. 622

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to Earl Curzon (Received July 31, 6.5 p.m.)*

*No. 52 Telegraphic [C 2769/1897/18]*

*Urgent*

ALLENSTEIN, July 31, 1920, 1.40 p.m.

German delegate to-day informed Commission that German Government have renewed request already made to the Allies that German Reich[s]wehr troops might enter plebiscite territory in order, if necessary, to reinforce guards along the Southern frontier.

He pointed out that the withdrawal of Italian troops from Lyck had exposed the Eastern end of area.

Yesterday 2000 Polish troops had crossed near Lyck and have been interned (see my telegram No. 48<sup>1</sup> to Foreign Office, for 200 read 2000) and it was not unlikely that similar incidents would recur.

He said Lyck and Ortelsburg were two points which would be probably threatened.

He asked Commission to support this request. We feel that Commission and Allied forces cannot remain in the territory once German troops have entered.

According to latest information in addition to two thousand Polish troops referred to, baggage, transport and 1500 baggage guards crossed yesterday.

Addressed to Foreign Office 52. Repeated to Paris 41, Berlin 12.

<sup>1</sup> Of July 30, not printed.

No. 623

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 854 Telegraphic [C 2693/140/18]*

*Urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 31, 1920, 5 p.m.*

In view of observations contained in Warsaw telegram No. 609<sup>1</sup> (of July 27th) repeated to you in my immediately preceding telegram, His Majesty's Government feel that no useful purpose will be served by the retention of the allied troops in the East Prussian plebiscite areas. War Office, who have been consulted, urge that British battalion be withdrawn as soon as possible, and, in view of the fact that this battalion will now have to be withdrawn to the Rhine and not *via* Danzig, suggest August 10th as a suitable date by which withdrawal should be complete.

His Majesty's Government trust French Government will concur. If so, it will become necessary for the Conference of Ambassadors or its substitute formally to notify the results of both East Prussian plebiscites and to arrange for the withdrawal of the plebiscite commissions on the above date.

On the analogy of Slesvig, I presume that the Conference will eventually arrange for the drafting of the regulations provided for under Paragraph 5 of Article 97 of the Treaty of Versailles.

Repeated to Rome No. 343, and Warsaw No. 358.

Allenstein and Marienwerder informed [Nos. 22 and 14 respectively].

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This telegram from Lord D'Abernon said that the withdrawal of the troops from the plebiscite area 'would only affect question of Rail and River communication between Danzig and Poland indirectly'. Moreover, one battalion was said to be 'somewhat Sinn Fein in its sympathies and . . . Bolshevik proximity might be dangerous'.

No. 624

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 2, 3.55 p.m.)*

*No. 902 Telegraphic [C 2745/140/18]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, *August 2, 1920, 12.40 p.m.*

My telegram No. 900 of yesterday.<sup>1</sup>

President of the Council has sent me message that he hopes that troops will not be withdrawn from Plebiscite areas in Eastern Prussia until situation is clearer.

Monsieur Jusserand has apparently telegraphed to him that Lord d'Abernon has, somewhat reluctantly, concurred in leaving troops for a short time longer.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Lord D'Abernon had reported on August 1 (in Warsaw telegram No. 623, not printed) that M. Jusserand and the French member of the Allenstein Plebiscite Commission had called on him to urge that the Royal Irish should be left for another fifteen days at Allenstein. He commented: 'I am not much impressed with arguments but if a delay of fifteen days meets their wishes it may be undesirable to refuse.'

No. 625

*Mr. Rennie (Allenstein) to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*<sup>1</sup>

*No. 44 Telegraphic [C 2905/1897/18]*

ALLENSTEIN, August 2, 1920

My telegram No. 43.<sup>2</sup>

In the event of Allied Forces leaving plebiscite territory what should be done regarding disposal of interned Polish troops who surrendered in plebiscite area? Also what should be done regarding their arms and equipment?

Polish Consul General inquires urgently pointing out difficulties that would arise if surrendered troops came under German control.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated as No. 15 to Berlin and as No. 55 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on August 3 at 11.45 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> No. 43 to Paris, repeated as No. 54 of August 2 to the Foreign Office, not printed.

No. 626

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 2646 [C 2703/140/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1920

My Lord,

With reference to the fifth section of Your Excellency's telegram No. 872 of July 27th [*sic*]<sup>1</sup> in regard to the Marienwerder plebiscite, I transmit to Your Excellency herewith a translation of a note which the German Chargé d'Affaires handed to Sir Eyre Crowe on July 30th<sup>2</sup> protesting against any decision of the Ambassadors' Conference, which might give to Poland sovereignty over a portion of the right bank of the Vistula.

2. Mr. Sthamer in presenting this note to Sir Eyre Crowe declared very solemnly that if the decisions foreshadowed in his note were to prove accurate they would amount to a breach of the Treaty of Versailles.

3. The Treaty, as Your Excellency is aware, provides that the Allied Powers shall allot to Poland so much territory on the east bank of the Vistula as is necessary for the regulation and control of the river. German experts, who, according to Mr. Sthamer, were alone competent in such matters, considered that that portion of the right bank of the river now to be allotted to Poland was not 'necessary' for this purpose. The German Government accordingly desired to protest in advance against any such decision being made.

4. Sir E. Crowe reminded Mr. Sthamer that according to the text of the Treaty, the decision rested with the Allied Governments, and added that he had not yet seen this decision but could not admit that this was, in any case, a question to be decided by expert German advice. If the Allied Governments through the Ambassadors' Conference, which acted on the responsible

<sup>1</sup> See No. 621, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

and technical advice of the Plebiscite Commissions, had made a decision there was no doubt that it would be found to be in strict harmony with the Treaty. Any protest or representation which the German Government might desire to make should be addressed to the Conference by the German Delegation at Paris.

5. Mr. Sthamer reiterated his protest and said that it was for His Majesty's Government to instruct their Ambassador and that therefore the German Government were entitled to make representations to the Foreign Office. Sir Eyre Crowe replied that he could not prevent such representations. He could only repeat that the proper course was for the German Delegation at Paris to address the Conference, which represented all the Allies, and he declined to promise that, as a result of Mr. Sthamer's present communication, His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris would be instructed to bring the German protest before the Conference.

6. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would inform the French Government and the Italian Ambassador of the substance of this conversation.

I am, &c.,  
(For the Secretary of State),  
ERIC PHIPPS

**No. 627**

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received August 8, 9.55 a.m.)*

*No. 36 Telegraphic [C 3292/140/18]*

*Confidential*

MARIENWERDER, August 5, 1920, 11.15 a.m.

Your telegram No. 14 July 31st.<sup>1</sup>

French Commissioner is endeavouring to obtain extension and prolongation of mandate of this Commission.

His view is that troops of occupation should not be withdrawn but should rather be re-inforced, in order to guarantee communications with Poland.

These however are already adequately provided by railway from Dantzic passing only through Polish territory.

If it is intention of Allied Governments to assist Poland by despatch of troops it would be necessary to obtain complete possession of the two lines passing through this area. Against this Germany having declared neutrality<sup>2</sup> would protest with exactly the same effect whether Commission were here or not.

In these circumstances I agree that our remaining on after completion of mandate would serve no useful purpose.

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. See No. 623.

<sup>2</sup> See Nos. 180 and 620.

No. 628

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 875 Telegraphic [C 3109/140/18]*

*Very urgent*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 5, 1920, 2 p.m.*

Your urgent telegrams Nos. 902 (of August 3rd)<sup>1</sup> and 912 (of August 2nd.)<sup>2</sup>

His Majesty's Government consider that (1) Germans should be allowed to send troops into Allenstein area at once. (2) British troops should be withdrawn at once. In this connection please point out that neither of the arguments advanced in Warsaw telegram No. 623 (of August 1st)<sup>3</sup> really apply, as work of plebiscite commission is complete and German and Bolshevik troops are already in contact North-East of Allenstein. (3) Polish troops who have surrendered and been interned in plebiscite areas should be handed over into German custody against a guarantee for their good treatment. The Polish arms and equipment should be given up to the Allied Commission of Control.

In view of the importance of keeping Danzig open, Sir R. Tower has been asked by telegraph<sup>4</sup> whether the employment of Polish labour in the port and on railways, which under existing conditions is deprecated as likely to cause serious trouble, could be made safe by an increase, in the last resort, of the Allied garrison or by any other means he can suggest.

Repeated to Warsaw, Berlin, Rome, Allenstein, Marienwerder and Danzig.

<sup>1</sup> (Of August 2), No. 624 above.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 624, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See Volume XI, No. 385.

No. 629

*Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 7, 9.30 a.m.)*

*No. 933 Telegraphic [C 3271/140/18]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, *August 6, 1920, 9 p.m.*

Alenstein.

I have reported in my telegram No. 926<sup>1</sup> sent by bag, that Monsieur Cambon called together yesterday a meeting of representatives of Embassies to consult with him on certain questions which would have come before Conference of Ambassadors if it had been sitting. He submitted to Meeting telegram which was despatched by French, Italian and Japanese Members of Allenstein Commission to Conference of Ambassadors during Mr. Rennie's absence in Paris. This telegram proposed a modification of frontier adopted by Conference on July 26th on recommendation of Geographical Committee whose report is enclosed in Lord Derby's despatch No. 2393.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 268.

<sup>2</sup> Of July 26, not printed.

The proposed modification is that Railway Usdan–Gilgouburg–Marwalde–Mamifelde–Peterswalde–Borgfriede<sup>3</sup> shall be transferred to Poland with as much territory to East of Railway as possible up to nearest German villages, topographical conditions being taken into account. This would involve transfer to Poland of a number of villages which were [? had] voted for Germany. Monsieur Cambon at yesterday's meeting strongly supported this modification and argued that Conference had reached decision of June [sic] 26th without due knowledge of facts and in absence of a formal report from Commission. I pointed out however that yesterday's meeting was incompetent to reverse a formal decision of Conference of Ambassadors.

Monsieur Cambon thereupon said that question must be referred to respective Governments.

It is evident that if discussions now arise with regard to proposal it will delay formal notification of new frontier and consequent transfer of territory by German [? and] Polish Governments which must be effected before Commission can terminate its functions. On the other hand until Commission has terminated its functions it would seem difficult to withdraw allied troops from the area. I had these circumstances in mind when I refused to be a party to reversing decision of Ambassadors' Conference on July 26th.

Pending receipt of instructions I have made it clear to Monsieur Cambon that decision of July 26th must be considered to be binding on Allied Governments. Italian Ambassador is telegraphing to his Government to ascertain whether they intend to support their representative at Allenstein in this matter, seeing that they are as anxious as His Majesty's Government to withdraw their troops from Allenstein and Marienwerder at earliest possible date (see Rome telegram No. 327).<sup>4</sup> Mr. Carr who attended meeting of Conference of Ambassadors when this question was considered is at present at 105, Crouch Hill, London, N., and could give you any information as regards discussion which took place.

Your telegram No. 875.<sup>5</sup> I have just received a message from President of the Council that he maintains his view already expressed<sup>6</sup> that Allied troops should not at present be withdrawn from Allenstein.

I have acquainted Italian Ambassador with your views.

<sup>3</sup> These names should read 'Usdau–Gilgenburg–Marwalde–Marienfelde–Peterswalde–Bergfriede'. <sup>4</sup> Not printed. <sup>5</sup> No. 628. <sup>6</sup> See No. 620.

## No. 630

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 9, 9.50 p.m.)*

*No. 948 Telegraphic [C 3410/140/18]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, August 9, 1920, 8.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 875.<sup>1</sup>

French Government have now replied officially to the effect that they hope that His Majesty's Government will give necessary orders so that British

<sup>1</sup> No. 628.

troops may not be withdrawn until further orders from East Prussian Plebiscite Areas. Granted that contact has already been established between Germany and Russians at certain points the French Government hold that for this very reason general supervision exercised by Allied contingents is rendered all the more necessary. They consider it indispensable to maintain a general isolation 'Cordon' so long as Poland is unable herself to assure protection of her frontiers.

No. 631

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)*

*No. 901 Telegraphic [C 3410/140/18]*

*Immediate*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 11, 1920, 3 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 948 (of August 9th<sup>1</sup>: evacuation of East Prussian plebiscite areas).

Please point out to French Government that His Majesty's Government have consistently urged the simultaneous evacuation of the troops and commissions and the formal notification of the Conference decision of July 26th by August 10th. It now appears from Mr. Beaumont's telegram No. 39 (of August 9th)<sup>2</sup> repeated to you and from Mr. Rennie's telegram to Paris No. 51 (of August 9th)<sup>2</sup> that Italian troops received orders to evacuate on August 10th.

Please therefore inform French Government that in these circumstances and in view of the severance of the Mława railway (the direct railway communication between Danzig and Warsaw *via* the plebiscite areas) His Majesty's Government, whilst they are willing to defer completion of the evacuation of the British troops to August 15th,<sup>3</sup> feel that the French Government will agree that further delay will serve no useful purpose. Instructions have accordingly been issued for evacuation of British troops from plebiscite areas to be completed by August 15th.

Please also inform French Government that His Majesty's Government cannot consent to any revision of the Conference decision of July 26th (based on the plebiscite results)<sup>4</sup> and move Conference immediately to warn Allenstein and Marienwerder Commissions and German and Polish Governments that a formal notification of both plebiscite results will be made on August 15th on which date troops and Commissions must complete evacuation.

Repeated to Rome No. 360, Berlin No. 265, Allenstein No. 25, Marienwerder No. 17, Warsaw No. 378 and Danzig No. 35.

<sup>1</sup> No. 630.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> According to a memorandum by Lord Curzon dated August 5 (Volume XI, No. 387) instructions had already been sent for the withdrawal of the Irish battalion from Allenstein.

<sup>4</sup> In his telegram No. 50 of August 8 (not printed) Mr. Rennie had urged that there was no reason to modify the decision of July 26 unless it was desired to compensate Poland for the six Polish communes which would remain in E. Prussia.



**No. 632**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 12, 10.30 p.m.)*

*No. 969 Telegraphic [C 3717/140/18]*

PARIS, August 12, 1920, 7 p.m.

Your telegram No. 901.<sup>1</sup>

Official notification of Marienwerder frontier line is being communicated today to Polish and German Representatives in Paris, and President of Commission is being informed simultaneously by Italian Embassy, so that Commission may leave forthwith. The Italian Embassy have particularly requested that this notification should be made today instead of on 15th as suggested in your telegram so as not to delay withdrawal of Italian troops which has already begun and will be completed before 15th.

Repeated to Marienwerder.

<sup>1</sup> No. 631.

**No. 633**

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 13, 10.40 p.m.)*

*No. 975 Telegraphic [C 3793/1897/18]*

*Urgent*

PARIS, August 13, 1920, 8.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 973.<sup>1</sup>

Following sent to-day to Allenstein:—

French Government have agreed to surrender of Polish interned troops to German authorities.

Commission are accordingly authorised to take necessary steps to this effect, arms and equipment being handed over to Military Mission of control. German delegation in Paris is being informed.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

<sup>1</sup> Of August 13, not printed.

**No. 634**

*Mr. Rennie (Alenstein) to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors (Paris)<sup>1</sup>*

*No. 20 [C 4474/140/18]*

ALLENSTEIN, August 14, 1920

M. le Président,

With reference to my despatch No. 17 of July 15th,<sup>2</sup> I have pleasure in forwarding in addition to my report on the Plebiscite vote enclosed herewith, a further report of the Commission,<sup>3</sup> with which I am in general agreement.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this despatch was sent by Mr. Rennie to the Foreign Office, where it was received on August 21.

<sup>2</sup> No. 615.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

*General Report on the Allenstein Plebiscite Vote*

The plebiscite vote for the District of Allenstein and Oletzko took place on July 11th. The total number of Communes that voted was 1,704. The total number of electors was 370,921.

For the purpose of registration the voters were divided into three categories:—(a) Born in the area and residing there; (b) Born in the area, but residing outside; (c) Residing in the area since 1st January 1905. The result of the vote was 1,694 communes voted for incorporation in East Prussia. Nine for incorporation in Poland. In one Commune votes were equally divided.

The total number of voters for East Prussia was 363,209. The total number of voters for Poland was 7,980. 526 votes were disqualified.

Of the total votes, as regards districts, the distribution was as follows:—

<i>Place</i>	<i>No. of Communes</i>	<i>Total votes</i>	
		<i>Germany</i>	<i>Poland</i>
Sensburg . . . . .	190	34,334	25
Lötzen . . . . .	116	29,378	9
Heidenburg [Neidenburg] . . . . .	144	22,233	330
Oletzko . . . . .	121	28,625	2
Johannisburg . . . . .	198	34,036	14
Alenstein Town. . . . .	1	16,742	342
Osterode . . . . .	248	46,385	1,043
Rössel . . . . .	118	35,262	788
Alenstein Rural. . . . .	192	31,486	4,902
Ortelsburg . . . . .	197	48,204	511
Lyck . . . . .	189	36,534	44

From this it is shown that the Majority of votes cast for Poland were in the Districts of Allenstein (Town), Allenstein (Land) and Osterode.

A table is enclosed giving a further list of results.

*Votes—Abstentions from.*

According to the statistics, about 96% of voters inscribed in List 1 (born and resident in this area) and List 3 (resident since 1905) recorded their vote.

As regards List 2—born in Area, but non-resident—about 71% voted. In this list, 157,074 names were inscribed, of whom some 25,000, according to the German estimate, remained in Germany in consequence of the difficulty experienced in crossing the Polish Corridor, while the other 5,000 voters, who were expected to come from Posen, West Prussia, and the Soldau district, were prevented by the Polish authorities from arriving. The remaining 13,000 who did not vote represent 9.5% of the total of List 2. Assuming this 9.5% to be a normal estimate of absentees from the vote, 90.5% of the total inscribed on List 2 would have voted but for difficulties of travel across and from the Polish territory.

### *Polish Complaints.*

The complaints of the Poles are to be divided into three headings. Firstly, the date of the Plebiscite; Secondly, the methods of terrorism that prevented the Poles from voting; Thirdly, complaints against the voting lists.

As regards (1), the date of the plebiscite, the Conference of Ambassadors has been fully informed, and the matter has been dealt with in this Commission[s] Despatch No. 17 of July 15th,<sup>4</sup> as well as in previous Despatches, and the Commission decided that the demands of the Poles that the Plebiscite should be postponed could not be acceded to, for reasons that have already been stated.

As regards (2), *terrorism of Polish population*, this question has already been dealt with in Despatch No. 17, above referred to, as well as in previous reports. The Conference of Ambassadors will, it is hoped, be of opinion that the Commission, so far as their powers and the material forces at their disposal permitted, did all they could to protect and reassure the Polish-speaking population. Allied troops have been shown in the Districts as far as circumstances have permitted, and were distributed all over the area some days before the vote actually took place. Steps which have already been reported were taken to re-form the Polish [? police] organisation in the District, and the force was placed early in June under the command of an Allied Inspector-General, to whom a Polish Officer was specially attached to deal with Polish Complaints. During the whole of its stay in the area, the Commission has taken special care to investigate Polish complaints as regards want of security. The Commission has also done all it could to prevent undue influence being exercised through the Church and through the educational system. The[se] matters have also, from time to time, been dealt with in previous reports, though no doubt there has existed that silent pressure of the strong on the weak which can be exercised without being apparent. Against the contention that little has been done to alter the administrative system of the District, it must be pointed out that Allied officials supervise[?d] the working of the Central Government offices at Allenstein, and that District Officers, with assistants, to whom a Polish representative was also attached, took over the control of the Landrat's office in the various districts, that the German officials made a declaration of loyalty to the Commission, and that it is only fair to the latter to state that very few cases, and those insignificant ones, of abuse of their official position have been brought to the notice of the Commission. As regards the Polish representatives that were attached to the District Commissioners, at the request of the Polish Consul-General, it is to be feared that at least some of these representatives have not taken their task seriously, and that their presence has led to few practical results. As to the moral effect of their presence it is rather difficult to judge.

In general, Polish complaints as to terrorism have been greatly exaggerated, and their reports of incidents have been inaccurate and misleading.

<sup>4</sup> No. 615.

It was but to be expected that considerable agitation and excitement would take place in the District during the period preceding the Plebiscite. Disturbances and encounters were to be anticipated. It should, however, be recorded that the Commission have no knowledge of a single Pole having met his death in consequence of election excesses, though the case may be cited of a certain Mr. Linka, a gentleman of advanced years, who is stated to have died in consequence of injuries received at a meeting held before the arrival of the Commission.

There is no doubt that it has been part of the Polish tactics to raise a cry of terrorism. The Polish Committee are even known to have complained shortly before the Plebiscite of the special measures taken to protect them on the ground that one of their propaganda points was thereby spoiled. It must unfortunately be placed on record that the policy of the Poles has been to endeavour to embarrass the Commission and not to co-operate with it. Considering all things, and what has occurred in other Plebiscite Areas, it seems creditable that no disturbance occurred up to the time of the Plebiscite entailing actual loss of life.

In view of the complaints of the Poles, the Commission judged that a period up to the 30th July should be allowed for them to register the complaints against the manner in which the Plebiscite was taken. The complaints of the Poles are divided into various headings which may be summarised as follows: (1) Omission of Polish voters from the list and illegal inclusion of Germans. (2) Refusal to show the list and falsification of lists after they had been closed. (3) Poles inscribed on list 2 were prevented from entering area, while Germans illegally inscribed entered and voted. (4) Pressure on Polish members of electoral Commissions and terrorism. (5) One-sided treatment of Polish protests and violation of secrecy of vote. The documents presented have been examined. They chiefly relate to Allenstein Town and District. It would seem that they have been mostly dealt with by the local District Officers (Italian and French), and their Control Commissions. They consist mainly of *ex parte* statements, and are to be considered as insufficient evidence. They also contain much palpable exaggeration. They cannot be considered as affecting the general results of the Plebiscite.

#### *Comments on the Result of the Vote.*

(1) Apart from the overwhelming German majority, which has been shown by the Plebiscite returns, there appear to be various practical reasons for the smallness of the Polish vote. These were briefly summarised in Despatch No. 17 of July 15th,<sup>4</sup> and seem on closer review to be confirmed rather than weakened.

Among these should be mentioned the general condition of affairs in Poland since at least the beginning of the year, the reports of administrative disorder which have no doubt, in an exaggerated form, reached the ears of this population.

(2) The failure of the Polish propaganda to convince the so-called Masurian inhabitants who are of Slav descent, and who are said to number some

200,000, of the desirability of throwing over their allegiance to Prussia, and of casting their lot with the new Polish Republic.

(3) The ill-timed action of the Polish authorities shortly before the Plebiscite, in calling up the male inhabitants of the Soldau district, which only recently formed part of East Prussia, to register themselves, probably with a view to eventual military service with the Polish army.

(4) The Bolshevik victories on the Eastern Battle front, and the reports of Polish panic and demoralisation which have been sedulously spread in the area.

(5) Economic conditions and the fall of Polish exchange and the purchasing value of the Polish mark.

Full use of these points was made, and the impression produced was accentuated by the disunion which has existed since the arrival of the Commission between the Polish officials and the Consulate-General, the propaganda committees that arrived from Warsaw, and the Polish-speaking inhabitants, all of whom appear to have had serious difficulties among themselves, and have been unable to agree in any common line of action. Further, one must also take into account the not unnatural timidity of a race that has been dominated for centuries, and lived in an inferior position.

The German party, on the other hand, were favourably situated:—

(1) Owing to the general favourable treatment accorded to the area by the German Government since it became known that the Plebiscite of the inhabitants would be taken.

(2) Superior intellectual [*sic*] and organising aptitude, and a general capacity for united action.

(3) The continuance, as regards outward form, of the old system of administration, and the connection with East Prussia through the pension system, the insurance system, and such like institutions.

(4) The irritation caused by conditions and traffic difficulties in the so-called Polish Corridor.

(5) The vote of the socialist party, who at one time seemed likely to be won over by promises, but who appear by subsequent events to have been deterred from throwing in their lot with Poland.

These facts seem themselves sufficient to account for the general solidity of the German-speaking vote, and for the overwhelming majority, and although it has been declared that the vote took place at a time that was most unfavourable for Poland, and the events of the past three weeks have certainly confirmed this view, it is nevertheless probable that, even had the situation in Poland remained normal, and the Plebiscite been postponed for a period of one or even two years, the general results of the vote would not have been materially affected.

#### *Recommendations.*

As will be seen by the map<sup>5</sup> showing the Plebiscite vote as taken by Communes, only three of the nine Communes that voted for Poland are situated on the Polish border.

<sup>5</sup> Not attached to filed copy.

Those three Communes formed, since 1466, part of the County of Gilgenburg, East Prussia, belonging to the Counts Finkenstein, who disposed of their property in the first half of the nineteenth century. It consisted mainly of forest land which was cleared and allotted to Colonists.

Between 1880 and 1890, when the prussianising of the province of Posen was taken in hand, the Polish Colonists were removed thence *en masse*, and a number of them transferred to these Communes.

Kl. Lobenstein has an area of 383 hectares, of which 170 hectares forms a property of German ownership. The remainder consists of small holdings owned by peasants. The village has its own school.

Kl. Nappern has an area of 271 hectares, 75 of which is one property, the remainder apparently pretty equally divided between Germans and Polish peasants.

Groschken has an area of 251 hectares, and 211 inhabitants. It has its own school. The voting results of these three communes is [*sic*] as follows:—

	<i>For E. Prussia</i>	<i>For Poland</i>
Kl. Lobenstein . . . .	51	93
Kl. Nappern . . . .	43	45
Groschken . . . .	5	69

All three communes are situated in a strip of territory S.W. of the Soldau–Usdau–Gilgerburg [*sic*]–Bergfriede line, of which the portion from Soldau to Usdau runs through territory recently given to Poland. There appears to be no difficulty in altering the Polish frontier line so that these three Communes can be included in Polish territory.

As regards the remaining six villages that voted for Poland, Georgenthal is situated about 5 miles from Kl. Lobenstein, but on the opposite side of the railway. It belongs to the German parish of Marienfelde. Its Polish origin is believed to be the same as that of Kl. Lobenstein and the other two villages that had a Polish majority.

The remaining five communes are situated in the interior of the area, and are surrounded by a German population.

Accordingly, it is not possible for me to make any frontier rectifications in their favour. It has been suggested that it would be equitable that the German Government should buy out the Polish landowners in these Communes. It is not, however, known whether this is actually desired by the inhabitants, and it therefore seems enough to put forward the proposal on the grounds of pure equity. It appears to be beyond the scope of this Commission to suggest to the Council of Ambassadors that German villages should be handed over to Poland in exchange for these Polish villages which must remain incorporate in East Prussia, and accordingly the question of expropriation has been suggested as offering a more just solution.

# FINAL Plebiscite Results: Allenstein Plebiscite Area.

<i>Kreis</i>	<i>No. of votes given for—</i>		<i>No. of votes disqualified</i>	<i>Total votes</i>
	<i>East Prussia</i>	<i>Poland</i>		
Oletzko . . . . .	28,625	2	23	28,650
Lötzen . . . . .	29,378	9	14	29,401
Rössel . . . . .	35,252	758	29	36,039
Altenstein Town . . . . .	16,742	342	54	17,138
Osterode . . . . .	46,385	1,043	54	47,482
Johannisburg . . . . .	34,036	14	19	34,069
Altenstein Land . . . . .	31,486	4,902	185	36,573
Sensburg . . . . .	34,334	25	13	34,372
Neidenburg . . . . .	22,233	330	37*	22,600
Ortelsburg . . . . .	48,204	511	65	48,700
Lyck . . . . .	36,534	44	33	36,611
	363,209	7,980	526	371,715

\* One commune equal votes.

# FINAL Plebiscite Results: Allenstein Plebiscite Area.

<i>Kreis</i>	<i>No. of votes inscribed</i>				<i>No. of Communes that voted for—</i>	
	<i>List 1</i>	<i>List 2</i>	<i>List 3</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>East Prussia</i>	<i>Poland</i>
Oletzko . . . . .	18,957*	13,053	..	32,010	121	..
Lötzen . . . . .	19,720	13,652	2,312	35,684	116	..
Rössel . . . . .	22,786	16,673	1,900	41,359	117	1
Altenstein Town . . . . .	13,848	3,900	2,412	20,160	1	..
Osterode . . . . .	29,432	20,605	4,261	54,298	244	4
Johannisburg . . . . .	24,561*	13,831	..	38,392	198	..
Altenstein Land . . . . .	25,616	14,295	1,460	41,371	179	3
Sensburg . . . . .	23,416	14,431	960	38,807	190	..
Neidenburg . . . . .	14,481	10,830	1,298	26,609	142	1
Ortelsburg . . . . .	32,517	22,630	1,164	56,311	197	..
Lyck . . . . .	25,370	13,528	1,406	40,304	190	..
	250,704	157,428	17,173	425,305	1,695	9

\* List 1 includes List 3.

I have, &c.,

ERNEST RENNIE

August 14, 1920

No. 635

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received August 15, 9 p.m.)*

*No. 43 Telegraphic [C 3836/140/18]*

MARIENWERDER, August 15, 1920, 2 p.m.

German representative at last moment on instructions from Berlin has refused to sign protocol putting into execution decision of Allied Powers communicated August 12th.<sup>1</sup>

Commission propose to change protocol into a notification and place Polish authorities in possession of East end of bridge, of port of Kurzebrack, and of five villages, pending formal delimitation.

This should be completed tomorrow, date fixed for Commission to leave. Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 632.

No. 636

*Mr. Beaumont (Marienwerder) to Earl Curzon (Received August 16, 7.15 p.m.)*

*No. 45 Telegraphic [C 3986/140/18]*

MARIENWERDER, August 16, 1920, 2.15 p.m.

My telegram No. 43<sup>1</sup> of yesterday.

East bank of Vistula, as defined by Conference of Ambassadors, was transferred this morning by Italian troops of occupation to Polish authorities without signature of formal protocol by German representative here, on simple notification signed by members of Commission. Transfer was completed without incident; in the case of 5 villages arrival of Polish soldiers was even welcomed by many of the inhabitants.

Commission leaves this evening.

Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> No. 635.

No. 637

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 11)*

*No. 1082 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, September 10, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Cambon, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires being also present, and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> (14) The Conference decided to reply to the German note enclosed

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.



in my despatch No. 2662,<sup>2</sup> in which they declined to recognise the new frontier line drawn by the Conference of Ambassadors as a result of the Marienwerder plebiscite. The reply will state that the Allies cannot accept the objections of the German Government, since by Article 97 they are bound to accept the decisions of the Allied Governments in this matter.

<sup>2</sup> This despatch of August 19 is not printed. It contained a copy of the note from the German Peace Delegation handed in at Paris on August 15, which is printed in *Deutscher Geschichtskalender Ausland Juli-Dezember 1920* (Leipzig, 1921), pp. 17-19.

## No. 638

*The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 1)*

*No. 1140 Telegraphic: by bag [Confidential/General/199/3]*

PARIS, September 29, 1920

The Conference of Ambassadors met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Cambon, and considered the following questions:—

...<sup>1</sup> 19. The Polish Delegation have complained that the German Government have informed them that the communes in the Allenstein district, which, as the result of the plebiscite, have been allotted to Poland, must be still considered as part of Germany, as the plebiscite Commission handed back the whole district to the German authorities on August 16th. This is strictly speaking correct, as it was impossible for Mr. Rennie at that period to hand over the communes allotted to the Polish authorities, since the Russian invasion of Poland had at that time severed communication between Allenstein and the Polish Government. To put matters right the Conference decided to address a formal note to the German Delegation stating that notwithstanding the action taken by the Commission on August 16th, the districts allotted to Poland by the Conference of Ambassadors must be considered as forming part of Poland from that date onward. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The omitted sections related to other matters.





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